Dipula Properties Limited (DIB) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Sorry, if you don't mind, take off my mask. I just can't speak through this. Welcome, everybody. Suppose under the different circumstances than the last time we met. I've got Ridwaan Asmal, our CFO. And we will try and not bore you for too long about the results. So I'll go through the normal sort of business aspects of presentation, and Ridwaan will take you through the numbers, the 3 sections of the presentation: business review, financial review and then a very short way forward after that. At the back of the presentation, there's a whole lot of annexes, then for completeness, just for those of you that would like to sort of load those into your various models to analyze the portfolio and so on. And of course, I think we're always here to provide you with additional information to the extent out, and so on should you read that. Right. I think that you look at our results for the 6 months. So we continue to improve our portfolio and refine our operating platform. I think you'll agree with me that Dipula is a very different company from the company that listed 9 years ago. We have a clear strategy that we've been executing with discipline and scale. We are quite pleased with our capital -- our tactical capital allocation that we, again, been executing over a number of years under very trying times. Capital is always a scarce resource, but even more so now. But I think with very limited resources, we've managed to sort of squeeze whatever cent we could after whatever sources we could find those resources to improve this portfolio. So we believe that the REIT property is a long-term game. And I think with some of these, the COVID-19-related challenges that everybody is facing now, we believe that we will weather the storm. And we'll speak about that when we get to the right part of the presentation. In summary, our portfolio -- basically on Slide 8, [indiscernible] portfolio was up 3% period-on-period. That's purely on valuations. Our vacancies have dropped 38% to about 5.8% period-on-period. We'll unpack that a bit later in the presentation. Earnings were substantially in line with the prior period. And our tenant retention ratio was roughly about 80%. I will speak about that ratio a bit later on. We have signed leases of -- new leases of roughly about ZAR 94 million in value and had let new space of about 21,000 square meters. We had renewed leases of -- value of roughly ZAR 276 million. And that equates to about 58,000 square meters of renewals. And in addition to that, we have maintained our portfolio escalations at north of 7%, roughly about 7.4% at the moment. We had done the -- we had bought no properties during this period for, I suppose, obvious reasons, the scarcity of capital and the cost of our currency at the moment. Disposals of roughly ZAR 49 million were executed. That's about 4 properties that we had sold and transferred during the past 6 months. And we have spent about ZAR 28 million in portfolio-improving refurbs. Our gearing was maintained at roughly 40%, and we're quite pleased about that because I think if you look at that number in the context of how much property we sold, it means that quite a big underpin to our gearing levels is our portfolio maintaining its value and so on. So basically just the retail portfolio briefly. I'm on Slide 10. Our retail portfolio retention rate was [indiscernible] [ 74% ] [indiscernible] sectors that we cover. And I think the main reason for that low retention rate was the change in banking models where a lot of our banks, especially Standard Bank and the Nedbank have closed their branches. And we've also had quite a few restaurant tenants that have closed their doors [indiscernible] a few restaurant tenants that had closed their doors. Our occupancy for this sector had improved slightly from 92% to 92.4%, and retail leases made out roughly 17,000 square meters of the 21,000 square meters of new leases concluded. So a drop in retention rate, but quite healthy activity in terms of replacing those tenants and signing up new ones. And that was done at escalation rates of 7.3% and a WALE of roughly 3.5 years. We had further renewed about 24,000 square meters, 24,617 square meters of retail space at an average escalation rate of 6.4% and the WALE of 3 years. There's obviously still quite a bit of pressure from all quarters, especially on our retail portfolio in terms of the escalation base that tenants are willing to accept. Difficult one, this one because our experience is obviously that I mean everybody negotiates to CPI, which has been sort of reasonably low. But I mean our cost pressures and the escalation in terms of our costs is a lot higher than CPI. So one would hope that I suppose sense will prevail as we negotiate to our tenants to try and lock in reasonable escalation rates as landlords sort of absorb most of those costs in the shopping centers. You will remember that national tenants don't actually contribute towards operating costs. So I mean the burden really falls on us. So some of that needs to be absorbed in that escalation rate. Moving on to the office portfolio. And I think in summary there, we achieved an impressive retention rate of roughly 92% in that portfolio, and our vacancies dropped to 7.2%. And that was thanks to all of our efforts over the past number of years of selling the sort of a tail of that portfolio and spending quite a bit of money on the stock that we decided to retain in terms of how it looks and feels and basically also buying some good assets there. We had renewed about 14,000 square meters of office space. Half of that was the SAPS IJS building, government building out in Erasmuskloof in Pretoria. And there, we took quite a knock on that renewal rental, which contributed to an overall negative reversion in our office portfolio of about 5%. And the WALE achieved there was about 2.5 years. We still get quite a lot of reluctance on the office tenant side in terms of long-term commitments. And I think that's obvious reasons, tough economic times and people don't want to commit for too long. So obviously, there will be ongoing activity there. And hopefully, as things improve, we'll be able to stretch that WALE a bit there. Moving on to the industrial portfolio. That's our Slide 14. Great success achieved there, again, improving portfolio over a number of years, good quality stock and big boxes, particularly doing well year for us. We had dropped our vacancy there by an impressive 65% to about 2.8%. And this is mainly due to quite a bit of letting activity at Corporate Park, and the last remaining space being let at our large warehouse, General Motors in PE, New Brighton. And our retention rate there had improved significantly year-on-year or period-on-period. In the prior period, we had a retention rate of 70%, and we had actually improved that to about 82%. I don't think we're going to achieve any of this had we not internalized management, all aspects of management. This is working very well for us at the moment. We did renewals there for approximately 20,000 square meters. And just slightly scrape through in terms of positive renewal rate, that was at roughly 0.3%. That's basically the sort of commercial components of our portfolio. I will now move to Slide 16. And basically there, we've got 1 property asset, a largest asset that's transferring in July, Cosmo, that's gone really well. It is substantially let. There are 428 units in that particular development. And as you may remember, we've locked in a 12-month rental guarantee there. So when that property does transfer, we'll at least have 12 months of certainty in terms of that rental. And we're quite happy that the product is strong enough to sort of sustain itself going forward. And the leasing fundamentals around that area are very strong. I think I had mentioned to you previously that these -- this particular asset is located, the right opposite the Curro private school there. So I mean demand has been great for this particular asset. All right. I think the utmost question on everybody's minds at a moment would be where our company stands in terms of liquidity to weather this COVID-19 storm? But also just generally how we perceive our debt position? So we did some analysis for you to sort of just discuss. I'm on Slide 18. So if you look at our current situation, we've got debt, drawn down debt of ZAR 3.6 billion. We don't have much in the way of undrawn facilities. So not much in terms of cash resources that you'd call a liquidity buffer and/or undrawn facilities that would fall into that liquidity buffer at a moment. But we believe that there's still capacity on this portfolio to raise debt if the need arised. Obviously, it is at time that everybody needs to be quite conservative in terms of how much debt you place on your balance sheet. We're certainly not one of the lowest-geared REITs out there, but we're also not one of the highest-geared REITs out there. So I think we sort of, on average, okay. We could do with less debt, but we could also survive with more debt basically. So if you look at a table there on Slide 18, we kind of sort of show you various scenarios where in an unlikely event that we move our debt from 40% to 55% and basically then also just plots a 45% scenario and a 50% scenario, so at 40%, our debt would be what it is now, ZAR 3.6 billion. At 45%, we'd move to about ZAR 4 billion. And at 50%, the debt would move to about ZAR 4.4 billion, roughly ZAR 4.5 billion. And in an unlikely event of going all the way to 55%, that debt would be at about ZAR 4.9 billion. What does that all mean? It means that if we were forced to stretch to exactly on our covenant limit, which is 45%, that would bring in about ZAR 429 million worth of liquidity for us, right? But obviously, that comes at a cost, and it's not productive debt necessarily, unless we were utilizing that in the acquisition of assets. But I mean let's just say we're just doing it without any acquisitions or in any case, if we did go there, that would cost us an additional ZAR 50 million in interest. And that's interest assumed about 7%. I mean, as you know, the JIBAR rate is quite low at the moment. So we've assumed a JIBAR Plus about, I think, 2.5 basis points. So 2.5 is obviously very high for what we pay now at the moment, but I mean we're assuming worst-case scenario. We then stretch that further and say, if we were forced to go to about 50%, what does that mean? That would be about a ZAR 876 million additional amounts of cash coming into the business. And that would add another ZAR 68 million to our interest burden at 7.7%, and 55% then takes us to ZAR 1.3 billion. It's an illustration just to show you that an unlikely event of us having to aggressively tap into whatever debt, that would come at a cost, obviously. I mean, I think the banks would even increase the interest if we went over the 45% on the existing facilities. If we take those same numbers and we start looking at the sensitivity of our portfolio to a fall in valuations and what that means in terms of LTVs, again, concerns in the market around REITs and valuation of our portfolios, we will show you in the latest slide. We don't believe that our portfolio is necessarily overvalued. In fact, we think that it's actually quite fairly valid just based on empirical evidence that we've gathered in the market. But nonetheless, if you look at the second table there, you'll see that we're currently sitting at ZAR 8.9 billion. That's the third column there. Right on top, you'll see ZAR 8.9 billion there. And our debt is ZAR 3.6 billion. That stay the same across the sort of scenarios that we're laying out there. We then plot that and we take LTVs from 40% to 45%, and we saw for a answer here to see what happens in the portfolio. So I mean if we were -- if our portfolio had to drop by 2%, that means a decrease in value of ZAR 179 million. Portfolio would go to 8.7% and basically, our LTV will then move to 41%, all right? And if our LTV went to 45%, our portfolio would have to drop in value by 10.6%. That's a total decrease of close to ZAR 1 billion, ZAR 950 million, all right? So we then play around to that number a bit further in a second. Now what happens, what would take us there? There's only 2 things that will take us there. It's a drop of income and/or an adjustment to the overall valuation yield that valuers would apply to the portfolio. Our average valuation yield as of the latest valuations is about 10% at the moment, not the highest valuation yield compared to competitors. And I think if you look at what would have to happen to our income, our income would have to go from roughly about ZAR 890 million, okay, that's our net property income, to roughly ZAR 800 million for us to get to 45%. So that's an entire drop of income of close to ZAR 100 million to drop us to our LTV limit. And basically, if we then say what's the yield sensitivity of that whole story? It means that from a yield sensitivity point of view, our portfolio yield, if you keep the income constant, would have to drop or increase from 10% to 11.2%, right? So we believe that we've got enough breathing space here, even if valuations have to fall. And that's what the slide is seeking to sort of demonstrate to you. So why is it so important? It's obviously important because of a concern the market has around valuations, but it's also important around concerns that the market may have around whether we have capacity within our portfolio to survive COVID-19 from a liquidity point of view. If I look at our interest cover ratio and where the sensitivity for that particular ratio lies, we've got about ZAR 220 million of income to lose just to get to 2x cover. At the moment, we're sitting at 2.74 cover. All right. Then we sort of take this thinking further, and we've got a slide that we included there, Slide 19. And on the extreme left of that slide, we basically just show you what Dipula's portfolio is valued at per square meter across the different asset classes that we hold. And the line graph shows you basically -- or the dot shows you where we are in terms of the yield on the portfolio, right? So the dark Dipula, Dipula sitting at 12,000 for retail, 12,060, and that's at the yield of 10.2%, okay? Now I've blocked out the names of the competitors, but these are all comparable. So there's no overseas or anything like that. So this is all pure retail. And obviously, the only difference here would be the types of retail. But I mean, obviously, there's a mixed bag. Everybody owns -- owes -- owns everything. But as companies that are directly comparable. But if you look at that, you will see there that the overall average is sitting at 8.3% in terms of yield, okay, across that competitor group, okay? And our yield is sitting at 10.2%. And our retail portfolio is valued at 12,000 square meter compared to a average of 21,000 square meter, right, with the highest valuation per square meter being 41,000 or almost 42,000 square meter and the lowest valuation being 11,990 square meter. Again, I think that indicates that even under sort of extreme stress, our portfolio should hold up quite decently with valuations under tough conditions. When we move to the office portfolio, significantly improved portfolio, as you saw on the leasing performance of this portfolio. Again there, Dipula sitting at about 14,280 square meter. That's a 9.2% yield. The average is at 8.7%, and the average rate per square meter is at 20,000, all right, with the highest valuation there being at 42,000 square meter and the lowest being 9,900. We looked into that. That was a bunch of C-grade offices mainly. So again there, I think we've got room there to breathe even with any sort of sensitivity or shocks that might happen on the valuation side of things. Further comparison on the industrial side, 9.6% is our yield and 4,300. This includes logistics and sort of [ money ] parks. We did a similar comparison where we basically stripped out where we took the average of people's portfolios and not just logistics. I mean, obviously, that doesn't include the guys that are pure logistics players. Again, there, we're sitting at 9.6%. The average is 9%, and the per square meter valuation on average is 5,800. I think we are comfortable that there shouldn't be too many shocks with our valuations. Go further and we sort of -- I suppose this one is more of a market than a sentiment-driven thing, but we thought we should nonetheless show it. And basically, our current combined discount to NAV is about -64%. That is made up of -48% discount on the As and -80% discount on the Bs. Those prices are as at the 12th of May because the market NAVs that we obtained there from, I think, it to catalyst were on the same date. So just to compare apples with apples, the ALPI is sitting at a overall discount of -50.58% and the SAPY are sitting at -49.93%. And in comparison, we are sitting at -64%. I think the market is being a little bit on the harsh side there. One would submit. And I think that if our property valuations had to drop by 16%, that would get us to that sort of discount. So it's a massive drop. And I think if you looked at the slides that I was just showing in our other side, if the concern is around the NAV, I think that concern is actually overdone in terms of how the market is looking at the stock. Right. I am now on Slide 22. And here, we attempt to just speak a little bit on COVID on the numbers side, also to just give you a sense of what's going on. I mean a lot of this is unknown, I mean in terms of what the actual impact of this thing is going to be on us. But we're starting to see a little bit of a picture as things progress. And hopefully, that becomes clearer and clearer as we go. And everything is obviously dependent on how government sort of -- and how quickly government sort of relaxes trading conditions and so on. But if you look at Slide 22, what we went and did is we went and split the portfolio into its sectors, retail, office and industrial. And obviously, as you may appreciate, the hardest-hit sector by COVID on the commercial sectors is retail. And the reason for that is that government has already specifically went and prevented certain retail categories from trading. That is not necessarily the case for offices and industrial. I think that we're all doing what we should be doing from an office point of view. People work from home. Our business hasn't stopped necessarily. And to a large degree, quite a few of the industrial tenants can also still trade. But from a retail perspective, I think right in the beginning, obviously, restrictions were quite harsh on certain categories and less on others. So The Property Group has categorized tenants into those 2, 4, 6 categories there. So we did the same in our portfolio just for competitive purposes, so you understand what the nature of our exposure is. And if you look at our retail portfolio, 44% of our retail tenants are essential. So they provide essential services. That's the likes of [indiscernible] and Shoprite and Pick 'n Pay, Woolworths, I mean they are 44% of the portfolio. And within our shopping center, there's another 4% that's let to government and SOEs. That will be a little Home Affairs office, whatever the case may be and so on. So I mean those are 4%. So that brings us to just about half of that space, 48% being to tenants that were never restricted from a trading perspective. So that's 48%, all right? And then another 20% is nonessential large tenants, okay? So these are guys with turnovers above ZAR 1 billion, okay? And these would be mainly your listed fashion guys, Pepco, your porcine groups, your [indiscernible], those tenants fall in that category. So they're 20% of our retail portfolio. And then you got another nonessential medium. Nonessential medium are the second-tier fashion guys. They have turnovers of anywhere between ZAR 80 million and ZAR 1 billion. Those are 12% of our tenants. And then we've got the SMMEs, which are combined 20% of our portfolio, all right? And in that SMME, 20% is 8% that's highly impacted. I mean these are guys that literally cannot trade probably until level 1, and hair salons and massage parlors and these sort of places. And then basically, the medium impacted guys are your restaurants that are now starting to trade, et cetera, that sort of category of tenants, as well as your smaller sort of supermarket-type guys that feed off the bigger guys would fall into that medium-impacted category. So if you look at that, it obviously indicates a reasonably defensive picture, doesn't necessarily reflect what people are willing to pay, but I mean, nonetheless, puts them in that category. So I mean our biggest issues, obviously, has been with nonessential large and nonessential medium guys with the knowledge that obviously the small SMME guys are truly suffering because they just cannot trade meaningfully without the long trading hours, the weekly trades, the daily feet that go through those centers as a result of office workers, et cetera, et cetera. So from an office point of view, now 95% of our office portfolio is occupied by A and B tenants. And of that, 47% is government, and the other 48% is your A- and B-graded tenants, with 5% being fairly risky guys in our office portfolio, smaller guys and so on. The industrial portfolio is occupied about 94% by A- and B-graded tenants. So again, there, assuming that these guys are willing to pay us rentals, they should be able to pay us rentals. The payment and -- the actual payment and people's ability to pay the rentals are 2 different things, as we will discuss a bit later. All right. So we went further and ran a scenario analysis for you here based on what we know so far. I mean this could change and so on. And basically, what we did is we took April's billings, and we annualized it. I'm now in the second table at the bottom that it says COVID-19 Scenario Analysis, okay? So April billings, annualize that, that gets you to a total of about ZAR 1 billion per annum on the billings. And we then run a base case, a moderate case and a worst-case scenario based on what we assume is the situation as we know it now. And basically, you'll see that a lot of our pain would come from retail, and that's for obvious reasons because that 20% SMME component is hard hit by this thing. And we obviously assume that your nonessential large and nonessential medium guys will survive. But having said that, there are 1 or 2 business rescue situations that are looming at the moment. So one doesn't know where that's all going to go. But be that as it may. If you look at our base case there, in our base case, and this is not rent discounts or rent deferments, this is people that we think might actually be casualties in this thing, okay? So base case of casualties, there's about ZAR 50 million in income per annum exposure. And worst case, as things stand, it's about ZAR 74 million. These are guys that we think will go out of business. I mean I'm not talking about supporting you over 2 or 3 months of no rental. That's a different discussion. That's a liquidity discussion, it's a cash flow discussion. This is more of a business discussion in terms of saying this thing is going to hit us by this much at this point in time. What does it all mean? It means that on a base case scenario, we think that our vacancies will increase by an additional 3.3%, and worst-case scenario increase by an additional 6.2% if you look at the total column there. Our current vacancies by GLA are 5.8%. So if we add the base case, moderate case and worst-case scenario to that, it takes you on a base scenario to a 9% vacancy factor and 8.9% on the moderate case scenario. I think there's a formula issue there or something. And then it takes us to about 12% on a worst-case scenario basis. Our vacancy would literally double as a result of COVID-19 and so on. And so I mean, I think those scenarios could either be significantly better for us or significantly worse depending on how long the lockdown sort of persist for and depending for how long we get to Level 1 and depending to how long -- what government does in terms of letting people into that net of the various levels that they're introduced in there. Because I mean, obviously, the situation is changing. And there's often nonsensical things happening. I think guys are not allowed to sell certain clothing items like T-shirts and flip flops and things like this. So I mean, I think the guys will probably just become a little bit more pragmatic in terms of that. If that happens, that would improve our scenario quite a bit. But if it becomes stricter, I mean the numbers are not telling a great story at the moment. I think if we look at the latest release numbers, increasing about ZAR 1,000 when the entire world was increasing by about [ ZAR ] 4,000, I think [ ZAR ] 600. That was quite a big number for [indiscernible] since this pandemic. So really a model that you can play around with yourself, but that's the information at our disposal at running these numbers. And we hope that the picture is better, to be honest. So just coming back to, again, just on COVID. From an operations point of view, we're pleased to report that we had a very smooth transition from having the full team we had at our office to having no one. We were quite impressed that I think there were certain things that were not in our disaster recovery plan that we sort of innovated on the time. And I think we've now had practical experience of what the disaster recovery plan is. But I think having moved our operating system, our accounting package, our property package to the cloud about 6, 7 years ago, even when we were managing externally, has really assisted there. And I think that's been an ongoing improvement in terms of how we look at that. But close to 98% of our people are working from home on the system, no problems. So we were quite pleased with that. And the -- our operating staff were on site, obviously observing all of the safety regulations that they need to be observing. But I suppose the unfair thing about this whole discussion we're having with some of the guys that don't want to pay rental is, I mean, we are not of DT. We are operating at even higher intensity in terms of looking after these assets at the moment. So I think people need to think quite carefully in thinking that the landlord has this unlimited resource of absorbing most of this COVID-19. And as I said to you, the IT systems, where everybody has full access to those. And we're not expecting any significant savings on the operating expenditure side. If anything, our cost might go up because as the malls become a little bit more abundant or some of the properties become a little bit more abundant, we need to secure a bit more and so on. So there's no major cost savings that we expect there. To date, municipalities haven't agreed to give us any relief. So unfortunately, again, there sort of water down services, but no relief from municipalities. We collected 73% of our rentals for May. Most of that was basically from our office and industrial assets. The breakdown of -- sorry, that's for April. April was 73%. And a breakdown there was that we had collected 69% on the retail side, 94% on offices and about 62% in industrial. And so far in May, we've collected 66%. And that is 70% retail -- or 69%, retail; 67%, office; and about 49% -- sorry, I'm not doing this right. So it's 94%, office -- 67%, office, 69%, retail; and 49%, industrial for May so far. Our biggest problem, as I stated previously, is whether our SMMEs will survive this. So what we've also done, which everybody is going to -- I think that question came from one of the journalists yesterday about involvement on the CSI side. We have not contributed anything to the government fund, what's we call the solidarity fund. We have been doing our own initiatives in house and so on, and that mainly involves feeding schemes at a few of our centers. Tenant rent remissions, it's a -- this is a lengthy very complex topic here. I think right in the beginning of COVID-19, people all ran off and got opinions from various legal people. And I think these opinions were obviously skewed depending on who was asking for an opinion type of thing. But I mean the legal position for us matters not that simple. I suppose there's 2 main considerations here in terms of where we stand legally. One is, are you giving these tenants beneficial occupation? And the other from a landlord perspective is, is there unfair enrichment for the tenant that's effectively sitting your space and not wanting to pay you everything? On the question of beneficial occupation, yes, it can be argued that in some instances, you're not. But even where you're totally not doing that as a result of COVID-19, the tenant is still in your space. And I suppose finding that amount, that number of how much should be paid is the key discussion point here, not whether the one person is right to the other extreme or wrong to that extreme. So I mean we've taken a very pragmatic approach here. We're engaging with our tenants. And hopefully, we'll find a middle ground here. I think you would have seen that the Property Industry Groups has put out certain guidelines that aren't necessarily binding on anyone, but it's nonetheless a good starting point to start to speak into tenants. And we're obviously quite supportive of that initiative. And I think when it comes to the fashion guys, especially the category that I said that was occupying about 20% of our portfolio, I mean, we haven't actually -- there are various deals being discussed, but that situation is ongoing, and we haven't collected as much rental there as we would have liked to collect so far. Obviously, I think if you look at the PI Group document, you will see that office and industrial tenants are specifically excluded from that document. Just very briefly, we are also in discussions with our bankers. That's ongoing. And I think there is really a question of of ensuring that we are transparent in terms of where we are in terms of liquidity within our business and perhaps having discussion with them about availing certain facilities on a need basis, ongoing discussions. And I think fairly positive discussions with the guys to date. There was a broader discussion at the Basel level. And I think that will be used as input into bilateral discussions between the parties, the banks and the various landlords. Basically, from a regulation point of view, I mean, COVID-19 obviously comes with certain potential challenges for us as REITs. And right in the beginning of this, again, through the PI Group, there was engagement with the JSE. JSE was quite kind and listened to us. I think the sort of bottom line there is JSE is not granting any blanket dispensations. We all have to actually state our case on a case-by-case basis if the need arises. And I think the key thing here is that the JSE is quite adamant that you need to comply with the listing requirements. And I think so far, we are and most of our -- and all of our colleagues. And if there are any deviations, even if approved by the JSE from a REIT regulation point of view, that would have to be published and dealt with quite transparently. And I think the JSE had undertaken to have a discussion with the asset managers is to gauge their attitude towards being understanding that things could actually go per shape as a result of COVID-19. The one place that we haven't heard back from is National Treasury in terms of what our attitude would be if there were certain bridges, but also to just sort of buy breathing space from the National Treasury for a period of time, should COVID actually get some of us into trouble. I think the overall message from a JSE really was that the company is at requirement of liquidity and solvency needs to always be observed by directors in making dividend declaration decisions. And I think we've all sort of heard on the side of caution of saying, "Listen, we need to think about liquidity and solvency before we declare dividends, and I suppose, hence, our decision to sort of pend that decision this time around."

Good afternoon. I'll take you through the financial highlights for Dipula Income Fund for the 6-month period to 29 February 2020. So on Page 28, just to highlight. Izak touched on our banking requirements. Our LTV covenants are at 45%. Our ICR covenants are 2x cover. For the 6-month period, we are within that cover at 40% LTV and 2.74x on ICR covenant. On the net cost-to-income ratio, we -- I think we are quite pleased to note that for the 6-month period, despite the tough trading conditions [Audio Gap] net cost-to-income ratio at 21.1%, which was almost the same as the prior 6-month period. The main reason for that is that there was significant emphasis placed on maintaining operating cost and what -- quite a large portion of our costs being utilities, particularly electricity, there's a -- there were quite a lot of measures we've put in place in trying to achieve maximum recoveries in efficiency, make sure we recover the correct tariffs, that we ensure that there's no water leakages at our properties. So all those different measures assure -- assisted us in trying to get in achieving a 21.1% net cost-to-income ratio. Then just on the distribution and the dividend, just to clarify, and for certain people that might not understand exactly the Dipula's distribution and the dividend per share, the distributable earnings per share for the 6-month period was a combined ZAR 0.9597, which was a decline of 1.4%. The DIA's distributable earnings was ZAR 0.4735 (sic) [ ZAR 0.5736 ], which was a increase of 4.6%, and the DIB at ZAR 0.3861, which was a decline of 9.1%. So that basically -- I specified the distributable earnings per share. But on the distributable earnings per share, no dividend was declared by the directors. So that those numbers were effectively given to indicate that had we declared the dividend, those would have been the numbers we effectively would have declared to the shareholders. And that was put out in the SENS announcement a few weeks ago. And I think as Izak touched on the point to say that because of the current COVID situation, liquidity challenges and uncertainty, we will pin the decision on exactly what dividend we need to declare prior to the end of the financial year. Then just moving on to Slide 29. I think we've illustrated it just for historic purposes what the distributable earnings per share history was. And we can obviously see that in the last executive figures I spelled out now, the B distribution obviously has declined to ZAR 0.3861. And in total, we've declined to 1.4%. If we look at comparatively where we are on the B, that ZAR 0.3861 is very similar to where we were in February 2016 because the A distribution obviously grows annually by 5% previously. And currently, it grows by the lower 5% or CPI. I think that's on Slide 29. Just moving to Slide 30. Illustrating our market price to NAV. For February 2020, the combined market price was ZAR 10.90. Our combined NAV was ZAR 20.36. That is a 47% discount to NAV at end of February. That situation, obviously, with the market price dropping further, combined market price at 15th of May, ZAR 7.13 and NAV of ZAR 20.36, which is a 65% decline discount to NAV. And as Izak touched on, we feel that the discount or the market price is probably discounting the NAV too deeply. It might be too high at the 65% level. Previously, if we look at historic numbers, we were anywhere between minus 5% to minus 3%. So we're previously very consistent on where our marketplace to NAV was. We understand that, obviously, the COVID-19 impact is uncertain for everyone. We've tried our best to sketch scenarios and trying to illustrate to the market on a different base, medium and worst case scenario what impact would be. But even if we factor that into the equation, we still think that, that market price is a bit low. Then on Slide 31, just exactly what I mentioned previously, just illustrating the drop on that A share and the B share price. For those that are not -- that haven't been following the shape quite closely, in Feb '19, we were at ZAR 11.12 on A. We then dropped Feb '20, ZAR 8.85, and then 15th of May to ZAR 5.13. On the B, we were at ZAR 8.09. Feb 2020, we went to ZAR 2.05. And at 15th of May, we're sitting at ZAR 2. Going through the income statement. I think just on a 6-month -- on 6-month basis, our total distributable earnings was -- we were down by minus 1.4%, which was mainly driven by some of the lower increase in the revenues. So if I just go to the different line items, if we look at the revenue line, we were at ZAR 661 million, which effectively is a 1.4% increase compared to the prior year. And the reason for that is the -- there was a few reasons, the previous 6 months or effectively generate a CPI or higher increase in revenue compared to the prior year, one being in the previous year, we had certain of the banks that effectively closed branches, and there was an element of rent cancellation in the previous 6 months. The other second reason would be on the government leases. We know historically, we've been trying to renew that -- those SAPS VIP and IJS leases. The rentals we achieved on those renewals were effectively lower than what we previously earned on those leases that contributed to that lower increase. Then on the industrial space, in the previous 6 months at year end, we demonstrated that we let quite a significant chunk of that industrial space. While the vacancies effectively came down, the rental was effectively lower at about 8%, so compared to what we previously effectively earned on those industrial leases. And then on the retail side, we highlighted earlier, the retention rate was 74% on the retail side. But what -- those new lets that were concluded would have been slightly lower than what we would have achieved on the previous rent -- previous space that was then relet. So I do -- when you combine all those factors into the figure, the revenue figure is effectively 1.4% higher. On the property expenses side, with 3.8% growth in property expenses, which is effectively lower than CPI. So we controlled our costs quite nicely. On the administration and corporate cost side, we're sitting at ZAR 21.3 million, which shows a 13.4% increase on administration and corporate costs. The reason for that is not because head office effectively spending more on cost. If the market was aware in the previous year, we embarked on looking at corporate action, the asset corporate transaction. And there was an element of corporate cost we incurred on that. The figure was about ZAR 1 million on the total cost we spent on it. There wasn't some -- there was some speculation that there were -- there was quite a large number spent on it. But there was only ZAR 1 million spent on that, line that effectively gave rise to the 13.4%. If we strip that ZAR 1 million out, the adjusted growth in cost is 6% on the admin and corporate cost line. Net finance costs were pretty much in line, ZAR 153 million. What the effect -- JIBAR rates effectively decreasing. We're hoping in the next 6 months, there obviously will be some positive on contribution towards lower finance cost than what we previously envisaged. That will come through in the next 6 months. Noncontrolling interest. We've got on 2 companies where we effectively pay the NCIs. That was pretty much in line with previous year. And all of that translated into ZAR 254 million distributable earnings. The property cost-to-income ratio, 33.1%, grew by 2.4%. Property net cost actually decreased by -- from 17.5% to 17.1%. And that's effectively -- once you net your utility cost, so that effectively tells you that we were recovering better on the utilities compared to previously, that therefore, there was a decline in the net property cost-to-income ratio. Total cost, 36.3%. One of the reasons or one of the main reasons why it was that extra corporate costs we incurred on that corporate action. And total cost to income on a net basis, pretty much in line with previous year, 21.1%. So I think in summary, for the 6-month period, we think we -- in a tough market, we did quite well. We basically were flat on previous year's growth figures. Looking at the sectorial performance. If I look at the -- on the revenue rental income side, retail effectively decreased from 67% to 66%, and industrial increased from 14% to 15%. And as I mentioned earlier, it's because we effectively -- we were -- letting on our industrial side increased. So that effectively generated slightly 1% more. On the property expenses ratio, pretty much similar to last year. And when we compare to a net property cost-to-income ratio, we see now in the industrial portfolio contributing 18% to the net property income compared to 15%. And the main reason for that is because of, obviously, the lower margin on the -- on our property expense ratio on industrial. If you just -- if I just ran some numbers on the side, total property cost-to-income ratio on the retail was 36%. Obviously, retail is much more expensive to operate in the other sectors. offices was 33% property cost-to-income ratio, And Industrial was 19% on the property cost-to-income ratio. Moving on to Slide 34, which is the statement of financial position. Our investment properties from -- compared to prior year, we increased from ZAR 8.6 billion to ZAR 8.9 billion, which is a 3.3% increase in property valuation figure. That was obviously quite a large contributor to the total assets growth. Trade and other receivables, we actually managed to decrease from ZAR 202 million to ZAR 170 million. In the prior year, there were some parky debtors that we -- that were outstanding, which we managed to recover. That was the main reason for that decrease. On the loans receivable, we increased from ZAR 195 million to ZAR 204 million. And that's mainly vendor loans that we've effectively -- we issued on certain properties that we sold. Intangible assets, ZAR 93.7 million to ZAR 56 million. We effectively -- intangible asset is effectively the amount we brought in when we purchased the Manco, and we amortize it over the 4-year period. So that will effectively decrease on an annual basis. Other assets, we've got ZAR 70.1 million. The biggest number in that other assets figure is there's a derivative asset we recognized at the end of August for a put option for ZAR 66 million. And in the previous 6 months, we effectively didn't have that. So that increased that to ZAR 70 million. Total assets grew by 3.3% to ZAR 9.5 billion. Our Interest-bearing liability is pretty much similar at ZAR 3.6 billion. Trade and other liabilities increased by 13%. I think the other numbers -- the other number just to highlight is on the lease liability, where the IFRS 16 standard being implemented, we needed to account for that in the 6-month period. So there's a ZAR 86 million liability we brought onto the balance sheet and liabilities, and there's a similar amount sitting under investment properties. That's an IFRS entry we have to bring in. On the derivative liability side, we increased from ZAR 10.4 million to ZAR 48 million, and that's only the interest rate swaps. We don't have any other derivative liabilities in there. Obviously, with the interest -- with the JIBAR rate and the other curve moving down, that mark-to-market values are increasing on the liability side. But on the converse side, we'll effectively pay lower interest with financial institutions as the JIBAR rate effectively decreases. So I think in total, on the net asset value, we're sitting at ZAR 5.3 billion, and that obviously is significantly less -- more than where the market cap is sitting on the -- for the fund. Loan-to-value sitting at 40%. NAV, we effectively grew by 2.9% to 10.18%. The main reason for that NAV growth is the investment property increase compared to the prior 2019 Feb. On a cash flow basis, if I compare the cash flow period-on-period, they pretty much similar of ZAR 419 million on cash generated from operations; ZAR 153 million on net finance costs; ZAR 266 million on dividend paid; disposals, we effectively sold ZAR 49 million; and on acquisitions and CapEx, there was no acquisitions in this 6-month period, CapEx was ZAR 34 million. And debt funding shows there's a minus ZAR 57 million. The reason for that is we have revolving facilities. So as we have excess cash, we push it into the revolving facility, So it effectively shows that the debt decreased by the facility limits, obviously haven't decreased. And there's a small element of -- on some of the disposals of ZAR 49 million, where we repaid some debt So closing balance for the end of the 6-month period, we're sitting at ZAR 70 million. Okay. Moving to Page 36. Just to highlight for the FY 2020, our expiry profile, we're setting at 3%. So there's about ZAR 106 million that we need to refinance by 31st of August. We're already in discussions with the banks. We're just finalizing pricing. So we'll finalize that shortly. So effectively, all the debt for 2020 will be refinanced. I think in this 6-month period, we did about ZAR 680-odd million of refinancing. And obviously that we start looking then at the 2021, 2022 debt. In 2021, we've got 26% of debt that we need to refinance, and we've got swaps that hedge that for 22%, and the -- for the remaining 3 years, we see it's pretty much around about a 20% to 25%. So I think in summary, debt has been refinance for the year. There's no issues on the debt refinance, and now we'll concentrate on the next financial year facilities. On our hedging profile, we were hedged out at 79%. So there is an element of about 20% that we're benefiting from lower interest rates. And we'll take a view and we look at responsibility on, there's about ZAR 360 million of hedging. It comes up in July that we'll make a determination of what we want to do at that hedging. Weighted average cost of debt, almost the same as previous year, sitting at 9.24%. And then our weighted average debt expiry at 2.3 years, and our weighted average hedge expiry, 2 years. So I think the -- from a debt profile funding position, I think the company is pretty much pretty stable. There is no major issues. I can just hand over to Izak now.

Thank you, Ridwaan. Just briefly on the way forward. So I was looking at the time here, I think it's 11:00 already. I think key for the next 6 months for us, survive COVID-19. I think that goes without saying, all efforts are going into that. I think we need to continue to enhance the defensive nature of this portfolio. If you look at some of those annexes that we've included there, you'll see that our A and B tenant profile improved by 3%, 29% from the last reporting period. So we're edging closer and closer to get into the ideal sort of mix of tenants there. So we're going to continue doing that and hopefully, most of our tenants survive here. I think we need to start thinking quite hard and implementing some strategies around adapting this business post-COVID-19, what's our attitude towards e-commerce and how we work with our staff around here. And basically, in our business generally, what does this mean for our office portfolio in terms of certain adaptations that one might have to do there. Even though residential property, I mean, there might be a change in terms of how we approach all of that. But a key thing here is that there are certain things that are going to take quite long to sort of execute in a sense of e-commerce and all this that's now happening much faster than we thought. Luckily, we do believe that our -- especially our retail portfolio lends itself while to being a great recipient of e-commerce, especially in the townships where you don't have reliable addresses and things. I think our properties might become the pickup points for e-commerce. And I think what's critical really is liquidity and balance sheet strength. We need to do whatever we can there to remain liquid and keep running this business. Thank you, and there will be an opportunity for questions now, if any. And then obviously, we are here for phone calls if you guys need to speak to us outside this platform.

Thank you very much, Izak. The first question is from Lessy Chetty from Sandler. He's asking can you give us some detail on how rental collections for the month of March, April and May on are going across the 3 sectors? He's also asking how is the areas position looking since the end of February? Have you seen a spike in retail and offices? And then his third question is banks seem to be very accommodative through this process. Current discussions included some element of covenant waivers. If ICR goes under 2x, would conditions deteriorate further?

Hopefully, I got all.

I'm happy to repeat if -- first question, can you give us some detail on how rental collections for the month of March, April and May are going across the 3 sectors?

Do you want me to take that one?

Rental collection [indiscernible] April and May.

Okay. So I don't understand this numbers yet, Izak. I'm just going to...

Do you want me to?

Yes.

Okay. So on the question of collections. I don't think we have the Feb numbers here readily. I mean, we can come back on that one, but then just answer for April and May, okay? So up to the end of March, it was kind of business as usual here for us, and the collections were at a sort of normal levels. But come April, basically, the situation changed because of lockdown happen towards the end of March. So there were certain tenants that were fully paid up for the month of March because they pay on the 1st of the month okay? So I mean, those are -- some of those tenants are actually trying to claim back rental on a basis that they haven't traded for April for those last 5 days of March. But to give you the breakdown, we collected in total, 73% of the rentals for April. And we collected in total so far, 66% of the rentals for May. Okay? As I said earlier in the presentation, I think our biggest sticking point in terms of the big quantums on the rental side is with the fashion guys, okay, the large fashion guards and the medium-sized fashion guys. And obviously, there are some real struggles on the SME side. So if I break that down into the various categories that retail collections for April was 69%. They're at similar levels for May, okay, up to date. And basically, your office collections were 94% in April. This month, we're sitting at 67%. I think what we find is that there are certain office guys have paid and thought that they had made a mistake paying because everybody is asking for discounts. So I mean we always thought that May would be a more difficult month for us. So we're finding quite hard there to get the monies in. And in industrial, we were sitting at 62%, and we're now sitting at 49% for May. So that's a collection picture there. As far as the banks are concerned, we have discussions early on with the banks. There is broader discussions at the Basel level, as I said earlier on. And basically, what the industry group has done is we -- they've sort of gone and there have been discussions at the banking association level that says, listen, obviously, everybody understands that landlords are absorbing quite a bit of this negativity around COVID-19, which may or may not lead to valuation issues, with standard affect LTV covenant levels. It may or may not lead to tenant defaults and vacancies that may or may not affect your interest cover ratios. Watch your attitude towards that. I mean the banks understand that the banks obviously want to enter into buy lateral discussions on a case-by-case basis. So I don't think you're going to see mass foreclosures in the sector by banks just waking up one day and shutting down our businesses. I think the banks pretty much understand that this is a Black Swan event and that maybe some of this might blow away. And the banks are actually willingly discussing the potential for facilities with us. But obviously, it's a process. We need to run numbers and demonstrate to the guys what's going on in the business. I think based on that, I think facilities may or may not be forthcoming. But in as far as Dipula is concerned, I mean, I think we demonstrated in the slide earlier that we do have room to borrow up to close to ZAR 450 million just on a base -- just to get close to our covenant. And I think our number right in the beginning that we were discussing with the banks was a tops facility of about ZAR 200 million and so on. And I think if we need those -- that facility, I'm fairly confident that we will get the facility. But I mean, at this stage, there isn't really a desperate need for that facility. But I mean I think we obviously -- we're trying to position ourselves in such a way that if the need arises for that facility, we'll be able to actually access it.

The next question is from Jonathan du Toit, he's asking from Oyster Catcher Investments. Sorry, he's asking 2 questions. The first one is please, can you provide more detail on when you have debt maturities over the next 24 months? Why have you not increased access facilities to ensure that there is no refinance risk? Please also explain how the residential acquisition on 1 July will be financed. Has this finance already been secured?

Ridwaan?

May I take this? I think on the debt maturity profile, I mean, we've highlighted it in the Slide 36, effectively, the way the REIT industry works is we're normally negotiating with the banks between 3 to 6 months of expiry. So it's a continuous cycle. We effectively roll debt. So between 3 to 6 months, we engage with the banks, and we lock in the pricing and we refinance the debt. So I think that's the additional [ outing ] raise that has taken place, and we've always managed to roll the debt. And I think that's across the industry on that issue. And I think on Slide 36, we basically illustrate the profile between the expiry between 2021, which is 26% of our debt that comes up. On the Cosmo acquisition that we effectively highlighted in July 2020, effectively, the acquisition needs to be funded for. We -- we've ran our -- prior to the COVID situation, we effectively had all the amount about roughly 40-odd percent of it that was bank funded. The funding is in place, and 60% of that was effectively going to be refinanced by cash resources that we would have had in place. So if COVID did not take place and we didn't have the disruption in the collection cycle of between the 60s and 65%, 70%, we would have had enough facilities in cash to effectively fund the Cosmo acquisition. And coupled with that is there were quite a few disposals we were working on. So we recorded for the 6 months, we had disposed ZAR 40-odd million of disposal. There was much more disposals, which we effectively would have concluded. Had COVID not taken place in the disposals after proceeds from those disposals, element of that, we would have had to pay the bank to bring -- keep our gearing in place. And the balance would effectively have gone to effectively fund the Cosmo transaction. So -- and that transaction was basically included probably over a year ago. The development needed to complete -- be completed. We still think it's the right assets. Letting on that development is sitting around north of 60%. And it will probably be close to 80%, 90%. There are rental rates we achieving are much higher than what was anticipated. So we still think it's the right acquisition. Unfortunately, no one saw COVID coming, and the -- but the funding with what we currently have, we will still be able to fund that transaction.

The next question from Jonathan is do you believe that the 3 loans receivable totaling ZAR 204 million are fully recoverable given COVID? Have these entities made payments post-February 2020? And can you provide more detail on the underlying properties financed?

Yes. So the -- there's basically 2 loans with 2 large groups. Those loans of all interest is fully paid up. The loans are up to date. We don't foresee any issues on those loans in any way. And besides, we've got security on those loans. So we've got mortgage bonds. In the unlikely scenario that those loans default we'll effectively attach those properties, and the proceeds we'll be able to realize on those attachments would probably either be equal to or more than what those loans are valued at.

Can I just add to that? I mean, the actual borrowers, I mean that's peanuts in the bigger scheme of the balance sheet position.

Yes, it's quite -- it's too quite -- it's large -- probably groups larger than maybe similar or or even larger [indiscernible].

[indiscernible] from Zealandia Capital is asking 3 questions. He first of all, say, thank you, Izak, for the presentation. Do you regard the current market price of Dipula shares on the JSE as its fair value that you would accept to sell your own personal holding set? The second question is how much will Dipula's LTV go up after transfer of the Cosmos development? And the third question, would you actively look to dispose assets and rather buy back your own shares with the proceeds given the very attractive yield on Dipula's own shares versus rental income on assets?

Okay. Let me just start with the Cosmo question. I mean at -- our component of it is about ZAR 140 million?

Yes. The one [indiscernible] probably just...

Yes, it just adds another ZAR 100 million, so it's not a big number.

Yes.

Then...

But just on top of that, sorry, the asset is there. So your gearing ratio will stay the same because we're gearing the thing to [indiscernible].

Yes. We're not gearing by much more. And then I think on the -- whether the shares are trading at a fair price, I think we tried to demonstrate that we're trading at a much deeper discount to NAV than the average of the market at the moment. So I believe there's a lot of value in those shares. And no, I wouldn't sell at the current price. Some are holdings at a current price. And I think the third question was?

It was, whether you would dispose the assets and rather buy back your own shares given the attractive yield on your shares versus rental income on assets?

Yes. All right. Yes. So I think it's a question of at what price you dispose of the shares. I mean I suppose the key thing is also to ensure that you don't destroy NAV in the quest to try and go buy back shares cheaply. So we need to start the balance here. I think if we could dispose of shares at a reasonable price, we'd do that. And the transaction being proposed there of buying back shares makes perfect sense and so on. So I mean, it's not something that's like foreign to our thinking, but it's really a question of whether you can find a balance in terms of how all of that works out in terms of pricing.

Thishan Govender from Truffle Asset Management is asking, you spoke to vacancies on your COVID-19 slide. Could you touch on your expectations of renewals and reversions?

Yes. No, that's a tough one. I think that, obviously, we are speaking to tenants, but our experience so far is that no one is really talking renewals at the moment. I think everybody sort of like waiting it out a bit. So I think what you might see, you might see a slower sort of renewal pace than the first half of the year in terms of how quickly tenants sort of engage on the renewal side of things. So we're not going to rush into that because we understand that people are bit uncertain. We're also not going to rush into situations where people are pushing quite hard for lower rentals, taking advantage of what's effectively an unusual situation. So there's potentially a risk there of lower renewals, but I think we just need to skillfully navigate our way through that.

Then the second question from Thishan is could you please talk to the rights of the respective classes of shares? Are the A Class distributions cumulative, if the dividend is passed or not paid in full? And in that scenario, what are the rights of the B Class shareholders given that they earn half NAV?

Okay. A very simple answer to that. The A class growth is cumulative. Other words, if I don't pay in this year -- like if I declare a dividend in this year and I've only paid sort of half of it, you don't get the other half the following year. But if you are meant to grow at 4% this year, so in other words, if you go from -- for one to a better example. If you are sitting at ZAR 1 base this year, and we're looking at a 3-year scenario, assuming that inflation is 10%, A will then go to ZAR 1.10, okay? And in that particular year, if I don't pay anything, but I pay the following year, then it needs to go from ZAR 1.10 to whatever...

ZAR 1.21.

To ZAR 1.21. Then basically, I wouldn't have to pay what I didn't pay in the previous year, but I'd have to -- my base it have to be ZAR 1.21 for the A share. So there's no cumulative dividend, but there's definitely a growth adjustment factor that doesn't stop sort of growing.

Then [ Jania Hari ] from Coronation is asking, Izak, please could you go through the reversions on industrial and renewed leases as well as on new leases? And he's asking Ridwaan, could you please just touch on the increase in admin and corporate costs that went up to 13.4%?

Okay. So let's just quickly go to the industrial portfolio there, [indiscernible] as Ridwaan is...

So maybe just on that admin and corporate costs. The admin and corporate cost is basically a 1 line of about ZAR 1 million for the corporate action fee we pay the advisers on the assay corporate transaction. So I think if you still get out, you'd be around about 6-odd percent on the admin and corporate cost.

Okay. On the industrial reversion rates, we were flat year-on-year, 0.3% positive. But I think where we took our knock was up to the end of the financial year, and that's sort of filtering through in the Basel and Ridwaan's comment earlier on about how that had impacted the top line growth. But for this past -- immediate past 6 months, we were flat on diversions. And as far as new leases are concerned, we concluded new leases at a weighted average rental of ZAR 52, which is quite good because it's sort of almost in line with where our average renters are. In fact, it's higher than our average rentals at the moment.

And [ Nick Kricker ] from Signal Asset Managers is asking, how have the clothing retailers been trading since entering Stage 4? And do you expect them to pay full rent?

Okay. All right. So the clothing retail is the first, I don't know, 2 weeks of April when customers opened up for them on the 1st of April was chaos for us. I mean there were lines and lines and lines and just to sort of facilitate social distancing was a nightmare for us. We don't have those numbers, but from what we saw, and the long lines that we saw, there was quite a lot of people there. And I think our experience, even with the cloths regards is that, that first announcement of a lockdown led to massive bottlenecks of people going in and out of the stores. That sort of stabilized over time. And I don't know how liquid people are at the moment. But there was definitely a spike for that period of time. And I think only time will tell me. I mean, we'll only have those numbers sort of in a month or so to come in terms of how they did for those months. I mean I think what's key for us Is this thing is not about one great month of trading. I mean these retailers need to have continuous trading. And I think there needs to be money in people's pockets. I mean ultimately, what's going to determine is for a cash guys, cash in people's pockets. If the banks are not those credit extending entities, where is the money going to come from? And if people obviously are unemployed, it means that even your credit retailers are probably not going to do great because their credit extension is also being curtailed. So that I don't foresee great trading conditions for our guys going forward. But I certainly think it's better than not trading at all, which was a situation in April. In terms of the rent collection discussions, that's ongoing. I mean, I think we started in the North Pole. They started in the South Pole. And hopefully, we'll find each other [indiscernible]

Thank you very much, gentlemen. That concludes questions from the webcast. And Izak, I'd ask if you want to leave us with some closing thoughts.

That's all, yes.

Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the presentation. Thank you very much for your time and attendance.

Thank you. Thanks.