Claros Mortgage Trust, Inc. (CMTG) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

July 30, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Real Estate Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) earnings 42 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Anh Huynh

executive
#1

Thanks. With me are Richard Mack, who is CEO and Chairman of Claros Mortgage Trust, plus Mike McGillis, our President, CFO, and Director of Claros Mortgage Trust. Also joining us is Priyanka Garg, Executive Vice President of CMTG and President of Mack Real Estate Group. Before we started, CMTG's earnings release and supplement went out. Please look at those materials alongside what we share during today's call. Should anything come up, reach out to me. A reminder that forward-looking statements may be part of today's call, as defined under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Various important factors, including those covered in our SEC filings, could cause actual results to differ materially from what those forward-looking statements indicate. Any forward-looking statements we make today reflect our views only as of today, and no obligation is undertaken to update them. Today's call will also include references to certain non-GAAP financial measures, like distributable earnings, which we think may matter to investors when assessing our operating performance. Reconciliation of non-GAAP measures to their nearest GAAP equivalent can be found in the earnings supplement. I'll now hand the call to Richard.

Richard Mack

executive
#2

I appreciate that, Anh, and good morning everyone — thanks for being here with us for CMTG's earnings call covering the second quarter of 2026. When it comes to the wider macro picture, investors keep facing a mix of openings and obstacles. Inflation is still running hotter than the levels targeted, rates of interest have stayed high, and geopolitical events keep fueling stretches of turbulence in financial markets. Meanwhile, conditions in commercial real estate have largely gotten better, helped along by a scarce pipeline of new construction, solid amounts of capital looking for a home, and a pickup in deal activity; against that background, our second quarter results show we're still making headway — painful headway, mind you — on the path back to originating loans on transitional real estate. As we've said before, our 2026 strategic priorities consist of turning over the portfolio, resolving watchlist loans, repositioning our REO assets, and de-leveraging the balance sheet. Our second quarter results along with activity so far in July speak to that dedication to pursuing these goals. Among the highlights: another $482 million of loan and REO resolutions, three watchlist loans included among them; through these resolutions we lowered leverage, brought in extra liquidity, and cut our watchlist loan exposure, all while getting closer to a point where capital allocation decisions become possible. On last quarter's call, we noted eight lender-driven sale processes running across our portfolio. Those processes produced pricing discovery on liquidation values relative to how we see the inherent worth of the underlying assets over a longer horizon. While demand across these sales processes has largely been robust, in some instances the pricing came in below what we expected, particularly within the multifamily sector, which we'd have thought would hold up better given the demand we observe from investors in that asset class. So, in line with our stated goals, we booked additional specific CECL reserves in the quarter against certain office and Sun Belt multifamily loans to capture anticipated near-term resolutions. We likewise wrote down the carrying value of two REO assets that we shifted to held-for-sale. These adjustments brought Q2 2026 book value to $8.58 per share. The drop in book value stems mostly from nine loan and REO positions in the portfolio. What remains of the portfolio falls into three buckets. First, 15 loans on accrual that are subject to general CECL reserves. Two of them repaid in July, and we presently expect the other 13 loans to repay in full, mirroring the $464 million of UPB that has seen full repayments so far this calendar year. Second, just four loans carry specific CECL reserves and have yet to undergo price discovery, and they're likely to be longer-term resolutions. Finally, there are seven more REO assets with carrying values that are appropriate and possibly some upside; these provisions show our dedication to turning over the portfolio, resolving watchlist loans and REO assets, de-leveraging the balance sheet, and building liquidity so we can reallocate capital toward more accretive uses in the near future. With our strategic priorities moving forward, our hope is that the gap between book value and stock price becomes narrower. That being said, we recognize that getting back to a loan portfolio that's largely performing, completing other accretive deals like buybacks of shares, and eventually reinstating a dividend will require time. Staying focused on carrying out these priorities ought to leave us well positioned to achieve those aims. As I've mentioned previously, difficult choices were necessary across the past 2 years. Even though more remains to be done, given where we stand today, we think we've mostly gotten past the worst and now anticipate being able to decide on capital allocation during the quarters ahead, potentially involving originations of new loans, further de-leveraging, putting money into select REO assets, and repurchasing shares. These strategic priorities have our commitment since they're required for us to take advantage of what we expect will be a more and more appealing investment backdrop for CMTG as time goes on. I'll hand the call to Mike now.

Mike McGillis

executive
#3

Richard, thanks. CMTG posted, for Q2 2026, a GAAP net loss amounting to $1.81 per share, alongside a distributable loss of $0.63 per share. Before realized gains and losses, the distributable loss came in at $0.07 per share. Throughout that quarter and into July, our attention stayed on carrying out the strategic priorities Richard laid out, wrapping up an additional $482 million in total loan and REO resolutions — among them $223 million in regular way repayments. We put the money from those resolutions toward cutting leverage by $346 million, and liquidity as a whole climbed from $116 million on May 5th to $168 million by July 24th. In Q2, we took care of a single watch list loan via foreclosure; it was a $25 million, 5-rated loan backed by a multifamily property located in the Dallas MSA. We likewise finished selling one of our Dallas multifamily REO assets, which had first been foreclosed upon in July 2025, generating gross proceeds of roughly $47 million — a touch above our carrying value. After the quarter closed, July proved busy. Through a loan sale, we resolved a watch list loan, bringing in gross proceeds of $70.7 million. As of June 30th, that loan sat classified as held-for-sale. It was a San Francisco office loan, originated in February 2020, that ran into serious difficulties. Since early 2022, it had been on our watch list. Given our strategy of turning over the book, we concluded now was the moment to sell, with the San Francisco market recovering. After quarter end, we resolved another watch list loan through a discounted payoff, producing gross proceeds of $70 million against a $75 million UPB, or 94% of par. A multifamily property in the Salt Lake City MSA secured that loan. Once the discounted payoff was agreed upon, the loan was downgraded to a 5 during the quarter. Last, after quarter end, two loans with a combined $223 million of UPB were repaid in full. Multifamily assets collateralized both loans — one in Seattle, one in Chicago. To sum up, since Q2 began, we've resolved five loans totaling $435 million of UPB prior to principal charge-offs, three of which were watch list loans totaling $212 million of UPB. So far this year, we've resolved 10 loans totaling $1 billion of UPB prior to principal charge-offs, seven of which were watch list loans totaling $647 million of UPB. Our watch list loans have declined steadily — from $2.7 billion at year-end 2024, to $1.7 billion at year-end 2025, to $1.1 billion today. After the July resolutions, our portfolio now holds 23 loans, or $3.1 billion of UPB, plus nine REO assets with a total carrying value of $724 million. Now to portfolio credit. Like Richard mentioned, the marketing efforts for our loan and REO asset sales, combined with our objective of cycling through the portfolio, resulted in downgrades for four loans, higher specific reserves on three loans, and the reclassification of two REO assets into held-for-sale. Three loans, with a total UPB of $372 million, saw their risk rating move from four down to five, largely because of price discovery during our lender-driven sales processes. To settle these loans now, CMTG must satisfy purchaser return thresholds that are still elevated given today's interest rate environment. Because of those downgrades, we recorded specific CECL provisions of $109 million, or $0.75 per share, on these loans, which shows our dedication to carrying out our stated goals and our readiness to transact at current levels. The fourth loan downgraded is the $75 million Utah multifamily loan referenced earlier. During the quarter, after negotiating the 94% discounted payoff that closed following quarter end, this loan's risk rating went from three to five. As Richard noted, beyond those four downgrades, we raised specific CECL reserves on three additional loans previously rated five, in order to capture real-time market feedback from our lender-driven sales processes. Based on what those sales processes told us, we booked extra specific CECL provisions of $74 million, or $0.51 per share, in Q2, which once again demonstrates our commitment to executing our stated goals and our willingness to transact at today's levels. At quarter end, our total specific CECL reserve stood at $517 million, averaging 32% of related UPB. Though some of these watch list loans may hold greater collateral value over a longer horizon, we view these risk ratings and reserve levels as suitable given our stated aim of turning over the book in the near term and broadly aligning our book value with those objectives. Our general CECL reserve in gross dollar terms stayed roughly flat QoQ at about $50 million. Yet measured as a percentage of UPB for loans subject to the general reserve, that reserve rose from 2.3%-2.9% of UPB. Now to REO. At quarter end, we moved our mixed-use REO asset along with one of our multifamily REO assets into held-for-sale at carrying values we anticipate transacting at within the next few months. Consequently, we recognized a loss on reclassification to held-for-sale of $30 million, or $0.21 per share, for the quarter. As anticipated, our New York City hotel portfolio delivered better performance quarter-on-quarter thanks to expected seasonality. This portfolio added $0.3 per share of distributable earnings, an improvement of $0.5 per share versus the first quarter and an improvement of $0.2 per share versus Q2 2025. Operating performance for our multifamily REO portfolio stayed consistent with Q1 results. We remain focused on boosting property performance, finishing targeted capital improvements where appropriate, and actively assessing monetization opportunities throughout the multifamily portfolio. Buyer interest in a number of our REO assets continues to be encouraging, and although prices at which the market clears have occasionally come in below what we expected, our view remains that in most instances, moving these assets into REO has generated value beyond what a loan sale would have delivered. Now to the balance sheet. Over the quarter, we brought outstanding financings down on a net basis by about $66 million, which included $20 million in deleveraging payments. Even so, our ratio of net debt to equity rose to 2.0x from 1.7x as of March 31st, largely because book value declined due to added CECL provisions and losses on REO held for sale recorded in the quarter. After resolutions completed so far in July and further financing repayments totaling $299 million, that net debt-to-equity ratio has fallen to 1.7x on a pro forma basis. Liquidity stood at $103 million when the quarter ended, with cash accounting for $90 million. By July 24th, our liquidity had grown to $168 million. Beyond that, an unencumbered asset pool of $509 million in loan UPB and REO carrying value keeps giving us financial flexibility, and we are currently working through sales of some of those assets that we expect to produce roughly $140 million in added liquidity. On the whole, we have made strong headway on the objectives we laid out: turning over the portfolio, resolving watchlist loans, repositioning REO assets, and bringing down leverage on the balance sheet. Ours has been a deliberate, consistent strategy. As we keep executing on those priorities, we believe CMTG will be well-positioned for the company's next phase. At this point I'd like to open the call for questions. Operator?

Rick Shane

analyst
#4

Hi, everyone. Thanks for fielding my questions today. I really appreciate all the detail you've provided. So, you've got property sales happening. You've also got loan sales happening. What I'd like to know is: which kinds of investors and which kinds of buyers are you seeing out there? Another thing—yesterday we had a call in a neighboring sector where a really big company mentioned that volumes were lower in Q2 because of rate volatility, and that basically put a freeze on their markets. Since you're currently operating as net sellers, I'm wondering how behavior and feedback have shifted, and whether the rate volatility we've been seeing has had any kind of chilling effect?

Priyanka Garg

executive
#5

Hello, Rick, this is Priyanka. I'll kick things off, and then perhaps Richard may want to chime in. That's a really relevant question—it's something we've discussed quite a bit. For your first question about what kinds of investors: since certain of these assets demand significant operational attention, we're seeing many local players who will work out assets, in both multi-family and office. These are local GP players who are seeking to partner with LP capital. That LP comes from various places, but a great deal of it is private family offices and private investors; we're seeing that less in the more private equity hedge fund space, which actually leads nicely into the second part of what you asked. Yes, volatility is definitely something we're seeing. Much of that volatility is what's driving the additional CECL reserves we took this quarter, along with some of those downgrades. Investors just have higher return thresholds, and that's being pushed by rate volatility, plus the availability of LP capital, because I think that LP capital—which has a broader range of investment options—is being allocated differently, and they're waiting for what they believe will be better opportunities ahead. To wrap up my comments: we are extremely committed to turning over the book. We're meeting the market. You can see that in the book value we just reported, and we believe we can reach those levels. Richard, would you like to add anything?

Rick Shane

analyst
#6

My apologies, Richard.

Richard Mack

executive
#7

Rick, if I could just jump in on that, Rick — I appreciate the question. The fascinating piece here is the sheer depth we're seeing among potential purchasers. There are occasions when a bid list will draw 20 people. As Priyanka points out, the swings can be severe. At times a price comes in far above what we'd anticipated; at other times it lands well below. In my view, that mirrors the many participants out there, the expensive cost of capital, differing views on underwriting, and how much rates are moving. Whenever we bring something to market, our aim is to be prudent while also staying opportunistic. If bids arrive that strike us as attractive, we're inclined to accept them. If they don't — and particularly when a bid sits at the far end of that volatility range, especially with rates shifting daily — often we'd rather record a CECL reserve, keep the asset, work to create a bit more value, and then take it back out. This is simply a marketplace where pricing fluctuates enormously. To me, that partly mirrors a somewhat negative leverage setting in certain asset classes, along with an enormous supply of debt capital, though equity is not as plentiful. I hope that answer is comprehensive.

Rick Shane

analyst
#8

Understood. Richard, that actually connects to what I wanted to ask next, which is this: given that you're heading toward a situation with somewhat greater liquidity and beginning to put some capital back to work, what's your thinking on offering seller financing for certain property dispositions, recognizing that the market has doubts about it, yet it also lessens certain frictions on your end and could let you extend credit in scenarios you know quite well?

Richard Mack

executive
#9

Yeah, so I'll pass this over to Priyanka shortly, but our approach will be opportunistic. Broadly speaking, plenty of capital exists for buyers, people who have reset bases on these assets and capital at fairly tight spreads, propelled by extremely cheap cost of capital on warehouse lines provided by the banks. Doing that isn't frequently necessary for us, but should somebody propose, "Hey, take back some junior paper or subsidize something and we'll deliver something that, on a present value basis, we think is more appealing for our investors," naturally we'd certainly consider it. Priyanka, let me just hand this over to you.

Priyanka Garg

executive
#10

Alright, thank you, Richard. So, Rick, one subject that frequently arises from our side while we work through these sorts of transactions — what we've discovered is that providing financing to buyers typically won't boost the valuation in a way that matches our objectives. The amount we get from a sale probably won't increase, given how intently we concentrate on unlocking the book value and equity tied up within every one of those holdings. Honestly, since our leverage sits far beneath that of numerous competitors who extend seller financing, substantial embedded equity exists when we sell. Once we calculate it, offering such financing generally fails to make financial sense.

Rick Shane

analyst
#11

Great. We really appreciate you taking our questions today.

Priyanka Garg

executive
#12

Thanks.

Marissa Lobo

analyst
#13

Morning, and thanks for fielding this. Turning to the restart of originations, could you walk us through how the schedule looks when you factor in the five risk-weighted population and where rates stand right now? On the balance sheet side, what kind of performance are you watching for, and which milestones need to be hit before origination activity picks back up?

Mike McGillis

executive
#14

Appreciate that, Marissa. Let me kick things off, and then Priyanka or Richard can jump in. As we've mentioned previously, once we reach a point where we can look at other ways to allocate capital, new origination among them, our focus really needs to be on bringing down watchlist assets held in the portfolio, keeping up our REO monetization work, and taking leverage out of the balance sheet — that means both asset-level financings and the term financing facility we have at the corporate level. When you add all of that together, it positions us to begin assessing fresh origination opportunities. Naming a specific timeline is tough, since some of these moves aren't entirely within our control. Our sense is that the latter part of this year and early next year is the window when we'll be ready to put capital back to work in new originations.

Marissa Lobo

analyst
#15

All right, I appreciate that.

Priyanka Garg

executive
#16

There's nothing further I can contribute on that point.

Marissa Lobo

analyst
#17

All right. When it comes to how the San Francisco office loan got resolved at $0.63 on the dollar, could you discuss that alongside the other office credits rated five, and also address whether reserves on those are sufficient?

Priyanka Garg

executive
#18

Yes. I appreciate the question. During our prepared remarks we mentioned that this originated in February 2020. Everyone in this business knows that timing matters more than almost anything else. The basis was quite high, and the timing honestly could hardly have been worse. What I believe we handled really well, though, was showing some patience, since had we disposed of this loan twelve months back, my sense is the market clearing price would have been roughly fifty percent of what it eventually turned out to be. Our aim was that, with San Francisco improving, we hoped to move at the front end of a process driven by lenders looking to sell, so we could truly drum up interest. Richard mentioned this before — the bid sheet here was incredibly deep, and that simply would not have happened earlier. Possibly there might have been fewer dollars available had we held off a bit. Getting in early and having everyone engaged in one of the earlier lender-driven opportunities genuinely benefited us. That asset struck me as quite distinctive given the market where it sits. You'll see we recorded specific additional reserves against two of the remaining office buildings; those reflect what we're seeing in today's market. Those were quite live updates. We believe our reserves on those are appropriate. That leaves just two other office assets across our whole portfolio. Each is quite distinctive within its own market and truly fits into the have versus have-not buckets. It lands squarely among the haves when it comes to a newly renovated amenity base that tenants demand. On the whole, we believe our reserves are solid. That San Francisco loan was simply a one-off situation driven by timing.

Marissa Lobo

analyst
#19

Understood. Thanks for such a thorough response, I appreciate it.

Priyanka Garg

executive
#20

Thanks for asking.

John Nickodemus

analyst
#21

Hi there, I appreciate you making room for me today. I realize the quarter had its share of movement on the leverage front. It sounds as though that's declining after the quarter closed. I also saw that net interest income turned slightly negative over the course of the quarter. Considering the de-leveraging moves already made so far in the third quarter and what's slated to get going across the back half of the year, what kind of path might net interest income take as we move toward the close of 2026? Thank you.

Mike McGillis

executive
#22

Thank you, John. I'm glad you raised that. There are, I'd say, a few things driving it. It's worth remembering that roughly 1/3 of the interest expense we carry is tied to the corporate term loan financing. We took on that financing in January of this year in order to retire our prior term loan. Our aim there is to pay it down as fast as we reasonably can, while also continuing to pay down financings across our other direct asset financing facilities; against that background, I want to stress that whenever we work out a watchlist loan or an underperforming asset and retire the associated financing, our net interest income will get better because interest expense goes down. Similarly, any direct de-leveraging through ordinary repayments, even if it lowers interest on loans that are performing, could lower interest income. If we take the total recovery from that and apply it to de-lever, that too will work to bring interest expense down. Predicting precisely how this plays out is difficult, but I believe that as we keep resolving assets, especially watchlist assets, de-leverage the portfolio, and reach a point where we can rebuild the portfolio and retire the term loan, that should in time serve as a catalyst for lifting NOI and net investment income on the loan portfolio.

John Nickodemus

analyst
#23

Excellent. That level of specifics is genuinely useful, Mike — thank you.

Mike McGillis

executive
#24

Right.

John Nickodemus

analyst
#25

Following up on what I asked before, and using those pro forma numbers from page 5 of your supplement, the loan portfolio has dropped roughly $1 billion — it stood at $3.1 billion when you released results. So I'm wondering, with your present plans and your outlook for the remaining part of the year, what's the lowest the portfolio could fall to by the close of 2026? Thanks.

Mike McGillis

executive
#26

Let me take that first, and then Priyanka can add her thoughts. Clearly, as we handle ordinary course repayments across a big share of the performing loan book, and given our aim of exiting some of those five and five-rated credits, I believe the portfolio is going to contract quite a bit. Whether that happens before this year ends or at some point in early 2027, we'll have to wait and see. There are quite a few loans among the performing group where the borrowers are busy pursuing refinancings or selling assets, so we'd anticipate getting repaid on those. Like we've mentioned, our top priorities involve turning the portfolio over and getting rid of the four and five-rated loans over time via those different sale processes. It's tough to name a figure, though it's reasonable to say the decline will keep going until we return to originating and can begin building the loan portfolio back up.

Priyanka Garg

executive
#27

Right. The one point I'd tack on is that this represents close to $1 billion of activity — loans our borrowers are actively selling or refinancing, plus the lender-driven sales we've spent the past quarter and a half talking about. A great deal of it could still play out. We're all aware of how volatile conditions are right now, and I don't believe everything lands by the end of the year or in first quarter 2027, though that's possible. I'm definitely with Mike that on a percentage basis, we'll see a meaningful drop from where we stand today.

John Nickodemus

analyst
#28

Great. I truly appreciate you both taking the time, Priyanka and Mike. That's everything from my side.

Mike McGillis

executive
#29

Awesome. Thank you, John.

Priyanka Garg

executive
#30

Thanks.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#31

Thanks. Compared with what you had anticipated for the first quarter, on credit did conditions deteriorate, improve, or perhaps stay roughly the same as the quarter went on?

Priyanka Garg

executive
#32

Let me begin with credit. From where I sit, the sole element that deteriorated involves satisfying what buyers expect in the marketplace. Since this year started, and continuing through the close of the first quarter, their required returns have clearly climbed; they now underwrite to higher returns, and to satisfy the market that plainly forces us to lower our pricing, which is exactly what shows up in the book value we reported today. That has been a letdown, yet I'd say all other aspects, including pace and the billions of dollars in resolutions so far this year, look fine. We did $2.5 billion in the prior year, and that was an extremely busy year. The rhythm of transactions seems healthy, and especially given that we've said we will satisfy the market in the majority of cases, on the whole I believe we are positioned well to deliver on the objectives we have stated.

Mike McGillis

executive
#33

Jade, allow me to jump in here.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#34

Richard, is there a—

Mike McGillis

executive
#35

Pardon me. Jade, simply—

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#36

Please, go ahead.

Mike McGillis

executive
#37

One more point was on my mind, and after that I'll get to your question. My apologies. What I wanted to mention is that when it comes to refinancing, the activity for loans that are performing has been extremely robust, and that is the area where repayments came in. You could call it a split kind of market: for assets that are performing, plenty of capital exists to refinance them, while for assets that are not performing, the bid sees a great deal of volatility. My apologies, Jade, go right ahead.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#38

Is there some range you're considering for where book value could hit its lowest point?

Richard Mack

executive
#39

I'm not sure that's something we're prepared to address. Mike, perhaps you'd like to take that one.

Mike McGillis

executive
#40

No, I think.

Richard Mack

executive
#41

I think we

Mike McGillis

executive
#42

I'll take a crack at it. There's no way for me to give you a real number on that, Jade, though my sense is that we believe we've absorbed some fairly sizable write-downs tied to the active sale processes we're in the middle of at this moment. My sense is that I feel fairly confident about that. Clearly, should operating losses keep coming for a few quarters, book value will keep getting eroded. My sense is that a good chunk of this is now behind us, yet until those assets leave the portfolio, my sense is that calling a bottom is premature. My sense is that we've made some fairly aggressive moves during this quarter.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#43

Okay, so how do you view multifamily? From what I understand, quite a few commercial mortgage REITs have taken pretty significant loss severity on multifamily. Yet other firms have recorded only minimal losses on multifamily loans rated risk 4 or 5, maybe somewhere around 5% to 10%. Generally, that seems like a lower loss severity than what office has produced. With rates staying elevated and putting downward pressure on multifamily valuations, do you think that picture will change? Or do you feel people are seeing better supply absorption and are thus optimistic about 2027?

Richard Mack

executive
#44

Okay. That's a great question, and honestly a very hard one to answer. The situation really depends on which market you're looking at. My sense is that in the Sun Belt, we're still going to see a high level of deliveries. Across 2026 and 2027, the U.S. should see 400,000 units come online. The Sun Belt accounts for 60% of that figure. Normally, the U.S. averages roughly 280,000 deliveries. So deliveries are running high nationwide, and especially in the Sun Belt, yet absorption remains quite robust. That said, deportation is a factor, along with reverse migration, particularly in the Sun Belt, and it's the lower quality assets that are dragging on the market. Then you have places like L.A. and Seattle, where local government simply can't function effectively, and valuations there have fallen. Even so, in places such as New York, we observe rents climbing at a remarkable pace while cap rates sit at quite depressed levels. Whether we're talking about demand, growth in rental income, new supply, or consequently cap rates, the picture really varies from one sub-market to the next. On top of that, you add interest rates, which introduce additional swings. My sense is that the uneven outcomes across multifamily stem from the fact that this asset class functions somewhat like fixed income. Rates are swinging quite a bit, and similarly, the balance of supply against demand is swinging quite a bit across each of these different markets. The only real way to get a handle on this is to look at each individual market and talk through how supply and demand are either balanced or out of balance in that particular market.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#45

The bulk of that exposure sits within the Sun Belt. In your view, will multifamily cap rates across the Sun Belt head higher?

Richard Mack

executive
#46

Should interest rates keep climbing, I believe you'll witness that upward movement. Assuming rates hold steady, I'd say there's at least some optimism when peering toward the close of 2027, or really when simply examining construction starts, which have fallen away — the sole silver lining being that starts have fallen away. Completions keep coming, yet starts truly have fallen away; whether folks anticipate that is the real question. When rates have given people an optimistic tilt, they've behaved more aggressively in anticipating that decline in starts. Once rates turn them pessimistic, they're less inclined to do so. My read is flat to lower absent any rate movement.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#47

Okay.

Richard Mack

executive
#48

Rate movement down, I should say.

Jade Rahmani

analyst
#49

Thanks very much. Appreciate it.

Richard Mack

executive
#50

Thank you.

Richard Mack

executive
#51

Thanks once more to everyone for being here. CMTG just went through a quarter that was challenging yet fruitful. So far this year, resolutions have reached $1 billion, which shows that financing is available in the market. Bid-ask spreads remain wide, pricing stays volatile, and worries about interest rates persist — all of which have held transaction volume at a modest level, though we hope it is getting better. We will keep steering through these conditions with effort and tough choices as we reposition the portfolio and return to allocating capital. Thanks again for being with us.

Operator

operator
#52

This concludes today's call. Thank you for attending. You may now disconnect.

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