Chicago Atlantic Real Estate Finance, Inc. (REFI) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
August 11, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Lisa Kampf
executiveGood morning, and thank you for being here. I'm glad all of you could take part in this conference call for Chicago Atlantic Real Estate Finance, since we'll be walking through how the company performed. Joining us are Peter Sack, who serves as one of our Co-Chief Executive Officers, along with David Kite, our President and Chief Operating Officer, and Phil Silverman, who holds the Chief Financial Officer role. This morning, our numbers went out through the earnings report, which is available on the investor relations section of our website, along with the supplemental information package that was furnished to the SEC. A live audio webcast is also being offered today. Should you be tuning in to the replay instead, please note that our remarks apply only as of today and will not be updated following this call. Some of our comments and statements today may count as forward-looking statements under the meaning set by securities laws, including statements about how our portfolio will perform in the future, our pipeline of possible loans and other investments, upcoming dividends, the proposed merger in which the company would merge with and into Chicago Atlantic BDC Inc., the timing and benefits expected from it, and the benefits we anticipate from our recent financing transaction with affiliates of Coach Capital. We'll also go over certain non-GAAP measures, such as distributable earnings among others. Definitions for those non-GAAP metrics, along with reconciliations to the nearest equivalent GAAP figures, appear in our earnings release and supplemental materials, both of which are posted on our website and have been provided to the FCC. A reminder for everyone on the call: remarks made today, as well as the investor presentation accompanying them, contain forward-looking statements subject to substantial risks and uncertainties, and because of those factors actual outcomes may end up differing materially from our present expectations. We urge investors to go through the various disclosures the company has issued, among them the risks and additional details found in the company's SEC filings. The following are some of the risks and uncertainties involved: our capacity to finish the REFI and Lien merger within the timeframe we expect; securing the necessary approvals from shareholders and regulators, plus the required consent from lenders; achieving the benefits we anticipate from the deal; and shifts in the regulatory landscape for cannabis — these come on top of additional risks outlined in our SEC filings and in the legends included in the material filed today. Results could end up differing materially from what we project, and unless the law demands it, we have no duty to revise these statements. This call's transcript is being submitted to the SEC under Rule 425 of the Securities Act of 1933, and it is also being submitted under Rule 14A-12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Regarding the planned merger, LEAN submitted a registration statement to the SEC using form N-14, and that document contains both a joint proxy statement from refi and lean as well as a prospectus from lean. Those materials, together with any future amendments or supplements, should be reviewed by investors and stockholders without delay, since they will hold significant details about the transaction. Lean, Reef-I, their directors and executive officers, Chicago Atlantic BDC Advisors LLC, and Chicago Atlantic Reef Manager LLC, along with certain other persons, may be deemed participants in the solicitation. Information about those individuals and their interests is included in the joint proxy statement and prospectus. You can get copies of everything that gets filed at no cost on the SEC's website and on the investor relations site for each company. Keep in mind that nothing said on this call amounts to an offer to sell or a request for an offer to buy any securities. No securities offer will be made unless through a prospectus, as Section 19 of the 1933 Act requires. At this point I'll hand things over to Peter Sack. Go ahead. Thanks, Lisa. Morning, everybody.
Peter Sack
executiveReFi turned in a solid second quarter, even as geopolitical strains persisted and discussions about inflation and interest rate expectations kept going. Distributable earnings came to $0.44 per basic weighted average common share, which landed under our dividend, yet that shortfall mostly stems from when capital was put back to work, not from any real shift in the business itself or in portfolio quality. Thanks to what we've learned in the cannabis ecosystem, we hold the know-how, the relationships, and the capacity to redeploy capital faster than the typical mortgage rate. Even so, redeployment is never allowed to compromise our underwriting discipline and strict risk standards, which safeguard an acceptable balance of risk versus reward. In this instance, loans totaling 16.3 million were prepaid early in the quarter, and that capital did not get redeployed until later in the same quarter. Although the portfolio principal balance rose roughly $40 million from one quarter to the next, income growth took a hit from that gap in redeployment timing. Our pipeline of cannabis opportunities is still robust, sitting at $649 million right now, though as of June 30, 2026, just $204 million of that carries real estate collateral. We keep watching the regulatory landscape, and we've likewise observed that capital markets have lately grown more accepting of the cannabis industry, a shift reflected in the New York Stock Exchange uplisting of two cannabis-related companies; that came right after the Department of Justice said it would reschedule certain medical marijuana products from Schedule 1 to Schedule 3. An administrative hearing that might open a path toward rescheduling recreational adult use wrapped up on July 15th, and following a briefs deadline set for August, we await what happens next. The strides being made in federal policy, along with wider acceptance of cannabis, encourage us, and we're thinking about what that might mean for our borrowers. Even so, our outlook stays conservative. None of these changes are required for our strategy to succeed. In many ways the cannabis industry keeps changing, and ReFi has to plan on changing alongside it. Back in June, we announced a deal to merge Chicago Atlantic BDC and ReFi. As previously reported on Form 8K filed on June 18th, the merger terms call for ReFi to first elect treatment as a business development company, or BDC, and then merge with and into Lean in an all-stock adjusted NAV-for-NAV transaction, with Lean remaining the service provider. providing company. By merging ReFi and Lean, we aim to unlock potential value for ReFi stockholders that we think would be hard for ReFi to reach on its own as a public mortgage rate. Given how broad the Chicago Atlantic platform is and its capacity to grow the asset class and cannabis industry investment—an area where both companies have found success since each was founded—we believe Lean is the right partner to deliver the advantages of scale. Both boards gave unanimous approval to this deal, since they see it as a chance to deliver real value to shareholders of each company by broadening the portfolio mix and boosting scale along with stock liquidity — something anticipated to lift market visibility and open the door to bigger capital markets possibilities. Lien submitted a preliminary registration statement on Form N-14 dated July 31, 2026, and that filing contained a joint proxy statement from ReFi and Lien. That N-14 registration statement still needs SEC review. Our present expectation is that the deal will be completed during the fourth quarter of 2026, assuming we obtain the necessary stockholder approvals from lien and refi holders, lender consents, regulatory clearances, and the usual other closing conditions. Also, after the second quarter ended, we disclosed the second lien financing covering 32 retail properties located throughout the United States, managed by affiliates of Coach Capital. All 32 of these retail properties, leased to cannabis tenants, are separately secured by second lien mortgage notes carrying a total principal balance of roughly $62.5 million. Thank you. Interest on these notes accrues at 12% annually, with 10% of that paid in cash and 2% paid in kind. The notes further carry an exit fee plus an amount reaching as much as 2.5 times each note's commitment amount, determined when repayment occurs, after subtracting interest and principal, if any, already paid up to that point. Via these exit fees, which might be realized fully or partially, ReFi could gain economic benefit from selling any of the 32 retail properties in the portfolio. That gives the notes a distinctive shot at convexity when it comes to realizing potential value for refi. As we've mentioned, the regulatory picture at both the federal and state levels is shifting quickly. Within the Coach portfolio, we carefully underwrote every property as well as each tenant's credit quality. As regulatory shifts bring more equity capital into reach, we anticipate cap rate compression will occur along with rising values in the market for retail real estate leased to cannabis operators. ReFi is now positioned to gain from this possible market shift; as consideration for the notes, ReFi issued roughly 4.3 million new common shares. Phil will cover certain elements of how this transaction is treated for accounting purposes, but let me recap once more why Chicago Intic found this deal appealing. To start, our newly issued stock carried a price at a 1% premium over book value, which keeps cash liquidity available for additional originations. Next, the deal spreads our revenue sources across more streams and gives us exposure to another asset class — one whose durations run longer than what the current portfolio holds, which we anticipate will bring more chances to generate alpha as the industry keeps developing. Finally, we think this deal could offer refi stockholders meaningful potential yield upside past the 12% blended annual rate by way of the exit fee structure. This fee is set up so that refi can take advantage of possible cap rate compression along with any economic gains the borrower earns when properties are realized; to wrap up, ReFi keeps generating solid returns via our distinctive method of lending to operators and property owners within the cannabis sector, a niche space where competition is still scarce. We stay confident in our capacity to steer through a shifting landscape while keeping discipline in our underwriting and remaining faithful to the strategy that has fueled our results so far, including the $0.44 figure.
David Kite
executiveDavid will now take a closer look at the portfolio. David? Thanks, Peter. As of June 30, our loan portfolio's principal — meaning loans held for investment along with those at fair value — totaled approximately $453 million across 26 portfolio companies. The weighted average yield to maturity stood at 15.8%, which matches the first quarter of 2026. During the quarter, originations reached roughly 56.8 million in principal fundings, divided between 56.1 million for new borrowers and 0.7 million for existing ones. On the other side, repayments came to about $19.7 million, consisting of approximately $3.3 million in scheduled amortization payments and $16.4 million in full loan prepayments. During Q2, there was minimal movement in both portfolio risk rating and credit quality. As of June 30, 2026, roughly 10.8% of the portfolio holds a risk rating of 4 or above, compared with 10.7% as of March 31, 2026. This slight difference came from the shift in the overall portfolio risk rating during the first quarter—specifically, the portfolio amount—not from any changes in loan-level ratings. CECL reserves totaled $0.6 million, which represented reserves tied to two new loans. As of June 30, 2026, approximately 3.7% of the portfolio, based on outstanding principal, is on non-approval status, a decline from about 4.8% as of March 31, 2026. As of June 30, 2026, fixed rate loans accounted for 37.5% of the portfolio, while floating rate loans made up 62.5%. Looking at our floating rate loans, the split is roughly 74% tied to prime and 26% tied to SOFR. Since prime sits at 6.75% right now, every one of our prime-based loans is sitting at its floor. When you add it all up, just about 3.6% of the principal across our whole portfolio could still be hit by additional rate cuts. Another key point: none of our floating rate loans carry interest rate caps, and when you pair that with the floors we have in place, it gives us a structural edge in how we build the portfolio — one that stacks up well against what most other mortgage REITs have. As of June 30, total leverage came to 47% of book equity, up from 38% on March 31. When we hit June 30, the amount drawn on our senior secured revolver stood at 90.1 million, while 49.5 million remained owed under the unsecured term loan. Looking at where things stand right now, roughly 15 million can still be tapped from that senior facility, and that figure gives you a pretty fair picture overall.
Phil Silverman
executiveThat accounts for the liquidity we have available to put toward new deployments. At this point I'll hand things over to Phil. Thanks, David. Net interest income came in at $12.8 million for the second quarter, which works out to a $0.3 million, or 2.2%, decline from the $13.1 million we recorded in the first quarter. That drop stemmed from how the timing played out on redeploying new original out of payoffs we collected in Q1 and through the first half of the second quarter, plus a reduction in one-time non-recurring fee income, which came to roughly $0.8 million in the second quarter versus $1.1 million in the first quarter. The company's non-accrual positions saw no material changes, although loan number six was fully repaid, something we flagged as a subsequent event on last quarter's call. Interest expense in total, including non-cash amortization of financing costs, was about $2.4 million for the second quarter, up from $2 million in the first quarter. Weighted average borrowings under our revolving loan rose to $67.5 million from $48 million in the first quarter. As of June 30th, our CECL reserve on loans held for investment stood at roughly $9.4 million. Relative to size, the reserve for expected credit losses comes to about 2.3% of the outstanding principal on our loans held for investment. Risk ratings showed no significant movement across the portfolio, and on a weighted average basis our portfolio kept a strong real estate coverage of 1.2 times along with a loan-to-enterprise value ratio of roughly 46%. Distributable earnings per weighted average share, basic and fully diluted, were about 44 cents and 43 cents, respectively, for the second quarter; and in July we paid out the second quarter dividend of 47 cents per common share that our board declared in June. Since inception, the company has paid $9.41 per common share in dividends, an annualized yield on cost of roughly 12.4% when measured against our IPO price. Book value per common share outstanding was $14.15 as of June 30, 2026, and roughly 21.7 million common shares were outstanding on a fully diluted basis as of that date. As Peter mentioned earlier, on July 9th the company closed the coach financing transaction, through which ReFi issued approximately 4.3 million new common shares at $14.53 per share, in exchange for second lien notes carrying an aggregate principal balance of $62.5 million. That transaction price represented a premium to book value per share as of March 31st, 2026. And pro forma for the coach transaction, the company has approximately 26 million common shares outstanding on a fully diluted basis. Since the coach notes were received as consideration for issuing the company's common stock, they are expected to show up in the company's third quarter financial statements as a reduction of stockholders' equity rather than as loans held for investment. The corresponding cash flow is to be reported via stockholders' equity, not as interest income or as part of total equity assets on the consolidated balance sheets, in line with GAAP. So the deal raised the count of common shares outstanding, yet it produced no material net impact on total stockholders' equity and brought no increase in total assets at issuance. Despite how that looks in the financial statements, the Coach Notes are genuine debt backed by real property, and for the company's REIT qualification they should count as qualifying real estate assets generating qualifying distributable taxable income under the applicable gross income and asset tests. Per the agreement and plan of merger between the company and Chicago Atlantic BDC Inc., the company plans to distribute any accumulated REIT taxable income before the merger's effective time. While the transaction still needs shareholder and SEC approvals, lender consents, and customary closing conditions, the company presently expects it to close in Q4 of 2026. Even with the proposed merger, we anticipate keeping a dividend payout ratio of 90% to 100% of our basic distributable earnings per share for the 2026 tax year, and we also point to figures such as $0.43 and $0.47.
Aaron Grey
analystMorning, and thanks a lot for taking the questions. The first one is mine — I get that there are some timing complications, you know, related to prepayments and the ability to put some of that capital back to work, but I'm just wondering how you plan to handle that in the meantime? I know it's come up a few times over the last quarter. Perhaps it turns into less of a problem after the merger, but given the way refi works right now, how do you intend to deal with that and maybe build yourself additional room for that distributable EPS in relation to the dividend?.
Peter Sack
executiveas you try to seize opportunities to make the most of the capital at your disposal. Thanks. Thanks for the question, Aaron. And with the merger with Lean now complete, I think at this point we're only ready to say that we anticipate distributing... all or almost all of ReFi's distributable earnings via its taxable income up to the merger date.
Aaron Grey
analystAlright, I appreciate that. This has been raised a number of times over the last several years, but I'd like to ask about it once more, because the situation may be shifting by the time we next speak with you in November — especially if we end up with phase two rescheduling of the whole plant. Could you walk us through how things might change on your end if other players potentially enter the space, and how you'd be able to use your sector expertise to uncover additional opportunities and secure more capital for yourselves at better rates? A quick refresher on what might change as a result would be great. Thank you.
Peter Sack
executiveSo the talk about rescheduling started in mid-2025. Trump issued an executive order in December that told his administration point-blank to carry out the rescheduling process. Then in April, the Department of Justice issued its landmark order rescheduling medical cannabis. Starting in mid-2025, that process brought notable shifts in how the equities of major Canadian-listed U.S. cannabis operators were valued. Then this year, after the Department of Justice's order rescheduling medical cannabis products, two U.S. operators have listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and one NASDAQ-listed cannabis operator has announced it would be buying U.S. medical assets. For the U.S. cannabis industry, these are truly major capital market transitions. That said, across this whole stretch — from the start of 2025, through the Executive Order, through the Department of Justice Order, through cannabis operators listing on U.S. exchanges — no new entrants have shown up in our competitive lending environment. Naturally, I can't say for sure why that's the case, and I can't guarantee there won't be new entrants, but I can explain why I believe debt markets and equity capital markets are fairly distinct. When I think about debt capital markets versus equity capital markets, I see them as rather different. Equity capital markets work a bit like a light switch: either you're listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ, or you aren't. Debt capital markets are more like turning, turning, turning the Titanic. For cannabis operators to gain greater access to debt capital markets, and for a large number of participants to be involved, so many incremental pieces of our financial plumbing system are needed. You need rating agencies. You need the leverage providers that lend to levered lending companies. You need more law firms willing to write loan documents for cannabis operators. You need the big four accounting firms willing to audit funds that serve cannabis operators and to audit cannabis operators. You need more custodians; and any one of them can make it difficult for existing debt capital providers to support the cannabis ecosystem. Having said all that, we'd be happy to see additional lenders participating in this sector, since the marketplace right now operates in a highly inefficient manner. Plus, we think our position will be the strongest one for gaining an advantage from it. from having more capital made available. We're eager for the chance to see a wider variety of providers of debt capital; we're eager for the chance to collaborate with a wider variety of credit rating agencies serving lenders like ourselves. And we're eager for the chance to see a wider range. of equity investors who feel enthusiasm for this sector. And in our view, having additional U.S. cannabis companies listed on U.S. exchanges translates into more equity analysts tracking this sector in a broader way, and that will work to our advantage too. I believe this also factors into why we consider the combination of ReFi and Lean to be timed very well as a platform operating in a bigger market. It opens up a chance for us to communicate with and to pursue the interests of a wider spectrum of equity investors along with a bigger group of debt investors. while these shifts are taking place. Does that address your question, Aaron?.
Analyst
analystYeah, hello everybody, and thanks. Regarding the coach deal — you provided plenty of detail, but could you walk us through why that structure made sense rather than, say, simply acquiring the leases on those 32 dispensaries? Let's begin there.
Peter Sack
executiveMm-hmm. As you know, since we are listed on NASDAQ, we're... refi is still barred from owning cannabis properties, from holding the equity of cannabis companies, or the warrants tied to cannabis companies, or even convertible loans connected to U.S. cannabis operators. So... And so I believe this structure, along with the financings we extended to Poach Capital, lets refi capture a substantial portion of the economic upside tied to cannabis-related leases while not owning properties, which our listing would prohibit. We should point out that with this strategy, with our exposure to the sale-leaseback market, we're obtaining exposure to a market inefficiency quite comparable to the market inefficiency we see in debt capital markets today. That in debt capital markets and cannabis, our capacity to originate loans at what we consider far lower risk levels than the broader private credit and lending markets, at far higher reward levels than the broader private credit markets, stems from the imbalance in supply and demand between debt capital and the need for capital in the cannabis sector and the scarcity of debt financing choices within the cannabis sector today; that very same gap is present within the market for real estate and leasing to cannabis operators. Frequently cannabis operators — and I'll concentrate on the retail market, since that's what this portfolio represents — cannabis operators in the retail market run into difficulties obtaining properties from landlords who will lease to cannabis companies. They struggle to find properties in businesses, in locations that meet zoning requirements or distance requirements, and in municipalities that are prepared to permit cannabis operations. What these structural challenges produce is that cannabis operators frequently wind up paying higher cap rates, higher lease rates than the broader retail leasing market. And that's precisely what this portfolio of investments provides us more exposure to. It provides us more exposure to that market inefficiency, provides our investors more exposure to that market inefficiency. And then should that market inefficiency... shift over the years ahead, the structure, the manner in which this transaction is put together, the exit fees tied to them, let refi have exposure to the convexity that might arise if cap rates compress, if the market for leasing to cannabis operators grows more competitive. And so I believe this portfolio and this decision align nicely with regard to Aaron's question, when he asked how effectively he asked how his refi positions, as the market evolves, as additional competitors enter; and I think this coach transaction is one illustration of how we... In the near term, they can gain from a compelling yield profile and appealing earnings opportunities, and they stand to do particularly well if that market shifts — if pricing for properties leased to cannabis operators moves dramatically.
Analyst
analystThat sounds positive, Coddard. Thanks. So if we assume those inefficiencies stick around for a while, this wouldn't be a single isolated deal. You'd pursue additional transactions like this to build up more exposure and then sell it back into the cannabis sector. Possibly, yeah, okay. Would you be willing to share any details about those 32 dispensaries? I don't want to get too deep into the weeds on this, but just, you know, where are they situated? Is there only a single operator? Can you provide anything at all?
Peter Sack
executiveWe'll offer additional detail when we report Q3. What I can tell you is that the tenant mix is fairly varied; it's not a single tenant. I'd say our footprint in this industry, the position we naturally hold in it, means that as it happens we already know a lot of the tenants who are part of this. That made the underwriting work easier. Much like underwriting a credit, the borrower's credit quality matters most; here, what matters most is the tenants' credit quality; so our diligence work... puts tremendous weight on that element of the deal.
Analyst
analystAll right, and the final one regarding coach, and perhaps this is for Phil. Clearly, I'll attempt to calculate it myself, but are you aware of what the contribution to adjustable distributable earnings would be per quarter during 3Q and 4Q? Approximately what amount would come from this transaction, from the coach deal, taking into account the higher share count? My apologies, Pablo, might I ask you to say that again? I didn't catch the front-party question. Well, I'm simply attempting to figure out the effect on adjustable distributable earnings stemming from the coach transaction. For instance, how many cents does it contribute, let's say, during the fourth quarter calculated on a full run rate basis? Approximately, if that's possible.
Phil Silverman
executiveYes, I appreciate the question. Guidance isn't something we offer regarding shifts in distributable earnings for upcoming quarters, yet as I mentioned during the prepared remarks, since the loans extended are backed by real estate and qualify as assets for the REIT income and asset tests, the income produced by these properties at the contractual rate along with any exit fees shall be distributable income, even when it isn't shown on the income statement under GAAP inside the company's financial statements. Thus, the fixed profile, so to speak, of the loans at 12 percent represents the yield plus any exit fees on the upside. Guidance on the pro forma distributable earnings isn't something I will provide. Okay.
Analyst
analystOkay, that works. Thanks. And then only a few additional ones, if that's okay, plus I owe an apology to another person waiting in the Q&A line; so. So you had that early on, I mean, when it comes to prepayments, I suppose it's par for the course, That sort of thing will occur, but has anything changed? Are you observing a higher level of early repayments compared with before? And if that's the case, what's driving it? Or is it merely the usual cadence? Sorry, Peter, I'm not sure whether my connection is fine. I apologize. Could you say the question again? No. Yes. When it comes to the early repayments, I'm aware that's par for the course, correct? But you recorded roughly 19 million, specifically loan number 37. As I recall, that was scheduled for November, 2028; so 17 million from that. Relative to earlier quarters, is anything shifting? Are you seeing a greater amount of early repayments? And if that's the case, what's the reason?.
Peter Sack
executivePerhaps not; it's merely the usual cadence. No, nothing materially different. I believe we can proceed. Sorry, continue Papa. Sorry.
Analyst
analystSo nothing major has shifted. And with the possibility of improvement, consistent scheduling, plus all of these favorable reform applications, are you noticing that certain prospective borrowers in your cannabis pipeline are pausing while they wait for such developments, or are folks continuing to move forward.
Peter Sack
executiveand working with you. What we're really observing is the reverse. Demand for debt capital is growing, since operators perceive a chance to expand, to acquire, to invest. as these possible regulatory shifts approach. Especially when it comes to M&A, operators view this as perhaps a final window to merge, acquire in...
Analyst
analystWhen valuations are low, that picture might shift down the road. Fine. Then for the final question, I just want your perspective on the broader cannabis landscape, even though you speak with nearly every company out there, uh. First off, from where I sit, whenever I listen to the majority of MSO calls, they provide guidance or expectations regarding quite a few macro matters, yet no guidance has been offered about when they anticipate the IRS or the Treasury will put out guidance concerning tax debt relief, 280 debt relief. In your view, do you think that arrives prior to us getting REC rescheduling, or does it only emerge once REC rescheduling has happened? I realize this is a crystal ball kind of question, but I'm simply attempting to hear your opinion on it.
Peter Sack
executiveMy sense is that market participants hold the belief that tax relief tied to rescheduling takes effect for medical operators at the same time as the Department of Justice order, in connection with adult use and its rescheduling process. Only time will reveal the answer. Right, it's more centered on the tax debt question, correct? Still, I follow what you're saying. Oh, the tax. My apologies. Yeah, I'd say guidance is quite scarce and it's hard to predict. In our underwriting process, we treat that IRS tax debt as debt.
Analyst
analystThat's also something we heavily weigh when underwriting. Right. And, Peter, apologies, just one final, final item. An increasing number of businesses are discussing the possibility that trade between states could be close at hand following the rescheduling of REC, correct? My own view is that I don't agree. More businesses keep bringing that up, referencing the dormant commerce clause, saying it's bound to occur eventually, and fairly soon if you believe certain companies out there. When you're underwriting, how do you weigh the chance of interstate trade and what effect that would have on a few of your borrowers?.
Peter Sack
executiveIn our underwriting, I'd say we have a... I'd say diversified retail portfolios give you stronger credit protection. Along with limited... limited license regulatory moats, varied retail portfolios deliver extra geographic moats; plus extra diversity when it comes to EBITDA generation. I'd also say retail portfolios tend to be better insulated from dangers tied to interstate commerce. Even if product can move across state lines, operators will still need retail licenses in order to market and sell product to the end consumer. I'd say our tilt toward EBIT generation from retail, EBIT generation powered by brand strength, already shields our portfolio fairly well from interstate commerce; yet I'd say, Pablo, I share your feelings that states can be quite effective at erecting moats and barriers against interstate commerce in order to protect industries and to protect jobs that have been built up in this industry locally over the course of the last decade. And so my belief is that the shift toward greater accessibility of interstate commerce, should it start, is going to be a gradual process.
Operator
operatorThat wraps up the question and answer portion. We have now finished the conference. Thanks for joining us for today's presentation. You're welcome to disconnect at this point; this live transcript is generated automatically, with no human involvement or review.
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