Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. (EXPD) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

January 16, 2024

New York Stock Exchange US Industrials Air Freight and Logistics special 57 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#1

Hello, greetings, everyone. My name is Nick Beehler. I'm the Head of Business Performance and Technology for Onyx Strategic Insights. I'll be your host and your moderator today for our webinar. Thank you for attending. We have quite a large group, and it's an honor to have you here. This is our first webinar of the year, and we'll be offering a monthly series throughout 2024. Today's session is called Turning Point, an outlook for 2024. We'll be covering a range of topics from economic forecast to geopolitical shocks to consider and highlight of key elections and sustainability issues to monitor. Onyx Strategic Insights is a division of Expeditors formed in the last couple of years. One of our speakers, Fernanda will be giving you a bit more details about us shortly. You can follow us online on LinkedIn. And we published our different observations and updates on key areas regularly. You can also visit our website at onyxsi.com. Before we begin with the content, just a few administrative details to cover. At the start of the webinar, you're automatically muted and your cameras are turned off. We have about 45 to 50 minutes of content with Q&A mixed in during the session, and we'll leave some time at the end. On that note, you can submit questions in the Q&A box. You'll see that at the bottom of your Zoom panel. So just click that and enter your questions throughout. And like I said, we'll pause throughout to address questions. If we can't get to your question, we'll follow up after the event. At the conclusion of the event, sometime in the next 24 hours, you will receive a survey. We value your opinion and thank you in advance for filling that out. When you fill out the survey, you will get copies of the content, both the slide deck and the link to the recording of this event. Okay. Before we get started with today's event, I just want to put a quick little promotional word in. Next month's event is called Dynamics of Nearshore into Europe. We have two options: February 20 and 22, feel free to put your smartphone up now and grab the registration link for the event you would like to attend. And I will drop in the link in the chat here shortly, too, once I'm done speaking, so you can look for that there. And I'll show this at the end of the event. You can also follow us on LinkedIn where we announce events like this month's and next month's webinars. So we encourage you to follow us there. With that, I'm excited to introduce our 2 speakers today to get us started. First of all, we have Fernanda Kroup, the Vice President and Head of Onyx Strategic Insights. Fernanda has more than 20 years of experience in management consulting, geopolitics and macroeconomic analysis. She has lived and worked in 4 continents, serving clients and technology, heavy industries, basic metals, financial services, retail and consumer goods. A native of Brazil, Fernanda has earned a Bachelor's Degree in Law from the University of Sao Paulo and International Relations from the Pontifical University of Sao Paulo as well as a Master's in international affairs from Columbia University. Also with us today, we're honored to have Adam Karson, the Chief Economist of Onyx Strategic Insights. Adam has more than 20 years of experience as an economic adviser to global leaders across a range of industries. He has extensive experience in the U.S., Europe and Middle East. Adam most recently worked at Chevron as a senior economist, and he is responsible today for Onyx macroeconomic analysis and forecasting. Adam earned a Bachelor's Degree with Honors in Economics from Johns Hopkins University and a Master's in Public Policy from Duke University. With that, I will turn it over to Fernanda as the first speaker for today's event. So thank you, Fernanda.

Fernanda Kroup

executive
#2

Thanks, Nick. It's great to be with you here today, and thanks, everybody, for joining. Just wanted to give you a sense of what Onyx is. In a nutshell, we aim to help clients build more resilient, efficient and adaptive supply chains, and we do that by focusing on the geopolitical policy and economic disruptors. We are a consulting division of expeditors and so we took consulting engagement, supporting planning and risk management. And we're happy to engage and answer any questions you may have about Onyx separately. And so let me just dive into the content for today, which is our outlook for 2024. This is a big year for everybody. We thought we would separate out the certain and uncertainties, so our baseline views and the uncertainties. So all the geopolitical and policy items that can actually change the trajectory of macroeconomics and supply chains throughout the course of the year. So on the macroeconomic side, we still see a lot of that tug-of-war between growth and caution, right? Controlling inflation through monetary policy through interest rates, slow growth in 2024. We're more hopeful for a rebound in the second half of the year into 2025. But still, wages and raw materials at higher levels compared to pre-pandemic times. So a little bit of a tough situation here for businesses around the world, but some light at the end of the tunnel. On supply chains, mushrooming, sustainability requirements moving towards mandatory disclosure, but at the same time, a bit out of step with decarbonization efforts in country. So putting companies in a bind, really, in terms of their own stated goals and their progress towards those goals. Now on the logistics side, we see structural market changes and also, at the same time, bottlenecks at a time a notion of capacity glut. So a very interesting situation here on logistics and on rates. But then the geopolitical side comes along and you have the biggest year in elections. And we want to tell you a little bit about what to expect. Severe policy changes, not necessarily likely, but a lot in terms of changing existing policy environments to make countries competing with China, competing to replace China much more attractive. And then the U.S. being a little bit of an exception here, and we'll talk a little bit about it. But against this background, you have these -- this constant set of flareups and crisis going on, we call them geopolitical fault lines. Bigger impact contained for now, but a real sense of potential for escalation and how that impacts supply chains, we'll go into that. But probably the 2 main sources of risk this year to watch are the United States and China on a domestic level. Now we'll start with the macroeconomic side. I'm happy to pass on to Adam Karson, our Chief Economist. And once again, thank you for joining.

Adam Karson

executive
#3

Thanks, Fernanda. Hello, everybody. As Fernanda mentioned, I'm going to walk through our global macroeconomic outlook for 2024 and even a little bit on 2025. And I'll also touch on some supply chain risks and opportunities as they relate to kind of the macro outlook. But let's dive right in. So as you all know, we've been on a bit of a roller coaster in the past several years following COVID with lockdowns, injections of massive stimulus, the knock-on effects of inflation, pretty resilient U.S. economy, but high inflation and high interest rates, driving a lot of uncertainty in addition to the myriad geopolitical risks that Fernanda mentioned and we'll talk about in greater detail. So a key question as we come into 2024, as we're still focused on many of these same issues is whether or not we're still on this economic roller coaster or are we finally going to reach a firmer ground? So one of our goals today is really to provide some context for how to think about these key economic themes and watch points, and overall growth for the next year. So I'll start with the big picture, which I think is 2024 is a bit of a tale of two halves, if you will, where growth is starting to decelerate and will decelerate the first half of this year, in particular, as the U.S. and EU feel the full effects of high inflation and high interest rates. But then as we get to the second half of the year, we're anticipating a modest pickup as we get into 2025. At the same time that the U.S. and EU are slowing down, we also see China's economy having reached a structural peak and the 5% growth that it achieved in 2023 is likely the fastest it can grow for any sustained period of time. And this is on the back of headwinds from the property sector, soft consumer confidence and some questions around the direction of economic policy, both short, medium and long term, which we think all of these things will preclude faster growth going forward. And of course, there's the looming risk of a larger economic crisis stemming from the property sector, which we think is not only the biggest risk to China's economy, but to the global economy as well. And so the numbers here that we present in terms of our growth outlook probably aren't that different than what you've seen with some other consensus forecast. So -- but there are some, I think, some important differences to point out. First is that we are, I think, marginally pessimistic on U.S. growth as we go into 2025. We do see a chance for a pickup, but we think the effects of inflation and interest rates will linger for some time. We also think that the EU is on the brink, if not already in recession right now. Certainly, Germany and Italy are quite weak and that's something that is a little bit underreported. And if you look at market odds of recession, I think they're understating the risk to the EU right now. And then on China, maybe less around the base case, but the scenarios that are presented on China tend to focus almost solely on these big sort of existential risks from the property sector and potential financial crisis. But we would argue that there's actually a range of risks and scenarios that not only lead China down a path of a sharp contraction, but maybe even a more likely scenario that leads to persistent stagnation and deceleration of growth even beyond what we're projecting in terms of growth going to 4%, we could see that even go -- decelerate even further for a longer period of time. And then digging into some of the details, we'll start with consumer demand. Our view on consumers is pretty commensurate with our top line view where we see the resilience of the U.S. consumer starting to fade, and that's being predominantly driven by some weakness in the labor market. We're starting to see some of those cracks form. Confidence is not as strong as it was last year. And then also the tailwinds, the things that were supporting growth and keeping it resilient in 2023 have largely faded away. And so we see growth decelerating to low 1 -- somewhere between 1% and 1.5% in the U.S. Similarly, we see growth among consumption in China, it's slowing as well. Decelerating after a decent rebound after it reopened from the COVID lockdowns in late 2022, early 2023. Japan is more or less steady as she goes. And Europe consumers look like they may be improving a little bit, but this is really on the back of a really weak 2023. So we have a bit of a base year effect. But all in all, we see among these major economies, consumers slowing down and momentum shifting to a slower trajectory. And if we look at the other side of the coin of demand, what's happening among businesses, largely the same trends, where companies' CapEx budgets are pretty tepid, and they're facing multiple headwinds again from inflation. So the cost of capital goods is quite high. And also, the cost of capital is high, of course, with interest rates having increased so much over the past couple of years. Now perhaps a bright side here is that when we think about the second half of 2024, if there's some clarity on the demand side, then businesses will feel more optimistic about spending at the same time that we anticipate interest rates starting to turn lower, which will significantly lower the cost of capital projects. So this is one area of optimism and one reason we think that growth could actually start to pick up in U.S. maybe around Q4 of this year driven by some pent-up business spending. And then underpinning this view and central to our global macro outlook is our view on global inflation and interest rates. And this is an area where we've held pretty steady on our outlook that inflation would ease and normalize by the second half of 2024, which would give some breathing room for central banks to begin cutting rates. And we see that in the market, the market is quite jittery and consensus has more or less kind of come around in this point of view but is still looking for any glimmer of hope that the Federal Reserve, in particular, could cut rates sooner than later. Inevitably, these kind of waves of optimism kind of come and go and then the market re-anchors around sort of midyear, June, July cut for beginning easing of interest rates. And that's kind of what we've held consistent to over the past 1.5 years. And so we're looking at the Federal Reserve cutting about 100 basis points on rates this year. The ECB could do something similar and perhaps even begin cutting rates sooner than later depending on the relative strength of the European economy. But as Fernanda mentioned, the level of prices is still relatively hot. So although inflation rates are coming down, the cost of labor and the cost of key inputs remain high by historical standards. We're certainly off the peak of 2022 when we had major market disruptions from geopolitical events. But we're not -- we have not returned nor do we think we're going to return anytime soon to 2018, 2019 sort of levels on prices. We do see some sideways momentum across many commodity markets, so that's perhaps a silver lining. But depending on what markets you're looking at, there might be some upward pressure as well. So in particular, things that are related to the energy transition, electric vehicles and infrastructure build-out that's being driven by a lot of industrial policy and infrastructure policy around the world. So I'm thinking copper and building materials will face, we think, upward pressure from this point forward. And then I'll wrap up this macro section with a little discussion on oil prices, which have albeit started off the year kind of in a bearish tone with a lot of uncertainty on the demand side and some resilience on the supply side, in particular, U.S. producers have outpaced market forecast. So prices, Brent Crude is below $80. We're thinking that an average price for the year will be in the low $80s, $80 to $83 per barrel, driven largely by a balanced view on fundamentals where demand is growing at 1 million barrels a day or so and a managed supply growth will more or less keep that market balanced where a lot of the growth is coming out of the U.S. and we anticipate OPEC to remain fairly disciplined and keep a floor under prices more or less where we are. Now I think the more interesting discussion here is, I believe the geopolitical risks, are all of the uncertainties that could push prices significantly higher or lower, in particularly, what we're seeing in the Middle East, right now and potential for spillover and a supply shock that could drive prices significantly higher. However, we should also note multiple downside risks that could be quite bearish for oil prices, in particular, a more dramatic kind of slowdown in the U.S., Europe and/or China and a breakdown of OPEC compliance. And Fernanda will touch a little bit more on some of these geopolitical risks that could really move markets in a significant way. Perhaps I'll pause there before we go on to the next section, and I can see if there are any questions popping up in the chat.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#4

Yes. Thank you, Adam, that was really interesting. You talked about China, and you mentioned the property sector there. And then you read a lot about deflation, especially in the manufacturing sector and other numbers that might be worrisome for people. Using the term hard landing, maybe you could explain that too for the audience, like what do you see are the chances of a hard landing in China that becomes really disruptive for the global economy?

Adam Karson

executive
#5

It's a great question. It's a kind of a perennial question as we've been doing this for a while. We've -- at least in my career, I've worked on China hard-landing scenarios pretty consistently for the past decade or so. And I think this time around, those risks of a hard landing are more significant than ever but still fairly well managed. Now the property sector is a major driver of growth in China. Depending on how you measure it, if you think about all upstream and downstream connections, you're looking at 30% of GDP connected to directly or indirectly the property sector, which is undoubtedly in a period of acute stress and stemming from years of overbuilding and excess capacity. And so you can't -- you don't want to understate the challenge that China faces in trying to deflate that situation, deflate the property bubble, if you will, and engineer a soft landing. But by our estimates, they do have the -- they have the financial capability and have a general transparency and knowledge of the situation that, I think, if we juxtaposed China today versus, say, the U.S. in 2007, 2008 or Japan in the late '80s, there are some key fundamental differences around the structure of debt in China's property sector and the political economy structure and ability for China to manage it. Now -- but just to kind of tie a bow around this, I think the risks are significant, but we think a greater -- sorry, the risk of hard landing are significant, but we think there's even greater risk that there's a prolonged slow deflation of the property sector with it sucking up more money than anticipated and it being a drain on growth for not only a short period of time, but, say, for the next like 5 to 10 years even. And that could take 0.5 percentage point or more off of our baseline view.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#6

Awesome. Thank you. I think we'll end with that question and then allow you to move on to the next section.

Adam Karson

executive
#7

Sure. Thank you. So let's move on to some of the things we're seeing in the supply chain world. In particular, around a lot of the hot terms you've heard: friendshoring, nearshoring, reshoring, China Plus One, so on and so forth. All of these are just different ways of saying derisking. And each strategy related to derisking depends on what companies are trying to -- what risk they're trying to mitigate, whether it's a particular geopolitical risk or proximity to demand issue, trying to get closer to their end consumers? And another common theme we see a lot is try to improve ESG, in particular, manage the environmental side of their ESG score, if you will. Now in addition to these kind of common themes around sources of risk, we should also note that as companies are thinking about mitigating some risks, these strategies imply new risks that will be embedded into their supply chain. So for example, moving a supply chain, moving sourcing from Asia to Mexico comes with a whole new set of challenges related to security, infrastructure, logistics performance that companies are only getting to kind of wrap their head around what that means for their supply chains going forward. And as companies are thinking about derisking, it's happening at a time when countries are using policy in a very direct way to compete for foreign capital. And this is just a snapshot of some of the countries we cover and the key policy areas that we focus on, including labor, industrial policy, trade, tariffs, infrastructure, taxes and ESG. And some common themes that we see pretty much across the board as countries compete for capital is the use of industrial policy to improve investment attractiveness of their domestic market. Typically, this is pretty focused and honed in on specific sectors, so whether it be autos in Thailand or consumer electronics in Vietnam; in the U.S., we see it with semiconductors in the CHIPS Act. And then also, we see this being paired with infrastructure policy to build out -- make sure that logistics capacity is going to keep up with new manufacturing capacity. Now not all countries are going to be successful at this. Even within infrastructure, often you need regulatory and process change to go along with more modern infrastructure. And so we're going to see -- we anticipate a divergence in performance across countries. And that's notwithstanding some of the backsliding we're seeing on labor and tax policy that is making some markets less attractive. And then to complicate this even further, as we move into this year and then in 2025, there is really a tidal wave of ESG disclosure regulations that are coming and the shift really here is -- there are a couple of shifts. One is from voluntary reporting to mandatory and then the increase in scope and transparency, in particular, including Scope 3 emissions in mandatory reporting and then it's double materiality assessment of moving from the old days of showing how climate impacts your business, but now showing how your business impacts climate and essentially opening up the door, opening up the windows to allow regulators and investors scrutinize company's actions to -- in particular, to decarbonize their businesses. And as we view this, this increased focus on decarbonization is happening at a time when many countries are kind of stagnating on their efforts to decarbonize their economies and in particular, their manufacturing base. And we think this is another point of divergence between some key economies you normally associate with sourcing. In particular countries, if you look at the ASEAN economies, countries like Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, are investing heavily in renewable power, increasing their chances to be able to keep industrializing but in a more sustainable way, juxtaposed against countries like Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, that are laggards in the space. Mexico as well, once a leader, now a laggard on decarbonization. And this presents quite a challenge for companies in the context of their derisking strategies of how to think about balancing ESG risks and decarbonization in particular, with other key concerns around mitigating geopolitical risk, maintaining cost discipline, getting closer to your consumers and really trying to kind of uncover what your actual options are and what kind of capacity is out there in the market. So if you look at China, for example, making up nearly 30% of global manufacturing capacity, is relatively high cost compared to a lot of alternatives, if you look at total end of costs, but it performs say decently on carbon intensity, but there's a lot of room for improvement. However, the alternatives out of China are much smaller. Vietnam, for example, is 2% the size of China, to need 50 Vietnams to replace China, which obviously is not going to happen. So it forces companies to think very strategically and surgically at the same time about where exactly they would want to source from to balance this sort of trilemma even more complicated picture. So with that, Nick, I will pause again. Before we move on to the geopolitical side, see if there are any questions so far.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#8

Yes. Maybe just a quick question for climate and sustainability. Are there any like signposts, whether those are like legislation, different programs that people should be looking out for or different regions that people should be looking -- whether it's Europe or U.S. in terms of where to look for sort of guidance in that area, whether it's reporting or just kind of new legislation? Anything people should be looking out for this year?

Adam Karson

executive
#9

Yes, there are. So I mean, the leaders in this space are Europe and California. And so first, focus on where legislation is already -- regulations have already been passed. There are -- in California, I believe there's at least one Senate Bill and one House Bill related to climate disclosure -- ESG disclosures. And then in Europe, there's regulation in place. Now I think there will be some additional things this year to pay attention to. What does -- for example, what does the SEC do in terms of acquired reporting? And then also, I think there's still some question marks on how exactly companies are going to comply with reporting Scope 3 emissions. This is something that a few companies are doing. The data for Scope 3, if you think about all of the suppliers in your supply chain, the data is quite weak. And so compliance is going to be a pretty sticky issue and company should be engaged very proactively to manage that. You don't want to get to the end of the year and kind of caught behind the curve.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#10

Awesome. Thank you for that. Great. So I think at this point, we'll turn it over to Fernanda for the Section 3 of the presentation. Fernanda?

Fernanda Kroup

executive
#11

Yes. Thank you so much. So we'll start with the elections this year, right? It is a big year, unprecedented in many ways, right? 60% of global GDP and 55% of global trade and just in this little selection that we have here. It has started already with Taiwan, moving on to Indonesia, South Africa, Russia, South Korea, India in April, May, June the EU Parliament in Mexico. The U.K. has to have an election no later than January 2025, the date has not been selected yet. And then to cap it all off, the United States in November. Now these are all elections that; one, impact major hubs in global value chains; and two, also touch upon long-standing geopolitical fault lines. Now what is the way for us in supply chain to think about elections, right? There's a macro political side. But how do we think about this? And we took a stab at it to how to think through this. And you see that there are 4 policy buckets that matter directly to us here. Trading tariffs, industrial subsidies, and that, to some extent, also includes ESG subsidies, labor regulations and infrastructure. So every time you have an election, there's this opportunity for a change in policy direction. We believe that industrial subsidies and trade and tariffs are really the most important topics for this year. But labor regulations, particularly in India and Indonesia, an infrastructure are also very much top of mind. This, in many ways, though, in terms of risks is the year of trading tariffs and industrial subsidies as a way to compete. Civil unrest is something to really watch out for, particularly in the U.S., Mexico and India, but then to some extent in Russia. We've had the elections in Taiwan already. The 2 main issues here to think about are always the relationship with China and the dynamics between the U.S. and China and then the competitive advantage of its industry and also, do we invest abroad, how do we spur economic growth? Those are some of the issues. That's not unlike other places, right? But everybody is looking in one way or another at how to make themselves much more competitive. Perhaps the exception here is the United States if we move to the next slide, please. Instead of calling the election, which seems like an impossible task to anybody observing these elections, we thought about looking at the actual policy issues that impact businesses around the world. In the X-axis, you can see the likelihood of policy actions. So is there going to be any change? And then on the Y-axis, the convergence between the two parties: Democrats and Republicans. So the issue around curbing trade and investment with China is bipartisan. And it's that much more likely that we'll continue to see a lot of restrictions. The big question here is whether those are much more in terms of sanctions and export restrictions, for example, as opposed to playing tariffs, which seems to be the preference of an eventual potential Trump administration. Trade with other partners, though, is much more of an open question here. The possibility of additional tariffs with trade partners outside or beyond China is a real possibility in a Trump administration, for example. The questions around support for Russia, Ukraine and then specifically climate and sustainability. That's probably the most -- one of the hottest topics moving forward, and it creates the most uncertainty for businesses around the world. In the event of a Trump administration, there has been already chatter of rolling back some of the climate provisions in the IRA and other signature Biden administration initiatives. And that is probably one of the biggest sources of uncertainty here. But on the other hand, China right in trade relations, not a source of uncertainty per se, it's how much further will it go. We have the USMCA there and I just wanted to call your attention to it. Here, we're talking about the potential for a new trend in trade policy. Now the USMCA has a sunset clause and that's in 2025. So there's a lot of discussion that needs to happen in 2024 and then in 2025. Now it is not lost on the U.S. Government that Chinese companies are nearshoring to Mexico. And so this question around whether trade policy should target country of origin as opposed to country of ownership is very much a live discussion. Now that already happens in many ways on the country of ownership side if you take into account, for example, sanctions or restrictions on the tech side, whether that becomes an actual trend and impact other sections in other industries is the big question right now and the big uncertainty. Now if we could dig a little bit deeper here on to what else in geopolitics you should be paying attention to. There are all these geopolitical fault lines around the world, and they do remain active. We've selected the most impactful on supply chains around the world, starting with Russia-Ukraine, the Balkans-the South China Sea, China-Taiwan and Israel-Hamas. These are very volatile situations, but let me highlight Russia-Ukraine. Right now, tilting towards escalation, this is a war of survival for both sides politically and militarily, much more politically for Russia. But the possibility of not resolving and actually believing that one can win this war is still very much alive on both sides. Now the momentum seems to be tilting towards Russia. And you see an upward tick on military activity there. So that tilted towards escalation. It opens up all sorts of security questions for Europe, in particular. We are concerned about the potential for spillover into the Baltic states, and that would trigger a much more complex situation involving collective security mechanisms. And so it is not -- the war is still going on, it's not -- there's no end in sight at this point, and it's still a large source of risk. A lot of those risks have been priced into rates and particularly oil markets, but it's still a source of uncertainty. Balkans-South China Sea and China-Taiwan are tilting towards status quo. Let me go ahead and say that the South China sees probably the most underreported crisis and potential threats to global supply chains today. They are -- it's related to, as you know, China's claims onto the territory -- on to the South China Sea against various countries in Southeast Asia, in particular, Vietnam. Now these claims remain unresolved, but the macroeconomic picture points towards status quo and a against escalation. The same is true of China-Taiwan. There's a lot of tension going on. But unless there's a very unlikely unilateral declaration of independence on the Taiwanese side or accidents leading to an unwanted escalation, particularly in the South China Sea and China-Taiwan, then it tends towards status quo. The only exception here is if the U.S. security umbrella falters as well, and I'll get to that in a second, but that is probably the biggest risk today. Now when it comes to Israel-Hamas and the Red Sea, we're seeing an escalation right now on the one hand, but also a move towards the escalation. So all cards are on the table at this point, all options are on the table. There is certainly [pushed] domestically within Israel to contain the military activity and actually find a negotiated solution to the hostage situation. On the other hand, and this is the hallmark of escalation at a regional level. When the conflict stops being just about the Palestinians and it starts being about much more than that, including Lebanon and Syria and Yemen, then you start seeing a point towards escalation, that's a key signpost. Now we're seeing a lot of activity from the Houthis in the Red Sea. One way to think about this is that this activity is connected to Israel-Hamas, but in many ways, it's not. It's also about the domestic situation in Yemen. It is a way to attract attention to a frozen conflict on the Houthi side and to push for recognition of its status as the government of Yemen. So it is also about talking to Saudi Arabia and coming to the negotiation table. And so when we see an end to the crisis in the Red Sea is tied to both Israel-Hamas on the one hand, but also the domestic situation in Yemen. And that's probably one of the most unreported or underreported sides of this conflict in this crisis, right? It also pulls Iran into the spotlight and its desire to continue a negotiation with Saudi Arabia in terms of mutual recognition of their original interests, and that is a dialogue that has been sponsored by China. So it is a way of politics. It's politics by other means, and it's a way to bring to the forefront all the frozen conflict besides the Palestinian issue. Now in the next slide, we try to give you a sense of how to think about these conflicts. And by far, Russia-Ukraine is the one that most impacts supply chains with the exception of a major escalation in Israel-Hamas and I'll get to that in a second. But if you think about raw materials inputs, sourcing and production, distribution and logistics and end markets, this aims to provide you with a mental map of how to think about it on key minerals, in particular, titanium, nickel, cobalt, platinum, aluminum, fertilizers and wheat. So pushing those critical minerals and those -- and [food] prices up. Now sourcing and production, particularly in Europe, fuel price volatility and then in end markets, particularly in Europe, that inflationary pressure. Now contrast that with Israel-Hamas, much more concentrated in distribution and logistics. So when we think about an escalation scenario, we need to think about fuel price volatility, but then continuing major lane disruptions. But we're not talking necessarily about inflationary pressure in market levels. Now those supply chain impacts are contained for now. Again, Israel-Hamas being perhaps the biggest wild card here. I would pay attention very closely to Russia-Ukraine at this point, particularly for European operations. It seems like it's just going through the motions, and it's sort of a frozen conflict, and it's a war of attrition. But it can lead to major disruptions very fast, depending on how escalation happens. Pressure on support for Ukraine would lead to an escalation and then perhaps a de-escalation but at the same time, it wouldn't resolve long-standing issues in terms of security for Europe. And so even though you could have a negotiated solution for Russia, Ukraine, instability along the EU borders is a key feature that's here to stay. Now Balkans and South China see only in an escalation scenario really, but it's not that hard to see how this could escalate. And let me add to this that perhaps one of the most important aspects of this potential escalation is what happens with China's economy. To be able to afford military action, even if unwanted, requires some macroeconomic backing to it. So the macroeconomic picture in China also matters, particularly for China Taiwan. I'm going to stop right now, Nick, to see if there are any questions before I move on to our major scenarios here.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#12

Yes. Probably a couple. I mean, obviously, the Red Sea topic is top of mind for a lot of people, and you've called that out. There was a lot of interest by our audience during registration to hear about the Red Sea and yet I think you've addressed a big part of that. It's a tough question admittedly, but with the situation going on right now, have we seen the worst? Will it get better soon? I mean, any kind of sense of what to look for even so that it will start to look better in terms of the shipping, the supply chain impact of that conflict?

Fernanda Kroup

executive
#13

Yes, I'm afraid we haven't seen the worse yet or at least the potential for a significant escalation is still there. I think we always like to think about signposts. So ways in which people can think about and read the news and think about where conflict is going. If we see any signs of a negotiated solution between Israel and Hamas or a negotiated solution between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia when it comes to the domestic situation in Yemen, then you're likely to see almost an immediate de-escalation in the Red Sea. But until then -- right now, we're still in an escalation scenario. And it's interesting that you see forces pointed both towards escalation and de-escalation but I'm afraid that we're not necessarily over the worst part yet.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#14

Great. Thank you for that. Maybe shifting to China-Taiwan and South China Sea, perhaps kind of a layman explanation, I think a lot of people understand those are geographically close to each other but you've called them out as a different dynamic. Could you just kind of explain the difference between the 2 areas and the dynamics going on there? Maybe what issues again to monitor?

Fernanda Kroup

executive
#15

Of course. China-Taiwan is the best known of the 2, right? And it's about the question of Taiwanese independence for Taiwan being a part of Mainland China. Now it is a long-standing policy priority for Beijing to bring Taiwan back or if you ask me, Beijing never left. U.S. policy on this is one of strategic ambiguity. So the U.S. recognizes One China, but at the same time it doesn't have formal security commitments towards Taiwan. But Taiwan is almost the canary in the coal mine when it comes to the security assurances and the security umbrella that the U.S. can extend to Southeast Asian nations and to its allies in Asia. And so it's almost testing how -- the alliances that the United States has in the region and the United States positioning as the global super power. Now the South China Sea is a little bit different. There are territorial claims when it comes to the economic zone. Covering that seat, it is a major trade lane, and it does have an enormous impact on global trade. These claims are unresolved. There has been some arbitration, but China doesn't recognize it and continues to press its claims and continues to create sort of a fait accompli on the ground. And so there's this constant attrition and harassment of vessels in the region, right? And it is sort of -- a bit of a powder keg there. It's about control over major ocean lanes. And if you ask me, geopolitically, ocean is the most risk-exposed these days. During 9/11, one could talk about air. These days, it's a lot more ocean. And if you think about all the geopolitical fault lines and all the crises happening around the world, they all coincide with major ocean lanes and control over those lanes. That's the key geopolitical question for the future, and it's something that impacts trade directly, especially now that we're talking about sustainability requirements and the idea that ocean can be much more environmentally friendly, and so it really puts businesses in a bind here.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#16

Awesome. Thank you for that. Maybe just one last. North Korea, it seems like with all the other conflicts going on elsewhere, we aren't talking as much about them. There is a question from the audience about their recent posturing. I'm not exactly sure what that means in terms of the details. But just kind of -- anything to look at or be worried about with North Korea?

Fernanda Kroup

executive
#17

Yes. So the news is that North Korea has changed its policy, right? And it was a stated goal of North Korea to reunite with South Korea. So reunification was even a constitutional goal. And now North Korea has shifted direction and has stated that it's not seeking reunification anymore. In fact, it seeks to continue to be an independent state. And if there is military action and it vows not to be the one that starts it, it will try and occupy and capture the South. Now this is all in response to 2 things. The first is having a nuclear program seemed at odds with the goal of reunification of [indiscernible] you're going to be bombing your own compatriots. The second is it is very much in response to a deepening of the alignment, particularly on the current administration in South Korea with Japan and the United States. Now is -- North Korea remains very much an unresolved issue. Even the economic viability of North Korea is still a question. We don't expect that to significantly escalate in the short term. But it does present one of those other frozen conflicts that we're not seeing an end in sight. Now North Korea is much more rhetoric than anything. It's not just rhetoric, it's a change in policy. It's a pretty stuck change in policy direction, but it's something that had been happening for a while now. And for months, the government of North Korea has been tilting towards that direction. Now it is worrisome in the context of this next slide that we have. Probably the biggest risk for this year is domestic crisis in the U.S. or a financial crisis in China. And this is a bit of a first. There are multiple pathways to a constitutional crisis in the United States, somebody is not on the ballot, someone who is not recognized as the winner, the Supreme Court is not recognized as a legitimate body, debt ceiling is not increased, there's no budget. I mean, there are number of pathways to it, similarly for China. And on China, it's really a major financial crisis that can lead to contagion over export sectors and then a wave -- let's say, for example, a wave of bankruptcies, not unlike what the United States faced in 2008 in a much more -- in a credit crunch for a number of businesses. Now the retreat of U.S. security umbrella is an underappreciated aspect of this. And it means that all of those geopolitical fault lines become much more active because you have all of a sudden an opportunity here to change the status quo if you're not happy with it. Now we don't think that this is likely, but we do pay a lot of close attention to it. We still think that there's a lot of potential in 2024, particularly a rebound towards the second half. We think there is, for the first time in a few years, light at the end of the tunnel here after the excesses of the pandemic time. But at the same time, this is -- these are probably the two most important risk that businesses should be watching for. And with that, I'll ask Nick if there are any final questions.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#18

A few more minutes. Just maybe back to the elections, a lot of uncertainty there, and we're not making a call or anything, but in terms of the supply chain issues or impact that come out of the elections, and you could just pick one, I suppose. But what might be one of the top 1 or 2 supply chain issues to monitor coming out of this year's elections?

Fernanda Kroup

executive
#19

The answer to this is like very fast. It's trade policy, especially because of U.S. elections. And that triggers a response from Europe, that triggers a response from China. And so this is the year of trade policy really.

Nicholas Beehler

executive
#20

Great. That makes sense. Okay. Yes. Well, we are getting close to the end of the hour. So let me just wrap up with a few notes. Thank you again for attending today. There was a question about the copy of the Power Point. If you fill out the survey, you'll receive in the next day, you'll get a copy of the Power Point as well as a link to this recording. And then please join us next month. I put the registration links in the chat. And again, you can use the QR codes here to grab those. And you'll see that we will promote this event through our LinkedIn account as well. So keep an eye out for that. And please do follow us there. We have a lot to share. We post updates regularly and links to articles of our own as well as events that we're hosting. So with that, I believe we are done for the event today. And thank you again for attending, and wish you all a great day.

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