Union Pacific Corporation (UNP) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Okay. Hello, everyone. It's Walter Spracklin here from RBC Capital Markets. I'm a transportation analyst here. And I welcome everyone to our virtual Industrials and Transportation Conference here today. I'm very pleased to have with us Jim Vena from Union Pacific. He joins us via conference call, obviously, and along with Brad Stock from the Investor Relations side. What I'll do is give you a quick overview of how the call is going to go forward. Brad is going to do a few preliminary cautionary language. And then we'll go straight into discussions, focusing here on the notion of Precision Scheduled Railroading. So who better to talk about that than Jim Vena, the Chief Operating Officer of Union Pacific, a role he's been in since January 2019, but from -- and at Union Pacific, he is certainly responsible for all aspects of operations. That includes the company's Unified Plan 2020. Before joining Union Pacific, though, Jim has served as EVP and COO at Canadian National, and he was there for 40 years up until June 2016 and really started his career from the ground up, having experience as a conductor, a locomotive engineer, a little bit of sales and marketing in there as well, peppering in there as well and has had increasingly -- roles of progressively increasing responsibility here. And has been -- like I said, with -- at an organization that has seen Precision Scheduled Railroading from its very beginnings right up until when Hunter Harrison moved on. So he's seen it from beginning to end. So like I said, a great resource for understanding what has turned out to be a core tenet of the operating principles that most, if not all, railroad companies pursue. So before I begin the Q&A, Brad -- I believe I'm going to turn it over to Brad Stock. He's got a little bit of, I guess, cautionary language to read off. I'll turn it over to you, Brad.

Okay. Thanks, Walter, and good afternoon. Before we start, I'd like to remind everyone that Jim will be making some forward-looking statements. These statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, so please refer to the UP website and SEC filings for additional information about our risk factors. Additionally, while Jim doesn't have a formal -- any formal presentation materials today, I would like to call attention to our updated pitch book that you'll find next to the web link for this webcast on our Investors page. Jim may reference some materials that are in that pitch book. With that, I'll turn it back over to you, Walter.

Yes. Thanks very much, Brad. And so like I was saying, Precision Scheduled Railroading, Jim, has been a concept. It's not a new concept, but it's an absolute -- it's an important one. It's followed by every railroader out there. And so perhaps for investors who want to learn a little bit more about this concept of Precision Scheduled Railroading, how would you define it? What would you -- how would you describe it in layman's terms as to what it is that is PSR?

Okay. Well, Walter, thank you very much. Thanks for having me on. And everybody who's listening in, I hope all of you have not been impacted by COVID-19 personally or your families and wish you all the health -- and as we work through this. So trying times for a lot of industries, including ours. So you can see what's happened to our volume. Big, drastic change in the last 60 days. But I'm absolutely sure we are set up at Union Pacific to recover whatever the market does and when it comes back for us. And I like where we are operationally and efficiency-wise and service-wise. So with that, Walter, great question. So sometimes we make things to be real complicated, and we like to label it. And Union Pacific decided that instead of PSR, the label was UP 2020. Well, we're UP -- we're in 2020. So I guess, we'll have to come up with a new one here pretty soon. So maybe PSR 2.0 or something else, but we do have to rename it. But underlying, and that's where the importance is, Walter and everyone, is what is it that we're trying to do? So what I found and what I was taught and what I've learned and what I was able to implement in my time at CN was a lot of changes in how you look at the business. The foundation of what you're trying to do is you always -- not try to do, you have to deliver, is a great service product. And if you don't deliver a good service product, there's no use being super-efficient with your assets, super-efficient on cost control and you impact safety or how you have people that are working. So your baseline that you're doing the thing so that you provide the service to the customers that you actually sold them and not something different. It's what we agreed to the customer that we were going to provide for service. And we -- and the railroads provide a service that is different for different commodities. If you're on a -- if you're a bulk carrier handling unit trains, big -- of grain, of coal, of potash, of sulfur, you name it, it is more of where is the stockpile? Can we work with them? And that's part of PSR. Do we understand the entire supply chain? Do we understand where their ships are coming in, what their outflow needs to be, what can they produce at the mine? And then you build the most efficient system to be able to move it. And time-sensitive is not quite exactly the same other than you want to do it as quick as possible, so that the assets turn and you need less assets. And it's assets in locomotives, it's people, and of course, it's in the equipment that you have out there. So that's a piece of it. The service for a parcel carrier is completely different. They want to be able to -- and we're competing against trucks, and we're competing against other modes of transportation and other railroads, and we have to be able to be fast and consistent on that. So we have that broad range of service that we have to build. And that's at the foundation of PSR. And Walter, I got a lot of pushback even when I came back to work here from people outside saying that we were going wreck the service level of Union Pacific. And I can report to anybody that wants it the way we measure it, and we measure ourselves harder than even what we've sold to the customer because it helps us to turn our assets quicker is that we are in the high 80s now running the last month or so and even the first quarter on our performance with intermodal product, our premium product. And even our boxcar product is in the high 70s right now. So great numbers. So our service product is good. Listen, it's helping us a little bit that the volume is down. So I'm not here to say it's -- we didn't get a benefit of that a little bit. But the underlying business is there. So if you look at that, if you remember always what you're here for, you want to grow the business. You want to win in the marketplace. You want to be able to grow with the customers that you have already, and you want to win market share against anybody else in the industry and trucks. So if you remember that, how do we do that? Well, PSR is, you turn those assets, use the least amount of assets that you need. And what we've been able to find is there is huge opportunity. You look at our locomotive fleet at Union Pacific, we were 18%, and it's -- the best measure is not the number of locomotives we got parked because we have more parked right now than we're actually working. But if you can increase your productivity, the number of miles a day that they're running and the hours that they're working and the time that they -- less time they spend to get serviced, the better time -- they're queued at the diesel shop, we've been able to improve that by 18%. And that was a number I reported for the first quarter call, and we continue to build on that. So it's about moving the assets as fast as possible. That's what PSR is. And...

[indiscernible]

Go ahead, Walter.

Just on that note, when you have an organization that does not have it, and you've been at 2 companies that didn't have it, CN didn't have it and UP didn't have it, when Hunter first came in and implemented at CN and when you first went over to Union Pacific, what were the first, call it, couple of things? Because I would say Union Pacific has always been service-oriented, right? I mean wanting to maximize service to their customer. But what are the first couple of things that you wanted to -- that low hanging fruit that a PSR model attempts to improve upon one that didn't have it before?

Great question. And I had that challenge. Remember, I was -- I had left CN, and I was happy with my life and happy with what I was doing. I was only going to come back to work if it was a true challenge. So UP ended up the one that I chose to come back to out of all the opportunity I had because I thought it had the greatest opportunity, and it was the biggest railroad that you could actually get your hands on to be able to do that. So the first thing is I went want to North Platte, Walter, and you've got to love this, big yard, okay? Over 3,000 cars humped a day, massive facility. In fact, if I had to build it, I'd cut it down in half because it's so big, the lay of the land on the place. We don't need it quite that big to handle the cars we're handling. But went to the diesel shop, and there was 75 locomotives parked outside the diesel shop to go get serviced. So how long were they there? Way too long. So that was just too easy. It was easy to find locomotives that you needed to adjust. And that's all about assets and how you do that. But that's the first piece. And then it's how long should it take to service the locomotive to fuel them, clean them, do all the things you have to do when they come in. How fast are you moving them through the system? And how fast are you taking them off of the trains and the inbound? How many times can you actually bypass the yard, so that you don't have to touch those locomotives because they're good to go 3,000 miles without having to handle them? So those were the things that just jumped right out at me, Walter, and it was across about how we handled our intermodal product. Like we used to -- we allowed our railcars to sit at intermodal terminals for 42 hours on average, and we're down to under 20 in some places and getting to where we need to get to. So those are the things that jump right out of at me, Walter.

Makes sense. I think you were going to go on about costs.

Yes. Absolutely. That's the other foundation is -- the assets, you got the service, cost control. This is not about cutting costs. The cutting cost is actually an action that comes from what you do to be able to run the place efficiently. If you come in and say I need to cut $50 million or $100 million or last year, we delivered over $500 million of productivity, and we're in line this year to do $400 million-plus of true productivity, okay, and we think that you do that by adjusting what you're doing, so that you continue to still move the product the way you should. And we are 15% better on our metrics on service than we were under the old UP. So I think we're winning on that. But that cost control is there. And you make sure that you still run a safety -- a safe railroad. You invest in the people, and you invest in the railroad itself, which -- we've adjusted our capital inflow for this year because of where the revenues are. We've dropped at $150 million to $200 million from what we had planned, but we did not cut in places where we had to reinvest in the railroad itself to keep it operating in a safe manner.

Has PSR always been a static element? Like has it always been the same back when it was first implemented to when it was more recently implemented by yourself and others at other organizations? Or has it evolved with the times and been tweaked? And if it has, what ways has it evolved?

Well, I think if you look at the history of what Hunter started at CN -- and Hunter was an absolute master at seeing the opportunity and driving and trying to change the culture in the company. And it took a long time at CN to be able to do that. It wasn't an overnight discussion linear and in 6 months, and there was a lot of noise. There was some noise. It was -- first off, there were some customer issues. There was some regulatory issues. You name it, we had it at CN. But at the end of it, changing the culture takes a long time. And that's one of the things that I wanted to see here. I did not want to wait 4 or 5 years to get a full implementation of PSR. So we've been moving very quick to change the culture in the company. And the culture can't be, Walter. This is where people make it. It's not just the operating department. It's got to be everybody and how they think. How they look at the business. It's going to start from the CEO. The CEO has to be bought in, understands where the model has taken it, what the opportunities are and then the finance department on how they look at projects. I remember when I came in and I went for my first train ride here, at Union Pacific, beautiful piece of railroad. I'm telling you. It was gold plated, and it still is. It's a fantastic railroad. I haven't seen a piece of railroad as well put together from El Paso West to Los Angeles. But there was an opportunity to run trains longer to save crew starts, save costs, but it wasn't the saving costs. It was -- we just had the plan to do that. But what we needed to do is put 5 sidings in. And I asked the engineering guy who was on the train, and I said, so how long is it going to take us? This is through the desert. We're not talking through the mountains. And I said, how long is it going to take us to get the 5 sidings in? And I had in my mind like 4 months. [Audio Gap] have to change of how fast you have to move to take advantage of the opportunity, and that's part of the cultural change that you have to make. Now we didn't do it in 4 or 5 months, but we got the first 1 in, and we were done in 8 months. And that's really made a difference in how many trains we can operate at up to 14,000 feet in that corridor, and we're doing it every day.

You touched on leadership, and that clearly is a big part of this from the top all the way down into getting a culture change. I know when I covered CN and CP back in '04, for the period between '04 and right up until 2012, CP had been attempting to emulate the CN PSR model year after year after year and was not successful. And we've seen others, a varying degree of success as well. My question is, is it an easy -- if you've never done it before, is it something that's easy to replicate? And even if you have done it before, what would be the challenges of just copy and pasting it onto another organization?

Well, it's difficult in that the -- you stop and think about it for a minute, the whole philosophy is sometimes of how the business is operated can be influenced more by one group in the company than the other. And if the marketing group influences, they love to sell 4 car trains. They say, listen, it ties into our network. It's business growth. It might grow really good. And I remember seeing that here. There was a strain with 2 locomotives and 4 cars in California. And I think the people on the train, that was the same trip, and they were asking me to look the other way on purpose because they were worried that I was going to see after they spent 1 day with me that this train is sitting on this side. Well, as soon as I heard them keep on -- wanting to look out the left side of the vehicle, Jim, and I went -- I would look the other way and here was this, and I said to him, "Tell me what that was. That wasn't the train we just went by, was it?" They said, "Yes." They had a hard time, but they finally came on. So you need to -- if it's influenced too much by not looking at what the -- what a good railroad can operate, you sometimes lose sight of what you need to do. And people -- if you don't have the right leadership in the company, then they don't quite -- they get PSR, but they don't get the full benefits of PSR because in the long run, that 4-car train with that kind of service, there's no way that we could operate when it costs us $150,000 a year to just keep a locomotive running plus -- so make 2 of them, plus the crew cost and everything else makes a particle of sense for us to run that. Let's go get the business that makes sense. If a customer can pay us enough money to let us operate a 4-car train, then I'm all into it. But sometimes if the influence is too much from a different department, companies and especially if the top level of the company don't understand it, you never get the full benefit of what you can get with PSR.

And even if you're a nonsales-oriented, operations-led team that has never seen PSR before, can you look over the fence and really gauge what it is and be able to apply it in that case?

No. I think you've seen that the places that have been successful, and CSX has done a spectacular job. Of course, CP is spectacular. They've done a real good job and Keith keeps improving all the time. When you look at the places that are truly successful, and I'll let everybody else judge whether we are or not, but I think with the best operating ratio when you get rid of the noise in the first quarter, I think we've done a good first step of where we need to be. But no, you need to have some talent that cuts through the noise, the bureaucracy of a company and is clear about what the expectations are and what we need to do. So absolutely, Walter. I think you need to have some of the right talent at the right level. You can get lost if you're at the wrong level, right? But at the right level -- and I was very specific about coming here. I said, if you guys want me to come, this is the minimum job, I'll show up on the property. If not, I'll play golf and hike and bike in Scottsdale, Arizona.

We are going to leave some time at the end here for questions. So I thought I'd take the opportunity to instruct those on the call on how to log in on or how to poll a question. You would have logged into your -- into the website. There will be an ask-a-question button there. I will be checking for questions toward the end. So please do get your questions in now, so that we can get them into Jim before the call is over. So Jim, is there -- we talked about people being able to implement, but are there some railroads that are just more where PSR just fits better than others? I know there's been talk of spaghetti bowls and people eating them and so forth. But is there any network that you would say, look, PSR won't work here or it's going to be a lot more challenged? Or is it a concept that can apply equally across any organization?

Well, Walter, that's why I came back to work to prove some points. And I think it's -- when I was at CN, we heard from everybody that CN could do some sort of level of PSR that Hunter started and Keith had a lot to do with it. And Claude was a great leader to work with. And I had a little bit to do with it -- the years before I left. So -- but the noise was -- I don't know. I don't know if the other railroads could do that. And then it was, well, the Canadian railroads could do that, but I'm not sure about the American -- U.S. railroads. That's the biggest piece of b*******, pardon my language, I've ever heard. We all can run efficiently, give good service, watch our assets, make the right decisions on how we spend our capital. Have the right smart people. You have to have the people with some sort of idea of what a switch engine does, train them properly, not always -- we don't need university educated people only, and I'm university educated, I don't have a problem with people with university education, with the right people out there that understand the business and how to handle it. And there is not a railroad in North America that I've seen -- or in Mexico, the 2 that I've visited enough to be able to say that we could not all have a version of PSR that fits our model that gets us to be efficient. And I'm not sure whether -- and I'm not going to guess about where the bottom line best railroad operating ratio would be, but I'll tell you, UP, with everything that we have, we have the opportunity to have the best. We've got a great length of haul. We have some complication that's different. We have some grades that are different than some of the other railroads, especially going over the number of passes we have to go over and when the railroad was built. So our fuel might not be as good as some other railroads, but so what. But all of us can be -- all within a tight range of 2 or 3 basis points, 100 basis points of having an operating ratio that drives the right value that our investors and the company and provide good service. And I've said it, and I'll say it again. UP with what we have advantage as long as the business is there, that's the only thing that would impact us. I think we showed in the first quarter what's possible. And I -- absolutely, we should be the best operating ratio company in North America -- railroad in North America, and that's where we're going to end up here pretty soon.

Great. What would you say if you had -- I know you touched on a few challenges and impediments to implementing PSR. If you had to, in order of magnitude, what are the most important or toughest things to overcome in applying a PSR model to a new railroad?

Well, I think the biggest thing is culture in the company. You really do. You have to change the culture of all the people at different levels. And we've done a good job at UP. Culturally, we're aligned. But the next big piece is down at the -- drived us all the way down at the front level. And people have heard me talk about driving decision-making to the lowest level possible. Very important, and we are not there yet. Some of the things I've seen in the last few weeks and some of the time I've been out in the field, the opportunity is still there. You have -- I went to one place, and it's just about embarrassing as we're going through the assignments, and they're allowing people to work 3, 4 hours and going home. That's unacceptable. But it's a cultural change to the company. And I -- that's the most difficult piece to do, and you have to make it so sustainable. The rest, you win. When you take the locomotives and you drop 500 of them in about 1.5 months, they realize that they really didn't need them, and away you go. When you speed up the cars at the terminals, you can see the successes. So those things are pretty easy. The nice part about the -- with my history is I'm not learning as I'm going, okay? I have to learn this network. At CN, because I was there 40 years, I could take you through subdivision by subdivision and tell you how many miles and how far it was. And if you leave Vancouver to Boston Bar, it's 101.3 miles and where the sidings are, but I can't do that at Union Pacific, but so what. But the general piece I understand and what the railroading is. So that was easy. It's getting the people aligned and getting the whole -- and some people don't like that. I'm sure that I'm not in the top -- there isn't the calendar with me unless it's on a dartboard with some of the marketing people and salespeople with some of the things we've had to change. But that's the toughest thing, Walter.

I have some more question. But let me turn over to the investor questions that I'm getting here so we get through them. One question is, if I look at your OR under the backdrop of a more normalized volume environment, you're already 100 to 150 basis points within your 55% OR target. How do we think about the medium-term OR opportunity at Union Pacific? And can it be substantially better than the 55% target?

You know what, Walter, there's so many puts and takes that I'd be guessing it. Anybody that knows me, I like to deliver, and then we can talk about what's next. This is what I do know is with that 59 operating ratio in the first quarter, you all can do the homework of what normally would happen to us with regular business. And I think we had -- we would have had a pretty good year, a spectacular year, in fact. And I don't see any reason for us not to get to 55%. We need business, the right business to come back. And I don't think it's along with what we've been able to deliver already. I don't think the structure allows us to get there. I'm not sure where the bottom line is -- number is, and I'd be speculating to say where the number is. But I'll tell you this much, if we have the possibility to be well under 55%, then I'm going to deliver it, and we're going to deliver it. But I love where we are. I think we showed what we could do. And if the business comes back, I think a lot of people will be surprised. I do remember the best. I remember a quarter of 53.4%, and I remember a full year at 58.2%. And I know that we can beat those numbers, no problem at all, Walter.

Fantastic. I guess there's always different hands up or different views and ways and thoughts on doing things. What do you think is the biggest risk to PSR that -- can a company deviate from that because they take advantage of something that just seems too appealing? And as investors, how do we watch for those warning signs that -- of companies that might be deviating away from the tenant of PSR?

I think you got to be careful in that the asset use, you take a look at that. And we're putting out a lot of metrics now, a lot more metrics than we ever have before, on purpose, to say this is our RTMs, this is what our car velocity is. They're online for us. And I want people to look at it. At the end of the day, we're going to have a tough order just because of the drop in business, and everybody can figure that out. But in the long run, we think we're building the right model. Margin. If we lose our way, if railroads lose their way and they start to miss the returns of what they should get for what they're selling, that doesn't make a particle of sense. That hurts your operating ratio and hurts your efficiency. We start making service deals. If you hear about too many service deals that are tight, that tie you up to a point where it costs you assets and people to deliver the business, then you should be worried about that. So those are the key areas to take a look at. And it's a little nuance. When I listen to the other railroads, you can -- some of them you can see. They've got that balance well put out that it's -- they want to grow the business. But you don't want to grow the business that's going to impact you operationally to the point of being ridiculous. But let me say this, though, Walter, because this is really important. If somebody said to me, you can be a 53% operating ratio railroad -- but you would be a 55% operating ratio, but you got another $4 billion in revenue, I would do that. So there's a balancing act at a place, but that doesn't mean that I'm a 59% operating ratio railroad to get that extra money. It just doesn't add up at the bottom line for the company.

A couple of questions here on your decision to end your perishable service to Cold Connect, the refrigeration business and so on. Why -- what went into that decision to discontinue that?

We just did not see that to be a benefit, a long-term sustainable benefit to our business model and the way it fit in. And it was as simple as that. It was a tough decision. We tried a lot of different things. It was across the country, lots of touch points. And when we looked at everything and what the -- what it cost us, not just to operate, but what value it added to the railroad, it just did not make sense, and that's why we decided to shut it down.

Question here on your competitive position relative to BN, the question from the investors. If I look at your market share over the last few years, there has been a loss share to BNSF and to the Western Canadian ports. As you get to an improved cost structure, how do we think about how you plan to pivot your marketing organizing -- organization to get more share back?

I think we've done a great job at Union Pacific to draw money to the bottom line. And if you look at it, I think we've done well even with where the different business level is when comparing to -- at market share with BN. But what we've done now is, is we pivoted to having a very efficient, lower cost operation, and we think that the model is going to work. We have a much more efficient, better service that we can provide our customers. We are in the marketplace. Going to be able to handle those real fast customers better and the customers that want more consistently -- consistency better. We can do it at less cost, so it allows us to be able to work in areas where before, we wouldn't look at it. And I'll give you one tenant at PSR that's just changed the mindset here at Union Pacific. Union Pacific was driven on train speed. And all they cared about was train speed. And they hit train speed once a 28 miles and everybody, which is the AAR metric, it's not the metric I like because it excludes crew changes and all that. That's why I like the all-in metric. But it doesn't matter. So -- but what they did was they walked away from business. They didn't want to stop trains to pick up cars. They didn't want to go to -- through Nebraska and into Wisconsin and say, I've got a customer that wants to give me 15 cars of grain, boy, oh, boy, they walked away from that stuff. We're going to open that up. We have already. We want Kenny to sell that. It makes sense for us. We'll chew up a little bit because we're very efficient through our terminals. We'll chew up a little bit of that train time to stop, make it efficient when we pick up and move. So those are all changes that we can do, Walter.

So a question here from investor on volumes, but it's a good longer-term one. So I don't mind fielding it here. The question is, given that the energy segment faced headwinds even before the COVID pandemic, how long do you think it will take before you'll be able to pass that or lap that and see carloads growing again? And what, in particular, are the areas where you see the most opportunity longer term?

Well, the benefit of our franchise is -- coal is what it is. I don't have to explain it to anybody. And energy is pretty tough right now. If you're handling oil or products tied to it. But we think that a lot of the products that are oil-based plastics and everything else, we think we've got a great franchise. There's expansions that were happening in the Gulf that we have a great tie-in in. Our industrial base is still strong. Our base across -- from intermodal is still strong, both domestic and international, and we think we can grow that business, whether it's coming in -- wherever it's coming in. We think that we can remove product that's on the highway right now and bring it to rail. Housing, we've got a great access to the Canadian railroads to get lumber and work together to bring business down. Our potash movements into the West Coast, I can list them off. I think when we look at everything that we do, we've got some that are going to be tough. But -- and on the railroad, there always is some. I remember years ago where a bad crop in the prairies, and it was like, holy cow, that's a big piece of the business, and they had a bad crop, but the next year, it was a bumper crop. So you just have to work what you get, and there's so many markets that we play in with this franchise from all the industrials in the different parts of this company that I'm very comfortable that we will grow as the economy grows and beat the growth of what the economy gives us.

True. Last question here, Jim, and I appreciate your time. Obviously, COVID-19 has created a lot of disruption. And certainly, from that can emerge some opportunities or some long-term changes to the way we run our businesses. And I'm just curious from your long experience, are you identifying or seeing any avenues that a permanent change, that, good or bad, is going to impact how you do your business every day once we emerge from COVID-19? And I know we've talked about near-shoring the impacting from that, talked about more e-commerce buying and how that might be impacting railroads. We're even talking about how, in some companies are saying that this is allowing -- they will come back more efficient because of the significant reduction they've had to do in resources, they can bring them back on more effectively, more efficiently. Do any of those stand out as an opportunity for Union Pacific? Or is there another one that I might not have thought of?

Well, I think, first of all, the economy is only going to come back when people feel comfortable that they're able to go out and spend money like they were before, whether buying automobiles or going out to buy services or products that we handle. On the railroad, I think the best thing for us is tied in with the efficiency that we have that it doesn't matter whether it's more products that are going to be produced within North America or within the U.S., things will change. I think some things will change. But in the long run, I think we win with the capabilities that we have. Internally, it will change us. The way we look at cleanliness on locomotives, the way we handle people when they're coming to work, the facilities we use, how we move people around, that all is going to be impacted with what COVID's done. And we've already made a lot of changes just to make sure that we keep all our people safe. We have 10,000 people out there working right now at some place, moving trains, picks and track, repairing cars, and I've got to give them a lot of credit, Walter. They've come to work every day, and really, we don't have a lot of positives or people that were presumed to be positive, but -- in the low hundreds, which is excellent, and it's a testament to all the work they've done. But it's going to change a lot of things for the economy and Union Pacific.

Okay. Well, on that note, Jim, thank you very much for your time, insightful and entertaining as always. And thank you as well, Brad, for organizing for us. With that -- and I hope you both certainly stay safe and healthy. And with that, I think we'll close down the call. Operator, if you could...

Thank you very much, Walter. Appreciate it.

Thank you.

Good bye.