Tetragon Financial Group Limited (TFG) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Good afternoon. Thank you for joining Tetragon's investor call. [Operator Instructions] The call will be accompanied by a live presentation, which can be viewed online by registering at the link provided in the company's conference call press release. This press release can be found on the homepage of the company's website, www.tetragoninv.com. In addition, questions can be submitted online while watching the presentation. And as a reminder, this call is being recorded. I will now turn you over to Paddy Dear to commence the presentation.

As one of the principals and founders of the Investment Manager of Tetragon Financial Group Limited, I'd like to welcome you to our investor call, which will focus on the company's first half results for 2020. Paul Gannon, our CFO, will review the company's financial performance for the period. Steve Prince and I will talk you through some of the detail of the portfolio and performance, and Steve will spend time discussing the outlook. As usual, we will conclude with questions, those taken electronically via our web-based system at the end of the presentation, as well as those received since the last update. The PDF of the slides are now available to download on our website and, if you're on the webcast, directly from the webcast portal. I would like to remind everyone that the following may contain forward-looking comments, including statements regarding the intentions, beliefs or current expectations concerning performance and financial condition on the products and markets in which Tetragon invests. Our performance may change materially as a result of various possible events or factors. So with that, I'd like to pass over to Paul.

Thanks, Paddy. As a reminder, Tetragon continues to focus on 3 main metrics. We look at how value is being created via NAV per share total return. We also look at investment returns measured as a return on equity or ROE, and we monitor how value is being returned to shareholders through distributions, which are mainly in the form of dividends. The fully diluted NAV per share was $24 at 30 June 2020. After adjusting for dividends reinvested at the NAV, the NAV per share total return year-to-date is down 1.9%, which compares to up 8.1% for the same period in 2019. For monitoring investment returns, we continue to use an ROE calculation. And for H1 2020, this was down 2.9%, which is net of all fees and expenses. The graph that you can see right now also shows what the return would be if it were annualized for the full year, which is down 5.8%. With reference to that target, the average ROE achieved since IPO is 11.8%, which is within our target range of 10% to 15%. Later on in the call, we'll give more color as to how the specific asset classes contributed to the return this year. Finally, moving on to the last key metric, which is dividends. As a reminder, during the first half of the year, Tetragon modified its dividend to capital return policy to remove any specific dividend target payout ratio referenced to normalized earnings. Tetragon declared a dividend of $0.10 for the second quarter, which represents a year-to-date dividend of $0.20. Based on the quarter-end share price of $8.76, the last 4 quarters' dividend in aggregate represents a yield of approximately 6.5%. In addition, during the second quarter, the managers took advantage of the fund's widened discount to NAV to repurchase $25 million of shares, which was accretive to NAV by 1.8%. So now on to what we call the NAV bridge. This breaks down into its component parts the gross Tetragon fully diluted NAV per share from $24.76 at the end of 2019 to $24 per share at the end of the first half. So looking in detail at some of the component parts. Investment income reduced NAV per share by $0.47 per share. Operating expenses and manager fees reduced NAV per share by a further $0.21, with $0.04 per share reduction due to interest expense. On the capital side, gross dividends reduced NAV per share by $0.29. There was a net dilution of $0.20 per share, which is labeled as other share dilution. This bucket primarily reflects the impact of dilution from stock dividends plus the additional recognition of equity-based compensation shares. Finally, the impacts of the $25 million share buyback I mentioned previously, which closed at June 2020, resulted in $0.45 of NAV accretion. I will now hand over to Paddy.

Thanks, Paul. As on previous calls, I would like to put the company's first half performance in the context of the long run. Tetragon began trading in 2005 and became a public company in April 2007. So the fund has 15 years of trading history. This chart shows the NAV per share total return, which is the thick line at the top; and the share price total return, which is the dashed line. The chart also includes equity indices, the MSCI All-Share and the FT All-Share; and the Tetragon hurdle rate of LIBOR plus 2.65. As you can see, Tetragon has returned 287% since IPO on a NAV total return basis to a near fourfold increase in value since IPO. The last 6 months' return of minus 2.9% on an ROE basis in the first half compares with minus 17.4% for the FT All-Share and minus 6% for the MSCI Global Index. As you know, there's been a great disparity in various worldwide equity indices because both the U.S. NASDAQ and S&P are at their highs for the year, and their performance is dominated by a narrow range of predominantly tech companies. Continuing the theme of looking at the long-term, here are some more performance metrics. Our return on equity or investment return target is 10% to 15% over the cycles. The average return since IPO is 11.8%. And as Paul has shown, return on equity for the first half of 2020 was minus 2.9%. Long-term interest rates are down to their lows. The U.S. Ten Year Treasury Yield is approximately 0.57%. So with risk fee rates so low, we should naturally expect all risk assets to return at the lower end of long-term expectations. And thus, with respect with Tetragon, this means that [ ex ante ], our return expectations are at the bottom end and could possibly even be below our 10% to 15% range. The last figure on this table shows that 32% of the public shares are owned by the principals of the Investment Manager and employees of TFG Asset Management. We believe this is very important, as it demonstrates a strong belief in what we do as well as a strong alignment of interest between the manager, TFG Asset Management employees and Tetragon shareholders. This next slide shows the composition of Tetragon's assets. So looking at the breakdown of the $2.3 billion of net asset value. And these colored discs show the percentage breakdown of the asset classes and strategies as of the end of 30 June this year on the right in comparison with the end of last year on the left. I would highlight some notable changes, first, growth in private equity from 12% to 15%. And this is as a result of the growth in the value of investments within the Hawke's Point Fund, which we'll talk more about in a moment. Second, the hedge fund exposure has actually remained constant, but worth noting that we've redeemed from QT a quantitative manager and put fresh capital into both the Polygon European Event Fund and the Polygon Convertible Opportunity Fund. And thirdly, would note there's been a small increase in cash over the first half. Moving on to the next slide. We can move on and discuss the first half performance in a little bit more detail. The NAV bridge that Paul showed was a high-level overview of NAV per share. And what this table does is show a breakdown of the composition of Tetragon's NAV at 30 June 2020 versus year-end 2019, and it does so by asset classes and the factors contributing to the changes in NAV. Thus this table shows investment performance plus capital flows, and thus tying back to the change in NAV. Now as you can see from the bottom right-hand side of the tables, the aggregate investment performance, labeled Gains and Losses, generated a gross loss of $44.3 million year-to-date. And this was the sum of the various segments above. So briefly on those. TFG Asset Management, our private equity holdings in asset management companies, had gains of $14.1 million, driven primarily by Equitix. Our hedge fund strategies lost $50.9 million, and there were losses in the QT Fund, which is the externally managed [ qual ] fund. And these losses have been realized through the redemption from that fund. We also have losses, hopefully unrealized, in the European Event Driven Equity Fund. And these were offset slightly by a small positive in the first half from the Convertible Opportunity Fund. Thirdly, bank loans lost $42.2 million in the first half. These losses were driven by actual defaults as well as changes to forward-looking assumptions for U.S. loans. So default expectations, recoveries, prepayments, discount rates, et cetera. Moving down the table. Real estate had losses of $13.6 million for the first half. And you'll note that that's not much new from where we were at Q1. And then, private equity and venture capital had the strongest performance, with $39.3 million positive. And the primary source of those profits being from the Hawke's Point Fund would have strong performance from investments as those projects progressed and benefitted from the rise in the gold price. And finally, other equities and credits generated gains of $7.9 million led predominantly by investments in public biotech companies. Now for more detail on each category, we'll start with TFG Asset Management. And [ after ] that, I'll pass over to Steve.

Thanks, Paddy. Our private equity investments in asset management companies through TFG Asset Management represented the largest asset class in the portfolio at the end of the first half and produced $14.1 million of gains during the period. Equitix was the most significant contributor during the first half, with an investment gain of $33.2 million. This gain was primarily driven by a combination of investment performance, capital raising and capital deployment. During the first half of the year, European Fund I reached a final close of EUR580 million. Fund VI was launched along with associated managed accounts, raising approximately GBP500 million of capital and is anticipated to raise further capital by the third quarter. Equitix also had a first close of approximately $400 million for its [indiscernible] joint venture with Oman Infrastructure Investment Management. This performance was partially offset by an increase in the discount rate applied in the discounted cash flow model to value the business. During the first half of the year, Equitix repaid GBP25.7 million of their loan notes plus accrued interest, or including accrued interest, to Tetragon. Moving on to BentallGreenOak. This investment is valued using the present value of the various cash flow elements of the merger deal. That's comprised of fixed quarterly distributions, variable distributions, carried interest from funds and a put call option in 2026-2027. During the first half of the year, this investment made a loss of $8.6 million. This reflects an increase in the discount rate applied to the carried interest and the put call due to the prevailing uncertainty in the COVID-19 environment. TFG asset management [Technical Difficulty] 13% of the combined entity. LCM recorded a loss of $5.4 million, primarily reflecting a higher discount rate used in the discounted cash flow model. The AUM of LCM slightly decreased to $9 billion in June 2020 from $9.1 billion in December 2020. Polygon's value fell by $2.4 million during the period, primarily reflecting a higher discount rate in its [ DCF ] model. The value of Tetragon Credit Partners decreased by $2.7 million in the first half, mainly due to a decrease in the projected carry. The Tetragon Credit Partners Opportunity Fund, an open-ended hedge fund investing primarily in CLO debt securities, launched on 1 May. In addition, Tetragon Credit Partners' TCI III vehicle deployed the remaining 17% of its un-invested capital during the period. The NAV of Hawke's Point remains small, with AUM of $121.4 million at the end of the first half. However, the Hawke's Point team, as previously mentioned, experienced strong results during the period in 2 of their investments. The valuation of this business is unchanged from the end of 2019. Banyan Square Partners was founded by TFG Asset Management in 2019 and is an investment management business focused on providing non-controlled, structured and common equity solutions to financial sponsors. Tetragon's investment in Banyan Square Partners has not yet been valued by a third-party valuation specialist. As of June 30, 2020, TFG Asset Management's EBITDA was $37.8 million, 51% higher than the previous year. Higher management fees, performance and success fees and increased distributions from BentallGreenOak were all key drivers for the increase. Management fees increased by 34% year-over-year, driven mainly by Equitix. Performance and success fees also grew. They were up by 37% versus the first half of 2019, again driven by Equitix. Other fee income, which is largely made up of income generated by Equitix on manager and service contracts, was stable year-on-year. Distributions from BentallGreenOak reflect: one, distributions from ongoing operations; and two, distributions from carried interest. Up to 2019, June 2019, carried interest has made up nearly 80% of these distributions. Post the BentallGreenOak merger, carried interest distributions are supplemented by the fixed and variable payments agreed as part of that deal. For the first half of this year, fixed payments contributed $7 million with carried interest accounting for the remainder. Operating expenses increased by $11.6 million year-on-year. However, on an annualized basis, they are broadly consistent with the full year 2019. Paddy will now go over our hedge fund investments.

Thanks, Steve. Tetragon invests in event-driven equities, convertible bonds and quantitative strategies through hedge funds. And at the end of the first half, the majority of these investments are through Polygon managed hedge funds, as you can see from this slide. Our investment in the Polygon European Event Driven Strategies lost $47.1 million in the first half. Our investments in Polygon Convertible Bond Fund made plus $2.9 million in the first half. Our investments in the Polygon Global Equities Fund made $0.4 million in the first half. And lastly, our investments in the QT Quantitative Fund lost $7.1 million in the first half. And as mentioned earlier, this loss of the QT fund has been realized through redemption. And our investment is nearly fully redeemed out. We actually received $42.4 million in redemption proceeds during the first half, and we made additional investments in the Convertible Opportunity Fund and into both versions of the European Opportunity Fund, as you can see from the table. So now moving to bank loans. Tetragon predominantly invests in bank loans through CLOs by taking the majority position in the equity tranches. Tetragon's investments are split, as we show in the table here, between LCM deals, non-LCM deals; and then in the various funds, TCI II, TCI III and, as Steve has just mentioned, the nascent, newly formed TCP Opportunity Fund. As you can see, in aggregate, our bank loan exposure recorded a $42.2 million loss during the first half of 2020. And this was obviously in the context of the COVID-induced weakening U.S. corporate credit fundamentals. ECLOs experienced some actual losses but also lost value to changes in the forward-looking assumptions with respect to default recoveries, [ prepen ] spread, discount rates, et cetera. Notwithstanding that, during the first half, Tetragon received $19.2 million in cash distributions and direct U.S. CLO investments, $2.4 million from TCI II fund and $3 million from the TCI III fund. And furthermore, at the end of the first half, all our CLOs were passing net interest diversion tests. Tetragon's commitment to TCI II is $70 million, which is fully funded. And Tetragon's commitment to TCI III is $85.9 million, which is also fully funded. On May 1, Tetragon Credit Partners launched the open-ended funds that were just mentioned, called the Tetragon Credit Partners Opportunity Fund. And this is looking to monetize dislocation opportunities, particularly in CLO mezzanine tranches. And Tetragon has invested $5 million into that strategy. Next, moving on to real estate. Tetragon holds most of its investments in real estate through BentallGreenOak managed funds and co-investment vehicles. And the majority of these are private equity style funds, concentrating on opportunistic investments, targeting middle-market opportunities in the U.S., Europe and Asia, where BentallGreenOak believes it can increase value and product positive unlevered returns by sourcing off-market opportunities where it sees pricing discounts and market inefficiencies. The real estate investments had losses of $13.6 million in the first half. And that's not much changed from where we were at the end of Q1. During the first half, Europe fund and co-investments generated gains of $11.6 million. And these were primarily driven by disposal of logistic assets in Spain and Italy. The U.S. funds and co-investments had net losses of $23.8 million, primarily driven by the [ damad ] valuation of a single building in New York. And in Asia, the funds and co-investments generated small gains of $2.1 million. Debt funds generated the very small positive of $0.1 million for the first half. In addition to the commercial real estate investments through BentallGreenOak managed real estate funds, Tetragon also has investments in commercial farmland in Paraguay, managed by Symitar, a specialist manager in South American farmland. And during the first half, the farmlands were revalued, which reduced the market value by $3.6 million. Now I'll hand you back to Steve.

Thanks, Paddy. Tetragon's private equity and venture capital investments are split into the following subcategories: Investments managed by Hawke's Point, investments managed by Banyan Square Partners, other funds and co-investments where Tetragon invests in a non-affiliated fund as a limited partner or in a special-purpose vehicle as a co-investor, and finally Direct, comprising direct private equity investments on the balance sheet including venture capital investments. This bucket generated the largest gains for Tetragon's portfolio year-to-date in 2020, with net income of $39.3 million, we've mentioned, driven by the Hawke's Point investment. Tetragon's investment into mining finance via a vehicle managed by Hawke's Point generated $33 million of net income during the first half, driven by substantial project development and corporate progress in 2 Australian gold projects in which Hawke's Point is the cornerstone investor. Both projects are anticipated to come online in calendar year 2021. This segment represents 5.2% of Tetragon's NAV. Tetragon's investment in Banyan Square's fund generated a loss of $6.2 million during the first half of the year against a challenging macroeconomic backdrop. Since inception, the manager has been disciplined in employing new capital given the heightened valuation environment. But it does anticipate a more favorable environment to make opportunistic investments toward the end of the year. Tetragon had a 2% allocation to investments in private equity funds and co-investment vehicles in Europe and North America. This category generated a small gain of $0.2 million during the first half. Investments in direct private equity states, including venture capital, generated net income of $12.3 million during the period. This category currently holds the investment in Ripple Labs. Our direct balance sheet investments in the other equities and credit category produced gains of $7.9 million during the first half. Our other equities bucket generated a gain of $9.2 million. These investments comprise European and U.S. listed public equities. The other credit bucket generated a loss of $1.3 million in the period, driven by corporate bond positions. Moving on to Tetragon's cash. Our net cash balance, which is cash adjusted for known accruals and liabilities, was $105.5 million at the end of June. At June month end, Tetragon had a $150 million revolving credit facility in place, which was fully drawn. This liability had been incorporated into the net cash balance calculation. We are pleased to have announced that since month end, we have increased the size and duration of Tetragon's revolving loan facility while also lowering its annual cost. Tetragon now has a $250 million facility in place with a 10-year duration. The company actively manages its cash levels to cover future commitments and to enable it to capitalize on opportunistic investments and new investment opportunities. During the first half of the year, Tetragon used $93.2 million of cash to make investments, $25 million to repurchase its shares in the public markets and $18.7 million to pay dividends. $222.8 million of cash was received as distributions and proceeds from sale of investments. Future cash commitments are approximately $206.7 million, comprising hard investment commitments, which include BentallGreenOak funds of $65.6 million and private equity funds of $26.3 million; and soft investment commitments, which includes Banyan Square Partners Fund of $85 million and the Hawke's Point Fund of $29.8 million. Our final slide looks at our future investment expectations. I'll go through a few of our expectations. But it's always worth pointing out that one of our advantages is our ability to be opportunistic as it relates to investing in what we see as the most compelling investment opportunities at any given time. As mentioned before, we launched Banyan Square during 2019. Aside from Banyan Square, we have no upcoming new businesses to report. This remains the largest unknown in terms of cash requirements. We expect our event-driven equity exposures and our exposure to our convertible strategy to remain relatively stable. Our [ pre-crisis ] CLOs are now fully amortized. But we expect to continue to invest in CLOs via various Tetragon Credit Partners vehicles at the rate of approximately $25 million to $50 million per year. While we do have commitments to BentallGreenOak funds, as I mentioned, we would also expect some of our existing investments to continue distributing capital. So on the whole, we would expect our real estate investments to be relatively stable over the next 12 months. We expect our private equity allocations to grow over time. There are a few small additional LP commitments we have yet to fund. And we expect the Hawke's Point and Banyan Square allocations to continue to grow. The other equities and credit is a bucket similar to TFG Asset Management. We expect to continue to invest in these opportunities, but the timing of those investments is less certain. Now going to hand it back to Paddy to begin our Q&A.

Thanks, Steve. So that concludes the main presentation. But we've got quite a few questions. So I'm going to kick off.

Firstly, the question reads: Has the Board ever considered changing the performance-related component of the manager fees to be based on share price instead of NAV? And I think the best way to answer that, or perhaps the only way, is to give you some context of the history. Pre-IPO -- so that is in 2005 and pre-2007 -- the fees were standard hedge fund fees, so 2% management fees and a 20% performance fee with no hurdle. And then, at IPO, there was a new agreement amongst the existing investors about $1 billion of existing investors -- obviously, new investors; i.e. those potentially coming in at IPO, and indeed the Board. And many things were contemplated, including -- one of the things contemplated, albeit rejected, was that the performance fee should be on the share price, not the NAV. But ultimately, what was agreed was the fee structure that we have today. So it's been in place since 2007 with one minor adjustment. It presented a reduction of approximately 40% from the [ 2 and 20 ] fee structure, to the 1.5 plus 25 performance over what was originally an 8% hurdle and then moved to LIBOR plus 2.65, which was 8% at the time of the structure. So that is a history of how we got to the fee structure that we have. And there's a second question here that I'll link it, because it's about fees as well. And the question reads: More and more closed-end funds are lowering their fee costs. Given the extreme discount price to NAV at Tetragon and the terrible stock performance, wouldn't it be a good idea to lower also the fee costs to make the stock more attractive for investors? Well, as I've just explained, the fees themselves were negotiated to be about a 40% discount to a standard hedge fund transaction. But perhaps more importantly than that, I think the net return to investors over the 15 years of just under 11.5% net return, so net of those fees; and sounds to me like a very reasonable return. The other point I would make is, whilst the short-term share price has been disappointing certainly this year, with the widening of the discount to NAV, actually over the long term, the share price has performed well notwithstanding the discount to NAV. But I would agree, if people -- well, not agree, but I would say that obviously, if people don't like the fee structure, they shouldn't invest in Tetragon. And they're perfectly capable of making that decision. Second question here: Have you considered radically improved reporting to try to reduce the black box perception? And I think this is an interesting and very pertinent question. Because we're obviously very keen to provide what I would describe as optimal information for shareholders. We do carefully monitor what other funds disclose. And as you know, we provide monthly data sheets, we have a more [ fulsome ] quarterly. And then we have certainly a much larger semiannual, as you've just seen, with 63 pages of information and indeed a much larger annual report again. So we do spend a lot of time focusing on what our disclosure is to the market. I also recognize that more information is not always better information. And I would note that we are always trying to balance transparency on the one hand with a certain need for confidentiality to either investment positions or trading strategies on the other. But with those caveats, we would certainly welcome any suggestions. If you think there's information that we don't provide that would be useful, please get in contact with the IR team. Now not too surprisingly, there are quite a few questions on the dividend and share buybacks. So I'll try and sort of tackle these in some sort of thematic process. So one reads: Although I applaud the tender at an attractive discount to NAV, I would prefer to see Tetragon liquidate some of its marginal investments rather than cut its dividend. With a negative market price return over the past 7 years, Tetragon's only source of investor return to recent years has been its dividend. So obviously, I completely understand the frustration with the share price performance, which I would sort of focus on the last 6 months in particular, given the widening of the discount, so over the COVID period. But I don't agree that selling an asset to pay a dividend is a suitable or sustainable solution in the long run. I would also say that the empirical evidence -- and this is from our own trading history, but I think it's the same for many other closed-end funds -- is it's actually, I suppose, low if any correlation between buybacks and dividends, and actually how shares trade versus their NAV. So even if we did sell assets to pay the dividend, I'm not sure that it would make much difference on the discount. So another one here tackling similar approach: Why do you not buy back shares to reduce the discount to NAV? At the current price of NAV, this would result in 100% return. This would be an efficient use of capital. Instead, shares are issued in lieu of dividends at a discount to NAV, further reducing the NAV. These actions tell me that the fund is run for the sole benefit of the Investment Manager, hence the share price of less than half NAV. And similarly, on a similar vein, let me read one more question: Do you realize you're running on a treadmill? By paying the dividend in stock at a massive discount, you completely offset the stock buybacks? Or alternatively, the stock dividend is just as dilutive as the buybacks are accretive to NAV. You wouldn't sell shares at such a massive discount, yet you do it every quarter with the dividend. So the answer is, I mean, a lot of things to tackle here. Obviously, we do buy back shares. And in fact, we bought back $25 million worth last month. And to put it in the long-term context, since IPO, we've repurchased $685 million worth of stock. So in principle, we absolutely and in practice agree with the proposal that buying back shares is accretive to the NAV per share. The second point about the scrip dividend as an alternative to investors. Yes, absolutely we have one. We always have. It's at the request of investors. For a certain group of investors, it's a particularly attractive way for them to take their dividends. And they get a meaningful benefit from taking dividends in stock. So that is the intention. But to put it in perspective. If you assume the current dividend and the current scrip take-up and the current discount, then the actual dilution on NAV per share is about $0.04 per quarter. And that is on the NAV per share of $24. So it's relevant, but it's a small amount. And the more important point is over the years we've bought back many more shares than have been issued by the scrip dividend. So we're very cognizant of it. And I suppose, to the last point, which is about run for the sole benefit of the Investment Manager -- I obviously disagree with that point. But I think the one fact I would point you towards is that including dividends and share buybacks, the company's returned over $1.4 billion to investors since IPO. So that's the number I would focus on there. So still on the theme of the discount to NAV, the question reads: The discount is at its widest than it has been for 7 years. Can you please comment on your views, re initiatives, undertaking to narrow the discount, and whether a new approach is required? So I think firstly, let's tackle the widening of the discount from, let's say, soft of very broadly 45 to 60 over the last 3 to 6 months. And I would say, if you watch how it moved, the share price moved down in March with the COVID selloff of all markets, but then has only had a very muted recovery notwithstanding the share buyback. So has not tracked the NAV at all. And I think there are a few causes for that. I mean, the first and probably most pertinent is there has been a seller putting pressure on the stock that we know of. And that obviously, in a relatively low-liquidity environment, has a big impact. I believe there is certainly some caution broadly over companies with illiquid assets. And certainly, there's been some fear, as many investors have discussed with us, over the U.S. corporate loan and specifically the CLO market. So those are sort of some short-term issues. But I think at the risk of, I guess, stating the obvious, invariably, we need to create more buyers than sellers for the share price to rise. And we're focused on -- and I think I've mentioned these before -- but we continued to focus on continuing to build a good business that compounds returns. And that's the key measurement. So a consistent ROE growth, a consistent NAV per share growth, and paying dividends. We did demonstrate that the assets -- and I would say in particular TFG Asset Management -- not only can grow but have repeatable earning streams and therefore support a sustainable return on equity for the business. I think -- and this gets to the point made earlier -- we need to strive to make the business easier to understand, not just for potential investors but existing investors, analysts and the street in general. We would love to increase the liquidated and certainly are trying to encourage investors to trade on a single exchange rather than multiple exchanges. And we're doing what we can to broaden the universe of shareholders. We're trying to get out to intermediaries who are the dominant holders of U.K. closed-end funds, institutions both in U.K., Europe, but also in the U.S. We're actively promoting to try and get analyst to follow the company and write if they so will. So there's a lot that we're doing. And even, obviously, we're doing less physical meetings in lockdown. We've done a fair amount of Zoom and Microsoft Teams meetings with current investors and potential new investors. So that is the path that we are on and continue to be on. I think there are a couple of questions here that I think Paul is probably best set to answer. So Paul, can I get you to fire in on a couple here?