Toyota Motor Corporation (7203) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Thank you for joining us despite the short notice today. I would like to begin the press conference. I am [indiscernible] from the external and press -- and the Public Affairs division. Thank you, I will be serving as MC. We would like to receive words first from our Chairman, Akio Toyoda, to explain about the cases.

I am Akio Toyoda. On January 26 this year, we received instructions from Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, MLIT, to conduct an investigation on type designation applications, which we followed. The investigation is still ongoing, but it identified that 7 models, including those that have already ended production since 2014 were tested using methods that differ from the standards defined by the national authorities, and we reported this to the Ministry on May 31. This matter involves 2 companies: Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota Motor East Japan. As the person responsible for the Toyota Group, I would like to extend my sincere apologies to our customers, car enthusiasts and to all stakeholders for this issue, following Hino, Daihatsu and Toyota Industries Corporation. I'm truly sorry. All the cases are related to certification. The certification system in Japan verifies whether a product meets the established standards, mainly in the fields of safety and environment using measurement methods in accordance with rules. Vehicles can only be manufactured and sold after meeting certification test standards. The point of this issue is that the vehicles were mass produced and sold without going through the correct certification processes. For the detailed explanation, I will ask Shinji Miyamoto from the Customer First Promotion Group to explain.

I am Miyamoto, Shinji Miyamoto. Please allow me to explain the details. First, we believe that the certification process is the bare minimum and most important process for mass producing and selling cars to customers and ensuring that they can be used safely and securely. Broadly, there are 3 ways to conduct certification. The first is to have an examiner from a designated technical service witness the test. The second is for the automaker to carry out the in-house certification test themselves and submit the data. The third is to submit the compatible development test data for certification. This time, cases were found in the second and third test types. Six specific types of cases were found this time. Here is the list of those 6 cases. This is the first case. During the partial redesign of the Crown and Isis in 2014 and 2015, development test data using an airbag timer system was used for certification application. When a collision occurs, occupants are protected primarily by seatbelts and airbags. In the case of Isis, we were developing features of the seatbelt to improve its performance. In the development test, a timer ignition method was used to create a more severe collision condition than those used for the certification test, and those results were provided. In addition, for the Crown, additional model development was being done. Development tests were conducted to confirm the occupant protection performance of seatbelts and airbags, A timer ignition method was used to ensure the deployment of the airbags in the test prototype. At this point, the performance of automatic airbag ignition had already been verified in an existing model. In both cases, certification tests should have been reconducted under conditions as close as possible to what would be delivered to the customer and the data acquired then should have been submitted. However, here, the development test data was provided and used for certification. Next, the second case. In 2015, during the development of the Corolla, one of the test items was to check the damage to a pedestrian's head in a collision. Development test data under a more severe test condition was provided and used for certification. As shown in the figure, the impact angle of 65 degrees is the more severe test condition. The test should have been reconducted with a 50-degree impact angle stipulated by regulations, and this data should have been submitted for certification. However, the development test data was provided and used for certification. Next is the third case. In 2015, during the development of the Corolla, Sienta and Crown, one of the test items was to conduct and check the damage to a pedestrian's head and legs in a collision. The data of the opposite side of the preapplied measuring points was used for certification, and the data of one side was used as data for both sides of the measuring points for certification. It was confirmed that the test results for the left and right points of the vehicle had no difference. For the certification process, the test should have been reconducted with the selected measuring points, and this data should have been submitted. There is a process to apply for and obtain an agreement from authorities in advance to determine the measuring points. However, we believe that there was insufficient communication with a designated technical service when changes occurred to the structural changes and technical verification during the development process. Next is the fourth case. This is about a test item to confirm of any fuel leakage or other effects due to the impact of a rear-end collision the development of the Crown in 2014 and the Sienta in 2015. The development test data using a moving barrier under more severe test conditions was provided for certification. In this case, a 1,800 kilogram moving barrier was used for development tests. This is heavier than the regulation standard of 1,100 kilograms, and the test was conducted with a greater impact. Here too, tests should have been done again using the 1,100 kilogram moving barrier stipulated by regulations, and this data should have been submitted. Next, the fifth case. During the development of the Yaris Cross in 2020, a test was carried out to examine the damage caused to the rear seat when luggage placed in the rear space of the vehicle moves due to the impact of a collision. After the regulation changed, there was additional requirements for luggage blocks. However, the development test data using the old blocks applied for certification, test should have been done again using the new blocks, and that data should have been submitted. Lastly, the sixth case. During the development of the Lexus RX engine in 2015, certification test was conducted to check the engine power. In this test, the targeted power could not be achieved or was not achieved. When a problem like this occurs, tests should have stopped, the cause investigated, and measures taken. However, the engine control system was adjusted to achieve the targeted power and the retested data was used for certification. This case is different in nature from cases 1 to 5, in that results were changed to meet the standards. A subsequent investigation has determined that the cause is the partial collapse of the test muffler. The 6 cases explained can be grouped as: Cases from number 1 to number 5 are cases of development test data applied for certification. And Case 6 is a case in which the automaker conducted its own certification test and submitted that data. In terms of the scale involved in the certification explained today, we certify about 50 models per year and submit about 7,000 reports over 10 years. The content of one report, for example, in the case of pedestrian protection that I referred to earlier, includes the results of numerous point collision tests and the results of tests on the left and right sides of the bumper. We don't have the total number of test results at this time, but we have -- we're reviewing tens of thousands of test results. Although we are still in the process of reviewing them, we have reported on 6 cases today. This concludes my presentation.

Although still ongoing, our investigation involving tens of thousands of items has revealed 6 cases. We have conducted internal verification again on all the cases and confirm that all cases meet the legally defined standards and can, therefore, be used safely by our customers. Nevertheless, these acts shake the very foundation of the certification system and as an automotive -- automobile manufacturer, we believe they are acts that must never be committed. After the press conference on January 30 of this year, my immediate action was to ensure that everybody involved, including myself, correctly understood the problem. Therefore, in February, I took the lead and called on Toyota, Hino, Daihatsu and Toyota Industries to hold the TPS Jishuken or Joint Kaizen Activities for certification work. First, we focused on the processes in which certification-related work was most prone to problems and began by visualizing the material and information flow diagram. As a result, work structure issues have now become clear, and we will carry out concrete improvements. The other day, I went to the genba myself and checked on the progress. The president of each company, Oyaji genba leaders, veteran engineers and young employees who have been working at the company for a few years participated beyond the boundaries of titles and individual corporate frameworks to learn from one another while studying the material and information flow diagram. By so -- doing, we were able to find where the problems were in the work structure. We also discovered that not only Toyota but also group companies are facing the same issues. That is where we are at now. Since we are all part of the same group, we should talk to each other and continue to make improvements together, including top management and genba employees. And I feel that we have taken the first step in that direction. I intend to expand our efforts throughout the entire group and restore authority to the genba to create a solid corporate culture that makes ever-better cars. These efforts will need to be done steadily and will take time. But I will go to the genba myself and take responsibility for the progress. We appreciate your kind attention.

From here, we would like to begin the question-and-answer session. From those on site, we would like to ask first for any questions. And if you have questions, please raise your hand, and the microphone will be brought to you. And please mention your name and affiliation. And since we would like to receive as many questions as possible, we would like to limit the questions to 2 per person. Thank you for your understanding. For the person in the front row, the second person from the right-hand side.

From Nikkei, my name is [ Yao ]. I have 2 questions. Both of the questions are for Chairman Toyoda. Why is it that this irregularity occurred? And why is it that there was not the voice raised up in the company and you overseeing this irregularity? You talk about these -- going after size and volume. Also that there was not enough attention paid to the genba. But once again, why do you feel this happened?

Well, first of all, on January 31, I explained about the irregularity occurred at 3 companies and explained about Toyota Group's vision. And since then, what I started immediately is that -- including myself, try to understand what is the process that was performed. And what happened actually, I did not have a correct understanding, including others. So from planning, development, design and production preparation, for all of the processes that is required for the certification, we looked at the flow of information and flow of the parts and goods. So we've created a chart -- a flow chart to understand what is happening. And for your -- [ Yao-san's ] question, we try to answer what is happening? What found out with that activity is that for Hino, the lead time is about 900 days. It is -- they are doing a work that has 900-day lead time. And then Diahatsu, 1 year and TICO, TMC and also TMEJ, a work that occurs for 1 year long is being performed by various and multiple divisions. So the unit of time that we are looking at is about 1 year. So where is the delay occurring? Where is process that is advanced? And no one has a clear understanding of the overall picture, and everyone tries to do things quickly. And that's fine. That attitude is fine. But when we think about it, originally, the starting point of information flow will be about many design changes or the planning changes. And if that happens, there will be redo and rework that occurs at many areas. And then for the later processes -- the post processes, they will have more waiting time incurred. And including myself, no one was aware or had a good understanding of this overall process, the total process. Probably no one in the whole auto industry understands the big picture, the whole process. But by doing this activity to create a flow chart of information and goods, there were more understanding of the big flow. And also for the work itself, if you are related to certification, sometimes it is very vague on what you need to do, and there were many cases that we were dependent on an individual scale. So some of the veteran members might recognize a problem but then if it is a newcomer, since there is no clear rule, it was difficult for them to become aware of a problem. And also, this was different according to what company we talk about. Everyone has -- was doing it in their own way. And so there are many ambiguous things and then problems occurred. And we had very short delivery time to redo all of the works necessary. And at the end, there were a strong burden placed on the people at the later processes. So when we think about what the true causes is as we have to think about the prevention of reoccurrence. And when we are asked about what -- how -- what the true cause is, my answer is that there is no one true cause. It is that a very long lead time is here. And there are many divisions and parties involved. So we need to look at the overall picture, the thorough end-to-end picture and see what is happening when. At this current time, in every certification process, we are trying to create a standardization of what needs to be done and also the quality criteria that needs to be guaranteed has been organized. So this is up to where we have been able to do. And if we can work further and create a standard and criteria, we can understand what is abnormal and to -- abnormal management, but probably it will take until the end of the year. But when we talk about irregularities, well, rules, if we are asked whether we were compliant with the rules, we found cases that we were not compliant with the rules. So there are tens of thousands of items and there were 6 types of cases found. However, probably, this is a -- sometimes a heavier and more severe condition tests were performed in some of these cases. And for certification, that is a rule to make an approval of mass production. When you think of this in a natural way, so there is the specification for mass production and many numbers and there are these tests for each of these various types of specifications. But in reality, maybe if -- we have to do that. But in reality, it will be impossible to do all of the test for all of the specification. That is why with the authorities, together, we decide on which will be the representative items that we will perform the test on and what will be the most appropriate test to perform. So that kind of negotiation will be done in order to decide what test items to perform. And in that stage of negotiation, sometimes we will say that "Well, we had more severe test done in development, and therefore, we should -- we don't need to do the certification test." But was done on just one side, and we didn't talk with the government. But when you talk about safety. We have -- safety is guaranteed. So we have secured the safety and security for the passengers, occupants of the car. But these things -- many things are happening in the group companies. And by having this instruction to do an overall thorough test, there were many things we became aware of and rediscovered. In that sense, to the Ministry, MLIT, we are grateful of receiving this kind of opportunity to review ourselves, but we need to think about the usability of these kinds of procedures and people who use these procedures and also to secure the competitiveness of the industry itself. And therefore, in order to achieve those things, I think for what we learned through the process that we have been going through, I think we should go through JAMA and other opportunities to be able to work together with the government authorities so that people -- we can create a rule that people can feel safe and secure once those rules are abided by. And so it is an irregularity that we have found. However, I think what we need to do is to create a traffic with these rules that -- together so that everyone will be -- feel safe and secure. And what we did wrong was an area for a certification process that we did wrong, and we need to correct that. And however, if we correct all these things now, we can't guarantee that in the future, we will be -- always say we will not have any problems in the future, forever. But -- so in that case, when we find something, we will be -- of course, make sure to report.

Thank you very much for your question. And so for what -- as I have explained, first of all, regarding the laws and regulation, we -- certification process is very important in relation to laws and regulation. Therefore, our sincere apologies to have done a wrong process. And -- but for Toyota Motor Corporation, we are trying to deliver safe and quality vehicles as much people to -- as possible. That is on our minds. And for the most safe and secure car as -- for the explanation, I think you understand that the test we perform has that target. However, because that thought is too strong, we have had a case where the certification process was not fully followed. And probably -- and so we were not fully following the rule in that matter. But -- and we are still in the middle of investigation. And therefore, the challenges that we have one by one, we need to do a deep dive and to understand what has happened and also to take the necessary countermeasures and -- to take the measures.

So I'd like to go on to my second question. The second question I have is that for -- how much burden the genba people are feeling? For Toyota's case, you have many numbers of models that is launched in the market. And for the development, for example, Yaris Cross, it is subject of the report this time. But first, the introduction was not planned for the domestic market. But Chairman, I think you were the one who had the idea during the planning stage that it should be launched to the domestic market as well. So when the number of models increase or when there is a sudden change in the plan, what -- how do you feel is the burden on the genba?

Well, yes, I do feel that there is more burden on the genba when we do that. But can you explain from the genba's perspective?

Yes, I would like to respond. In the case of Yaris Cross, the form of the vehicle is not a dedicated model. And therefore, whether or not it meets the law and regulation -- since it is not a dedicated Japanese model, it follows the UN certification rules. And therefore, there was not much additional pressure or a burden on the market. However, we need to look at how much burden has been on the genba with the plan that we have with the number of models that we have in plan. So we want to stop here for a moment to redo that review and be able to understand the issues that if -- the genba is feeling.

Now the next question, please. That's the third row from the front.

[ Fukui ] of Nikkan Jidosha Shimbun newspaper. Two questions. First question, such irregularities in group have been identified in multiple cases. And why is that such was not discovered at Toyota, TMC? Why is that there was a delay in identifying or discovering such irregularities at TMC itself?

Could you repeat the question again?

I'm asking why discovery of such cases was late?

Well, the MLIT gave us an instruction on January 26. That is, in mid-December, the Diahatsu case was revealed and -- in the wake of that, the set instruction came from the Ministry and therefore, we examined each one of the report, which contained tens of thousands of items. In order to discover these such -- the cases or factors, which test was conducted by whom and when, under what kind of conditions resulting in what results. We have to examine each one of those questions and also have to ask the people who were involved back then that require detailed examination and investigation. And then the data produced was different than what was submitted for application in some of the cases, that were discovered. Well, of course, we wish we could have discovered them earlier, but I have to say that investigation was extremely challenging and difficult. And in fact, investigation is still going on. Toward the completion of investigation by the end of June, we are striving for discovering all those cases, if there are any.

The second question I'm asking Chairman Toyoda. The -- for 7 (sic) [ 6 ] cases, except for engine, the -- for other cases, you imposed more stringent conditions. So therefore, I wonder whether users would call them as irregularities. And today, in addition to Toyota, there are other car manufacturers, who's -- the result of investigation was reported in the wake of the instruction by MLIT. Do you think there is something common among car manufacturers as the challenges in this car industry, for instance, in Japan, the prior certification is what is conducted. But in the case of the United States, the system is different, you get certification afterwards. And globally, we are seeing increasing intensified competition. Therefore, such -- the differences among rules and the regulations among different countries might be a kind of constraint, but have you identified any constraints or problems that resulted in such a case?

Well, the -- about the certification system, for mass production in order to ensure safety and environmental factor, it is in a way to get approval and permission to produce such a car. Well, in principle, all the cars that are on the road around the globe should be examined and investigated and then say that they are all safe. But practically speaking, that's impossible. And therefore, in view of such impossibilities, we consult with the government, the regulatory authorities to see this would be the condition and specification that will be applied to this kind of test for certification, that's defined in such a way, yet there are some ambiguities and from car manufacturers to car manufacturers, or in some cases, depending on the individuals and interpretation, sometimes tests are performed differently. And also depending on destination market, the rules could be different. Therefore, in the case of the rear-end collision, the 1,800 kilograms is included in the condition in the case of North America, but that is 1,100 kilograms in Japan. Therefore -- well, I'm not in the position of commenting on such differences, but for Japanese car OEMs including Toyota, we are globally operating, and therefore, what was approved in Japan is the one that was subject to the most stringent conditions so that it is safe in other parts of the world. I think that will be the simpler way to proceed for other OEMs as well as TMC. The investigation is still going on. But once the situation becomes clearer then, I'd like to also submit that information and report to JAMA and within the industry association JAMA, hope that will be discussed and then culminated into kind of a set of suggestions or at least a start of discussion as to how we can proceed. But as of now, we have to rectify what has been done. That's what has to be done first. And therefore, for the time being, we would like to secure more time for that.

So we'd like to go on to the next question. The person in the front row, please.

From Chunichi Shimbun, [ Sugito ] is my name. Receiving this case for suppliers and dealers, what will be the impact? This question is for Chairman Toyoda. I think -- was that 3 models are going to be suspended for shipment, and therefore, including suppliers, there will be a production suspension and also the delivery to the customers will be more longer in lead time. So through the Chairman, I'd like to ask what kind of message you'd like to send to the stakeholders? Another thing is that of what kind of guarantee are you thinking of for and compensation you're thinking of to the suppliers if you can...

Thank you for the question. And this time, it was about -- we made a mistake in the way that we conducted the certification process that is the regularity. So unless this becomes okay, we will not be able to do the mass production. And because we cannot do -- perform the mass production, that is why we're suspending the production line. And therefore, we will be providing the full cooperation to the authorities and as early as possible we would like to show that we are able to receive the approval. And once we see that approval, we would like to resume the production as quickly as possible. This is where we want to focus our efforts. Currently, in many forms, delivery lead times and for other reasons, we are causing struggles -- problems to our customers. However, I'd like to say that the car itself is okay in terms of safety, but there is a rule that we have to follow. Therefore, we will be following the rule. However, this is something that is related to many people. There are many stakeholders. And with -- just with Toyota's judgment cannot decide on the delivery date. So we need to receive the understanding and cooperation from the suppliers and the related parties. But -- and once we understand the magnitude of the issue, the executive team will be -- plan, thinking of the necessary measures and activities. So I hope to receive your understanding that we will be explaining when the time comes.

If I can explain a little bit more in specific terms, now in this case, there were 6 types of cases that we have found. And for the models that is continuing, it's Corolla Fielder, Axio and also Yaris Cross. For these 3 models from today, we have suspended the production. And therefore, we be able to deliver the cars to the dealers. And therefore, there will be the problems caused to our customers. For the customers who are riding these vehicles, I would like to say again that the car is safe and therefore you can continue, it is okay to continue to ride the car. And for the plant TMEJ, East Japan, Ohira -- Miyagi Prefecture, Ohira plant is one of the plants. And in the Iwate Prefecture, there is the second line. Two lines will include -- number 2 plant, 2 lines will lines will be impacted. And for the 130,000 vehicles that are manufactured here, part of it will be suspended, and for the timing that this will be resumed, I can't respond. But the -- what I can say that investigation will continue until the end of June, then we will make a report to MLIT, and then we see their instruction and guidance and implement the recurrence prevention methods and then we will receive the judgment from MLIT. Therefore, in the meantime, to the suppliers, and there will be about 200 directly -- direct suppliers. And if we include Tier 2 and beyond, there will be more than 1,000 suppliers that will be impacted. One by one to these suppliers we want to talk about -- do a detailed communication and discuss with them about any compensation if there will be any.

There's 1 more question. Earlier, the Chairman mentioned that the TPS Jishuken or Joint Kaizen Activity has started. So Toyota, Daihatsu, TICO, and Hino -- these were performed. And I think it is toward making improvements in the corporate culture. And you have gathered people from the veteran to the younger generation. And for the series of the irregularities, what have you heard as voices from them? And through the Jishuken activities conducted for -- what of achievement have you made? What kind of progress have you seen? If you can speak a little more specifically about the Jishuken TPS activities?

Yes. Thank you for the question. And for myself, including myself, I had -- did not have a full understanding of the certification system and process. Therefore, immediately, I gathered the 4 companies involved. And we -- I tried to do an Akio Juku -- the certification process, TPS Jishuken activity was held. There were a Kaizen team, improvement team gathered from the 4 companies and starting from planning, designing, development to production and everyone who is related to the certification process, we went to the genba to do the investigation and created the information and parts flow chart so that we can identify any reworking process and any problems to find the true cause and find countermeasures. As we did this, what we found out is that we have a very long lead time. And also for all of the process there was no one person who understands the total process or the full process. And that is what I found and also the companies who were participated found out. And originally, the TPS jidoka or automation is about building in quality at the process. And all of the process needs to have a criteria of what kind of quality that it -- will be built in. But for certification processes, the -- it was -- the shop floor members worked to find that out but -- the shop engineers worked to find that out, but it was very ambiguous in creating that criteria and standard. And looking at and comparing between the 4 companies, there was no standard way of working or standard schedule. And so probably, we assume that all of the makers have been -- have their own way of interpreting, an own way of approaching and doing the certification process. This means there is a high burden on the genba personnel. And this too was something that we finally found out through this activity process, including myself. So this is the first point I would like you to understand. And therefore, the nature of the certification process was quite ambiguous. And at the very end of the process, we found problems, and then when problems were identified, there was very short delivery time to do the redos and rework. And then the final process for all of the whole process was the certification process and the people working at the genba, the certification process was receiving much pressure and burden, and that is how -- that is we believe, is at the background. And now for the certification process, which group needs to do what is trying to be identified and we're trying to organize what is the quality criteria that needs to be guaranteed. So we've started from January, February. So this activity has now passed several months, and we're finally at this point to identify the flow chart. And -- however, what we see that the activities is now being reported by Toyota Times so once they finish the editing, I think they will be able to explain how long the lead time is, how many people are involved, how many information and parts are involved. That situation will become more clear once the Toyota Times reports about this, and I hope that we can receive more understanding about the nature of this process. So going forward, if something happens, if we go out of criteria, if we delay from the standard process, then we want to detect that as abnormality. And for the abnormality management that I'm talking about, it will become possible finally when we create the standard or criteria. However, we have not come to this point yet. And for the quality of the certification process, of course, Toyota and also the body makers, the unit makers, suppliers, there are multiple group companies and many processes and organization that is involved. And we need to make a full-fledged improvement here, and it will take time to do that, to do a fundamental improvement, but we need to really have the determination to do the improvement. Therefore, I think I will be taking the lead in pushing the -- further progress. And probably at the end of the year, we'll be able to make a report for further progress. So I hope to receive the understanding that this is going to be a steady process, a detailed process where we try to understand what is happening at the genba and using the flow chart of the information and parts and process, we would like to try to identify the total picture. And if you can give us the time to do that, we appreciate it.

Third row from the front, in the center column.

[ Ikeda ] of Sankei. This may be the request for repeating the explanation. But the irregularities that were identified in this investigation, were not recognized as irregularities by the people in genba. What I mean is that in the certification process, there are certain requirements and test performed were under more stringent conditions. So if the people in genba knew that they were performing something that was viewed as irregularity. And then they might have voiced that, but rather this was revealed as a result of investigation, meaning that the people on the ground and the genba did not realize that this was viewed as irregularities. That's one. And in relation to that, listening to Chairman Toyoda, for the sake of producing a safe and secure car, tests were performed in genba and then the procedure that will be required in certification process, there were some disparities, they are not consistent with each other. That's the impression that I gained by listening to your explanation. Because of that, what was considered as inappropriate cases were discovered. Is that the right way to understand the situation? So the gap or inconsistency between the safety criteria in certification and the safety standard recognized by the people in genba.

I'd like to ask Miyamoto to answer the first question, and I will be in charge of the second question.

Whether people in genba did not realize they were performing irregularities they might be -- the overstatement if I say that because investigation is still going on, I can't say anything definite. But we have a desire to deliver the fine cars because of such a strong desire, of course, certification is there to ensure the safety and security the product that will be delivered to customers. So that is a minimum requirement. But then there could be some consistency in the production process or some conditions that they consider as more difficult than what is required on certification. And therefore, they might have ignored the significance of certification.

In the process of the investigation, did you hear the voice from people in genba that they recognized that there were some irregularities?

Well, we confirmed our data and also conducted interview with the people in genba. And then, in the investigation, yes, some said that yes, we did have something that was considered as such.

And about the second question, as you stated, I hesitate to say this at this point of time, but I believe there is a kind of gap and because of that and yet such recognition -- discovery was gained. There was a time about the car inspection irregularities that was performed by dealers, and it was provided for under the minute -- the rules, and there was a case when Kaizen activities were performed together with dealers. And it was about 40 years ago or rather the cars that were about 40 years old, so that some of the items were required for car inspection or the performance. But in the case of new cars, that's not the case. In other words, no matter how many years have elapsed, that could be different, and therefore, such tests are no longer needed according to the judgment and discussion by the people that were involved in inspection, and that resulted in such irregularities and yet back then together with the authorities, we consulted and worked with each other and then as new models are introduced and when models are upgraded, the new jobs -- new work is added. And on the other hand, we should have identified which work is no longer necessary when new work is introduced. And that's something that we should have done together. I'm not in the position of stating that yet. This could be a right time for the government and OEMs to communicate with each other about the requirements for the sake of the customers, drivers. And for the competitiveness of the car industry in Japan, what is the right way to develop a system that would meet those requirements. I hope that, that will be what is going to be developed but I don't think that's what's something that I should advocate here. I hope that you would keep that in your mind but hope that such atmosphere be eventually developed.

So I think we should take questions from those participating online. Those who are participating online. And if you have a question, [Operator Instructions]. Mr. [ Naoto ] Ikeda, we will switch the screen. So when you see yourself on the screen, please start with your question.

I'm freelancer. I am [ Naoto ] Ikeda. So earlier, our Chairman was saying, I'm not in a position to say this and I might be talking about that again. But this time, of course, irregularity is something that cannot be accepted. Of course, that is. But I was thinking -- I was feeling that maybe there is something, a more deeper-rooted issue here. And before Toyota, I've been hearing the Mazda press conference, and it seems very similar. And then thinking about the Daihatsu case and others -- and thinking about this case, the impression I have is for these irregularities, it is a human error rooted as of cause. And -- however, in the Toyota's case, there are some items that has been intentionally used. But in most cases, they -- some members probably were not aware that they were doing something wrong. And there probably was a human error thinking that it was okay. And if people work on this, probably it will be impossible to eliminate all of the human errors. And in this certification process, unfortunately, it is a -- there is no system to resolve any human errors. And probably that will be a big issue. That is what I felt for this certification process. And for the recall process, recall system. I think the system is established on the premise that there will be a human error. And if there is a human error, then later on, you can make an application and do a modification and receive an okay with a post reporting. And I think that kind of design should be incorporated in this kind of a system, the certification system. But -- and if it is not possible to incorporate that into the processes and system, then there will be an error occurring -- human error occurring that cannot be fixed. And then at the end, they can be anticipated that there will be a problem that surfaces. And so what I -- is feeling that this system also needs to be restructured or reviewed so that we can eliminate the human errors. But -- and I think TPS is something that is based on removing the human errors possibilities. So maybe it is going to be a question quite demanding. But my question is whether or not Toyota can take the lead to create that kind of system using TPS. So with the Chairman Toyoda and cooperating with Katayama-san, the Chairman, the President of JAMA currently, isn't it possible to redesign the system so that you can eliminate the human error?

Well, thank you for your question. From end of January, I said that I have started the Jishuken activity. And for Toyota, we are in the passenger car business, Hino is the trucks and Daihatsu, the mini vehicles and TICO making engines. So thinking about that, these 4 companies are handling different types of products. And these 4 companies getting together we've been able to identify and discover many things that we have not before. And for the certification system, we found out that it is not unique, not just unique problems in each of the areas, but there are common areas across multiple companies and multiple business areas. And I'm not in a position to say this, but creating a correct criteria or standard in each individual company is going to be a very large task and tough thing to do. So at this time, what we are thinking is that -- what we found out, what we learned through this case is about the various category vehicles for certification process, what the true state is and what the challenges are, has become more clear through our activities. So we want to share our learnings with JAMA so that we can look at common challenge of the industry and use our learnings for the -- any improvements that we can pursue. And what we want to do is to provide safety and security and peace of mind to the users as much as possible and also to secure the competitiveness of our car industry of Japan. That is -- will be our end target. But this is something that I am not in a position to say here at this press conference. But still, if I may, with JAMA and with President Katayama, we have been working on multiple fronts. And therefore, I'd like to work with -- think about this, too, as in cooperation to think about the correct timing, of course, but be able to share and think about the whole industry as well.

We're going to take another question from the virtual participation, [ Kurahashi ] of NewsPicks. I'd like to now switch the screen, so please wait until your -- you can see your face -- yourself on the screen.

This is [ Kurahashi ] of NewsPicks. Allow me to ask a question. I have a question about the production volume in relation to this kind of certification-related irregularities and issues. For auto industry, looking back, the history, I think there is a kind of barrier, a wall or jinx, I would say, at the order of 10 million units, that may be layperson's idea but in early 2000, it was GM. And then diesel-related regularities for Volkswagen in mid-2010s and then the -- also Toyota was about to be #1, producing about 10 million cars under your presidency for Toyota. So it appears that there is something that would happen whenever the number of cars produced reaches or exceeds the 10 million. You mentioned about a wide variety of models maybe when the scale and the scope of the operation is so increased and then the accuracy required in certification and some irregularities, there may be something that are related with each other in conjunction with the volume, about 10 million units.

Yes, I do feel that there is a god there. You remember the GM, Volkswagen, Toyota, for all of them -- in the case of Toyota, that was 14 years ago. We had to be involved in the public hearing and that resulted in the concern and anxiety for all the customers around the world. And that's when it was around 10 million units of cars was about to be produced. Maybe that there is a kind of the hurdle that is defined and placed by the god trying to see whether this particular car manufacturer is allowed to produce more than that. And after 10 years since then, the planning, development, production and distribution globally in the full line with the objective of carbon neutralities with wide variety of powertrains, the operation is so diverse and complicated, and that we introduced the company system, that's what is in operation right now. For each car, the model for each platform the company is established. So in that sense, I would say that TMC in its entirety, we reached 1 million, but when you look at each company, then that will be smaller in volume. And yet, they could be rather voluminous. So what is important is that we should see each individual customer in each town. So instead of looking at entire fleet that we produce and distribute, whether we should look at each car that is driven by our customer in each town, that kind of sense has to be -- always be recognized. So this time, I think it has less to do with the 10 million units of cars with god, but rather by looking at the flow of the information and material in the process of planning, design, development and production. We should look at the way to identify problems as soon as we can and also consider standardization whenever possible. So it has less to do with 10 million units of cars.

Well, this time in view of the -- in compliance with the laws and regulations I don't think we can use the volume as an excuse. But when the volume is that large, then there will be different shapes of cars with different designs and models so that the -- we engaged in certification as such at TMEJ that's one, by taking into account those stakeholders involved. And the process is so complicated and diverse, we have to communicate with so many stakeholders in such complicated and diverse processes. That's a fact. And therefore, we have to the -- change and improve our mindset and improve the communication, there are various issues associated with those different factors. We have to make steady and strenuous efforts to that end.

And now, maybe we can come back to the venue, for those on site. The person in the middle row on the left-hand side, closer to the aisle.

[ Nagai ] from TV Tokyo. So my first question is to Chairman Toyoda. Hino, Daihatsu, TICO, in the group companies, there has been these irregularities reporting. And probably you were receiving questions in the meantime, why is it that we don't hear about Toyota and now you have this certification issue that we call -- occurring. And so what has happened? What is your feeling? How -- first of all, what is on your mind now hearing about this Toyota case?

Well, honestly speaking, I have this very unfortunate disappointed feeling and also another phrase that comes to mind is You too, Brutus? Well, but coming back, first of all, as I said, Toyota is not a perfect company. And this time under the leadership of MLIT, we have fully cooperated with the investigation, and we have found Toyota issues as well. And personally speaking, I think this -- I am very appreciative to find these issues. When we make a mistake, we're going to stop what we're doing and do a genchi genbutsu check -- and to check what's happening. And then we have been able to recognize that there is more -- still room for improvement for us. The certification rule and system is that there is a decided set of standards. And based on the rules we need to conform whether we are -- have -- that we have achieved that standard. And then passing that -- the test will be able to be approved to do the mass production of that target vehicle. And Toyota is a car manufacturer, therefore, the precondition or prerequisite is that we will be passing the certification or receiving the certification. And therefore, we first have to understand whether we are correctly following the rules set by the certification and are we achieving that criteria. So right now, speaking of that flow chart of information and parts, we are using that to confirm our work process of what we are doing. And the Toyota Group companies, they were the 4 companies that started earlier. And now this time, with -- with the addition of TMEJ, we're going to be thinking together and trying to understand together. And the other companies, we don't want them to say that they are okay. We want to use this opportunity and having everyone join us so that we can use it as an opportunity to make improvements in our work operations and our work culture. So I hope to receive your patience and understanding to bear with us for a little more until we complete this process.

And another question, for Daihatsu, Hino, there was a difference in -- with their irregularity. I think their irregularity was that the genba was over -- went over their capacity. But for Toyota, it was a little change, it's different because there was this difference in the certification and the development personnel, the group and teams were different in terms of organization. But this irregularity occurred in TMC too. And what do you think is the reason why it occurred in Toyota as well?

Thank you for your question. At this time, the issue that we have identified when you look at that, it is about the data used at the development process provided and used for the certification process. As one of the certification test ways, it is approved for certain cases. But for the development side, there is this strong aspiration that they want to make a great car and they have been making efforts every day to make good cars and doing tests and developments. And -- but seeing these irregularities coming out, I think it relates to what I said earlier. So for the certification process, it was not fully -- they were not fully concentrating on the certification process, but more concentrating on the development work. And hearing about the problems appearing about these cases, I was disappointed, too, but I think this was an opportunity for us realize this point. And therefore, we want to take this chance to come identify all of the challenges and issues that we have and think together on how we should make the changes. And I hope that you will be patient in watching us make those improvement measures. We'll work one by one.

The next is going to be the last question due to the time constraint. Yes, I see a hand in the center block.

Honestly, I came here with rather a heavy heart, so to speak. I didn't want to see that the -- those 2 speakers would be accused of the irregularities, but including the media that are present here. It appears that there was not a reaction on the -- of the media. So I'm somewhat relieved to see that. And before coming here, I also checked the reaction on the Internet to see the reaction among the general public. And those, the people that accused the car manufacturers, it was rather minority views. And as Mr. Toyoda repeatedly said that this may not be the time for you to state this. But yet, I would say that this is the best opportunity that is for those engaged in certification, the rules that they have to observe and yet psychologically, they felt that they didn't have to follow that, for instance, the -- instead of 1,100 kilograms, they used 1,800 kilograms. What's wrong with that? Because the rules are there to ensure the good quality of the product. Therefore, the -- objective, the purpose is to just to observe the rule or -- that has to be changed because eventually, that would benefit the users as well as car manufacturers industry as well. And of course, those that are engaged in their certification operation in the day-to-day. Well, the -- Chairman Toyoda has been repeatedly stating that this is not the timing for him to state this, but yet, I'd like to ask him what he is going to take advantage of this opportunity. In fact, TPS should be shared throughout Japan, not just limited to Toyota Group to improve the efficiency. So what is your view on that?

In this press conference, I don't think this is the right place for me to state following but, in fact, as we engage in Kaizen activities, when I face the reality, that's what I learned hard way. And in fact, there are those people, including the those in the shop -- in the operation in genba as well as young people as well. So despite their title, despite their territories, all of them share the same recognition that this is the hard challenge that we are faced with. In the case of Toyota production line, they're changing all kinds of different bolts and how long it would take to fasten a bolt, what is called the unit or the [Foreign Language]. For instance, in each process, the work that is performed in 1 minute that will be accumulated. And then with that, you can see whether the process is slow or fast to move. But in the case of certification, this is not something that you can measure by, for instance, minutes. There is no standard criteria like that. So everybody tries to do it faster. They think it's better to perform it faster yet instead of relying on individual and their expertise, what is the right time for performing this type of work in this particular step. And that has to be defined together with a defined process. I think that's what is necessary. There are some jobs that are so ambiguous so that it's hard to understand what to do or sometimes you have to rely on the individual attributes and sometimes it goes beyond the boundary of the different entities. For instance, the passenger cars, the heavy vehicles, the light or compact vehicles, engines across different types and the categories, we can get together and consolidate ideas, and that could be put forward to JAMA, for instance, as a proposal, that is -- but we should share this common challenge for the industry as a whole for the sake of users so that they can use our products safely and with a peace of mind and at the same time, to improve the competitive edge of the car industry in Japan. In fact, this is a great opportunity for us to do that together with the government, involving them as well. So hope that you would continue to follow us and follow the development.

So rules that you're willing to observe, you feel like following and that's something that would be created and to be observed. That's what I'd like to see.

We're very sorry, but there will be the other press conferences of other makers too. So we would like to stop, end the meeting here. Very Sorry -- so for the person who has your hand up.

[ Sugimoto ] is my name from Yomiuri Shimbun. So this time, for the reason why these 6 cases has you occurred, you have provided an explanation and you were saying that the car making, there is a very long lead time and then for the certification process, there was very tight and with burden on the people working on it. On the other hand, Chairman Toyoda, you have started the Jishuken TPS activities. This Toyota Production System, from a layman's perspective, I think it's about standardization and building in quality, I think that is the basis and foundation of TPS. And with that as an understanding, when we see the development process becoming more complicating, Toyota Production System not function -- is -- let's say Toyota Production System becoming dysfunctioning.

I don't think so. Well, looking at the lead time, it is more than 1 year or 2 years for the flow of information and goods. From the planning, design, the development, production preparation for all of the process involved in certification, we went to the -- we looked to the genba to do genchi genbutsu and we found out that the lead times that take more than 1 year. And for the many divisions involved, including suppliers' divisions, and that is how we are able to achieve the certification process. So we first need to have understanding of the process and then to understand where the information gets together, where the information is -- moves out. And what will be the priority. And no one had the full understanding of the total picture. It's not just that Toyota did not have the understanding of the full picture, but I think this is the same for all of the carmakers. So well, maybe you might say that we shouldn't be boasting that we don't have an understanding of the full picture. But what I wanted to say is that this is a very complicated work, and we're trying to use that flow charge to visualize the flow of information and goods. And for the ambiguous process that we have been quite reliant on the individual's expertise and skills, we are trying to standardize what needs to be done. And this is Toyota Production System. And then together, the quality criteria that needs to be guaranteed is being organized and being -- trying to understand right now. That is what we're doing right now. The reason why is that for the process that takes more than 1 year, we can't have just one person like a guard watching what is happening every minute. And therefore, we need to understand how to grasp the issues. And that will be -- the approach we will take is abnormality management and I think to take until the end of this year, but we are trying to create a system so that we can detect abnormalities occurring in the process. And if we can do abnormality management, if we become capable of doing that, then the issues can be detected earlier, and we can take the initial action more quicker. Therefore, in that sense, it's not that we can be able to do that just because we have Toyota Production System, it will be using and applying the way of thinking of TPS and using those way of thinking and the scales to look with everyone from end-to-end of the process and then after identifying the problems, then do what we need to do. So it's not that TPS is a magic stick for us. So we -- I can't -- I haven't said that we are okay because we have TPS. It's about we are going to use and apply the way of thinking of TPS to detect and find and deal with the issue and create a world that these kinds of problems will not recur. And this is the effort or the activities that we're trying to do, and I hope to receive your understanding.

There's one more question that I have for the 6 cases that occurred for the RX about the engine output control or adjustment that -- you said that, that case will be different in nature from the other cases. So for that case, why is it that the members have done that? And as -- and will that be the response also because the certification process was doing -- done in a tight schedule?

I would like to respond to that second question. As I explained earlier, for number 1 to number 5 was that the development tests were performed to get the test data and that was used for the certification process. But for the engine case, that engine test was done for the certification process. And at that certification process test, the output that was targeted was not achieved. And if it was -- and the correct way, it would be to stop and to the cause finding and do the correction and then perform the test again. But it was not done, and the engine control was adjusted. And of course, we do many kinds of tests performed with many vehicles so that we can -- we -- to secure -- confirm the data. And another thing is that in the similar timing, the -- during -- and probably they have found -- during that test they thought that something was -- something was a problem, but there was not enough time to secured up for them to stop and find out the cause and do the correction. And probably in that sense, it will be -- one of the causes would be a tight development schedule. So did I answer your question?

Yes, the person in the central block.

[ Kimura ] of Asahi. Two questions. First question, among the 6 items, there was a case related to the collision test. And it is not exactly the same but I, somewhat, associated with -- the case with the irregularities associated with Daihatsu. So if you can elaborate on this case?

At the time of Daihatsu, it was also the -- the use of the ignition by timer. And timer ignition was also used during the development phase. And then that data during the development phase was used for the application for certification. Timer ignition represents the more difficult condition, and that's what was performed in the case of Daihatsu. In the certification test, airbag performance itself was confirmed, and that's when the timer ignition was used. The use of timer ignition, that's the same, but the -- there is a difference in that, in our case, that was during the development phase, but it was in the case of a certification phase in the case of Daihatsu. And the safety performance itself was confirmed although the timer ignition was used.

The second question, Mr. Toyoda, at the time of press conference in January, you -- as far as the -- you mentioned that there was no case of irregularities within the group. But then Miyamoto-san stated that the -- he wished that it was voiced earlier on the ground. But while the -- this time, until the instruction by MLIT that started this investigation, there was no whistleblower within the organization. If that was the case, then what is your reaction to the absence of the whistleblower?

First of all, about the scheme within the organization for Toyota and Toyota Group, there is what is called the speak-up system, that is when the employees, the people find out something wrong, and then they can speak it up. Unfortunately, however, this time, it was not the channel through that system. That's a fact. But you know that engineers are engaged in their daily work, and they had a pride in the fact that they are conducting the development and the test under very stringent conditions for the sake of customers as well. And because there is a process of the submitting that result to TMC, so the TMC in turn, would make a submission so that was not clearly shared. But yes, I still feel that it could have been raised among employees.

In other words, speak-up system is not effective. What do you think you can do in order to improve the system?

And so the system per se, it is by way of communicating that to each individual employee that there is such a system so that they can make use of that system whenever it is needed. The kind of communication has to be performed.

Then the person on this side, please?

I'm [ Chikako ] from Nikkei [indiscernible]. And my very simple question or rather before that, it's tough for Toyota, you have Toyota way of customer first and the strengthening of the management function and you're doing various activities that can become a model to other carmakers. I think those initiatives has been done up to now. But at the end, you've had irregularities that you found in your company. So then how can you eliminate the irregularity, I would like to ask a question to Chairman.

Well, when we talk about irregularities, I believe that we will not be able to eliminate irregularities from occurring completely because environment changes, there are many things happening. And so if -- of course, first of all, we need to make people who intentionally tries to violate the rule to zero. But if it is unintentional, if people do something that is not compliant, but was not aware of it or thought that it would be better for others and thought it would benefit others. But at the end, it was irregularity, I think these cases can happen. But when these cases happen, what we should be able to do is to find that out as an abnormality. And as I have been repeating myself, Toyota is not a perfect company. And there will be mistakes that will occur going forward as well. But when these mistakes occur, what we need to do is to stop what we are doing and to correct that. This cycle needs to be turned. And as a company, if we -- as long as we turn that cycle, we will be able to -- I think that is about being able to continue our activities as a company. And so I am personally not talking about eliminating any irregularity. I've never said that in the company as well, but what I'm always saying is that if a problem is found, if something -- if a problem occurs, then we have to confirm the facts first as quickly as possible and to fix as correct. And if something happens, we'll repeat that process. And I think this kind of process is necessary at this point.

And I have another question. Chairman Toyoda has said in the January 30 -- end of January press conference that for the companies that had irregularities need to have a determination to remake and reestablish the company once again. So -- and so for the test that was performed with a more stringent condition, and maybe the thoughts of the people who did this was thinking that if they were -- tests were done with a very severe condition. But we had this social issue occurring. And I think it's 2 years after we learned about the Hino's problems. But in the meantime, there was no voices raised from the inside of the company. Does it mean that there is less awareness of crisis?

Well, that is a very difficult part to respond. I have now become a Chairman. And when I was a President, what would I do? I think that's a separate topic or a separate issue. But because now I am Chairman, the information of the genba has become a little distant for myself. That's a fact. Therefore, for the Hino's case and Daihatsu's case, those -- until there was time -- in the meantime until the report came out. For example, when I learned about it, what I did will be a separate matter, including this case, it's quite difficult to respond.

Well, excuse me. So for -- when you found out or we found out about the Hino's case, you were President.

Yes. And it did provide advice when we found out about the case, but it took a year and 3 months until that case was made public. But it's a separate company. Therefore, for myself, the -- I'm not in charge of the instruction and command role or line. And so if there is a -- it will be in a position of President or Chairman of a listed company. And so what Hino announces as what happened inside of Hino, that needs to be determined and decided within Hino. However, when you talk about who is responsible for what happened. Then I came out in the press conference on January 31. And by myself appearing at the press conference, I think many people have become able to speak with -- openly and honestly. And I think there was one step that we were able to move forward. I hope you can understand it in that way. So for myself, what I say many times is that at the point of January 31, if we want to implement a recurrence prevention, then we need to pursue the costs, the root cause and then when -- the tendency is that when we talk about finding out the cause, and we try to find who the culprit is. But actually, it's not one single culprit. This has -- this incident has been conducted for many years and many divisions, departments was involved. And therefore, it won't be able to find one single cause to -- for these issues to occur. So in that case, there will -- by saying that I'm the culprit, then genba will come down and then we would be able to start to have a discussion with open heart. I think that was what happened after the press conference at the end of January. So as a person responsible for the whole group, I'm in that position as I stand in front of you. So right now, I -- what I'm trying to do is for myself as well try to understand what has happened. And the first step or the measure that I have taken is to create that flow chart, the flow chart for the information and goods and try to understand what has happened, what is the correct thing. This is -- what we're doing is exploring that right now. So if you can spare us a little bit of time.

Well, for Hino, when the issue was discovered for Hino. I think there was a question -- you started to investigate, if you had done the investigation inside of your company, maybe we didn't find out these problems right now. And then why isn't that there was -- no voices come up?

Well, actually, we are now at this situation and for what happened in the past, we can't just hypothetically say with -- to your hypothetical question, it's very difficult for me to respond.

Well, one thing, it is going to be from the perspective of the person in charge on the working level. But there was a question about there is a less sense of crisis now because there was no voice raised from the genba, from the operation floors. Well, I don't think -- I shouldn't take and say that the reason is that there was no voices raised from the shop floor, I think we shouldn't use that as an excuse. What I always talk with the Chairman is that we have to -- the management has to go to the genba ourselves, we have to learn at the genba ourselves because the people at the genba, we have to find out if they don't have enough time, if they don't have enough money and if there is any situation or motivation that may connect into having irregularities occur, so we need to go to the genba to check that ourselves and also too, at the genba, if you -- if there are people involved in sending the information or people involved in a certain process so that, that person can be able to conduct -- malicious conduct. So we need at -- the management, be able -- we need to go to the genba to identify and understand the genba. So rather than saying that, "Well, we didn't hear from the genba, therefore, we weren't able to find out the problem." Rather than that, I'd like to say that we're going to make the effort as management to go to the genba.

I know that we are coming to the end of the press conference. And I know that there was another press conference going on with other OEMs. And therefore, this is going to be the last question. The person wearing white shirt in the front row.

[ Umeda ] of TBS. I have a question related to the press release, there was a press release by MLIT. And then I found out that there was some difference in implication between yours and MLIT. For 3 existing models, the irregularities related to the data submitted and also the irregular processing or handing of the data for the real-end collision. That's what the MLIT states. Well as -- in the case of your press release, it states about the irregularities in the test method as well as the report submitted to MLIT and therefore, I sense some difference in implications. So the thoughts behind them is something that I'd like to ask you a question. Mr. Toyoda has been -- repeatedly stated that the -- that we should consider the better way of performing certification tests but maybe that you have had a confidence that you have performed the proper certification test.

So in a way, you are trying to raise a question in that. Well, first of all, I'm not in a position -- I'm referring to the expression 14 years ago. At the time of the quality-related issue, I had to attend the public hearing. And back then, mass media said that Prius was out of control. And then with genchi genbutsu, what was the difference -- what was the distance that the Prius was the -- moving out of control. And then I found out that -- it was 70 centimeters. But when he says that it ran out of control, it gives you an impression that it doesn't stop until it moves for like 200 meters. At least that's a kind of the feeling that you might gain. So what is important is not about the difference between the expression used by MLIT press release and that of ours trying to guess that there were different thoughts behind those 2. But rather than that, more important than that is about this protection, of safety of the users as well as ensuring the competitive edge of Japanese auto industry. And for the purpose, what has to be done by both parties so that we can realize win-win situation. At least this could be the opportunity to start thinking about such a question. That's where I'd like to ask for your cooperation. Again, I don't think I'm qualified to state the following, but it is not about the kind of confrontation between the 2, trying to suggest that there is a confrontation, a conflict of views or trying to use a sensational headline trying to raise question or anxiety but I don't think it is right to use an expression that would lead to an easy and comfortable kind of sensation on the part of readers. That's what I'd like to ask you to avoid, and that's the kind of expression that I'm trying to use in this press conference as well. This will take time. In fact, the -- there is a lead time that was involved in the flow chart of material information more than 800 days. We are trying to eliminate bottleneck in genchi genbutsu, that's the process that we are right now -- in right now. And therefore, based upon the facts, each one of us should play its individual role to create better car society. And to that end, I'd like to ask for your understanding. I'd like to thank you in advance.

Thank you very much. I think now we have passed our scheduled time, so we would like to end the question-and-answer session. So with this, we would like to end the press conference today. [Statements in English on this transcript were spoken by an interpreter present on the live call.]