Capital Gearing Trust p.l.c (CGTL.XC) Q3 FY2025 Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

Good morning, and welcome to the CG Asset Management Quarterly Update for Q3 2025 webinar. [Operator Instructions] Before we begin, I would like to submit the following poll. And I would now like to hand you over to Head of Investor Relations, Katie Forbes. Good morning to you.

Thank you very much. Good morning all and thank you for joining us for this quarter's CG Asset Management Update webinar. We are delighted to have so many of you join us today. Joining us from CG Asset Management is Chris Clothier, our Co-Chief Investment Officer; as well as Hassan Raza, Portfolio Manager. Before I hand over, I just want to quickly go over the disclaimer slide. So please note that the value of investments can go up and down, and nothing we say here should be taken as investment advice. As a reminder, the views we shared today cover all the funds we manage. And as a reminder, these are free multi-asset funds and free fixed income funds. If you do have any questions on this or would like more information, please do not hesitate to get in contact with us following the webinar. As this is our final webinar of the year before 2026, I just want to note that we will shortly be sending our invitations for our Annual Investor Day. This year, it will be hosted on the 2nd of December. So please mark that date in your diaries and we'll send over the invitations very soon. Without further ado, I will hand you over to Chris and Hassan to get started on the presentation.

Well, our positioning remains defensive. Now I'll start with managed liquidity reserves, formerly dry powder, which present a robust hurdle for new investments to make it into our portfolio. This hurdle is 4.1% for treasury bills where we manage a ladder of maturities that exploit the cross-currency basis swap and north of 5.8% for short-dated corporate credit. As you can see on the left-hand chart, our risk assets remain at historical lows. This reflects our concerns at the exuberant valuations we are seeing in a concentrated collection of U.S. equity. We suspect that these extraordinary levels of CapEx and AI by U.S. technology firms might deliver rather disappointing returns on investment. I do say Chris will talk to this quite interesting topic later in the webinar. But in our view, from these valuations, there is a significant threat to global equities that are highly correlated to a correction in U.S. equities. Therefore, we remain at a historically low level of allocation to risk assets with selective exposure preferably for investment trusts to the U.K., Japan and emerging markets. On the right-hand side, you can see our performance. As you can see, most asset classes have contributed positively, but index-linked bonds are the exception. And in particular, U.S. TIPS have faced headwinds over the year from a combination of rising yields and a depreciating dollar. So what has changed? Over the quarter, we have added 6% to U.K. index-linked bonds. This increase has come from a reallocation of hedged U.S. TIPS. In the U.K., we've principally added to the belly of the curve where the steepness of offers improved values. We continue to maintain a substantially shorter duration than the index at 6.5 years in the U.K. versus approximately 14 years for the index. And this reflects our concerns that the U.K.'s deteriorating fiscal position poses a significant threat to the long end of the curve. On risk assets, as you can see, we've had a modest 1% reduction in alternatives, which has been the sale of substantially all of our renewable infrastructure holdings in July with some of those proceeds be invested in core infrastructure assets, such as IMPP, HICL and 3i Infrastructure. We also saw the realization of investment trust holdings such as India Capital Growth, which were reinvested in other emerging market opportunities. Overall, as you can see on the right, performance has been positive across all asset classes over the quarter, but we remain vigilant to the risk of the U.S. equity market correction. This vigilance is perhaps expressed in asset -- in our selection of risk assets, which, as you can see on the chart to your left, exhibits a low beta to equities and in particular, during the April sell-off. Overall, as these charts show, both equity and bond portfolios have had a reasonable track record of outperformance. Now one thing I was keen to address, and I've had these conversations with a few of our investors over the last week is the malaise and dare I say, turmoil we are seeing in the trust sector, persistent discounts, lots of trusts winding up and a substantial return of capital. As one of our investors asked, is the trust sector shrinking to relevance? I have to say I'm rather more optimistic. I would observe and what this chart shows is I would observe that the last -- in the last 20 years, the trust sector has, on several occasions, returned similar, if not more levels of capital as a proportion of market cap and over that period, the sector has roughly quadrupled. Yes, we're certainly seeing some consolidation, but this is positive and part of the Darwinian rhythm of the sector. For example, what this chart shows is that if you look at the cohort of pre-GFC companies leading up to 2008, there was about 230 IPOs in the 4 years leading up to 2008 and 90% of those companies have gone, at least in their original form. And yet the sector has materially grown over that period. So the takeaway is that M&A is positive, and we should not underestimate the sector's resilience and ability to evolve. Indeed, the investment companies have grown as a part of the U.K. market, at least in the number of companies coming to the market. It's certainly a dynamic and arguably the most interesting part of the U.K. market. Whilst the investment trust sector might not be growing, our investable universe is. Governance and management have improved. And in the last 6 months or in the first 6 months of this year, I should say, 10 investment companies have introduced single-digit discount commitments, and what we are seeing is that more companies are introducing exit mechanisms over the last 3 years as well. The implications of this for our portfolio are that there are more opportunities in larger sites that we can invest in. One such example is fidelity to [ pan value ]. This is a small cap growth focused portfolio, which is our largest Japanese investment trust position. It had been on our radar for a while as it began to fall of a single-digit discount commitment and have a continuation vote coming up in May '25. We began to build our position materially, as you can see from the chart in August and September of '24. And we built this position into a top 10 shareholder and subsequently had a series of constructive conversations with the Board to highlight their commitment to the discount. The cadence of the buyback did improve, which brought in the discounting to single digits. But more importantly, the trust was also the subject of a combination proposal from ADI Japan, which we supported. The discount has narrowed from 15% to 3% and the NAV performance has also been satisfactory. I'll now hand over to Chris, who will discuss our outlook.

Thanks very much, Hassan. Good morning, everybody. Thank you so much for joining. And yes, I think the take-home message from that is that the investment trust -- the opportunities that we're seeing in the investment trust market, there's lots of interesting things for us to go at. And in particular, what's nice to see is that this continual introduction of discount control mechanisms, tender mechanisms, all of these sorts of features actually are kind of sowing the seeds for future opportunities for us to invest in. So we're kind of encouraged by what we have at the moment, but also what's coming up. So I was trying to summarize in my own mind how I was feeling about the world. And I can see that -- and Katie flipped on to the next slide, so she's giving you perhaps a flavor of it. But anyway, I was trying to think of a mean that would summarize how I was feeling about the world, and it would be that this is fine dock. And I imagine that most of you can sense a degree of sarcasm when we suggest that in our view, things are probably not fine. And why -- what is not fine? Well, I'm going to summarize it by just looking at 2 different things. One is equity markets and the small side bar on the presence of AI investment within equity markets. And then the second is the fiscal outlook, and I'm going to take a look at the U.K. and the U.S. in particular. So let's start with the cyclically adjusted P/E ratio, which, as you know, is a valuation metric that we place a great deal of store by for reasons that I will come on to. And you can see that the cyclically adjusted PE, the cake ratio has only ever been expensive for 2% -- ever been more expensive for 2% of history. The ratio stands at 38x today. Now if you invert that, you come up with a cyclically adjusted earnings yield of 2.6%. Now the last time that it was this expensive was in the everything bubble in 2021. Now at that moment in time, real yields, let's say, the 20-year mark were minus 1%. And so -- and the difference between those 2 yields was therefore 3.6%. Today, real yields at the 20-year mark stand at about 2.5%. And so you can see that while the difference between the Cape earnings yield and the real yield is probably not an absolute measure of the equity risk premium. It's certainly a very good relative measure of the equity risk premium. And so that has compressed by at least by about 300 basis points over those -- that 4-year period. So that's the first major source of concern for us. But even putting that aside, if history is at all a good guide, then the prospective returns from here look very, very poor indeed. And so what does this chart show? This shows starting Cape ratios bucketed into deciles and the 10-year subsequent real return. And we are all the way at the right of this chart. And as you can see, through that prism, then the prospective returns look very, very poor indeed. And we've been doing some work on AI investments by the hyperscalers. And the general consensus is that the total spend on sort of AI-related CapEx is of the order of $500 billion a year for each of the next 5 years or so. So if we were to say then that the total investment is going to be of the order of $3 trillion, just summing that up by 2030. We were trying to work out what would be the necessary revenues that would need to -- that the hyperscalers would need to earn in order to generate reasonable return on the investments that they've made up until now. And we've done this by looking at what is a reasonable rate of depreciation for the capital expenditure that they're going to make, looking at some estimates of what their operating expenditure are likely to be to do this, we've taken a look at the large cloud computing businesses, so the AWS division of Amazon, Google Cloud being two kind of very prominent examples. And the conclusion that we're coming to is that in order to justify this expenditure, they will need to generate revenues of the order of $1.75 to $3 trillion per year. Now I was talking to one of our investors this morning, and he said that the sort of -- there's a real comprehension problem when you start to come up with numbers on those sorts of scales. So I thought perhaps one way of thinking about it is to compare that to Amazon Web Services itself. And that business was started nearly 20 years ago in 2006. And I think it's the market leader in the provision of hosted cloud services in the world. And those -- that's not 1 million miles different from the provision of AI compute, which is presumably what these hyperscalers are building out, AI compute either that they're going to lease to other people or that they're going to use for their own purposes and hopefully generate revenues from. Amazon Web Services today has a run rate revenue of $125 billion. And that's a business that has been built up over a 20-year period and has been the most successful business in its field. So essentially, what -- in order for this investment to generate reasonable returns we need to build something of the order of 20 brand-new Amazon Web Services over the next 5 to 6 years. And I'll leave you to ponder the credibility of that. Another way of looking at it would be to say that, that would also constitute spend of 5% to 10% of U.S. GDP. And now I suppose that such expenditure could come in one of three ways. The first way, which I guess would be great would be in rapidly accelerated U.S. GDP growth. And of course, that is possible. However, it would certainly be a marked deviation from the trends that we have seen in U.S. GDP growth in recent years. The second way is that if such a large portion of GDP is going to be spent on this, then presumably, that means that there is a substitution effect and that money is going to -- what is now spent there is not going to be spent elsewhere. And so that, in turn, I think, looks concerning for large swathes of the economy that are not associated with AI. Or the third possibility is that this expenditure becomes useful because of its role in substituting labor. Now Historically, of course, that is what technology does. It causes increases in productivity that results in the substitution of labor. But this would be done -- this would have to be happened on such a vast scale, 5% to 10% of GDP over 5 years is really not something that we've ever seen before. And so at a minimum, I think you'd see very high levels of disruption to the economy as labor is released from its current activities and takes time to be redeployed successfully into other parts of the economy. So at a minimum, that presumably would result in high levels of kind of flux and instability. And those are all sources of concern. So I think our base case assumption is that we are witnessing what is going to prove to be a very significant misallocation of capital and the returns from these investments are not remotely going to stack up or justify themselves, at least over the short to medium term. Of course, I mean, it may well be the case that just as with the technology boom of the late '90s that a lot of the Internet infrastructure that was put in place was ultimately useful and was the backbone upon which businesses like Google and Meta built themselves. But it means that the financial results of the people spending the money are likely to suffer in the meantime. And I think it is worth reminding ourselves that pretty much every technological boom that's been associated with an investment boom throughout history, has resulted in overinvestment and a misallocation of capital. So that's whether that's the canal boom, the railway boom, the bicycle boom, the automobile boom, the technology boom and telecom boom of the late '90s, so on and so forth. This tends to be the way. So in summary, valuations are very, very high in equity markets, and there are additional sources of concern surrounding those valuations relating to the very large investments that are being made. The other area that we remain very concerned about, and we've talked about in the past is the fiscal position. And I show here the forecast fiscal deficits and debt to GDP ratios for the U.S. and the U.K. But as we've seen, France is in a similar, if not worse position. Clearly, Japan has incredibly high debt levels. Potentially, there is -- we have a new administration there that is looking to further expand deficits. And so these are situations that are going to get worse. Just to kind of remind you of the scale of some of the deficits that we're seeing by 2030, 100% of federal tax receipts in the U.S. will be consumed by mandatory expenditures. So that's social security, Medicare, Medicaid and debt interest expense. The entire discretionary federal budget, so things like Department of Defense, roads, civil service, education will be deficit financed. Here in the U.K., we're forecast to spend GBP 100 billion on debt interest expense this year. As a reminder, that's roughly half the budget of what we spent on the NHS. And so markets are alive to this. And we are seeing the emergence of concerns in the bond market through a steepening in the yield curve through selling off at the long end. And yet, equity markets seem to be completely sanguine about this. We think that there is a very real possibility of a fiscal crisis. Our 3 most likely candidates would be the U.S., the U.K. and France. And within the 3 of those, our most likely candidate would probably be the U.K., the reason being that the U.K. is neither the global reserve currency nor does it have the ECB to backstop it. But frankly, we wouldn't be surprised if the shoe were to drop in any of those 3 economies or indeed other ones. So there is the risk of a fiscal crisis and then in turn, a bond market crisis. There is also the risk of fiscal dominance. These -- someone needs to buy all of these bonds. And that supply will result in savings being diverted towards government bonds that might otherwise have gone to equities. And so just as I was explaining with the difference between the equity risk premium in the U.S. looks as though it's compressed very, very dramatically. At some point in the future, people may well conclude that the prospective returns on long-dated government bonds are roughly the same as they are on equities. And therefore, they will -- may ask themselves, well, why am I bothering with these equities? So we can see risks arising from this fiscal position, both to long-dated government bonds and to equities. And it is for those reasons that we are proceeding with ever increasing caution in our portfolios at present. I think I will stop there and hand over to questions.

That's great, Chris. Hassan, thank you very much indeed for your presentation. [Operator Instructions]. I would like to remind you that a recording of this presentation along with a copy of the slides and the published Q&A can be accessed via investor dashboard. Katie, at this point, if I may now hand over to you to chair the Q&A session, and I'll pick up from you at the end.

That's great. Thank you very much. We have received a lot of questions. We'll try our best to get through them. But if we can't, we'll make sure to follow up with a written response following. Chris, Hassan as to be expected, we've received a lot of questions on the topic of gold. So I'll try and group these together as much as I can. But first and foremost, people have commented that our weighting to gold is only 1%. Do we have any preference of changing this allocation? Or do we consider 1% a sufficient allocation?

The honest answer, Katie, and thank you for the question is that it's clearly been an insufficient allocation given gold's very strong performance recently. A couple of things on gold. The first is that it's very, very difficult to value. And so we are very reluctant to put things in the portfolio where -- which might fall say, 50%, and we wouldn't be able to tell you why. As a reminder, it's also true that over the very long term, gold is not necessarily a good protector of purchasing power. So where you have bought it at its peak, which I think was in inflation-adjusted terms March 1980 and held it to its trough, which is probably summer of 1999 or thereabouts, and you have lost over 85% of your money in real terms. So we do find it very difficult to own gold in a meaningful way in the portfolio. We prefer inflation bonds because we can understand those better and they generate a yield which our investors can enjoy.

Sticking on the topic of gold. So now that gold is now a popular press -- do you believe that signals that the main price move may have happened given how mainstream the news of its strong performance now is?

I don't know. I would agree that, that feels like a contrarian indicator. But of course, this rather gets to the heart of it because of the fact that gold doesn't generate a yield, and therefore, you cannot carry out a discounted cash flow analysis on it, it can trade at frankly any price. And so I wouldn't like to speculate as to whether this is the top or not.

Thank you very much. Next question direct to Hassan. So what is your view and investment thesis on the listed renewable trust?

So I suppose the context of this is that we made a switch earlier in April from U.K. wind to TRIG and by July, we had substantially sold all of our renewable positions and namely TRIG around the 87 mark. I guess that the challenge with renewables is that we can have a conversation about assumptions offline, but the absence of M&A to validate these has been an issue. In contrast, core infrastructure, there has been substantial transactional evidence to reinforce NAVs. And we think the profile of those cash flows presents a much better risk-adjusted proposition. So that has been our thinking and portfolio positioning over the last 6 months.

Thank you very much. The next question is, what would it take for you to increase the duration of your index-linked holdings? Real yields seem average too attractive.

Well, that is an excellent question, and thank you very much for it. And it's probably the single thing that we debate most around the debt. Yes, the short answer is that compared to any reasonable estimate of Star and Star is the neutral real interest rate, which again is what are the things that drive neutral real interest rate over the long term, that tends to be some form of kind of trend growth, productivity growth, GDP per capita, those sorts of measures are the things that underpin where the neutral real rate should be. The neutral -- the real rates on offer in the U.S. and the U.K. fantastic value set against that context. They also, to the early part of my presentation, look very attractive relative to the valuation of equities. So tick, tick on both those grounds. As you can probably sense, there is a but walking into the sentence and the but is our concerns about some kind of fiscal crisis. How are we managing it today? We are managing it -- sorry, Finn, our Chief Morale Officer, clearly feels he wants to join in and he has something to say on the subject, which just shows kind of that this is such an important topic of conversation. How are we managing this? We have positioned our duration slightly longer in the U.S. than in the U.K., which reflects partly the higher yields on offer in the U.S. than in the U.K. and partly our greater concerns about the probability of the fiscal crisis in the U.K. over the U.S. So our duration is sort of the order of 6.5 years in the U.K., I think approaching 8 years in the U.S. So we're around -- our single largest position in the U.K. is the 2031. In the U.S., we're sort of at the 2033 mark. The reason for that is that there with us given the steep yield curve, we're picking up these attractive yields. We're picking up hopefully plenty of roll down. But we hope that should a fiscal crisis emerge, we will not suffer too much at those durations, partly simply because they're shorter duration and those instruments are fundamentally less volatile, but partly that should there be a fiscal crisis, we would expect that to play out at the long end of the curve. Of course, what we need to do is have the courage should a fiscal crisis emerge to push out and lock in the very attractive real yields that we expect would be an offer on offer under such a circumstance.

Thank you very much. Next question is we have more clients wanting to know what their exposure is to defensive companies and wanting more. Clearly, you have investments three investment trust. How would you consider what is defensive?

Sorry. Katie, I think the question is not what is defensive, but how we assess what proportion of our portfolio is invested in defense companies. The answer is that I should expect that it is a very low amount. And we -- if the questioner would like to get in touch, we can certainly try and come up with a best estimate based on a look-through analysis of our investment company holdings. But I think the overall answer is it will be quite low.

Next question is could you give information on the relative proportion of positive and negative outcomes from your IT purchases? I guess that not all work out well.

Hassan, talk about a couple of winners and losers this year.

Certainly not. I guess the positive and negative outcomes. I guess one way to probably aggregate the outcome of that is our performance against the investment trust index, which has been sensible on 12-month and more long-term basis as well. Some of the winners have been things like PCFT, Temple Bar [indiscernible]. There are other investment trust positions where we are still constructively engaging with the Board and the management team that will come to fruition, we hope in the subsequent 6 months. So I think that in aggregate, our performance has been ahead of the trust index and in each respective area, the relative performance has been attractive.

I was actually just reviewing one part of our portfolio this morning, which kind of illustrates the point rather elegantly, which was our emerging market holdings. So our 2 largest emerging market positions are Mobius Investment Trust and Fidelity Emerging Markets. Fidelity Emerging Markets is up 40% year-to-date. Mobius is about flat. In both instances, and that just reflects -- there's been -- and that is largely a function of the performance of their underlying portfolios. Mobius is a highly idiosyncratic portfolio -- and unfortunately, it just hasn't paid off this year. However, it has a structural feature, which means that we will get guaranteed liquidity in the not-too-distant future. And so -- and it currently trades at a discount to its NAV. So we will enjoy that pull to par over the next month or so. But yes, the answer is that some work, some don't. That's one of the reasons why we have a relatively diverse portfolio because while you can't be certain, which ones are going to work and which ones won't, we are much better at getting the discounts right. And so therefore, across the entire portfolio, we will deliver outperformance. And so the performance of our risk assets year-to-date has been just over 13%. I think the MSCI world in sterling terms is about 9% so that's been okay.

Thank you very much. Moving on to the next question. Clearly, the Cape ratio looks expensive relative to history. But how relevant do you think historic comparisons are in the post QE and high fiscal expenditure world we now live in? Chris, that one's for you.

It's an excellent question. GMO wrote a paper a year or 2 ago. And the question that they were asking was why had U.S. equities performed so well over roughly the last decade? Given the relatively high starting cape ratio. And the prism that they looked at through which they concluded that they have made an error was through the Kalecki equation after the Polish economist, which essentially says that when countries run large fiscal deficits, as has been the case, particularly in the U.S. over the last decade, that those deficits show up in elevated corporate profits. And so corporate profit margins, which are generally thought to be mean reverting have not been reverted over time. So I think that goes a long way to explaining what has happened recently. If we are right that at some point in the not-too-distant future, the bond vigilantes will demand a greater level of fiscal -- or sorry, not a greater level of fiscal prudence, some slight measure of fiscal prudence, then we will have to see some level of fiscal consolidation. And so that effect through the Kalecki equation will go into reverse. The other thing that I would say is that we are now no longer in a quantitative easing era and maybe the quantitative easing will be forced upon us again should there be a fiscal crisis. But with real interest rates so very much higher as they are today than they have been in the past, that then creates a challenge to equity valuations, which we don't think justifies very elevated cape ratios that you are seeing.

Thank you very much. We have received a couple more questions on renewable infrastructure with those noting that we have been reducing our exposure. Any more reasoning on that would be appreciated. But we do have a third question in that do you think AI data center energy demand is a long-term energy demand driver or likely more of a bubble?

Interesting question. Let's see what are the implications of such demand. I mean if you look at the power curve at the short end, it's a function of 2 things, the gas price and the carbon market. And as you move along the curve medium to long term, it's a function of some of the secular demand and supply dynamics that you rightly pointed out. It's much harder to call the middle of the curve. And I would point, in theory, yes, it should increase demand, but the relative fall in demand we might see from the EV rollout and other electrification and the relative rollout of those things versus how much supply is coming online is also important and much -- and we don't think we can necessarily call that with any more acuity, and we'll leave that to the consultants perhaps. And I would note that consultant forecasts have been falling. So the power environment is weak, particularly in Europe, and we've seen that expressed in the M&A market as well. So yes, in theory, AI would increase demand for energy and so with electrification. The energy mix that supplies that demand doesn't necessarily have to come from renewables, but it is much more challenging to make those calls over the medium to long term.

And the next question is, what's your starting position in Bitcoin?

We're not going to do it.

That's quick one. The next one is your weight to global indexing bonds remains significant, but performance hasn't been that great. What scenario do you need to see this to change? And what are the wide implications of such a scenario?

The first thing to say is that the wonderful thing about inflation-linked bonds is that on top of having a whole array of characteristics, which I'm sure we have bored you about endlessly over the that mean that we think that they are a very useful investment. But just very quickly, they are in macroeconomic terms, the mirror image to equities. That is they do best in macroeconomic environments when equities do worse. And therefore, they are the best, in our view, long-only hedge to a portfolio of equities. But on top of which, the nice thing about them is that you get paid extra return to own them. So the average return since the turn of the century on U.S. has been 1.3% higher than on nominal U.S. treasuries. And given the starting levels of breakeven today in the U.S. and in the U.K., we expect the outperformance of index-linked bonds over nominal bonds to continue. And so that's just really nice. If you can just earn a little bit extra every year by owning one asset class over another, that's a really good start. But there are clearly 2 scenarios in which owning inflation-linked bonds does very much better than nominal bonds, either burst of high inflation or large falls in real yields. And let's take a look at each of those in turn. Breakevens today suggest that inflation-linked bonds -- sorry, breakeven today suggest that inflation in the U.S. is going to be essentially target. So -- and target in the U.S. is 2% on the PCE, which is about 2.3% on the CPI, that sort of thing. If you just look at where inflation actually is in the U.S. today, so CPI is 2.9% year-over-year, core is 3.1%, super core as they like to call it, which is services ex shell 3.2%. Earners equivalent rent is running at 4%, median inflation is running at 3.6%. If you sort of take all of those together, inflation is just not coming back to target anytime soon absent a very nasty recession. I mean it looks like it's settling down somewhere in the kind of low 3s sort of area. So that is one reason to own inflation in bonds, which is just that you're going to earn the difference between that level of inflation and the breakeven over time, and that's very attractive. I agree that what we haven't seen is a dramatic fall in real yields, which would be the other area that pays off. Our expectation is that, that would only occur perhaps during the recession, we definitely expect real yields to fall in a recession, and then they would provide some nice defensive characteristics and particularly with respect to equities. But I suppose the real payoff would come in the event probably on the far side of any crisis in the bond market where as part of the resolution of that crisis, we would see central banks and the fiscal authorities effectively needing to take control of the yield curve and financially repress away the very elevated levels of debt, and that would be associated with negative real yields. And so that would be the environment where inflation in bonds would do very well. My response was too long and boring.

No, that was great. Thank you very much. The next question is, to what extent may the corporate credit part of the portfolio be exposed to a sovereign bond crisis?

The answer is not terribly much because the duration is very short.

And that concludes the Q&A session for today. If we have not gotten around to your questions, we will be following up with a written response. And if you would like a one-on-one update following this call as well, please do not hesitate to reach out. Thank you all for joining, and I hope you have a wonderful rest of the day.

Katie, Chris, Hassan thank you very much indeed for updating investors today. Could I please ask investors not to close this session as you'll now be automatically redirected to provide your feedback in order that the management team can better understand your views and expectations. This will only take a few moments to complete, and I'm sure will be greatly valued by the company. On behalf of the management team of CG Asset Management, we'd like to thank you for attending today's presentation, and good morning to you all.