Delivery Hero SE (DHER) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Good day, and welcome to the Delivery Hero Half Year Report 2020 Conference Call. Today's conference is being recorded. At this time, I would like to turn the conference over to Daniel Fard-Yazdani. Please go ahead.

Hello, everyone. Good morning or good afternoon, and welcome to our today's conference call. In the past, we haven't always hosted a call on the publication of our half year report. But given the announcement of the acquisition of InstaShop today, we wanted to offer this additional touch point for you. You have probably all seen the press release in the morning and have received the H1 report and also the slide deck for this call by e-mail. If not, of course, all documents are available on our website. Niklas will start the call with a summary of the InstaShop acquisition before Emmanuel is going to give some remarks on the H1 results. And after that short introduction, we will open it up for your questions. [Operator Instructions] And with that, let me hand over to you, Niklas.

Thanks, Daniel, and hey, everyone, and welcome to our call today. We hope you are staying safe and healthy. So after a strong Q2 and a very good start into Q3, we are happy to now also announce the acquisition of InstaShop. We believe this is a fantastic acquisition that fits perfectly to our strategy. They have made great progress in the quick commerce space and, in particular, around groceries. We're already active in this field in 2 ways: We act as an agent where we deliver groceries that customers have shopped at one of more than 20,000 vendors we partner with; and we are also acting as a principal when it comes to our own Dmart. So that's our small warehouse that's positioned close to our customers. We believe the opportunity in grocery is large. And with this acquisition, we gain further capabilities and speed. We have known the InstaShop team for over a year or well over a year, and during this time, we have put very strong conviction in their team and their products as well as their service. Compared to the 100-plus other grocery platforms that we have also looked into, the InstaShop experience is a magnitude better than anything else we have seen over the last few years. And we believe that together with Delivery Hero, we can further leverage our logistic capabilities, Dmart's product and marketing experience to further help them grow even faster. The current strength in MENA is, of course, an extra bonus for us. As you know, this is a key region to us, where we will continue to push strong partnerships, product offering and service to provide a world-class service to the people in this region. So then going to some background on the numbers. So since Ioanna and John founded InstaShop in 2015, they have launched the service in 5 countries in MENA that you can see in this chart here. It's a pure marketplace, meaning that vendors are responsible for picking and delivering. The average delivery time is 45 minutes, which is great for being a marketplace, but slow compared to our market. They currently have about 1,500 vendors as partners on their platform and around 50,000 active customers in the first half of 2020. And just qualitatively, we have been amazed by their cohort data. It's been significantly better than any other grocery platform we have seen, and we think this is a further evidence to have built that best customer experience. Revenue is generated from commission rates paid by vendor, fixed fee paid by customers and revenue from CPG companies for visibility and other. We come to deal structure, then we go to Slide 4 to give some details. Here, you can see we have acquired 100% of the outstanding shares of InstaShop based on the valuation of USD 360 million. The initial price was paid -- or the initial price that we paid was USD 270 million, approximately. As you know, it's important to us to keep strong founder teams on board of the companies we acquire. We want them to continue to drive the business forward and expand it. Given our scale, platform and network, we are confident that we can significantly contribute to this, and we want the founders to know that they will also prosper from the value creation we generate together. So hence, there isn't a deferred component of the purchase price that's dependent on the growth and the profitability of InstaShop in the future years. We will, of course, be more than happy if that component is going to be very sizable as it means that the business has increased significantly in size, but also in profit in the near term or mid-term. To put valuation in perspective, using Q2 2020 as a run rate basis, InstaShop stands at an annualized GMV number of around USD 300 million, which corresponds to an increase of about 330% year-on-year. And importantly, while doing so and having this fantastic growth, they've also recorded a positive EBITDA for the first 6 months of this year. So overall, to recap, I think it's fair to say that the company is not only on super-fast growth mode, but has proven the business model by bringing it into profitability already. We are excited about the additional growth that we can achieve together, and we are ready to invest into the expansion of the footprint, even if that would mean to forego profits for a while. Together with the management team of InstaShop, we want to utilize as much of the potential that we see in the asset in the coming years. So with that, I'll hand over to Emmanuel to give some remarks on the H1 report. Thank you, everyone.

Thanks, Niklas, and good afternoon, everyone also on my side. Like was mentioned already, we are using this opportunity to give a small update on the H1 numbers, even though we already published most of it in our Q2 trading update a month ago. The numbers we have published then have really changed, but in the report released today, we have now also included an update for profitability by segment. So moving to Slide 6. And here, first, I'd like to reiterate some of the impressive numbers and growth numbers on the top part of the slide. In the first 6 months of this year, order numbers have increased by 93% year-on-year to 519 million, and GMV was up by 63% year-on-year to EUR 5.1 billion. And just as the orders, our total segment revenues was also -- have also almost doubled over the first 6 months '19 with an increase of 94% to EUR 1.1 billion. And all numbers -- all these numbers have an accelerated year-on-year growth in Q2 this year. As you note here, total segment revenues are defined before the effect of deducting for revenue discount, which are -- mostly are vouchers we use to acquire new customers. And the proportion of this discount to revenue stood at 16% for the first 6 months of the year, and that compared to 12.2% in the first 6 months 2019 and to 17.5% in the second half of last year. So you see that we strongly increased the use of vouchers in the course of '19, and a good part of this in Asia and specifically in Korea. But we are now on the downward trend that we have guided to before. In terms of profitability, our gross profit was stable year-on-year and reached EUR 167 million in H1 2020 after EUR 168 million in the same period of 2019. And given the strong growth we have shown the gross profit margin, therefore, down at 17.5% compared to 32.9% in the same period of the prior year. We have already mentioned the factors for that in the Q2 trading update, but let me reiterate them here. So the main reasons we've lost revenues and the corresponding profit contribution for the MENA segment due to COVID-19-related restrictions. We have stated that this effect alone accounting for EUR 45 million to EUR 55 million in gross profit for the first 6 months. Maybe here a short comment on the MENA region. We've seen that the restrictions being lifted during the last weeks and months. And on August 30, for this month, the curfews in Kuwait will end, which means that the last parallel market will be without curfews again. Furthermore, and this is the second aspect, our delivery share in Asia increased year-on-year, and we initiated several measures to support restaurants during the COVID-19, such as the waiving of the onboarding fees and also like free delivery campaigns to support the local restaurants. And lastly, the fast opening of [indiscernible] across almost all segments impact negatively the gross profit margin in the first 6 months, but this negative impact is obviously not permanent. Now looking at the EBITDA margin. The numbers for the group have been confirmed and to be at negative minus 28.4% for the first 6 months, therefore, slightly up compared to the same period of time last year, so H1 2019. If you look at the 4 geographies of our platform business, all regions show an improvement in the EBITDA margin. The integrated vertical segments that we introduced this year stood at minus 43% after the first 6 months of 2020. Now let's move to the next slide finally. And also in terms of guidance, nothing really huge here. As you can see on Slide 7, we are fully conserving the guidance that we have updated a month ago. Remember that we have raised our guidance for total segments revenue in the range for between EUR 2.6 billion to EUR 2.8 billion, up from EUR 2.4 billion to EUR 2.6 billion year before. And the EBITDA margin is seen in range between minus 14% to minus 18% for the full year 2020. We also have reserved an additional flexibility of up to EUR 150 million, of which EUR 20 million to EUR 30 million are earmarked for the launch of our activities in Japan. Talking about profitability, I would like also here to mention again the guidance for 2 of our segments, which is Europe and MENA. For Europe, we expect to reach breakeven on the full year basis in 2020. And despite the impact I mentioned from COVID-19 on the MENA segment, we still expect this segment to generate an adjusted EBITDA higher than 2019 in absolute terms. So with that short recap of our numbers, I would like to thank you for your attention, and we are now looking forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

[Operator Instructions] We will now take our first question from Giles Thorne from Jefferies.

My first question -- well, both questions are on InstaShop. First one is the grocery marketplace model is now pretty common. But having all the merchant partners do the delivery, as is the case with InstaShop, feels less common. And grocery today is, as I'm sure you are definitely aware, has been mostly crystallized by the platform doing the delivery. So InstaShop stands out a little bit as being different. It'd be interesting to know why in each countries of operation, the vendors are generally doing the delivery rather than the platform? And second question is, I've certainly interpreted some optimism around dark stores from many dimensions, but one of them being that the economics there are broadly better than the merchant partner model. And yet, you've gone out and bought a merchant partner grocery marketplace. So a bit more into the logic to the deal. Why didn't you use that capital for more dark stores, for example? And then kind of if you could add any color around how this will impact your allocation of capital going forward? That was it.

Perfect. Okay, Giles. So I'll try to answer those 2 questions. We -- they've taken the approach of being more of a marketplace, but it doesn't mean that all the vendors are doing their own delivery. They're often outsource to delivery experts in the region. So logistics might still be organized in a professional manner, even if it's not actually organized means to shop and stuff. I think they have been very successful in doing that. So I have nothing against doing that. Of course, I do think that we have the best logistic efficiencies and so on. If someone else can make an additional margin on that logistic, then maybe there is something to be looked into that because I don't think anyone will be able to do more margins than what we can do. But I'm generally not against letting someone else deliver. And in this case, they have proven that they have been generating very good cohorts. Their reorder rate is very, very high, and it's a profitable business. And if they do that by externalizing logistics, that was interesting. I think when it comes to Dmart, we still maintain that, that is economically more possibility to drive margins. And in particular, you can drive speed of delivery significantly. But of course, it's not very easy to set up Dmart because it requires a lot of scale and so on. So I don't think that is for everyone. So I also understand that InstaShop have not been approaching this -- there because that would simply not have been possible. For us, doing the InstaShop transaction or investing in Dmart is not one or another, and it can be bold, and I think they're both complementary to each other. And sometimes, you want to have something in 15 minutes. Sometimes, maybe you want to go to Carrefour or you want to go to some of the vendors. And the Dmart doesn't have to be the choice for every customer, and therefore, I do think that it complements each other. My previous comment is more like, it's very hard to groceries to work economically, but in this case, we have one example out of many -- out of very few to have done so.

We will take our next question from Andrew Gwynn from Exane.

Yes. Kind of following on from that question, I'm just wondering if there's anything more that we could take away and learn from InstaShop that would be applicable to the broader business. I mean you mentioned, for instance, the money you can make from CPG insights. So perhaps just elaborate a little bit on that. And then the other one, just sort of mini trading update, if you will. I know it's not too long we spoke, but obviously no change in the guidance, but just a little bit of an update on how sales have been during August.

Sure, Andrew. Yes, there are a lot of learnings that we have made. It's been very interesting experience, and there's a lot of learnings that I think we can give as well. I'm a little bit hesitant to share all those learnings. I also understand that there are many industry players potentially getting the material from this call. So -- but if -- specifically on the CPG companies, and they have a lot of value on platforms like this. It's a distribution partner. And the larger that distribution partner is, the more value one can create. This means launching new product items or simply making product items visible. But in the same way, when you go to a grocery store, there will be some who buy the shelf, the middle of the shelf or in front of the cashier system or they make the product very visible, and they pay the grocery store for that visibility. The same come to us as a shop. You have the visibility in the app. There will be what are the product items that are most visible. Maybe there are new things they want to sell, a new product they want to try. There is, of course, also an enormous amount of more data and analytics that we can do, what are the products that actually works. There are also a combination of products that are a little bit harder to do in a store. And of course, you can roll it out very quickly in multiple markets. So the value that we create with CPG companies is enormous, and it's only going to increase as we get more scale, and therefore, we work increasingly close with them to help them driving more business and help them selling their products. And of course, we will also make a fee for that. Then on the other question, which is around the sales. Sales has been very good. We -- Q3 has been a very good quarter. And I think with the curfews now being released even further in Kuwait and other places, that is, of course, also a little bit of a tailwind that we're having. We remain very bullish about the business.

We will take our next question from Andrew Ross, Barclays.

I've got two. First one is on Korea. I think we had a couple of press articles out this morning, talking about a tax investigation that's going on there into you guys and some other international companies. So wondering if you can update us as to what's going on there, and any read over to review our transaction that we should be worried about would be helpful. Then the second question is on the gross margin, which you called out in the first half was clearly a little bit weak, and there's a lot of moving parts around why that was the case. But it would be helpful if you could just go into a bit more detail as to how you see the gross margin trending in the second half? And anything else you can give us around what gives you confidence that gross margin as a percent of GMV can get up to double digits over time, which I guess is what you need to do to get to your long-term EBITDA margins?

Maybe Emmanuel, you can...

Yes. I think I would take the one and the two and then you can complete the other two, I guess. So Korea, yes, we can confirm that the Korean National Tax Service initiated an audit of Delivery Hero Korea Yogiyo. The tax inspections concerns 21 multinational companies. So this is there are 21 national companies that have been audited at the same time. A procedure is itself is very common in Korea, and it ends at accessing our practice of transfer pricing. So the key purpose of this audit is on transfer pricing policy and the way we set it up. So our local team, our local finance team is there in collaboration with us in the headquarter or central and have always been working closely with the tax consultant partners to ensure that all processes are compliant with national regulations and also very well commented. So we will -- we commit to full transparency. We are working together with the tax authorities. We'll provide them with all the information they need. And maybe I can highlight here that the transfer pricing policy and recommendation have been introduced already back to 2013 and '14. So that's -- we've been extremely focused on having a clean document in terms of pricing policy. From what we understand, we do not expect this audit to have any kind of impact on the approving process concerning the Uber transaction. Since it doesn't have any kind of competitive effects, they are 2 separate events with no kind of connection to each other. And on the second question concerning the gross margin and the evolution from H1 to H2, I think what you can say is that, first of all, in general, in this business, you have seasonality. So H2 is always better than H1. We've seen this in the last years, and that will be the case also this year. The margin, as we stated in Q2 and also today, the gross margin was impacted by MENA. And like you know, we've been impacted by COVID with loss of orders. We evaluated gross profit/loss that we had to -- through COVID only for this region by EUR 45 million to EUR 55 million. And as we mentioned, the last state to lift the restriction will be Kuwait in a few days. So that means that for us, the second half of the year, we should have the full benefits of MENA. And also, like you've seen the level of porters that we are reducing. So this is concerning the IFRS treatment. That will also improve the margin and gross margin going forward in H2. And besides that, we put a lot of efforts looking at the unit economics and improving this -- all this issue combined. So the top is combined with seasonality, MENA coming back from COVID-19 in H1 what's been impacted to H2. This all combined give us some confidence around the gross profit margin.

Yes. I can only iterate that you also asked a little bit for the long-term margins and how confident improved. So as exactly as Emmanuel said, all markets have improved their economics, their gross profit on delivery, and it will continue in Q3 as well. There is only MENA actually not improving, but that was due to curfews and so on. I think -- and also then you have the mix effect, of course, Asia becoming a larger part and Asia was one market where we -- or one region where they've been doubling down, and we have been most aggressive. But that's also where we see the largest improving gross profitability. So you will have the positive effect also on that as you go into the next couple of quarters or so. Then discount is also because now we're looking at discount basis. You've seen that it has dropped a little bit. Q2 was also lower than Q1. Q1 was lower than Q4, and Q4 was lower than Q3. And this will also continue for Q3, but I expect that it will be a larger drop. The reason for doing this discount is usually to get customers to try something out. We usually give it to the first couple of orders. But maintaining discount over time makes no sense. It's very costly and small. So once we reach a certain size in the market, it makes no sense. But of course, we have a lot of market at early stage, in particular, in Asia. If you look at H1, Thailand was early stage, Malaysia was early stage, Philippines was early stages. All of those markets are now becoming very sizable, and therefore, the proportion of discount is drastically also dropping there. Same, we go to go to a new vertical. It's incentivized people to try something new, and we have a good return on it. We have better return actually on those customers on a nondiscounted reorder rate basis. We don't look on a reorder rate basis with a discount, but actually reorder rate basis on a nondiscount basis. And the lifetime value of those customers is lower, but it's not lower than what we get from a lower CPA point of view. So therefore, net effect is actually very valuable to building your base that way. So I think all combined, yes, there are many levers coming at same time. So we are very optimistic by Q3 and Q4. And I forgot, sorry about that. The main point was actually long term. Yes, and we -- I think some players described it as adjusted net revenue. I don't know that is not the same as gross profit, but I think a target of 15% of adjusted net revenue. And then, of course, you have other items like server cost, customer care costs and a few other things. But we still think that in the long run, maybe that can be in the order of magnitude 11% to 13%, probably, hopefully, closer to 13%. But that's the range, including the customer service and everything that has a variable component.

We will take our next question from Marcus Diebel, JPMorgan.

I think the main questions have been asked. Only one question is left from my side. Niklas, I'm still not fully -- this isn't fully understand how to valuate this acquisition. Does it mean that you decided now to move maybe a bit earlier into the value chain? You highlighted previous times we see yourself more and more as a logistics company. Now we've seen the acquisition today. Is there also an element of kind of seeing these kind of acquisitions in online grocery and in other areas, but potentially also that you move earlier into the value chain when it comes to restaurants. Is that something that you also think about it at this point, yes? This one I just want to understand whether it was just opportunities that you just grabbed? Or it has been all the time for Delivery Hero to make major moves, maybe at the beginning of the value chain, if that makes sense?

Yes. Perfect. So yes, we highlighted a couple of times before, but of course, without being too clear that we find it too dilutive to make some of those mega acquisitions unless there is a very strong strategic sense like with Woowa Brothers. We just find it too dilutive. We then rather invest in our own customer experience and bring more value to the customers. However, we did say that anything that is adding our capabilities has a lot of value because, in this case, we get a good value for this, of course. There is a good stand-alone value that we acquired this business. But we can also add a lot of value to it, and we can also get a lot of value from the knowledge and cross opportunities here. So therefore, there is a multiple effect of the value creation here, and that's why this kind of acquisition extends. They're also slightly smaller in size. So it's also less dilutive, and that's why we like that something more than just size. Just adding size is not that valuable anymore. That we do with our own business and our own growth. In terms of early in the value chain, we try to do that. We already do that by our own initiatives because we know it's -- in order to create the best customer experience, we have to work very closely into integration into restaurants or into grocery stores like InstaShop is doing, where you integrate into POS systems. You also provide them with a number of other technologies to help driving their costs down and add more value to them also for the customer. It is a tight margin business overall, if you look at food and food delivery. And that's why every cent matters, and that's why -- and we want to be as affordable and as good as we possibly can, and that's why we are willing to go a little bit deeper into the value chain, and we'll continue to do so. If you do that through acquisitions or our own initiatives, yes, that's to be seen. But yes, that's to be seen.

Our next question comes from Monique Pollard from Citi.

Just 2 questions from me, please. The first one is around the competitive dynamics in Korea during the first half. Given Coupang has launched same-day delivery of fresh food, just wanted to understand what you're seeing there in terms of the competitive environment? And whether that changes or increases the likelihood of the career you're completing? The second question was around delivery times, and how exactly that measures? Some customers in MENA tell me that typically from the time that they go on InstaShop, for instance, to order to the time that food gets delivered, it's about more like 2 or 3 hours. So just trying to understand that.

Got it. So on the competitive dynamic in Korea, yes, this is a highly competitive market and especially, the strong competition in our grocery space and delivery of e-commerce items. You have, of course, Naver. You have Kakao. You have Coupang. And you have probably 50 other companies there. It's a very competitive market that we operate in and in actually all our verticals. So that maintains the case. But I think, together with this, we can challenge some of those competitors. As I mentioned, the previous one with this, we can step up and be comparative against Naver, Kakao, Coupang and so on. So I think we will stand the competition well. In terms of delivery time, they have also scheduled delivery. So of course, that is not part of the 45 minutes. So -- but when you order on a nonscheduled basis, then it's 45 minutes. There are also certain articles that needs to be scheduled deliveries so it could also be that some people have ordered from there, and then you only have the short of scheduled delivery. But when you do delivery ASAP, then average delivery time is 45 minutes from the time we click on order until the time it's at your door step. So that's how to do that.

We will take our next question from Sarah Simon from Berenberg.

I just had a question really about the synergies between your existing MENA business and InstaShop. You said that you're going to keep InstaShop as a sort of separate business. But will you promote it like in the way you do with Banabi and Yemeksepeti. So you have a split screen? Or will it still have to do its own customer acquisition?

Yes. So we'll keep it separate. So we like to have this focus, and we will keep doing also grocery on our end but with a slightly different focus and so on. But they will be independent in that sense. But of course, we can provide them with logistics who cannot offer it themselves or where we see that we can do it better, faster, cheaper, we'll be able to provide that. We may also list some of our vendors, and we have 20,000 vendors. They have 1,100 vendors. So we can massively increase the vendor selection outside of MENA, in particular, but also in the MENA region. So that will help them also. The same will be the other way around, but there might be certain vendors who now also want to be part of our offering. We will not have a split screen as we have or that's not the plan at least for it. We still see that in the case of Middle East with the Talabat, you have all these grocery stores like Carrefour and so on in there, and then one of those stores is also then the Dmart. It's one out of many. If we don't add another brand name in there so that people go to Talabat in order to convince this up in order to be at Carrefour. So that's why that is not the plan, but rather list those vendors directly in that. Yes, so I hope that answered questions. And maybe add a little bit to it. I think in general, the grocery segment is still fairly early. I think a lot of our customers who come to us to understand that they can order groceries through us. It's delivered very fast. It's one of the best experience we can get. But I also think that some customers will associate us not fully for that offering, in particular. So they would rather than when I think of food and groceries, they will think of InstaShop and therefore, goes directly InstaShop. So I think in this case, it's also a clear value in having a second proposition for those who only think about that grocery or supermarket type of product items, having that for those who have not yet associate our brand with that offering. Long term, we will have to see if that changes, but that's what we believe in, in the short term.

We will take our next question from Jurgen Kolb from Kepler Cheuvreux.

Two questions from my side. First of all, when we look at your earn-out period, maybe you could give us an idea as to how long the earn-out period for that acquisition will last? And maybe also on the second side, the time frame for your -- for the next steps in your acquisition in terms of what additional partners, what additional retailers you may want to add over what period? When do you think new countries are relevant to step in? So a little bit about the expansion plan you have with your acquisition -- with your newest acquisition. And a very quick and last one. Will InstaShop be integrated in MENA region from a reporting perspective or in the verticals?

Right. So the earn-out the structured over 3 years, but there are a small earn-out in year 1, smaller earn-out in year 2 and then a little bit larger earn-out in year 3. It's done on multiples of GMV and profitability that we find attractive. You should also keep in mind that we add a lot of value to this business to grow it much faster, and of course, we should also get the benefit of some of that, that we have here. So that's why it's generally very attractive multiples that we get there, but we also help them to scale much, much faster together with us. So net-net, I think it's a good deal for the founders, but also a very good deal for us. Then in terms of how to work with partner retailing and so on, we will do a first step into launching in some of the larger MENA countries as the next step, which are not yet discovered. So that will happen in probably more in the short term. Then we will -- over the next few months, it might take a couple of months here or a few months here until we see how we can do this test to scale up quickly. But it will probably take a few months of preparation, and how we can work together, how we sort of take that might be booked so that we can do a more excellence in our rollout. So but once we do, we -- and we will not constrain it as long as we see good result.

Maybe the last one, we will take the last one.

Sure.

Yes. To come back to where we report InstaShop, the role of InstaShop is an agent, and as such, they will report it under MENA. So we report them on the MENA segment and not integrated verticals. The distinction being agent versus principle. So as a reminder, when we do -- when we are acting as a principle, it means like when we are buying the goods and store it and then sell it to the customers, we are acting as the principle, and that will be reporting on the integrated verticals. In this case, clearly an agent, and we consolidate InstaShop on there on MENA.

So we have the last question, if you would like to go on with it, the last question.

Please.

The next question is from Rob Joyce from Goldman Sachs.

So two from me. And the first one, just -- sorry if I missed it, but will InstaShop be integrated into the local Delivery Hero apps in the markets they're in? And the second one, would you be able to give us an idea of the average basket size, the kind of take rate and whether the business is profitable, if you -- before the monies from the CPG companies?

Thank you. So it will not be directly integrated into that, but we will help list the partners who want to also be listed and get more volume also from us. So we could provide that volume. So that will be listed. There might be some technology that we will pull together. Catalog management could be one, and there are many other things that we're working on that we might partner on to make the experience better, both for, let's say, deliveries pre-acquisition entities and InstaShop. Same other way around, we will also not integrate food delivery in InstaShop. We want to keep InstaShop as a clear target-specific USP. The same way, if you imagine U.S. adding Uber to Instacart, I think, will be very confusing. Instacart is good because it's very focused, and the same there. You might not want to order all your groceries on a food delivery platform because you think of them as a food delivery platform. And therefore, when you do groceries, you might rather than go to the grocery stores. I think there is a lot of overlap, and that's what we're going to use, and that's also why we see a lot of success in growth in our grocery segment also on Talabat, but some customers will still prefer clear purpose app. Then in terms of the average basket and so on, it's -- it is higher than when we do grocer delivery. It is a little bit more of a weekly purchasing pattern than this. There is daily, smaller budgets that we generally have. And I think that comes back to the focus -- their focus on being a clear grocery app, and we are a little bit more or less a convenience portion as of today. In terms of the profitability excluding the CPG I cannot answer or we will not answer, but -- so I'll have to ask on this one.

And the take rate -- sorry, Niklas, how does the take rate compare?

I'll -- I'm not sure if they are giving out that information. If we do, then I'll promise to come back on that. I see that, then I'll come back on that. I think there is something in the presentation, I'm not sure. I'll panic now. Thank you very much, Rob, and thank you, everyone, for dialing in. As I said, I'm super, super excited about this transaction. I think it's in the center of what we're building. I think this will further speed up our execution in the quick commerce, which we already do today really well. I think this will add us another significant edge and clear position as that they go to app or work through this as well as quick commerce. I'm super excited. This is, by far, the best asset we have been out there, and we have looked at a lot. We have looked at 100-plus grocery players. Nothing is comparable. And therefore, I'm super excited, working with the team here. It's going to be fantastic. So thank you, everyone.