HomeToGo SE (HTG.DE) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to today's investor and analyst call of HomeToGo, following the publication of the updated full year 2025 financial guidance. I'm delighted to welcome the Co-Founder and CEO, Dr. Patrick Andrae; COO, Valentin Gruber; as well as CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. After the presentation, we will move on to a Q&A session, in which you will be allowed to place your questions directly to the management. So let's dive straight into the presentation. Dr. Andrae, the stage is yours.

Thank you. Good morning, dear analysts and investors, and a very warm welcome. Thank you for joining us today. We are thrilled to discuss the implications of the successful closing of our acquisition of Interhome, Europe's second largest vacation rental management company, marking the beginning of a new era for the HomeToGo Group. Today, we will also share our updated financial guidance for 2025, reflecting this transformation. But first, let me show you what we have planned for today. We have structured our call into 3 key sections to give you a comprehensive overview. First, I will give you an overview of how the landmark acquisition of Interhome fundamentally repositions HomeToGo as Europe's leading vacation rental group, marking not only the largest, but also the most transformative deal in our history. Second, our COO, Valentin, will give you a detailed look into the Interhome business. And finally, our CFO, Sebastian, will present our updated 2025 financial guidance and a look at the financial profile of the combined group. So let's now begin with our new strategic positioning. With the Interhome acquisition, we are not just growing. We are now Europe's leading vacation rental group. So we are entering a new phase of scale and strategic focus, but let me walk you through exactly what this means. First, we outlined the 5 key pillars that define the new HomeToGo and our strategy going forward. We will go into more detail with each of them afterwards. In summary, first, the acquisition of Interhome is the next logical and deliberate step in our long-term evolution, making us Europe's leading vacation rental platform, B2B focused and vertically integrated. Secondly, as a result, our B2B segment, HomeToGo Pro is our new core and center of gravity, and it will be the primary driver of our profit growth. The B2B business provides us with reliable, recurring and highly predictable revenues in a market with limited competition. This allows us to deploy capital with a high expected return at lower risk. Third, we are implementing a clear and disciplined focus for our B2C marketplace. Our strategy prioritizes growing profits over growing top line. The marketplace will operate as a resilient and profitable segment that generates capital, which we will actively redeploy to fuel the growth of our high-return B2B businesses. Fourth, we have identified tangible and large synergies across the group. There's a powerful flywheel effect between our marketplace and HomeToGo Pro, but also within the HomeToGo Pro businesses themselves, creating a unique competitive advantage that we will leverage to drive further profitability. And fifth, this brings me to our clear focus for future growth. We will pursue a 2-pronged strategy. First, we will drive organic growth with a clear prioritization of growing profits over top line growth. This is a discipline we will apply across the entire group, but especially for the Marketplace segment. And second, we will execute a targeted roll-up M&A strategy for B2B, capitalizing on the significant opportunities within the large, growing and highly fragmented property management and software segment of the market. And now we go a little bit more into detail of these 5 pillars. Our first slide illustrates our long-term strategic evolution, starting with our first pillar, where our story first began with Metasearch. By 2017, we had built the foundation to what became Europe's #1 vacation rental focused marketplace, giving us unparalleled insights into traveler demand and this strong B2C success paved the way for our next strategic move. In 2020, we made our first decisive entry into the B2B market by offering software solutions, especially for the supply side of vacation rentals. The next inflection point, however, began in 2024 when we added tech-enabled full-service property management to complement our B2B offering by acquiring the German leader on the Baltic Sea, Kraushaar and now culminating with the acquisition of Interhome, Europe's second largest vacation rental management company. So this step elevates our B2B segment, known as HomeToGo Pro to become the center of our success in our business. So our shift to a B2B focus is not a recent decision, but the successful execution of a clear long-term strategy. This strategic journey empowered us to create a unique and integrated ecosystem. The Interhome acquisition in February 2025 massively strengthens our B2B capabilities. Within HomeToGo Pro, we cater basically to every type of host. So to those who want to manage properties themselves, we provide best-in-class software solutions. And for those who want a full service like Interhome is offering our tech-enabled service solutions now operate at an entirely new scale. Through our acquisition of Kraushaar in early 2024, we gained already valuable hands-on experience in property management and how to scale them further utilizing marketing -- our marketing and tech capabilities. Now with Interhome, we are taking this proven strategy to a pan-European level. And finally, this is all complemented by our powerful B2C marketplace, Europe's largest online travel agency for vacation rental and its positive network effects also for the B2B businesses. So this newly -- new vertically integrated ecosystem has a profound impact on our strategic and financial profile. So let's look at what this means in numbers. As already said, B2B is our new center of gravity. The chart on the left clearly illustrates a significant step change in our top line. Our pro forma IFRS revenues are forecast to reach approximately EUR 400 million in 2025. This represents an increase of nearly 150% from our stand-alone revenues of EUR 162 million in 2023. So we are more than doubling the scale of our business in just 2 years. Even more important is the strategic shift you see on the right. Previously, our business was 2/3 B2C. With Interhome, this completely flips. HomeToGo Pro becomes our primary business segment, accounting for approximately 2/3 of our total group revenues on a pro forma basis. A key reason we are so confident in our B2B-centric strategy is the exceptional quality and predictability of the revenue it generates. What we know from our software business is also true for Interhome. As this chart clearly demonstrates, Interhome's business is built up on an incredibly loyal customer base with recurring revenues. Over the past 5 years, an average of 92% of annual revenue has consistently come from existing customers. This is a powerful testament to the value and stickiness of the service offering. So what this means for us and also for U.S. investors is a high degree of financial predictability and a stable recurring revenue stream. This is not a business that needs to reinvent its customer base every year. It's a reliable compounding model. And this inherent stability provides a resilient foundation for profitable growth and is precisely why we are making our B2B segment the new center of gravity for HomeToGo. This brings me to the third pillar of our strategy, our B2C marketplace. As the headline states, our priority is on growing profits, not on increasing top line. This is a deliberate strategic decision. As you can see from our recent Q2 results, this strategy is already delivering. We increased our adjusted EBITDA by EUR 4.5 million year-over-year in quarter 2 on virtually flat revenues. This demonstrates our ability to actively manage and steer this segment for profitability. And going forward, the Marketplace will operate as a resilient and profitable cash contributor to the group. We will reallocate capital from the Marketplace into our HomeToGo Pro segment, where we see stronger growth potential and more attractive risk-adjusted returns. And to be very, very clear about the implications, especially for next year, so for 2026, this means lower marketing investments and a relentless focus on marketing efficiency and as a result, higher profitability. It also means a resetting of the revenue base for the marketplace as we optimize for these higher returns. So this disciplined approach will ensure our B2C segment effectively supports the accelerated growth of our B2B core. Let's now talk about the fourth pillar of our strategy, leveraging the tangible and large synergy and network effects that exist across our group. Our integrated model is our core competitive advantage, creating a powerful flywheel that is difficult to replicate. Let me highlight the key synergies between our B2C Marketplace and HomeToGo Pro in an overview. First, our Marketplace acts as a Bloomberg for vacation rentals. It provides us with deep real-time insights into travel demand and market dynamics, which we use to optimize performance for our B2B partners and businesses. Second, it serves as a technology incubator. So what does it mean? We develop and test innovative products at scale in our B2C environment like our HomeToGo Pro ‘Doppelgänger’ redistribution tools, checkout and payment solutions or dynamic pricing. Third, the marketplace is a highly effective lead generation acquisition channel for our B2B segment and actually also vice versa. It also gives us unique insight into the performance of M&A targets. And fourth, there's a direct and significant financial benefit. When we distribute our B2B inventory through our own marketplace, we internalize the distribution margin that we would otherwise pay to third-party platforms, boosting overall group profitability. And finally, there are powerful synergies within the HomeToGo Pro segment itself. We offer our host a full spectrum ecosystem of software and services. This allows them to trade up or trade down based on their evolving needs, which makes our platform incredibly sticky and significantly reduces our overall host acquisition costs. Our goal is that once you are a Pro customer, you will stay a Pro customer, even if your needs change. So HomeToGo Pro will always have the right solution with the right level of service. And this brings me to the fifth and final pillar, our clear and actionable growth strategy, which is the engine that will power our future. Our strategy was and is boosted by our proven M&A track record. As you can see on the left, we have successfully acquired and integrated 16 businesses since 2018. So our M&A journey has mirrored our strategic evolution, starting in B2C and shifting decisively towards our new core B2B. This is exemplified by key acquisitions in the software and service solutions space like Smoobu, SECRA, Kraushaar and now, of course, the transformational addition of Interhome. So our future M&A focus will be mainly on expanding our HomeToGo Pro segment with, like already in the past, value-accretive profitable additions. So building on this foundation, our path forward is driven by 3 specific engines. First, as already mentioned, disciplined organic growth. For HomeToGo Pro, this means expanding through new customer acquisition, upselling, price optimization and geographic expansion. For the Marketplace, on the other side, our focus remains firmly on marketing efficiency, further increasing customer retention and deepening the synergies with our B2B segment. Second, strategic M&A. We have a proven playbook for value-generating acquisitions. We will continue to act as a consolidator, rolling up small and midsized European vacation rental agencies and acquiring strategic software capabilities. And third, leveraging our powerful segment synergies, as I've already detailed out, the interplay between our B2C and B2B operations creates significant competitive advantages and efficiencies that will fuel further growth. So as a summary, as I have emphasized several times, HomeToGo Pro is now our core growth engine. It is our new center of gravity, and we are already operating at a significant scale. Today, HomeToGo Pro source over 60,000 paying customers with an inventory of over 250,000 properties, enabling a gross booking value of around EUR 3 billion. This scale established us as the leading one-stop shop for vacation rental software and tech-enabled services. We are now a market leader in European property management and the largest direct vacation rental supplier to third-party channels. So therefore, the logical next step that HomeToGo Pro will be the group's key focus area for capital allocation and future M&A. This is where we will direct our resources to accelerate growth and build on our market leadership. To conclude my section, the HomeToGo Group has a clear vision, a transformed business model with B2B at its core, a disciplined approach to capital allocation and an actionable plan for the growth. This is the new HomeToGo. To now give you a deeper understanding of the key ingredient Interhome for the path forward, I would now like to hand over to our COO, Valentin, and he will walk you through the Interhome business in more detail.

Good morning, and also a very warm welcome from my side. I'm delighted to share some more background and some more insights on Interhome and the market that it is placed in and also answer some more operational question on what does Interhome actually do. So let's start with some key highlights of Interhome. It's an iconic market-leading company with over 60 years of experience as a Swiss vacation rental management company. It provides its services through over 200 local service offices, providing a wide area of full service options, everything from property management through rental services as well as listing and distribution. The focus is clearly on rural properties, and this they do with over 40,000 vacation rentals across 28 countries, of which 70% of those they manage exclusively. So this clearly marks the second largest vacation rental management company in Europe. And that they are successful in it is clearly proven by the average service contract lifetime. So owners stay on average 9 years with Interhome leading to the over 90% in recurring revenues that Patrick just mentioned prior. This is possible through a service-driven model combining tech as well as personal support, but the business model is by far not yet done. There are multiple growth levers. On the one side, what they've done in the past, but what we can do even more aggressively is expanding our portfolio in existing as well as in new geographies, which we can do organic, but also inorganically through M&A because in a moment, when I embed Interhome in its wider market, you will see that the very high fragmentation in the short-term rental market offers a wide optionality for further consolidation. Additionally, also optimizing distribution mix, I think, has a lot of potential in growing the market share of the largest 3 VRMCs at the moment to much more of what we see today of Interhome. As a last point, but also very important and which was also very relevant to us during the entire process is Interhome is led by a very experienced management team with a very proven track record that brings over 100 years of industry experience. But let's start with where are we in the market. So as I said, it's a large market because there are over 70 million vacation rental homes in Europe. If we break it down, what is rural and what is serviceable, we are getting to 2.5 million vacation rentals, our service addressable market. If we break that further down to where VRMCs are servicing these vacation rentals, we are at 0.9 million vacation rentals. If we then go into the differentiation of what of the serviceable addressable market is managed by owners. We see that for the VRMCs or vacation rental management companies, only 30% to 40% remain, out of which roughly 90% today are managed by a very, very fragmented set of vacation rental agencies, usually with less than 100 properties under management. So you see that there is a significant gap versus the top 3 players that combined bring a 10% market share roughly, that this market offers growth in multiple perspectives becomes quite obvious not only when we look into the VRMC market, but also when we look at the EUR 70 million because what happens is that in many places, generational changes are happening, younger generations take over, younger generations see historic vacation rentals also as an additional source of income and are there with transforming them into vacation rentals, not only serving the family, but serving a crowd of customers. So aside from the service addressable market growing, it likewise clearly states the potential for further M&A in this. But there are also further trends. If we look at market insights, we see that there is a trend moving from vacation rentals being managed by owner to seeking more professional management services on the one side. And likewise, but this is no news to anyone. Obviously, booking trends are also going more and more online, while the vacation rental market still seems many times a bit conservative, the trend clearly points to the direction that a significant amount of the bookings will be made online, all which favors Interhome and Interhome in the combination working together with HomeToGo and its relative expertises. So -- but what does Interhome offer? It's not a one-stop shop. It's a wide area of services that homeowners can pick from. It's from partial service vacation rental management where listing and pricing, 24/7 off-site support through central service centers, where invoicing as operating as a tour operator or quality management are part of so solely managing the properties schedule and distribution on behalf of the owner to also the option of going full service and full service classically brings the part of the key handover, the on-site guest welcome and handling all requests during the stay, the cleaning and the laundry part of the vacation rental as well as classic maintenance of the object or, for example, of the garden. So it's really end-to-end full service property management for owner that is provided through Interhome. And last but not least, also the distribution part is a very relevant one, where we have our 2 own platforms, Interhome and them as part of HomeToGo, the HomeToGo platform, but also third parties are very important in advertising the property to give it an as wide audience as possible to maximize revenues for owners and the company itself. If we look at this on the property portfolio, there is a significant service part. Service always means that either there is a local office just right in that geography that provides all third-party services, everything like mentioned from cleaning to maintenance and organizes these on behalf of the owners with many times the owners being far away, maybe even in another country from the vacation rental that is being then managed by Interhome. This is also for us the part that is of highest value. It brings the highest margins. It has significantly more than the 9 years average contract duration that I mentioned previously. And the service part is for us the entry stage into the local service office part. So this is where we do provide the services even though we don't have a local office. The guests are billed for the owner services or the owner at least coordinates the services that are provided at the property. Here, our goal is clearly to figure out geographies that have a certain density in the property portfolio to also develop them into LSO property into LSO geography as said for the highest margins and also for the longest contract durations. But then there is also a significant part of the portfolio that is non-service. So these are private hosts that are organizing all the services by themselves, but that also trust the distribution strength of Interhome and therefore, hand over all distribution and also 24/7 guest support and so on over to Interhome that then do take care primarily of the distribution and the booking process. So this, they do, like mentioned before, across 28 countries, the 3 largest of which are France, Italy and Spain, classic vacation rental destinations, each with 23%, 21% and 15% share of properties consecutively. It's also a property portfolio that grew over the past years purely organically. There wasn't any significant M&A in the past, something that we plan on changing significantly moving forward. But exclusive properties at the end of '24, we stood at 27,500 roughly. Also, the expansion highly aligns where there's a lot of properties. There's also a lot of local service offices across the various countries. And let me bring you back to something that you've seen multiple times previously, also now having been the owner of Interhome for quite some weeks. We are still very confident with the plan that we presented with you in the past on short-term and mid-term effects of the acquisition. So we remain very confident that in the short term, next 1 to 2 years, we will manage to get the company to above EUR 30 million in adjusted EBITDA and in the midterm horizon 2 to 5 years, certainly to above EUR 50 million. So with this, thank you very much for the attention and for allowing me to take you a bit deeper into the business model of Interhome, and I there hand over to Sebastian, our CFO.

Thank you very much, Valentine -- Valentin. As Patrick has already said a couple of times, the acquisition of Interhome was very, very transformative for HomeToGo. And this is not just true strategically or operationally, but also financially. As you can see on this slide, the transaction significantly increases revenue, triples profitability and also will enable significant positive free cash flow going forward. You can see this especially when you compare the pro forma figures with the statutory figures for '24. So the pro forma IFRS revenues, which we expect for this year are about EUR 400 million, which represents an increase of about 88% compared to the reported numbers for last year. You can also see, again, the strategic shift, which Patrick has also mentioned a number of times towards the B2B segment. So the revenue share of our B2B segment as a percentage of total IFRS revenues almost doubles and will reach about 64%. Lastly, when looking at the adjusted EBITDA, the pro forma adjusted EBITDA for this year is set to triple, so about 213% increase from the about EUR 12.8 million that was reported for last year to about EUR 40 million this year. At the same time, the EBITDA margin will expand from 6% to about 10%. This chart shows the group as it now stands on a pro forma basis. So what you can see here is if we had acquired Interhome already on the 1st of January in 2023, how would the combined group have looked like over the last 3 years? As a very important note, these numbers do not include any synergies, but they just show a sum of the 2 businesses, obviously adjusted for consolidation effects between the 2 businesses. So over the last 3 years, the combined group has shown double-digit revenue growth and even faster EBITDA growth. This highlights the new overall group's margins and also potential for further operating leverage. The pro forma revenue growth shows double-digit growth with a CAGR of about 11% from 2023 to the expected number in this year. Pro forma EBITDA has grown even faster than revenue with a CAGR of about 28%, as you can also see from the margin expansion from 7.6% in 2023 to about 10% this year. This again highlights the scalability of the cost base of our combined group, and we expect to be able to increase EBITDA margins even further in the future. Also as a note for analysts and investors, we want to be as transparent as possible, so you can really understand the financial profile of our group as it stands right now following the acquisition of Interhome. We have, therefore, included 3 pages with detailed financial information into the appendix of this presentation, and we really invite you to have a look at them. On those pages, you can find the quarterly P&L starting with the first quarter of 2023 up to and including the second quarter of 2025 for, A, the HomeToGo Group without Interhome; B, Interhome stand-alone; and C, the combined pro forma group. As I said before, for the pro forma financials, we have not included any expected or actual synergies for the historic periods. We hope that this additional information will enable you to update your models to reflect the new HomeToGo and to inform your view of the valuation of our company. As Patrick has said, and as you can also see in our ad hoc release from last night, we have updated our financial guidance for 2025. The statutory guidance, which you can compare with our audited annual reports for this year will include from an accounting perspective, Interhome only from the 28th of August up to and including the 31st of December, i.e., from the date when the transaction closed. Our old guidance, which was for HomeToGo on a stand-alone basis was EUR 270 million in booking revenues, EUR 230 million in IFRS revenues, EUR 19 million in EBITDA and positive free cash flow. The new statutory guidance, which again only includes Interhome from the 28th of August stands at IFRS revenues of about EUR 260 million, adjusted EBITDA of EUR 11 million and free cash flow is now expected to be negative. Because of the transformative shift to B2B, which Patrick has also outlined, we will not provide guidance on booking revenues for the group anymore as this metric is not very meaningful for a business where 64% of revenues are from B2B. The group's free cash flow for FY '25 on a statutory basis, as you can see, is now expected to be negative. This is driven by Interhome's normal working capital cycle. Cash from guest bookings for Interhome is collected leading up to the summer, but large payments to hosts are made after the peak travel months. These significant cash outflows fall into the post-closing period for us, leading to a negative free cash flow contribution for that specific time frame starting on the 28th of August up to and including the 31st of December. I will show you these effects in more details on the next slide to explain this a bit further. But in our view, the statutory guidance, especially for EBITDA and cash flow is distorted by the late closing date. I will also explain this a bit further for EBITDA on the next slide. We have, therefore, also included a guidance on a pro forma basis, which includes Interhome for the full year, i.e., starting from the 1st of January. This pro forma view reflects the true economic status quo of the group. In other words, if you want to value the company today, we believe that the pro forma financials are much more helpful to form a view on the valuation than the statutory financials. The pro forma financials will also help you to compare our performance in 2026 with our performance in this year. On a pro forma basis, the guidance is around EUR 400 million in revenues, adjusted EBITDA of EUR 40 million and also positive free cash flow. Looking a little bit further on the statutory guidance change for IFRS revenues and EBITDA. This slide is meant to transparently explain how the new statutory guidance is composed of the old guidance plus the contribution from Interhome for the time period from 28th August until the 31st of December. On revenue, the bridge works as follows. The old guidance was EUR 230 million. You add EUR 30 million contribution from Interhome for the post-closing period, which gives you the new guidance of EUR 260 million for this year. Interhome's contribution is impacted by the business' seasonality. The consolidation date of the 28th of August means that the peak summer travel season, where the majority of revenues is generated had already largely concluded by the time we acquired the business. For EBITDA, the bridge works as follows: The old guidance was EUR 19 million. You deduct a negative contribution from Interhome of about EUR 8 million. So the new guidance is EUR 11 million. For Interhome, profits are heavily concentrated in the high demand and high travel quarters, which is the second and third quarter, while operational costs are incurred more evenly throughout the year. This means that for the post-summer period, which is mainly Q4, the business is typically loss-making. You can also see this seasonal profile and pattern on the next page. As I said before, Interhome's business is highly seasonal, by the way, the same as for HomeToGo's Marketplace business, with more than 50% of revenues and nearly all profitability generated in the summer quarter, which you can see is the third quarter. As a reminder, under IFRS, revenue is not accounted for when a traveler is booking a holiday, but when the holiday actually takes place. For Interhome, as for HomeToGo, this means that the summer holiday season is most important. In practice, most holidays are booked in January and February, so the first quarter, but are taken in July and August, the third quarter. And you can see this clearly in revenue and also in profitability. So Q1 and Q4 are loss-making typically because revenues are much lower, but operational costs continue. Furthermore, for Q1 for Interhome, as again is the case for HomeToGo, especially on the Marketplace, it is also impacted by higher marketing costs because this is when the holidays are booked, and this is when we try to acquire customers. As you can see over the last 2 years, the fourth quarter showed a negative EBITDA of between EUR 8.7 million and EUR 11.3 million. We expect the same seasonality in this year, which is why you have seen the negative EUR 8 million EBITDA contribution from Interhome in the previous slide. For the M&A transaction, so for the acquisition of Interhome, we used a so-called locked box mechanism. This meant that HomeToGo had benefited economically from Interhome since November 1, 2024, even though the actual consolidation and the transaction closing happened almost 10 months later on the 28th of August. The important distinguishing factor here is economically versus accounting view. So economically, we had benefited since November 1, 2024. On an accounting view, we're only on a statutory basis allowed to include Interhome when the transaction has actually closed. So in terms of the economic benefit, the economic result generated between November 1, 2024 and August 27, 2025, are attributed to HomeToGo as a new owner, and this is reflected in the high cash balance, which was transferred to us at closing and which stood at about EUR 75 million. Again, for the accounting view -- for accounting purposes, however, revenue and profits are only recognized in our financial statements on a statutory basis from the official closing date onwards, which again was the 28th of August. This slide provides more background why on a statutory basis, we expect a negative free cash flow for this year in contrast to the previous guidance of a positive free cash flow without Interhome. As you can see, the transaction closed at the peak of Interhome's annual cash position right before seasonal payouts to host decreased the cash balance. So what happens is that up to and including July, August, Interhome actually collects more and more cash. The cash balance is building up. And then once the holidays are actually concluded, the share of the cash, which is owned economically by the host is then transferred to those hosts. And that's why you can see a relatively steep decrease in the cash balances basically from the time between, say, August and November, at which point it then is stable. This is the normal working capital cycle for Interhome, and we continue to expect that this year is not going to work any different to any previous years. So while we continue to expect the positive free cash flow from HomeToGo stand-alone on a statutory accounting basis, i.e., including Interhome for the time where we own it, this is more than offset by the negative seasonal cash movements for Interhome from the end of August until the end of this year. This slide compares our guidance on a statutory view and on a pro forma combined view, both for IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA. As I said before, in our view, the pro forma view is the much more strategically relevant perspective as it shows the true underlying performance of the combined business. The statutory view, while being the official accounting guidance, so you can compare it to the audited annual accounts for 2025 is heavily distorted by timing and seasonality effects from the late closing date. As you may also remember, there was a holdup in the closing of this transaction due to a phase 2 merger control, which had nothing to do with Interhome and HomeToGo, but to the connected transaction under which DERTOUR bought Hotelplan and this pushed out the time of the closing of the transaction by a number of months. So looking again at this chart, IFRS revenues. So the statutory year-on-year increase of 22% is from EUR 212 million up to EUR 206 million. But on a pro forma basis, the increase will be from EUR 383 million up to EUR 400 million. So importantly, again, as Patrick has also mentioned, the transformative nature of these transactions, which can be seen by the 88% increase from statutory EUR 212 million last year to the EUR 400 million pro forma of this year. And this is also mirrored and even amplified in the view when you look at EBITDA. So the EUR 12.8 million on a statutory view is going down to about EUR 11 million, as I've explained before. Again, in our view, this is not really reflective of the business as it stands right now. So the EUR 40 million pro forma EBITDA for this year is, in our view, much, much more meaningful. And you can see the huge step-up from about EUR 30 million last year to EUR 40 million. But even if you compare just on a pro forma basis, 2024 and 2025, you can see the 22% increase in like-for-like EBITDA for these 2 years. One word on the financial guidance for 2026. We will provide this together with the annual report for 2025 on the 19th of March of next year. This is in line with how HomeToGo has always done it, so that 2026 guidance will be provided together with the annual report for the previous year. And now back to Patrick with some closing remarks.

Thank you, Sebastian. So summarizing a little bit what we have looked at today. So the HomeToGo Group, as pointed out before, has a clear vision, a transformed business model with B2B at its core and a disciplined approach to capital allocation and an actionable plan for growth. So this is what we call the new HomeToGo. So if you look on the strategic transformation to B2B as the core of HomeToGo, we have fundamentally repositioned HomeToGo into a leading B2B focused and vertically integrated vacation rental platform with HomeToGo Pro now our new center of gravity and core growth driver. We also see a step change in scale and profitability. The acquisition of Interhome is a transformative deal that elevates our financial profile. So as mentioned several times, we expect pro forma IFRS revenues of around EUR 400 million and a tripled pro forma adjusted EBITDA of around EUR 40 million for 2025. Our growth is now built on a more resilient foundation with over 60% of revenues from predictable recurring B2B streams. And lastly, we have a clear path to further profitable growth. We have a disciplined strategy for value creation, focusing on prioritizing profit over top line growth and reallocating capital to high-return B2B opportunities and a targeted roll-up M&A approach in the property management and software space. So with that, I thank you very much for your attention today, and we will now open the floor for your questions.

Yes. Thank you very much for the presentation, and we will now move on to the Q&A session. [Operator Instructions]. So we look forward and then Mr. Bharath, you should be able to speak now and place your question. So we move on to the next participant because Mr. Nagaraj is not able, and we can't hear him. And we move on. Mr. [indiscernible], you should be able to speak now and place your question.

Yes. I have for the first question, just a general question regarding the numbers you have showed us in terms of the pro forma revenue base for 2024 in your February presentation, you had a pro forma revenue of above EUR 330 million, and now you showed EUR 383 million. So I was just wondering where this difference is coming from. So let's start the first question and do it one by one.

Yes. And thank you very much. The old numbers, they were based on the due diligence, which HomeToGo was able to do. And so this was based on a more limited information basis. And the information that was provided during the due diligence was in Swiss GAAP and not in IFRS. So during the due diligence, we, together with our external advisers from PwC took a step at transforming the Swiss GAAP numbers based on the limited information that we had to IFRS. And so the biggest change actually is how we treat cleaning and laundry services costs. So back then, it was shown to us in a way that we thought under IFRS, we had to use it as a negative net of item within revenue. But now that we have access to the actual underlying information, really, we can look into SAP. We came to a different conclusion. Again, this was also not just our conclusion. We took advice from PwC on this as well. So we think that this is now the correct way to showing it under IFRS.

Okay. Understood. And then the second question, you mentioned the locked-box mechanism. So can you share how much cash Interhome generated since the beginning of November last year?

I think the most important number to focus on, to be honest, is the EUR 75 million in cash that we got together with the business. So again, this like basically represents the economic benefit for the time period. There was some dividends paid to Migros, which was not included here. So I think the most important number is the EUR 75 million to focus on.

Okay. And then for 2026, you mentioned the lower marketing budget regarding the B2C business. Can you already share some ideas you have in terms of reducing the marketing budget in 2026 versus this year?

Look, we're in the process of doing the planning for the next year, which is a deep planning process that we go through that involves the whole group, obviously, including our marketing people as well. We're looking at a number of different scenarios with the view of generating the best return. This involves different marketing mix, different channel mix, different timing throughout the year. So there is a number of scenarios that we want to look at further. As I said before, we will provide the financial guidance for 2026 in March of next year, which will probably then also include a little bit more detail on marketing. But the strategic focus point will absolutely be to provide the best return on the marketing and also to have the best potential capital allocation between the businesses. So that means the marketplace business versus the B2B business, but there is no specific number that we've landed on so far.

Yes. Thank you very much. And we try again to get to Mr. Nagaraj, you should be able to speak now and place your question. So this seems not to be possible, maybe you check your microphone. Yes. Now we can hear you.

Thank you. So sorry about that. I'm not sure what's happening. Just a few from me, please. What's the take rate differential between the different kinds of service packages that you offer? I know the average is around 30%, but just wanted to understand what you can potentially get up to in the future. That's the first question, and I'll ask the rest of the questions after this.

Yes. Very happy to take this. So it depends. If we are only looking for the exclusive distribution services, so everything from the distribution across major booking channels as well as on the own channel and then the booking handling, we're usually in the area of 20% to 27%. Once we go full service, it depends also a bit on the market, on the geography within that market and on property type, et cetera. But this is where we usually are between 30% and 36% as a take rate. And then it depends like Sebastian just explained the differentiation between IFRS, our past and new view on how we look at external costs that we get contracted with on cleaning and maintenance. And yes, this is what the [indiscernible] does and so...

Understood. That's very helpful. The next quick question is around the statutory guidance for 2025 for the EBITDA. Does that include the synergies? Because I know you said it doesn't include synergies for the pro forma number, but just checking because some of the synergies, I know you previously highlighted would be realized pretty quickly.

Yes. No, it does not include any synergies.

Okay. Understood. Okay. Then just a couple of other questions for me, if that's okay. One is around the -- I know you don't want to give the guidance right now, which is as is normal for HomeToGo, you give it in March. But just for investors and analysts to anchor towards like a growth rate in terms of modeling for the future, should we kind of like be closer to the 4% kind of number pro forma growth that we have seen? How do we think about it given the reset in Marketplace expectations, given you're focusing more on profitability? Just some kind of input there would be really helpful.

Look, we -- as I said, we're at the moment, going through our planning process for the next year, which obviously this year is also different or quite different to last year given that it includes Interhome for the very first time. So we don't want to give any guidance on revenue or on EBITDA at the moment, neither on growth rates because, obviously, implicitly, this would then also be kind of revenue or EBITDA guidance.

Okay. Fine. No worries. Last one for me, if that's okay. The management, I think, had presented after the acquisition in February -- sorry, in February or March, approximately that we were presented with targets, short-term targets for the EBITDA margin and long-term or medium-term targets, respectively, of 15% to 20%. Does that still hold in general, not immediate guidance?

I think in general, that absolutely should hold. Given the underlying profitability of our business, especially on the B2B side, we're -- yes, we remain highly confident to be able to reach that, especially also including the synergies that we will be able to generate within the different businesses, that is definitely a mid- to long-term target, which remains in place.

Well, thank you for your questions. And we have some questions in our chat. I will read them out for you. So what impact will the acquisition have on HomeToGo's balance sheet? How much goodwill will result from the acquisition? And what amortization of intangible assets will there be in the future?

Yes. So we're going through the exercise of producing the PPA, the purchase price allocation at the moment, again, including external advisers. This work is ongoing. For the financial results at the end of September, we will book it all into goodwill, but this is only on a temporary basis. So the PPA will be done until the end of the year. So for the 31st of December, we will have the full PPA. At this point in time, I don't know how much will be the different parts within the PPA. So I don't know yet what will be goodwill versus other assets.

Okay. And we have another question in our chat. I will read this out as well. Could you please provide some clarity on how depreciation, interest expenses and other below EBITDA items are expected to evolve over the coming year? In particular, it would be helpful if you could outline the expected impact of these factors so we can better bridge from EBITDA to net income and get a sense of the potential bottom line results.

So for the first part of the question, as it relates to depreciation, and I think depreciation here probably should also then include amortization. So I don't know that yet. Again, it is -- it will be a thing that will drop out of the PPA exercise. In terms of the impact on interest expense, as we have said before, we have taken out a loan of EUR 75 million to fund a part of this purchase price that we had to pay. This loan was taken out at relatively standard terms for a transaction of this nature and size. So you can, for modeling purposes, assume about something between 7.5% and 8% interest on the EUR 75 million for your modeling.

Okay. Thank you very much. [Operator Instructions]. By now, there are no further questions. And therefore, we would come to the end of today's earnings call, and I once more hand over to the CEO for some final remarks.

Yes. Thank you. So again, we're very delighted that you joined us today for this call, which, as said, marks a really step change in how HomeToGo, the new HomeToGo is moving forward. And we look forward to welcome you again at our next earnings call in November. Thank you very much, and see you next time.

Yes. And to all the participants, thank you for joining and your shown interest in HomeToGo. Should further questions arise at a later time, please feel free to contact Investor Relations. You will find the presentation on the website of HomeToGo and also at the Airtime website by clicking into today's event. And for now, we say thank you. Have a lovely remaining week, and goodbye.