Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (ENTEL) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

[Interpreted] Good morning. We are about to start our event. Well, welcome everybody to Entel's Investor Day of 2025. I am Paula Raventos relationship -- Investor relationship officer here, I'd like to welcome all of you joining us here in person, here in Santiago, particularly those who came from aboard and all of you joining us online to our platform. Before we begin, I would like to say that we are recording the event [Operator Instructions] So today, we're going to be talking about the vision and progress made by Entel in an environment that is challenging. We are going to start with an international expert who is an expert in antitrust topics. Then we will continue with the presentation from our CEO and CFO, who will talk about our corporate strategy and our financial sustainability strategy. And finally, we received some details of our partnership with Starlink, that improves our spirit, that is innovation, thinking always ahead. When we close the event, we will have a Q&A session. And of course, throughout the day, the documents will be available on our website in the investor website. To start, I would like to welcome our international expert, Thilo Klein, VP -- Executive VP of Compass Lexecon. He's an economist and international consultant. He has been involved in various cases of mergers and acquisitions in the European Union and other jurisdictions and he has vast experience in recent cases in the telco industry, actually a recent case in the U.K. with Vodafone/Three. So let us welcome Thilo to the stage.

Good morning to everybody. So in the next 30 minutes or so, I will try to give you a little bit an idea of trends in merger control in the mobile telecommunication space. And in doing so, I'll focus especially on cases of mergers between mobile network operators, MNOs, because these horizontal mergers because these horizontal mergers. So first of all, there has been quite a large number of those over the years, and they all attracted very intensive scrutiny by the respective competition authorities that were charged with investigating them. Just to give you a flavor of what's happening there. So you've got here basically all horizontal MNO mergers in Europe that were investigated by the European Commission in the last 15 years. So you see that, there have been eight of them. All of these were 4 to 3 mergers. All of these underwent Phase II investigations, i.e., there was very intensive scrutiny of these. And only one of them was cleared unconditionally. Two of them were blocked and the five remaining ones were only approved subject to conditions and those conditions and remedies became more interventionist over time. The two most recent ones with remedies are Orange MásMóvil in Spain and the Italian one, Wind Hutchison. And in both of these, the commission wanted a remedy of divesting network assets in order to make sure that a 4-player market structure was preserved. But it's not just Europe, it's also everywhere else. So you may be aware or you will be aware of most of these cases, we've got T-Mobile/Sprint in the U.S., which was only cleared subject to conditions. Same is true for the U.K. case of Vodafone/Three that Paula just mentioned. I will talk about both of these in a bit more detail a bit later. And then you've got a bunch of cases also in -- here in Latin America. We see the Brazilian case Oi Móvel which was very contentious. And currently, you've got a couple of cases in Argentina and Colombia that have to do with Telefonica's retirement from the Latin American market. So what I will try to do is, first, give you my explanation of why these cases tend to be difficult, and that has to be with the regulatory framework. Then tell you a little bit about the economics of mobile telecoms mergers, what are the series of harm that competition authorities are looking into, but what are also the efficiencies that these mergers tend to generate. And then I will go through a few case studies of recent or not so recent cases from which we can learn a little bit how these cases are investigated, what the outcome is and also what the effect of these mergers on the market has been. Okay. Starting with the regulatory framework, why are these cases difficult? And why is there usually some intervention? So essentially, obviously, what antitrust authorities have to do is they have to look after the welfare of consumers. So essentially, what they try to do is avoid situations where these mergers lead to price increases, reductions in quality and such like. And in order to do that, they need to balance two potential effects that horizontal mergers can have a market outcomes. One is obviously retire -- a merger retires a competitor from the market. So competition may be relaxed and that may lead to price increases, reductions of quality and so on. But on the other hand, horizontal mergers also may lead to efficiencies, cost reductions, improvements in quality and so on, and that's good for consumers. And so both of these things need to be balanced. Now it is a fact that certainly in Europe, but I think in many other jurisdictions as well, competition authorities are not keen on efficiencies. Certainly, the European Commission isn't. They are more worried about the theories of farm. And the problem is that in mobile telecoms mergers, theories of harm are very plausible, and I will get into this a little bit later, whereas efficiencies, they happen in the future. And especially if a competition authority basically says, yes, there will be efficiencies and these efficiencies then afterwards don't materialize, they've got egg on their face and it will be embarrassing. In mobile telecoms, you've got the additional problem that it is a politically pretty sensitive industry. It's a consumer market with a large share of wallet. There are lots of stakeholders around. And that means competition authorities are extra cautious when they investigate these things. Now what are the typical theories of harm that people are worried about? I think the key word here is upward pricing pressure. What does that mean? If I raise my prices, then what will happen is I will lose customers and these will go to my competitors. Now if I acquire a competitor, the customers that I lose to that competitor are no longer lost to the merged entity. So that means competitive pressure is reduced and that creates an incentive to raise price. And that incentive to raise price depends, the economic theory tells us basically on two indicators. One is when I raise price of the customers that I lose, what proportion goes to the competitor that I'm acquiring. And if that proportion is large, then obviously, the competitive pressure of that competitor on my prices has been large. And if I remove that, then the incentive to raise price will be stronger. The other indicator that's relevant is the gross margin that my competitor earns on the customers that I'm going to lose to him because if that gross margin is very high, then sort of this company internal customer diversion is worth a lot, and that creates an extra incentive to raise price. Now if you think about this, both of these indicators for mobile telecoms will point you to important price effects of mergers. That's because it's a concentrated industry. That means whoever I'm acquired will always be somebody that will attract a lot of customers when I raise my price. And the gross margin will always be high because it's a fixed cost industry. So variable costs are relatively small, therefore, high gross margin. And it is possible basically based on very little data to the economic models that allow you to forecast what the price increase is going to be when I acquire a competitor. And that's exactly what the European Commission has done in all of its mobile merger cases. So I'm obviously not going to go into this here, but what you'll see there is that the European Commission forecast suggested that in all of these cases, there would be very sizable price increases, and that was then a reason for them to adopt relatively interventional decisions on these things. So that's the theory of harm. But you can also look at efficiencies. And mobile telecoms is, I would say, because of the nature of the technology, a sector where you can expect actually quite a lot of efficiencies procompetitive efficiencies being created from a merger. The most important one of these I've tried to illustrate here is that when you integrate two networks, there will be a lot of additional capacity created. And that's basically because if you integrate two networks, then there will be a denser site footprint. So in any local area, you will have more master antennas on them. And at the same time, you're pulling the spectrum of the two operators. And that means that there will be a lot more capacity in that area to transport data over. And more capacity in an area means two things. One, it means the incremental cost of the operator of catering to additional customers is reduced, and that creates downward pricing pressure, i.e., an incentive to reduce prices. And the other thing, of course, is that quality improves because more capacity means less congestion, faster download speeds, all of these things. And that's obviously good for consumers directly. And if I have a better network, then that also puts more pressure on my competitors who will also have to make an extra effort. So that is all good for competition. There are a few other plausible efficiencies that have been argued in many of these cases. I don't want to go through all of these. One of these that's obviously relevant in the current situation is that if you have to integrate two networks, that means that an engineer has to visit pretty much every site in the new network. And as they are doing that, you can then take the opportunity to implement new technologies. And in the current situation, that might mean if I merge today, then that may accelerate the pace at which 5G is rolled out, for example. And that, of course, also increases quality and is good for consumers. With that, so the idea then is to have a little look at some of the recent cases and see what happened there. The first case I would like to look at is an Italian transaction. So Hutchison Italy and Wind had a joint venture in 2016 that was reviewed by the European Commission. And what you see here essentially is that, that merger involved the #2, #3 and #4 in the market to form a new market leader. We advised Hutchison in that case also. And essentially, in that case, we basically prepared a very well-evidenced case that efficiencies would be generated. What efficiency are we talking about? So first of all, we said that merger will lead to a faster rollout of a 4G network. That means that there will be faster speeds and wider coverage. We said variable costs will be reduced by the merger, and that will create downward pricing pressure. And we said -- we also said that the fixed cost savings that all of these mergers generate will provide incentives to invest more in the network. So what happened in this case? The European Commission was very skeptical about the merger. They did the UPP analysis and said there will be large price increases. In addition, they had another theory -- that's an antitrust jargon, is called coordinated effects, and that basically means you reduce the number of players that they may tip the market into a collusive equilibrium where everybody holds back from competing because they fear that if they compete too strongly, there will be a price war or something like that. So basically, they said competition will be softened in the retail market. At the same time, they said if we have one competitor less in the wholesale market, then MVNOs will have less bargaining power, and that means that wholesale prices are going to go up. The efficiency arguments that we put forward were altogether rejected. That's what I mentioned on my first slide. So the European Commission is generally very skeptical about efficiency arguments, and they rejected all of them, in my view, based on pretty superficial arguments. And as a consequence of all of this, -- what we have here is a case where the commission then imposed a divestment remedy. So essentially, the parties in order to get the merger through had to divest some spectrum and some slides to allow the entry of a new MNO. In order to facilitate that further, they also had to give sort of during a transitional period, network access to that new entrant so that new entrant could already compete while it was still rolling out its own network. And important to note here is that, that remedy was designed as a fix it first remedy. That means sort of the entrant had to commit to entering formally with the competition authority before the merger could be closed. So that entrant back then was a French operator called Iliad. Okay. So what I want to do now is knowing what happened in that case. Have a look at what the market development has been or how that merger may have affected market outcomes. What I'm going to do is I'm going to look at what happened to prices, what happened to investment and quality of service, what happened to market share and talk a little bit about what happened to the profitability of the merged entity in that case. So let's look at prices first. So in my opinion, the best price indicator to look at when you want to do an analysis like that is revenue per gigabyte of data transported. The reason why that is a good indicator in my view, is that it is -- that gives you a better reflection of value for money supplied to customers than an indicator like ARPU, for example. Now this effect, and many of you will know this, that revenue per gigabyte pretty much worldwide has been continuously falling over the last probably 10, 15 years. And the reason for that, of course, is that as you had technological process and new technologies being introduced, the cost of producing extra data or transporting extra data fell, and that basically also pushed prices down. And that also happened in Italy. And what you have here on that chart is basically what happened to Italian prices between 2011 and 2022. Now one thing to note about this graph is that usually the downward trend that we're seeing in revenue per gigabyte is a convex curve. So it's basically a curve where the trend becomes flatter as prices come down. What we have done here in that graph is we have converted these prices into the natural logarithms. And what that doe,s, is the natural logarithms, they follow almost a linear declining trend. It is almost straight line. And the advantage of that is that you can see changes in trend very easily. So maybe let's look at what happened in Italy. So you see the -- so the black line here is the point in time when the merger was completed. And -- but you see at that point, nothing happened basically. So you had -- you see this declining line and that there's no change in trend in 2016 at all. Where you do see a change in trend is in 2018. So there, the black line, which is the prices, the decline suddenly accelerates. And the reason for that is the entry of Iliad, i.e., that remedy taker that basically had their network ready to go in that year. And immediately prices started to come down because they had a very aggressive strategy of attracting market share by offering very low prices and all the other players reacted to that. So what that tells you is that here you may have a case where actually there was over enforcement, i.e., the remedy did not just preserve the level of competition that you had in the market premerger, but actually the remedy made competition more intense, which obviously is not the idea of merger control. Then let's look at what happened to investment and network quality. Now that suggests that the commission did not only get it wrong on prices, they also got it wrong on efficiencies because what we observed was and that you have here on the right-hand side. So the blue line is basically the combined or the investment of the merged entity. And what you see is that the merged entity invested much more in its network than the two stand-alone companies combined before the merger. And that allowed the merged entity also to basically improve its 4G coverage as was predicted. And over the time of the consolidation of the network to basically catch up in terms of network quality, download speeds and so on with the other operators. So contrary to the commission's finding and the decision, actually, there is pretty good evidence that efficiencies were generated in this case. And the fact that efficiencies were generated is something that we have observed in pretty much all the European mergers, as you can see on this slide here. So what this shows is on the left-hand side, you've got the GSMA's ranking of European countries by network quality in 2014, i.e., before the big merger wave. And on the right-hand side, you've got the same ranking in 2022. Now each merger where you had -- each country where you had a 4 to 3 merger over that period has a colored bar in that -- in those two charts. And what you can see is that all of these countries, all countries where there was a merger increased their position, improved their position in the GSMA's network ranking. Okay. Final slide on Italy. Here's another indication that we had over enforcement, i.e., the remedy was too much really. What you see here is -- so the red line is Iliad. And what you basically see is that they increased their market share by quite a bit. So that these people turned out to be a much more dynamic competitor than both merging parties had been before the merger, i.e., more competition was introduced than you had even before the transaction. All the other network operators lost market share. And for the merged entity, i.e., for the merged wind, that meant that basically their financials suffered. For example, the EBITDA margins went down quite a bit since the merger. And I think something similar is true for the other operators in the market as well. So essentially, really, the Italian case is one where the European Commission overdid it. So the remedy was quite a bit stronger than would have been required in order to preserve competition in the market. Okay. Moving to the next case study. Looking at this time at T-Mobile/Sprint in the U.S. that was approved in 2020. And here you've got another case where essentially #3 and #4 are combined to form a stronger third player, i.e., another 4 to 3 merger. In that case, there was also -- so the parties put forward a very strong efficiencies case. And here, the case was made that I mentioned earlier in this presentation. They said we're going to integrate these two networks that will create a lot of additional capacity that will bring incremental costs down and create downward pricing pressure that will improve quality. In addition, they also said the merger will help us to accelerate the rollout of a 5G network. What was the outcome of that? So obviously, this was investigated by the DOJ and the FCC in the U.S., they were mainly worried about the retail market and really the theories of far more exactly the same as in the Italian case. There will be upward pricing pressure and there will be coordinated effects. So they were worried. And in the end, they only approved this subject to, again, relatively strict divestment remedies. In addition, you had the added complexity in the U.S. that, that decision was then appealed against by several of the U.S. states in a Federal District Court who, in the end, however, rejected that challenge and the merger was approved. Now there's one big difference here between the Italian case and this one, which is that the FCC, in particular, actually accepted several of the efficiencies arguments. In particular, they agreed that the merger would lead to quality improvements that, that would be good for consumers. However, they remain concerned because I said there may be many consumers in the market that are not really interested in better quality that are price sensitive and they may still be harmed by this. And that's why in the end, remedies were imposed again. What did these look like? Well, mainly, it's again about divesting some assets, in this case, a prepaid brand, including all the customer contracts and a bunch of spectrum licenses in order to once again enable the entry of a fourth player. In that case, that was a TV operator called DISH. Now that remedy and the merger approval in general attracted a lot of criticism from observers. So there are many people that said that remedy is not going to work, and it will not be sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects from happening. Now what the first point -- as far as the first point is concerned, that remedy is not going to work. They were proven absolutely right. So five years have been -- have passed since that merger was approved. The new entrant, DISH has been very slow to roll out a network. They're mainly still to this day, an MVNO. They have not been able to grow a lot of market share. So as a matter of fact, as of 2025, the idea of preserving a 4-player market structure has not really worked. So this is a 4 to 3 merger, which is interesting because that then allows us to assess whether the remedy was actually needed. We can observe what happened as a consequence of the 43 situation and whether that affected market outcomes negatively. So let's just do that. So here, you've got exactly the same price chart as before. So the dark blue line is the natural logarithm of revenue per gigabyte in the U.S. And that build -- that picture is a bit more ambiguous than in the States. So what you see there is that round about -- the merger, the price curve starts to flatten a bit. But then shortly afterwards, it basically goes back to the old trajectory in terms of what the slope is concerned. So this looks like the merger might have led to at least temporary deceleration of the downward trend. But it's not quite such a clear-cut picture among other things because 2020 to 2023, [indiscernible] also was a -- these were years of pretty high inflation in the U.S. So that might somehow distort the picture. So as I say, overall, it's not that clear cut the picture, but it's also not clear that there were hugely negative price effects in this country. The picture is much more clear-cut as far as investment and network quality is concerned. So what you see here is, again, you have a situation where the merged entity, i.e., the post-merger T-Mobile invested much more in the network than the stand-alone parties did combined before the merger. So basically, they delivered on their promise to build a very good 5G network. And as a consequence of that, and that you see on the right-hand side, we've got the download speeds. So T-Mobile is the red line. They are now by far, the quality leader in the U.S. market. So we can say very clearly that merger has facilitated investment and at least in that aspect has had a pro-competitive effect. There are a few more indications that this merger has had pro-competitive effects. If you look at market shares, what you see here, and that's the red line that T-Mobile's market share today is higher than the combined market share of the two stand-alone parties before the merger. And that is exactly what you expect to see if a merger produces pro-competitive efficiencies. So the efficiency means they now have a better network. That better network allows them to make more attractive offers to customers. They grow their market share. The other guys lose market share. A growing merged entity in terms of market share usually tells you that the merger has actually been good for competition. There is a second aspect that goes in the same direction, and that has to do with the evolution of the operator share prices since the merger. So there's an interesting paper by -- which is co-authored by a former Chief Economist of the FCC, Tom Hazlett, and they observed that T-Mobile's share price has basically multiplied since the end of the merger, whereas the share prices of the other two remaining MNOs, Verizon and AT&T have quite substantially underperformed the market, i.e. their growth was much below the S&P 500. And again, that is exactly what you expect to happen if a merger produces pro-competitive efficiencies, the merged entity now has a better network. They put competitive pressure on the remaining competitors. And as a consequence, investing in the merged entity becomes more attractive, investing in the other guys becomes less attractive. And that basically means that sort of the share price trends diverge in that way. So as I say, I think the -- this is a case where you can say that the merger had a pro-competitive effect despite the fact that the remedy hasn't worked, i.e., in that case, also the remedy was not really necessary. Okay. So that then brings me to the final case. That's Vodafone/Three, which is obviously the largest big MNO merger that we have had worldwide where we have a decision. That case is already a very important precedent. So lots of people in the antitrust world look to that case to predict the future. And here, we have, again, a situation where the third and fourth largest operators merge and form the, I think, yes, probably the joint largest player. There's one important bit of context that you need to take into account in sort of forming a view of this merger, and that is there has, of course, been a similar merger, 43 merger proposed in 2015. Back then it was Hutchisons, Three and back then Telefónica too wanted to merge. That merger was blocked back then by the European Commission, which, of course, is not a good omen when you then 8 years later, want to try it again. Now important to note two things that had changed in the meantime. One is, of course, there was Brexit. So this time around, this was not under the jurisdiction of the European Commission. It was a CMA of the U.K., the Competition and Markets Authority that had to review this merger. That's one big difference. The other big difference is there was a very strong mood change in the telecoms regulator. So in the first merger -- during the first merger investigation in 2015, the telecoms regulator, Ofcom was vitriolically opposed against the transaction. Back then, they had the attitude we need four network operators in this country. Otherwise, there won't be sufficient competition. Therefore, there's absolutely no remedy that will be sufficient to solve the problems we're going to have. And that was instrumental in getting the deal blocked. This time around, their attitude has softened very substantially. So they were much more open to this transaction. And I think one of the reasons for this is that both merging parties for some years had failed to earn their cost of capital. And of course, a regulator cannot be interested in having half of the operators in the market not earning the cost of capital because that cost doubt on their ability to invest in the next-generation technology, 5G in this case. So they were pretty open. Now in that case, we also put forward a very detailed efficiencies argument. And essentially, we again said, okay, we're going to invest EUR 11 billion in the integration of the two networks. And basically, the outcome of all of this will be a top-notch 5G network, the quality leading network in the U.K. In order to do this, I mean, if you present an efficiency case like that, you need to basically put forward evidence and analysis to prove each and every point you're making. So a lot of analysis was presented, and I've got a summary here on the right-hand side. So there was -- and I'm not going to mention them all, but maybe just the most important ones. There was technical network modeling done in order to quantify the improvements of the quality of service, i.e., by how much are download speeds going to be faster with the merged network than what we currently have, by how much is latency going to reduce, et cetera, et cetera. Then you had net network cost modeling to quantify by how much the incremental cost is going to reduce as a consequence of the capacity expansion. We did an econometric demand estimation based on consumer survey data to estimate the value in monetary terms that telecoms customers attach to these quality improvements, i.e., how much are they willing to pay for faster speeds and that sort of thing. And finally, having quantified all of these things, we then fed this into a merger simulation model. And what a merger simulation model does basically is it does the weighing up of the upward pricing pressure effects and all the efficiencies effects, i.e., the downward pricing pressure that comes from reducing incremental cost, the quality effects and all of that. The results of that analysis are on this table here. I'm not going to go through all of this, but the headline results are that we found that sort of the upward pricing pressure effects, if you discount all the efficiencies, so you assume that no efficiencies are generated, the upward pricing pressure effect was actually relatively moderate. So it was not all that large. But most importantly, we found that the effect of the quality efficiencies was huge. So we found that customers value these efficiencies a lot. And as a consequence, once we take these into account, the model predicts that the merger is going to be very pro-competitive. And in particular, sort of the headline number we had was that consumer welfare would improve market-wide for the whole of the U.K. by around GBP 1.8 billion per year. So quite important numbers. Okay. So what was the outcome of this? I would say, obviously, the CMA also found that there would be upward pricing pressure in the retail market that there would be problems in the wholesale market as well. But the case is quite revolutionary for two reasons. The first is the CMA's assessment of merger efficiencies. And the situation here was really very different. They took these arguments very, very seriously. They gave a lot of thought to them, then investigated these quite in a lot of detail. And in the end, they accepted a large proportion of the efficiencies. They accepted that if the network was rolled out as stated in the merger business plan, then these efficiencies would be generated, i.e., the cost efficiency and the quality efficiency. Second, they also accepted that consumers would benefit from this greatly and that the efficiencies would be sufficient to prevent any anticompetitive effects. And third, they also accepted that the efficiencies were merger specific, i.e., a similar network would not be built by either of the parties on their own. Such a network would also not come about as a consequence of some network sharing agreement between operators. So only the merger could achieve this. Now the only thing that they were not quite convinced by is that they basically said, okay, but our concern is that once you have merged, your incentives will be not to roll out a network as described in your business plan, you may do something much less ambitious and that might not be sufficient then to overcome the upward pricing pressure problems that we have also found. Okay. And that's when then sort of the second revolutionary thing comes in, because essentially, they imposed a remedy that did no more and no less than asking the parties to put their money where their mouth is. So essentially, they said, you've got this network in your business plan. Now please commit to it and make a formal remedy out of it. And that's basically the key remedy that got this merger through. So the parties had to commit to roll out this network as described over a period of 8 years with clear guidelines as to how many sites need to be rolled out and in which locations, how much spectrum needs to be deployed over time and in which locations. And all of these milestones are part of -- are now conditions in the merged entities spectrum licenses, and that means the telecoms regulator monitors the rollout of that network and can impose severe penalties if the rollout falls short of the timetable. In addition, there are a couple of sort of complementary remedies that cater for the short term. So the CMA said, okay, rolling out that network will take a few years. We need to make sure that in the meantime, there are no price increases on the retail and the wholesale market and that they achieved by having a basically 3-year period during which the merged entity must freeze the prices of a subset of the tariffs that they're offering in order to ensure that customers won't -- that retail customers won't suffer price increases. And they need to, at the same time, install a wholesale reference offer, which will be available to all the MVNOs to make sure that they can still have wholesale access to competitive conditions. So that's that case. And I would thought that, that might -- that case might have quite a signal effect because obviously, that remedy has got a lot of attention in the antitrust world. I think many competition authorities are looking at this, analyzing it and thinking whether that is something that they might adopt also in some future cases. So wrapping it all up, I think the conclusions of all of this are -- so you have a situation where in mobile telecoms, series of harm are eminently plausible. So it is a candidate for upward pricing pressure situations, but it's also a market where efficiencies are very plausible. And that means that if you have a merger assessment that places a lot of weight on the theories of harm, but don't place any weight on the efficiencies, then you may get over enforcement, which is not a good thing and will lead to underinvestment in the end in the mobile telecom sector. But the recent Vodafone/Three case may be a paradigm of how to get this right. You need competition authorities to really look very closely at the efficiencies and not reject them out of hand. And that would be it from me for the time being. I hope it was useful. Thank you.

Thank you so much Thilo. Very interesting presentation, Thilo, where we could see all this merger and acquisition examples and where we can have pro-competitive instances. We will continue with the presentation from our CEO, Antonio Büchi. Please take the floor.

[Interpreted] So I think the perspective and the insight that Thilo gave us, I will touch on certain points too, and then we will get into the topic that is more focused on the company. So following and just to give you an overview of what has happened in terms of regulations in Chile is that Chile went from the '80 -- 1980 to 2010, and international example in terms of liberalization and market competencies in many of the markets. And we saw in the videos and this opening up of networks tender process that were much focused in deployments more than in extracting the best margin from operators and operators were deploying very powerful networks. The truth is that there was always free use of the spectrum and precisely to develop because many companies were blocked, they say, no, but this is for 3G. And in order to develop 4G, there should be a tender process for 4G. But in Chile, it wasn't like that. For example, and I will give you an example, a competitor that entered the market a few years ago, they used a spectrum that had been tendered for 3G and 4G. And that's how there was powerful competition, thanks to that. So those rules were very important in the country. Then came the calling party pace and made the prepayment massive and that was brutally important in the early decade of the 2000s, then came portability that was very fast and effective that made the competition more dynamic. And the truth is that all of that focused to what we have is leadership in mobile penetration, high-quality services, competitive tariffs. And this was the time when the operators were fighting between each other to get in here. International operators, mobile, fixed, multi-carrier, all of them were fighting to get into this attractive dynamic open market that reinforce the competition and the rights properties. But from 2010 onwards and now I will take on what Thilo said, logic started to -- we started to see this logic where there were more regulatory burdens that it was -- like if it was a monopoly when a sanitary or an electrical company is burdened, then it's at the next tariff cycle, you have to increase the rates. So in that time, in 2010, in fact, and with the same logic that Thilo mentioned that there was a prohibition of the incumbent operators in operating with the -- in there and like the WS, and they were left outside. And of course, in that time, there were fourth operators, possible fourth operators that took on positions in that regard, in that spectrum, which is the WS one. And it's important to say this -- but the reality is that in that time, [indiscernible] let's hold I can mention it now, came in, developed and broke -- went broke. And that is the same spectrum that another operator took on at a discount price to get into the market, compete and then once again it was broke. So that has been the evolution, the actual evolution when we see the competitive effects from the consumer point of view, it's fantastic or at least it's relevant. But behind that, you have to see what happens with the reality of the financial sustainability of the operators. And that has been the reality of costing burden and having four operators in the country. And with a series of other things, we started to put on more measures, the spectrum -- tender but with more restrictions and payments and systematically, the regulatory burden increased for operators. And you see the result today difficulty for investing, difficulty for developing new technologies on the existing spectrum. And before, we were very much leaders in Latin America and in the world for developing new technologies. But today, each step in a new technology is very complex. It's a country process. This is not a regulator issue. It's a sequence story of a change of focus of these regulations that started in 2010 by forcing the existing of four operators. That was the logic looking at Europe. Now looking at Europe today, inside is different, maybe our authorities can see that Europe that after their experience has started to reflect in that they need to balance different options. And as a summary, if in the first 10 years, the operators were fighting to get in the market in the last 20 years, either if they go broke or they want to leave. And we have to take that into account. But beyond the competition, Entel within all these challenges has developed with much commitment towards our proposal values that has allowed us to navigate very well. We saw the examples that Thilo showed Brazil, Spain, each one with their different measures ongoing and maybe emerging possible operations. We know that the one of Colombia that reduces maybe from 3 to 2.5 operators in the market, that's the reality is -- and they have -- they will probably be approved. And France is just too recently, and there has been the capacity of some operators to do a proposal. Some of them have been rejected. That's the reality. Why do I mention this? Because Chile, we like it or not, looks at Europe. And Europe is changing. Things that Thilo mentioned that are quite relevant, like some efficiency elements are crucial in this industry. And the spectrum is important because the more spectrum you have, the less antennas you have. That's the ambition antennas and spectrum. I have too much spectrum, I can reduce the amount of antennas if I have. More antennas, I don't need so much spectrum, but the antennas are the CapEx. So the less spectrum by operator we have, it's less efficient. And we have Chile and Peru here in the bottom line of the situation of the industries. Here, there's a list of country, most of them from the OECD. The green ones are the three operators. Here are four, but they share one network. So from the point of view of the network efficiencies, they are actually three--three networks competing. And the other ones are just sharing them, but we have a little spectrum by operators in Chile and Peru. And that evidently puts on a pressure -- CapEx pressure or CapEx intensity that is quite relevant. Another view of competition in other countries. This is one of the indicators that is used. Thilo mentioned others. This is the HHI that sees the distribution of the market shares, but the lower it is more competitive. This is the fixed the fixed competition and the indices for that, and this is the mobile market. This is where Chile and Peru are. So when you talk about possibilities and consolidations are not in Chile. You have to consider that in Chile, we are in a world where we have very little spectrum by operator. So the potential efficiencies are very big and where the competitive position is in the extreme side in comparison to the rest of the world. Here, we have the averages which are tie in mobile. In Chile, it's 2.5. As I said, the lower it is, the more competitive. And the OECD, 3.4 here is 2.2, 2.1. And so we have this situation. There are other relevant indicators. I have heard many times recently that in Chile, the price brought down 90% of our giga cost. But 4G arrived and it happened in the whole world. But in Chile, Chile had low prices and lower than most of the operators in the world in 2010, in 2015 and in 2025. And the cost by giga decreased 90% in all of the countries. So in terms of prices, there are good arguments to discuss that. And I think this is the last one regarding the comparative situation. Here, what we see is different countries, the operators. And these are countries of three operators each, and this is the case of Chile, Peru. This is public data. In the end here, we have the EBITDA less CapEx and the margin of EBITDA less CapEx. 23%, 27%, a little bit low, 14%, 29%. So we're talking the ones below was 25% EBITDA less CapEx. Entel, that is duo within our markets has 11%. So in that way, it is very difficult to invest and generate value. And that's us. If you do the calculation for the rest of the industry, I'll leave that to you. What's sure is that move from 4 to 3 talks about improving from going -- improving from 11% to 25% on average. But here, we have releases of towers. If we deduct that in Chile, we are left with 5. If we deduct the leases of towers. And here in these levels, you are left in 20. We're talking about from 5% to 20% in cash flow capacity generation. And in the end, that allows to develop more services, more networks, more quality, less latency, more coverage, more development of new technologies. And that's why those countries are more advanced in the world in the development of stand-alone 5G and better speed indicators. But beyond this is a very challenging context. The truth is that we think that we have been able to sustain-- a sustainability and giving good services to our customers. This is why we are quiet committed to our value creation model and obviously, very much committed with our country facility until Chile and Peru have. We are convinced that we do make a difference in the lives of people. And that mobilizes all of our company. That's why we do things before, better and in a better fashion and always with the attitude of going one step ahead. And an example of that is Starlink that I think we are close to launching it. The value creation model is this one. We have seen it before, but there are key fundamentals that's basically a robust network with a digital architecture of first line and obsession for the customer experience. And I think this generates a very powerful brand, brand power and customer experience. And with that, then we are capable that the customers are willing to pay a little bit more for that to be more loyal and that less leave the company. And that in the end, -- and as we can see that superior profitability. And it's -- the environment is complex, yes, we know. But in that environment, this is the equation that has allowed us to generate that value. Here are the fundamental pillars, network, network, network, the best network technology development, new features and everything. Also an IT architecture. This is in the core of the company and maybe it can seem so far away. But in the end, it's what allows to move the IT management technologies and allowing for agility, agility and agility. Obsession for -- with an exceptional service, working groups, working teams with common goals and also the capacity to transmit a real connection with our customers. Now let's do a summary fiscal 1 year ago, where we were, what did we say and what did we promise? We talked about the pillars maintaining this leadership. And concretely, we said, we should increase 1 or 2 points of revenue share, also keep a mobile at this level, and we will go through a higher CapEx 5G transition. That was our proposal to the investors market. The truth is that we could increase 1 point this year. So I think we got to 316, we captured more than 100% of the market net value. So we capture not only what the market could give us, but one more. And from that point of view, we can take that from our previous year's process. Return on the assets, 11.6% is the current one that we took for the first semester in the range of 11%. We still have the aspiration to grow a little bit more, which is an equation of ARPU costs, et cetera. And yes, in fact, we invested in 5G. We had a deployment of 5G of 3 points, but we offset that with some savings in other lines of business that allowed us to be in the first semester around 50% of CapEx over revenue, and that was a drop regarding last year. Probably, we will be a little bit higher. We will see what we have with the line. So this is what I said, keeping our value creation model. First, the network experience, coverage, speed, latency, speed for deploying video. So there's companies like Signal and others are open. You can look at this in the web pages. They're not financed by us, but they show the values. And that network experience is good, which has allowed us to keep an NPS of 20 points more than the second 20 points over the second one and the brand power of 10 points above the second competitor. As I said, these fundamentals lead for loyalty. This is what I call rate. And this is the 20% above the rest of the industry. So what is coming now? We have competitors that left a situation of financial stress. They have an attitude that is competitive, but maybe putting emphasis on other things. We still have some competitors that we know are probably leaving the country and that changes the competitive situation. So it's actually a mix. We have always had much competition with 3, with 4 and -- but we need to navigate through all of that. This is just to remind you, this is a long-term overview. When we see the available cash flow, it's very relevant, obviously, and we saw that in the operation of 3 and 4, but this is the EBITDA less CapEx. So after the leases, EBITDA less leases, less CapEx. Entel Chile and taking [indiscernible] that today, deducts because we went from a network of 1 million homes to 4 million homes where fixed costs really tend to drag you down. But then we also sold the former business, the data center business. We had before '15, '16 capacity generating cash flow. We moved around 4 years to an area of depression. And even though there was more competition, we kept levels of around 17%, 18% of cash availability. This was the pandemic that was quite positive because positives because I know many people suffered, it was terrible. But from the reality of the industry, this was a demand for industry, had many temporary services with certain cost decreases. And then we went to the 5G stage, and it marks us here. It goes -- it went down and that today, we're here. That should allow us to improve progressively as the availability of cash flow as it happened with 4G. And another thing that's relevant and probably have been worried about is that given the inflation increase, the increase of the dollar exchange rate that have put a lot of pressure on the cost structure, how have we been able to manage the tariffs? This is the ARPU. This is public data. There are some estimation from operators that don't report revenues, but you can estimate them. And the truth is that Entel has been able to grow on average 3.4% of the ARPU in an environment where the remaining competitors apart from different maneuverings, they have not been successful in keeping that tariff increase. So from here on, we continue with the ambition of growing 1 or 2 more points in income. And to know the brands, the quality will allow us to do always sustaining the return on the assets. We had talked about from 11% to 13%. Now we're talking from 12% to 14%. We are currently in 11.6% and also maintaining the power brand and customer experience, which are the main pillars that enable us to increase our revenues and to keep this in profits. So there's many pillars, as I said before, obsession for the customer, capability of showing and having the brand, the network, network, network in the -- it's the main pillar of our proposal. And just to close the Chile chapter, this Chile 2024, these are the EBITDA margins of most part of the competition. This is our EBITDA margin. And what I think is more interesting is here on the right side, which is the return on assets. Today, we are in 2 businesses that we are getting into and betting on it, one on a more-longer term and one on a short. One is the home and others are the digital services. Now if you take Chile as a whole, you have 7% of RONA. And if you take Chile and you take those 2 businesses out, one because they are not scalable, which is home, and we still need to increase 10 or 12 market points to reach the scale. And that happens with any brand that will do this kind of business. And then it's digital that's also a business proposal that has -- doesn't have upfront investments and that is -- can be regulated depending on its success or not. That also we have an 11% return on assets. We have shown a good track of growth of the EBITDA recently until 2024. This is the EBITDA margin, and that has been positive. So last year, we wanted to grow in revenue share, which that would take us a greater EBITDA and also to drive the RONA progressively. And here, we have faced more difficulties, advances in some issues and not so much in others. The positive side is that we have been able to capture the net [indiscernible], we have got 24%. It's very much in line, but it hasn't been reflected in revenues. We haven't been able to grow our revenues basically because the pressure of discounts captured in the market has been very intense. If you eliminate the discount in order to compare more or less 1 year against another, if you take this, then the income would increase by 8.1%. So when you get into a more normal scheme, even if they maintain, but the comparative should remain the same, then the speed of income growth is relevant. The EBITDA, the truth is that there were no improvements due to the above, and it's all in a chain. Obviously, this takes to a more EBITDA margin, and this leads us so we were doing here more or less and going down, we didn't advance the way we wanted to this year. We still think that we have the relevant pillars. One is that we have been capturing a good percentage of us. That's key in subscriptions also. We're talking about subscriptions, customers with ARPU with a good NPS. Here, the network, we have some coverage weaknesses, but not of quality. Our network where it is, is the best network. You can talk about scale, but there are really precise indicators. The quality of the network is not -- but if you button and the video doesn't download, you don't like that. Well, that's one of the quality additional metrics. And the truth is that, that is where we have a price of loyalty. The port out rate is 2.2 in the rest of the industry is 2.6. What do we face? Well, it's a diverse competitive environment. We have retail that has been powered by the spectrum and also with our competitors that are in a stress stressed financial situation in settlements and maybe reorganization or restructuring right now. So there's pressures for discounts, and we think that, that should be normalized and that benchmark will start comparing one homogeneous year against another one to allow for growth. And the strategy that we have seen is that you have maybe a focus on the medium-sized cities, improving the quality of the coverage in the areas surrounding those cities. And also we have prepaid aspects where we can improve. There are objectives. They are more or less the same to have those extra 3, 5 percentage points that will allow us to sustain a better RONA with this that to grow beyond Lima, reinforcing Lima though. And there are many points, deployment of networks, expansion of the brand and channels. We had some weaknesses in the prepayment and postpayment in some of these main cities, 7 or 8 cities outside of Lima, and we are reinforcing all of that. Then we talked about the whole long-term 20% 25% of the market share. And in Peru, we're talking about 15% to 20%. If you look at the presentation of last year, that's more or less. So how did we do? In Chile, more or less aligned. We will talk about the details. We grew almost 2 points of market share in the Internet to home, which is the effort for this deployment in Peru, at the end of last year, the Movistar in Peru didn't work with what they had agreed with KKR. So we had no option of a network, and we have been working on that now. And putting an effort, focus on Chile, we the clearance from the controllership to get to the 4 million network. We are -- so we have the capacity to operate with the network, even though we had some initial problems. Today, it is working quite well. And the brand power, the truth is that we maintain the brand power. We're the first one in the industry. And if you look at the NPS, it's more or less at the first point with customer satisfaction. It's a tie, and we have been capturing this was before on it and that's after we had 20% of the growth of the industry. Here, we're capturing 66.7% of the industry. Now the reality is that to grow is very easy. You just put lower prices, but that's not the focus and the way of growing that we want in Entel. Entel wants to grow with a value consistent with our brand and with our pillars. So we started to see that the dynamic of this narrative was very strong, like short-term discounts that incentivated customers that are on a trading, they go, they accept the offer. Six months later, the offer is gone, then they change and that orders all the time. So we changed our offer structure. We are focusing more that instead of doing 6-month discounts, we stretch this to 12 months at least, and that causes the big shock to be at the moment of changing is lower. And the search basically of quality offer at a fair price. And this is what we're doing today and probably and what's important is that today, we are 56%. In Chile, you can't do commercial offers that are converging. But the brands, the attention channels continue with all the synergies that we have and the capacity to attract quality customers that already have a mobile experience of good quality. They expect the same from our home offer. And that's why today, we have a rate of convergence like 56% of what we have at home every once. And we also -- we had been relatively weak in our TV platform, weak in the sense that it wasn't world-class, consisting with Entel's proposal. But today, it is -- those of you that have it can assess and comment on that if it has -- the NPS has grown on their TV platform, and that will allow us to have an extra for attracting customers. The objectives continue to be more or less the same, a broadband market share around 20%. Margins for '28, I think we're talking about 8%, 9%. Long term, in a business like this, when you look at all our operators that operate on leased networks, they are more or less around 20%. Here, we will still be growing on the network. You take 4 to 5 years to finish growing on a new network. And a convergence rate that is probably higher, we will probably be around 65% to 70%. Pillar service quality. Well, I remind you that the network is shared. So what is service quality? 70% of the customer service is at home. It's in the TV platform, the Wi-Fi, the connection, it's in the router, and that is under our control. So we're putting all the focus on assuring that customer experience. The same as the TV service. And what I said that we have a very good approach without doing convergent offers, but leveraging as much as possible on our brand of the mobile market. In Peru, the truth is that we're talking about network alternatives. We think that there are concrete alternatives that we have been working on and where we have a reasonable expectation that in the end, we might be able to give you more details about that. And in Peru, you can do converging offers for rates. And for the defense of the mobile service, it makes it even more important than in Chile. We continue with the business large-sized companies. While we were talking about a 10% RONA and growing because remember, we're very good with large companies that's been traditionally the case in Chile, but we are weaker in the lower segment because we haven't had the network capillarity we expected. So our presence is good, but our profitability is not so good. And when we're talking about small and micro companies, we can grow on the net we have today. Just to give you an idea because people is not really aware of what B2B is, but basically, the EBIT is 41% of Chile's EBIT -- in Chile, including home and digital. So this is what I'm talking about. This is the share. It's not marginal within the company. And of course, with that diversity, meaning that medium-sized app, we have a decent market share that we could improve, but are good with high convergence rates, 30% or 40%, but that's not the case here because we've been weak and we haven't had that capillary network. So we wanted to grow in RONA and in micro and small companies. So today, RONA is 12% and fixed. So we are happy with that in the large companies. This means turning down some businesses with lower margins, right, when it comes to profitability because these types of services are on a project basis, right? Because you have large customers that call for tenders, some balance price and quality, others consider price only, and we focus on price and quality. Our focus is on those levels. We comply with that. And in terms of growth in SMEs, we had a modest 4% growth in revenue. To be honest, this is a market that is not growing because of the pressure on prices. So we grew 1 point in our revenue share in that market. We are around 20%. So when it comes to our goals, we fulfill that goal. And what are our midterm ambitions? Similar. Preserve this RONA, hopefully get to 13% or 14% with SMEs, continue that growth and capture an additional 5% to 7% participation or share in those companies. And when it comes to digital, we are talking about a long-term dream here to double or triple our revenues, hopefully, to get to up to 5% or 8% of Entel's revenues. I will tell you why. This is a business with a low CapEx and low EBITDA margins, different to other business lines in Entel, right, that rely on infrastructure. The ones rely on talent on people. And so where did this [indiscernible] come from? Well, there are many operators worldwide that have done this with more or less success. The share of -- the total of these lines represent from 6% to 15%. So our aspiration was getting to 8% or 10% that sounded reasonable because remember where we came from. We used to have data centers, and we were quite strong in that. We capitalized that decision with a sale that was over 20x the EBITDA, right? That was the reality of our data centers. But with that, we brand our ships, right? And we preserved the service, the new generation services, connectivity, making use of narrowband IoT on 4G, 5G features, everything around the network and growing on those services, network services. And the truth is we didn't do that well here. It wasn't as good as we expected. In '24, we saw positive growth. In 2025, some contracts came to the end and we weren't able to renew those and new sales have been underperforming. Our EBITDA minus CapEx, and please keep in mind that this is a business that is still growing or developing. So it's still negative. It basically produces a drag to the company's general EBITDA. And we think that in 4 or 5 years, it could be more positive. And another thing that's interesting is that we're not risking much here. We have a CapEx of revenue of about 4%, which means that what we are risking upfront means less risk in deploying a whole fiber network, again hope for customers to follow. We have built many capabilities. We have been focusing on attracting people and talent. And I think we have fulfilled that goal. And the Peru launch, providing some services, we bought a portfolio of customers in the asset bracket, which is doing well. So I think it's a good time. It is a fragmented market, meaning that when the country slows down, the digital investment of companies isn't high. If the company is not -- the country is not running, companies do not run and they focus on the savings instead of developing new solutions. There are some interesting opportunities we see the growth of acquiring networks, those SIM cards that are in the POS use for transactions. So a lot of opportunities there. Also in smart metering, that is going to be important for utilities, water, maybe electricity is behind, but for water, that's going to happen, and we see room for growth there with a platform for those sensors. There are some 5G SA capabilities for upstream services. The stand-alone 5G which is a real 5G of the future has an interesting feature that it allows you to manage the bandwidth that are insured. When it is that bandwidth is too good, downstream, it's not so relevant to make sure that you preserve that. But if you're focusing on the upstream world, if you want to stream a concert through your phone, you want to have that upstream bandwidth ensured, and that's another concrete example. And also asset tracking services. We still have the ambition for that to represent about 8% or 10% of Entel's revenues with a 10%, 12% EBITDA minus CapEx margin. The pillars be able to reach that have to do with continuing being a recognized tech partner, preserve the cost structure I mentioned about the launch in Peru with many synergies and some M&A opportunities we could see. So this is a business area that has been debated in the history of telcos, right, about the right to play and their capabilities. And we believe that for this new generation of services, we have it, we have that right to play and we are taking that testing if we are able to develop that with the strength the market provides and we separated that as an independent business unit, which means they can have different policies for attracting talent and a different identity. One last box that we didn't have last year, new business outside our core B2C. We're talking about opportunities with consumers. This is fairly recent. This is under development. We are exploring what's out there. First, the ability to identify opportunities and having an MVP flow of projects under development. Where do we see opportunities here in financial services Chile and Peru, we have about $250 million in funding for terminals, and that's good business. So growing in that area of financial services could be good. We do credit ratings, collecting. If you consider the margin we have for handsets, about 60% and 70% comes from the financial service, right, not the sale of the hand itself. It's a financing of that purchase. So there's room for growth there. And as we grow in home, there are different services that have been good for other telcos, and we think we can replicate that and expand that here in Chile. To wrap up, there are some cross-sectional things we are working on. One has to do with our in-house work, but I think it's going to drive us forward, which is moving to an agile at scale organization, which means that the entire company follows practices of managing itself that are agile, which gives you room for dynamic accountability and more autonomy for teams. And we think that this will add additional speed and power to our company. You need to have the technology enablers. We have those. We have the digital architecture that facilitates this, and that's going to be key for the intel of the future, Artificial intelligence, of course. Everybody is trying to find the real applications for AI. We have some that are at a more advanced level, not at the pilot level anymore that are being more widespread used in our channels. We will talk about one. And of course, everything related to boost efficiencies. Here, we have a short video about AI. So this is not a pilot anymore. It's being used widespread in our call centers and some shops at the stores. And this means that sometimes people go with an issue that you could try to sell something to them. So that conversion rate has seen a 20% growth. And that's relevant because it is assisted because they provide them with the right offering for the person's profile. So you can actually make that happen. And the average handling time has dropped by 12%. So we have more efficiency and conversion. We have been doing testing other ideas, processes for the business. So we do a follow-up of all calls. We analyze those calls, and we structure better training paths and learning paths for our executives, moving the curve of the quality of attention, meaning that the positive sentiment during calls has increased 6 points and post service satisfaction has gone up 8 points. And there are some other ones that are more-simple, but relevant, saving energy by using the best software with AI-driven energy optimization, reducing consumption during low demand hours. So it is dynamic and it produces savings. And to wrap up, we are going through turbulent times in Chile and in Peru, having 4 operators is not easy. [indiscernible] talked about that from the point of view of customers, but now we need to look at the company side. And it has been demonstrated that at least in countries like this with this size and this scale, financial sustainability does not exist in these environments. We have 1 or 2 who survive and luckily, we have been one of the ones who have been able to survive with reasonable returns for our investors. We believe that has to do with our value creation model that we -- I talked about earlier, that obsession for the experience and network being always one step ahead. So we can always try to make people's lives better. And that's it. I think that is a summary. We went through the progress made in the past year, some were great, some were in between and some we still have work to do. But in general terms, it was good from the point of view of the evolution of the business. Thank you very much.

Thank you so much, Antonio. Of course, anything you share about the context of the industry and our strategies and priorities for the next year. I should leave the stage, right?

Yes, please.

We will continue focusing on growth and preserving our leadership in the mobile business, increase our scale in Peru, continue to grow in the home business while protecting our mobile businesses growing in the digital business, improving our profitability in the B2B segment and continue our growth in the home business. So now we have a 20-minute coffee break. We will be back in 20 minutes. Those of you joining us remotely. And those of you who are here, I invite you to share a cup of coffee. We will continue with the second part of our Entel Day. And then we have Marcelo Sáenz, our CFO; and then with MatÃas Del Campo that will tell us also about the alliance with Starlink. And after that, we'll have a session of Q&A. So welcome, Marcelo.

Hi, Paula, thank you very much. Can you hear me? Thank you. Good morning. It's still good morning to those of you who are at the coffee table, I'll give you a couple of seconds to get back to your seats. It's so good to be with you today with the bankers and investors and the community. After Antonio's words, in terms of the strategic position of Entel. The first analysis that we saw of [indiscernible] regarding business cases of antitrust cases in the European market. I will give you an overview and an update of the Entel's financial position and check out the investment plan. And sometimes we need to be accountable, right? So I will begin by showing you what we said in the last Investors Day a year ago and in relation to certain relevant parameters such as cash flow and determining the company's financial standing has to do with investments and cost efficiency plans and the view that we had been about the of profitability towards our shareholders. In relation to the first term, the ambition last year was we said that we would be going through a transition through 2 years due to the expansion in the fiber optics business and some additional efforts, especially in both in Chile and Peru in supporting 4G and launching of 5G and that we would go up 2 to 3 points in our CapEx and return on CapEx. So we could be even over 21%. That's what we said a year ago. To date, the good news and if we can see it that way, is that we have been able to manage investments based on a competitive dynamics that has been favorable to manage this in the best possible way without leaving aside the quality and all of the improvements that we are doing in our network. To date, we are foreseeing to close the year around 16.5%, which is a lower figure. But later on, we will probably have to do a catch-up and take on part of the expansion of our investments due to the growth of fiber, optics and 5G, both in Chile and Peru. But so far, Tech, we have complied with that expectation. On the side of efficiency, we still have an operational efficiency program and further CapEx called Entel+ Reloaded that from last year, it was showing a relevant impact in terms of expenses. And this year, we have been continuing creating efficiencies. And if our expectation was to generate annual having a run rate at the end of 2025 of around $80 million, $120 million, both in OpEx and CapEx, we have exceeded that goal. And probably, we already have -- in the first semester of this year, we have -- we are above in relation to what we did last year. We had $34 million. And for the second semester, we, maybe it will add around $54 million in order to finish this year adding $88 million to what we already brought in from last year. So we will get to $150 million between '24 and '25. We still have something more to do. We will see that further on. We see the initiatives that we still need to do moving forward. And in terms of the return for shareholders, a year ago, we said that we were aspiring to maintain a yield -- dividend yield around 10%. So we don't do calculations on how the future shares will be moving. So that yield looks as the total shareholder return, and we managed to see that return in the LTM figures I'm mixing the dividends and how the share has grown in the last 12 months. So we're getting to around 22%. So we have been profitable, both in what we have given as dividends and the price of the share. From the financial point of view, we have check, check, check. Based on what we said last year, we are on the right track. Just to remind you and to give you instructions on how today we see [indiscernible], probably in a couple of weeks, we'll have more updated figures, and we will be publishing in October, especially in February, we will have our figures for the first semester. But even using these benchmark figures of '24 versus '25, we have an important performance. Now, it can be evidenced by the growth of around 8% in the consolidated earnings when comparing the semesters. And in Chile, here, you see that it has been growing in terms of income, more than 6%. Peru shows an important acceleration in growth due to the strategy that we have been following with investments, both in the network and infrastructure and commercial capillarity. So this is part of what we have been describing and probably it will continue in the future. Peru represents 35% of our income and Chile 64%. So we have quite similar numbers in terms of 10 million subscribers. But it's important to see if you see the B2C, it's 65% in Chile with 35% of the B2B market. And in Peru, it's much more relevant. B2C, so we have a lot to grow and develop using the same capabilities and products that we have in Chile from the B2B side to transfer this and adapt it into the Peruvian market. And that's an important growth potential. And that is part of the strategy that Antonio described and that we are implementing. When we go into the details and we try to explain what is generating this increase in income, we see something that's quite interesting when we look at the consolidated income by service. These are just mobile services, leaving aside the terminals and fixed. So we even see a growth close to 6%. That's very good news at the consolidated level. But we would also like to emphasize the growth of around 12% in sales of terminals and financing. The business that Antonio described, we have locations that have better margins. So if we see this growth of 12%, we will see an important impact the impact on the margin because there's a blend or mix there. And also, the growth in fixed, we have been growing, especially in Chile with making the most of the better footprint of unit and from the middle of '24 and all of '25, precisely in our fiber network. We see the impact of this and other measures and how they have impacted the evolution semester by semester on the EBITDA. The EBITDA expands. It has a growth of a little bit more than 2%. But what's interesting is that we have been able to sustain and even improve our mobile margin. We are leaving aside here the fiber business, as Antonio said, that basically deducts. And in mobile, it expands. The margin mobile expands, and this is due to the terminal business. It has very good margins. I mean, it has improved its margins even though the margin of terminals is lower or less than the mobile margin. So if we can grow in financing and the sales of equipment, but the mix makes the margin -- the aggregated margin to decrease. That's why it's important that part of this, when we look at the EBITDA margin, which is the blue dotted line and the EBITDA, which is after the leases, we see a decrease, but it is mainly explained by the issue of financing. So the mix, the more we finance, even though it's a good business, the margin decreases even -- but even with the core business, it's improving. And this is quite important. And this has an impact in the last line regarding the same semester of last year, we showed an important impact in terms of the net profit. This is very relevant. But what has happened? What are the big differentiators and the main elements that determine the EBITDA. That's why we use this case waterfall graph comparing with the first semester and our business, including the efficiencies that we have done at the operational and network level. Here, we have issues including the customer base. So we have efficiency, and we have done very well here, $33 million that have allowed us to compensate impacts that the impact of the pandemic that there's impact on inflation, exchange rate and obviously, energy costs and leases. Leases, I mean the growth of the network plus what the leases are costing us related to on-net or fiber. So thanks to the operational performance, we have been able to absorb and even increase our performance in EBITDA. That's where we see 2.2% in that period. We're also talking about the operational efficiencies. We have a very good perspective for the Entel+ Reloaded project. We mentioned that very much. And I don't really want to close it, but we are getting to the end of the first stage that were the first 2 years that we are aiming at $150 million. We did $62 million last year. And we will add $88 million this year to get to the $150 million that was above our expectations. We still have measures that we can -- where we can still continue value -- gather value. And we're doing the analysis of the impacts. We will probably keep on looking at networks. We have issues in terms of construction, wholesale market and in these areas, it had to do with installations and different initiatives in B2C, B2B and also in networks and billing and collection that are basically that billing and collections using AI and also having overheads, general overheads. We will see the impacts not necessarily in the next 12 months. It has to do with the agility in operating with agility through all of the functions and areas of Entel, Chile and Peru. And that's why we are working on a transformation -- digital transformation project in the administration area that leverages the NP. We will put the same [indiscernible] in Chile and Peru. So we are advancing as fast as possible in a services model, which is shared services that will be implemented not necessarily in 2026, but probably at the end of 2027 that should give us even more efficiencies. That's why we look to support and use this -- have the business in a more efficient way. And -- another issue that is quite important for the investors community is to have sensitivity on the expansion pace of our infrastructure. So I wanted to show you, this is like a guidance of how -- at least for this year, how we expect and what's coming to be investing in our network. If you see what has happened at the CapEx on revenue, see here the figures of this year and red is Peru and here is Chile. And for 2025, we are aiming at a slight increase of 4.6% in nominal peso figures regarding the previous year with a very important growth that comes from Peru, 12% growth in Peru, and we were talking about the reinforcing of our 4G and 5G network with greater coverage in Peru, maintaining Chile. And we see this here. If we go to the detail of this consolidated, even though we came with figures of 18.5% due to the competitive dynamic that existed in the market last year, we could manage the CapEx in a more efficient way, and we ended up with 17%. The drop was in mobile. And this year, we're aiming at ending with 16.5%. And it's important that this is a very relevant factor that how as a company, you can apply and select the projects of a greater added value and you can do an intelligent investment where value is created. And this will allow using that as a lever and also keeping the differentiation and quality but without going beyond what is necessary. So as you can see, we saw a drop in Chile. We were around 20.8% in mobile in 2023 with a different phase in 5G and 4G. Our goal is to finish the year at around 16%, a little lower than that. But in Peru, we were seeing levels around 13%, 13.4% is growing at 16% rate. So you see that change in focus. But in the aggregate, you see that there's a slowdown of sorts, but it's smart, focusing our investments where we find value. So ahead, if you remember the first slide, we said we're going to have a 2-year cycle that we will probably be on CapEx over income levels of 2 or 2 points for 2 or 3 years. And since we are starting from a lower base, we believe we will preserve those 2 points for the next 2 years because we also delayed the growth of the fiber business. So it's the same, but it's going to last a little longer, but with a lower base. So these 2 points will remain in 2026 and by mid-'27. And our expectation is converting to a more normal year at a steady state of 16% or 17% CapEx over revenues after this 2-year CapEx cycle produced by mobile and fixed. So given the competitive dynamics, the efficiencies we obtained, we could preserve that CapEx level, which has a significant impact in our cash flow. Just to give you an idea, we will go through that in more detail. This year, we saw a good performance of our EBITDA margins also in Peru and in the handset business, thanks to that, we have seen a better cash flow, and we will probably finish the year with a higher level than expected. We were $220 million consolidated for this year. So we have a relevant or significant position there in terms of cash flow for next year's operations. So some interesting investments in Chile and Peru. We need to continue rolling out fiber in Chile next year. We will also continue with the investments related to the change in the spectrum from fixed to mobile. This is a conversion of our facilities in 2026 and probably part of 2027. And in Peru, we will start the investments probably in 2026 related to fiber, adding to that the development of the 3.5 spectrum. And those are the focus for Chile and Peru that I mentioned already. So with that, we're going to be aiming to that 16.5% at a steady state by 2028. As I said before, that EBITDA positive performance in terms of margins in general and the proper administration considering the competitive dynamics of our investments allowed us to be in a sound position with our liquidity. And this means we have a better financial position. If you take a look at the gross financial debt, I'm comparing here June of 2024 with June of 2025, you saw a 9% decrease. The net debt grew a little because we were using part of the cash we had available given the sales of the on-net fiber network. And because of that, we are at a comfortable position, and this is also reflected. You see an increase in these indicators. But comparing to 2023, the EBITDA debt and IFRS is about 3 points. Today, we are at 260 if we consider the debt plus IFRS divided by EBITDA. And to the right, we are showing what we've been doing since the second half of 2024 in terms of administrating our financial position for it to feel comfortable to tackle the challenges ahead. We have been paying some debt. You see here everything we did in 2024. We repaid -- we did the last payment of a bond some payments of maturities in the and we prepaid 2 maturities for 2026. This was a bond due in 2026. And we funded that with different sources you see here with very good conditions. We went out to the local bond market to the banking sector, international banks, and we even did some recouping of cross-currency swaps connected to this bond that was matured in 2022. And with that, we were able to leverage $456 billion with a positive rate, and we have about $100 million committed with an international bank to use them if needed during 2026. So we were able to ensure those $400-plus million, but those additional $100 million for next year. And because of this, we have a nice flexible structure, which means that if we see an evolution in rates, interest rates, we can prepay or make decisions when conditions improve. But these are very good conditions in terms of maturities and rates. So this means we are comfortable in our amortization schedule, which supports our investment grade that you see here, we had these maturities in 2025 and '26. And now we have some wiggle room to have no concerns during this period. This was well received by the market. Actually, just last week, Moody's updated our outlook. It's now considered as a stable outlook, that category. So our financial position, the development of our businesses and our liquidity and structure for financing let us rest assured that these indicators will remain, and we will be able to continue with our business in the future. So that's why it's so important to say that our business and financial strategy are creating value. And you see that in our margins, in the increase in our revenue and the sustainability of the business that you see behind this credit risk rating, right? And this is a summary of the strategic actions we took that allow us to be in this position. I talked about operational efficiency, $115 million in 2 years and active hedging. I talked about that our investments in Peru and covering exposure of our OpEx in U.S. dollars is about 30% that is dollar indexed. Our CapEx, about 60% and 70% is in U.S. dollars, and we've been active in covering that to reduce the volatility of that line, and that provides us with some edge compared to our competitors. I talked about the strategic refinancing, which means we're in a comfortable position for the future. And we also talked about the disciplined capital allocation that is basically what we call smart CapEx. So investing, thinking about competitive dynamics and the value of those investments for the company and our customers, of course, because they're connected. I should mention the positive performance in Peru with a positive cash flow, which gives us the assurance that, that's going to work in the future. In previous years, some investments helped us like what happened with the data centers. But I wanted to show you this in gray here, you see 2022 dividends from the sale of data centers. Here, you have the total shareholder return, dividend yield plus those differences between the price of this year. We were comparing the past few years. And in blue here, you see the yield of that organic dividend without considering the investments or even the effect of changes in prices. So except for 2023, it was a particular year, we had some adjustments that had an impact in our performance. So if you see that 10.2% of 2022, the 9.7% and our 15% LTM -- sorry, 6.8% LTM tells you about our stability compared to other competitors in the industry. So our expectations for the future are the same that we mentioned last year, having a return of around 10%. And I always underscore that when I say this, I'm thinking about a total shareholder return, thinking of a dividend yield, like thinking that the price of the share will remain stable. So we stick to what we said last year. We believe that we will be able to produce that return. Any movement in the price of the share would be on top of that. I would also like to talk about CapEx. This is basically a review of our ambitions where we stand today, thinking about the future. As I said, we would like to reach 16%, 17% of consolidated CapEx over revenue and continue capturing full run rate initiatives. I'll tell you more about that once they are determined. And that's basically huge. I say it's a positive outlook, and I hope it's useful for your own analysis. Thank you very much.

[Interpreted] Thank you so much, Marcelo. This is a relevant presentation because it showcases our commitment of creating long-term value for our investors and shareholders. And now to continue, I would like to invite MatÃas del Campo to the stage. He's the VP of B2C here in Chile. He's going to be talking about our new partnership with Starlink. Welcome MatÃas.

[Interpreted] A network that obsession our customers and always being one step ahead, those are the things we discuss this morning. And now I am here to tell you about that one step ahead side of it, and this is not new for Entel, It's part of our DNA. It has to do with the beginnings of the company after the Valdivia earthquake in 1964, which was, of course, a major tragedy in Chile. And that's where the idea came from of having -- focusing on the network, obsessing with the customer and being always one step ahead. And we're going to move a little faster with this. But what I want to tell you about the work we're doing with Starlink is another step forward in that conviction of finding new technologies being first movers, which means building new things, taking chances. But at the end of the day, that's what allows us to be one step further ahead and have the returns Marcelo explained and following the strategy Antonio explained. And a year ago, we told you about this stream of being anywhere at any time to the further south or north, we're long time in the ocean, during an earthquake, during a fire in areas where we can say check my colleagues said this morning, this is already a reality. We have over 40,000 Entel customers that have this incorporated with their services, and we hope to be able to launch that for our entire customer base soon. And early this year, we conducted the first trials at the [indiscernible] there's nothing, but a road. You have some traffic going through. There's no connectivity whatsoever. We met there with a regulator. We were conducting some testing. We were pioneers in Latin America and the same in Peru. We are also rolling out this technology, which is also important for the Peruvian market because they have a larger territory with no coverage as we will see further along the presentation. So this also has a high value in the Chile and Peru. And DNA, to try to look for the infinite possibilities, some industrial leading, so how much this is cost, the truth, and I say the other way around, how much less we would need to charge you in a plan, if I had to tell you no. The plan will have a network in [indiscernible] nor on the weekends. If you move to a plan like that, for CLP 100 or CLP 500, yes I don't think so. So you have to imagine this now onwards. That will be part of the core business and to imagine that without it will be difficult. Because it has not started yet, it's difficult to imagine it without [indiscernible] service. The first question is, okay, but I have Starlink in my house. But it's not exactly the same because in the traditional Starlink services, fixed or semi, because there are some antennas that can be moved, but it is parked in a house with an antenna aiming at a satellite to do a cell to cell service is mobile where the satellites, other satellites, not the ones that Starlink have today, but connected with mobile, that mobile that many of you today, you have it in your pocket and there's a list of the devices that are standardized using. And probably the ones that we sell will be part of this. It's not just a high couple of phones. They connect to satellite through phone user and work from satellites and the software vendors and terminal vendors have to participate here. And what is the enabler because why did this happen today now. Satellite telephony exists from a long time. Remember these old movies with big phones that allow people to communicate. The problem was at what cost. It was high cost because the way when they were doing this with satellites that were further away and that were stationary in relation to the earth. If I look up in the sky, the satellite was always there. So it was expensive because very few people had to pay for that. But with the new technologies, Starship launches and rocket launches, you could be in [indiscernible], for example, it's like the antenna was there. That allows to have a smaller space, and therefore, many more people can use this service simultaneously and that brings down the cost, and we can go with the phones that we use today. And to launch this amount of satellites, the enabler behind this is a very important part that is lowering the cost of transporting this load to the space. And these are the satellites and rockets are the ways to transport this. And we all know that SpaceX revolutionized all this rocket launch and Elon Musk, and we see this on YouTube what this new way of advancing the technology through trial and error is to be able to have rockets that are reusable and that decreases the cost drastically. Look at the cost there to take 1 kilogram of payload into the space, how it has decreased and it will continue decreasing with this last rocket it's still under testing and if it will land or not, that will drive this even further. And look at the amount of satellites in orbit and how it has had an exponential growth. And those satellites are about Starlink. What they do is that in each of those satellites, there's an antenna, not exactly as the antennas we see in the earth towers, but the operation is similar. The telephone communicates with the antenna that is in the satellite, then the satellite returns it to some stations on earth and then they go to the earth network. That's how they get to the receiver. And if he's here [indiscernible]. And if the receiver is also in the satellite network, it goes back. That's how this network operates and the services it offers, and I would like to compare this with other technologies because people say, well, this will replace mobile telephones. And well, we don't know what will happen in the future. But the law of physics don't make it that easy because these satellites are quite far away and they have a certain capacity and they don't work indoor, which is 70% or 80% of today's traffic belongs to. So in the same way as the fiber networks and have not replaced the mobile technology, even though those are where we are 80% of require, the risk would be greater there. But it's a complement in the end to an omnipresent connectivity that depending on where I am, I will connect to this network or the other network. That's the ecosystem that is being expanded with the satellite network. And there are some differences here and had to do with the distance of where they are, the speeds that they reach according to the devices and the coverage that you see. So the satellites, for example, are outdoor, depending if they are closer or further away from earth as we see the [indiscernible] outdoor. Then we have the land or WiFi technologies and 5G, where I do have indoor coverage, faster fiber than the mobile technologies that work with a reduced coverage. And all the things complement each other. And with my mobile, I will go from one to the other and the other depending on where I am, and in the situation where I am, I will have this multiplicity of connection technologies. And since we are in an investors' community, well, this is by consulting firms and this is the future. And this is seen as the time that will continue growing in investments that will need to be done and also in value and income that these services will bring on. And what is required to make this a reality? This is a very complex ecosystem. When we began with this alliance with Starlink around 2 years ago, we have had to work with a large amount of partners and different partnerships where apart from the mobile operators that are in this box up here that are advancing in this technology in the world, but it's not many of us. We have worked a lot with the regulator because the standards and regulations have to adapt to this technology. We have been working with the terminal vendors because the hardware has to work, and also with the developers of the operating systems like Android, the iOS and the operating system on the phone has to also contemplate all of this. The applications because the operating system can support that, but if the application on top of that doesn't, okay, so we go and meet with Meta, so their apps will work also with satellite connectivity and SpaceX that launches the rockets and also there's other satellite operators that are developing this service, too. And in time, this is good because there will be competition in that layer where that with the partner we are right now, it's much more advanced than in the rest. So why Starlink? And what I want to show you here is the amount of satellites in orbit. Some people can say that they are working that they're testing the satellite, et cetera. But today, the reality is that the difference that there is in relation to others in this layer of the service is huge. Therefore, we are confident that we are working with all partner that is very important and has -- they are a first step ahead also in this arena. Several operators are working on the service today, you see them on screen. They have once launched a few things. Probably you have seen them in the news. And we are within the first layer, or group of operators. We will begin to service portfolio, the community will expand and this other thing, this is all subject to geopolitical issues each country is trying to develop their own satellite network. And what will we do with all of this? Invitation here is just to imagine because when this begins, it's based on today's services. And you imagine these services, there will be omnipressor everywhere, which is good. But it also opens up the new business possibilities and those we will just start thinking about them today. And here are a few things that are being talked about and just see this. Direct to sell, which is the one at the bottom left, next message is just the first part of what will be available. This has a big roadmap going ahead. There's many markets, B2B, B2C and the disaster response. We have a lot of agriculture. There could be sensors in many cars where there's no coverage, in mining. So there will be many applications that will provide much value. And the first things that are happening, so we have this T-satellite is here. They have a web page satellites more than 650 satellites integrate network that allow this. You can look at the sky and see like a change your lives and they're not UFOs, they are the Starlink satellites. You have probably seen them at night because it's one after the other after the other and the phone connects always to the one which is in the better position and at closest distance. And unfortunately, there have been some natural disasters. So this network opened up even though it wasn't available for everyone commercially, but it was put at the disposal of people and many messages were sent to them and it helped in a moment where the towers were not operating due to this natural disaster. And these things resonate so much because we suffer those things, so the possibility of creating value is also very important. So we are beginning with Starlink. We're very happy with the first beta tests that we have developed. And this is part of getting the technology close to everyone, which is part of our DNA. The other day, I was in a small country of Asia and they said, why do you want this if there's coverage everywhere? And we thought that maybe in that small country, yes. But in most countries, even ours, it's not like that. Just see that much of the population that has mobile coverage, but the land coverage in the world is 20%. The other 80%, if I move, there's nothing. Then in the case of Chile, less than 40% of the surface coverage, a large part of the population, yes, because antennas are where people live, but there's many other places where -- or even ourselves we circulate, we move where there is no coverage today. And in the case of Peru, it's -- the opportunity is even greater for this. So that conditions where this service will fire. The first idea that you might have is that this will be the same thing that I have, but everywhere and at all times. But in the first stage, it will not be like that. There are certain restrictions because satellites are further away. So this basically is outdoor. You need to be outdoor. There has to be a line of sight between your cell phone and the land where the satellites are. Then secondly, there should be no land coverage. And it's by definition because the land network will always give better coverage and services where they are. So where there's land coverage, I will connect to the land network. That is the best one in that specific area. The devices have to be compatible. We have -- in our web page, we have a list of all the devices. And every week, we add new models because the software is being developed in order to enable the devices. And those that are sold is the legacy. Of the new ones, well, basically 95% of the equipment sold are enabled for this technology and they have been -- they are indicated in our web page. And finally, in Entel's case, this applies to the national territory, plus the coast, the coast line, it's going to work in those areas also in the Eastern Island in the island of Juan Fernandez. So as you can see, it's quite omnipresent, the level of coverage. So what comes next? What are we doing? So for this first phase, we have a messaging service available, which is Step #1. And we are also working on the services that will follow. So first WhatsApp, which is one of the most widespread used apps in Chile and the world, and that's why we wanted to incorporate the service, which is basically a data service. And then some other data services will come, first, which SAT mode, which basically means services that do not require high intensity of the network because we're just getting started. The opposite would be video, right, which is the most intensive in network usage. So those services won't be available yet, but many of the other things we do, showing pictures, messages, we will be able to do that shortly. And then for Phase 3 and 4 that require new satellites and Starship, right? Because they don't fit with the rockets, the spaceships we have today and that's being developed. We see that on the news and on different videos. Those satellites will allow us to provide advanced data services and also [indiscernible]. Because for some that might be a thing of the past, but it's actually one of the more demanding challenges for the networks because it doesn't allow for [indiscernible]. If you're watching a video on YouTube, you have data accumulating and if it fails then you need to wait. So it's not always connected. Data services can be accumulated. But if you are talking and cuts out, it doesn't work. That's why it needs a continuous connection, continuous connectivity. And again, that requires new technologies. You think of those micro headwinds in communication. And as I said before, this is already a reality. Many of our customers already have this enabled, more than 43,000 users already connected in the same messages. This is in a beta phase for our customer base. If you have one of the devices that is compatible, you can open the app and test that. May be if you have been to the desert or hiking in an area with no coverage, may be you saw a satellite, a [indiscernible] kind of a satellite, where you usually see 3D or 4D or VR when you are abroad. Well now you will see an icon of a sunlight and that tells you that you are connect to the satellite network. And that means also those changes, [indiscernible] when you use roaming and provides you with different services compared to the terrestrial network. And there are many [indiscernible] in the app that explain how the experience was. What about monetizing this? How does it work? Because this is an investor meeting, right? They told me I needed to talk about this. Just kidding. So there are many ways of doing this that are already a reality in other countries. So this is not just being created. One way of monetizing is having different services available with different plans as you do with roaming today. Maybe at an entry-level plan, you won't have it, an intermediate one could have some coverage, and more extensive plan could include more roaming. The same goes for the services segment that depending on the fixed charges [indiscernible] to upgrade their plans. That's one way of doing it. And the other option, it's selling these packages with bundles. If you're traveling, buy one, so you can have roaming abroad, except if you're traveling to Argentina or Brazil because that's included. But if you're traveling to other countries, that's an option. I'm not saying this is what we're going to do, but that's another option for monetizing, offering these bundles or packages for satellite connectivity. And another option for the company beyond the mechanism or the plan is capturing new clients. When you're almost one step ahead, you have something the others don't. In the future, they will have it, too. But if you are one step ahead, you try to provide something that's unique and that means that those who want to be first movers who want those services can come to your company. And so there's room for growth there as well for Entel. And to summarize what I've been telling you about, this is a technology with a high impact. This is a new generation in terms of connectivity in mobile technology. And we need to get ready because this is just the beginning. It's going to be a significant revolution. And so it requires the coordination of multiple stakeholders, including, of course, our investors because, of course, you need investment. But as I said before, for the OIMs, the handset providers, the system we are working with partners like Ericsson, they all have joined this work. So we were one of the first operators in the world and one of the first countries to offer this technology to continue moving forward and transforming society and contributing to the country's connectivity both in Peru and Chile. That's what I wanted to share with you is. Entel is always with you. Thank you very much.

[Interpreted] Thank you, Matias. That was an interesting presentation. It is a clear example of our innovative spirit and our vision for the future of always being one step ahead. And with this, we conclude the presentation part of our Investor Day. We're going to invite Antonio Büchi to the stage for some final remarks, and then we will start the Q&A session. Thank you.

[Interpreted] Well, I don't have any final remarks to say. I just would like to thank you all for joining us today. Hopefully, this was useful to better understand where the company is at. I would like to underscore 2 things, one that we are undergoing a transition in the industry, not just in Chile, but globally. So we see that in the telco industry, through different administrations in Chile and globally, we see more pressure and excessive regulation, trying to determine what the organization of the industry will be through regulation and not allowing the market to operate. So what we see in general terms globally is that apparently, but hasn't been that good. And of course, that creates an environment that's quite different thinking about the future. And of course, that's what we are working for as Entel. But beyond all of that, I would say that another key takeaway is that in Entel, in spite of that more hostile environment, we have been able to sustain our positioning, our value creation model that has allowed the company to sustain itself financially with positive profitability reasonable, not the optimal ones, of course, in this more hostile environment. And that's why we are certain that regardless of what happens with the institutional framework in general, if we stick to our values, if we stick to our foundational pillars, to our value creation model with that conviction that we want to provide the best experience and bringing the technology that will help people and companies, we will do well. So again, thank you very much, and have a great day.

[Interpreted] Thank you so much, Antonio. So now we have some time for Q&A session. Just give us a few minutes so all of our speakers can join us on stage. Those of you who are online can share your questions through the platform. And those of you who are in person, can ask for a microphone and we will pass this. So we have a question here. if you could please state your name and then ask your question.

I am [indiscernible] Ignacio from [ VCI ] Asset Management. I have a question. [indiscernible] this is where remedies went too far like where the authorities actually increased competition after including those remedies. And show us cases where remedies were okay, like [indiscernible] competition. Is there a set of remedies that you would think that are incredible like when increased competition, and we should worry about those apparently in the discussion, or it's actually a combination of things and it's very hard to tell exactly each that is going to increase or decrease competition?

Every case is different and competition authorities will rightfully look at detail of the case, of the situation of the market and of the capabilities of where all the firms in the market before they take a decision on these things. And then it is usually right. So I think it is quite difficult without doing a detailed analysis to know what the outcome is going to be. All that I am saying really is, what competition authorities should do is to equal rate toward the assessment of the [indiscernible] and that applies to the upper pricing pressure, and that is in particular and to do assessment of efficiencies. In many jurisdictions today that's not the case, especially in the European jurisdictions. You can commercially find it very hard to accept the efficiencies. There has not ever been a case in European jurisdiction where that had been cleared on the basis of efficiencies arguments. And I think that is something that needs to change. It seems to have changed in the United Kingdom and that's really something that I wish for because if you don't do that and may easily be overenforcement, which is I think happen in the [indiscernible] case. And that's not good for anyone. So that's an obstacle to investment and I think that's not something that any body should wish for.

[Interpreted] Thank you, so much, Thilo. I would like to add an idea. Some of these compensations or remediations that have been asking other markets for example roaming offering, and we know those already exist in Chile. I would like to mention that. So the battlefield of the GM market already includes many of those measures that have a number of houses have asked in some of these cases.

[Interpreted] We have another question on this side.

JPMorgan. I also want to ask a question for [indiscernible]. Thank you very much for the presentation, very interesting. You put three cases to us. First one had very tough antitrust response. The second one was more average. Third one, the U.K. one was constructive. Will you see this as a trend like can we put this into like the regulators are rolling with past experience, and we are seeing through, or is this more like [indiscernible]. Just want to get your perspective on that?

And it's hard to tell for me the CMA case sort of on 3 is really -- that's a modality and things like that really has not existed before where that was the outcome. And if you just look in terms of trends, if you're talking European Commission there, really the challenges vary towards more intervention. We said at the beginning in sort of [indiscernible] cases on the commissioning [indiscernible], but the market structures [indiscernible] as before [indiscernible]. So they would not accept [indiscernible] where after the merger that see operate was there than before the merger. And I would hope that the CMA case, we'll be taking it as an example, in our authorities in other places [indiscernible] hard at this. And really, as I said, the only thing I really hope for is that [indiscernible] here is especially in this industry, technology is such that we have [indiscernible] there will be efficiencies. And if you take those into account, I think there will be many situations where [indiscernible] these things [indiscernible].

[Interpreted] In the back, we have another question.

Vitor Tomita from Goldman Sachs. My question is about the fiber business. Since you're going to have more investments of fiber in Chile and Peru in '25 and '26, can you tell us about how you see the competition situations and the drivers of margins for that fiber business in these countries?

[Interpreted] Would you like to comment on fiber in Chile?