The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company (SMG) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

August 2, 2023

New York Stock Exchange US Materials Chemicals earnings 92 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Aimee DeLuca

executive
#1

Morning, everyone. Thanks for being here on the call for Scotts Miracle-Gro's third quarter earnings discussion. Joining me today are Jim Hagedorn, our Chairman and CEO; Mike Lukemire, President and Chief Operating Officer; Matt Garth, our Chief Financial Officer; and Chris Hagedorn, Group President of Hawthorne. Shortly, Jim and Matt will offer some prepared remarks, and then the operator will open the lines so you can ask questions. As usual, we anticipate making forward-looking statements, so please keep in mind that actual results may differ materially from what we discuss today. I'd encourage you to review our Form 10-K, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, so you can familiarize yourself with the complete range of risk factors that might affect our results. If you'd like to continue the discussion after the call, you're welcome to email me or call me directly at 937 to 578 to 5621, and we'll work to arrange some time as quickly as we can. Finally, please be aware that today's call is being recorded. An archived version will be posted on our website at investor.scotts.com. With that, let's get going. I'll hand the call over to Jim Hagedorn to begin. Jim?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#2

Thanks, Aimee, and good morning, everyone. There are three topics I want to cover. First, how the consumer is doing and how our lawn and garden business is performing. Second, the steps we're taking to make Scotts Miracle-Gro stronger. Third, the opportunities we're chasing to create shareholder value. Let me be direct. The first half was excellent. It came in as we expected. Our teams' execution supporting our retailers on load-in could not have gone better. Retail is challenging right now, and we're working through it alongside our retail partners. Turning to the second half, so far the season isn't shaping up the way we had anticipated, due to lower consumer takeaway. We think that's the result of several things coming together: how people feel after COVID, fewer shoppers visiting stores, severe weather in different regions, inflation, and price elasticity. As a result, we won't reach our +10% POS goal in our Lawns unit. Across the full year, that means an $80 million EBITDA shortfall versus our Lawns target. Our other businesses are basically on track with expectations. So how are we responding? We're going after fall with twice the activation dollars, and our retail partners are joining in as well. Remember, fall accounts for about a third of the Lawns business. Under Project Springboard version 3, we're removing another $100+ million in costs. That effort is already underway, and the savings from our Springboard program are now set to significantly exceed $300 million, and we've amended our credit agreement with our banking partners to get maximum financial flexibility moving forward. We continue to make the tough choices necessary to strengthen the financial position of the company, all without impacting our core franchise; we've improved cash flow by $700 million and remain on target to deliver $1 billion in free cash flow by the end of fiscal 2024; we're directing this cash flow to debt paydown. By fiscal year-end, we will have reduced our debt by nearly $300 million. Our capital structure right now isn't where it should be. We're carrying a hefty amount of debt, and the earnings we anticipated from Hawthorne, from cannabis, and from building out capacity to meet pandemic-era demand haven't come through. The mission is straightforward: we'll reduce debt until net leverage sits below 3.5x, and we'll do it as fast as we can. Some context is worth giving. Our consumer franchise has everything—top brands, a sales force, in-store execution, supply chain, innovation, and strong cash generation. Getting Hawthorne on track within the multi-billion dollar U.S. cannabis industry is a big opportunity for us, and Bonnie Plants gives us a terrific partnership as well. Financial flexibility is one thing we lack, and paying down debt will clearly bring it. The amended agreement provides the headroom required to handle seasonal working capital swings and to seize margin improvement opportunities fully. Our dividend remains unchanged, and we foresee no need to issue equity; that said, let's review what happened during this year and how we are responding. Overall, consumer retail sales in Lawn and Garden increased through Q3, with shoppers spending $117 million more than twelve months earlier. Pricing drives most of that gain, yet it demonstrates that people continue investing in their lawns and gardens. That fact reminds us how strong our consumer franchise really is. We beat retailers and rivals. Based on what major retailers report, we picked up share, and awareness of the Scotts Miracle-Gro and Roundup brands exceeds 80% among all homeowners, millennials included. Nobody is better positioned than we are to build consumer connection and attachment with lawn and garden. Fundamentally, lawn and garden overall remains robust. Household penetration sits 6% above the pre-pandemic 2019 level, which signals that the great majority of consumers who entered the category during COVID have stayed engaged. People who took up edible gardening during COVID are still gardening, and we know that over 10% of those gardening in 2023 are new entrants. Those kinds of increases reinforce our belief that this category will continue to expand. Customer visits to home centers dropped 6% during the year. Our marketing and sales group succeeded in drawing shoppers into stores. We assisted numerous retailers in recovering their spring season. Every month, our point-of-sale volume outpaced foot traffic, often by double-digit percentages. Through the third quarter, gardens recorded point-of-sale increases in both dollars and units across key product lines. Currently, our organic gardening business is valued at $200 million. It represents the quickest-growing segment of the gardens portfolio. That occurred without complete support from every one of our major retailers; we expect our new organic listings to perform substantially better in fiscal 2024. In Lawns, the outcome has combined encouraging and disappointing elements. Let me be clear that Lawns is in good shape as a business. It has been under pressure from the macroeconomy, the weather, and pricing. I'll go through fertilizers and grass seeds separately. On fertilizers, branded POS dollars are up 11%, and at the major retailers we've picked up more than 5% of share. Total branded POS units are down 3%, but the gap between our performance and private label's is remarkable. Private label POS units are down 20%. There was no trading down by consumers — they actually spent more on our brands. On grass seed, POS dollars are up 1%, while POS units are down 8%. We've had single-digit share loss, driven largely by retail pricing at one major retailer. In fiscal 22, we attributed the decline in Lawns mainly to weather. Looking back now, we can say that post-COVID consumer sentiment and inflationary pressures also had a part. People moved discretionary spending elsewhere, particularly toward experiences. That began in 2022 as part of the post-COVID hangover and carried into 2023. In a recent McKinsey report, it was noted that most consumer spending fell in April—just as the lawn season got underway—marking the first decline of that kind since the pandemic. Entertainment outside the home and travel were the sole categories that saw an increase. Our own consumer research backs up these findings. Consumers, when asked why they weren't engaging in lawns, pointed to the economy and budget, and to spending their money elsewhere; they also told us their lawns look good enough. That has a great deal to do with weather, chiefly in early spring, which is growing more unpredictable and prone to weather events and extremes that affect our early seasons. In our view, this stems from climate change. This year, weather patterns across the Midwest and Northeast substantially cut the normal dandelion and weed pressures that bring consumers to our Weed & Feed fertilizer product. The lack of weed pressure hit our Ortho Selective Weed Killer business similarly, with that unit declining by a similar amount across the Midwest and Northeast. Gardens tend to be less exposed to early-season weather because consumers aren't working against a schedule. Planting happens when conditions support growth, and our figures confirm this. This year we increased Lawns spending to connect with consumers early; in March we rolled out the National DayLawn Savings campaign, which matched up nicely with good weather in the South.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#3

That produced a big lift in POS units in Texas — 79% — and in Florida, 86%, at launch. That first wave of engagement generated ongoing POS momentum; Texas, for instance, which is our biggest lawn state, now shows lawn unit POS ahead 10% year to date. Florida is flat. The Northeast and Midwest didn't see that, since shoppers there were still contending with cold, wet conditions while our early national activation ran. Day Long made basically no difference to POS in those regions. We understand that consumers engage when our marketing reaches them at the right moment, so here's the adjustment we're making. Our approach to weather is changing. Because spring has become less dependable, beginning in fiscal 2024 and going forward, we'll spread our marketing and promotions more widely to account for weather extremes and stretch out the lawn season. Spring remains our primary activation window and we won't abandon it, but we'll put more investment into summer and fall to support sustained growth. I've set the team a challenge of pushing 10% more Lawns business into the fall. Regarding Q4 of this year, as I mentioned before, we'll make a strong push this fall, an ideal window for fertilizing and seeding. Retailers are partnering with us on fall campaigns to drive consumer takeaway and right-size their inventories. I look forward to sharing the results of this effort on our fiscal 2024 Q1 earnings call; we've also concluded that pricing — particularly on grass seed — was a problem for consumers. Unhealthy price gaps have existed among our products, competitors, and private label. Some consumers chose the cheaper option. We're tackling this by lowering prices on certain targeted SKUs..; these special programs with retailers will deliver incremental volume lists and expanded shelf opportunities this fall and into fiscal 2024. Looking ahead, innovation matters in lawn and garden. Last month we hosted our annual field day at our Marysville research facilities, where we present new products to our senior leaders and board of directors. The pipeline is impressive; in Lawns, we're working on products that simplify lawn care and on combo products that make DIY easier for consumers with awesome results; we're also keeping weather extremes in mind with drought-tolerant solutions and turf alternatives. These products will launch in 2024; in gardens, organics, natural products, and live goods matter more to consumers. Next year, we'll broaden our robust line of Miracle-Gro organic solutions. Now let's turn to Hawthorne. This business has stabilized in Q3; it held the line, and the daily sales run rate has improved slightly quarter-over-quarter; it's a small win, but a sign there are pockets of recovery in this industry. I've said I want Hawthorne to reach profitability by fiscal year-end. We believe that's achievable, especially since we know many seasonal professional horticultural sales arrive late in the fiscal year. We also continue to actively explore non-cash partnerships with other industry leaders. We’ll enter into those transactions only when they deliver scale and added capabilities that help both Hawthorne and the industry grow over the long term. Talks are continuing with a number of parties that have expressed interest. My aim is to transition Hawthorne into either a partnership or a standalone entity separate from Scotts Miracle-Gro, with us holding the controlling stake. I’m hopeful that I’ll be able to share further progress on that front before long. Turning to the outlook for the whole company in 2024, we have tailwinds ahead that should help margins improve as we work through expensive inventory and capture the advantages of cheaper commodities and reduced consumer inflation pressure. Urea peaked above $900. Today it sits in the mid $300s. Costs for other commodities such as resins, corrugate, and pallets have fallen, and freight rates keep easing. They are lower by mid-to-high single digits in 2024, and we anticipate additional decreases next year. All of that signals opportunities to improve margins and keeps us able to stay flexible with the targeted price cuts we offer consumers. We’ve traveled this path previously, and we’ve come out stronger. That’s how I expect things to unfold now. Our fundamentals are on a strong trajectory; we’re lowering our cost structure, reducing debt, producing cash flow, and investing suitably in our brands, marketing, sales, R&D, and supply chain. I’m very grateful for the support of JP Morgan, CoBank, and every one of our banking partners; they have shown enormous confidence in us, and we won’t disappoint them. I’d also like to commend our finance team’s efforts. In restructuring and optimizing to match today’s realities, we’ve been forced to make hard choices. That has meant parting ways with good, loyal people; we’ve tried to look after them. We wish them all the best going forward. It’s just as important that I recognize the determination of our leadership team and associates. They are skilled, proven, and world-class. Their dedication to winning and to delivering outstanding shareholder returns is unmatched. Thank you. I’ll hand the call to Matt to cover the financials.

Matt Garth

executive
#4

Thanks, Jim. Good morning, everyone. As Jim mentioned, we entered the year with load-in for the first half at a record level; during the third quarter, it became clear that consumer takeaway in the second half would fall short of expectations, which means margin recovery will take longer than anticipated and the deleveraging path will therefore differ. As a result, we pursued an amendment to our credit agreement; in our view, this agreement properly reflects SMG's core strengths and strong free cash flow while giving us flexibility to maximize value going forward. Now to the financial review. For the third quarter, overall company sales reached $1.12 billion, which represents a 6% decline versus the prior year, primarily because Hawthorne experienced a 39% drop in volume. U.S. Consumer net sales totaled $916 million, an increase of $12 million compared with the third quarter of last year. This 1% gain reflects both POS growth achieved during the quarter and elevated retailer inventories at period end. More specifically, our Growing Media business delivered the biggest improvement, with shipments running almost $100 million above the year-earlier quarter, fueled by consumer demand for attractive and productive gardens across the growing season. During the prior earnings call, I mentioned that when May began, point-of-sale unit volumes at our biggest retail partners were basically level while dollar sales had climbed by a mid-single-digit percentage, and the mix skewed toward growing media. As gardening season reaches its peak, the POS patterns we're seeing at the start of August align with those figures. We anticipate a better POS mix during the fourth quarter, since that's when we'll roll out our fall season media along with promotions backed by retailers that center on our branded fertilizers and grass seed. Although overall units trail what we initially forecast, they're still above where they stood in 2019 before the pandemic—which reinforces our confidence that consumers want to stay involved in the category despite the shifting conditions Jim described earlier. Looking at retailer inventories, units are running about 3% higher than a year ago as we head into August. We anticipate retailers will keep trimming seasonal stock, and that will cut into our shipments. Because of this, our full-year net sales forecast for the U.S. Consumer business is now a decline of 2%-4% versus last year. Over at Hawthorne, the industry headwinds persist, though we're starting to see some early signs of stabilization in the top line. Even so, that's still down 40% from a year ago. Net sales in the third quarter came in at $93.4 million, a modest improvement over the second quarter. Customers are looking for value, and we've backed up better demand signals through targeted pricing actions. Turning to what's ahead, North American hydroponics sales for the fourth quarter should stay fairly level with the third quarter; the Pro Horticultural Lighting segment is set to expand considerably, fueled by seasonal patterns and growers' ongoing move from HPS to LED. On a full-year basis, although Hawthorne's total net sales are projected to fall 30%-35% versus the prior year, the impressive effort the team has made to rightsize Hawthorne's cost structure should enable run rate profitability by the close of the fiscal year. Now, regarding the gross margin rate for the entire company, a number of key factors are influencing it this quarter. The adjusted gross margin rate for the quarter came in at 21.3%, which is 420 basis points lower than the prior year, and that pulls the year-to-date rate down by 200 basis points to 27.6%. Looking at the full year, our expectation now is a gross margin rate decline of 275 to 300 basis points versus last year. Five factors are behind this rate decline: First, the biggest one was roughly a 190 basis point decrease stemming from write-downs of pandemic-driven excess inventories in the U.S. Consumer business, which came in $20 million above what we had expected; across the full year, those write-downs will produce a 120 basis point drop in gross margin rate. From where I sit, this is a one-off event, so when estimating underlying performance I'd put it back into the margin calculation. Even though commodity costs have continued to ease, those savings will show up more completely in the back half of fiscal 2024, since channel inventories are higher and production volumes are lower. Material costs explain 175 basis points of the gross margin rate decline for the quarter and 430 basis points year-to-date. For the full year, roughly 95% of material costs are locked, and they are expected to cause a 350 basis point year-over-year decline in margin rate. As we described earlier, we are running operations at reduced levels in order to bring inventories down. In the quarter, reduced output accounted for almost 130 basis points of the rate drop, and for the entire year it was 300 basis points. Project Springboard and net pricing provide some offset to these pressures. For the quarter, net pricing came to 130 basis points, and year to date it was roughly 560 basis points. Keep in mind that the pricing moves from last year reach their anniversary this month; across the full year, net pricing—including volume rebates and promotional programs that ran above plan—should deliver more than 500 basis points of gross margin rate gain, compared with the high single digits of net pricing we had initially expected. To wrap up the quarter, an unfavorable product mix was partly counterbalanced by a favorable segment mix, which produced larger volume declines in the lower-margin Hawthorne business. Across the full year, mix will reduce the rate by 60 to 70 basis points. We have a clear route back to gross margin rates above 30%, driven by a return to normalized volumes, continued easing in commodity costs, targeted net pricing actions, more favorable mix, and the full benefit of right-sized warehousing and inventories in both major businesses. With our most recent actions under Project Springboard, we will deliver savings of more than $300 million. Although our teams have achieved significant gains via Springboard, reaching the margin targets we’ve set will carry over into fiscal 2025, which aligns with the outlook we provided during the previous quarter. The SG&A line likewise reflects how far Project Springboard has advanced. For this quarter, total company SG&A came to $129 million—5% below the third quarter of last year and 34% below where it stood two years earlier. Worth emphasizing is that we achieved these reductions while keeping our core strengths intact. As one illustration, U.S. spending on consumer media advertising—vital to fostering consumer engagement—will increase 25% this year relative to the prior year. When measured against sales, we continue to expect that we will maintain SG&A at 15%-16% of net sales as we move forward. Because sales this year are now projected to be lower, it's possible we finish the year nearer the top end of that range. Putting all of these pieces together, our current expectation for operating income is 7%-7.5% of net sales for the fiscal year, with adjusted EBITDA roughly 25% below the prior year. We expect non-cash adjustments to EBIT to come in $10 million-$20 million above last year, driven mostly by greater share-based payments. Beneath the operating line, we now project a full-year tax rate of 28%-29%, reflecting lower pre-tax earnings. Higher average borrowing costs will push interest expense about $60 million above last year’s figure. One thing to keep in mind: this quarter marks the point where the year-to-date trend of climbing average debt levels stops. When the fiscal year wraps up, average debt should sit roughly $200 million under the prior year. From the Bonnie business, equity income ought to land $5 million to $10 million ahead of last year.

Matt Garth

executive
#5

Now for the bottom line: non-GAAP adjusted earnings this quarter—leaving out impairment, restructuring, and other non-recurring items—came to $66 million, or $1.17 per diluted share, versus $110 million, or $1.98 a year ago. Keep in mind that the one-time inventory write-off running through U.S. Consumer profitability had an EPS impact of roughly $0.25 per share. Moving to free cash flow: it improved by more than $700 million year to date across the first three quarters of 2022, as we kept driving inventory down. We still expect to generate strong free cash flow of about $1 billion through fiscal 2024, and on average $300 million per year going forward. Let me go a little deeper on the credit facility amendment we recently made. That amendment permits higher maximums for our debt leverage, changes to adjusted EBITDA so it better reflects underlying performance, and introduces a new fixed charge coverage covenant. In light of lower Hawthorne sales levels, we agreed to shrink the resolving credit facility by $250 million, bringing it to $1.25 billion. Borrowing costs under our revolver and Term Loan A also rise by 25 basis points under the amendment, plus another 25 basis points whenever net leverage exceeds 6 times. We closed the quarter with leverage of 6.15 times adjusted EBITDA, which includes $41 million of allowable increases to adjusted EBITDA for non-recurring E&O and warehouse closure costs. The maximum net leverage glide path ahead leaves us ample room and flexibility to handle seasonal working capital, weather, and POS swings. Based on normal seasonal ordering patterns, the first two quarters of 2024 are the most acute periods in the outlook, and we have adequate headroom to manage any outside swings. We stay committed to bringing leverage under 3.5x as soon as possible, which would let us return to a more balanced capital approach—preserving balance sheet flexibility while delivering growing direct shareholder returns. Until that point, our cash flows stay earmarked for paying down debt. It has unquestionably been a dynamic period for the company. I want to emphasize that the results and guidance we shared today reflect near-term conditions. 2024 will arrive quickly, and we have laid out the expected high points for the year ahead: broadened retailer partnerships, gross margin improvement, continued benefits from Project Springboard, significant free cash flow generation, and improving financial flexibility. As Jim stated, we are accountable for improving our results. I am extremely motivated to create value at levels commensurate with our market-leading positions. I draw inspiration from the joy our products bring to our consumers, the pride our associates take in shaping the future of some of the world's greatest brands, and the commitment to excellence across every facet of the organization. Our priorities are clear, and we are executing urgently against them. With that, I'll hand the call back to the operator so we can take your questions. Operator?

Joe Altobello

analyst
#6

Thanks. Hey, guys, good morning.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#7

Hey, Joe.

Joe Altobello

analyst
#8

So, a few questions on pricing. You mentioned price elasticity both in the press release and again during this morning's call. Is this genuinely the first time you're seeing it take center stage, if you will? How should we be thinking about pricing going into next year? Commodities clearly are declining — is it possible pricing goes down next year?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#9

For some SKUs, I believe you will definitely see lower pricing. Joe, it's not a simple... This is a topic we've devoted an enormous amount of time to. If you take a look at the whiteboard I have in here, we've been thoroughly examining what's going on. Consider the lawn fertilizer business, alright? We picked up around five share points there, and in our view that figure is fairly cautious. At some retailers our gains were considerably bigger. We simply toned the numbers down somewhat so they wouldn't, you know, confuse us internally. On the fertilizer side we definitely took share, though the category itself shrank. So you look at private label — we mentioned it was down, and I believe the figure was 20%. Our units we'd describe as about flat. On the branded side I'd say they're up slightly. That's a case where our share held even as the category declined. I'm not really thrilled about that, honestly, because if you rewind to the financial crisis period, we applied comparable price increases. After the recovery, volumes fell, yet we earned a great deal of money. So for Lawns going forward, my view is we have to push back on this and rebuild unit volumes, mainly since last year's drop was so steep that... when you examine units sold across roughly ten years, and we were reviewing those figures, they're basically level, perhaps slightly higher through COVID, but Lawns never saw the huge pandemic lift that gardening did. Things have been fairly level. After that sizable drop a year ago, we made the point that when you considered the droughts in Texas and California along with genuinely terrible Midwestern and Northeastern conditions, our view was essentially: "That's a weather event." Now as we examine it, although weather certainly played a part—and honestly, I could spend an hour on this topic. I won't. No, I believe they'd rather I didn't here. One instance involves a category we believe has declined, partly since product pricing has risen considerably—yet rather than losing share, we actually gained it. Grass seed, by contrast, looks somewhat reversed, and that's largely due to a single retailer. Normally we'd expect about a 30% difference between our offerings and private label—and we produce quite a bit of that private label ourselves. Between our team and the merchants, there's a comfortable middle ground: retailers require private label since the better margins it delivers keep them in good shape financially. That works for us. Unlike a lot of other marketing firms, we do play in private label, and we see that as a healthy move on our part. Take one of our retailers—a big one—where that gap showed up: they marked up our grass seed because they were after margin beyond our suggested retail price, so the spread against private label came to roughly 50%. We gave up share at that account. That strikes me as a case where, with a gap that wide—they won't do it again, and that's part of what we mean by specialized programs for particular SKUs. A difference that large won't be coming back. My take is that they’re aware of the—how do I say this—the harm done by letting that gap get so wide, and they won’t let it recur. In one case, we believe grass seed ended up costing more than it ought to have. Fortunately, commodity costs have fallen for both lawn fertilizer and grass seed, giving us room to adjust those prices downward. Mike, I don’t know—anything you’d like to add here?

Mike Lukemire

executive
#10

No, I think it comes down to a mix of units and getting the pricing right for consumers, and we collaborate with the retailers, and together we all achieve the. I mean, in one adjustment we've already seen a 40% lift in units; so we want to drive units, and we want to do that in a way that's margin-accretive.

Matt Garth

executive
#11

That's a really important point — that it's margin-accretive. Absolutely, Mike, since, as Jim just mentioned, you're watching commodities decline. You're watching us handle our cost structure, I'd say expertly, in lowering our average cost. That is margin accretive. So we'll remain ahead of the chosen price cuts we're making, through cost outs and our cost position heading into 2024. It's still early days, as we look at 2024, for that to be margin accretive.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#12

Right, Joe, this is again something fresh, but the price adjustments we're making aren't free; we're not simply offering blanket changes on grass seed or fert or anything else. What we're saying is that in exchange for cost outs—we're pursuing those because we kind of think it's a good idea anyway—in exchange, we get incremental listings and promotion that we didn't have coming into this year. We're working very closely and carefully, and I think in a really positive way, with retailers to offer opportunities for cost outs, focused on certain SKUs that we believe have become expensive, in exchange for other concessions from them on incremental business. That's... You know, this is, as we were preparing for this call, this is just this morning, Mike was telling us about the benefit in the supply chain of...

Mike Lukemire

executive
#13

Yeah

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#14

that incremental load.

Mike Lukemire

executive
#15

When your supply chain is running at complete, total capacity, that affects cost and balance, along with how well our field service teams perform — and honestly, it benefits retailers and us alike. We're after the halo effect that our products create. Shoppers aren't coming in for just one promotion — they're picking up several products, and getting back to that is really what we fundamentally want.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#16

Here you are, Joe.

Joe Altobello

analyst
#17

That's really useful, everyone. Thanks.

Aimee DeLuca

executive
#18

James, would you like to go with Chris next?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#19

Yes.

Chris Carey

analyst
#20

Hello, is it possible for you to hear me?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#21

Yeah, yeah, we can hear you. Right now we've got a small celebration going on here.

Chris Carey

analyst
#22

Yeah.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#23

Go ahead, Chris.

Chris Carey

analyst
#24

A few of them, then — well, I don’t know if they’re quick ones, but here goes. So, you know, this is a pretty significant earnings reset, right? The obvious debate today, I think, is just what this company’s earnings power is going to be, especially as we head into next year. Maybe it boils down to, you know, 2 key debates, right? First — and I know this has been touched on a bit — what visibility do you have that the excess inventory you’re still carrying will clear as we move into next year? Put another way, can you frame in any way the ability to enter next year clean on the inventory side? That’d be question 1. Question two would be: do you see a dynamic where, since you had such good load this year, you’re really building through next year? I realize these are tough questions, because we’re so far from that outcome — given today’s reset, all our eyes are already on next year, and a little bit of visibility, maybe on inventory and on phasing, I think might help people today. Any thoughts you have on that would be helpful. Thanks.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#25

Look, I’ll start and then hand it to Matt. Comparabilities are going to be hard, I think, because the last year has been one of sort of making quarters and dealing with leverage targets. That’s created, I think, sales within quarterly periods where we’ve sort of been incented to make numbers. For those of us who’ve lived it, you know, it was very much kind of week-to-week, day-to-day work where we’d start a quarter looking at how we want to end and kind of what we had to do to sort of get there. Coming out of that and going to a more natural flow, I think, will probably result in, you know, discontinuities. I’m not saying they’re negative, by the way. I’m just saying that it’ll create comparables that are. I think COVID did that by itself. I think our behavior through 2023 probably will make it even more challenging to read. I don’t think that — you know, if you look at our inventories and sort of retail inventories, I think by and large there’s not a giant retail inventory issue. You know, decisions we made, Chris, when you look at how we are sort of talking about the end of the year, because remember, we’re not there. We’re still sort of working our fall season right now. I think for us to have ended up under 4.5 times leverage, next spring — so I believe that was around the end of Q2 — that was roughly when our leverage dropped back beneath the old agreements, back down to 4.5 times. Getting there would have demanded a pretty exceptional year. I think we discussed it. Sure — we went through it internally and with the board, and it was a very different dynamic to head back to the bank and say, "We've made a ton of progress, but 4.5% is going to be challenging." You know, we made this quarter, and I won't debate whether we could or couldn't have made Q4; that's not really where we were. Once we basically said, look, we're going back to the banks for Q1 or Q2 anyway — and again, that's something we'd talked about before, certainly with management and the board — then we just said, with the shortness in Lawns, we're doing that. I then waited for a recommendation from Matt and Mike on how they wanted to pursue the year. If we said the pressure is off on trying to hit a certain number for a leverage count, how do we want to naturally allow the year to end? What I wouldn't do is try to read too much into that, because the recommendation I got from the two of them was, "Let's just let the quarter naturally end, Q4, and we'll build an operating plan to that." I'm not — this doesn't make anybody's job easier, but when you talk about the earnings power of the company, we could have struggled through Q4 and made a better number. There's no doubt that we could have done that, and retailers were willing to work with us. We made a decision to allow — since we're going to the banks anyway, let's just allow this thing to naturally unwind. I think it's a healthy thing, and actually, but, you know... Yeah, Matt, go.

Matt Garth

executive
#26

Okay, Chris. Let me put it to you this way. We’ll begin with Q3. You had $1.17. On the inventory issue, you watched us record a $20 million write-down on certain inventory in Q3. That equals $0.25 per share. For me, I take that $1.17, add back the $0.25, and arrive at $1.42. That represents the underlying earnings for Q3. Moving ahead to Q4, everything Jim just described reflects both tactically and strategically how we are proceeding; it lets us reduce inventory. With the fall programs we’re implementing, Mike and his team are carrying them out to bring inventories down and clear high-cost inventories as we head into 2024. What I’ve said regarding 2024 is that it will be something of another transition year for restoring margin, and I’ll discuss that shortly. Let me finish with Q4. If you consider the full year 2023, Chris, honestly, you just said it, and I believe we’re in the same position. We’re already focused on 2024. The numbers from Q4—we know that is a seasonally weak quarter for us. You’re likely looking at guidance of roughly $1 to $1.25. Again, I’m adding that $0.25 back into the company’s underlying earnings. That gives the full year. Looking at 2024, everything we’re doing centers on encouraging gross margin accretion, and that will probably exceed 100 basis points. SG&A will remain tight. All our efforts to drive costs out of the company will provide support, but the inventory overhang will probably still affect us in the first half; so you’re really looking at a 25, 2025, when you’ll have hundreds of basis points of margin as those high-cost inventories are fully released into the system. As Mike said, you’re gaining efficiencies throughout the entire system. What does that mean for 2024? There is a path back in 2024 where we see $3.50 to $4 per share in earnings, where we see EBITDA above $600 million, and where we see about $1 billion in free cash flow completed over two years, which will be directed toward debt paydown. That should lead to 2025 with improved margins, continued growth—given the share and shelf positions gained during the prior 2 years—and $300 million plus in free cash flow. That, again, will go toward strengthening the balance sheet. I can’t really provide an EPS view for 2025 yet. Also, one caveat for everyone: these are early days. We know the conversation at this point is very much about 2024. That’s why I’m giving you a bit of a preview.

Chris Carey

analyst
#27

That was a very thorough response. I’m not going to ask a second question—just to clear up a few points I picked up on. You’ll still be reducing inventory through the first half. That could constrain some gross margin improvement, which then picks up speed in fiscal 2025. Regarding fiscal 2024, did you state gross margins would rise 100 basis points, or are you only saying they’d be somewhat more pressured—confirming, you mentioned 350 to 400? I’m not sure whether you mean a multi-year figure or whether that referred to what you believe earnings power could be in fiscal 2024. Thanks, Randy, just clarifying that, and I’ll rejoin.

Matt Garth

executive
#28

Chris, I chose my words very carefully. I rehearsed it for three days. The 100 basis points is what you’re looking at for 2024 versus 2023, okay? There’s plenty of work still ahead before we can really pin down what that will be. Mike and the team, through the power of Project Springboard, plus all the optimizations they’re carrying out, that feels good. Plus, what Jim mentioned—growing those shelf positions, increasing our volume—that will all contribute. Together with the other potential items we have in place, that yields a 2024 view of roughly $3.50-$4 a share. A lot to execute on, it’s early days, but that’s what we need to be targeting, and that’s what we’re going after. That would then lead to a 2025 with another opportunity for greater margin expansion as the full deflationary effects on our cost structure work through, our inventories are aligned with the much lower raw material costs we have now, and that will help us move forward. By the way, all of that is essentially what I was addressing directly in that margin bridge discussion and the prepared notes.

Chris Carey

analyst
#29

Appreciate that, folks — many thanks.

Peter Grom

analyst
#30

Thank you all. Morning. Trust everybody's doing well. I suppose what I mainly wanted to bring up was... You provided plenty of detail regarding 2024, though what I was really hoping to get was some insight on the Hawthorne remarks — your plan to shift Hawthorne into a partnership or split it off from Scotts. This has come up for a while now, but, you know, previously the conversation happened from a place of strength compared with where we find ourselves today. Jim, might we take a moment to discuss that choice and the reasoning behind it — why now is the right moment?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#31

Okay. Certainly. Everyone on this call shares that view, incidentally. We have eliminated a great deal of expense from Hawthorne; using fairly cautious assumptions, that unit returns to profit—roughly speaking, you know, within this year. You know, I'm not certain. I believe that matches what we stated in the script. What bothers me about that unit is that, you know, back when it carried a strong valuation inside our equity, when it was generating, like, almost $150 million of EBIT, you know, it was fine. I think absent a meaningful rebound in that sector, and all the matters we're discussing here, you know, I'm simply circling back somewhat to the prior questions. Right now we're in the middle of putting together our first operating plan for next year. For anyone with questions, I'd say the bank plan and those early operating plans are quite conservative—deliberately so, given where we stand, and we're not about to stick our necks out. Assuming Hawthorne makes decent headway—and it will—we're already seeing what I'd describe as a mild rebound in that business. I simply don't believe it's... With the assumptions we've built in, which I consider sensible, it's remarkable that it can hold steady as it is. From my perspective, it appears to be a fairly small piece of the Scotts portfolio. When you examine it, it has introduced considerable beta into our earnings, and we haven't actually discussed that much. I realize I've been dancing around this question, but that doesn't mean I'm trying to sidestep it. Looking at where we stand, Hawthorne is producing negative earnings, and we had put roughly $1 billion into inventory and other capital areas—that's the core problem we're dealing with. You could describe it as about 50/50. A big chunk of what we're doing on the operations side is cutting hard—slash-and-burn style—on inventory, on the capital investments we made, on capacity, across both Hawthorne and Scotts, wiping all of that out. We're still running with, you know, over $1 billion—well over $1 billion—put into it, earning basically nothing, right? It's a good business. Now let me get to this point: we've discussed partnering up with others, and creating this kind of Ellis Island approach isn't new for me—meaning there are some genuinely strong companies out there that used to be worth multiple billions of dollars and now are worth 0. Much of that stems from how investors feel, the challenges the company has encountered, and the fact that it couldn't secure banking services. There are simply so many negative factors you could name in that sector at present. We have no plans to close it; the capital has already been committed. In our conversations with various people, you should all be aware that this is an extremely distinctive property—arguably the finest asset within that industry. When we speak with other partners—every one of them valued at zero, ourselves included, regarding this segment of the business—Hawthorne possesses so much, you know, we truly—we performed well in that area. The core problem is that cultivation isn't profitable for anyone, and no one is investing capital—that's really the heart of it. Plenty of factors explain this. I even came across some solid reports today on the reasons. I believe—I'm not sure, Amy, who authored that report I read this morning, but it's on point, right? We put the money in; we could just abandon it. To me, that would be a waste; we pursued this for a single purpose: growth. You know, we examined lawn and garden. During COVID, we saw an increase of about 30% in lawn and garden. Prior to that, growth was running at a few percent. When we examined live goods and cultivation supply within cannabis, it was clear those areas were expanding at rates several times our own. So we put money into them, and I believe we're still doing so—embedded in our figures is, I can't recall the precise number, roughly $15 million in R&D and innovation spending supporting the Hawthorne business right now. We have the option to step back from that; quite simply, it's the choice between having a future and having none. We could pull those funds and stop spending them. In conversations with partners, industry participants acknowledge the strength of what Hawthorne possesses, and everybody faces the same circumstances. The real issue becomes whether you could bring together players—multiple firms, not just Hawthorne—and combine them. The goal, then, is to construct an enterprise with enough scale and enough profitability that it could operate essentially on its own—regardless of whether that ultimately sits within Scotts or beyond Scotts. My contention, though, is that a business of that kind would need to clear $100 million in EBITDA or EBITA, which I think was the term we employed regarding the operating side. In the near term, I just can't picture Hawthorne getting to that level. And there are plenty of other companies out there with truly strong, outstanding businesses that are also having a hard time—combining with them would give us scale and strategic impact that I don't think we could get on our own. As far as the Scotts shareholders go, the beta that this investment has introduced into our earnings is, I'd say, probably not healthy. One thing we understand about Scotts: it generates a lot of cash flow, and we need to find ways to kind of strengthen the Hawthorne platform and present that, I think, to others who find themselves in exactly the same position—and you all know who they are, right? Build something that has strategic significance. Honestly, going it alone doesn't seem feasible to me. There's real potential here, and in our talks with those parties—different, maybe, from what we'd hear from all of you on this call, where the reaction is that no one else is making such claims. Everyone else tells us, "No, no, you guys really put something great together." Chris, did you want to add something?

Chris Hagedorn

executive
#32

Yeah, no, I just.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#33

It's your baby.

Chris Hagedorn

executive
#34

Yeah, no, that's right. Look, it's been hard, you know, everything we've gone through. Understanding what the investments on this side of the industry did to the core business, the sacrifices the North American business had to make to carry Hawthorne through what it's been through. I just wanted to briefly mention, you know, when you said, you know, making this decision from a, you know, in the past, you've discussed it from a position of strength, and now it's different. Look, obviously, I see the, maybe the irony in what I'm saying. Look, strength is relative, and obviously, Hawthorne is not the business it once was. This sector has changed from how it looked back then. Hawthorne remains part of it and is functioning from a comparatively solid position. In my view, that gives us a strong footing for negotiating and collaborating in partnership discussions. As Jim noted, plenty of genuinely solid companies exist with fundamentally robust assets. Should we be able to combine those with Hawthorne... When Jim mentions partners who recognize this, he isn't referring solely to the cultivation side where our operations are. Rather, when our customers—meaning the folks actually using our products—visit to see what we're doing at Hawthorne, when they come to Marysville and observe R&D and innovation, all the effort that goes into that part of the business, they come away genuinely impressed. They're also highly optimistic—not only regarding the industry's long-term prospects, regardless of the current situation, but also about the presence and contributions Hawthorne can bring to it. Look, I realize things are difficult at the moment; we are going to take action. The effort the team has put in to bring this business back to where profitability is genuinely achievable has been enormous. Nobody has had an easy time of it. Once again, I believe we sit in a comparatively strong spot relative to many others across the industry, and our aim is to move forward—not on our own, but jointly. There is a great deal of—

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#35

I want to spend just a moment, Chris, discussing what that strength has cost us. A few of the folks we've spoken with have a theoretical sense of how they could trim costs. Here, we've got absolutely blood all over us because of what we're doing. You know, dude, there was an entirely separate round of layoffs this week here, okay? Because we've been proactively handling our self-help, okay? When we speak with some of these partners, a number of them on Chris's side inhabit the same world, and they've made some of those changes. On our end, we turn up with total certainty in our numbers, since they're produced through blood, and that blood has been let, okay? So, you know, bringing Hawthorne back to profitability was, you know, shotguns and knives. We've already accomplished it, unlike some partners of ours who say, "Well, I could do this and that." We've already gotten it done. Part of the strength in these conversations comes from the certainty that we've already done it, you know? I, I don't know, Peter, whether that helps at all.

Peter Grom

analyst
#36

No, that truly covers a great deal, and I appreciate all of that detail. So Matt, thank you for all the context you provided Chris regarding his 2024 question. Perhaps just a few points of clarification, since reaching $3.50 to $4.00 appears to be a fairly substantial earnings increase compared with what's implied for this year. First, regarding the 100 basis points of gross margin expansion — does that come on top of what you'd recover from cycling the write-downs? I believe you mentioned that's 120 basis points. Is that a total figure? Whatever the number is, take 270 to 300, add 100 to it, and that would get you there. Then what I'm trying to understand within that is maybe what's assumed for leverage and interest expense? I think it would help to bridge us to $3.50 to $4 with 100 basis points of gross margin expansion. That would just be helpful. Thanks.

Matt Garth

executive
#37

Yeah, no worries. I do think, first, you have to factor in that there's top line growth next year, right? Right out of the gates, everything Jim and Mike have talked about is growing mid-single digits in U.S. Consumer next year, which comes with margin also rising that 100 basis points. Just to clarify, I'm framing this as full year 2023 versus full year 2024. As I said, what's flowing through is more volume, more cost reductions, and more capability expansion that we're adding to the shelf through innovation. All of those things come into play. That gives you a path to margin growth and EBITDA growth that moves in step. As you go further down the P&L, yes, you're right. We'll do the same thing we did this year. You'll see steady debt paydown of roughly $300 million next year. That obviously feeds into the net leverage calculation at an average of about $200 million. Along with that, interest expense should come down. You can work out the numbers yourself. At the moment you're averaging about 5.25%. Probably next year you'll land somewhere in that 5.25%–5.50% band. So I'll let you run the math. Though it will be on a smaller debt balance, and the tax rate likely gets somewhat better next year. As you know, this year we have a higher effective tax rate because earnings are somewhat lower. When earnings rise, those fixed tax items are covered more, and your effective tax rate comes down. I'm thinking it drifts back toward the 25%–26% range. So when you combine all those elements, that’s what contributes to driving PS growth compared with a year earlier.

Peter Grom

analyst
#38

Understood. Many thanks. I'll relay that.

Eric Bosshard

analyst
#39

Morning. A few points. Jim, I'm curious about pricing — how it's played out this year and what you're thinking for next year. I just want to know where that's headed and what your strategy looks like there. You've touched on it somewhat. I'd simply like to grasp it better. Have we reached the stage where you believe consumers have resisted pricing, such that achieving volume growth — and mid-single digit revenue growth next year — requires a meaningful shift in your pricing approach? Just give us some clarity on that.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#40

Well, I'd begin with what's notable: we aren't raising prices next year. Let's begin there. Eric, I'm not certain we've witnessed consumer pushback. As I said regarding grass seed, I believe we all think we have. I'm not certain we grasp it fully. Consider the Lawns business. You picked up 5 share points — again, I called that conservative. The category shrank. Perhaps that's the pushback. If you look at the research data we had, people said they were simply keeping an eye on their pocketbook — I don't think it's only us. I think it's every kind of product. Grass seed, I think, was a fairly unique case where a retailer actually priced our Sun & Shade above the recommended retail level and offered a private label item 50% beneath us; there, the consumer did vote. That's a very unique circumstance that won't recur. I think we began on pricing — and Mike, feel free to chime in at any point — is that we aren't raising prices. I don't think retailers would tolerate it much, and I think we do feel some of our products have become quite expensive; those were really lawn ferts. The combo products tend to be expensive regardless, and grass seed too. We've had conversations with retailers over the last 2 months that are, you know. I think you can begin with Depot, who publicly — I think, when Ted's spoken — is seeking cost outs within their system, and they're speaking with vendors about taking part, and they speak with us about that. Within that, I think the underlying thread of the conversation is that we were actually responsive on pricing for lawn ferts and grass seed, in terms of how we could participate with them — which, ultimately, I suppose a cost out amounts to a price cut. We've kind of aimed these reductions in return for concessions on listening and promotional support that's incremental to anything we currently have. Well — honestly, Eric, I see this more as a discussion, and it's a bit different from how you're framing it. Did we suddenly notice pushback from consumers? Not exactly. What we said, essentially, is that we aren't raising prices because we felt our products had already become pricey. The way it works with agricultural goods — food, that is — we spot these trends early since many of the same inputs affect us. You're dealing with farm commodities, urea, assorted nutrients, the chemicals that go into products, pallets, plastics, freight — everything has been climbing in cost. We've given back a great deal of that pricing. For us to simply presume we could push through price increases — I don't believe we'd have judged that wise for the company, and perhaps that's the point you were driving at. But being able to take part in cost-reduction arrangements with retailers in return for volume gains that went beyond what we — and I mean genuinely beyond what we currently have — I think that matters. Which is the very question that came up this morning while I was speaking with Mike, as we were trying to guess what might get asked. These deals are margin-accretive for us — not just positive on dollar margin, but positive on margin percentage too. Keep in mind, we expanded our supply chain during COVID, much like others did. Now that there's unused capacity in that network — demand truly hasn't shown up, and we witnessed that again this year — having extra business that puts more through our supply chain is genuinely a big plus for us on a margin-percent basis. On a percentage basis, it actually covers its own cost. I don't know, Eric — what's your take on that answer? We can discuss it, but I'm not attempting to be foolish here. Anyway, it's always a pleasure talking with you, Eric. I mean that.

Eric Bosshard

analyst
#41

Yeah, I'm just trying to figure out how all this fits together, because The Home Depot, your customer, wants to reduce costs. Your consumer has essentially said, "At that price, my lawn is good enough." Units are down. And you're saying, "It's great to load volume." It really feels like all of that suggests one route, which would be cutting the price to solve those issues.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#42

Well, I suppose that's basically what we're doing. I think you're misinterpreting what I said during my prepared comments, okay? Basically, if it's affordable, my lawn is fine as is. For those of us in the Midwest and Northeast, you experienced a genuinely soggy start to spring, and lawns were in excellent shape. They weren't dried out. I think people were trying to save money, and my lawn looks acceptable. From our perspective, much of that "acceptable" came down to the weather—my lawn appears fairly green with no effort at all, and that's exactly what happened this spring. Don't misinterpret the data. Mike, anything you—

Mike Lukemire

executive
#43

No, I mean, take Texas — we over-indexed there. The weather cooperated, and we ran the promotions plus the advertising. We were really— I mean, what was that percentage at the start? It was around 90% low, and we felt genuinely optimistic about it.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#44

Eric, I think in dollars, in Texas.

Mike Lukemire

executive
#45

Yeah.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#46

We're up, well, more than 25% so far this year. Texas is our biggest lawn market on its own, and there it's up about 25% in dollars. I don't recall exactly how we put it, but unit growth there is above 10%...

Mike Lukemire

executive
#47

Right.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#48

—up, year to date. So I mean, listen, this is one of those situations where honestly I don't know what all of it... I wish I could tell you I know precisely what it means. Matt and I have put in a huge amount of time this week insisting we've got to actually come up with an answer here. You know, Eric, here's one thing, and this really applies to everyone: our spring season has turned into very much a Weed & Feed season. Consider the Day-Long Savings initiative we launched early on—it matched up quite well with conditions in the South, and by now I know these figures inside and out. In regions where the weather cooperated, results were strong; as we've noted previously, promoting it where conditions are poor produces little effect. For Day-Long Savings, a promotion run nationwide, we observed no movement whatsoever in the needle—though it brought in substantial load-in, which was beneficial; even in northern markets, retailers had prepared. So then, because basically nothing happened with DayLawn up in the northern markets, it became essentially a Black Friday—just one single Black Friday-type event—where the lawn season's peak in, say, the Northeast lasted one week, right? That's when the product was being promoted. Part of that falls on us. We and the retailers became really fixated on Weed & Feed. And then you wonder, "What do people actually want? Is it a green lawn they're after, or dead weeds?" Lawns adopted this stance—the brand folks at Lawns said, "Man, the weed season in the Northeast was just sort of messed up." We replied, "Yeah, you know, that's what you're saying," right? It seems we might come across a bit like you—at least that's your take. So we revisited the Ortho figures, and they turned out to be essentially identical. Ortho selective weed was nearly the same, too. Part of what’s happened with Lawns is that in the spring season we’ve shifted heavily away from a halt-plus-weed, plus-dandelion approach; it’s turned into Turbo plus two, one large mondo promotion, and when weather gets in the way of that, it’s quite disruptive. So that’s roughly how we view these differences across the country, since you’ve got the biggest state in the union from a lawn standpoint, with roughly +$25 and +10 units, and rather poor figures in the Northeast. So how do we tackle the whole pricing question, where you've got one state, and the figure—well, it goes wild, and then we're dealing with this weed situation, and then we check Ortho, and the numbers are identical. Eric, honestly, I can't give you an exact total for all of it—all I can say is we're not gambling here, because I believe the retailers feel—and I know your relationships with them are solid—I believe the retailers feel price was a factor, so that's what we're dealing with. We're approaching it from a position of, let me put it this way, strength, meaning we'll partner with you on this in return for XYZ, and all of that is incremental. Here's what I think happens next... Look, to start with, no one has anything to work with on Spec and Central besides their first half figures, and those were terrible, right? I mean not our first half, right? That's part of what we're discussing here, right? It's that the effort we put in and the relationships we built with our retailers genuinely eased our load, and that lifted our share, right? The... I wouldn't describe these as concessions, but what we're doing with seed and lawn pricing will have some impact on our shelf presence and promotional percentages, in a manner of speaking. My expectation is that you'll observe that in the coming year. Those programs are in the final stages of being set as we speak, yet I'd say we have a good deal of confidence in the results they will deliver.

Eric Bosshard

analyst
#49

Alright. Moving to the second item, which is perhaps somewhat simpler. Purely from an inventory standpoint, you mentioned that during this year you've handled things on a quarter-by-quarter basis for the covenant, which is understandable, and at this point you've built some flexibility around it. That approach clearly required pushing some inventory out to retail. You've discussed the larger bet on fall lawns. My question is this: is there a risk that you close out this year holding more retail inventory than there ought to be, and that becomes a constraint for next year — or am I drawing the wrong conclusion?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#50

Yeah, I don't — listen, I don't believe it's a constraint. I do believe that, for those where we came in under our lawn numbers, there likely is elevated lawn inventory. You know, I personally have spoken with retailers — not that there's an issue, but they do raise it. Fall matters quite a bit, I think, to everyone. I don't know the precise percentages, Eric, but our marketing spend for the fall is nearly 250% higher than last year. We're not only talking... The major fall promotional items are grass seed, lawn ferts, and Tomcat, our rodenticide line; all of them are going to be pushed hard. I wish I could tell you next quarter — we could give you the answer then — but many of these things happen in that transition between fiscal years. A lot of it takes place in November. Our first quarter numbers should reveal how well we've done on both POS, our sales, and Tomcat as well. I don't know. Mike, anything?

Mike Lukemire

executive
#51

No, I think you're going to see retail inventories lower compared with a year earlier, Eric. What remains to be seen is the extent of that decline, given the fall program.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#52

Yeah, I believe that's a key point to keep in mind. As we closed out last year, we didn't claim to have inventory issues; what we said was that inventory was, I think, either below or roughly at the level it ought to be.

Mike Lukemire

executive
#53

All right.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#54

Inventory is going to be lower this year, okay?

Mike Lukemire

executive
#55

Yes, it will come in lower. The real question is by how much, what exactly the promotion involves, and which shipments land in the fourth quarter as opposed to the first quarter?

Matt Garth

executive
#56

Those were retailer inventories, absolutely.

Mike Lukemire

executive
#57

Yeah.

Matt Garth

executive
#58

Regarding where we stand on inventory, Eric Bosshard, we mentioned that of the $1 billion in free cash flow across 2 years, $400 million came from excess inventory. The plan was, and still is, to take roughly half of that this year and the other half next year. As Mike Lukemire explained earlier, working to build some momentum this fall will help pull part of that inventory reduction into 2023. And as Jim Hagedorn just noted, there will be a lot to report around Q1 of 2024 on how all of this ends up unfolding.

Eric Bosshard

analyst
#59

Let me squeeze in one final question. Clearly, nothing was off the table. You expanded the restructuring. You're referring to, I believe, a significant shift involving Hawthorne. You altered the debt covenant, and the board chose to maintain the dividend, even though you won't be covering the dividend this year or likely through the first half of next year. Why? What's the reasoning behind that stance or approach regarding the dividend?

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#60

Look, I think we... I'll answer wearing two hats, alright? Let me begin with the family hat, and that's not because it carries more weight, it's simply the simpler one to articulate. Although the dividend does matter to the family, my eldest sister, Susan, who serves as chairman of the limited partnership, we have. Sue and I have stayed very close on this, and our perspective is, whatever is best for the company is the correct answer, alright? Let's set that straight, which is, this was not some bizarre move by the family to, to preserve the dividend. When we examined this alongside other companies that have either suspended or reduced their dividends, the damaging impact on equity value is so pronounced that it was something that in the conversations Matt and I have had, and we have all had with our banking partners, it simply didn't appear to be worth it; it truly seemed like a kind of third rail issue, it doesn't really shift the leverage figures sufficiently to sort of take the risk on the signal it would send to our equity partners, alright? I don't know, Matt.

Matt Garth

executive
#61

Absolutely not — 100% no. During year one of reducing the dividend, the benefit is roughly 0.1, perhaps 0.15. By year two, it adds up to about 0.3 in terms of the effect on net leverage, Eric. So compared with what we'll accomplish in the denominator of that net leverage calculation, and on the cash flow front in terms of what we can deliver and steer toward debt reduction, it won't make a meaningful difference across 2 years. Another point — Jim touched on this briefly — is that when we spoke with our largest shareholders, all of them strongly value the dividend, our dedication to it, and preserving it while we navigate this period. I'll quote them directly: "Don't solve a near-term issue with a long-term structural impact," and harming the equity in the short term to the degree you've witnessed at certain other companies that reduced their dividend would be significant.

Eric Bosshard

analyst
#62

Great, that's helpful. Thanks.

Jonathan Andersen

analyst
#63

Hey there, good morning. Apologies if this has come up already a few times, but I'd like to see whether I can get a bit more clarity on the 2024 commentary Matt provided. Perhaps you could walk us through once more the thinking, or the baseline assumptions, regarding sales growth and especially gross margin. Is that 100 basis points of year-on-year improvement on an adjusted basis — meaning it excludes one-time adjustments in both years, like the inventory write-downs this year? And then, how much debt reduction are you assuming for 2024 versus 2023? Last thing, I believe I heard EBITDA mentioned at $600 million for 2024. Did I get that right? Is that what the $3.50-$4 EPS figure is pointing to? Thank you.

Matt Garth

executive
#64

Alright. There's a lot to get through. To start, when we look at 2024, it's still early. The reason we're talking about 2024 is to give each of you a sense of how we think we can steer through the year ahead, okay? Circumstances will shift, but these are roughly the waypoints we're setting out. Growth in the mid-single digits. You heard Mike and Jim describe how our retailer relationships are broadening. Every element contributing to that — strengthening where we sit on the shelf, strengthening where we stand with the consumer, so they're activated and motivated to keep taking part in the space. We're seeing volume growth in the mid-single digits. Regarding gross margin, as Eric pointed out quite clearly, we're focused on the factors within our control. There's an additional $100 million in cost reductions, which is incremental, and as Jim mentioned, that process is already underway, so it will show up in next year's earnings. As we move along that path, it means we're becoming more efficient. It also means more profitability lies ahead; we told you this year that we're roughly $100 million behind in U.S. Consumer. That will recover next year, on top of the efficiencies we're already achieving. That's the source of the difference between roughly the low fours—about $400 million of EBITDA this year—and returning to around $600 million of EBITDA next year. Beyond that, you consider the balance sheet and what we're capable of doing. Given that this $1 billion across 2 years, as we've stated, is expected to be split evenly between 2023 and 2024. During this year, we will reduce debt by $300 million. I think it's reasonable to assume that in the following year we'll also reduce debt by $300 million. After that, as I've mentioned, apply an average interest rate landing in the 5.25 to 5.50 range, and you can carry that through to the EPS line. We examined the tax rate and noted that it's somewhat elevated this year, with a trajectory pointing toward 25%-26% for the following year. All of those elements contribute to an EPS shift that puts you in approximately the $3.50-$4 range. One thing I left out — the gross margin rate. My preference is to look at matters on an adjusted basis. Let's go back to what's really happening. This quarter, $20 million is running through the P&L in our U.S. Consumer business. From my standpoint, that qualifies as a restructuring item, and sure, I know I'm the accountant in the room, but in the end, I don't. The genuine underlying earning power of this company — you take that out; it's nonrecurring, it's a write-down. That's what I do. I came to $1.42 in earnings in Q3. My sense is that's simply off from where consensus stood. I take the $20 million add-back to gross margin and build from there. Adding that back would make it incremental. Incidentally — sorry — the margins we report and discuss are adjusted.

Jonathan Andersen

analyst
#65

That's quite useful. Many thanks.

Andrew Carter

analyst
#66

Hi there, thanks, and good morning. Just briefly, if we step back and look at the whole year, weather has created plenty of headwinds. Channel loads have been heavy too. You brought up grass seeds and called it what you see as an isolated incident. Do you still believe you hold a strong position with your retail partners, particularly when it comes to leading the category, or has that slipped? Also remind us about private label at the retailer level — do they earn more margin dollars on it than on your branded product? What's the trade-off when it comes to influencing private label? Thanks.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#67

Alright, I’ll leave aside the question of how much they earn on private label versus our products. I’m fairly confident it’s more on ours, but I’ll defer that to people with better knowledge than mine. Let’s discuss where we stand in terms of partnership or authority in our relationships with retailers. You have no idea how much stronger that position has become because of everything we’ve all been through. I mean at the highest senior levels of our largest retailers. I regard them all as something like personal friends, and that’s not because we don’t matter—it’s because we matter to each other. I’ll put it this way, and I don’t expect anyone to feel sorry for me: it has been a really long year and a few months, like really long. One of the few people I can actually talk about this with is senior execs at our retail partners. When we are trying to make quarters, I have to go visit them, and so does Mike. You know what we learned? Not only are we like personal friends with these folks, but they need us, and we need them, and they see us as not less important, but more important. When we talk about the selective price adjustments we’re making, that will result in incremental listings at our top retailers, you do know what that means. It doesn’t mean diminishing power. It means increasing relationships with our most important partners and the biggest retailers in the world. I would say right off the bat, as Mike and I have had to make sales calls this last year, it has been one of the really great experiences of my life, and I want to thank any retailer who’s listening. To be able to sit with them and share what’s happening at this business and how we needed their help, and they gave it without having to really beg. I can’t tell you how much Mike and I appreciate it, but that is not a sign of a diminishing or weaker relationship. Mike, anything?

Mike Lukemire

executive
#68

Actually, I'd put it this way: the partnership has never been stronger, and each side relies on the other, and we'll collaborate so that both of us come out ahead. That's how I'd frame it.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#69

Well, I think — look, I'd have to rely on the figures. If you examine the past five or six years — my data is a bit out of date — the folks from sales and finance, who are all here, could likely field that question better. Over time, we've clearly been gaining share in, I believe, every category where we compete. If you look back across roughly the last decade — my numbers are somewhat dated — what I'd call fairly typical would be perhaps 50/50 in units. Inside that 50/50 unit split, likely 60+% of the dollars come from branded products in that mix. They earn a bigger margin %, no question, on that, but I'm certain in dollars it's the branded side where they make much of their money. I think those figures are fairly accurate — which is, say 50/50 units; that's probably 60+% of our business, and 40% private label dollars. Margins are better, but the dollars, I'm quite sure, are higher in our space, and everyone's nodding yes to that, Andrew. I don't know whether that answered your question.

Andrew Carter

analyst
#70

Yeah, it did. Thank you. I'll go ahead since it's late, pass it on.

Jim Hagedorn

executive
#71

Okay, thanks.

Operator

operator
#72

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now dis-disconnect.

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