Blue Owl Capital Inc. (OWL) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
July 10, 2024
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Andrew Watt
analystOkay. I think we're just about set. Hello, and welcome to the S&P Global Ratings Webinar, a North American Leveraged Finance Series. Thank you for joining us today. My name is Andrew Watt. I'm the regional practice leader for the alternative assets, financial services, infrastructure practice here at S&P Global Ratings. And I'm very, very, very pleased to have Marc Lipschultz, Co-Chief Executive Officer of Blue Owl Capital, as our guest for today's series. Just a couple of pointers. Although we're in a virtual environment, we do want to hear from you. We encourage you to ask questions at any time during our webinar through the chat function, and we encourage you to type them into the Q&A box. We're looking forward to a fascinating discussion with Marc. And as a reminder, today's webinar will not be recorded. Before I introduce Marc, it's here in the Northeast, we're having a pretty hot weather period. We actually started the series calling the summer pool side series. So I think we should have stuck with that 3 years ago. And in the past, we've had wonderful guests, including Ken Kencel, the CEO of Churchill, Professor Ken Rogoff, Aswath Damodaran, and we expect to have future guest speakers of that caliber here, and we're absolutely pleased to introduce Marc. Let me give you a little background on Marc before we get started. Marc Lipschultz is the Co-Chief Executive Officer of Blue Owl Capital, Inc. He's a member of the firm's Board of Directors. Marc also served as Co-Chief Investment Officer for each of the Blue Owl Capital Credit Advisers. Previously, Marc cofounded Owl Rock Capital Partners and the predecessor firm Blue Owl's Credit Platform. Prior to cofounding Owl Rock, Marc spent more than 2 decades at KKR, serving on the firm's Management Committee and as a Global Head of Energy and Infrastructure. Marc has a wide range of experience in alternative assets, including leadership and -- leadership roles in private credit, private equity and infrastructure. Prior to joining KKR, he was with Goldman Sachs, where he focused on M&A and principal investment activities. Marc serves on the board of the Hess Corporation and is actively involved in a variety of nonprofit organizations, including the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the Michael J. Fox Foundation, Mount Sinai Health System, Riverdale Country School and Stanford University's Board of Trustees and the 92nd Street Y. Marc received his MBA with high distinction. He was a Baker Scholar at the Harvard Business School and graduated with honors and distinction with a Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford. Welcome, Marc. Happy to have you.
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveThank you. Good to be here. I only wish we were poolside. We'll do that next time. If I earn a return trip, we'll do it poolside next time.
Andrew Watt
analystWe'll go back and do a kind of rebranding for the type of weather we're experiencing here in the Northeast. And maybe just to start, Marc, can you tell us a little bit how your summer is going? And any highlights to share with us?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveYes. Well, since we'll have -- summer is going well. So first of all, thank you for having me here today, and it is a privilege to be with S&P on this platform to have this conversation. So thank you for that. And in and of itself, therefore a current highlight of the summer. Summer is good. Business is very good, and we'll come back, of course, to that and [indiscernible] kind of the business answer aside. But on the personal front, off to a good start. I have all my kids back here in town, and they're all working this summer, and it's nice to have the family together.
Andrew Watt
analystGreat. And you mentioned something about a concert.
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveOh, yes. Well, so the nonbusiness highlighted [indiscernible] aside, of course, from having the family together. I did go with a group of friends out to see Dead & Co at the Sphere, and that was spectacular. I'm a longtime Dead ad. I'm sure it looks that way and love the grateful Dead -- and now Dead and Co, and the experience at the Sphere is incredible. So for anyone that has the opportunity to go for any show, personally biased toward Dead, but it's really quite incredible. So that's been a lot of fun. That was a highlight so far. And now this is the highlight.
Andrew Watt
analystThank you. Thank you for being so clear on that. And I'd love to see a picture of you a different type of car, but at some point -- we'll get to that at some point...
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveAnd that will be after the poolside chat.
Andrew Watt
analystAll right. But maybe just to start our discussion for our audience. Can you tell us a little bit about Blue Owl and its history in the private credit markets?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveSure. So Blue Owl, as a platform in total today, pro forma, we manage about $200 billion in assets. Roughly 50% of that is in private credit. It is the [ progenitor ] business here because Owl Rock, which is the predecessor, ultimately renamed Blue Owl, is our credit business, which coming up on a decade old since Doug Ostrover, and I and our third Co-Founder, Craig Packer, started that business. And so our business overall, as I said, therefore, has 3 components. It has $100 billion roughly in private credit. And then the other $100 billion is split. A little more than half of that is in our so-called GP Strategic Capital or the stakes business, more commonly known. And then we have a real estate business, a fairly particular real estate business, where we do triple net lease, that is to say we do really financings against real estate or investment grade rated or strong rated companies. So actually, we and S&P interact very actively there as well, another area where we really focus on the kind of ratings and credit quality of those counter parties. So that's the total picture. And the legacy, if I go back over that rough decade, has followed the sort of evolution of what I would argue are the private markets, and we can we can go back decades before that, too, if and when you wish, I started at KKR 1995, and private credit was not an -- didn't exist as a thing, and certainly direct lending didn't exist and definitely not in this format. The last 10 years, which we've been fortunate to be a part of and I don't say we're the ones that did it, but I think we've been a part of driving this evolution of direct lending from a lender of last resort model, if you go back more than a decade to lender first choice, and we've seen that evolution over the course of these many years now. And if you look over the last several years, private credit has played a fairly significant role in really the majority of large cap private equity transactions.
Andrew Watt
analystYes, I want to get to that specific point about the relationship on the private equity and private credit side and how that's evolved and how that will evolve over time. Let me just -- I heard you speak at a conference -- a few conferences this year, the BofA conference earlier this year in January, it's when that struck me where you talked about what I consider the 3 Ps, predictability, privacy and partnership as key differentiators in the private credit market for -- particularly for certain providers. Can you elaborate a bit more on that and tell us what you think some of the key drivers of success for private credit managers will be in the future?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveAbsolutely. Well, so first of all, thank you for listening to those remarks at the BofA conference or elsewhere. So what I've tried to do for myself and I, in general, try to do is sort of keep things simple, try to find where the core is because there's a lot of complexity, obviously, in the back end of everything we do, and I'm sure the same you would suggest at the end of the day, there's a -- the singular output, and that's what the users care about, right, whether that's that specific rating that you provide or in our case, like, look, at the end of the day, what we produce are principal protected, lower volatility, alternative solutions that are yield-oriented and inflation protected. And at the end of the day, that risk return is the experience the investor has and that's the experience that matters. But how do we achieve that? Why does it work? And then there's -- well, I'm sure we'll get into it. There's a lot of complicated mechanic, so to speak, at work, and lots of people that go into selecting the loans that we make. But what about this, where is the alpha? Where is the return? And why is it durable? And actually, I think you put your finger on it, it comes down to the 3 Ps, the predictability, privacy and partnership are the value that Blue Owl or our peers offer to a user of private capital, a user of direct lending solutions. And that's really been at the foundation of this evolution of direct lending from lender of last resort to lender of first choice. There has to be a value proposition. And the durable value proposition is the explanation for why the risk return works and I think is very compelling, and I always find that if you can't -- if something seems too good to be true, then either you have to be able to explain it or it's just too good to be true and maybe it's not. So the explanation lies in the 3 Ps. And what I mean by that is we do charge a premium in direct lending. And this has been a proposition from day 1. We charge a higher rate. Our documents, and I would argue more importantly, our documents are much more restrictive. So what a borrower is allowed to do is much more limiting in a manner of protecting, of course, the lender. And we do that all in a way where the diligence component is much more invasive. We'll spend weeks or months crawling through a company to make a decision to commit capital. So all of those things -- those are burdens. So why does someone pay those burdens? Why is someone willing to pay us more and restrict themselves more and subject themselves to that type of deeper dive because of the predictability, privacy and partnership we offer in the capital solutions we provide.
Andrew Watt
analystMarc, in that forum and other forums, you talked about situations, particularly over the last, I would say, 18 months or so where that partnership aspect really played out to benefit certain perhaps companies more so than it would have been in the public markets. Can you talk a little bit about that as well?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveAbsolutely. The most -- and you're hitting on, again, exactly right. The one that we ultimately think is what most both differentiates private credit. And frankly, it's also where Blue Owl itself can most differentiate itself even relative to the handful of other large-cap providers that we end up competing with is in this role of partnership. And that is this ability to have a call much like you and I are having right now when times change for better or worse. We obviously prefer the calls for better, but we obsess about what the calls are as what a user of the capital for worse. When times change in unexpected ways, how do we address those problems in ways that protect the credit, that's what's critical to us. But to the borrower, allow them to carry forward, having invested large amounts of capital, how do they remain in a position to continue to achieve their long-term goals. And that partnership, that dialogue, literally like this one-on-one, is kind of worth its weight in gold when that conversation is either required or desired. So I'll start with a more affirmative case, something let's move toward the negative case because, again, we all worry about downside. That's where this focus comes to. But the affirmative case that people have experienced very frequently over the last couple of years, think about 2022, 2023, there was no liquid debt market for leveraged lending debt market to speak of, right? It was nonfunctional. And the result of that is during a time when people had strategic ambitions to acquire businesses, those who have private solutions, those who were partners of Blue Owl or other direct lending peers have ready access to capital. They had a partnership with us and could call up in the middle of what amounted to a more of a debt market and say, listen, we have an opportunity. We're #2 in our market. We have an opportunity to buy #3 in our market. This is a great opportunity for our company, therefore, for our credit and our equity. Well, can we do this? Even if it's not wired into the document, we obviously don't have the capital. We need you to -- we'll provide equity, but we need some corresponding debt. And all of a sudden, they did that in a world where very few other people had access to capital. So it was an enormous competitive advantage to have access, and we have this regularly with companies of ours, say, we'd like to actually expand our credit facilities along with more equity, do something strategic, and we did that very regular in '22, '23. So I view that as kind of, let's say, that is the affirmative case of when times change, and you want to pick up the phone and make that call, how that can create value for the lenders and the equity holders. And so that's the affirmative case. The negative case, of course, is the one that we obsess about and largely all of us would think about is, well, what about when things change for the worse? How do you address that problem? And here, one of the catalytic elements, catalytic moments for private credit turned out to be the pandemic because the pandemic is obviously a perfect study in the absolute unexpected occurring, the overused black swan. We can all agree that nobody had built a capital structure or a business plan around, okay, well, here's my global pandemic case, right? Here's my case where my revenues are 0. But we had a lot of companies, of course, in the world that went through that. And within our portfolio, we have some companies that went through that. And I think roughly about 10 companies ultimately in our portfolio that literally were in this doing fine to -- we have 0 business, right? They had consumer interactions. They have factories that were literally shut down by the government. And so in that moment, the ability to call up and say, hey, we need to talk about what's happening here and what the path forward is, again, became worth more -- probably more than is waiting goals. One thing to capture an opportunity, it's another to deal with an existential moment. And again, we could have a conversation that said, none of us know the path of this pandemic. But we do all know that company -- I'll give you an example, we had a company that does the -- the largest provider of dental implants. They do all the lab work that's outsourced for dentists. And you can imagine, of course, the number of people that were having visits to the dentist in April, May of 2020, who all got 0. So number of people getting implants was about 0. But the number of people that were still going to need those implants and still have dental issues someday was exactly the same. And so we all could agree there'd be a day, and that would be a perfectly good business again. And the question becomes, okay, how do you get from here to there? And so those are examples of businesses. We have software business for the supported fitness centers, no business in fitness centers, but of course, people are going to return to working out outside the home someday. So all of those are examples of where we can engage and work to an answer that was protective for the credit and in 9 out of 10 cases, allowed the equity to carry forward in a way that worked out well for them.
Andrew Watt
analystAgain, thanks for that, Marc. One of the things that we observed coming out of the pandemic, and I think particularly over the last couple of years, has been this real drive to around formation of more private credit firms or more private credit vehicles or investment arms of existing companies. And I recall someone mentioning that in a conversation that when you have so many new entrants, so to speak, or you've always seen later on transactions that people said, well, this is my first deal that I've done. And the first deal in many cases for many firms is not the best deal that they've done. They go back and kind of regret that. Are you at all concerned about the -- just a high degree of interest and investment in private credit from firms that are maybe or entities that don't have the history of a Blue Owl and Owl Rock before entering the marketplace.
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveYes. I am concerned about certain behavior by certain firms on certain credits. However, not a small, however, I'm not concerned about the health of the private debt market writ large. And look, I'm using the word a little bit lucid because my job is to be concerned, right. I spent all day thinking about because we're in the downside protection business, well, what could go wrong in any given company, what could go wrong in a portfolio. But trying to address your question when it's useful to the people who are kind enough to join this morning, I'm genuinely not concerned about the health of the sector and the health certainly of our portfolio. And by the way, again, I don't know if you overly parochial, it's not unique to Blue Owl. I should say the market is pyramid-shaped. So I want to do one thing to calibrate my comments today. I tried it over time. What I find over the decades, is I realized how little I know. It is the more you realize the complexity of the world, the more one hopefully appreciates how little you know. But there are certain parts I have knowledge of, and I'd like to make sure I'm clear about what I'm speaking to. Think about the market, like any market, it's pyramid-shaped in direct lending. And at the base of the pyramid is this ever-increasing number of participants who can do small cap to mid-cap loans. $25 million, $50 million, which is not small dollars in the real world, but they are small in the world of what we would consider this pyramid of lending. And then you go up that and of course, each tier, it gets fewer people that can write the bigger checks. And at the top of the pyramid, where we are strategically positioned and we're -- we consider ourselves fortunate to be there, but it was always our strategic ambition for reasons we can get into if you want to be in the very largest end of the market. Now the largest end of the market 10 years ago was doing $100 million, $150 million loan. Today, we do $1 billion or $1.5 billion loan. So everything has gotten bigger. The whole pyramid has grown out of the sand, so to speak. But the top actually looks very much the same. There's a handful of people that populate this top of the pyramid, and we are the go-to providers for the largest credit solutions for the largest backers and their largest companies. And there's a reason for that, and we like it. But my comments are going to be more particular to the behavior of that small group. By definition, when I have 30 or 40 people running around, and I don't even have visibility into what they're all doing in the smaller end of the market, I'm sure we'll have by a number more challenges, and I'm sure even a manager here or there that tips themselves a bit over. But in the large end of the market and certainly by some extension out of that, generally speaking, the credit quality has been and remains extremely high. Will there be individual credits that don't work? Of course. Nobody can generate the kinds of returns we generate with no risk. That would be a ridiculous statement for any of us to make. It's a risk-bearing asset. But we're built to sustain having, hopefully, a very small number of problems. And when we have a small number of problems, get a good recovery. And when we do that, the math works. And today, when I sit here, I feel very confident that's where we are, and I feel quite confident, actually, that's where the industry, again, at the large end, is today as well.
Andrew Watt
analystMaybe switching over a bit to the sponsor side. Any observations there on how that relationship is changing and continues to change as sponsors grapple with exits and secondaries as different ways to essentially achieve the returns?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveSo the PE market, which is, by the way, is my origin side. In '95, when I started, I did LBOs. They were called LBOs then, as you know. Many on this call will not particularly have used that term because we changed it in the late '90s to private equity to sound better. And so now it's private equity. And back then, there were 2 large LBO firms in the world, KKR [indiscernible], and I was fortunate to be a KKR. And at that time, we had 20 total professionals, front, mid and back office include, contemplate that world for a minute. And our large-cap mega fund was $3 billion. I mean today, that's like right in the big middle of middle market. So the world has changed. But I say that, again, only to inform our friends on the call here can judge the value of my comments. From a PE point of view, I've been around that market for 30 years. And so if I anchor back to '95 to today, so that 30-year arc, there have been a tremendous number of changes. But looking now there through that lens and sitting here today, there's 2 changes of very substantial. One, of course, has been the tremendous growth and institutionalization and proliferation of private equity from 2 firms of scale to thousands of private equity firm, literally thousands today, right? From a $3 billion mega fund and [indiscernible] had something similar. So think about like single-digit billions plus TPG was a start-up. Blackstone had a $1 billion fund. You can add it all up, it would be measured in a couple of hands of billions to, of course, $4 trillion or $5 trillion of assets in the hands of private equity firms. So that's been one dynamic. The other dynamic more recently, though, with that evolution, has been a rigidity in the buying and selling, right? We've certainly seen a meaningful slowdown in probably what was this hyper speed by sell motion of 2021 being the peak of it. I think when we look back, we'll all remember 2021 is fairly euphoric moment, particularly wasn't unique to private equity. But within private equity for the purpose of this conversation, the result of all that is people bought a lot, LP has made a lot of commitments. And now just to cut to the chase, people are overcommitted, and it's not so easy to sell things. So the whole market is a little bit sluggish. And I think that is informing like through that lens, when you look at private equity, I think it helps us see a bit more about some of the pressures and opportunities, right? The pressures are certainly on, hey, how do I drive exits? How do I drive liquidity? It is creating new structures like NAV loans, right? That's a bit of a new -- it's a brand-new phenomenon in the U.S. It's a new-ish phenomenon worldwide. Europe started doing it a little earlier. But NAV loans are a new phenomenon. GP-led continuation I think, is going to be a very big phenomenon for people trying to bridge this world of I have a great asset. It's not really a great time to be a seller, but I need to be a seller because I have LPs and need capital, and I've got to print IRRs if I want to raise my next fund. So I think you're going to see a very meaningful development of this GP-led secondary market, right, where a firm keeps a prized asset, a trophy asset. You're going to see this question rise, and I'll let you guide me if I want to talk about it, the so-called maturity wall is going to be a very different animal in the world of private credit with private equity firms now with their scale being stuck with assets sounds too negative. Like, it's not like they're stuck with. They're not bad assets. It's just that it's not a very good market to try to sell them. And so it's going to bring kind of a new definition to the question of what do maturities look like and mean if the private equity firm either is in no hurry or just isn't in a place to optimally sell an asset and you have lenders that have lent capital to it. So I think there's a bunch of things that are going to change on the PE landscape. It's going to be -- the returns are going to be lower, right? Like that's just a reality, as math. I mean if you look at where people's expectations got to in PE, they got very high and they were partly generated by very rapid turnover. And if you take the same math and just stretch it out by 2 years, you know what that does to IRRs. The IRRs are going to change radically. And frankly, the cost of debt has gone up. I mean we're generating unlevered double-digit returns. And that itself, number one, they have to pay those bills before they realize their equity value, but also for investors, like what realistically you're expecting to make in an equity. And if people like ourselves could generate 10%, 11%, 12% returns, you got to have something meaningful above that to make it worth taking a whole lot more risk. So the world is evolving. It's not a bear science. It's an evolution or maturation of the market.
Andrew Watt
analystAnd does that -- in your view, does that make private credit a more attractive "asset class" relative to some of the other areas where planned sponsors, wealth funds and the others may be looking to allocate funds?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveIt does. At the end of the day, it's -- and by the way, it's not the solution for all problems, and it's not every dollar of every portfolio, and it's about risk return. And to be clear, the way we describe what we do from an investor point of view, we're in the sort of the stay rich business as well as to the get rich business. You don't come into private credit trying to make triple your capital like that, no, we can debate the viability of making triple your capital and where you're going to make it, what risks you're going to take. But that's kind of a conversation for another day. But our place in a portfolio, private credit, yes, I think at the end of the day, most investors, if they could say, look, I am pretty comfortably -- I don't want to overstate it. These not government bonds, but I can pretty comfortably make a 10% return that is floating rate, so I'm not having to take a view on, do I win or lose in the face of rate changes, that's going to be durable through recessions, they were going to have one. I think most investors for a portion of their portfolio would say, that works pretty darn well for me. And I think that's what we're seeing happening. Again, that doesn't mean we are the answer for every problem. We're not. But yes, I think institutions and increasingly individuals are realizing there is a distinct role as long as I can tolerate some illiquidity. To be clear, on purely liquid assets, this isn't your answer. But if I tell it's an illiquidity, this is an awfully good answer, and I think we are seeing many people say, you know what, to be on the top, we on average lend about 40% of the value of an enterprise we buy. So to be in the top 40% of the capital structure and earn, again, roughly double-digit return versus go to the bottom of the capital structure and be overly simplistic, like 2.5x the risk, like I got to get to 100 from 40 I appreciate that's a crude statement to earn what? I mean, I don't know, like are you going to earn at 12. I mean I don't know what realistic expectations people have or how much they want risk to get more. So I think -- and I don't want to make it sound like a commercial because again, as I said there's lots of reasons for lots of strategies. Yes, I think we have found that people are moving part of their PE allocation toward private credit moving from liquid credit to private credit in part, just like they did with liquid equity to private equity, and it's become a very helpful part of a well-thought-out portfolio.
Andrew Watt
analystI mean over time, one of our colleagues here, Ruth Yang, was absolutely terrific and leads our private markets effort, has talked about the kind of the growth of the private markets in general, whether it's private equity, private credit, and the more limited role of the public markets over time. Do you have any perspective on that you can share with us?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveThat observation, that work has been tremendous. By the way, I fully echo the sentiment. And so risks of these are directionally repetitive. There's little doubt the evolution over these same decades has been from more public to more private. And I think there's every reason to believe that's going to continue, not added to an item and not -- again, there tends to be these hyperbolic and maybe stories are more interested when they're written to the drama of this market, taking over that market, right? So private credit taking over from the syndicated market. That's not going to happen, and it shouldn't happen, or the private market taking over from the public market. That's not going to happen, shouldn't happen. There's a role for both markets. However, there is no doubt that the progression of time has led to an increasing scale and will continue directionally, in my view, to lead to an increasing scale in the private markets over the public markets and for one simple reason because it works. I mean, at the end of the day, back to like this -- again, I always like to come back to this [indiscernible] we'll keep it simple, which is the only reason that's true is it's not mysterious. It's because we are able to generate in certain applications for a certain portion of the market, a superior risk return experience for the investor. And that itself is back to, in our case, to bring it back to our world, the 3 Ps. This public market cannot -- there's no way for the public market to offer the predictability, privacy and partnership we offer. So where that is valuable. Again, it's not valuable in every case. It's not valuable to every user. We don't want to finance every credit. So it's not a singular solution, but where it's valued and where someone is willing to pay for it and investor is the beneficiary. So there's a durable explanation for private markets because at the end of the day, just bringing it back to private equity and private credit, that ecosystem. What is it we can do? We can take long-dated capital and provide long-dated solutions. We can plan for 5 years out and make fundamental credit decision, will we get paid back? And the equity holders could say, will this company fundamentally be worth more? And for those who want to, and I think there's a lot of value in being able to do that, that means there's a role for the private marketplace, and it's going to continue to grow. It's not going to wipe out the public market, but it's going to continue to grow as an application.
Andrew Watt
analystI want to come back to this point, particularly around some of the areas where I think we've done some work as an organization around transparency and so on. But there's another area where we've gotten a fair amount of questions. And I encourage our -- those who are listening into our webinar, too, if you like to put your questions into the chat and we will make sure we pose those questions to Marc. But in terms of the channels that support growth of private credit generally, so you've seen the tapping of the institutional markets. Clearly, there have been some linkages with large long-duration pools of capital, for example, insurance companies. And some interesting developments on the wealth channel. That's relatively new. And I wonder if -- my own personal view is it's a little untested, but that may be proven over time. Any thoughts about how that will unfold as we go into the next 3 to 5 years?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveSo again, fully correctly, I think you've hit on the 3 core capital formation channels for us. We're in all 3 of them now. We, of course, like everybody that's in this business are in the institutional channel, that's the traditional source of capital, of course, for any large alternative asset manager. As a firm, and I'll come on to the questions about wealth, we actually -- from day 1, when we started our Owl Rock, Blue Owl, we actually built our firm to serve individual investors and institutions as true peers. We had a view roughly a decade ago that serving individuals and -- this may be more high-minded sounding democratization of alts was a real opportunity to -- and by the way, it's just not democratization makes it sound all to selfless, I think it is wonderful to be able to deliver a superior risk reward that has benefited institutions for 20 years. There's a reason they do it to individuals. So I like being able to do good, but we can do well also. It's obviously because we thought that's a market that's been underserved. So we've actually been in the wealth channel really since it's pretty earliest days when we started our firm. Some of the -- literally the first couple of people that joined us were the people that run our whole wealth business, our broker-dealer and our wealth business. And so we have evolved to the point where today we have [indiscernible] actually probably depending on your measure it on gross or net flows in these continuously offer products, either #1 or #2 in the world of wealth management for alternatives in these types of products. So again, I will come on to this question of what does that all mean? And then there's insurance. So again, we'll -- we can come to insurance, if you want, but that's clearly become a convergence between the traditional insurance markets and the alternative markets. There's a little doubt there. It doesn't mean they're combining, but they're converging and the need because who has the longest dated pools of capital where they need to earn some kind of premium return, but can comfortably give up liquidity. Well, sure, it's the perfect marriage for what we truly use the term manufacturer, right? We manufacture long-dated assets. And so if you can -- if you desire or you can accept or like the illiquidity, the goals of that, you will earn a premium return, knock on wood for doing it. So with regard to wealth, it's like many things. The answer to does it work, is it tested? It depends. It's well tested in terms of the underlying investments. All we're doing are just semi-illiquid, semi-liquid fixed income securities. I mean that's well tested. It's the very same thing every institution participates in. We know decades of how leverage loans behave. You know better than we. There's lots of data. And the only distinction between a liquid leverage loan and ours today is, on average, our loan values are lower. Our documents are tighter. So there's actually lots of data to inform the underlying credit performance. As for the wrapper, so to speak, the wealth access channel, here, it's a bit of it depends. In a world where -- and this starts with for us, for example, credit, where you pay out every month or every quarter, the income. And the result of that is the investor is getting a testing all along the way, how am I doing relative to how I perceive I'm doing based on these reported results? Kind of ties to transparency a bit, right? What's untested, and I think actually will lead to some bumps in the road will be a miscalibration or even a structural reality. The more you put alternative products where the returns are generated through capital appreciation and not through income, the more you're putting pressure on the sort of market movements and distortions, the more you're going to have these moments where someone wants liquidity doesn't match so well with the time when people can provide liquidity, right? In our business, we have -- in our core income product, we have probably 400 different loans in there. They're being paid off at all different times, right? We collect interest every single day on some loan. So there's liquidity embedded. And we use one turn of leverage in our capital structure, right, so we can move that up and down. So there's all kinds of doors for access to liquidity. And even then we say to people, yes, it's quarterly access, but don't assume that you get it on a single quarter, maybe you don't, maybe you have to wait a couple of quarters. So don't -- understand this is not on-demand money. But the more you move toward things that are much more concentrated and much more illiquid and don't generate income, the more this ability to get liquidity will be -- I don't say illusory, but you have to be much more sober minded about what does it mean to say, "Oh, I would like some liquidity from this continuously offered infrastructure product." Well, okay. I mean, it could be a very long time before there's liquidity available. That's not fatal. It's just an eyes open question. So I think to your point, the untested part is how do these wrappers evolve and work and how do we make sure that users and providers understand each other's expectations and kind of the realities of the underlying assets.
Andrew Watt
analystYes. I mean the way -- this may not be the best way to frame it. But the level of sophistication and need in the wealth channel may not be quite the same as you see in institutional channel. And there are a couple of vehicles over the past year or so where you've seen this kind of disconnect between what's expected and what can be delivered, right? And sometimes in areas where you see rapid growth, it can actually become a little bit more problematic. So that's why that's what I'm...
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveYes. And I echo that sentiment. I mean, I -- like really what's great is you and your conversations like this and the way you're informing the people you do business with it is about education and information and transparency and people understanding. And as I said, even this spectrum of differences, if you look at where there have been some of these kind of problems over the last couple of years, not surprisingly, it's in places where people have said, "Oh, the returns are really good, here's your NAV, here's your NAV," then the market adjust. And people actually quite rationally say, "Oh, well, wait a minute, if I can have yesterday's NAV in today's world, that's a kind of a good result. I should do that." And so it's something no one's done anything wrong. It's just a structure like in sense one to say, well, then I should take those on paper profits. Again, I'm not pretending we knew this 10 years ago to be clear. But what has become very clear is an income product, and our -- again, this is what we happen to do. So we think about it a lot. But an income product doesn't have that attribute, right? What are you going to get? You can have your money back. I mean that's true. But all your income you've got, there's no, "Oh, if I want my profits, I have to cash in." You already got your profits. And in leveraged loans, to get you all know this better than I, what's the leverage loan market going to move 1 point, a couple of points. Nobody wakes up and says, "Oh, I should redeem because I think I can make a 2-point arb trying to trade the public market. However, when illiquid markets correct like real estate markets correct 30 points, nobody has -- nobody could produce enough alpha to overcome that beta. So it doesn't matter, you might be the greatest manager on earth. Anybody would logically say, "I hear you. You're the best that ever lived, but 30 points is 30 points. I should go take it."
Andrew Watt
analystYes. Thanks, Marc. We've got a couple of questions here. One question. I want to make sure I read it carefully. It says the same LP investing in your private credit fund may also be an LP in a private equity fund that you are lending to. How do -- how should that LP think about the returns that you're giving them double digit for being the top 40% of the cap structure versus a PE fund that owns the equity? I thought it was a pretty interesting question.
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveIt is, and it's a live question. Like it's a very real question that we're seeing play out in real time, again, as these time lines stretch out a bit and as some companies start to stumble a bit, all of a sudden, that stark contrast is getting starker, which is before we can have $1 of a problem, you have to have a PE firm lose all their capital, right? So they have to lose their 60% before we talk about any impairment. And so that is becoming a bit of a front and center, more visible conversation as time goes by. We have firms that have both. And I actually think that will prove to be part of the educational process as people watch the play forward and say, well, what experience did I have in average terms, on returns. And when I have both, and we have people that have both for sure, and I will candidly say that I'm very biased on what I'm about to say like this is the hammer on the nail, so I want to acknowledge this. But I have often wagered people a beer, so to speak, that look, I think on average, we will be able to deliver returns that are comparable or maybe even better than the average private equity return, not the top decile private equity returns. So there's still reasons all these worlds exist. But part of it is this articulation. Look, we live in the same world. So here's the -- and I'll finish this comment, but I think it was like states of the world. Here's what can't happen, using the word can't in quotes because we all know something can happen, that's what happens. Here's what can't happen. Private equity cannot have good returns and private credit have bad returns. That's not possible. It's possible for us to both have good returns. It's possible for private credit to have good returns and PE to have great returns. It's possible for private, and this is the important point. Private credit can have good returns and PE can have good. Private credit have good returns and PE can have fair. Private credit have good returns and PE can have poor returns. So on the side of, hey, I think the market's a little overdeveloped, or I think the world is going to get a little more topsy-turvy. What you cannot have is I'm going to be in private equity, but I'm bearish private credit. We're in the same companies. It's not possible for private equity to have done well when in our hundreds of holdings, it's all senior to their hundreds of holdings. So on a given company, of course, one person might have a good return, a bad return. But across these large portfolios, they and we alike hold. It can only be the case that we do well when they do well. We might do well and they don't do well because we're 40% and they're 100% of the capital. So that's -- a lot of LPs are, I'll say, waking up to that, but acknowledging, hey, there's something pretty appealing about this top side of the cap stack particularly versus more of my average private equity manager. And I think we are seeing attrition in the private equity middle. People are having trouble raising money in the middle a little bit because it's, well, what like what's the role.
Andrew Watt
analystYes. Let me move on to -- there's another question here about NAV loans. And the question is, what are your thoughts and how large the CV space can be and a NAV loan space can be?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveSo the CV space, I think will be a very large. I think the CV space is -- now it's a very small one today, so there's a little bit like growth rate. But I think the growth rate will be very high. When I think about addressable markets, I think it is the logical evolution of the -- this kind of growth and not maturation of private equity, but kind of maturation private equity. Because here's the thing I can anchor back to and I want to be conscious of time, 30 years ago in private equity LBOs, we used to say, you know what the problem with this market is, it's that you find a great asset. And look, there's a lot of things you don't know until you buy a company. I mean, like, the reality is everyone buys a company thinking it's a good business. Nobody buys a company, thinking it's a dog, right? So by definition, what really happens is the dogs emerge because you didn't know what you bought fully or if some problem occurs. But so do the trophies. The trophies emerge, and they become clear, they're better than you ever thought for reasons you didn't really grasp. And so once you own a trophy asset, this has been a decades-long complaint of the veterans of private equity, go back to the true legends of the business, the Henry Kravis and the George Roberts, they would forever say, you know what the problem with this model is we finally -- we get a great company and then we have to sell it. Like how ridiculous is that just so we can get the money and go back and try to buy another great company, which turns out often to work, but sometimes it doesn't. So like it's a wacky kind of structure. So the solution to that is once a private equity firm knows they have a trophy asset, if you can form capital to allow them to keep that asset that's a winner for the LPs that say, "Oh, hey, I want to stay in. I'm not worried about the liquidity." Some need liquidity. So I need to create an optional exit rate. And the private -- and the beauty of this model attached to a now multitrillion-dollar private equity industry is, "Hey, it's an exit ramp that allows those who want to stay to stay, and those who want to go to go." And the person who spent that time and energy finding that trophy asset to keep it and continue to earn economics managing that trophy asset. So again, meets a need. I think that will be a really significant high-growth business action. There aren't much capital for it today. The limit today is not people want to use it. You look -- there's been some surveys done. The number of people who want to do continuation or open to it, it's like literally 80% of GP, something about that number. But there's so little capital for them. So I look at that as, we call it, a megatrend. But it's a meaningful opportunity over the next 5 to 10 years to form and provide the capital for those GP lens. NAV loans, I don't think are going to be as big as sort of the [indiscernible] is today. They're complicated to implement. And the reality is LPs are already saying, we don't love these things, right? I think there's already an awareness. The -- yes, I think that there's an LP -- not from a lender point of view, we're perfectly happy to provide them. We've done NAV loans. It's a good piece of business for us. But I think a lot of PE LPs are saying, wait a minute. So now on the front end, it's subscription lines. So you're really borrowing my credit at the front end. Now you got to borrow my credit on the back end. You're going to cross collateralize one of the things about PE that's sort of pretty magically powerful is that each asset stands alone, right? So if a domino tips, it has no ability to impact the other dominoes. A NAV loan ties everything back together. Now done at conservative leverage levels, we probably all would agree, it doesn't very unlikely to happen, often a truly low leverage NAV loan can even be a highly rated piece of paper. But like anything, it's a matter of degree. And so the thing about NAV loans, I think is they're very hard to do, they do put limits on how you can then crystallize and return capital to LPs. LPs are saying, "Look, I don't love adding a whole another layer of leverage into the system. You're already doing leverage companies underneath them." So I actually think that one will -- it will be meaningful because it will follow the pressures that have led subscription lines to grow will push NAV lines the same way, like taking to the hyper and silly extreme, like you'll never call the money. It's just to be like this subscription line and then there's like NAV line. And like all that will happen is we'll just use the credits of the LP, it's not weak, but credit, the LPs and then just write the checks. Of course, that's not going to happen. But I mean that is kind of the extremity of these market pressures. So -- but that said, there's an awareness, and I think there's a skepticism by LPs about we don't love these NAV loans. Like it's just introducing a whole lot more leverage into the system. We don't want it.
Andrew Watt
analystMarc, this is not a question, but it's something that's come up in a wide variety of forums around LPs, and where do LPs sit relative to all these developments in a market? If you go back 5, 6 years, it was probably a little clearer on where things are and what people's expectations are. What are you hearing from LPs? I know it's a broader general question, but...
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveLPs are correctly more demanding, and LPs are -- have a more refined understanding alpha versus beta in the world of alts and the kind of PE ecosystem in general. It has -- I won't say tide has gone up, but enough of the tide has eased to the point where we're be able to were just sort of really just index trades, but with fees and carry. And so therefore, net weren't really producing value has been made more apparent to the LP community, and you can see it in fundraising today, right? There's a much tighter screen on who they allocate to part so they don't have the capital. But in allocating the capital, they're also saying, listen, I have 200 managers and 100 of them like, what's even the point. I don't -- there just nothing distinctive about what they're doing. We already made 50 and 25, like whatever the numbers may be. So what we are seeing is LPs seeing more choices. And to the first question, a very sophisticated question about the LP was in both sides of the equity and the debt, yes, some are saying, well, rather do the debt. I'm going to take -- or at least I'll divide my exposure because with regard to the same company, I'll take this durable top end. And if I like it for the bottom end, it most like it for the top end, like I can't want to own the equity, did not want to own, that doesn't really make a lot of sense. So we are seeing this evolution of allocations. And correctly, LPs are more demanding because the world has changed. If you look back 5 years, to your point, and people just couldn't getting into the funds was deemed the challenge and all the power, therefore, shifted to the GPs. I think we're seeing a rebalancing in it by the way, again, healthy, I would argue. A rebalancing of that power to, "Hey, listen, we got to do new things that work for both of us." Of course, the GPs should do well, you do do well. But some of this matters to us, too. There need to be some boundaries around this, and our voice needs to be heard. So things like NAV loans are an example, I think of 3 years ago, 4 years ago, LPs felt like they could say much about it or [indiscernible] wasn't a big phenomenon. But today, I think LPs are much more likely to say, well, wait a minute. We don't want another layer of leverage. That's just introducing a risk into this thing that we don't want or we do, then we would do it because we want higher returns. And by the way, our cost of capital is lower than yours. So if we want to leverage our assets, then we may as well leverage it. Like why are you leveraging for -- my cost of capital is a AA pension is a lot cheaper than your cost of capital as an unrated NAV loan.
Andrew Watt
analystYes. There's another question on NAV lines. And the question is, should investors be concerned about NAV valuations given the more opaque nonmarket-based valuations that it's based on?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveI think people should be -- the way I would look at it is be aware...
Andrew Watt
analystIt's relative to the public market...
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveYes, yes, yes. I think I would say, be aware. It's not necessarily alarming or even -- of course, it's concerning because everything should be accurate all the time. But there is a difference of what do you mean by a valuation, like is it a valuation of selling, what can be sold at that moment, which is a trading price versus what is in an undisturbed market, right? What would be the fair price between a willing buyer and willing seller? So there are legitimate differences. I think the answer is to be aware that the movement in NAV is by the mechanics of the way it's calculated. In equity, I'm talking about equity in particular, this is not so much movement in debt, right? So it's really not a very -- as much as it's relevant to the question of any illiquid asset as we all know, senior loans, again, they don't move that much. So this is a much less interesting question around credit. It's a very interesting question around equity or any bottom of cap structure, kind of securities that move a lot. But it only matters if there's a transaction occurring relative to that or if you're planning your portfolio around it, which is to say, you should care because we should understand the NAV will be slow relative to the public markets. On the other hand, if you're not really acting on it and you're sort of having this, okay, I made this PE allocation. I know I don't have access to it for the next 5 years, it's sitting here, and I'm going to find out in 5 years, the net result, whether you really understood exactly in between where the NAV stood on a given day relative to the public market, there's nothing you can do about it anyway. And so if you're not using it to kind of make a decision, I'm not sure how much it matters. So I think it turns it into, of course, we should care because everything should be accurate and everyone should have the best information they can have. But people more ought to be just vigilant of what relevance does the NAV have. If they're counting on it or trading on it, on the NAV, then it has a lot more relevance then, okay, well that serve interesting on a piece of paper. So in that distortion in a redeemable product turns out to be interesting. In the distortion in nonredeemable product, it doesn't -- it's not interesting, right? So let's take a real estate fund. Real estate funds to have redemption opportunities, that the gap between NAV and public actually was an actionable question. In a closed-end real estate fund, the actionability of the gap between NAV and public markets was inactionable. So it was maybe interesting but not highly.
Andrew Watt
analystWe're certainly in a very interesting and complex industry, offers opportunity. One thing that I did want to touch on, I think there are a number of questions here. There are actually 13 more questions and we're not going to get to. But one thing I did want to touch on, which I found interesting was, do you have any perspective on the recent acquisition of Preqin by BlackRock and what they may mean for the industry in the future?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveYou know maybe we'll do like -- we'll do rapid fire. I don't have any great insights. The consolidation of information resources at some metal level catches my attention, but I don't have any insights into the kind of strategic...
Andrew Watt
analystIt came to mind with this question is because there has been some talk over the past number of years about some type of private credit index or some formula metric that people can relate to relative to returns. Any thoughts on that at all?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveI think S&P should produce that, and we're happy to help. I think it would be great. I think coming from a highly credible organization, it would mean a lot. I think it'd be great for the market actually because people are feeling around trying to say, "Well, what's my benchmark?" So actually, I think it would be a great -- I think it would be very helpful development for the evolution of the asset class.
Andrew Watt
analystYes. And one last question. What's the best way for credit investors to access the private credit market. Is it through a publicly-traded BDC or a private vehicle?
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveEither, or, depends on what you're trying to achieve and depends on how you value liquidity. So let me -- just in the simplest form, in the world of Blue Owl, very simple, we have a public BDC, OBDC, trades publicly. It's a great product, great coupon, a great portfolio. We have private vehicles that are both institutional and we have continuously offered one thing. So we've created gateways, depending on this -- the answer to that question. If you want daily liquidity, you can access private credit on a daily liquid basis, but you will have a security in the trade. So what you're going to overlay is the market's trading views of private credit on a given day, not its fundamentals, right? Like the fundamentals could change. I don't change much at all on a given day of all the underlying companies and yet the price of OBDC moves around. If you go to the private vehicles like continuously offered, it's -- you go in at net asset value, you come out at net asset value. So it depends on what you're trying to achieve. If you're saying what I want is pure private debt and only the experience of the private in, private out, and I'm willing to take some liquidity to do it, then this is probably your wrapper. If you're saying, I don't mind if it goes up and down, if it's down, I'm just not going to be the seller if it's up, okay. Well, great. But the daily liquidity, I value, then you right answers to be in the public vehicles. So I think our job is to produce this. I come back to what you said, there's a lot of complexity that we talked about pulling back up. It's to do something really simple, which is to assemble pools of capital. Look at it as we have 10,000 companies to lend to the 500 rehab, do a good job of making sure almost all of them do well, and then having this -- we value at 7 basis points of running loss rates, 7 basis points, of course, it will go up from there. I mean that's not a durable number, but multiply it by any number one wants and a well-managed credit portfolio is to be a part of a portfolio, not a risk-free part and deliver a -- here's all those mechanics I talked about, all the complexity, what are we supposed to do. Lend to a good company and get paid back. That's what we're supposed to do. And then what we should do is create wrappers, gateways that suit the needs of investors. All the rest of the stuff we talked about, which I find interesting, I hope some people found interesting, should prove to be the sort of, well, that's what's happening behind the scenes. My experience is, I really care about liquidity, I kind of care, I don't care, and I'm going to access this kind of simple thing, lend money to a big company for a long time and get paid back most of the time. I think that's the job.
Andrew Watt
analystThose are great final words, Marc. I thank you so much for being our guest speaker today. We had over 300 participants, and we have a ton of questions still in the queue, we couldn't get to. And I didn't get some of my questions about PIK loans, feeder funds and all types of credit questions...
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveThen the pool side chat is preordained Any questions, you or your team, people on the call had, you feel free to relay them over to us, and we'll get answers across.
Andrew Watt
analystOkay. No, thank you so much. I also want to thank Ramki Muthukrishnan, who heads our Leveraged Finance Team here at S&P Global Ratings; and Ruth Yang, who heads our Private Markets Efforts, and Ruth has a web page -- a dedicated web page on private markets, puts stuff out on LinkedIn all the time on a biweekly basis on some of the research we're doing in this marketplace. And today's webinar was not recorded for replay. Your feedback is very important to us. So for the listeners, the attendees, survey is available at the bottom of the right-hand side of the screen. We'll part automatically once the session ends for your convenience. We appreciate you taking the time to join us. We hope your summer goes well. Marc, thank you so much for being our guest speaker. Wonderful session, and we look forward to talking with you and your team in the future.
Marc S. Lipschultz
executiveThank you. Great being with you all, and I hope everyone has a great day.
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