Global Ship Lease, Inc. (GSL) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Thank you for standing by. My name is Jordan, and I'll be your conference operator today. At this time, I'd like to welcome everyone to the Global Ship Lease Q2 2026 Earnings Conference Call. [Operator Instructions] I would now like to turn the call over to Thomas Lister, Chief Executive Officer. Please go ahead.

Thank you very much. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease Second Quarter 2026 Earnings Conference Call. You can find the slides that accompany today's presentation on our website at www.globalshiplease.com. As usual, Slides 2 and 3 remind you that today's call may include forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and assumptions and are, by their nature, inherently uncertain and outside of the company's control. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to many factors, including those described in the safe harbor section of the slide presentation. We would also like to direct your attention to the Risk Factors section of our most recent annual report on our 2025 Form 20-F, which was filed in March 2026. You can find the form on our website or on the SEC's. All of our statements are qualified by these and other disclosures in our reports filed with the SEC. We do not undertake any duty to update forward-looking statements. The reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to which we will refer during this call to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP usually refer to the earnings release that we issued this morning, which is also available on our website. I'm joined as usual today by our Executive Chairman, George Youroukos; and our Chief Financial Officer, Tassos Psaropoulos. George will begin the call with high-level commentary on GSL and our industry, and then Tassos and I will take you through our recent activity, quarterly results and financials and the current market environment. After that, we'll be pleased to answer your questions. So turning now on to Slide 4. I'll pass the call over to George.

Thank you, Tom, and good morning, afternoon or evening to all of you joining today. Once again, geopolitical uncertainty and volatility played an outsized role during the second quarter. Our liner customers are doing extraordinary work from day-to-day and even from hour to hour as circumstances change. Supply chains are reorganized and often, they are then reorganized again. In addition to the repeated closure and partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the security situation in the Lower Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has once again taken a step back. On top of that, the reintroduction of broad-based tariffs on U.S. imports is likely to contribute to continued supply chain fragmentation and inefficiency as procurement managers, suppliers and other cargo interests adjust their operations and risk management strategies. In short, any one of these factors in isolation would typically be highly significant for our industry. But having all of that same time is driving an extraordinary level of demand for additional vessels and capacity on top of that from underlying containerized freight demand, which is itself remaining quite firm. Flexible midsize and smaller container ships like those in the GSL fleet are the greatest beneficiaries as evidenced by liner company's continued appetite for ships that under more normal circumstances would be considered overage in these size categories. Meanwhile, prudent and selective fleet renewal has always been at the front of our minds. Against the backdrop of this evolving market, we have placed newbuild orders for a total of 15 container ships at attractive prices and derisked from the outset with multiyear charters attached and over 75% of the contract cost expected to be captured from the adjusted EBITDA generated by those charters within, on average, the first 25% of the ship's useful lives only. These container ships, which we will speak more on briefly, are best-in-class ultra-high-reefer, latest generation eco vessels and will replace our aging cash cows, providing us with visible cash flows well into the years ahead. In this supportive demand environment, at the same time as putting in place charter cover for the newbuilds, we have also locked in additional coverage at attractive rates for various of our existing ships coming up in the market. Our contracted revenues now stand at $3.2 billion over 3.3 years of cover, of which $1.450 billion was added during the first half of this year. Our fleet contract coverage is 100% for 2026 and is already at 90% for 2027. Our strong balance sheet and delevering efforts have been reflected in our affirmed credit ratings and an improved outlook for Moody's as well as a healthy recently upsized dividend of $2.5 per share annualized. We remain focused on maximizing optionality in these turbulent and unpredictable times. Our recent newbuild orders represent a continuation of our long-running focus on flexibility, discipline, downside protection and upside potential. These principles guide our actions and have served us well, and we believe that our emphasis on maintaining optionality is an excellent fit for the containership market of today and of tomorrow. With that, I will turn the call over to Tom.

Thank you, George. Hello again, everyone. Please now turn to Slide 5, where you will see in great detail our strategic fleet renewal, which consists of both investment in the next generation of cash cows for our fleet and the opportunistic monetization of older noncore assets. To echo George's words, on the newbuild front, we see our acquisition of 15 midsized ultra-high-reefer wide beam latest generation container ships with long-term charters attached as the exact combination of prudent downside protection and attractive upside potential that we look for in any transaction. As highly specified ships in a structurally underbuilt but crucially important segment of the containership fleet, we see these vessels as best-in-class, flexible, future-proofed and strong earners going forward. It's worth underlining the fact that more than $1 billion of the $1.3 billion of contract price is covered by contracted EBITDA expected to be generated by the firm charters in place ex yard over a TEU weighted average term of 7.1 years, meaning that these newbuilds are materially derisked right out of the gate. And essentially, we're covering over 3/4 of their aggregate contract price within roughly the first quarter of their collective economic life and all that with charter cover from top-tier charterers. It's also worth highlighting that several of these newbuilds include options for the operator to extend the charters at rates more than 25% above those for the initial firm periods, suggesting that the end users share our conviction that these ships will continue to be in high demand, valuable and with significant upside earnings potential well beyond their initial charters. These newbuild transactions were possible due to our ability to move fast, thanks to our discipline in building a fortress balance sheet, and we expect the forward visibility on contracted revenues to support attractive funding alternatives for these assets, which will likely involve a combination of cash from our balance sheet and debt to enhance returns on equity. For modeling purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the contract payments for these newbuilds are milestone-based and backloaded with more than half of the contract price not payable until the respective ship is delivered. We also consider the opportunistic monetization of older assets to be an integral part of fleet renewal. And at the bottom of the slide, you can see that we have sold forward 4 older noncore ships during the first half of the year for a total of $65.5 million, with an aggregate gain on book expected to be in the region of $33 million. Added to which we will continue to benefit from these ships earnings until they deliver to buyers in scheduled slots ranging between the end of this year and the end of next year. Moving to Slide 6, we show the structural rationale behind the new building orders and why this is the right time for us to pounce on these opportunities. As we have highlighted for some time, the midsized and smaller containership classes have been underbuilt for many years with the lion's share of investment capital piling into ultra-large ships. That has left the crucially important sub-10,000 TEU portion of the global fleet with an advanced age profile. And to illustrate this point, the median age of the oldest quartile by TEU capacity within each fleet segment below 10,000 TEU ranges from 21 to 28 years, and that's today, which translates to around 24 to 31 years by the time our newbuilds actually deliver into the space. So you have an aging global fleet combined with a more limited order book at a time when the value proposition of such flexible assets is proving to be increasingly important and in growing demand from liner operators. Furthermore, with the industry and its regulators now looking less likely to coalesce around a long-term decarbonization trajectory and rule set anytime soon, we see the option value of a wait-and-see approach on fuels and propulsion as having materially diminished. The convergence of these factors, together with the commercial terms available to us, our ability to transact on the newbuilds while derisking them with charter coverage ex yard and the aging out of our existing cash cows made these orders a clear and compelling opportunity for us and for our shareholders. We expand further on our rationale for investing in newbuilds on Slide 7. We have a history of being prudent in managing risk through the shipping cycle while capitalizing on upside cyclicality and volatility, particularly in time charter earnings to build value for shareholders. In the chart, you can see how secondhand asset prices, which are the dark blue line and particularly the time charter rate index, the green line, have both trended and spiked upwards, while the newbuild price index, the pale blue line, has remained comparatively flat in recent years. In fact, with yard order books essentially full for the next few years, the main factor currently expected to drive new building prices is inflation. So combining all these considerations, this is a good entry point for newbuilds as long as they are in the right size categories, appropriately specified and derisked with charters. And with the combination of our fortress balance sheet and strong industry relationships, we have the ability to move quickly and decisively in developing these compelling opportunities. The result is 15 newbuilds contracted on attractive terms with multiyear charters attached, which lower our average fleet age and crucially increase our cash generation runway as our cash cows begin to age out. In other words, exactly the recipe for low risk and high upside potential that we like. On Slide 8, you will see our diversified charter portfolio with the chart showing the breakdown of our charter revenues by charterer from our operating fleet for the first half of this year. As of June 30, and to be clear, these figures also include the firm charters from our 15 newbuilds, we have over $3.2 billion in forward contracted revenues over a 3.3 year of average TE weighted contract cover. In 2026, our revenue days are 100% covered with 90% coverage in 2027. Slide 9, we recap our dynamic capital allocation policy with which we have navigated both the cyclical nature of our industry and the flock of black swan events that have occurred in recent years. We have delevered to build resilience and create a fortress balance sheet, which in turn has allowed us to mitigate risk, build equity value and position ourselves to seize opportunities as they arise. This is reflected in our improved credit outlook, our order book of 15 new buildings and the continued return of capital to our shareholders via our annualized dividend of $2.50 per common share. With that, I'll pass the call to Tassos to discuss our financials.

Thank you, Tom. Slide 10 shows our financial highlights for the first half of 2026. I would like to emphasize a few key takeaways. Our financial performance and cash flow have remained very strong. Our cash position at quarter end was $649 million, of which $140 million is restricted. The remainder ensures that we can fully cover our covenants, our working capital needs and manage the potential financial implication of geopolitical disruptions and other macro events in an increasingly unpredictable world. It also provides dry powder both for CapEx to optimize the commercial value and marketability of our existing fleet and for disciplined investment in fleet renewal when the right opportunities present themselves, including the payment installments, of course, for our 15 new buildings. During the second quarter, we were also pleased to put in place a new $55.5 million debt facility with Bank of America, 5-year paper secured against ships we bought with cash at the end of 2025, priced at SOFR plus 140 basis points, a good addition to our capital stack. And of course, we continue to pay our compelling dividend. On Slide 11, we highlight our ongoing efforts to delever and derisk to build resilience and maximize optionality. The graph on the left shows our outstanding debt, which was $950 million at the end of 2022, and we have managed to reduce it to just under $600 million by June 30, 2026, while at the same time, growing our fleet considerably and increasing the number of unencumbered ships. The graph on the right shows the same story of the financial leverage front, but with even great progress, improving from 8.4x in 2018 to 0.4x today. Slide 12 further emphasize our commitment to a strong financial platform. The left-hand graph shows how we have successfully lowered our borrowing cost from 7.56% in 2018 to 4.43% today, even as base rates have moved higher. And despite an inflationary environment, we have managed to reduce our average daily breakeven cost from over $12,000 per ship at the end of 2018 to just over $10,000 per ship today. With that, I will turn the call back over to Tom to discuss the market and our fleet.

Thank you, Tassos. On Slide 13, we reiterate our focus on midsized and smaller containerships with our fleet ranging from 2,200 TEU at the bottom end to a little over 11,000 TEU at the top. Vessels in this range are workhorses of the global fleet, predominantly serving the non-mainlane trades that collectively comprise around 75% of total global containerized trade volumes. Very large ships are more or less restricted to the big East-West mainlane trades as they require specialized port infrastructure, deepwater berths and very long terminals to be operationally viable and equally importantly, huge volumes of cargo to be economically viable. Midsize and smaller container ships, on the other hand, like those in GSL's fleet, trade on a truly global basis. And as geopolitical uncertainty has decentralized and fragmented the containerized supply chain beyond China and throughout Southeast Asia, our liner customers have placed a growing priority and value on the commercial and operational flexibility that such ships provide. On Slide 14, we provide a snapshot of the choke points currently impacting containerized trade in the Middle East. While we cannot predict how these situations will develop, we can provide some context on how things are playing out for the industry in real time. Starting with the Red Sea and Suez through which around 20% of global containerized trade volume was transited before the security situation was disrupted in 2023. Since then, vessels have been forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. This longer, costlier journey has absorbed around 10% of effective containership capacity. And after a brief period of cautious optimism with some minor operators trialing a return to this transit with selected vessels, the security status has since deteriorated again. So as with so many things at the moment, it's a watch and brief. As for the Strait of Hormuz, the on again, off again situation there is both dangerous and unpredictable. Prior to this conflict, about 3% to 4% of containerized trade volumes passed through the strait in global terms. Now major hubs and ports within the Persian Gulf are severely constrained. Liner companies are rejigging service networks and although considerable effort is being put into trying to explore alternative means to reliably flow cargo into and out of the region, it is not proving straightforward. Both of these situations are highly dynamic and their long-term implications for container shipping are unclear. But in the near term, they add layers of complexity and inefficiency for the shipping industry to navigate with seafarer safety of paramount concern. On Slide 15, we highlight supply side and scrapping trends where little has changed. Idle capacity and scrapping activity both continue to hover near 0. The inefficiencies in the supply chain and subsequent longer voyages have both nearly eliminated slack in the system and kept vessels on the water longer than would otherwise have been expected in a "normal environment." Why? Because earnings have remained so attractive. Slide 16 shows the order book. While the order book has certainly grown meaningfully, it remains smaller in the segments upon which GSL is focused. For the big ship segments over 10,000 TEU, the order book-to-fleet ratio stands at 55%, which drags the average ratio for the overall fleet order book to 39%. Meantime, the ratio for the midsized and smaller containership segments relevant to GSL is significantly lower at around 25% with deliveries spread over the next 4 years or so. As I mentioned earlier in the context of our own newbuild orders, the midsize and smaller size segments of the global fleet are also aging such that the corresponding order book is quite closely matched by ships that are or will shortly become 25 years or older. Essentially, these ships will be scrapping candidates whenever the market eventually pulls back. If we assume that all vessels over 25 years old were to be scrapped through 2030, the net effect will be growth of under 1% for the global fleet sub-10,000 TEU. In any case, while charter rates remain strong, we're very happy to lock in charter coverage. If the market were to normalize on the other hand to the downside, then we would expect global scrapping activity to pick up meaningfully, offsetting fleet growth and potentially also creating countercyclical purchase opportunities for owners like us with strong finances and a long-term through-cycle strategy. So it's a win-win as we see it. On Slide 17, we provide a snapshot of the charter market. The right side of the slide shows market rates for term charters, which remain strong and should be considered alongside our average breakeven rates, which stand at just over $10,000 per vessel per day. With that, I will turn the call back to George on Slide 18.

Thank you, Tom. To summarize, we continue to focus on maximizing optionality and resilience in a world beset by geopolitical complexity, macroeconomic volatility and regulatory uncertainty. Supply chains have decentralized and fragmented, making the operational flexibility offered by GSLs, midsized and smaller ships a priority for our liner customers. We have continued adding charter coverage, which now stands at $3.2 billion, up by over $1 billion on where it stood at the end of the first quarter, thanks largely to the addition of our 15 newbuilds with charters attached. Our delevering efforts have resulted in a fortress balance sheet and our high operational efficiency and capital allocation discipline have resulted in highly competitive breakeven rates. Our prudent selective fleet renewal has seen us monetize older noncore ships and acquire both secondhand vessels and more recently newbuilds. But our recipe remains the same, be disciplined, be patient and be nimble and use the cycle to minimize downside risk and maximize upside potential. And of course, returning capital to shareholders remains a top priority. Our recently upsized dividend now stands at $2.5 per share annualized, which is a dividend yield of about 5.7% on the basis of yesterday's close. With that, we will be very pleased to take your questions.

[Operator Instructions] Your first question comes from the line of Omar Nokta from Clarksons Securities.

A couple of questions. Maybe just first on the investment in the new buildings back in June that you first announced. You've got 15 of them that come with a large backlog that, as you say, derisks the investments in a very big way. And as you highlight, it's interesting, 75% of the cost is earned back in the first 25% of their operable life. Obviously, it's a sizable investment and don't expect you to do more of this, but you do have the flexibility given just how strong your balance sheet is. I wanted to get a sense from you, how repeatable is this type of business? It's clearly unique, and we haven't seen this in the past, but just want to get a sense from you, is this sort of a one-off that you're really able to capture? Or is this sort of like kind of like the norm in what owners can expect to capture in today's market?

Omar, this is Tom. I'll kick it off and no doubt George and Tassos will add. Yes, we're delighted with this transaction, as you say, 15 newbuilds derisked out of the gate to the tune of 75% of the contract price with the adjusted EBITDA implicit in the contracted charters. Not easy to put together such a deal. So I wouldn't say that it's the "new normal" to use your expression, either for us or for the market. Indeed, I would say, while obviously, we're willing to look at new buildings, as we've just demonstrated, we're not dogmatic on that front either. We're happy to look at new buildings, existing tonnage, sale and leasebacks, whatever really, as long as the numbers make sense and the risk profile makes sense. So this doesn't mark a departure from our existing strategy. I would say it marks simply an evolution of that same strategy focusing on minimizing downside risk and maximizing upside potential. But I'll pass the call to George in case he wants to add more to that.

Yes. If I may say that by no means such a transaction is available in the market, and it's something that it's easy to make. We capitalize on our relationships with our clients and our know-how on designing ships that are not available in the market and that are very particular. So -- and the timing also. We chose to go into the newbuild market at a time where we felt it is an opportune time achieving relatively good prices. It is the same recipe. Timing is everything in what we look to do in container shipping, and we try to time our investments always very carefully. And our first priority is derisking the transactions that we do. That's what we have always been doing on the secondhand ships, same recipe here.

Yes. No, certainly from your history, you've been very nimble and methodical with your investments, and this is a very good example of that. And maybe just a follow-up, a separate topic. You've forward sold 4 ships so far. They're all generally older in age. I know it's a bit tricky. It's a nice problem to have in terms of deciding whether to sell these older ships in your fleet or hold them and put them on more charters. But how are you thinking about, say, the dozen or so feeder ships you have left that are built pre-2010? Are those likely to be sold as well on a forward basis maybe? Or do you think there's an opportunity to keep fixing them out?

There isn't a sort of a general answer that I can give you on that front, Omar. We effectively run a sort of a hold or divest analysis as we're approaching the end of the charter on any ship. And if it makes sense to sell in our view at that particular time, and we think we're going to make more money for shareholders by selling as opposed to by holding the asset, then we will sell depending upon the opportunities that are available to us at that time. On the other hand, I would say, more generally, at least, we think that you make more money out of holding and operating a containership through the cycle than you do by selling it. It's only because these vessels, these 4 ships that you referred to at the outset of your question were approaching inarguably close to the end of their economic lives that we felt that the option value attached to those vessels, at least for us, was somewhat reduced. And as a result, it made sense to divest them on what we consider to be attractive terms. But it's not a general approach. Every transaction, every ship, every investment and divestment, we analyze on its own rights.