Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. (EXPD) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
January 23, 2024
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Nicholas Beehler
executiveAll right. Good morning or good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for attending. We have quite a large group today. It's an honor to have you here. This is the first webinar in the series that Onyx will be offering this year, and today's topic is called Turning Point: An Outlook for 2024. We'll be covering a range of topics from economic forecasts to geopolitical shocks to consider along with a highlight of key elections and sustainability issues to monitor. My name is Nick Beehler. I'll be the host and moderator today. Anything admin-related, I'll take care of. I may drop some messages in the chat throughout the presentation. A quick overview of Onyx. Onyx's Strategic Insights is a division of Expeditors formed in the last couple of years. Fernanda, our -- one of our speakers will give you some more details about Onyx. You can follow us online on LinkedIn, where we publish our observations and updates on key areas regularly. You can also visit our website at onyxsi.com. Before we begin with the content, just a few administrative details to cover. At the start of the webinar, you're automatically muted and your camera is off, so nothing to worry about there. We have about 45 to 50 minutes of content, and we'll have a little time for Q&A at the end. Also, if you have questions throughout, please drop them in the Q&A box. Just click that button on the Zoom panel and ask your question there. We will have moments throughout the presentation to jump in, do some questions, which I'll be pitching to our 2 speakers. Lastly, at the end -- at the conclusion of the webinar, there'll be a survey that's sent out. We value your feedback. It helps us decide what topics to host in the future, time of the day, things like that, that we offer these webinars. If you fill that out, you'll be taken to a page online with a copy of the materials, so the presentation PDF will be there. So everything we're presenting today, you'll be able to review on your own computer as well as the recording of the webinar. So you'll get both of those things if you fill out the survey. All right. And then lastly, before we get into today's topic, just a plug for next month. We scheduled our webinar topic for February called Geopolitical Hotspots and Their Impact on Supply Chains. Two sessions, same content. You can see there, February 20th or the 27th. If you'd like now, you can use your phone, and with the QR code, it will take you to the registration pages. I'll show this at the end of the webinar today, and I'll try to drop in the links to those 2 in the chat so give you a few options to sign up for that webinar. And like I mentioned, follow us on LinkedIn. We'll be mentioning the webinars there with links to register over the next few weeks. All right. So with that, I am really excited to introduce our 2 speakers today to get us started. First of all, we have Fernanda Kroup, Vice President, Head of Onyx Strategic Insights. Fernanda has more than 20 years of experience in management consulting, geopolitics and macroeconomic analysis. She has lived and worked in 4 continents, serving clients in technology, heavy industries, basic metals, financial services, retail and consumer goods. A native of Brazil, Fernanda has earned Bachelor degree in Law from the University of São Paulo and International Relations from the Pontifícia University of São Paulo as well as a Master's of International Affairs from Columbia University. We also have Adam Karson, Chief Economist of Onyx Strategic Insights. Adam has more than 20 years of experience as an economic adviser to global leaders across a range of industries. He has extensive experience in the U.S., Europe and Middle East. Adam most recently worked at Chevron as a senior economist, and he is responsible for Onyx's macroeconomic analysis and forecasting. Adam earned a bachelor degree with honors in economics from Johns Hopkins University and a Master's in Public Policy from Duke University. So welcoming us to the webinar to get started will be Fernanda. She will provide an introduction to Onyx. Thank you, Fernanda.
Fernanda Kroup
executiveThank you, Nick. So just very quickly, thank you for joining us today. And just as an introduction to Onyx and what we do, so we are a consulting division of Expeditors, as Nick said. Our mandate is to help clients build more resilient, efficient and adaptive supply chains. Now the way we do this is by focusing on geopolitical policy and economic disruptors through consulting engagement, supporting, planning and risk management. So that's Onyx for you if you haven't met us. And so let me just dive right into today's webinar and our outlook for 2024. So it's a big year. We like to think about it as a collection of certain uncertainties and uncertain uncertainties. Starting with macroeconomics. Still, a tug of war between growth and caution when it comes to governments, the question around controlled inflation through monetary policy and inflation rates and still some expensive basics, meaning raw materials, right? So we're expecting a slow growth in 2024 more towards the end of the year and hopefully a rebound into 2025. But against this background, we still see wages and raw materials, and it's relatively high price levels compared to pre-pandemic levels. Now on supply chains, we also have an interesting year. We have a growth in mandatory sustainability requirements and disclosures and that creates a bind for companies this year because there's some backtracking in the efforts towards decarbonization, especially in countries that are vying to replace China in supply chains. And then in logistics, we have some structural market changes, particularly in ocean and perennial concern with bottlenecks, particularly in those countries also vying to replace China. Now this is all balanced against a certain capacity glut in ocean. Now -- and then we turn to the uncertain uncertainties. Here, we have elections. This is probably the biggest year in history. Over 60% of global GDP and trade involved in this. Civil unrest is a key concern. These are very contentious elections. We don't expect severe policy changes in most places but still elements to watch and we'll talk about those, and especially potentially in the United States, the big election of this year. And then in global geopolitics as we're all experiencing flare-ups everywhere. There's an accumulation of risks when it comes to ocean. So impacts are relatively contained for now, for today, but we do see a trend towards escalation in Russia, Ukraine and in the Red Sea and Israel-Hamas. Now -- but the biggest risks this year that are relatively unreported are within the U.S. and China on the domestic space. And that would really alter the trajectory of that macroeconomic and supply chain baseline that we'll be talking about first. And so let me turn on to Adam for the macroeconomic and supply chain outlook.
Adam Karson
executiveAll right. Thanks, Fernanda. Hello, everybody. So as Fernanda mentioned, I'm going to go through the macroeconomic outlook and then dive into what's happening in supply chains as well and some of the implications we think you need to pay attention to for 2024, going into next year even. So let's first start with kind of the high-level picture, the key takeaways for global growth for this year. As you all know, we've been on a bit of a roller coaster in the past several years. And as we think about the outlook for this year, we're facing many of the same issues that we've dealt with last year and even really since COVID started, specifically high inflation, interest rates, recession uncertainty and myriad geopolitical risk. And we're -- as I mentioned, we're still focused on these issues so the question is, are we going to stay on this roller coaster or finally reach some firmer ground and feel more normal? Our take on this year is that it's a bit of a tale of 2 hats, where the first half of the year is going to be a clear slowdown. But there's some light at the end of the tunnel as we move into the later part of this year, and we're looking at 2025 as potentially the return to a full year of normalcy. So what does that mean in terms of growth? Well, it means growth is going to be slow, and global growth is going to be around 2%, give or take. And that's pretty weak by historical standards and pretty much led by a slowdown in most major economies around the world, including the U.S., where we see the full effects of inflation and interest rates taking its toll on consumer spending and business investment. In Europe, we see a similar story, and we think Europe is, if not in recession right now, right on the verge of it. And then China as well, we think growth has peaked structurally and it's unlikely to exceed 5% for any sustained period of time. And China, in particular, is facing a number of pretty serious structural headwinds, including obviously, what's going on in the property sector, which we view as not only the largest risk to the Chinese economy, but the largest risk to the global economy as a whole. Now what does this mean in terms of kind of the details of growth? When we dig a little bit deeper, we see similar trends in consumer spending as we do in overall GDP. And so just kind of go walking through some of the details for each country, U.S. is clearly slowing down. We see some of the steam coming out of the consumer sector. There were a number of factors propping up consumer spending and keeping it quite resilient through 2023, including the sort of the after-effects of the massive COVID stimulus packages that households received in 2021, 2022. But that has basically rolled off now and we're losing some of that momentum. We're seeing a few cracks in the labor market, nothing too major but enough to suggest that things are getting slower. China, kind of a similar story, where the rebound coming out of COVID lockdowns in 2023 helped consumer spending accelerate a little bit, but now we're decelerating and moving more towards kind of a normal trajectory. And then Europe, of course, remains pretty weak, and Japan kind of a steady state around 1% as we go forward. As we flip to the business side, to the other side of demand, what's happening with business capital spending, similar themes here as well. The high cost of capital goods, combined with high interest rates, and a lot of uncertainty around demand has forced a lot of companies to hold off from big capital projects. So we see that across many sectors where the projected capital spending budgets are pretty much flat, if not slightly down, in a number of key sectors as we look at this year going into next year. And so similar themes here, but we think this is potentially 1 area where things could turn around and start to improve as we move into 2025. In particular, based on our interest rate view, which I'll touch on in a second, but as the cost of capital comes down, that's going to make capital projects significantly less expensive than they have been over the past couple of years. And if that's combined with a firmer view on demand, we could see that unlocking some pent-up capital spending, that could propel things into 2025. So underpinning all of this is our view on inflation and interest rates, which is sort of the key to the macro story the past couple of years. And we think the consensus view has more or less come around to our view, which we've held for about 18 months to 2 years now, which is that inflation is slowly normalizing as we get into the latter half of 2024, in particular, in the U.S., where the only thing really propping up inflation right now is services prices and still a little bit of wage growth. But on the goods side, commodities, those things have all basically rolled over and inflation from those sectors is pretty neutral. So we see a slow glide path, perhaps with some bumps along the way, but a slow glide path towards the 2.5% to low 2% inflation later this year. That's going to give some freedom for the Federal Reserve to begin cutting rates, but not until the middle or potentially even the third quarter of this year. And we see a lot of uncertainty in the market still. Stock markets, in particular, looking for any kind of glimmer of hope that the Fed might cut sooner than later. However, they -- a week or 2 goes by and they kind of come back to the central view that we should anchor around the middle of the year, which is what we've kind of held firm on and we remain that way. Now if we look sort of Europe and what could happen with the ECB, similar story. However, we think the ECB could begin cutting sooner rather than later, just depending on how weak growth ends up turning out in Europe. So potentially look for even a Q2 rate cut in Europe. And then just a few more details on our inflation outlook. The although inflation rates are rolling over, price levels really are not. They're staying at a high level compared to historical. So of course, we've come off the peak of 2022 when the war in Ukraine sent commodity prices around the world skyrocketing. And -- but things have kind of leveled off, plateaued, and now we're looking at structurally higher prices than we were pre-COVID. We don't see a lot of upward commodity price pressure from this point forward, except for some key markets that are specifically related to construction and energy transition. So things like copper, in particular, and some other metals that are widely used in electric vehicles, electrification in general and infrastructure and construction could see some upward price pressure from this point forward. And then I'll wrap up this macro section just by talking a little bit about our oil price outlook, which, of course, feeds into inflation, but also feeds into freight rates and other aspects of logistics. So our view on oil prices for this year is that we see them, on average, moving fairly sideways. So the average price for Brent Crude in 2023 was about $82, $83. We see it more or less in that range for this year. Underpinning that outlook is a fairly balanced view on supply growth and demand growth, give or take, 1 million barrels a day on both supply and demand. And the thing kind of underpinning our view right now is that OPEC will remain disciplined and keep the floor under price. There's some pessimism in the market right now, so oil prices have certainly dipped below $80 a barrel. And so we're starting off a little bit below our forecast. But we suspect that by the time we get to the second half of the year and demand starts to firm up, we'll be above $83, so on average, you'll be in that low $80 territory. Now I think that the more interesting kind of part of our outlook for oil prices is what could happen on the geopolitical and macro side that could swing things significantly higher or lower. And we're seeing -- we obviously saw that with Russia-Ukraine 1.5 years ago. But now we're seeing that again, more geopolitical risks in the Middle East that could, if things spill over into the region, could take significant supply off the market and send prices well above $100 a barrel. And Fernanda is going to touch more on how we see that potential scenarios in that region playing out and how that could affect market. With that, Nick, maybe I'll pause for a second and see if there are any questions about our macro outlook.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveYes. Thanks, Adam. Maybe a couple of questions. While we're on this slide, one observation is that the Onyx projection for pricing is, it's kind of between the market forecast and then the forward price. So could you add any color there to how Onyx is coming in between those 2 hedges, I guess?
Adam Karson
executiveYes, great question. So, yes we are. We're right in the middle of sort of that aqua-greenish line, which is the consensus kind of blue-chip forecast, which tends to not move that quickly in response to -- into market -- into kind of market move. So it may be a little bit kind of think there's a low elasticity there of that line to what's happening in the marketplace. So I would anticipate that, that green line will come down over time. But then you have the red line, which is the forward price in the spot market, which is pretty reactive and tends to anchor on the current price. And so it tends to -- because the current spot price is lower than what we're projecting the average for the year, it tends to kind of just structurally look a little bit lower. So I think maybe back up a little bit and say like how do we come -- how do we produce our oil price forecast? It's a combination of a couple of things and we build it up from a view on fundamentals. So where do we see supply and demand growth heading for the year? And in general, we're looking at some of the key markets obviously, U.S. and China and European demand. And then where are the big producers heading, in particular, U.S., Saudi Arabia and some of the other OPEC countries? On top of that, we layer 2 types of risks, country risk and geopolitical risk, and I'll separate the 2 things out. We categorize country risk as country-level policies related to energy production, in particular, OPEC policy, which obviously bleeds into geopolitics, but we separate that out. And then U.S. policy is increasingly important as the U.S.' largest oil producer. And then on top of that, we layered geopolitical risk. And this is more of the traditional sort of war premium type of thing that you would expect to see. So what's happening in the Middle East right now and the probability that, that could spill over and take barrels off the market. So that's generally how we think about the short to medium term on our oil price forecast.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveYes, super detailed answer there. I appreciate that. One other question before we transition. I think a lot of people read the newspaper however they read the news these days. You hear the term soft landing, hard landing, and a lot on the U.S., but then you brought up China earlier, and I think you touched on that. But what are the chances of a hard landing in China? Like how bad is the property sector there that it's going to drag down their economy and potentially other economies?
Adam Karson
executiveYes. That's a really important question. It's in bad shape and it's a huge part of the Chinese economy, depending on how you measure sort of upstream, downstream in the property sector. It's like 30% of the economy. And it's in very rough shape. And the question here is -- it's not a binary outcome. Either things are fine or it's a catastrophe. And having done this kind of work for 20 years or so, we've -- I've worked on China hard landing scenarios for the better part of a decade. And they're really important and they're very instructive. And because if things go poorly in China, it affects global demand in a very significant way. The chances of a hard landing in China are greater than ever, I think. Still, I think they're fairly well under control and manageable. It's something we need to pay attention to and it's definitely on our radar of scenarios that we need to be modeling out and working into strategy. But I would argue, in addition to that, we need to be thinking about the things that could happen in between just fine and catastrophe, and perhaps an even more likely scenario in which the Chinese government is able to manage the property sector and it's deleveraging of that sector in a fairly effective way. But the amount of resources that it takes to do so crowds out much more productive investment over the medium to long term. And instead of seeing 4% to 5% growth, we see 3% to 4% growth. So you just have a step-down in growth from this point forward based on the size and magnitude of this problem. So I would urge listeners to think about kind of multiple scenarios that -- how this could play out and how it could affect your business.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveAnd just one little add-on. Could you briefly define soft landing versus hard landing in layman's terms?
Adam Karson
executiveYes. Generally speaking, hard landing is more of -- I would put that in the category of more of a financial crisis. A soft landing could be a mild recession or kind of a trajectory where you are able to -- China is able to deleverage the property sector while maintaining modest -- moderate growth. Even a mild recession or a short recession, I think you could kind of put in that category even, but a hard landing is more of a sharp deceleration that is prolonged for a period of time where growth could say drop below 3% for the same period of time.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveRight. Great. Thanks, Adam.
Adam Karson
executiveSure. Let's move on to some topics on supply chain. So let's start with kind of a high-level take on kind of where we see some of the action around derisking and how companies are beginning to move chips around the table and think -- and look for opportunities for sourcing. And you've all heard terms like friendshoring, nearshoring, China Plus One, China Plus Many. These are all ways of saying derisking. And there are just different way -- different strategies aimed at mitigating particular risks, depending on what risks the companies are trying to manage, whether it be direct exposure to geopolitical risk in particular regions. It could be to try to get closer to demand. It could be to improve ESG. These are all goals that we hear over and over again. A point to note here, though, is that with each of these different strategies, they bring on new sources of risk. So there's no risk-free move out there for companies. So for example, if you see risk in Southeast Asia and you want to move closer to demand in centers of North America and go to Mexico, there are advantages of that, but there are also risks that brings along in terms of security on the ground, logistics at the border. These are all challenges that companies need to manage proactively. So this is a really dynamic kind of situation. And what even complicates this further is that at a time when companies are thinking about derisking and changing their strategy, countries are doing similar things, and they're changing in meaningful ways and competing using policy to attract foreign capital. And this is -- this slide shows a snapshot of kind of how we look at key policy areas listed on the left-hand side. There are 6 key policy areas, and just a snapshot of some of the countries we cover and a sense of whether policies are making things more or less attractive for foreign investment. But the 2 or 3 themes I would like to highlight here are first, we see most countries, including the U.S., not shown on this chart, using industrial policy to draw domestic and foreign capital into particular sectors. In the U.S., it's obviously around the CHIPS Act and bringing semiconductors and high-tech onshore. In Thailand, it's EVs. In Vietnam, it's Consumer Electronics. So we see these countries making concerted efforts to draw on capital, at the same time, using infrastructure policy to build up their logistics capacity to match the new manufacturing that's going to be taking place onshore. And not every country is going to be able to pull this off. And so there's a dynamic here where, for example, you take a Vietnam that is really heating up in terms of drawing in manufacturing, has a pretty robust plan for infrastructure, but it's not clear whether or not that's all going to be timed correctly and whether the right regulations or policies will be in place to ensure that Vietnam won't overheat, for example, or that Vietnam will be able to keep up logistics performance or even improve it to match some of its peers in Southeast Asia. Then going a step further, thinking about ESG, these companies and countries are changing at a time when there's some pretty big kind of regional regulations coming around ESG disclosures. And in particular, the shift from voluntary disclosures to mandatory, which in itself is enough to be -- to pay attention to, but the increased transparency and depth of the reporting is a game changer for many companies, in particular, ones that are operating in Europe and California, where these regulations are hitting the hardest. And the 2 things I'll highlight here is that, first, that these regulations now include Scope 3. So it's going to -- it requires full transparency of supply chains. And then there's this issue of double materiality, which sort of the way we used to do ESG and climate reporting was to show how climate affected one's business and whether or not your business was resilient to climate change. Now the opposite is true, where you also have to report on how your business impacts the climate. And so the increased pressure that investors and regulators will be able to apply to companies based on this new reporting regime, we think, is going to be extremely significant and something that forces supply chain professionals to really pay attention to their overall strategy but specific sourcing opportunities as they move forward. And oh, by the way, this is happening at a time when, unfortunately, decarbonization efforts have stagnated. And as time goes on, it's becoming clear, which countries are driving decarbonization and which ones are kind of lagging behind. For example, if we look at the ASEAN+6, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam are lagging behind, while Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia are investing heavily in renewable energy and pushing decarbonization forward. So there's going to be some separation here in terms of performance. And then if we take kind of a step back and think about when countries are looking at derisking and moving to alternate sourcing options and what options are available outside of China, China makes up about 30% of global manufacturing. And the most reasonable alternatives to China make up less than half of that combined. So all the red dots on this chart make up about 15% of global manufacturing. Most are less expensive. So if you look at total landed cost, most come in cheaper than China, but not all of them come in at a lower carbon intensity than China. So this creates a bit of a 3D chest, if you will, on how to navigate derisking supply chains in an environment where country-level policies are changing, decarbonization is stagnating a bit, but companies are looking to derisk out of China, in particular, but have limited options. So the countries that are able to kind of thread this needle of continuing to industrialize, but do it in a sustainable way, we think, are going to be -- we think will be the ones that are kind of the winners in the long term. Great. So with that, maybe I'll pause again and see if there are any final questions on that section before we hand over to Fernanda.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveHow about just 1 question within the ESG space? What like signposts or markers should people be looking for this year, whether it's a policy, regulation? Like if people were to pay attention to 1 or 2 things, what would you recommend they look for?
Adam Karson
executiveGood question. So they should be watching what happens in the U.S. So we have new laws in California. We're watching what the SEC does and whether -- and to what extent they increase requirements. I think the other thing to watch out for is how strict are the reporting standards going to be on Scope 3. Our sense of it is that no one has -- virtually no one has really good data on ESG throughout their entire value chain. That's going to be an enormous lift for most companies to gather that information, audit it and verify it. And I think we're going to get -- as we progress through this year, that's going to become an increasing challenge and be highlighted. So I think it's really important to watch what happens in Europe, in particular, to see the strictness around that reporting standard and what kind of best practices come out over the next, say, 9 to 12 months.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveOkay. Great. I think at this time, we're going to hand it over to Fernanda for the third section of the webinar here.
Fernanda Kroup
executiveGreat. Thank you. So we're going to be talking a little bit about the looming geopolitical risks that can alter this trajectory. Well, first of all, this is a year of big elections, right? We've started with Taiwan, then moving on to Indonesia and South Africa; Russia; South Korea; India in April, May; in June, the EU parliament and Mexico; the U.K. no later than January 2025 and then to finish it off, the United States. Now this is just a small collection of or a list of elections this year. I mean, we still have Bangladesh and others. But a lot of the economies that are driving global supply chains are going to the polls this year. And these are pretty consequential elections, right? We started with Taiwan, where the key issue is cross-rate relations. You did have a winner that is much more pro-independent. And so it always rises tensions with the Mainland, in particular, as Beijing looks for any signs of a unilateral declaration of independence or any steps towards independence. And so that always infuses risk into the system. Now if we go to the next slide, this is a summary for you to think about these elections, right? Just because it's a big election year, it doesn't mean that it's something to be worried about, right? A lot of these elections will actually mean a continuation of the trajectory, particularly for Indonesia and Mexico in terms of becoming attractive to foreign capital, in particular, Indonesia here and India. We don't expect -- I saw a question on what do we expect from India? We don't expect to change here. The BJP is largely poised to win this election and continue on with reforms to make India more attractive and an alternative to China. The question for all of those is simple unrest because of the polarization that's happening across economies across the world. Indonesia, you do see a change of guard. And so for you folks that are thinking about Southeast Asia, it's important to think about what are the policies, right? And what -- how will they be changing, right? The 4 policies that we always tell you to think about are trading tariffs, industrial subsidies, labor regulations and infrastructure, right? Besides ESG, which Adam has just talked about. This is -- these are the policies that can actually change the environment for supply chains. Now we don't see a lot of change here. Now on Russia, we can debate whether this is a credible election or not. There are a number of opinions out there, but the turnout is important in terms of as a barometer of support for the Ukraine war. We don't have a lot of credible public polling coming out of Russia these days, but that will give you an indication of how much support the government has as it continues on with its war in Ukraine. And then last but not least, let me just talk a little bit about South Korea. We don't expect a complete change here either in terms of policy direction. But we do expect a continuation of the perennial question for the Koreas, which is do we align with the United States and Japan or do we try to achieve a more balancing act, right? So -- and in the background here, you always have North Korea. And the critical change here that has happened in the past few days is that North Korea has changed its policy publicly, and it's not seeking reunification with the South anymore. In fact, it wants to continue to be an independent country. And it's -- and the rhetoric around war has notched up a little bit. Now do we have reason to expect a conflict involving the 2 Koreas? Not necessarily. And this is not necessarily new in terms of North Korean policy. In fact, there has been months where that had been indicated. But at the same time, it does create a little bit of -- it does increase attention around South Korea in its elections as well. If we move on to the next slide, I just -- I saw a question there, what if Trump wins? What happens, right? Well, it's impossible to call this election. But here's a map for you to think about the various issues where you're likely to see some change in policy as a result of the election, right? So in the X-axis, you see the likelihood of policy action. Will anything change? And then on the Y-axis, you see how much in agreement are the 2 parties, Republicans and Democrats, on these issues? And there's quite a lot of agreement on being tough -- that's the only bipartisan issue in the United States these days, and you can expect that a continuation of policy towards carbon trading investment with China. Now there are differences in approach between Republicans and Democrats. A Trump administration would favor tariffs and tariff increases. But even Congress these days is looking at increasing tariffs in China. You also see export controls there. And then the USMCA. This is important. And in many ways, this is the year of trade policy, so for the compliance folks on this call, and in particular also our logistics folks, the USMCA is coming to its [indiscernible]. And so in 2024 and 2025, we're going to see a flurry of activity in terms of potential renegotiation of certain elements of the USMCA. Labor standards come to mind. But there's one trend in trade policy these days that it hasn't become policy yet but it's evolving as a trend, which is a shift from country of origin to country of ownership of the company that's producing or manufacturing and then exporting. You see that already in terms of export controls on technology and its sanctions as well and that's likely to continue. It's not lost in the U.S. government that Chinese companies are nearshoring to Mexico. And so that is a top concern when you think about trade policy, too. Now on the other hand, where you do see differences is trade with partners other than China. This is where you're likely to see action if there is a Trump administration on other countries as well as a way, particularly on tariffs, as a way to bring back production to the United States and to curb the trade deficit. We can debate the merits of this and whether that won't fairly punish certain industries that are dependent on imports or the cost of producing in the United States. But the idea that -- and it's -- there's already a lot of tension particularly in Brussels and thinking about a potential return of tariffs or new tariffs, I guess, trade partners other than China, and particularly in Europe. Where you see a difference here is in climate and sustainability as well. So a rollback of all of all -- of the subsidies and industrial policy when it comes to renewables, when it comes to green technologies, right? So if your company is relying on green subsidies today, federal green subsidies, then there's a little bit of a contingency planning to be done in the event of -- especially of a Trump administration. Trump himself has already indicated that he intends to roll back a lot of the provisions of some of the signature initiatives of the Biden administration, for example, the IRA, right, the JOBS Act. And so there's something there to think about and be aware of. Let me just pause here for a second, Nick, to see if there are any questions related to elections or this part of the outlook.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveI think mostly, there's curiosity on the U.S. election. I've seen a question or 2 there. Nothing beyond that at this point. But yes, I think that's probably it for now.
Fernanda Kroup
executiveYes. Let me just say that, I mean, it's impossible to call this election, right? And everybody that has tried this in the past, has been a little bit traumatized by the results of their efforts, right? But it's important to think about the presidency but then also Congress. Now it's a toss-up as well. But a lot of the issues that we're talking about can be changed or results through executive action. A lot of the trade policy aspects of next year and this year are really concentrated in executive action, right? Industrial policy is a little bit of a question here, Russia-Ukraine, another question, right? But -- so some limited scope for uncertainty coming from Congress.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveThere was a question that just came in back to the Taiwan election, and you talked about how the person who won is more pro-independents. Is there -- do you have a sense of like how is that going to affect U.S.-China relations? Is it -- do we know? Is it too soon to tell? I believe it's the same party that was in power, so it's not like it changed parties, but do you see anything yet in terms of a significant shift on the U.S.-China relations coming out of the Taiwan election?
Fernanda Kroup
executiveNo, if anything, there's a continuation of tensions, right? It is very sensitive for Beijing. It sees Taiwan as a part of its territory. Now it is official U.S. policy that Taiwan is a part of China. And so that puts -- issues around Taiwan always put the United States in a bind because while the U.S. is publicly still subscribed to a One China policy, at the same time, it does have an unofficial security umbrella in Asia and in particularly -- and particularly around Taiwan, so that policy of strategic ambiguity. What would the United States do if tensions around Taiwanese independence increased to a point of potential military action? Allies of the United States, in particular, Southeast Asia look at what the United States does vis-à-vis Taiwan as an indication as to whether the United States would come to their rescue if they had a problem with China. So that idea of a security umbrella if the United States falters in one case, then it could be anybody. And so there's a question of credibility there. And it's important because in the absence of any free trade agreements or market access being offered to Southeast Asian nations in particular, the 1 card that the United States has in terms of attracting allies to its orbit is a security umbrella. So we don't see necessarily a change in trajectory, but the potential for escalation and accident increases expectation. Now if we go to the next slide, just wanted to talk a little bit about our -- some of the existing prices around the world that are affecting supply chains. We do see the [ BALCO ] South China Sea and China, Taiwan, really staying in status quo. We don't expect an escalation at this point. The 2 flash points that are important to pay attention to and we all are, is our Russia-Ukraine, now tilting a little bit towards escalation. Support for Ukraine has faltered a little bit in the past few weeks. There have been important Russian victories and a bit of a loss of momentum for Ukraine, but both parties still see this as a war of survival. And as the military imbalance at least apparently is tilting towards the Russian side, there is an incentive to continue to fight this war. Now what victory looks like at least for Russia is a question mark. There's certainly a need for fixed saving option here, at least in the east, but not necessarily a negotiated solution is on the silhouette of the table at this moment. And so important to watch the Russian elections for that. In Israel-Hamas, it's a little bit all options are around the table right now. There's significant pressure on the Netanyahu government to find a negotiated solution with Hamas. At the same time, we've seen a push towards escalation. And you can tell that escalation is happening when it stops being just about the Palestinians. Now there are 2 flash points that I wanted to highlight here. The first is obviously the Red Sea. So the Houthis overly say that they are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and they've launched these attacks as a way to force Israel to negotiating too. But under the radar, really, what's happening here is that the Houthis want to be recognized as the legitimate government of Yemen, and they want to bring -- they want to force Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table to achieve that objective. So the 2 signposts that are important to observe when it comes to the Red Sea crisis here are, first, of course, the Palestinians, right, and the negotiating solution with Hamas. But second, indications of a negotiated solution for the situation in Yemen itself. It's relatively underreported here, but it's important. I mean, for the Houthis, the agenda is clear and it's been something that they've tried to achieve without success for a number of years. The second point is Iran. Now, we've seen an escalation with Iran bombing Pakistan, Pakistan bombing Iran. We've seen attacks in Syria, in Iraq. And this is about Iranian security and militant groups, but at the same time, also Iran's regional ambitions. And Iran's regional ambitions need to include some sort of accommodation with Saudi Arabia. And so for Iran, it's also all paths lead to Saudi Arabia as well. There was a dialogue. It was sponsored by Beijing earlier in 2023 towards a normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. We've seen -- we haven't seen a lot of progress since then before Iran, that's a key element. The second is to prevent the normalization of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel in order to avoid regional escalation. So the 2 issues to watch are really Yemen and the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia in addition to Israel-Hamas. I'll just quickly finish here by saying that in many ways, you're starting to see the situation in Lebanon also escalating, but a negotiated solution between Israel-Hamas tends to favor a loss of momentum in terms of potential stability also in Lebanon. But it's not a complete resolution of the relationship and the conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel. So lots of volatility to think about. In the next slide, we summarize for you the global supply chain impacts. We see that it won't change for now. Yes, the situation in the Red Sea is worrisome, but we're not talking about World War III yet. But we do see some volatility in ocean. This year, there's an accumulation of risks around ocean, in particular, in the Red Sea. We don't see necessarily a resolution of that issue for now. And then oil price won't solidify as a result of these. But Russia-Ukraine also tends to be a bit more end-to-end in terms of its impact, its continuing impact from raw materials to [ endpoints ]. Now if we go to the next slide, I just wanted to leave you with a thought around the 2 biggest risks today. Now we say they are the 2 biggest because they are the 2 most systemic risks. They are low probability at this point. And China is taking steps to contain a major financial crisis related to its property sector. And in many ways, there's still room for optimism. But that is a huge risk for supply chains, not just because China is an important end market for a lot of companies around here, but also because lots of global economies depend on China as a consumer of raw materials, for example, Brazil. But also because a major financial crisis tends to be contagious across sectors and lead to bankruptcy, so sourcing from China also suffers in this scenario. In the U.S., multiple pathways to a major political or constitutional crisis. In 2024 and then bleeding into 2025. Think somebody can be on the ballot, somebody is not recognized as the winner, but also the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and issues around Congress, budget is not approved, debt ceiling is not raised. Now if that is protracted, besides the major economic and financial issues involved in this, there's a retreat of that security umbrella that I was talking about, and that encourages opportunistic behavior. So everybody or anybody that's unhappy with the way things are today and with the status quo will see an opportunity to escalate and resolve long-standing issues. So all of those geopolitical fault lines and more will become active. Now we do see this as a low probability, but they are -- but the consequence is -- it's low probability but -- and this is a first in my career, it's low probability but not a black swan. And so -- and the consequences and the impact is dramatic. Now we're still optimistic about -- especially the second half of 2024. We do see a lot of potential for a rebound. But in terms of thinking about what else could go wrong and how to be prepared for this year, these are the 2 biggest for instance. Let me stop here and, Nick, see if there are any final questions.
Nicholas Beehler
executiveYes. We do have some questions. We're all getting a little tight on time, so I apologize we couldn't get to everyone's question. I will say, maybe we'll just kind of wrap it up here, just kind of close it out. But there will be a survey, like I mentioned, it's going out today and you have my e-mail. So feel free to reach out to me via e-mail, and when you complete the survey, you'll have a chance to add your comments and ask other questions. So I apologize we couldn't get to every question today. There was -- actually real quick. So just a reminder, please follow us on LinkedIn. You can use the QR code there or just search for Onyx SI on LinkedIn. Reach out to us with our e-mail there and visit us online. We publish different reports and other publications on our website. And then there were some questions like 1 question in particular in the registration was asking about or commenting that fuel's the frequency with geopolitical issues occurring is increasing. And what's our outlook for the next 1, 3, 5 years? And how do companies prepare for that? And so that's actually a great segue into our webinar next month that we are hosting the 2 sessions. And we're going to get into a lot of that, so yes, it definitely feels like there's been an increase in geopolitical hotspots around the world and affecting transportation supply chains. So we're going to get into that next month. Please sign up and attend. We appreciate your attendance for that. Otherwise, thank you so much for attending today. We really appreciate it, and look for the survey coming out later today. Have a great day, everyone.
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