KEFI Gold and Copper Plc (KEFI) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Good evening, everybody. This is Harry Anagnostaras-Adams. I'm sitting in Addis Ababa, and I'll be presenting the quarterly webinar as scheduled. Because we've received a lot of questions already by last night, we put together and put up onto the website this morning. You have little PowerPoint that tries to capture, if you like, the answers for a lot of the questions. And I've also picked up every question that was submitted until last night. And if it hadn't already been answered on the public website where we have a Q&A line, I'll cover it tonight. If there's time left, I'll pick up -- I might pick up some more, if there's time left. Otherwise, we'll pick them up and answer them on the public website in for a line after the webinar, we'll try to get to 45 minutes as usual to keep it relatively tight.

So let's get on with it. The first questions were -- or first set of questions were about the timetable, what's it look like. So up on the screen, you've got an outline of the timetable there, alongside a digitized image of the plant as designed. Don't worry so much about the backdrop around the plant there as the digitized image is correct, and the rest of it is artistic license, the trees and the mountains and so on. I'm sure you can read the timetable there, it's almost the same as it has been for a while. So I won't read through it, so as not to waste any time. A question about timetable, which was a sort of an overarching question really, pretty good question, an important one. And that is, in light of the overall timetable, how would you -- how would the proposed sanctions by the U.S. and perhaps EU affect financing and construction? I think there's been -- my answer to that is there's a lot of saber rattling and posturing that goes on in these circumstances. Pardon me. But Ethiopia is not a country that's being sidelined like, say, Iran was. Ethiopia is a critical player on the world stage, and based with the African Union, an important country for the whole world, West and the rest. So it would be awful if banks were not allowed to lend money to a country, obviously, because one could lend. U.S. dollars to a sanctioned country. But that's not the case here. The savor rattling around Ethiopia has been over debates and disagreements over the way Ethiopia handles its internal affairs. It's made no threats to other countries or anything. And there's not been any threat or sanction against the country, it's been selective sanctions against individuals in the country or particular organizations [indiscernible]. So I don't think -- it would be a terrible thing if it was done, but I don't think it's on the cards in any way. The next chart is the funding and ownership organogram, and there's a lot of information on this chart and the questions that sort of a multitude of financing type questions as well as stakeholder alignment type questions around this. I think -- I'll just make a couple of, if you like, preliminary comments, and that is that KEFI is not a sort of a typical explorer developer. It is a manager of joint ventures, and it manages a lot bigger capital decisions than its scale of its own balance sheet. And so all the pinkish boxes are the stakeholders in the Tulu Kapi project, and they represent the provision of nearly or over $350-odd million for that project. And the greenish boxes are the boxes for the Saudi project, Hawiah, in particular and then others to follow, and that represent the planned financing in Saudi Arabia and the existing financing in Saudi Arabia from our partner and also from lending institutions there. So again, if you like boxing beyond one's reach or whatever you want to put it as in the sense that a little junior explorer that would set up as a GBP 2 million float is actually developing projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars or pounds as to catch by the joint venturing and by bringing in project finance at the project level. Now another thing that, that does is bring in a lot of risk discipline around each project, which can be very frustrating for a cafe shareholder who wants just everything to get going, if you like. But it's a good pro for having other people's money in our hands as our responsibility. And so the KEFI shareholders are not putting up the $356 million. It's the syndicate as a whole that does that. And we have our fiduciaries for all of them, not only for our own shareholders. So the risk mitigation impositions, if you like, or disciplined, however you want to phrase it, to protect the interest of the health -- the syndicate as a whole, are very, very serious, obviously, and weigh heavily and in a frontier market, which is developing its first mine for 3 decades. Obviously, there's a lot of risk managing to do. Now with that preamble, some specific questions. On 29 September, you reported a temporary pause in project financing due to security concerns. Please elaborate so we can better understand how security is managed. What can go wrong and what are the corrective actions? Well, what I've just said is really a very broad brush statement that we have the risk mitigation policies of banks, of private equity groups, of African contractors, specialist contractors and local partners and government, all requiring compliance, where they're not competing, they're already competing, obviously. But as a general statement, by complying with the obligations in respect of all those stakeholders, we're actually addressing the risks of security and everything else. Now I'll work through a number of slides that we've assembled specifically on security, but the reason I started with this particular slide is that it costs the tone when we sit down as a Board in Tulu Kapi gold mine company, we sit there with government representatives on the Board. And when we send out status reports, we send it to the whole syndicate. And they all have their own procedures and governance protocols to be complied with, and we respect all those and honor all those. So that's as overarching, if you like, compliance for all the stakeholders is how to risk mitigate, and every step we take is one which everyone has said they're comfortable with. The next question is, within the -- and this is turning more now to a finance-type question. Within the recent interim results, it shows there's a loan of GBP 1.5 million repayable. Can KEFI file the repayment of this into the financial closing capital raisings? And can such facilities keep things rolling in the meantime? Yes, that's the plan. That's what we're doing. The next question is, is KEFI considering management changes? The project is now at the launching stage and needs to be needs to be pushed over the line. I suppose, what that means is that it needs implementation management on planning and permitting and financing management to move into implementation and construction. Yes, changes are taking place as we speak. Quite a number of people are sliding away and quite a number of people are moving in as we move into implementation, and that's just a part of managing the transition of the company. At the moment, in Ethiopia, we have tens of people. And in 12 months' time, we expect to have 1,000 people. So obviously, there will be many changes in that expansion and in the deepening of different tasks rather than the tasks that have been in the order of the day to date. The next one is, will the Ministry of Mines work with and support all the other government agencies to extend the start-up date as required by the security situation you have reported? I think the government as a whole is one government, and obviously, the different agencies of the government talk to each other and coordinate as they deem appropriate as directed by the Prime Ministry. I think the main point is that financing be confirmed and that everyone agree the conditions precedent for launch will be satisfactory. And no one's arguing to point everyone collaborative on that there was naturally quite a lot about security because of our announcement of some security concerns that have to be dealt with. Now this slide here, this been diagram doesn't sound like it's about security, it's about community benefits. But the most critical thing about security is for the community to feel like the project is theirs, and that the benefits of the project are theirs, in particular. And therefore, anybody who wants to interfere with the project is actually interfering with the well-being of the community. Now in this particular case, just before diving into any piece of this graph or any specific questions. It's worth highlighting that, that unlike most mining projects where there's tension with the community, this has no artisanal interest in the ground. Mining projects that are well known for having tension with the community is often -- it's usually the case that there is some sense of competition for the ground and everything that the industrial company does is somehow taking something away from the community's potential for artisanal mining. That doesn't apply to the Tulu Kapi. There is no golden goose at Tulu Kapi unless the industrial miner is developed at over $350 million and some 20 million tonnes a year of material has moved to yield the gold that is yielded, and that's not possible from artisanal mining. So that's the most important foundation stone for any security consideration, which is why that -- as -- and I'll take you through it shortly, as that environment out there changes, and it has been changing a lot, and as this project moves through its gestation and moves into production, and that will change a lot, the most important foundation stone is the community and then all these little circles to summarize the different categories of community benefits. Another overarching thing is that effectively, $900 an ounce or thereabouts is the cost of -- projected cost of the operation, all-in sustaining cost. And that means that -- at today's gold price, that means 50% of the revenue just goes straight back out into procurement, labor, for the employees, suppliers and so on. And that means the first $900 of any revenue is straight out to the community, $900 per ounce. That's about $120 million a year, go straight back out to the community. A lot of it locally, a lot of it regionally and some of it not broadly. The next $300 an ounce or near enough to it is really to cover all the financing costs, which is to do with the funding or the capital expenditure, the debt and so on. So as long as gold is over $1,200 and the shareholders get a look into to get some of their capital back and to make it and to get a dividend, but the first $1200 is there for other people. That's a critical thing. It might sound a bit harsh to shareholders, but that's the deal. And it's very important for the community to understand that, that it gets first right in a sense to the economic play. Specific questions. What's the cost of pausing the project? Well, the cost of causing the project is not a great deal to our company today because we haven't started construction. But the real cost is that 10,000 jobs, direct and indirect, are not being created. But that's the big cost that everyone's basically waiting for it to start so that 10,000 people get a job. Can you provide an update regarding both recent progress and current status of the finance package for the Tulu Kapi mine? Well, the technical issues are effectively closed out. They've done legal documentation is flying around to all the various counterparties for approvals. One of the banks has already gone through their approval processes. They will go to board for ratification when the second bank is ready for that as well. And the second bank was in town already this week preparing itself for that moment, coming to town to check a few things that it needs assurance from the government before it does that. So preparations continuing progress being made despite the hiatus, if you like, of the trigger, given -- around some security issues. Now each of those little circles on that Slide 4 goes into its own rectangle on Slide 5 and 6. Now I won't take up your time to read through everything. But it's -- these are very important slide. This is what the community sees whereas the shareholders see different things. These are the things that the community is actually focused on. And when we've broken it out, we've broken each of those little topics in each individual circle into a small list of headings to sort of set out exactly what the company has already done. We often ask, what are you actually doing? We don't see anything happening. There's been an enormous amount of work into mapping out all sorts of schemes with the community to ensure that the community feels aligned with the project. And in fact, the only sense of dissatisfaction in the community is that they are dissatisfied with the delays. They just want to get on with it even more than we might as shareholders because the livelihoods and futures of their families on the ground, to some of them, is even more sharply felt than it might have been felt to some of us. Slide 6 is an elaboration of that. Again, I won't try to waste your time by going through any particular point in any great detail. I can, in fact, pick up one or two things you might not be aware of, like electricity, the capital cost for the connection provides doubling the capacity of transmission than is required for this project. So why is that? It's because -- and it's got 2 substations designed into it, not just ours. And that's been done so that we can electrify the district. The district is not electrified. This is typically a rural countryside, most of which has not been electrified. And while Ethiopia is building the largest hydro scheme in Africa, one of the motivations for that is to electrify and reticulate electricity to its population, most of which doesn't have it. So such a basic thing has been designed into our project so that, as and when the government agencies are ready, they'll rollout reticulation to the communities as things progress. So that's something that may not have been clear or known but it's designed into it, and that's a fairly basic thing. There's a myriad of smaller details that designed in. Now the Slide 7 is looking at the security situation published by one of the countries that sets out these sorts of hot zone [indiscernible]. And so we've highlighted there where we are on the left there. And you can see that it's not a red zone as such. In fact, most of the high profile development or aspiring for development projects in the country are actually in red zones. And we're fortunate we're not in a red zone. But having said that, it's called a orange zone, and you'll see shortly that it's been changing a lot. The incident rate in that area has changed a lot. The country's political landscape and social stability has changed a lot since our arrival 7 years ago. And I dare say that if it had stayed the same as it was, then we'd be well and truly in production by now. And those shareholders who have been with us or following us for a long time may well know that we had financiers who ran for the hills when the country started changing and became a bit less predictable. And one of the things that has happened is that we have African banks involved with us, and the other syndicate members are all highly experienced in Africa, if not in Ethiopia already. And that's quite the key. Again, as a general point, the structure of the syndicate is one thing, but the composition of the syndicate is also critical, and it's people who are familiar with these situations. And security issues are not unknown in the mining industry. It's an understatement. This particular site is not on the higher risk category compared to many sites in Africa, but it's the first in the country. It's in an area that's become more unstable and it has to be done right because it's the first mover and all eyes are on the project. So the next question, can you confirm the details of the recent security report that was going to be used by the finance syndicate to help them decide whether to approve the finance package? Well, we have had the people come through to prepare those reports. It is a private report, but I can refer to the essence of its conclusions without breaching confidence. And that is that the area has become much riskier. The predictability of the area has become more difficult. The level of security mitigation needs to be elevated beyond where we thought only a year ago. The degree of security planning, staffing, coordination, exercising needs, all need to be lifted as the project is launched. And the ones who are successfully completed and all the recommendations followed, the risk will be reduced to a tolerable level for construction and production. So the security report has highlighted an escalation of risk and the requirement for more intensified precautionary measures. Now I'm not putting words in their mouth, but it is the case that there are much, much more dangerous environments in other mines, in other parts of the continent that operate and have operated for a long, long time. But it needs to be done properly, and that's what we're setting that to be. The next question about this is, why did you say recently that mine financing would now be sorted in December, when in fact the pause has only been for 3 weeks so far? Well, the situation needs to be addressed and how long we estimate it we'll take is what I said, the situation needs to be laid out better, needs to be rectified and implementation of precautionary measures need to be implemented before money will flow. Safety first, it's always the case, and that's the way it needs to be. I'm not elaborating on things that are sensitive and confidential at the moment, but I think as time passes, all shareholders will come to realize. And we'll give a full report in due course, and it will be self-evident when we do so. The next slide is sort of an intensity map. One of the intensity of incidents in the country. Obviously, the intensity of incidence up north in Tigray is in a category of its own, I suppose. But you can see there was flow again where we -- is one of the other handful of areas where the incident rate has increased enormously. A couple of questions. Is it realistic to expect the non-financing to be concluded before the Tigray conflict has completely disappeared, or do you think the government wants to show that things are carrying on as normal? I think there's no doubt the government wants the project to proceed as fast as possible. But unfortunately, if you look to the government and the community, everybody has to be aligned. And the bottom line is that $350 million and hundreds of experts will not mobilize until things are in order, and that's just a simple truth. In the -- on the matter of the Tigray conflict having to be -- we feel like having to disappear, that's not going to happen. The country will settle into a new normal, so to speak. No one expects all of a sudden to wake up one day and everybody is happy and chummy and there's no aftermath of conflicts. There will always be some tension and some people who perhaps will never be happy. But as long as the majority settled down into a pattern of peaceful existence and come together as a country again, which I'm sure is inevitable, it's the overwriting feeling of the country. And there are a lot of Tigrayan people in government, a lot of Tigrayan people in business all through the community. If you just read the news media headlines, you'd think that Tigrayans are outcast. But that's not the case. And most of the country has had enough of this conflict and just wants to return to peaceful -- a peaceful, united Ethiopia. And I personally have no doubt that the vast majority of Tigrayans feel the same. And -- but there will be some ongoing conflict. It will never be the case that it will come down to 0, I don't believe anyway. The banks basically need to see things settle down a bit. It needs to be predictable in the pattern, which is, I think, emerging. I think you'll see -- in short order, you'll see sufficient clarity and stability for things to present. Based on the previous statements regarding what a strong relationship you have with all levels of local stakeholders, can you provide an explanation on how this security issue was allowed to happen? Well, the site itself and our offices, and we have a number of offices across the transport route, so they're all acquired in towns. And the company doesn't manage the country. I mean, we're just a company, we don't manage the district, the region, the country. So it takes a fairly bold criticism of the company to say why is West Welega unstable and why haven't you made it less unstable or whatever. But certainly, the government, I have zero doubt that the community -- all stakeholders in the community want the golden goose to be born. Everybody wants the wealth that will be created to flow, and the government will do everything it possibly can to participate in the risk mitigation to make the foreign experts welcome. They can come and build it and train and allow the community to get on with it and our workforce to get on with it. What are the top 2 or 3 things that could stop Tulu Kapi mine be built on schedule? What is KEFI doing now to ensure these things do not happen? Well, the COVID is no longer such an issue. I think we've -- the country and the company are okay on that one. So I don't rank that one as one of the top 2 or 3 things, which I think only 6 months ago, you would have had to put COVID on that list, but I don't think anymore. Tigrayan, we don't -- obviously, we don't have any control or influence over what's going on up there, and it's a long way away. But if you disagree with our analysis and our prognosis and if you thought that somehow you believed in the wild theories of the country is going to blow itself apart and all that sort of stuff, we personally consider that be completely unrealistic and non-sensible. But if you believe that, you put that on the list, we don't. So what do we put on the list? It's the very basics. We have to keep the community on site. They are, but it takes a lot of work to keep it that way. It's not the technical staff or financing stuff. It's the community, it's the security and then it's simply building the organization from some tens of people to hundreds of people. All those things need to be done in tandem. And right at the top of the list is community and security. The next slide is just showing you the routes, the lifeline, if you like, to decide anything that happens on that route, that disturbs daily deliveries of fuel and people and whatever, is an arterial blockage to the project. So we're not only reliant on the site, we're not only reliant on the district. We're reliant on the arterial feed, if you like, for the projects. And then the question here is, will there be finality to the local security issues that you referred to when it's been dealt with, or is it likely that there'll always be a background ready to arise again? I think there'll be finality to the current situation, but there'll always be a background of intense security requirement. Perhaps not as intense as some other countries and some of the projects, but nevertheless, intense. And that's -- that wouldn't have been the case. When I first arrived in the country 7 years ago, but it is the case now. The next question sort of takes us a bit away from just talking about Ethiopia and security and financing, and takes just a broader the Arabian-Nubian Shield story. Why are all these companies -- the question is, why are these companies coming to the country if security is such an issue? Well, they are all extremely keen. And exploration by definition means that one has to probe and explore in new areas that try to find and get their first before other people, obviously. That's the competitive game of exploration. Newmont and 2 of the companies on this list are very prominent explorers, great teams, Newmont and Sun Peak. Well, they're pretty stuck at the moment because they're up in the north of the country. So they're keen to get going, but right now, they're completely stuck until that situation up there sorts itself out. And so you take these things on the team. Centamin, up in Egypt, has been there, I think, about 20 years, from memory. And I think the first 10 years was -- it was very much a situation of being stuck. Now of course, it's in production and doing very well. It's a leader in the industry -- or in the region, rather. Over in Saudi Arabia, Barrick is over there in a VMS deposit, which has some relevance in looking at our discovery there. And so they're all interested, but it doesn't mean to say they're all on the ground working today. Some of them simply can't today, and others are waiting and others are working today. So it's working in countries that have issues in different parts of the country, brings it at the requirement to suspend. For instance, at Hawiah, we suspended our initial work there because we had locals running around with AK-47s, sending us a few messages we didn't really want to hear at the time. And we had to suspend until that was sorted out. And you do that, you have to do that. You stand down, and when it's sorted, you go back in again. And that's what one has to do in any organization because you always have to put safety first. Now of course, everyone is keen on the progress in Saudi Arabia. Why is it so fast here and so slow in Ethiopia? But these things do ebb and flow. And you have to do your best, you have to be safe, you have to be disciplined, you have to be responsible. The -- a question was, could you highlight some of the projects that you think have particular relevance as analogies to taking projects in this part of the world? I think that as are in Saudi Arabia, I don't know that the slide shows that, but bullseye and there is a company in a deposit called Al-Masani' -- I think Al-Masani', which is very, very similar to how we -- so if you look up the Al-Masani' deposit, you'd probably find the work site. [indiscernible]. We're very similar to what we're on to in, Hawiah. I think Hawiah's hole is a little bit bigger than Al-Masani', but it's a very similar, technical proposition. But geologically, a little [indiscernible] too. And if we're fortunate enough at Hawiah to discover [indiscernible] or [indiscernible] that's fed the saltide structure that we're following at Al-Masani's, of course, following that deposit, if we find that feeder, we'll close that into a much bigger thing at the source, if you like. It would look like what Barrick is mining at Jabal Sayid in Saudi Arabia. That is the twinkle in the eye, if you like, of what's possible and how we have refined the actual red zone. In Tulu Kapi, none of the existing projects are dead ringers for it. It's more akin to -- I think it's more akin to a lot of the open pit deposits around [ cavity ] in Australia. There are many of them there, but not that many on this listing, I don't think that you can point a finger on. Albeit that it's mostly done, but it has gone from about 5 tonnes a year of gold production, which was about 150,000 ounces about a decade ago, to over 20x that -- no, 10x -- 5 tonnes a year. Yes, 20x, that is now over 110 tonnes a year, so over 20x growth. From the artisanal sector, for the most part, believe it or not, Ethiopia has a lot of artisanal potential, but I'm also tells you there's a lot going on beneath these artisanal deposits, or source, if you like, for industrial development as well. That will happen in North Sudan, it will happen in Ethiopia, I'm sure. Keep moving. Some questions about Hawiah. So we put this long section up. The right-hand side shows you that we've had the best results to date in the north and the south of this long strike. So the right-hand picture, you're looking from a pickup to down. So to speak. Again, the 2 left-hand pictures, you're a superman looking through the earth, looking east at a long section of what looks like in plain section. So the mid-zone hasn't stacked up so well. Yes, there's still work to do, but it hasn't stacked up. So the north and the south zone has stacked up. It is actually very confident that the maiden resource estimate and the prefeasibility study for Hawiah lode both be completed and published before the end of '21. And the maiden resource estimate was published 12 months ago in 2020. And what we're publishing in this quarter is an update of it. And as for the PFS, that's due in the middle of next year, not this year. Does KEFI have a clear plan for following up on the completed MRE and DFS reports? In terms of getting finance, ready for Hawiah during January, February of next year. If not, why not? Are bookings -- meetings booked with ARTAR and with the Saudi ministry and the development fund providers, et cetera, et cetera? The resource update is now and it will be updated again next year as we do drilling. The DFS isn't until the middle of next year. We only discovered this thing 12 months ago. So you have to bear with us if it's fast track stuff, but we're not ready to build it. The DFS will be middle of next year. We'll load to the mining license application on the back of that. We'll conclude the DFS during the following year. Again, this is fast track stuff. Anyone who thinks that one that starts drilling manages a discovery, completes the DFS and built the mine within type of months is not quite with it on the practical realities here. The financing is for the end of '23, and it's expenditure is '24, '25 on Hawiah. If the Tulu Kapi mine approval and build process continues to be held up, will KEFI move Hawiah to it's top priority project and immediately progress with the mine build process ahead of Tulu Kapi? If not, why not? I think the simple answer is if Tulu Kapi for some reason was held up stolon that Hawiah could overtake it, we would do so without hesitation. But Hawiah hasn't applied for a mining license yet and can't apply for mining license until the middle of next year. And it needs to be granted. And so Tulu Kapi will be in construction well and truly before then. So I don't think the question is pertinent, but the philosophy is correct. If one project can't keep up and the other project charges delivery routes, we would switch without that hesitation. What are the 2 or 3 things that could happen that would stop Hawiah being built by the end of next year? And what is KEFI doing now to ensure those things don't happen? Again, Hawiah won't be built by the end of next year. It will apply for a mining license in the middle of next year and will be built in 2024. Okay. KEFI's advanced projects. We're asked to set out a little summary of the different projects and compare them in a sort of ranking sense. The first thing to say is that the NPV of the top 2, if you like, talking about Hawiah, this is set out on the corporate slide on our normal PowerPoint. It's about GBP 270 million, I think. And that's more than 10x the company at the moment. And the question is -- the question here is, why is there such a disparity? I think the market is, you might say appropriately, unforgiving of delays or whatever. It depends on your own adjective. But it's certainly unforgiving of delays, but the upside is clearly there. And I think as we sort out the situation at Tulu Kapi security and get moving, that the financing can proceed and the development can proceed. A question is about -- another question is about Jibal Qutman. Why have you described it as being a [indiscernible] and why can't you fix it? I think the mining license application expose that the regulatory system in Saudi Arabia has a lot missing, wasn't as efficient as it should have been. There were defects revealed in the way the authorities have processed the exploration license we've worked on for years. And it wasn't our fault. It exposed shortcomings in the regulatory process. The problem with that, we met many representations. And the government has overhauled the regulatory system. I think that they will be publicized. I'm not saying that we give all of that, but it was certainly responsive to our complaints on representations, and has to fix it. We can't breach the regulatory system. If the season has been fixed and that the [indiscernible] original exploration license have to be rectified and the government has undertaken to do so. It better needs to do so when these things take forever, unfortunately. So the question for them, how embarrassing it is for the company and how we should be ashamed of ourselves and so on? I could only say that it was a defect in the system, we highlighted it, it has been approached and it's taken a long time. I believe it will be fixed. And I'm sorry to say, it comes to the territory of [indiscernible], this thing opened up by the first movers like us. We expose lessons to be learned by everybody, and then we have to bear with the lessons to be learned. Another question is, in respect of the value of Jibal Qutman, could it ever rank, as we call scale, to Hawiah and Tulu Kapi? I think, Jibal Qutman is -- all we did was scratch the surface really. We describe it at times like a string of pearls with a series of bit of deposits. Then we focused on the open pitable oxides, which are heat [ vegetable ], but we didn't focus on what's going on at depth when it turns into sulfides. That's quite conceivable that we've got a much bigger play there. But there's no point in spending money on it until the tenure is sorted out. What are the top 2 or 3 things that could stop Hawiah mine being built? Not sure if I've covered that one already. We talked about building it next year. It's not being built next year. What we have to do is complete the PFS. It's very important. And can we recover the zinc or not? We think we can. The early results indicate we can, but we need to establish that beyond any doubts, so that we can estimate how much metal we will recover, not just how much metal is in the ground. That's a particular technical question, which is quite critical, the sourcing and optimization of water is a critically important, environmentally. The early indications are that the Artesian basin there is plentiful, but the aquifers are prone, but again, that has to be proven to the level of reliability from the point of view of regulatory compliance as well as operational compliance and reliability. So the 2 or 3 things, the DFS, it's just a sequencing. The license application needs to be processed and approved. We don't believe there will be any defects in this one. We're not aware of any with once bitten, twice shy with the regulators as well as the company. And the DFS needs to prove up all aspects as it did over into the company. The financing itself will be a lot easier because Saudi Arabia is -- there is no shortage of capital in Saudi Arabia. There's a shortage of capital in Ethiopia. So with a strong partner and strong local lending institutions, project finance in Saudi Arabia will be a piece of cake compared to Ethiopia. But nevertheless, each project has its own synchros and challenges. I hope that flowed a bit better than just answering questions, perhaps a bit higgledy-piggledy. We covered all the questions I'm aware of until -- received until last night. And as I said earlier at the beginning of the presentation, we're going to try to stick to 45 minutes, and I've just taken 50 minutes, I think. And and any questions received since last night through the day or during the actual webinar, we'll look at over the next few days and we'll get some answers assembled and posted up onto the website of the company. And I hope that worked okay. We much appreciate your interest and attention. here from Ethiopia. I hope the clarity of the signal was fine, sometimes gets a bit wobbly here, but I'm not aware of a problem having a reason during the webinar. So I greatly appreciate your interest and patience. And we are working very hard here on the ground, and it's all happening, but we have to do it properly. Thank you very much. Good evening.