Banco de Sabadell, S.A. (SAB.MC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

All right. Good afternoon, everyone. We've got another exciting session, I think I would say, we've been 16 months on and M&A is still on the table. We are live with the deal. So we're going to try to be respectful of that. But we're super pleased to have Cesar Gonzalez-Bueno, CEO of Banco de Sabadell and is joined today by Sergio Palavecino, Group CFO. Thank you both for joining us.

Pleasure. Thank you, Antonio. Thank you, everybody.

So I think let's dive straight into the sort of the main topic and start with tender offer. We are live with the offer period when you and your Board rejected the offer, I think you formalized a number of points as to why that was the case, 3 in particular, bear in mind I've asked the same question to -- on earlier. But please correct me or complement if you think it's wrong. The first point you mentioned was the offer significantly undervalues the potential of Sabadell. Two, stand-alone, you can create more value for your shareholders with, of course, an emphasis on capital distribution. And three, you said the BBVA shares have some risk that Sabadell shares don't have. Now I'm sure there's a lot of your shareholders in the audience, what would you tell them here?

Well, I think this question, unfortunately, is going to take a bit of time, if I see people snoring, I will try to improve the speed, but certainly, this is at the core, the response of -- it was not an excessively long board, but it was a long board. We covered a lot of subjects. We analyzed with our full responsibility the offer at hand, and we concluded unanimously that the offer was, in our opinion, the recommendation to our shareholders was to say no. I don't think that came as a surprise given the price of this thing. But we first said that it did significantly undervalues Banco de Sabadell. Banco de Sabadell has been the best performing stock for the last close to 5 years with multiplied by more than 12%, the value, of the banks in Europe, and it has been the best performing stock in the IBEX, but that, of course, doesn't say about the future. And about the future, our consideration was that the fundamental value of the bank was ranging and the investment banks have presented the fairness opinion and so forth. They were ranging it around -- north of EUR 4 per share. And on top of that, you will have to add a premium. Then the consideration was also shareholder remuneration. You have to understand that we are distributing EUR 3.8 billion in the course of less than 9 months. And that is very attractive because that represents almost 40% of the market cap of the bank in the total of the 3 years, which is EUR 6.3 billion, but it's very front loaded. So that has also a tremendous value because shares are a risky business, but when the upfront distribution is so heavy, certainly the risk diminishes. And furthermore, in order to reduce further the risk it's a Spanish equity story. And Spain right now is perceived as -- and it is safe and sound, growing healthy at 4%. We are growing a little bit faster than that. So very handsome distribution and in a safe environment. That's different from what is being proposed, and we will see in a second, the impacts of being in an environment that is more emerging markets. That's not good or bad, but it's different and it's riskier and it carries some consequences. We talked then at length about the synergies. BBVA, and I'm sorry, I have to refer to what they say and contradict it. And this is not -- this doesn't pretend to be contentious, but I think it is relevant to clarify different points of view. They said, well, the synergies will come at EUR 900 million and will come in the year 4. Okay? But there are going to be 3 periods. One is what it's called autonomy of management. There cannot be any synergies there. The definition of autonomy of management is that they have to be managed individually. And if there was any possibility of having synergies with anyone, they would be the same with BBVA or with Santander or with whoever. So any synergies that would need to be obtained in order to fulfill the mandate of the autonomy will have to be really checked if they can be higher with someone else. So there during that period, there are none. Is it 3 years or 5? That is still to be seen. But what there cannot be is further more any preparation during those 3 years. Whoever has done a merger with the bank knows that the preparation paralyzes a bank, a preparation for merger. You have to stop the systems, you have to freeze everything and you have to concentrate in the migration. That is completely forbidden by the decision of the government because what it has required is that, that autonomy of management means that the products will continue to be improved. The services will be continued to be specific to the needs of the clients of each of both entities. And furthermore, it is assumed that the merger would be allowed in the next nano second, of the 3 years, which might be 5 of the autonomy of management and then immediately, the merger will happen. And then after that instant merger, the 4,000 people would be laid off in the first day and all the other synergies, so in order to attain the full synergies in the full year 2019. That is unrealistic. Let's start one by one. First, there's no evidence whatsoever that the merger would be authorized. And whoever is a Spaniard understands this much better. Catalonia is the main place where the elections are won or lost at this point in time. And for the people in the right, for the people in the left, for the people who are Catalan nationalist, for the people who are patriots for Spain or everyone Banco de Sabadell represent something very important. There has been so much a position to this transaction because there has been a social opposition. It is perceived to be a very relevant player. So the fact, let's assume that there's a change of hands and that -- which I don't think will happen, and that BBVA takes over and has a majority stake at Banco de Sabadell. In the perception of the public that is not really as relevant as the brand disappearing, the merger occurring, people being laid off and losing the people with whom you relate as an SME. So I think the synergies are completely overestimated. But if they were true, their price should be completely different. So there's a certain contradiction here. Either there are synergies and they are in full and they will happen in the near term only with 1-year delay, as BBVA say, and then the price should be bumped significantly to provide the 30%, 40% premium that is customer in these type of transactions or there are no synergies or they are so uncertain that, that creates a trouble. Let me address now the EPS accretion, that BBVA is putting forward as 25%. They say that in this transaction, the shareholders of Banco de Sabadell will have an EPS accretion of 25%. The calculation is wrong, and it is significantly wrong because what it happens is that it ignores to begin with, the EUR 2.5 billion of dividends. It assumes that they don't exist. And the reasonable thing to do, if you want to compare apples with apples is to assume that those EUR 2.5 billion are reinvested and therefore, that they also have an impact on EPS accretion. They cannot just disappear. You can just -- you can't just ignore them. That will reduce by 14 percentage points that 25% EPS. And then if you continue doing adjustments and you use for both banks, the consensus from the analysts, which is the correct thing, then you go down another 4%. And if then you adjust minimally some synergies and so forth, you go to negative accretion. So that 25% is not positive. It turns into a negative EPS accretion for shareholders. But then we come to the next thing that the Board analyzed and that is what is the ability to generate capital from one and the other. Because, of course, it's very noticeable that one has, in the case of BBVA, a 21% return on tangible equity. That's very good, very impressive. But not all returns on equity are the same because if you take that 21% and just using the year '24, but we've done the calculation looking backwards, then you have to subtract 2 very relevant elements. They are very inflationary economies. 70% of the business of BBVA, which is not a European bank, it's a bank based in Europe, but 70% of its profit, 67% last year comes from emerging markets. And what happens then and what happened during year '24? It's very simple. The first thing that you have is to adjust and that is not adjusted in the P&L, it's adjusted in the capital afterwards. You have to adjust for inflation or devaluation of the currency more than inflation, which is they are somewhat related. And that means if you do it over year '24, that you have to reduce that 21% by more than 5%. But that's not the end of it. In order to have those returns, you have to grow your assets at a tremendous pace in these very inflationary countries. And that means that you have to increase your risk-weighted assets in a phenomenal way, bumping your requirements of capital and reducing your ability to distribute capital. So if you adjust that 21% to these 2 factors for year '24, you go for 21% to 9% distributable increase of capital. In the case of Banco de Sabadell, you started at 15%, and the impact of those 2 factors are very small because we just operate in Spain and even more going forward. But even in '24, and you go from 15% to 14%. So in the end, that 21%, which compares with 15% in terms of return on tangible equity, in terms of distributable capability becomes a 9% for the case of BBVA and a 14% for the case of Banco de Sabadell. So that means that we not only have the possibility to commit to extraordinary dividends in the short term on the back, not only of what we generate, but also on the proceeds of a good transaction, which was TSB, but on top of that, we have the longer-term ability to generate more capital to distribute. And that is because using proxies -- and return on tangible equity is just a proxy, it's not the real thing. The real thing is capital generation and that's to what we are devoting. And -- I can't see very well. Is everybody sleeping? Because there's a lot of light -- do you think they are sleeping?

No, no, I think they're still there.

I'm almost finished. And there will be -- and we will go faster with the following questions, I promise. So furthermore, the Board came to the conclusion that the current offer is worse than the original one that we rejected. Why? Because originally, they were offering 16.2% of the resulting entity. And because we have given more dividends than them, and that has to be adjusted because it's already in the pocket of our shareholders. And because we have done more share buybacks and the price is per share. Now they are offering a meager 13.6%. So we have been punished for being better for our shareholders because that's the way you adjust the offer, and that's what the prospectus said. But it's not only that. That is that for all the residents in Spain, it has lost neutrality because although they distribute -- although they pay less, there's a component in cash. And the moment that component in cash is above 10% of the nominal value of the share, it loses the tax neutrality and our shareholders will have to pay in full the increase in value during this period, which has not been small. As I said at the beginning, I'd like to say this a lot. We have increased the value of the bank by almost 13x in less than 5 years. And finally, there's this complexity around below the 50%. that the Board also considered in detail. And this creates quite some complexity, and this was the last minute thing. And I don't know if everybody understood the consequences that this could have. So what happens is that they opened in the last minute and the last day, the possibility of giving up and waiving the limitation of withdrawing from the offer, they were below 50%. So below 30%, they've given up, probably -- the possibility, but between 30% and 50% they could accept and go on. But it's different than the Italian regulation in Spain to keep something between the 30% and 50% you have to launch another transaction, another offer, another tender fully in cash for the 100% of the remaining amount. It was yesterday that the Chairman of the CNMV, which is the market's watchdog worktop clarified that this would be at the price that is equal or higher than the one of the original offer. So you find yourself in a very complex situation. Should I go to the first offer when the probabilities of going above 50%, and they prove it themselves by opening this possibility is very low. We have a large share of retail shareholders with this price, the probability of going above 50% is very small. If there was a price bound or if there was who knows, maybe they could go in the terrain of 30% to 50%, but then this creates enormous problems because whoever goes to the first transaction loses the opportunity of having the tender in cash. And as per the saying of the one who has the ultimate goal, the ultimate word, which is the CNMV at the price that will be equal or higher. And furthermore, BBVA will have to make this decision days before the price is known. So the pressure on going forward in an amount that is unknown at the price that is unknown and full in cash is very relevant. And the people who go to the second transaction will not be diluted because of course, this would require a share increase and if that share increase occurs, the people who go to the first transaction and get BBVA shares will be diluted by the people who get the cash at a higher price won't, or it could mean that all these prospects of the EUR 36 billion in the course of more years because otherwise, they wouldn't have matched our prospects, and they had to extend by a year until '28 will have to be diminished because they will have to pay it from their own capital. With all these considerations, the Board said no.

Perfect. I think it was clear. It was crystal clear, and I think you made your point.

Clear and short, no?

To the point. Now, you've talked about BBVA's return on tangible, you've touched briefly on your own tangible returns. Why don't we deep into a little bit more. And you've recently upgraded your guidance for a return on tangible equity above 14.5% this year and you're looking to reach 16% in 2027 ex-TSB. So excluding your U.K. unit. Maybe let's start by going through sort of some of the key moving parts to better understand what is driving this expected performance?

Shall I?

Yes, sure.

Yes, as you said, Antonio, we have -- we're guiding to a 16% return on tangible equity in 2027. We're convinced of that improvement in profitability. And equally important, we are guiding to tangible book value of EUR 10.5 billion, because this is just for the ex-TSB perimeter. So it will be after the sale of TSB. And we think that, that's important in order to help people. And then if you do the maths, the return on the tangible, then if you multiply it, you get to a net income, which in our model is close to EUR 1.7 billion, actually, 16%, 10.5% is EUR 1.68 billion. And by that, we mean that we think that net income is going to be close to EUR 1.7 billion. And the moving parts that will allow us to get there, in the Capital Markets Day, we shared a breakdown of the different moving parts. If you remember, from 2024, we expect revenues to add 1.6 points. We expect cost to deduct 1.4 points of ROTE, and then we expect cost of risk to add 1.3 points. It's been already 6 months of the 3 years. So interestingly, it's a plan that 6 months are already gone. And what we can see is that the improvement in cost of risk is done already. So that component is not backloaded. It's completely front-loaded. The improvement in cost of risk is already taken place -- has already taken place. In the cost side that we guided for a 3% CAGR, when we look at this year, we're running below 2%, so we have left ourselves plenty of room to maneuver in the years to come. We're very comfortable with that guidance, too. In the revenue side, when compared to 2024, we see NII stable 2024, 2027, and we see fees going up at a mid-single-digit CAGR. Again, fees are already started -- have already started going up. So this is happening. And of course, NII has gone down because of rates, but we showed stability on a quarterly quarter basis. So of course, the NII dynamics are a bit more complex, but all those components are well aligned with our guidance and things are going well. And we can only confirm that expectation.

They do it every time. They undershoot and then we overperform. And Leo did this to me. Sergio is doing this to me. This will never end. We are this way.

Earlier, we've talked about capital distribution, how that's an important part of your strategy and of course, something that your shareholders value. And you've committed to pay EUR 2.5 billion in special dividend from the sale of TSB, your 13.6% CET1 ratio and you set your payout at 60%. So you've increased your capacity to remunerate shareholders to about EUR 6.3 billion, including ordinary over the next 3 years. Now tell us maybe a bit more how you get to that number? And how shall we think about your shareholder remuneration and mix going forward?

Well, I think, first, I think it's important to consider that we are establishing to distribute anything that is above 13%. That is more conservative than other players, for example, BBVA and despite the fact that we operate in a market that is much safer than the one in which they are. So if at a point in time, anyone decided, including our Board, that this is a little bit conservative, there will be even more room for that, although that's not something to be expected in the short term. I think it is important to note that this 13% was established before we had any hint that this transaction would happen. It was done at the beginning of '24 before April and before the conversations and then the hostile offer from BBVA. Within that, I think we have established in our policy that the cash dividend would be between 40% and 60%. But lately, we have moved more to the higher band, which is the 60%. And this allows us to do significant growth around mid-single digit. We are estimating 5% growth of our asset book. That's exactly where we landed, a little bit north of 5% during the year-on-year, ending in the first half of 2025. And beyond that, in principle, we will do share buybacks, which means that our EPS will continue to improve on the back of good results, but at the same time, a lower base of our shares.

Yes, absolutely. For this year, we have guided to EUR 1.3 billion distributions -- and I think the year is going well in capital, probably a bit ahead of expectations because we are able to achieve the targets by growing a bit in segments with lower-risk asset density. And also, we are taking advantage of the good shape of the capital markets. We just executed a new securitization this week. It was an auto securitization with significant risk transfer. And we budget for EUR 500 million. But finally, we've been able to do EUR 750 million, which is almost another 10 bps of CET1. So on the capital generation, we finished the quarter with 13.6% and we continue generating capital, that we can use in cash dividend and share buybacks. Those are in the plan. And I think as long as the market is not fully recognizing the value of our share, we intend to keep on using share buybacks.

Very clear. Now one team across Spanish banks, and we had CaixaBank just before you has been sort of the fast and important uptick that we've seen in loan growth, because that's really picked up, and we seem to be out of the woods after a long deleveraging cycle. Now can you talk a little bit more about what you're seeing both from your clients as well as from your competitors? And to what extent can market share gains, which you've been achieving can be generated without sort of compromising on price discipline. And maybe while we're there, we can also talk a little bit more about sort of your expectations for growth in mortgages and SMEs where you have, of course, a leading franchise.

Very good. I think Spain was very leveraged, and it has gone through a tremendous deleveraging. We have repeated these numbers at -- and it's now at private level, both in individuals and in corporates, it's below Europe in terms of leverage. The government is not doing exactly the same thing, but that's less of our business, okay? And therefore, what we are seeing is at the beginning after COVID, everybody expected things to slow down. But what we saw was a very heavy increase of sales. and that meant a lot of working capital growth. That grew very rapidly, but the investments were not there because still the interest rates were high. Then when the interest rates started to lower, the volumes of sales more or less remain. So we didn't see the increase of working capital to be so exciting, but the investments that have been delayed with an environment of more stable and not as high interest rates started to deliver. We are seeing that growth of around 4% for Spain. It's 2% GDP plus 2% inflation, around 4%. And we have projected to grow at around 5%, so slightly above mid-single digit, slightly above the market. You can't grow much faster than the market. Even if you do -- and I think we have leapfrogged in terms of operations, in terms of price segmentation, in terms of risk model and in terms of commercial incentives and production, I think we have leapfrogged. We were coming from behind before year '20. And since then, we have accelerated and the transformation has been phenomenal. And it's not finished. You don't do -- you don't turn around the bank, which is north of EUR 200 billion from one day to another. So we're almost there. And -- but with this improvement of all our processes and activities and very importantly, of the incentives of our people. At the beginning, in year '20, the incentives of our people were just in income, top line. We have included railroads first and then P&Ls per region, per branch, per this per that. And now we are moving to the next generation, which I think doesn't exist. And fortunately, we have done it without consultants. So very hard to copy, which is value generation and it is for it's ranking and comparing the portfolios of the different types of commercial agents, especially in our SME area. And that should lead us to go from a market share of approximately 8% to an 8.3% by the end of the period. And why are we not more ambitious? Because experience shows that you can do very well the operational, the risk, the pricing, the everything and then gain market share progressively and slowly. In a mature market, if you try to do the fast, that's a call for disaster. And the proof that we are doing it is that we are improving, and we show that in our second quarter results. We are improving all the railroads. We are improving all the PDs, even if comparing '24 and '25 to '23, we are improving all the metrics while growing marginally more than the market. And that is only on the back of this transformation that, as I said before, is not finished. Anything to add? I am fanatic about this subject.

Absolutely. Maybe the audience will have any -- some questions then.

No, definitely. Let's try to leave some time for that. I want to ask you about NII because, of course, we talked about growth. When you guided to NII, you've talked about EUR 4.9 billion for this year, which is higher than the levels we've seen in 2023, only modestly below what was a record year in '24. In your plan target, you have EUR 3.9 billion by 2027, and that's excluding TSB. So I'm conscious we're not comparing apples with apples because that's implying about EUR 300 million or so of growth on a like-for-like perimeter. Can you talk about the bridge and what's driving that delta and what makes you confident you can do it?

Sure, absolutely. Of course, in NII, we have had remarkable tailwind of interest rate reduction. Interest rates have come down from 4% last year to 2% this year. And of course, that is coming with some spread compression -- customer spread compression. When we look at the last quarter, actually, we were able to completely offset that affecting NII of margin compression, thanks to the expansion of volumes and the reduction in wholesale funding. So going forward, I think that trend is going to be important because we see a very active market in Spain, connected with the activity that we see in the economy and the growth in the GDP, I think Cesar already touched on the different segments and volumes. As of the end of the last quarter, the loans in Spain were growing 6.1%. Customer funds were growing 7%. We think that growth connected with the growth in the economy is going to continue. And the good news is that by the end of the year, rate will be already stable. So that growth in activity, that growth in volumes will translate into higher NII maybe not in the next quarters that we think is going to be stable, but certainly, from 2026 onwards. And with that, we will be able to grow those EUR 300 million, which is 8%, so 4% each year. So on the low part of the mid-single-digit area, connected with the growth in volumes.

If you want to take a little bit of a step back and a little bit more of our strategic vision, I think we have grown from being a very high NII bank, but with a high risk to improving much more of the risk cost than what we lose in NII in relative terms. So we are still catching up with our NII because we are growing faster but we are treating a risk in a way that frees up even more capital. So it's capital generation. And this is a tremendous transformation of the bank, and that is not fully completed. And it gets -- we are at the final of that transformation. And that transformation requires some loss of volume because you lose the cues of the skewed curve, in which you have a lot of risk in the queue, and we've cut that off. You price much better, you lose some volume, but overall, it is very much value creation. And from now on, all the rest being equal, we should be able to grow volumes and income at the same pace.

No, that's very clear. And I think it's important because it links me to the next question, which seems to be, to your point, that you're not really compromising on credit quality or pursuing growth for the purpose of market share gains. And you've guided in that regard to 40 basis points cost of risk for this year, again, excluding TSB and be remaining there through the plan period at these levels for 2027. Now TSB's credit book obviously has come with low LGDs because it was pure mortgages. So how sustainable is this cost of risk guidance? Can you give a little bit more context and then we'll open up for questions.

Very good. I'll give if you don't mind, Sergio, the high view and you can go in the numbers if you want. The thing is quite simple. If you look at our second quarter presentation, the probabilities of default in all products, if you compare '24 and the first half of '25, is clearly lower than '23, not to mention '22, '21 and going backwards, which means that the quality of the portfolio is improving, and we see that in the portfolio, and we see that in the cost of risk. And that is a trend that is going to continue because it's not over. In some products, it will take longer and because they have higher duration. And in some products, it will be shorter because they have shorter duration, not interest rate deterioration, it's duration in terms of the term of the loan. And that is unavoidable. I think we have been conservative by keeping it stable, of course, provided that there's not tremendous and dramatic change in the environment. But because we have also included something that is quite relevant, which is growth fundamentally and to focus our growth on SMEs and to focus our growth in consumer lending. Consumer lending, very relevant. We're growing at 20%, and we have been growing for the last few years after we fixed in '21, the problem. We had to stop production because it was out of work. Now it's a state-of-the-art and it's growing and gaining market share also because we are very below our market share compared to our peers. So we are gaining the rein. But the core is SMEs. And SMEs is a beautiful market. It's a beautiful market first of all, because the barriers to entry are very, very high. To do SMEs, you need a lot of things. You need some complexity in terms of product range. You need proximity. You need to know your customers. You need digital. You need transactionality. You need export and import. You need a myriad of things, which we have and 1 in 2 of the SMEs in Spain are our clients. And we have changed our mentality. Before we used in the SME world, a little bit of mentality, the same as if they were corporates. You can't have the 60%, 70% share of wallet. We have changed that. The diversification in SMEs comes because you have many and one single SME even if it fails, it doesn't put you down. And furthermore, now we have the PDs calculated upfront for all our SMEs. And we can be proactive in our commercial approach because they are basically preapproved. We almost treat them as if they were consumer loans. So it's a touch of a button. So this transformation is what gives us the confidence that, that 40 basis points is conservative despite the fact that we are changing the mix to, in principle, slightly riskier products on which we are managing the risk very effectively as we see the transformation of our back book.

Right. Yes. And I would simply add that those numbers are not backed by sort of aggressive macroeconomic assumptions, rather the contrary, we are assuming quite a conservative macroeconomic backdrop for 2027, where we have assumed that the Spanish GDP will -- growth will get back to some 1.5% and actually, we see kind of potential upside to those numbers.

Very clear. And I could go on for another 40 minutes of this because I'm actually finding very entertaining but let's try to give a chance to the audience also to ask a question. We have really time for one. If anybody has a question for Cesar or Sergio, please, one on the side there.

One of the most robust arguments that BBVA has made about the logic of the consolidation of your 2 banks together is removing the duplication of IT costs because banking is a fixed cost business. So on the assumption that you're right in the deal falls away, looking forward over the next, let's say, 2 to 3 years, should I anticipate that you would look to embark on some sort of consolidation ambition of your own?

I think there are 2 questions in that one. To the second, no. So no consolidation, [indiscernible] no nothing. And it's not because they would make sense. They would make lots of sense, but there is no appetite. So let's be pragmatic here. Let's be rational. Synergies between all the banks that are below the 3 large ones would make sense. And there would be positive synergies from a cost perspective and positive synergies from an income perspective because there's very little duplication in terms of geographies and very little duplication in terms of segments. So the second question it's not there. Not that it will make sense, but it's not going to happen. And to the first question, I think that one of the things that we were questioned very hard on year '21 is, geez, you're not a digital bank and you're not digitalized. You're going to have to make tremendous investments. We have had a trajectory of cost management that has been -- sorry to be a little bit proud, stellar. And we have done that while we digitalize completely the bank. And this is because you have to understand how IT works. Once you have a stable back end, which we do, the developments are mainly the front end and the front end, it's about human intelligence and cooperation within the bank. It's about doing the things right. We've run around 1,000 projects, we have failed and stopped one. Usually, the rate of failure is 40-50. And this is management, and this is having people working together from the beginning, starting from market research, understanding customer needs and then getting everybody on board, including audit, including second line of defense, of course, everything element -- all the elements around the thing and including IT and making them work together with the others. And then it's cheap. And the rest is a flat cost. I mean, the data centers are about cost per byte. There's no advantage in the size. And I can take you and visit one. And next to that one, you have Telefonica. And next to that, you have BBVA and you pay per byte, okay? So it doesn't make any difference. The lines of communication, the same. So you could save on the IT people. That is true. But every time it's a lesser amount because the efficiency in which we program. And the proof that this is true, is that the most effective and the most efficient are usually the smaller banks. Look at Bankinter. Look at other players like that. Size and furthermore, if you have it in Mexico, and in Spain, the only thing that it adds its complexity because you have to overcome. There are no economies of scale there. You have these economies of complexity. So I think the approach there is a little bit theoretical to tell you the truth. And we'll do fine.

Well, I wouldn't have expect any less from Cesar and Sergio for this session. So thank you very much. I hope you find it as insightful and entertaining as I did. So thanks for that.

Thank you.

Thank you.