Match Group, Inc. (MTCH) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Thank you for joining the Deutsche Bank Media, Internet and Telecom Conference virtually. Thank you again for bearing with us for the delay in the start of this keynote discussion with IAC's, CEO of Dotdash, Neil Vogel, who is -- who has actually been with Dotdash since 2013, has been instrumental in devising the strategy. And Dotdash, as you know, post the Match spin, will probably be one of the pillars of IAC's valuation and therefore, there'll be a lot more focus on the business and on Neil. So Neil, thank you so much for joining us for this fireside chat.

As a start, can you talk about your journey since 2013 since you joined Dotdash and how that has informed on the strategy and everything else that you guys are doing?

Sure. Thanks for joining. I would much prefer to have woken up in Palm Beach than with 2 small children in my bed. So that being said, let's get going. I've been in IAC for sort of more than 6 years. I joined to run what was then About.com, which IAC had bought from the New York Times for about $300 million. We spent a couple of years trying to fix About.com. And after a couple of years of struggles, I think we realized there was no fixing it. And that is how we evolved into Dotdash and got to our new story. Essentially, About.com had the roots and the nuggets of what then became what we think is a very successful Dotdash. And what About.com was and what we are today is what would have been called, sort of like in the old days of media, a service publisher. It publishes need-to-know content, content that is informational, that helps people. It's easy to define by saying what it's not. It's not news, it's not sports, it's not gossip, it's not celebrity, it's -- and in the case of us now, health, finance, home, food, tech, travel and beauty, things where the answers people get matter and where the quality of content matters. And in trying to fix About.com, which we were not successful at and -- but it sort of like was the germination of our new idea. And what we learned sort of around 2015, '16 was that there wasn't really a place anymore on the Internet for a general interest sort of information site. If you're giving health advice, we could have had the single best information on diabetes on the Internet, but you're not going to want that information from the same people that teach you how to beer batter fried chicken when you can get it from WebMD or from Healthline. And we saw this across categories. We saw it -- again, we saw it in finance, we saw it in travel, we saw it in food, that there was always a vertical expert that was better than us, and that's where the Internet had moved. And under the New York Times and prior, About didn't move in that direction. So we knew that we had to do something to take the best nuggets of About.com and turn them into vertical competitors. And what we decided was, at the time About.com had about 2 million pieces of content, we threw about 1.6 million of those pieces of content into the trash because we did not think they were good enough. And what we decided to do was build new brands around the areas where we thought we had a critical mass and expertise that aligned with areas that we thought we get a viable economic model on the Internet. And again, that is health, finance, tech, travel, home, food. So we set out to launch brands from About.com. And when it was finished, we were going to be done with About.com, and we were going to become a portfolio of these vertical brands. I think in doing that and in working with IAC to do that, which was sort of -- this was a -- looking back, it seems like a relatively smart thing to do. But at the time, it was a relatively radical transformation of what we thought was one of the classic Internet brands, About.com. What we then concluded was About.com wasn't really our asset, it was our problem. And in looking at that, we also took a hard look at Publishing and -- Internet publishing at that time and basically said Internet publishing is fundamentally broken. And if we don't think we can fix it, we shouldn't do this. And what that means is, on the traffic source side, there is now an algorithm between you and your people in almost every case. 70%, 80%, 60%, 90% of your traffic is going to come from some algorithm. That is just a fact. So you need to figure out a way that you have some leverage and control of algorithms or it's not going to work. And on the advertiser side, online, people just have begun to sell audiences, undifferentiated demographic audiences, which became a race to the bottom. So we decided that if we can't get some leverage in our relationship with algorithms, and we can't get some leverage in our relationship with advertisers, then we shouldn't do this, but we thought we could. And here's what we did. And it sounds fairly simple, but it's actually a little bit complex. As we said, we're going to control what we can control to take back some control in this marketplace. And we set out to do 3 things as we launched our new brands. And the first thing, as we said, for every new site that we launch, we're going to endeavor to do the very best content on the Internet on every single thing we cover, whether it's an article on how to speed up your router or an article on the best way to paint the windows of your kid's room, we're going to have the best content. That means the best words, the best video, the best illustrations. But having the best content, people will like that and that gives us some advantage. We did not think the Internet needed more mediocre websites on topics trying to get content in front of people to serve advertisers. So we thought we'd make the best stuff. The second thing we wanted to do is we needed to -- we thought we needed to make the fastest sites online and the fastest sites in Publishing. Because of our experience with About.com, we learned that performance for advertisers and performance for users and user satisfaction is not a linear relationship with site speed. It's an exponential relationship. You get exponentially better the faster you are. So we're going to build sites that by any measure of site speed, we are the fastest and we've done that. So okay, we now have great content on superfast sites that are well designed. And then the third thing we did, which took some convincing to IAC, but eventually, we all got on board, is we said, we're going to look at every other publisher in every space in which we compete and we are going to do 2/3 of the monetization. We're going to allocate 2/3 of our space to advertising and we are never, ever going to do things that annoy people and people who use Internet know what I'm talking about. We are never going to do a pre-roll on a video. We are never going to do a pop-up ad. We are never going to do it interstitial. We're never going to do anything that gets between you and content or disrupts your reading experience. And so it turns out that faster sites, better content, fewer ads, that formula really works. Now let's go back to talking about how that gets us some leverage back. The first way it gets us leverage back is we decided with algorithms that we are not going to care about algorithms, Google, Facebook, et cetera, that don't care about where they send people. So Facebook, Twitter, they don't care where they send you. They just care what something like a virality engagement thing is. We don't care about that. Our content is too good and it's too expensive. We want to align with people that care where they send people, or part of their business model is to deliver people answers or information or content that they need. So we aligned very well with Google and with Pinterest and with Apple News and with Flipboard. And with these sources that care, we also build direct relationships with users who use our stuff and have really good experiences and e-mail lists and other direct things. The second thing that we did is we took back leverage from advertisers. And what I mean by that is, our content is such that we do not generally have browsers and that is by design, meaning people browsing. It's -- they're not reading Red Sox scores, they're not reading Kardashian pictures. They're in the mindset to take action because you're looking for a new television set. You're looking to deal with your mother's diabetes. You're looking on what to do in your trip to Florence, when people used to travel at least. And when people are doing that, they're in a mindset to take action. If you take an audience of people to take action and you put them on a page that is very fast that has fewer ads, your ads will perform extremely well for advertisers. It's the combination of fewer better ads and a very high-quality intent-driven audience. So all of a sudden, we have some leverage over advertisers because we perform, in our opinion, and as well as, if not better, than anybody else online. So we make the best content, so algorithms like us who build direct relationships, we have an advertising setup that allows us to monetize in a way that we're greatly differentiated by people selling audience because we're selling a little more action and the whole thing has started to work. So we -- from About.com, we've launched a series of brands: Verywell in health, The Spruce in finance, we purchased Investopedia, which is something I'm sure you guys know; The Spruce in home and food; TripSavvy in travel. And we've made a series of acquisitions, including Byrdie in beauty. We bought Brides in beauty from Condé Nast. We recently bought our way in the sustainability space, and we now have very strong properties in health, in finance, in beauty and style and in lifestyle, which is tech, travel, home, food. Our traffic, since we started this endeavor of breaking up About and launching these brands, we've gone from about 40 -- mid-40s million users a month, according to Comscore, to about 100 million. Almost all of that was organic. Our acquisitions have been fairly small. Our revenue has gone from, ballpark, $70 million a year to last year, IAC reported we did $167 million. We made $40 million in adjusted EBITDA last year off of a loss of nearly $20 million a few years ago. So this model that we've put together is working. We're investing very, very heavily in content and online products. We are still smaller players in every space in which we compete. There's a lot of upside. We have a lot of organic growth. We think there's a lot of -- we sort of -- we've proven we can buy and integrate acquisitions. I think if the market continues to be choppy like this, there's going to be a whole host of new opportunities. So we're just very excited looking forward. We're very excited.

Great. Thanks, Neil. So a number of questions that would come up from your answer there. Let's start with like traffic. And how much of that is paid versus organic? How much of that comes from Google or other social media? Can you talk to that, please?

Sure. So virtually, none of our traffic is paid. I think 99.5% of our traffic is organic. We will occasionally buy a little traffic to satisfy an ad deal, but that is the exception. We are entirely organic traffic, which is a very big part of our model. Organic traffic performs significantly better because people are coming to you because they want to visit you, not because you paid them to visit you or you had to buy them from somewhere. The second question is sort of traffic, in traffic sources. Depending on the vertical, we are 60% to 80-plus percent from Google, which is our largest source. That's very consistent with pretty much every other publisher on the Internet. I think our traffic sources look a lot like pretty much everybody else. If you start looking at sort of the service brands of Condé Nast or Hearst or WebMD or any of these guys, we are similar to Google or maybe even a little bit less than some of them. We are not dependent at all on sort of the more fickle social outlets like Facebook, et cetera, et cetera. We do have some traffic from -- as I mentioned before, from Pinterest and Flipboard and Apple News and these places, places that generally are looking to deliver people information and answers that are good and credible on these topics of interest. So this is generally how that shakes out.

And then there's always a question of like Google. And as part of IAC, you've undoubtedly seen how fickle at times Google's traffic can be. Is there like -- is there safeguards that you have in place or anything of that kind with regard to -- if that traffic disappears tomorrow?

We get this question a lot. I don't think Google's traffic is going to disappear tomorrow. I mean what -- we have more than 20 different domains. We have sort of more than 10 different brands. We have a lot of diversity. But what Google wants to do -- obviously, Google is going to do what's in the interest of Google, not what's in the interest of us and we know that. Google's business now is primarily delivering people the best possible answers to their query. As long as we are the best answer, and we endeavor to be the best answer, as defined by the best content on superfast sites that have a very respectful ad load, we're going to be fine. We're going to be totally fine with Google. And this is going to sound a little strange. We do not manage to Google. We manage to doing the best thing and Google will work itself out. Obviously, we're very savvy with structuring and technically, so Google can read what we're doing. But we're very confident in our ability to make the best content that appeals to Google or that appeals to Pinterest or that appeals to Flipboard or that appeals to whatever it is. I mean, we're obviously very focused on direct relationships with consumers. But in many instances, our direct relationships are -- people recognize our brands on search results pages and pick that. Now Google is obviously -- I'm not sure how close you guys follow it, it's obviously encroaching on many, many, many things. But we've been at this for 3 or 4 years now. We have not -- we have generally been up into the right on Google as we have on other algorithms we're focused on.

Okay. And then as you saw the verticals that you mentioned, that you are strong in, health, finance, beauty. As you look at the competitive landscape for some of these brands, I mean you definitely have -- you're competing against WebMD on the health side, maybe a Yahoo! Finance and a Google Finance on the Investopedia side. How do you compare versus your competition, especially when your competition is probably much larger in some of these verticals?

So it's a good question. It's actually the main question for us. I think the good news and the bad news are the same news, which is in every space in which we compete, we are not the market leader. And if you take health, we're about half the size of WebMD and half the size of Healthline, the 2 leaders in the space. However, we've grown from -- if you -- Comscore numbers, I'm going to give these directional because I don't know exactly what there -- we've grown from less than 10 million users a month to more than 30 million users a month over the past few years in the most competitive category on the Internet with a brand that no one had ever heard of, but I think more and more people have heard of it now. It's because of what we're doing execution-wise, because our content is great, our sites are very well-designed and very fast and very efficient and our ad load is very respectful. And if you take WebMD and you take a look at WebMD, I think you'll very quickly see the delta between Verywell, Verywell Health and what they look like. And obviously, they've been around forever. Their brand is great, way -- much more well-known than ours is, but we like our chances. And if you look across all of the brands we've launched and all the brands we've acquired, every single one of them is bigger than the point we launched it or the point we acquired it, most of them in multiples. Because of this formula that we're doing, online publishing has been fairly challenged and we are investing heavily in the face of that because we like our model pretty much better than everybody else's. And I think our margins and our P&L proves that there's a yield on this. It's just a lot of focus and a lot of execution on one thing when a lot of other publishers are focused on a lot of other things that maybe don't create value.

Great. And so -- which brings us to the point of differentiation as far as advertisers is concerned. How do you frame the return on the ad spend for advertisers? And how does that compare with other forms of advertising that may be options for those advertisers such as search or social media or anything else that they may be looking at?

So we -- what we do, I'm going to open by my favorite stat. I think it's -- and over the last 4 or 5 quarters of our top 25 advertisers, I'm going to -- I believe it's -- Mark said it actually -- I believe it's 22 of the 25 have advertised with us in every quarter. So just start by saying, our advertising absolutely works. It's the only way that, that happens. Like our return rate quarter-over-quarter is always like 80-plus percent of advertisers. And it works because we are able to connect advertisers with intent-driven users in an environment where people will actually see their ads. A, they're viewable, which is both sort of like a term of art in the business and a reality, people can see them. There's less clutter. And if you're -- if we know someone is coming to our tech site because their router is too slow, we know an awful lot about them. So we know that we can put people that are trying to sell routers or trying to sell other tech things around these people, they have an intention to solve a problem and do something. They're very likely going to buy a new router. And if they're in the market for a new router, they're very likely in the market for other new tech products. So you can extend that out to almost anything, in pharma, in health, in account sign-ups, in finance. When we know somebody is on content that helps them with their move on The Spruce, we know an awful lot about them. And we can really connect advertisers in an uncluttered environment to people with intent, at scale, in a way that just drives real results for them. And our stuff works. I can tell you it works, but the proof is in the pudding. Our advertisers come back. Advertising is something we actually like a lot. It's been growing very rapidly for us. I think you'll see in our P&L, last year, 25% of our revenue was, I think, we call it, like e-commerce and performance marketing, which is people using us to directly make purchase decisions. They trust our content enough, they take our recommendation, they go and buy things. That's grown from almost nothing to $40 million last year in our revenue stream. And we're just very good at making uncluttered sites with very good information that can connect people to advertisers in the context of taking action. And the other thing that I'll get in front of this issue is there's a big online privacy thing happening now where cookies are going away and cookies are ways to track users. We don't need cookies at all because based on what you're looking at, we know enough about you that we don't need to know anything else. We don't need to guess who you are because we know exactly what your intention is. If you're looking at barbecue chicken content on July 2, we know exactly what you're trying to do and we can connect relevant advertisers around that.

That's really very interesting. We will definitely have questions regarding the affiliate commerce commission revenue stream. But focusing for the time being on the advertising revenue side, if we try and slice and dice the advertising revenue, how much of that would you say was brand versus performance?

The vast majority is brand. We do -- now we do -- I guess it depends. Among consumer advertisers, sort of more consumer CPG, it's brand. When you get to financial and pharma advertisers, it is often performance. Consumer advertisers were primarily a brand basically because their stuff performed so well. It's so expensive that consumer-direct marketers can't use it, and we don't really market to them. The brand guys are much better for us and appreciate our offering. In things like finance and pharma, those advertisers are a little bit more sophisticated in many ways and have a very different KPI set. And a lot of those are cost per action type advertisers, which we love because our audience is ready to take action. So we do fairly well with those. I think we've had a lot of growth in both pharma and finance, which are sort of like 2 of our biggest categories as a direct result of that.

Great. So then in terms of the advertising budgets that you're getting, how much of the advertising budgets do you think are like more along the lines of like test budgets versus always on budgets?

So the idea of the test budget is a little bit more of like a DR concept. I mean, typically, when you deal with a large consumer advertising, your first deal is sort of a test. We're kind of like -- with some guys who are new, we're still in the test phase. But we're kind of out of that. I think our repeat advertising does that. I think where we are now, and we've seen this before, is if there's a home advertiser that we've cracked or we're trying to crack, no media buyer ever got fired for putting all of their money in better homes and gardens. We need to get our brands like The Spruce up to that point brand-wise, where they can say, "You know what, we're allocating you a 7-figure deal, but we now want to give you the $4 million deal instead of the $1.5 million deal, where you are the anchor to the program as opposed to the add-on to the program." Now we're the anchor for some programs, but some of our brands aren't there yet. We see it in pharma with very well where there's big competitors in this space. But then on the flip side, and like Investopedia where we have a good brand, we can be the anchor for some of these big plants. But most of our brands are at the point where I would say we are firmly challenger brands. We are beyond the test point, but we are not at the -- we are the anchor point on virtually everything, if that makes sense.

No, it totally does. So the thing is, as we think about these firmly challenger brands, how should we think in terms of like, what kind of growth do you need to get? What do you need to be to become the always on kind of a thing, maybe an anchor for an ad budget?

So just to be clear, we are always on, like we are always on for people who are marketing phone plans. We're always on for a lot of our financial buyers. It's just sort of -- always on sort of is category dependent. But what I would say is if you look at where we are in food with The Spruce and our recipes, like I will take our chances with our product versus our recipes any day of the week. I think we're doing like a spectacularly good job. We're still like 1/4 of their size or 1/3 of their size. In health, there's guys twice our size. In finance, you mentioned Yahoo! Finance. Those guys are so much bigger than us. In tech, there's players so much bigger than us. And in smaller categories, actually categories where we are smaller, there are huge categories like beauty and style, with our brands Byrdie and we bought Brides from Condé Nast, I mean, we're -- again, we're 1/5 the size of the market leader. We're probably, almost in every instance, investing more than the market leader. And in almost in every instance, if you look at what we're doing, we're building real advantages in a real mode. Like great content, fast sites, fewer ads is something that appeals a lot to advertisers and appeals a lot to users. I think a lot of publishers have built models that are definitionally based on not doing those things. They have a very, very heavy ad load, which slows down their page. They make content in a way that isn't -- that is a little bit more for maybe 2015 than for 2020. And we're -- we like our position, and we've got a ton of room. I mean obviously, we're going to look to make acquisitions. I think if the market continues to be choppy like this, I think there's going to be some real opportunities to add scale that way, but we don't need to. We don't need to. I think we can be an extremely substantial publisher if we don't buy anything else.

Operator, at this point, can you please open up and see if the audience has any questions? And can you give the instructions for what the audience needs to do to ask a question? And then, Neil, as we wait for those questions and as we wait for the instructions, your audience has already expressed intent when they come to the site. And you mentioned that on the financial and pharma, you have basically more cost per action. How much of your ad revenue is cost per action based versus CPM or CPC-based?

So it's -- I think a lot of the cost per -- it depends. A lot of the cost per action is in the performance marketing number. We're much more CPM than CPC-based. But again, I think that's limited to categories like health and finance, the more CPA-type things. I don't think -- I'm looking at Mark, I don't think we're going to give out those specific numbers.

Okay. No, that's completely understandable. And then the point on the scale in terms of scaling and in terms of where you are on the scale, one interesting thing that you mentioned right at the beginning was with the valuations coming in where they are and given the fact that the IAC parent will be sitting on a significant amount of cash, how do you see M&A kind of playing into you guys kind of getting more scale?

So I think we've been fairly aggressive over the last year. We've done a series of deals. They've all been -- again, they've all been pretty small. We bought our way into beauty. We bought 2 sites called Byrdie and MyDomaine. Then we bought the old Brides magazine, which we've rejuvenated, I call it the new Brides from Condé Nast. We bought a brand called Liquor.com from an entrepreneur to add to our Spruce home thing. And we just entered the sustainability market by buying sort of the 2 biggest independent sustainability sites, called TreeHugger and Mother Nature Network. Now I think none of those deals individually are material, but when you -- they got us into a few areas we wanted to be in, which were sustainability and beauty and the others were add-ons. So as I said a minute ago, I think we're going to see some larger things potentially dislodge and become more available. We've been trying, frankly, to become more available if the world goes sideways or down a bit. And as you said, we have IAC's balance sheet. They've said publicly they're going to be aggressive with us. This is what IAC does. IAC is patient. We build a model that works and then we scale it as fast as we can. As the extent M&A makes sense, we're going to do it. But if the market sort of continues in the direction it's going this morning -- I love our model. I think IAC backs our model, and I think we're going to be fairly aggressive. Whether that means anything gets done, I don't know, but we're going to be fairly aggressive.

That absolutely makes sense. And that's absolutely in line with the IAC's strategy over the past 40 or so years, so we completely get that. You previously mentioned that your ad rates were going up while the market was generally staying flat. Can you talk about how much headroom you have in terms of both ad rates as well as ad loads for the different properties?

Again, I'm not sure how to comment on ad rates. I think anecdotally, we've gotten some -- we've gotten a lot of information from partners that our rates are higher. I mean advertisers complain they have to pay us more, but then they do it anyway. We see it programmatically, we get some information from some middlemen that like our yield is significantly higher. And programmatic advertising, selling or electronic selling of ads is a little bit more of a pure market that's based a lot on viewability and performance. So if you -- if people can see your ads and they perform better, they pay you more for them, so we do really well there. I would hope we have more upside. It's hard to say. I think we're very comfortable where our yield is now. I mean I think you'll see in areas where our brands are just not as strong as competitors like in health. For nearly identical inventory that I like our performance on, we don't get the same rates that the most premium of that brands you've heard of do. That's just part of being a challenger brand. So I think there's a lot of opportunity there, but we'll see. We're -- look, we're working hard to build brands, and if we can continue to deliver the results we're delivering and we can continue to deliver audiences at scale, we have a big opportunity. I think it's -- in a lot of the spaces in which we're competing, health and pharma, finance, home, there has not been a scaled new entrant into this -- any of these spaces before us in like a decade or even longer in some cases. So a little bit of our break-in was like, "Well, who are these guys and where did they come from?" We obviously had a head start with all the content and the original traffic from About.com. But it's like, "Who are these guys? How are they growing so fast? We need to learn about them." And we're just sort of like along that curve now. I think we're further along than we were, but that's still happening.

That's interesting. And from the perspective of the investor base, a great way to kind of frame the growth opportunity. So as we -- that was, I think, a lot of like advertising. Let's look at the e-commerce side of the affiliate commerce commission revenue. What exactly is that? Is their CPA ads kind of in there? Or how do you kind of generate that revenue?

No, it's not -- there's no -- it's not CPA ads in there. So let's talk about sort of like commerce and transactional things that we do. So we initially -- when we broke up About.com into these brands, we thought commerce might be an opportunity, but we didn't really understand it, and it wasn't really a focus. I think we quickly moved into it. As a result of -- what was happening was -- I'll go back to the router example I always use. When people come to figure out why the router is too slow, we were not helping them take the next step, which was, "Well, I'm just going to buy a new router because my thing is not working right." And once we figure out that people trusted us for that as well, we developed a whole sort of like secondary type of content around commerce and around helping people -- helping our users decide like what to do, like what credit card to get, what brokerage account to open, what router to buy, what refrigerator to buy. When we do commerce content, you'll see a lot of publishers do this where they just have an article and they throw a link in it to try and sell something to you. That is not what we do. Every bit of commerce revenue that we drive or derive, again, any of the things I just mentioned, comes from pages on our site that are specifically around commerce intent and transactional intent. So there will be a page that talks about the best routers and we'll review a bunch of routers, and we'll say which routers we like the best and then you may click through to Best Buy or Amazon and buy a router and we get paid. We do the same thing with vacuum cleaners. We do the same thing with online therapy. We do the same thing with consumer credit cards. And we scaled this very rapidly over the past few years. I mean, we were basically in 2016 at a standing start. Last year, we did north of $40 million in commissions from vendors for sending them customers. It's important for us that we -- and I think it's part of the reason why it's working so well, we do this not -- you'll hear publishers, I'll talk about how much money they make from this. That is not the #1 KPI that we drive from this. The #1 KPI is helping customers make satisfied purchase decisions or acquisition decisions. If customers are happy, then it's great, then we'll make money and our traffic will go up. And that's what we've been doing. And now we're getting a little more sophisticated on how we monetize these things. And that's part of the opportunity for us. Now believe me, we like money and we like getting paid to do this. But the #1 difference and it's sort of like hard to quantify and people like think it's bulls*** when we say it, but the #1 thing that we're doing is we're winning consumer trust in all of our brands. And you do that by having fewer ads and faster sites and better content. And you do it by presenting really editorially-driven advice on what to buy and what to sign up for, not -- we're going to feature the guy who's paying us the most, which a lot of publishers do. So it's a real growth area for us. We're very excited about it. It's not really CPA ads as much as we send someone to a retailer or we send someone to a vendor of a product and they buy it.

Is there -- but then how do you kind of visualize Dotdash evolving over time? Is there a path towards you guys kind of becoming a marketplace -- an actual market transaction marketplace or maybe a 1P retail business?

Maybe -- I mean I think there's a few things happening. I think there is a general distrust on the Internet of reviews and information provided by people who are selling things. So there has become this sort of like vibrant middle layer, which is us, that help people decide what to buy. Also, if you go on to Amazon or almost any retailer, like infinite choice of products and it's very, very hard to decipher. So that has been very, very good for us. Is that a marketplace? I'm not sure it's the marketplace, it's more we're a trusted source. I think what you will see us do, and we've begun to do it a little bit in The Spruce in some of our own products, we launched a paint product direct to Amazon with a large paint manufacturer called The Spruce Best Home Paint earlier this year. It's a very small category. It's a bit of a test to see if we could move the needle on chalky paints for millennials under a cool brand, and it turns out we can. And I think you're going to see a little bit more from us in beauty and home and health, of maybe making some of our own products where we have distribution because of our audience and we know where the demand is, and we know the kind of products people like because we know what they're buying.

Great. Thanks. Thanks, Neil. I think we've run out of time and I can -- we can virtually see people kind of coming in for the next fireside chat. So Neil, thank you so much for doing this with us. Thank you so much for coming into the virtual conference and to do the virtual fireside chat. For the audience, thank you and wish you the best for the rest of the day.

Thanks, everyone. Great. Thank you.

Absolutely welcome. Thank you.