Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. (DHBK) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Hello, and welcome to the Doha Bank Fourth Quarter 2022 Financial Results Conference Call. I would like to advise all participants that this call is being recorded. Thank you. I'd now like to welcome Shahan Keushgerian to begin the conference. Shahan, over to you.

Thank you, Gavin. Hello, everyone. I want to welcome you to Doha Bank's Fourth Quarter 2022 Financial Results Conference Call. On this call from the company's management, we have bank's acting CEO, Gudni Adalsteinsson. And please, sir, go ahead.

Thank you, Shahan, and welcome to all to this financial results conference call. My name is Gudni Stiholt Adalsteinsson. And with me on the call, I have the acting CFO, Sanjay Jain; and also the acting CRO, Taher Alagha. And together, we will take you through the presentation. And we'll leave enough room to ask and answer some questions later on. I think I'll stick to the same format as on our previous calls, go through some of the key takeaways from the results then provide guidance for this year and on what to expect. Now we ended the year with a profit of QAR 765 million, which is an increase of close to 9% from previous year. If I try to break down the major components in our P&L statement, then -- probably the first thing to highlight is the reduction in impairments, which went down 19% year-on-year and reductions, which I believe is here to stay. Net fee and commission income up by 22%. Now that equates to around 40% of our operating income. And the reason why I bring this up in this context is that this is an area which I believe we can grow much, much further. I can see that fee income -- commission income can be at least between 20% and even 25% of our total income. So that's the reason that I specifically want to highlight that because there are more things to come on that side. Now the biggest part of income comes for our loan portfolio. Net interest income, QAR 2.3 billion in 2022. I'd like to point out that this is the same number as in 2020. But still, however, a reduction of 10% from 2021. I think it's important that we kind of look what is -- look at the individual components. So interest income, up 11%. Now what happened in 2022 was that -- as we mentioned before that our government overdraft decreased substantially. It decreased by 68%. And without the government overdraft, our interest income would have increased by 17%. I think that number is more reflective on the repricing capacity that we have going forward. So I'm highlighting that here and now. Also, at the same time, during 2020, we've been more cautious about increasing our lending margins. You're all aware of the rescheduling program introduced by the QCB, the Circular 15. We want to be sure that the rate levels that we are imposing on our clients, especially those who are going through some sort of restructuring, are not preventive for developing. Basically, what I'm trying to say is that the rate levels will not reduce the payment capacity of those clients. And I believe this should be addressed upfront with adjustment in rates rather than postponing principal repayments further down the line and extended the payment profile of the loan. So this is the reason why I'm seeing, I would say, slightly lower interest income than we would see in a normal year. This is important to highlight. Now the other component of the net interest income is -- are the interest expenses, up 67% from the previous year. This also needs to be put into context. The reason for this increase is that 2021 was nothing short of an exceptional year when it came to funding. So back in 2019, we saw an opportunity to reduce our funding costs by keeping our funding very short. And effectively back then, reap the full benefit of the almost 0 rate environment during 2020. In 2022, we have changed our strategy a bit. We're becoming, I would say, more risk averse. We have lowered our nonresidential funding for -- from something like 46% down to 27%. And that means we were repricing something like QAR 9 billion equivalent during 2020 from offshore to local, which resulted in increase in cost of funding. However, what I want to make clear is that our funding cost is not high. On the contrary, it is the second lowest amongst the Qatari banks. The way we calculated it comes out at 1.96, and we intend to stay in that category. And I'll talk more about the impact of these 2 components when we talk about the guidance for this year. But I believe we are well positioned into having a very stable net interest income this year. Now other things in the P&L statement is probably a bit unusual, but I also want to kind of mention things that are absent. Those of you who have been following us for some time do know that we have -- we run a very active bond portfolio. In 2019, we made some QAR 300 million in trading profits from our portfolio. And the year after that, in 2020, I think the number was close to QAR 190 million. This has always been a contributor -- a big contributor to our bottom line. And you can see that these numbers are almost absent this year. We made on investments -- sorry, on -- yes, on bond investments in around QAR 25 million. Now this is kind of a reflection of our investment strategy. When the markets are weak like they were in 2020, we are net buyers. When the markets are strong, we harvest the assets and do a lot of selling. Last year, and I'll talk about that more in a minute, we have actually done that. We have been harvesting assets as quickly and robust as we can to build off for trading profit in, I would say, this year or the year to come. If I ask you now to turn to the balance sheet numbers, then we see the -- the total number is a net contraction of 3%. Again, one -- I'd say things are not quite the way they've seen. As you can see in the numbers, our investment portfolio is reported to be flat year-on-year, around QAR 50 billion. Now that is -- sorry QAR 24 billion. That is perhaps not the true reflection of our portfolio. This is the market value of those securities, which have come down during 2020. At the same time, we have actually increased the portfolio of close to QAR 2 billion, again, to build up to the future. And this year, we have already in January alone increased at the same portfolio by close to QAR 800 million. The reason again, I bring this up, I see this as a potential for future revenues going forward. And right now, with the way the markets are or have been, we believe that we can build up this portfolio up to even 30% of our total assets. Now long-term advances decreased by 7.3%. The biggest contributor to that was the reduction in the government overdraft as I mentioned earlier. Private sector loan growth was, however, 2.7%, which actually, we are quite proud of. This is something we finally have -- are seeing now. We have to go back 3 years to see a similar growth here at Doha Bank. So we're happy to see that materialize. As I mentioned in our previous calls, this was largely back-ended to 2022. The fourth quarter was exceptionally strong quarter, where we added, if I remember correctly, close to QAR 1.7 billion of new assets. And the pipeline going into 2023 is looking very robust. So net-net, on the P&L and on the balance sheet, I think we are in a very strong position. We have the right capitalization as well with the total capital adequacy ratio around 20%, which I think is something that is needed now going into 2023 and 2024. So if I give you a bit of glimpse into what we can see for this year, in our last call, we talked about the strategy that the bank is formulating -- has formulated that is working towards. This plan is being implemented. This includes, as I mentioned, streamlining of our domestic and international branch network, and we have already closed some of the offices abroad. We also exited the mass retail network in all branches and there are more things which we'll talk about later on, which are going to be implementing this year, both on the revenue side and also on the cost side. To be more specific on the business plan for this year, we do intend to grow our GRE business. Again, having low cost of funding is the key element to that with our position as a second lowest cost funded bank in Qatar, we think we are well positioned to reap those -- the benefits of those loans. We all know these are very thinly priced, and you need to have a cheap source of funding to get some margin out of it. But again, this is going to impact our NIM, which we'll talk about in a minute. We're also going to grow the international business in the wider sense of that word. We have around 150 people working for also abroad. That business is not generating something like 100 -- just shy of QAR 200 million a year, I believe we can do much, much more there. I believe -- I see this as a risk diversification we came as well as opportunity to tap into growth areas. We talk more specifically. We are contemplating selling our personal Saudi Arabia desk here in Qatar to facilitate the business we are going to be doing in Saudi. Now the engagement model of this is going to be very strict. This is going to be completely risk participation and also following our Qatari clients into Saudi, as many of them have set up business down there. There will be no sourcing of risk by ourselves. And the approach, as I said, is going to be very limited to these 2 things: following our clients in there and risk participation with local banks. Also, the highlight for this year is going to be the reconstruction or regeneration of our tech stack. There's a lot of focus here in at Doha Bank in redoing our technology capabilities, which can enable us to launch new products and improve products and services this year. And then last but not least, we also hopefully very soon going to see some of the fruits of our ESG strategy come to light. And that's something I hope I can share with you quite soon. Now in terms of the performance scorecard, which is included in the slide deck. We are working towards -- or aligned with a 5-year strategy. And that strategy is marked by certain KPIs, which we've listed in the presentation. These are largely unchanged from the last call we had. I do think, however, it's useful to go through them one by one just to reiterate where we're going to be heading. Now the capital adequacy ratio, we still believe that for this year is going to be around 18.5% to 19%. But on the long run, when growth picks up, it should be around 17%. Net loan growth, we're not changing our forecast. We believe that net-net for this year is going to be between 3% and 5%, where we think the private sector should be more around the 5% level. NIM, last year, we finished the year about 2.39%. We had, in the previous call, give guidance that we expect NIM in 2023 to be 2.5%. I think we should take that number down to 2.25% for the reason that I explained earlier. We believe that while some of our clients are going through the -- we could call it the government restructuring Circular 15, that repricing should be not as aggressive as of the normal circumstances. And adding to that, the growth we expect in the GRE business, I think 2.25 is more realistic for 2023. However, in a more benign environment, I think that number should be 2.5% in the long run. Cost of funds, we are committed to be what we call top 3. It's probably the -- I'm actually wanting to say that because you want to be bottom 3, but don't understand where I'm coming from. Nonperforming loans finished the year last year at 6.43%. We expect this year and even next quarter to bring that number down to 6% again. In the long run, the bank should be running itself on NPL, I would say, in a 5-year context somewhere between 4.5% to 5%. Cost of risk is coming down from 220 basis points to 160. We believe that number is going to stay where it is until the end of the year. But in the long run, we're probably talking about 120, 130 basis points. Cost-to-income ratio, 30%. We're not changing that. But of course, in the longer run, we want to be running the bank more efficiently. And that is effectively the return on equity strategy that we are following is to move that number quite dramatically down to something like 25%. ROE, still the same number that we have in mind. We finished last year at 5.8%. We need to do better. And I believe this year, we're going to be finishing at least 7%. In the long run, our backlog hours should have an ROE of around 14% to 15%. Now that kind of concludes the quick overview of the financials and the underlying dynamics that were contributed to the results. But I think Shahan, I'll pass it back to you for some Q&A. Shahan?

Thank you, Gudni. Yes, I just have a few questions on my end. So basically, Doha Bank stock has been the worst performing bank stock over the past 5 years. Like what is your strategy to change investors' perception of the bank and the stock? Okay. That's my first question. And then my second question is what is the change or shift in strategy for the current management versus the previous CEO management? And then finally, there was rumor circulating around last week, I believe, regarding Adani, but do you guys have any exposure to his companies, enterprises?

Thank you, Shahan. If I could just -- I'll probably start with the last question, that's the easiest one. We had a 30-day CP out of Indian office, which equated to around QAR 20 million worth. That was repaid by the Adani Group last week. And after that, we have no exposure to that group. So that is clear. Now in terms of the investor perception, well, we basically are not equipped or not allowed to influence the perception of the stock market. And so I can't really comment on that. Our role is to have a strategy, to implement our strategy and be transparent to the investor world for them to make the right choices on back of that. So we cannot be giving any stock picks on this call. Now, however, we've done also our bid not just on that front in terms of running the bank, but also to improve the technicals on our shares. So we have engaged with to liquidity providers to improve liquidity and price discovery of our shares. And I believe we are the only listed entity in manner that has 2 dedicated LPs. We've also been beefing up our Investor Relations and the dialogue that we have with investors and including increasing the number of coverage on our shares. Secondly, I think going back what I mentioned, transparency. I'm a big believer of sharing the strategy with the investor world, sharing also how well we are doing on that strategy. And it should be very clear where we are on that path and where we are failing, and where we are making good progress. So transparencies for me is effectively covers the only thing we can contribute to that equation that you mentioned. Now in terms of the shift in strategy from the current versus previous CEO and management. I wouldn't say it's a safety strategy, but there's perhaps a change in priorities. And if you look at the bank hasn't changed for quite some time. Last year, what we described as a universal bank. And we would like to narrow the focus, shifting a bit the focus that we have in the bank. And you can see that already that our delivery platform is changing. We have redefined our retail footprint in foreign branches. We are also taking an outlook what is the best delivery of the service we provide abroad. We're also changing the customer segmentation here in Qatar. And we understand that we know that these new customers, which we look into, they will look at a very different encasement model than we have currently. That needs are different. That means that the bank needs to be a slightly different setup in terms of branches, in terms of electronic delivery platforms. So there's a bit of a rejuvenation that is happening with us currently. Shall we get some more further questions? Shahan?

Sorry about that. No, thank you very much. Thanks for clarifying those up. We can -- Gavin, we can go to Q&A now, please.

[Operator Instructions] And your first question comes from the line of Waleed Mohsin of Goldman Sachs.

A couple of questions from my side, please. Firstly, if you could clarify, there's a line item on your profit loss statement. Net impairment loss on other financial facilities. This has increased significantly to QAR 256 million number. So if you could provide some clarity on what's driving this? And if this is a one-off or a recurrent item, that would be very helpful. Secondly, I wanted to delve a bit further into your Stage 2 and Stage 3. I want to understand what's driving the, I would say, the stickiness of the Stage 2 book. Our understanding was that much of the discussion with the Central Bank was around resolving Stage 2. So if you could please talk about what sectors in particular are sticky and are still sitting in Stage 2 and what is going to lead to a resolution over there? And then on the Stage 3, given that the last few years in Qatar from a macro perspective, are pretty strong and we -- and I think the main question which arises now is that we've seen a fall in real estate prices. We've seen -- I mean, the World Cup was successfully held, but now people will ask questions about overcapacity, et cetera. So what has been driving this move into Stage 3? Which sectors are these? And if the last few years caused a significant uptick or at least no improvement in the asset quality picture then going forward, how worried should we be regarding the asset quality dynamics? And when I look at your credit loss guidance for this year of 160 basis points, it's the same as last year, which indicates that this is going to be a slow, gradual cleanup process versus what we perhaps initially thought could be like a '21, '22 event and then we normalize quite quickly. So your thoughts on this would be very helpful.

Yes, I think we'll start with the credit quality questions that you asked, Waleed, and I hand it over to Taher then.

Taher here. With regards to the first question, the increase in the provision for nonfunded exposure. The increase was made to maintain the adequate provision in line with the QCB guidelines for Stage 3 for nonfunded exposure to meet that 2050 100%. The increase was also taken -- we have taken in consideration the drop in the collateral value and to maintain the haircut accordingly, that increase has been reflected. This is my answer for this point.

Stage 2, Stage 3. Stage 3 evaluation. Stage 2 with regards to Stage 2 now it is mostly that contribution of Stage 2 is mainly for trading and real estate sectors. And with the -- for Stage 3, it's only the contracting and trading sector.

And the stickiness, I mean, of these like what's causing these or what's taking time for these to kind of resolve? When will we see an improvement in Stage 2? And yes, I mean, if you could clarify that, that would be helpful. Like when should we see an improvement in this bucket? And then -- how should we think about the NPL trajectory going forward? I see that you have shown that NPL should trend lower into 2023. But should we not be concerned about the picture on the commercial real estate and real estate side?

Well, as discussed earlier, we have with regards to Stage 2 improvement. And as conveyed earlier that certain customer has taken the flexibility and the facility of restructuring their exposure under Circular 15. And this circular will be -- I mean, they will come -- will be under the cooling period, which will expire on the last quarter 2023. And accordingly, we will definitely have to take the -- review those accounts wherever applicable and we will submit for approval for Central Bank. Certain other number -- other accounts where we believe that the risk rating has been improved. And accordingly, we will definitely improve their stage from Stage 2 to Stage 1, which is expected by last quarter this year.

Your next question comes from the line of Srivalli of Analytics.

Hello, am I audible?

Very much, sir. Go ahead.

Yes. Perfect. I have a couple of questions. So my first question is on coverage ratios. So when I see your coverage ratio currently Stage 3 is around 60%. So you have any short-term guidance on these coverage ratios? Secondly, on real estate and contracting portfolio. So combined exposure is around 42.7% of your total loan book, which is around QAR 26 billion. So I just wanted to understand how much of it is a risky exposure according to you? And what is the total provisions you are currently holding on this portfolio? And lastly, so bank has written off around QAR 1.8 billion in 2019, then QAR 4 billion in 2020. But post that, we see downward trend in write-offs. So in fact, only QAR 900 million written off in 2022. So what is your view on this? Can we expect some more write-offs in 2023? Yes, that's it from my end.

I'll take a question on the coverage ratio of 60%. If you look at from the last year, we have improved from 51% to 60%. And I think third quarter, we gave a guidance that ideally, if you look at the coverage ratio of 85% is the ideal. When we will reach there probably slowly and gradually. I expect this year to reach our coverage ratio of 65% to 70% in that range. And when it comes to the write-off, yes, you're absolutely right, QAR 4 billion down to QAR 2 billion to QAR 900 million. Now, QAR 839 million to be precise. There will be some write-offs, but not to the extent what we had the last past 3 years. So that will gradually go down. And there's another question on...

On the real estate state.

Sir, can you repeat the question, please, on the real estate?

Yes. So my question was real estate and contracting, so combined portfolio is around 43% of total loans, which is around QAR 26 billion. So I just wanted to understand how much of it is risk exposure according to you? And what is the total provisions already done on this portfolio?

I don't think we have the breakdown available here on -- specifically on these 2 sectors. Now -- you're right. The real estate sector is around QAR 20 billion out of the QAR 55 billion loan portfolio. This has been the part of the loan portfolio that I would say has been more resilient if anything, done before. And when these loans were being granted, there is very tough requirements in terms of loan-to-value, our overall collateralization on the Central Bank of 160% plus. And right now, if I'm not mistaken, the loan-to-value on the credit portfolio, the recent portfolio is, Taher is around...

33%.

33%. So with that low loan-to-value on the real estate or of QAR 20 billion I think we are adequately equipped to weather any revaluation storms or repricing of the real estate sector in Qatar.

Your next question comes from the line of Lee Beswick of QNB.

Just a couple of questions. The first one is just related to the international. And I think you mentioned at the start that you were looking to expand that a little bit, doing more in Saudi with your current customers, et cetera. The issue over the Adani CP that you're involved in, but it's a small amount of money, obviously, but it sort of speaks to the reputational problem that the bank has. Can you not see the link between owning an Adani CP in a market which you have absolutely no expertise at all relative to the domestic banks. And then going to another market, Saudi, okay, it's slightly closer, slightly more similar to Qatar, but it's still an international market where you don't have any expertise at all and where the local banks are infinitely better than you are. So can you not see the link between -- you got lucky with Adani, okay. It was a small amount of money. But then you're talking about going into Saudi. Can you not see that link that there's an issue there?

No. No, we did not get lucky with Adani, not at all. We have a branch or branches in India with local people in all the local markets. And this is a short-term investment done there on that level. So it's a full knowledge, a full underwrite criteria when we act into these transactions. Absolutely. So that India market is a market we know quite well. Now as I said about our reach into the potential into Saudi. This is going to be done on risk participation level. Again, we are not going to be originating anything ourselves. We fully know and as you follow the name for quite a long time, trying to resonate on it by yourself in the foreign market, you can have tire consequences. We're not going to be doing that. It's going to be a very limited approach. It's going to be participation with players in Saudi, banks in Saudi. Secondly, we're going to be following our own clients in there. So this is kind of the strategy. But again, I want to reiterate, it's a very narrow defined strategy.

Okay. And secondly, I just wanted to talk about, again, sort of as Shahan actually probably alluded to the start reputational. There's a sense of your numbers, whenever your numbers are released are always quite aggressive rather than conservative. And I'll just give you a couple of examples. So, for example, you mentioned in the presentation that your LTR is 105%. I was actually if you just work it out on the loans of QAR 58 billion and deposits of QAR 50 billion, as a 115%, not 105%. Secondly, your EPS, your EPS every single year has to be -- you have to take the interest in Tier 1 capital makes away from your EPS to actually get your net profit attributable to shareholders because the Tier 1 capital amount is something you have to pay every year. Otherwise, it would reduce your Tier 1 ratio. And also the other thing is just your Q4, you make a loss in Q4 every single year. So you have 3 sort of normal quarters and then everyone's waiting for the bottom at the end of the year. So can you not be -- there's a general sense that your numbers are very aggressive. And I think this is something that's a hangover from previous management team. I don't think it's something that you've instituted yourselves. But is there a sense that you can be more conservative in the way that you present things and present numbers because the aggression leaves you no room for error. And as we see in Q4 every year, and this has happened for quite a number of years now, there's a bottom in Q4 every year, year in, year out. I can't remember the last time you didn't make a loss in Q4. So is this something that management could address?

Good value points. I'll take a question on the EPS. On the front of the P&L, you're right, it's 0.25 versus 0.23 last year. But if you look at the disclosure suggested by the auditors. And then put a note of 0.32, where we have the diluted one, which is after taking an impact of Tier 1. So that comes out to be 0.1, nice 0.1. Yes, that we put in a point.

0.19, it's not 0.25.

Yes, exactly. Correct. You're right. Yes.

On the LTR and the information that you find in the investor pack, the LTR is 105% which report is per the new reporting guidelines to the Central Bank. So there's no being aggressive or benign on that. That is just a number that we report, and it's been a certified Central Bank and we basically reported as such. Now in terms of the Q4 losses and the cycle that you mentioned, our total with you. And we're definitely changing that this way around. It is not healthy for -- to have a process in place where you rather, you basically waited to fourth quarter to take a hard look at your provisioning. And this is something that has been followed not only by our bank, but other banks for quite a number of years. This is something we also discussed with the regulator. And this year around, just to be absolutely clear, we are going to be aiming at a proportional provisioning throughout the year. There's no reason to take provisioning just for 1 quarter leaving with a loss. It's most more sensible within, let's call it, 4 equal strong holds.

Your next question comes from the line of Abdullah Amin from QNB Financial Services.

Thanks for the presentation. I have just -- I just wanted more details on the Circular 15 that you mentioned and how it's helping you and other banks as well. Is it something that the QCB has done to help banks as such? Or this was in the pipeline anyways?

No, this is largely to help the customers. And the instructions that we were given by the Central Bank was to help the customers weather the storm. But again, only customers where we could see they had a valid proposition on restructuring their business, the clients that had a stake hold to see the light at the end of the tunnel would only qualify for the Circular 15. Those who didn't see any hope for, we would have to take down immediately to Stage 3. Now we did that exercise. As you saw in our NPL numbers, we had few accounts that we took from Stage 2 to Stage 3. They did not meet the quantifications of Circular 15 and hence were downgraded. So that is the way the system has worked, but it is largely not to the benefit of the banks but largely to the benefits of the customers.

So is it -- the decision is with the bank? Or do you see we also check that it's relevant that you have made the provisions or you have not made the provisions accordingly?

Our numbers get reviewed, but the decision itself lies within the banks.

Okay. And any update because I've been in this call -- on this call with the PS management as well. And every time they had said they will write back some things, they have overprovisioned somehow or they were very conservative to pretty diplomatically. But I've never seen a write-back in Doha Bank for the last 2, 3 years at least.

No. No, there has been a write-back in -- I think we had around QAR 400 million write back in 1 year, that's 2020.

Yes, 2020 -- 2021.

Yes. In 2021, a write back of around QAR 119 million -- sorry, QAR 150-plus million something. I don't remember the exact number, but it was north of QAR 150 million.

On a net basis rather than on just a gross write-back and then a bigger write-off, I thought that was the criteria because the write-back is smaller and the right office much bigger. So net-net, it's a bigger write-off every year.

So yes, I agree that is true. Now in terms of being conservative or overly conservative, I believe we just put the right number in place in every quarter. There is no reason to be over provisioning or under-provisioning. It doesn't show them the right numbers at the end of each quarter. So the provision just like any other number should adequately reflect the value that we have in that point in time.

Sure. No, no, I appreciate that part. And is there any suggestion or in the pipeline to reduce cost? Close some international branches that are not viable or that are just represented office is technically not a real branch there? Is there any proposal on that side to reduce cost overall in the group?

Yes. As I said, we are in the process of streamlining our branch network, both internationally and locally. We have the -- if I'm not mistaken, the second biggest branch network here in Qatar. That is part of the reason why we have a cost-to-income ratio of close to 30%, with new clients and new customer segments, there is a new engagement model. Ad model might not require the same number of branches locally. And as people move more from the physical contact with the bank into a more mobile one, we will, of course, have to follow in the same way. And part of the thing is to move on the branches side.

Just one last question. There's also one more concern that every time you announce a Board meeting for the final results, and then it's been delayed. At least this year, it happened. I think last year also happened. That also hurt the stock price that there's something wrong with the stock results there something might be a scary thing. So why does that happen that you announced to date and then you have to change the rate after 2, 3 days?

No, it's a valid question. No -- we, of course, we can't influence any perception in the market. Our job is to get to the numbers. Now this time around, there was nothing malicious that happened. One of the branches we needed to take a second look at the numbers to make sure they're actually absolutely correct. And if the change sales would be material or not. We did not really know if they were material or not, it turned out they were not material, but we decided it would be better to postpone the meeting for a week rather than running over these numbers without having double check that. But this comes from one of the branches. It had nothing to do with the approvals or the setup of the accounts. Just one thing on the bench that we need to take a second look at. And that is the reason why it would be delayed.

[Operator Instructions] And there are no further questions at this time. So I would like to hand the call back to Shahan.

Great. Thanks, Gavin. Thank you, Gudni. Thanks for the update, and good luck.

Shahan, thanks for taking the time and look forward to the next quarter.

Thank you for participating. You may now all disconnect.