Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

May 22, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 41 min

What were the key takeaways from Frontline plc's May 22, 2026 earnings call?

In Q1 2026, Frontline plc reported a significant profit of $559 million or $2.51 per share, driven by a substantial increase in time charter earnings, which rose to $536.5 million from $42.5 million in the previous quarter. The company highlighted strong cash generation potential, estimating $1.5 billion or approximately $7 per share based on current fleet time charter rates. Management indicated a bullish outlook for the second quarter, with 82% of VLCC days booked at $18,700, suggesting continued strong performance amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions affecting oil supply chains.

What topics did Frontline plc cover?

  • Record Profitability: Frontline reported a profit of $559 million in Q1 2026, marking the most profitable quarter since 2004. CEO Lars Barstad stated, "We have put the most profitable quarter since 2004 behind us and are well into a potentially even more rewarding one."
  • Strong Cash Generation Potential: The company indicated a cash generation potential of $1.5 billion, or approximately $7 per share, based on current fleet time charter rates. This represents an 18% cash flow yield at the current share price.
  • Geopolitical Impact on Supply: Management discussed the ongoing geopolitical tensions, particularly the Middle East conflict, which has tightened fundamentals in the tanker market. Barstad noted, "We reached an unprecedented situation after the 28th of February with the trade performance effectively closed."
  • Fleet Utilization and Market Dynamics: Despite a loss of oil supply from the Middle East, Frontline has seen robust demand due to changes in trading patterns and increased long-haul trade. Barstad mentioned, "Adjusted for distances, shipping demand is surprisingly robust."
  • Future Market Outlook: Management remains optimistic about the tanker market, citing a potential increase in cash generation if spot market rates rise by 30%. They noted, "If we look at a 30% increase from current spot market, that will increase the cash generation potential to about $2.1 billion or $9.51 per share."

What were Frontline plc's May 22, 2026 results?

  • Revenue: $559 million (vs $444 million previous quarter, +26% QoQ)
  • EPS: $2.51 (vs $1.95 previous quarter, +29% QoQ)
  • Adjusted Profit: $44.9 million (vs $42.5 million previous quarter, +5.6% QoQ)
  • Time Charter Earnings: $536.5 million (vs $42.5 million previous quarter, +1165% QoQ)
  • Cash Generation Potential: $1.5 billion (based on current fleet TC rates, equating to $7 per share)
  • Cash and Cash Equivalents: $945 million (including undrawn revolver capacity of $473 million)

Frontline's strong Q1 performance and optimistic outlook for Q2 position the company favorably in the current volatile market. The focus on cash generation and strategic time charter coverage mitigates risks associated with geopolitical uncertainties. Investors should monitor developments in the Middle East and the company's ability to maintain high utilization rates and profitability in the face of potential market disruptions.

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

Thanks, everyone, and I appreciate you joining Frontline's quarterly earnings call. "Unprecedented times" is the phrase that comes to mind as we deliver our Q1 2026 report, with the year already well past its first half. Over 20 years in this business have taught me a lot, yet I never pictured a stretch like this, where the Strait of Hormuz is essentially shut, alongside OPEC, OK, and today's unpredictable political backdrop. Our team at Frontline keeps its attention on the genuine cash-generating work in front of us rather than guessing too far ahead. The strongest quarter since 2004 is now behind us, and we're already deep into one that could prove even more lucrative. Later in this call, I'll return to how we read the current situation. Before I hand things to Inger, let me walk you through our TC figures on slide three of the deck. During Q1 2026, Frontline earned $103,500 per day with our VLCC fleet, $72,400 per day with our Suezmax fleet, and $50,700 per day with our LR2/Aframax fleet. Looking ahead in Q2 2026, 82% of our VLCC days are locked in at $181,700. For our Suezmax days, 79% are booked at $131,300 per day, while 68% of our LR2/Aframax days are booked at $125,000 per day. Six figures everywhere you look. Every figure in this table follows a loaded-to-discharge basis, with ballast days at quarter-end factored in. I'll now hand over to Inger for the financial highlights. $13,500 per day with our VLCC fleet. $18,700. $5,700 per day with our LR2/Aframax fleet.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Right. Thank you, Lars, and good morning, good afternoon, everyone. If we move to Slide 4, we can review the highlights from the profit statement. For the first quarter of 2026, we're reporting a profit of $559 million, which works out to $2.51 per share, along with an adjusted profit of $44.9 million, or $1.55 per share. Adjusted profit for the first quarter rose by $114.5 million versus the prior quarter, driven mainly by time charter earnings climbing $112 million, from $42.5 million last quarter to $536.5 million this quarter. Ship operating expenses came in $5.9 million higher than the previous quarter, largely because supplier rebates dropped by $5.4 million during the quarter. Administrative expenses, excluding the synthetic option revaluation loss of $5.8 million in the first quarter and a gain of $0.5 million in the fourth quarter of $25 million, went up by $8.5 million from the prior quarter, mostly on synthetic option exercises in the first quarter of 2026. Adjusted interest expense then fell by $9.8 million versus the previous quarter, thanks to lower debt as well as reduced interest rates and margins. Depreciation was also down $6.2 million from last quarter because of PC sales during the period. Finally, income tax expense declined by $0.6 million compared with the prior quarter. Let's move on to the balance sheet on Slide 5. From plan carries a solid balance sheet and strong liquidity of $945 million in cash and cash equivalents, including undrawn revolver capacity of $473 million, marketable securities and minimum cash requirements, as of the 31st of March 2026. No meaningful debt maturities come due until 2030. Remaining newbuilding commitments stood at $925 million at the close of the first quarter, tied to acquiring the 9 newbuildings from affiliates of Hemen. As outlined in the press release, the company has secured newbuilding financing of up to $737 million. Let's turn to Slide 6. <<inaudible>> competition cash breakeven rates and offset. Our fleet is made up of 33 VLCCs, 21 Suezmax tankers and 18 LR2 tankers, with an average age of 7.5 years, and it is 100% eco vessels, of which over 64% are scrubber-fitted. For the coming 12 months, we estimate average cash breakeven rates of roughly $24,300 per day for $24,300 per day for Suezmax tankers and 2 per day for Suezmax tankers and $2,600 per day for the LR2 tankers. That works out to a fleet average estimate of about $24,000 per day. This figure includes dry dock costs for 6 VLCCs, 3 usage tankers and 8 LR2 tankers. Excluding trade costs, the fleet average estimate is about $23,000 per day, or $1,100 per day less. OpEx including dry dock came in for the fourth — or rather the first quarter at $11,300 per day for VLCCs, $9,100 per day for Sulige tankers and $10,900 per day for ELT tankers. That covers the startup of 4 VLCCs and 3 LR2 tankers. The Q1 26 fleet average OpEx, excluding Dido, came in at $8,090 per day. Now let's turn to Slide 7 and cash generation. After that, we've been signing 1-year time charter agreements, and we also have fleet renewal happening in the first quarter and in the second quarter as well. The spot base for the next 12 months comes to roughly 23,700 days. Frontline carries substantial potential for cash generation, with 2,700 earnings states annually. As this slide shows, the cash generation potential, based on current fleet TC rates and TCE as of May 22, 2026, stands at $1.5 billion, or approximately $7 per share. That gives a cash flow yield of 18% based on the current share price. Should we see a 30% increase from the current spot market, the cash generation potential would rise to about $2.1 billion, or $9.51 per share, and with a 30% decrease from current spot markets, the cash generation potential would fall to about $1 billion, or $4.41 per share. With that, I'll hand the word back to Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#3

Thanks, Inger. Now we move to slide eight, where I'll go over several market highlights this deck will address. First off, I'd like to remind all of you on the call that tank market fundamentals have been tightening since about this time last year, prior to the Middle East conflict; then, after February 28th, we encountered a situation the likes of which we'd never seen, with the Strait of Hormuz basically closed. The chart in the upper right region sort of illustrates this. What it displays is weekly flow changes compared with the corresponding week one year prior, and you can observe the Middle East Gulf dropping sharply starting in week 12. The on-again, off-again peace talks involving the U.S. and Iran, together with the prospect of Iran-related sanctions being either tightened or eased, plus uncertainty around Russia or Russian oil assets, is creating tremendous volatility. Market participants are starting to focus on what today's Middle East situation might mean over the longer term, and even more so if we attempt to envision it being resolved. What we'll witness is inventories being rebuilt, greater strategic storage, especially among Asian importers; we'll also witness a stronger emphasis on diversifying oil supply sources, now that everyone has seen how exposed you become when you depend entirely on Middle East supply. Beyond that, order books continue to grow, with delivery windows extending out to 2030. That's occurring while prices continue rising, the freight market outlook remains firm, and we're seeing rather brisk activity in the longer firm time charter market, or contracts. One small note on the chart in the bottom left corner: we aren't depending solely on the TD3C index, which covers Middle East Gulf loadings headed to China. We're also using the TD15 index, which covers West Africa to China outside the Middle East Gulf. It looks pretty bleak, paying us only $100,000 per day, which is 4x our cash break-even levels, so that's still pretty strong money; we'd love to have made $400,000 per day each and every day, but given the market's current state, that's mostly a theoretical exercise. Turning to slide nine, I'll take you through two slides that are fairly complex, but I think they're essential for this session, given the circumstances we face. First, a Strait of Hormuz closure is very much a VLCC event. It's the big opportunity for the VLCC. That's where the largest volume is listed on VLCC, moving oil both east and west. Before the closure, we'd seen the daily tied-up VLCC count in this market average 491 vessels. That figure includes laden drydock vessels performing cargo ops or other work. At any given moment, we've had stopped ballasters east of Suez, and we've always had vessels waiting to load in the Red Sea, with 3.2 million coming from Iraq. Basically, when the straits were closed off, we took a massive hit — 130 vessels lost, either what you'd term laden drydocking or else engaged in cargo operations. That represents the dark blue baseline shown in the chart right in the middle here. Another 21 ships were observed waiting and loading in the Red Sea; since that number reflects daily tied-up tonnage, it truly shouldn't be treated as an absolute figure. Simultaneously, 41 VLCCs sat laden, full of oil, waiting inside the Middle East Gulf. On top of that, 55 VLCC equivalents were halted and in ballast east of Suez; once Hormuz was shut, that brought us back to 480 VLCCs. Put differently, that's merely a reduction of 11 VLCC equivalents amid what is an exceptionally brutal situation, especially for the VLCC segment. Moving to slide 10, let's examine how flows developed following the closure. We were at 17.7 million barrels per day, sourced from a variety of suppliers across the Middle East Gulf. We lost 5.9 million barrels per day out of Saudi, 3.2 million from Iraq, close to two from UAE, and so forth. 1.4 from Kuwait, and nearly one million barrels from Qatar. As time went on, UAE succeeded in boosting throughput on the pipeline terminating at Fujairah by almost one million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia started utilizing the Yanbu pipeline running from the Middle East Gulf out to the Red Sea, adding 3.5 million barrels per day. The rest of the world has gradually, up to where we are today, lifted outputs by 3.3 million barrels per day; this has essentially meant a net loss of just 6.2 million barrels per day. What we'll look at later, and we might jump straight to it, if we go to slide 11, is that even with Hormuz effectively closed, we've seen such large shifts in trading patterns that we're actually back to oil moving over distances, oil on water, as it was before the Hormuz closure. The long-haul trade has grown beyond the loss of the relatively short-haul trade from the Middle East Gulf to the Far East. We've also seen export capacity that we genuinely didn't know was there, or at least we hadn't really paid attention to it, contributing to this volume. We've seen Asia raise its sourcing from practically every available region, all of them farther away, driving this ton mile and this high utilization. So despite the volume shortfall, once you adjust for distances, shipping demand is remarkably robust. Crude on water is bouncing back quickly, and that's important to note. When you look at a real-time picture, you won't capture this until after the fact. It takes 30 to 45 days from when a barrel is contracted to be freighted until the oil is actually loaded onto a ship. That means it's only in the last three, four weeks that we've seen this material happen, using the data or using the oil on water data. Let me take us back to slide nine for a moment, since this point really does matter. If you look at the middle of the chart, toward the upper right, there's a figure marked + 55. Those vessels have been signed up, or mostly signed up, by parties whose economic rationale isn't necessarily the same as ours as shipowners. Those ships carry the basic crude flow out of the Middle East Gulf into Asia. The contracts are held by refiners and oil majors, industrial players of that kind. Should the strait reopen and those parties found themselves without vessels available, the cost of that could be extremely high. These ships are locked in at relatively low rates. We're talking about five-year, six-year, seven-year, or 10-year arrangements, priced somewhere in the range of $35,000 to $45,000 per day. So that's the premium they're paying for the option to lift the first oil once it shows up. For them it's a logistics question, not a profit question, and that's what makes it different from Frontline. Of course, if we hadn't had this kind of idle fleet, my feeling is that tanker supply and demand, and especially for VLCC, would look a bit different. That's the situation, that's where things stand, and right now we're reaping the benefits of the fact that a fairly large portion of the fleet remains unutilized, waiting on Middle East developments.

Lars Barstad

executive
#4

Shifting ahead again, let's go to slide 12. Like I mentioned before, our order books continue to grow. We're moving into a range where the percentages start with a three, but the fleet keeps aging no matter what. In the table at the top left, the ships that are 15 years old or younger right now will reach 20 in five years, and all together they make up 45.5% of the fleet as it currently stands. Hold onto that number while you look at the order book, which across the asset classes we run adds up to about 23.2%, and the situation doesn't look troubling at all. Those order book deliveries are spaced out over the next three to four years, and most of the newbuildings, especially for VLCC and Suezmax, won't show up until 2028. With all of that in mind, I wouldn't say the order book doesn't matter, but I would say it's something we can deal with. One point worth noting when you go through these charts: if a peace agreement were reached between the U.S. and Iran, the likely outcome, or the likely items on that list, would be sanctions being removed from Iranian oil. That would make useless the part of the fleet that currently moves Iranian crude — equivalent to 15%-17% of the whole VLCC fleet — and it would become worthless in an instant; let's go to slide 13 and dig into this argument a little further. On top of the fundamental backdrop I just covered, we have very strong spot and period markets, and that's what keeps ordering activity high even with the Middle East situation as unclear as it is. Tanker ordering is accelerating for 2029, and slots are starting to move into the 2030 window, which stretches out the runway. We're talking about three years, or three and a half years, before a new hull enters this order book. Because nothing is being scrapped while the fleet continues to age, net compliant fleet growth is still something we can handle right now. Remember, again, that no ship older than 20 years is being used in any market, even when rates are extremely attractive. As I mentioned, the likely end of Middle East conflict would mean Iran sanctions are rolled back, lifting demand for compliant tonnage and perhaps kicking off the much-wanted wave of recycling. A larger fundamental piece of all this is that shipyard figures are still well under the peak from 2010 to 2011. Consolidation, along with more recent efficiency gains, has brought TCE capacity closer to its highs. What I'm really saying is that although it looks like there are limits on shipyard capacity and on the ability to add new vessels for future crude transportation needs, the truth is we're set up to keep running a fleet that can serve oil markets for a long time to come. In the upper right part of this chart, you can basically see what the net fleet growth picture looks like right now, and it's definitely not something to worry about. Moving to slide 14. Take a look at the bottom chart on this slide — we've leaned on it for a fair number of quarters at this point. That orange bar all the way on the right is the one to watch. As I mentioned, going all the way back to 2004, Frontline has not seen a quarter like the one we just had. Now think about where we sit on a year-to-date basis in 2026. That really is extraordinary. Sure, part of this index comes from certain trades that simply can't be done and are being quoted at very high levels, but even so, we're in unprecedented territory. Underneath it all, the market is tight, and it was already tight before things blew up in the Middle East. The disruption to trade routes has bred inefficiency and spawned new trades, and we keep seeing longer voyages appear. Our sense is this could turn out to be somewhat sticky, mainly because of the energy security angle. We continue to observe subdued growth in the compliant tanker fleet. That's still the heart of the case for owning tanker equities. Asset values just keep rising. Both the spot and period markets underpin the investment decisions ahead. Today's political environment changes the picture. Once more: from here on, energy supply security will get more weight. With our VLCC-focused, efficient operating model, Frontline is front and center, and we hope good results will follow — across roughly 2,700 earnings days annually, that works out to about $8,090 per day, with over 64% of the fleet scrubber-fitted. Thanks very much for listening; I'll open it up for questions now.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#5

Hello, and thanks — good afternoon. I want to begin with the number of fixtures. Looking at VLCC fixtures, activity from the U.S. Gulf and West Africa appears to have softened a bit between April and May, despite rates staying really firm. I'd like to know whether you're observing the same pattern, and whether you have a sense of what's driving the fixture activity.

Lars Barstad

executive
#6

This market has really shifted into something of a stealth mode. Naturally, not everything is visible. From a utilization standpoint, if you're an oil trader, you'll always put your own fleet to work first. That means those matters won't get reported to the market, even if the volume stays the same. Second, fixing out of the U.S. Gulf has been exceptionally — well, let's call it cyclical. It begins with short-term barrels getting fixed on Aframaxes, which is what we've seen lately. Then all at once it shifts to Suezmaxes carrying oil to Europe, until all at once you see dates confirmed for oil heading to the Far East, which pulls the VLCC into play. Then all at once the VLCC fades, the Suezmax fades, and we're back on the Aframaxes. It simply repeats. It appears the U.S. Gulf fixtures on the VLCC side occur on a monthly cycle, and it only occurs during a week and a half within that month. I think it's rather hard to read from fixtures, first because it's very hard to see all of them, and second because you have this somewhat atypical pattern. You don't get a steady flow of VLCCs being fixed, or a steady flow of Suezmaxes, or a steady flow of Aframaxes. It mostly depends a bit on crude prices and how the arbs are opening or closing. Naturally, with such an extremely volatile narrative, practically every Friday we're about to open Hormuz, and every Monday it's closed once more. That makes this a very tough playground even for the traders.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#7

Yeah, headlines definitely give me whiplash. Staying on the subject of captive fleets, the deck references 55 VLCCs sitting idle outside the Arabian Gulf. Any theory on why the NOCs — and I'm guessing they are NOCs — would choose that instead of taking part in other trades right now?

Lars Barstad

executive
#8

No, look, I obviously don't have inside knowledge here, but one plausible explanation is that if things open up — suppose someone tweets and a press release lands tomorrow announcing everything's fine, we can transit — the first ship through could snap up Iraqi oil at a $30 discount to Dubai or Brent. That's $60 million right there. I believe that's what's driving it. Being able to act fast and grab those first barrels, instead of having to ring Frontline and request a rate; that's enormously valuable. On the other hand, if they entered and competed against, let's say, us in the Atlantic market, that ship would be unavailable for 70 to 90 days, and then they'd truly need to call us if they require freight out of the Middle East Gulf in a hurry. I think — I'd presume that's the reasoning here. Because the expense of holding these ships isn't like a current market cost. It's a time charter contract signed years ago. I'd say the price of preserving that option is manageable. Naturally, what tomorrow brings is anyone's guess.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#9

Another excellent call, as usual. Thanks, Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#10

Thanks.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#11

That's about right. Good afternoon to both Lars Barstad and Inger Klemp. Lars Barstad, slides 9 through 11 are genuinely impressive. There's a huge amount of detail there, really fascinating. I've never seen it presented in that manner before. What I want to ask is this: assuming the fleet impact shown on slide 9 amounts to just 11 VLCCs, and then slides 10 and 11 cancel each other out, as you described, the lost volume is clearly a negative, but the effect on ton miles nearly offsets it entirely. So it seems like overall utilization ought to be roughly in line with where it stood before the strait shut, and yet rates have clearly been extraordinarily firm. You've got the theoretical figures, but you've also got the actual ones. What is the factor that separates what appears to be a wash relative to 3 months ago from rates that have gone through the roof?

Lars Barstad

executive
#12

Honestly, the largest unknown, and none of us anticipated it whatsoever, was how many ships appear to be sitting idle for reasons that aren't obviously economic. The ton miles, I'd say, really do add up to quite a bit. I believe folks are taken aback by how much volume Saudi has managed to increase the Yanbu loadings by. There's no escaping the reality that this portion of the fleet — uneconomical for various reasons — staying unused is the single biggest element at play here. Even we ourselves didn't think that what has occurred or unfolded since the 28th of February could be bullish for VLCCs, or at minimum neutral for VLCCs.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#13

All right. On slide 13, you discussed what the probable final outcome looks like. I believe nearly everyone would share your view that this is the most probable scenario, and without a doubt the equity market behaves accordingly. Frontline, as is obvious, has consistently been set up to get the greatest possible exposure to the spot market. Suppose we turned to the alternative final outcome — one where hostilities persist and intensify, and perhaps that waterway ends up shut down on a more lasting basis — what's your thinking on handling risk in such a scenario? Once more, I realize we must tilt toward the probable scenario, what the market is signaling, and those Friday afternoon tweets. Have you given any thought to running the fleet, or perhaps even the balance sheet, differently purely as a precaution should that improbable tail risk materialize out of these unprecedented times?

Lars Barstad

executive
#14

Yes, that's correct. While we've secured additional time charter coverage—especially for the VLCCs in Q1, and that effort is still ongoing—I'd say the initial round came about because we were examining an extraordinary market before Hormuz shut down. Naturally, we had no idea that would occur. In the wake of it, we've kept locking in near-term coverage, such as one-year arrangements on the VLCCs, to the point that—and Inger includes a table showing this—we're approaching 30% of our voyage dates for VLCC over roughly the coming 12 months, or at minimum across the first two quarters, being covered through time charter contracts. We've consistently told you this: what we offer investors is an effort to provide spot exposure. Naturally, at particular moments along the curve, we'll seek coverage, and that is obviously meant to keep us from going bankrupt if we turn out to be wrong. I believe that addresses your question. We might be fully spot right now, yet we're in fact quite near 30% of our voyage dates on VLCC, which we consider the segment most exposed to a prolonged closure, should nothing get sold there.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#15

Yeah, that's great. All right. Thank you, Lars. Really helpful.

Lars Barstad

executive
#16

Thanks, everyone.

Deven Sangoi

analyst
#17

Hey, Lars. There are a couple of things I'd like to ask. To start with, we've noticed many nations dipping into their stockpiles — the crude reserves they'd accumulated — as a result of the disruption. Should they need to return to the outcomes seen before, prior to this conflict and ianudible, what would demand look like even after the fighting ends?

Lars Barstad

executive
#18

Okay, assuming I understood you right, what you're really getting at is how this marketplace will appear once things settle back to normal, isn't that so?

Deven Sangoi

analyst
#19

Yeah. Yes.

Lars Barstad

executive
#20

Yeah. From where we sit — and obviously we rely on an analyst who genuinely understands this subject — my sense is that exports out of the Middle East won't return to the volumes seen before the closure at any point in the near term. Getting there is going to require time. At the outset you'll get some oil moving: number one, ships that are already loaded; number two, crude sitting in tanks within the Gulf right now; and after that, fresh output will start arriving. For certain exporters this is obviously a matter of liquidity — they're eager to sell as much crude into the market as they can and bring in cash quickly. Simultaneously, we'll also see what we judge to be a strong likelihood that Iranian crude becomes a compliant grade once this takes place. Bear in mind, that's another 1.5 million to two million barrels coming from Iran that will need compliant tonnage. Looking ahead from here, if I were a refinery in Asia, or a short oil entity in Asia, the moment my inventories were full, I'd begin essentially diversifying my risk regarding how I source crude going forward. My view is that could produce a longer-lasting scenario in which those lengthier, old school ton miles grow increasingly steady as we go along. As for the opening scenario, I believe it's extremely hard to paint a bleak picture for tankers. There's also the potential to paint a rather bullish picture for the oil price, essentially, since all of this inventory building is required. Production won't come back overnight, and there will be something of a shortage in oil too as we move ahead. The point we can't escape, I think, is that this entire situation — which by now has gone on for 12 weeks or whatever it is, if I'm keeping count — also represents an enormous push toward energy diversification through examining alternative energy sources such as nuclear, wind, gas, whatever you like. Perhaps not gas, but solar at least; this really is a push toward the long-term energy transition. My sense is that's five years away. It isn't something we have to consider at this moment. The near-term scenario, I think, is the one I just laid out.

Deven Sangoi

analyst
#21

Lars, there's another point — India signed a deal with Venezuela as of today, and once this conflict ends, that 20%, which represents a massive reliance for many nations, particularly India and China, which currently sources from the Middle East, they'd want to spread their sources. Would that bring a lasting shift in ton mile demand and the ton mile travel for vessels, above all the big ones?

Lars Barstad

executive
#22

Yes, I think that's right, and I also see this as the underlying reason behind some of the curiosity we're getting from those Asian industrial participants, who in fact are attempting to get into the term charter market, securing ships for delivery across 2027, 2028, and 2029. In my view, that's the long-term play here — they're present to try and bind themselves to oil supply contracts out of Latin America, West Africa, and U.S., and as a result essentially must lock in tonnage to cover those contracts.

Deven Sangoi

analyst
#23

So through FY 2029 — calendar year 2029 — does that mean this ship will enjoy a scenario of very strong rates, or one that's stable and high?

Lars Barstad

executive
#24

Honestly, I'd say there's no way to know. Freight markets and period markets, as we see them, are backdated. For a vessel set to deliver pretty soon, a one year contract runs about $120,000 per day. As soon as the contract stretches to two years, you're looking at $90,000; at three years, $75,000, $76,000. And if you go out to a five year deal with delivery in 2029, you're down in the $40s.

Deven Sangoi

analyst
#25

Okay.

Lars Barstad

executive
#26

Yeah.

Deven Sangoi

analyst
#27

Thank you very much, Lars. Wishing you the very best.

Lars Barstad

executive
#28

I appreciate that.

Lars Barstad

executive
#29

Yes. Once more, we really appreciate you tuning in. The political environment we're operating in is pretty chaotic. You can be sure that Frontline is concentrating on attempting to gather cash as we move forward here, and at this point it appears fairly fine. Thanks.

Operator

operator
#30

Appreciate it. That brings us to the end of today's conference call. We're grateful that all of you joined us. At this point, please go ahead and disconnect.

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