Capital One Financial Corporation (COF) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

July 21, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Consumer Finance earnings 94 min

What were the key takeaways from Capital One Financial Corporation's July 21, 2026 earnings call?

In Q2 2026, Capital One Financial Corporation reported earnings of $3 billion, or $4.73 per diluted share, with adjusted EPS at $5.81. Revenue increased by 30% YoY, largely due to the Discover acquisition, while the provision for credit losses decreased by 27% to $3 billion. Management maintained its guidance for earnings power post-Discover integration, signaling confidence despite ongoing challenges with loan growth from the Discover portfolio.

What topics did Capital One Financial Corporation cover?

  • Revenue Growth Driven by Acquisitions: Capital One's revenue surged 30% YoY, primarily attributed to the Discover acquisition. Excluding Discover, revenue growth was still robust at 9.5%, driven by organic growth in legacy Capital One purchase volume and loans. Management stated, 'Revenue was up 30% from the second quarter of 2025, largely driven by the addition of a partial quarter of Discover revenue.'
  • Credit Loss Provision Reduction: The provision for credit losses decreased by $1.1 billion or 27%, reflecting improved credit performance. This was highlighted by management stating, 'Our provision for credit losses decreased $1.1 billion or 27% to $3 billion in the quarter.'
  • Loan Growth Challenges from Discover: Loan growth remains pressured due to the Discover portfolio's 'brownout,' with ending loan balances increasing only 2.6% YoY. Management noted, 'Discover is going through a brownout and shrinking,' indicating ongoing challenges in the near term.
  • Marketing Investments for Growth: Management emphasized the importance of marketing investments to drive growth, particularly for Brex and Discover. They stated, 'We continue to lean into marketing to take advantage of these compelling market opportunities.'
  • Efficiency Ratio and Cost Synergies: Management indicated that the efficiency ratio will reflect ongoing revenue and expense trends, with about 1/3 of the operating expense synergies realized to date. They expect to achieve the remaining synergies by the second half of 2027.

What were Capital One Financial Corporation's July 21, 2026 results?

  • Earnings: $3 billion
  • Adjusted EPS: $5.81
  • Revenue: $30 billion (+30% YoY)
  • Provision for Credit Losses: $3 billion (-27%)
  • Delinquency Rate: 3.39% (-31 basis points)
  • Net Interest Margin: 8.01% (+14 basis points)

Capital One's Q2 results reflect strong revenue growth driven by acquisitions, alongside improved credit performance. However, challenges remain with Discover's loan growth, which could impact future performance. Investors should monitor the integration progress and marketing effectiveness as potential catalysts for growth moving forward.

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeff Norris

executive
#1

Thank you so much, Josh, and hello to all of you joining us. If you'd like to watch the live webcast of today's call, head over to the Investors portion of Capital One's site, capitalone.com. The earnings presentation, along with the press release and financial supplement, is likewise available in the Investors portion of Capital One's site — just click on financials and then quarterly earnings release. Joining me this evening are Mr. Richard Fairbank, who serves as Capital One's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Mr. Andrew Young, Capital One's Chief Financial Officer. Rich and Andrew will take you through this presentation, giving an overview of our results for the second quarter of 2026. Be aware that forward-looking statements may be included in this presentation. Details about Capital One's financial performance, as well as any forward-looking statements in today's discussion and the materials, are accurate only as of the specific date or dates noted in the materials. Capital One assumes no obligation to update or revise any of this information, whether because of new information, future events or otherwise. Our actual results could differ materially from those laid out in forward-looking statements due to numerous factors. To learn more about these factors, please refer to the section titled Forward-Looking Statements in the earnings release presentation, along with the Risk Factors section in our annual and quarterly reports, which you can access on Capital One's website and which are filed with the SEC. I'll now hand the call over to Mr. Young. Andrew?

Andrew Young

executive
#2

Thanks, Jeff, and good afternoon, everyone. I'll begin with Slide 3 in tonight's presentation. During the second quarter, Capital One's earnings came to $3 billion, equivalent to $4.73 per diluted common share. Just a reminder that the Brex acquisition was completed in early April, and additional information about purchase accounting appears in the appendix of tonight's presentation. Results for the quarter contained a number of adjusting items tied to the Discover and Brex acquisitions, which Slide 3 outlines. Excluding those adjusting items, earnings per share for the second quarter came to $5.81. Compared with the first quarter, revenue rose 4% while noninterest expense climbed 7%, producing pre-provision earnings growth of 1%. On an adjusted basis, pre-provision earnings were flat versus the prior quarter. Our provision for credit losses fell $1.1 billion, or 27%, to $3 billion during the quarter. That provision reflects $3.7 billion of net charge-offs of $662 million. Moving to Slide 4. I'll go through the allowance in more detail. The $662 million allowance release during the quarter brought the allowance balance to $23 billion. Our total portfolio coverage ratio declined 26 basis points and now sits at 5.02%. I'll walk through what drove the changes in allowance and coverage ratio by segment on Slide 5. Within our Domestic Card segment, we released $705 million of allowance. The coverage ratio fell by 41 basis points and now sits at 6.99%. That decline in the coverage ratio came from continued favorable observed credit during the quarter along with a modest reduction in the consideration given to economic uncertainties; in our Consumer Banking segment, we built $150 million of allowance. That allowance build was mainly driven by strong growth in the auto business. The coverage ratio finished the quarter at 2.39%, 3 basis points above the first quarter. And lastly, within our Commercial Banking segment, we released $59 million of allowance. That allowance release was mainly driven by specific reserves on loans that were charged off during the quarter. The commercial banking coverage ratio fell 8 basis points versus the prior quarter to 1.62%. Moving to Page 6. I'll now turn to liquidity. Liquidity reserves finished the second quarter at roughly $144 billion, down $21 billion versus the prior quarter. Our ending cash position fell by roughly $22 billion to approximately $55 billion. That decrease in cash was mainly driven by growth in our loan portfolio, wholesale funding maturities late in the quarter and the impacts from Brex. Our preliminary average liquidity coverage ratio came in at 165%, and our preliminary average net stable funding ratio came in at 136%. Moving to Page 7, I'll go through our net interest margin. Our second quarter net interest margin came in at 8.01%, 14 basis points above the prior quarter. That increase was largely driven by a 9 basis point impact from 1 additional day in the quarter. The rest of the increase was driven by a lower rate paid on retail deposits and a $5 billion decline in average cash balances. Moving to Slide 8. I'll wrap up by going through our capital position. Our common equity Tier 1 capital ratio stood at 13.7% when the quarter closed, which is a decline of 70 basis points from the first quarter. Three things — $2.7 billion in share repurchases, roughly a 40 basis point effect tied to the Brex transaction, and growth in risk-weighted assets — together outweighed net income for the quarter. So with that, I'll hand things over to Rich. Rich?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#3

Thank you, Andrew, and hello to everyone this evening. On Slide 10, you can see how our Credit Card business performed during the second quarter. Results for the Credit Card segment mostly reflect what's happening in our Domestic Card results and trends, and those appear on Slide 11. Once again, the Domestic Card business delivered a quarter of top line growth along with strong credit results. Just to remind everyone, the Discover acquisition closed on May 18, 2025. That means period-end balances for the prior year quarter now reflect the addition of the Discover portfolio; regarding items such as purchase volume and revenue, we'll still need to talk about the partial quarter impacts of adding Discover. In Q2, we completed the move of Brex into our Domestic Card segment, and we also transferred the small, older corporate credit card operation from the commercial bank over to Domestic Card. Purchase volume for the quarter was up 26% compared with the same period a year earlier, with the biggest factor being that we picked up a partial quarter's worth of Discover purchase volume. On top of that, we saw a slight pickup in growth for legacy Capital One purchase volume, and we benefited from mild tailwinds related to bringing in Brex along with the Corporate Card business. As for legacy Discover purchase volume, it increased by a little less than 2% versus the prior-year quarter. On this call, purchase volume across the legacy Capital One businesses — and that includes the addition of Brex and corporate card — was up roughly 14% compared with a year earlier. Most of that gain came from faster underlying organic growth that was already happening before Brex and Corporate Card were added in. Ending loan balances were 2.6% higher than the prior year. For the legacy Discover card loans, there was a 1.5% decline versus last year, which is what we expected given the temporary brownout in Discover loan growth. If you set Discover aside, ending loans climbed approximately 5.3% year-over-year, mainly because organic growth in the legacy Capital One loans picked up somewhat, with the addition of Brex and Corporate Card providing an extra lift. Looking past the tech integration, we still expect solid chances to expand the Discover Card business, and there we can roll out growth initiatives that draw on our distinctive technology and underwriting. Compared with the second quarter of 2025, revenue climbed 30%, mostly because a partial quarter of Discover revenue was added. If you set Discover aside, revenue rose 9.5% versus a year earlier, mainly from organic improvement in legacy Capital One purchase volume and loans. For the quarter, revenue margin came to 17.4%. Domestic Card charge-offs in the second quarter stood at 4.71%, which is 39 basis points lower than the previous quarter and 54 basis points below the same period a year ago. At the close of the quarter, delinquencies stood at 3.39%. That's a decline of 31 basis points versus the prior quarter, and it's 21 basis points lower than the same point last year. Across both the legacy Capital One portfolio and the legacy Discover portfolio, the credit trends look alike. Domestic Card noninterest expense rose 38% from the second quarter of 2025. Two things drove that: adding a partial quarter of Discover, plus our ongoing investments in technology. Both operating expense and marketing were higher than a year earlier. As for marketing across the whole company, the single biggest driver is the choices we make in Domestic Card — although decisions in our consumer banking business are playing an increasingly large role as well. During the second quarter, company-wide marketing spend reached approximately $1.7 billion, up 23% versus the same period last year. The rise came from incorporating Discover, increased direct marketing for legacy Capital One products in Domestic Card and Consumer Banking, higher media outlays, and continued funding of premium benefits. Looking more broadly, our marketing efforts continue to generate strong new account originations, enabling us to build a durable franchise with high-spending customers at the top of the domestic credit card market, while growing checking accounts across the country in consumer banking. We remain committed to investing in marketing to capture these appealing market opportunities. Our Consumer Banking business results for the second quarter are addressed on Slide 12. During the quarter, our Global Payment Network handled approximately $190 billion in transaction volume. Compared with the partial-quarter volume recorded in Q2 2025, that network transaction volume was up 156%. Another factor was that we successfully finished bringing Capital One debit customers over, transitioning those customers onto the Discover network. Looking sequentially, the rise from one quarter to the next was roughly 9%. Auto originations were 19% above the level of the same quarter a year earlier. In the current marketplace, we continue to be well positioned to pursue resilient growth. Ending loan balances in consumer banking increased by $9.2 billion, an increase of approximately 11% year over year. Average loans likewise rose 11%. Ending consumer deposits increased about 5% relative to the year-ago quarter. Average deposits were up 19%. Our digital-first national consumer banking business keeps expanding and building momentum. Consumer Banking revenue for the quarter increased about 26% year-over-year, mostly because of the partial quarter of Discover operations being added, along with Discover revenue synergies and auto loan growth. Noninterest expense rose about 24% versus the second quarter of 2025, mainly due to the partial quarter of Discover, plus higher marketing to fuel growth in our National Consumer Banking business, more auto originations, and sustained technology investments. The auto charge-off rate came in at 1.43% for the quarter, 18 basis points higher year-over-year and 21 basis points lower than the sequential quarter. The increase compared with a year earlier comes from a steady change in the blend of newly originated loans and originations, since our subprime share is going back to where it stood before the pandemic. On the auto side, the delinquency rate climbed 11 basis points relative to the linked quarter while dropping 52 basis points versus the same period a year ago. Our Commercial Banking segment's second quarter results appear on Slide 13. Measured against the linked quarter, ending loan balances and average loan balances were both up roughly 1%. Ending deposits declined roughly 1% versus the linked quarter. Average deposits came in essentially flat. During the second quarter, the net charge-off rate for Commercial Banking increased 24 basis points compared with the sequential quarter, reaching 0.53%. On the criticized side, our performing loan rate came in at 4.4%, which is down 55 basis points from the prior quarter. Criticized nonperforming loans fell 8 basis points to reach 1.32%. So, to close things out, the second quarter continued to deliver solid top line growth and strong credit performance. We're now in month 14 of the 24-month plan to integrate Discover, and things are moving along well — the migration of Capital One's debit customers onto the Discover network is now complete. And within the second quarter results, you'll see the full quarterly run rate of debit revenue synergies. Also reflected in our results is roughly 1/3 of the quarterly run rate tied to the operating expense synergies we announced. We are still on schedule to achieve the entire $2.5 billion in announced synergies. For a long time, we have been working in reverse from the sweeping transformation of the business marketplace, using modern technology, data and AI. This marks year 14 of our technology transformation, which started at the bottom of the tech stack and moved upward. We are far along that road, and we keep putting money into some highly potent foundational capabilities, plus AI infrastructure and particular AI experiences. Beyond that, we're continuing to put money into expanding our franchise for big spenders in the upper segment of the market. That covers rewards, airport lounges, special access to experiences, and cutting-edge digital tools. On top of that, we're still advancing our unique goal of building a full-service national bank with a digital-first approach, done organically. Several of our opportunities get a lift from buying Discover, which of course also hands us a brand-new opening to expand and scale our own global payments network. We continue to spend on acceptance for the network and on technology. As we've mentioned before, these outlays will keep turning up in the efficiency ratio. At the same time, they're what powers growth and returns over the long haul. Taking a step back and looking at the big picture, the transformative purchase of Discover continues to drive our forward progress. A few specific inputs in the model we used for that transaction have moved around since we first announced it, and on top of that we've since bought Brex and taken ownership of the technology behind Capital One Travel. Even so, our expectation remains that once Discover has been fully folded into our operations, the resulting earnings capability will line up with the outlook we gave at the time we revealed the deal. With that, we're ready to take whatever questions you have. Jeff?

Jeff Norris

executive
#4

Thanks, Rich. We'll now start the Q&A session.<<operator_script>> Josh, please start the Q&A.

Terry Ma

analyst
#5

Let's begin with Brex. Rich, you'd said before that you could speed up Brex's growth nearly right away by ramping up marketing and technology spending. So I'd like to know how much of that spending is already baked into the expense run rate we have now. And then when will investors begin to see clearer, more concrete gains; I have a follow-up after that.

Rich Fairbank

executive
#6

Thanks, Terry. Let me address Brex briefly. I don't think we claimed that the moment we get it, we'd be able to speed up its growth. What we did say is that essentially the moment this acquisition closes, we can begin putting the solutions in motion, and many of them don't need full integration, and those solutions can deliver real value and help us push forward and truly speed up Brex's growth. So it has been more than 100 days since the deal closed, and our enthusiasm for Brex hasn't faded at all; we bought Brex because it succeeded in the appealing corporate card market, because of its infrastructure at the bottom of the tech stack, and because of its world-class talent. And all of those remarkable strengths keep impressing us. And working together, we're making solid headway on the foundational capabilities that will carry the business forward. So Brex is already feeling some early tailwinds that our brand will bring, and we expect those to keep getting stronger in the next few months. They're also gaining from the cost of funds effect of shifting onto our balance sheet. We've already launched a program to share high potential leads from across our businesses with Brex, and the initial results look very promising right out of the gate. We'll expand this approach more aggressively as time goes on. Now certain other advantages we offer will take somewhat longer. In the months ahead, as we test and learn, we'll begin putting marketing dollars behind it. To fully tap the marketing machine of Capital One, a bit more technical integration is needed; we'll need to build data pipelines and tune our models for Brex's customer base. So that piece arrives a bit further out. On our travel business, our focus through the rest of this year will be the Hopper build-out. So extending our travel portal to Brex will probably come after that work; we expect Brex will also deliver plenty of advantages to Capital One, particularly by bringing Brex capabilities into our small business, card business; those advantages need integration and will be unlocked gradually; so we're already acting to bring them benefits. Most of that isn't yet showing up in our investment dollars because really most of the effort has been sort of getting capabilities into place.

Terry Ma

analyst
#7

Understood, that's useful. Now for my second question, about loan growth — it keeps getting better month by month in cards, even with the Discover brownout. So when we think ahead to Discover originations running entirely on Capital One's platform, how should we view card growth once that happens? And what about the marketing spend needed to restart Discover growth?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#8

Many thanks, Terry. I think what I'll do here is address what you're really asking about, which I like to call, proverbially, the Discover brownout. I'll give my thoughts on that first, then circle back to marketing spend. As we've said before, the Discover card portfolio is experiencing something of a loan growth brownout, with a number of factors together weighing on loan growth in the near term. After Discover expanded credit in their card business during '22 and '23, they reduced their origination programs and credit line management considerably near the end of 2023, and those reductions have mostly stayed in place. Since we assumed control, we've been making small cuts to Discover's credit policy in places where we feel less confident about the resilience of the underlying customers — mainly when it comes to high balance revolvers. Because of all these pullbacks combined, the portfolio has been shrinking and still confronts growth headwinds as these newer, smaller vintages season. As we noted, Discover card outstanding fell 1.5% year-over-year. Now, it's important to point out that the other side of these pullbacks and the brownout has been solid credit performance, and we're pleased to see that coming through; so let's discuss getting back to growth and moving past this brownout in Discover volume. This brownout won't last, because — in time, we'll deploy a range of capabilities as we shift Discover originations and existing customers onto Capital One's technology. Once Discover is on Capital One's technology, we'll be able to set loose our models, full spectrum underwriting and lean into spender capabilities to drive more originations, greater spend volume and, in the end, more loan volume over time. So we're still enthusiastic about the longer term potential. Let me say a bit about where we stand in that process. On the Discover front book, 50% of Discover originations now sit on Capital One's tech platform, and we anticipate being entirely on our tech stack for new originations by the close of the third quarter. What we're doing right now is combining the testing and the rollout of the features that drove the growth of our card business at Capital One, and we think those same features will improve things for the Discover portfolio and for the new applicant flow at Discover. A number of encouraging early signs are already visible to us, though it's still early days — but what we've seen so far supports what we were hoping for. Regarding Discover's back book, the first big conversion waves start later this month, though we won't be entirely on Capital One's technology stack before the first quarter of next year. That means a bit more patience is required before those benefits show up in full. Essentially, we're moving the rest of the back book over in waves. One wave lands in July, another in October, and another in January. So this will happen in stages. As for the brownout, we anticipate further shrinking in the near term, but once we can bring more of Capital One's technology and capabilities to bear with Discover after the conversions are done, we expect to get back to growing again. I'd also like to note that alongside Discover's reduction of card loans, they pulled back on personal loans too, and during the integration we've likewise made some mechanical reductions — a modest amount — on personal loans ourselves. So that brownout is going to persist and actually deepen, and the lowest point of the brownout should arrive at some point around the fourth quarter of this year. After that, we're eager to push into growth as time goes on. So to revisit the brownout, these things are a normal and short-lived element of the transaction. Nothing here reflects any long-term worries on our part; in reality, it all simply belongs to an integration and the aligning of credit policies, and we're eager to press the accelerator somewhat more step by step in the months ahead. Terry, you raised the question of marketing spend. On the Discover side, we'll put more into marketing as we go — marketing really is largely a front book matter; so right now, at this very moment, we're putting more into marketing so that we can produce a really strong flow of applicants to Capital One. That will be one of many areas we push on across the next year.

Sanjay Sakhrani

analyst
#9

So my first question, I think, is directed at Andrew. When I look at the NIM — and you kind of touched on this during your prepared remarks — it appears the liquidity portfolio declined throughout the quarter, finishing lower yet remaining elevated on average; therefore I calculate that this created a drag of at least 10 basis points or more on the NIM. Can I safely assume that? Thus, as we move into the following quarter, you ought to see a higher NIM headed into the third quarter?

Andrew Young

executive
#10

Thank you for asking, Sanjay. That's right, as you mentioned, during the first quarter we had heightened cash levels stemming from the Discover home loan sale at the close of '25; and then we experienced very strong deposit growth in Q1, which tax refunds helped drive. And at that moment, we finished the quarter holding roughly $75 billion in cash. And so during the second quarter, that figure dropped considerably because of growth and because of the maturities I had mentioned on the Q1 call, along with the cash effect tied to Brex, all of which pushed the ending balance lower by $20 billion, yet the average declined by only about $5 billion. So as you're implying, going forward, there ought to be some NIM catch-up occurring in the third quarter as the average cash converges with the ending cash. And then, additionally, don't forget that in the back half of the year, each quarter contains one extra day; so this contributes a 9 basis point tailwind to NIM. And so if I simply gather all of that together, I would be remiss not to point out plainly that any material shifts in our balance sheet might affect NIM down the road. And our NII is essentially completely neutral to rates over time, yet should the Fed act, there might be a NIM impact at least near term, because of how deposit and asset repricing are timed; but that consequence ought to even out eventually; so during the prior quarter, I directed you toward the back half of last year as a fairly solid proxy for a NIM level once we had closed on Discover; and so naturally there will be quarterly variation from day count and other seasonal elements, but I keep directing you to that as a fairly reliable signal of where our structural NIM will probably sit in at least the near term.

Sanjay Sakhrani

analyst
#11

All right. Great. I suppose my question mirrors the one I raised three months ago. Rich, perhaps we could revisit what Terry asked regarding costs. As I see it, when we consider the added spending tied to initiatives like Brex and promotional efforts, should the effect on our adjusted operating efficiency ratio be viewed as increasingly modest going forward, compared with what Brex and Hopper have already contributed to the current run rate? I'm simply attempting to gauge the margin picture, since you also have the other two-thirds of the OpEx synergies still to come as we head into the following year; so any additional detail would be welcome.

Rich Fairbank

executive
#12

Yes. Thank you, Sanjay. Our efficiency ratio will keep mirroring how revenue and expenses are trending, what our investment priorities demand, and how synergies materialize; and as we've talked about, the synergies on the debit revenue side are basically reflected already. On the operating expense side, the synergies arrive later in the schedule. And as we noted before, roughly one-third of those operating expense synergies has been captured so far, and we remain on pace to deliver the rest of them by the latter portion of 2027. Beyond that, naturally, we keep pressing forward with our investment priorities, which include foundational technology, AI, and the growth opportunities over the longer term that our technology transformation has unlocked, plus of course Discover and Brex; so these outlays matter a great deal for the company's durable growth and returns across time. So the efficiency ratio is just one among numerous factors behind the company's returns; given how many pieces are in motion, we've decided to center our discussion on earnings power, but — and as we've stated, we anticipate the earnings power of the merged company once the Discover integration is behind us to align with what we projected when the Discover acquisition was announced, factoring in Brex and the bringing in-house of technology that underpins Capital One Travel and factoring in every one of these investments we've been pursuing. So baked into that is a necessary efficiency ratio that allows the numbers to work; but we aren't offering specific guidance on it; still, I believe the combined financial performance of the company keeps tracking alongside the guidance we've provided on earnings power once the integration is complete.

Ryan Nash

analyst
#13

Rich, perhaps I can expand a bit on what Sanjay asked. When you go back to the time this deal was made public, combine the two companies, and factor in the synergies, the resulting return came out at roughly 20%, give or take. Based on all that you've told us today, it seems there are additional investments you're looking to make, and I get that you want to keep optionality intact, but should we think of this as a business that ought to deliver at minimum a 20% return? And which of those investments might drive it above or below that level in the current environment?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#14

So Ryan, there obviously was — Discover delivers significant earnings power, and we contribute a great deal of synergies to this transaction. So earnings power has played a major role in the discussion and a truly major role in the value calculation for this deal. The — a number have — let me just linger on that point, and there are quite a few variables that have shifted and keep shifting as we move forward here. The brownout affecting Discover's loan growth, which is going to persist for a while, and we discussed how that would ease in the quarters ahead, yet it remains a significant element. What offsets the loan pullbacks is improved credit performance. On the whole, credit has been doing rather well. Capital One margins have been strong given the accelerating growth in retail deposits, the full Walmart P&L included in all of this; and then we've had this investment imperative, which essentially falls into two major buckets. One bucket consists of the spending on technology and AI to seize the moment and capitalize over time on an extraordinary transformation taking place in the world, and we are far along the road of our technology transformation, yet there remain significant investments we are making, and we keep pushing further into that; and then on the other hand, we have plenty of emerging growth opportunities that will form a very significant piece of the growth and value calculation down the road; so the — but what stands out in certain respects, to return to that phrase, the more things change, the more they stay the same. It stands out that on the far side of this. We anticipate earnings power closely matching what we described at the beginning; we aren't putting a specific number on it because many aspects of Capital One performance don't lend themselves to precise — pinning down with exact figures. But when we examine earnings power as shown through ROTCE, we believe we are on track for performance closely in line with what we anticipated throughout. In that context, when I discuss the investments we're making — we're genuinely pushing hard on that lengthy list of investments we mentioned — with the same intensity we're pursuing cost-effectiveness in 1 minus all of that throughout the entire company. A good portion of that stems from the other side of our tech transformation: the capacity to reduce tech expenses even while putting money into other tech expenses, the reductions in legacy tech expenses, the operational gains we're generating throughout the business. However, I simply want to note that we're sort of leading two lives simultaneously here, truly pursuing opportunities and truly, truly managing costs so cautiously in order to at the same time produce the earnings power we anticipated when this deal began and to put ourselves in position to generate value for our investors during the remarkable years that lie ahead of us.

Ryan Nash

analyst
#15

Understood. So perhaps for my follow-up, Rich. Looking at the capital shown on the slides, clearly, it declined by nearly 70 basis points during this quarter. However, if you take out Brex's effect, you repurchased somewhat more shares this quarter, yet capital ratios remained basically flat; and I suppose now that the deal has finalized, do you believe we might see buybacks increase further from this point? Also, how are you considering the route toward those stated capital goals?

Andrew Young

executive
#16

Yeah. Ryan, I'll handle that question; and allow me to begin by zeroing in on the phrase you finished with, which is the 11% we characterize as a long-term capital need rather than a target. And we still believe that need equals 11%. We recently received the CCAR results. Yet annually, when those are released, we've observed a fair amount of fluctuation over the past several years, ranging from the low 10s down to 7%. Consequently, our need comes from our internal modeling. It's simply much more consistent. And as has been true for several years now, we remain convinced that 11% represents that need, where we oversee our capital at any particular moment, incorporating numerous planning assumptions, such as growth expectations and projected capital buildup from earnings, the regulatory landscape, AOCI, share price, the macroeconomic climate; but I'd add that past that list of particular factors, there's also a philosophical aspect that we see capital as possessing asymmetric worth, especially during stressful times delivering enormous offensive and defensive benefit in those stretches. And so this multifaceted strategy has allowed us to keep a solid mix of distributing capital, while also achieving robust returns and the adaptability to seize growth chances as time goes on. Thus we aren't hurrying to lower it as fast as possible to some particular figure. But ideally, that provides you with an idea of our approach to capital.

Darrin Peller

analyst
#17

Okay, so it seems to me that you folded in both a partial quarter of Brex and the legacy corporate card when reporting domestic purchase volume. What I'm really trying to do is figure out—could you help us understand how the pro forma Domestic Card purchase volume growth would have looked for that quarter, especially considering how much acceleration we've all been watching industry-wide? We can probably back into some of those numbers ourselves, but having a bit more clarity on certain specifics would really help.

Andrew Young

executive
#18

Right, we haven't given you a breakdown showing exactly how much Brex contributed. What we did give you, from a purchase accounting standpoint, is the closing balance sheet along with all the related amortization schedules. But since Brex represents a fairly small percentage of Capital One—a fairly small percentage relative to Capital One as a whole—both the P&L and the balance sheet, when you look at them on a run rate basis, simply aren't all that material. That being said, we couldn't be more enthusiastic about what adding Brex means over the long term, and we believe the growth this platform delivers will generate meaningful accretion. Even so, we have no plans to break out any specific P&L details.

Jeff Norris

executive
#19

Okay, Darrin, I want to take you back to what was actually stated during the call. We mentioned that when you isolate the old Capital One Domestic Card operation, there was a slight pickup, and once you combine that with bringing in Brex along with corporate card, the figure came to roughly 14%, and most of that came from the legacy portion.

Darrin Peller

analyst
#20

All right, that's useful. One brief thing I'd like to circle back on: I recall that during the prior quarter you said — and a few remarks came up sooner about costs — but to be more precise, you noted that marketing got shifted out of the first quarter into the rest of the year. So was that still the intention during this quarter? Perhaps we could go over the marketing spend we should expect more generally, keeping in mind the investments made in Discover and Brex over the last few quarters. We looked at those recent quarters and averaged them, accounting for some of the timing. Is that a sound approach for thinking about the run rate for marketing levels at the company moving forward?

Andrew Young

executive
#21

Yeah, Darrin, seasonality plays a role there. Looking at the past, no single year matches another exactly, yet you do tend to see that rising pattern, especially in the latter half versus the first half. What we pointed out in the first quarter was simply that a portion of the spending we'd originally expected to occur in the first quarter was being deferred to the second. So we merely wanted that fact to be clear. Naturally, though, the real amounts of marketing spend will simply hinge on the opportunities we identify at any given time. Thus I'd rather not hand you an exact blueprint for what share of yearly spend lands in any particular quarter; however, reviewing the past reveals fairly obvious patterns regarding the back half versus the front half.

Rick Shane

analyst
#22

Let me dig into this Brex topic a bit further. Rich, you made it quite clear during the call that — when we consider this, and the questions have basically followed that same line — the best result for Capital One as a standalone company means maximizing ROTCE and margin. For most of its existence, Brex has operated in an environment where the only yardstick was growth. Now, inside Capital One, you have to strike a balance there. How do you get the true outcome from Brex while still paying attention to what investors genuinely value, or appear to value, when it comes to maximizing ROTCE and margin over the near term?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#23

Well, my hope is that Capital One's broader objective function isn't near-term ROTCE maximization. We're all watching it, and we're moving toward a strong exit rate once this integration is behind us. But let me focus specifically on Brex and how value gets created there. It's well known that tech start-ups rely on power metrics that aren't tied to vertical earnings; and at times those can seem very, very distant from how things operate in a mature public company. Still, we believe Brex's method of generating value aligns closely with the founding philosophy of Capital One when we started this company and continuing through today. That philosophy involves adopting a horizontal economic perspective; so — when Capital One was founded, I examined businesses and found it really striking that financial — the big banks and everyone else are so fixated on vertical earnings, yet banking is fundamentally an annuity business. You put in a considerable amount of money to build annuities that endure across a long stretch of time. So what we did was construct a huge horizontal — we termed it horizontal accounting, essentially, where whenever we considered investments or originating a cohort of accounts, we projected the lifetime economics of that, what it would cost to create those, and so on. Prior to the investment, while it was unfolding, and then once it concluded, we assessed it to determine whether value had truly been generated. And this method of disciplined financial decision-making on a horizontal basis. Putting money into annuities and building long-term value forms the financial foundation of how Capital One operates and how we generate value. So when we examined Brex, clearly, Brex — the world was focused on their power metrics, but we got to work and studied how Brex was building valuable annuities over time, though they lack as deep and rigorous a horizontal accounting system, which I wouldn't expect them to have. Yet just earlier today, I found myself in a discussion about the ongoing efforts on the Capital One side, examining Brex's investments and how every tranche seems to deliver returns as time goes on. What we noticed is that these generate a great deal of value. Naturally, not all investments made by tech firms create value. Still, based on all our observations, Brex's method — particularly when we bring them onto a more systematic, horizontal accounting framework — will align perfectly with Capital One's philosophy around creating value; and through building Capital One, we've discovered that when growth opportunities like these arise, the more thoroughly you actually dig in and quantify the value creation potential, quite often the more we end up committing, since we can confirm these things genuinely produce value as time passes. Brex sits in a phenomenal moment of opportunity. They've grabbed a tiger by the tail. They're pursuing 3 markets simultaneously: the commercial card market, the payables marketplace, and the expense management business; they're pursuing these with an integrated solution. Remarkably, that solution is something required by small companies all the way up to large corporations. It's a remarkably vast market. So we intend to lean in and supply the resources and capabilities to assist Brex in getting even — in creating even greater value. Yet throughout, we'll measure very rigorously to ensure that whatever we put money into yields value on the other end; but what we observe keeps confirming our acquisition thesis. And I'd also like to say, having observed and spent time around many young companies throughout the years, I remain astonished by how sophisticated this business's operations are and by the chance to generate value here.

Rob Wildhack

analyst
#24

I want to ask about the way Domestic Card loans have increased over the last few quarters, looking only at core Capital One; that number has bounced around, as I recall, near the low 3s, and for the second quarter you cited 2.6%. So each of those has landed below the longer-term trend. What's causing that slowdown — could you remind us? And more broadly, aside from the law of large numbers, is there any structural factor that would keep Capital One Domestic Card loan growth from eventually getting back to the longer-term average?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#25

Robert, whenever you mention Domestic Card, you're referring to the full scope, counting Discover in our results. As we've already talked about, Discover right now is going through a contraction. That's certainly holding back loan growth here at Capital One. The — when we — if I take away that Discover brownout impact. Capital One continues to turn in loan growth that stays really consistently solid. It's not — there are factors — when I look at the various growth measures and compare them with the industry, examining legacy Capital One alongside quite a few of the top competitors in the industry. On each growth measure, Capital One is delivering a very strong result. On the loan growth front, I want to highlight one thing, though it actually stems from something quite positive. We continue to see elevated payment rates, which is something we're always happy about since it generally translates into better credit performance — however, it does act as a slight drag on loan growth. Now, when we examine the numbers — and I realize we don't share all of them with you — what we see is this: Discover is experiencing a brownout and contracting. Meanwhile, legacy Capital One is expanding robustly across every dimension, especially in account origination, purchase volume, and many of those highly significant metrics. Then, another practice of ours—though we don't make it public—involves taking the upmarket portion of what Capital One originates. In doing so, we essentially create a stand-in for how competitors behave when they aren't deliberately lending in the subprime space. Once we isolate that upmarket originated segment of Capital One, it's performing incredibly well and ranks among the very best in the league tables on the important growth measures. That, incidentally, is driven by our ongoing push to succeed at the premium end of the market and to win with high spenders. This is really the reverse side of the spending plan we're pursuing with those who spend heavily. That said, Robert, I get it — Discover is going to slow us down for a while. And looking beyond that, once the integration is complete, it seems fair to expect that Capital One — the original Capital One, that is — would grow more quickly than Discover. What's the reasoning there? Well, if you examine Discover on its own, its approach in the credit card business is much narrower, targeting the prime portion of the market, and truthfully, it has delivered remarkably consistent results. As for Capital One — the old Capital One — there are simply so many additional avenues for expansion within card. Most likely it will keep setting the pace; however, at this moment, we're dealing with something of a brownout that's restraining our business.

Don Fandetti

analyst
#26

Rich, could you spend a moment on the credit card migration? I understand some testing has been happening to shift it onto the Discover network. Where do things stand with that? Are the results encouraging? And after that, do you foresee a situation in which you might shift somewhat more volume across than you originally expected at the time you struck the Discover deal?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#27

So what we're discussing — Don, what you're referring to is moving Capital One cards onto the Discover network. Yeah, it's perpetually confusing, since naturally we're also moving Discover cards onto the Capital One platforms and so forth. But yeah, let me just make clear exactly what's under discussion here. Earlier this year, we finished converting our debit card business onto the Discover network, and we're extremely happy with the way that turned out. I'd say that effort has simply been, in my words, a smashing success, judging by what we see. So at this point, as we consider growing credit card volume on the Discover network. You can do that in two ways, through the front book and the back book. And — so what we're pushing hard into at present is testing, originating legacy Capital One branded accounts on the Discover network, plus testing the conversion of existing Capital One accounts onto the Discover network. So as we push into that, and once those tests are behind us, we'll then settle on our final decisions regarding how — which credit card volume we intend to shift across and on what schedule; alongside that, a crucial companion obviously, is ramping up the volume that — the amount of investment in the network as we broaden international acceptance and continue building the brand. And what we're up to, the way to conceive of it — I mean, the pursuit of broadening international acceptance is going to be an endless endeavor; so for us, what matters is that we want to stagger the work; so we'll stagger our pursuit on both fronts of this effort when it comes to acceptance, international acceptance. Actually, let me begin with domestic acceptance. So Discover has — it simply astonishes me how strong their domestic acceptance is. There are a handful of isolated gaps and we're putting everything into literally shutting every one of them. So that's something progressing very well, and we're delighted on the domestic front. When it comes to international, once more, it will be a lengthy endeavor. But what we're doing is staggering the — while we strive to raise it everywhere, we're especially pushing to raise acceptance to a greater level in the locations our customers visit most often; and unsurprisingly, we find that where do they journey most, they journey to Mexico, the Caribbean, Canada, the U.K., and those make up the top 4 destinations; we're especially pushing there to genuinely shift the needle and boost acceptance there. In addition, the additional shifting we're undertaking, along with our trials, involves shifting what we transport and concentrating more on transporting items for customers or products, items that require less overseas travel; therefore, from a strategic standpoint, we are simply exerting tremendous effort to secure as much volume as possible across the network; and we will shift the acceptance efforts and shift the migrations so we can deliver excellent customer experiences and optimize the volume we transport as time goes on.

Don Fandetti

analyst
#28

Also, do you figure that eventually you'll need to issue cards internationally? Some people argue that's necessary. Or can that be handled later on?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#29

When it comes to acceptance abroad — you can get there through several different routes. Issuing internationally, incidentally, is an excellent route, since what that involves is a local company putting out our cards; that way, they can really help push acceptance within their own home market. So that's 1 of 4 routes toward building acceptance outside the U.S.; actually, once more, it blows my mind how Discover, given their fairly modest size, managed to construct such a striking global reach, though it still isn't yet the destination we'd ideally want; so the paths to reach that point from where we stand — and Discover has employed all four. The first is teaming up with other networks; that has formed a genuinely significant piece of Discover's approach. They've struck partnerships with networks across Japan, China, India — I mean, enormous acceptance in several of the largest nations on earth stems from network partnerships. A second route involves card-issuing financial institutions, an avenue American Express has especially committed to. It's a terrific avenue. We've had a few instances of that at Discover. For Discover it's been a smaller lever than for AmEx, yet that's another option. And incidentally, just a quick note — as an issuer ourselves in Canada and in the U.K., we're eager to secure our own issuer lift for acceptance there. A third lever means partnering with merchant acquirers; and last of all, the fourth is approaching merchants directly; so that's the playbook Discover has followed. We'll keep putting money into this playbook; and naturally, a flywheel advantage exists whereby the more acceptance we secure, the more volume we can secure. You're familiar with how that flywheel operates. But those are the 4 levers we'll push on throughout this journey.

John Pancari

analyst
#30

Turning back to the investments you're making. I get that you can't give us an efficiency ratio or expense growth expectations tied to your network investments. But is there any way you could help us understand what inning you're in with those investments? Rich, I know you've mentioned before that these would be sustained investments over a number of years. Any more color on where things stand now, now that you've gone down this path, you've seen the debit migration. You've discussed the testing, and you just took us through some of those approaches in your earlier answer. What inning are you in when you think about the investment required here?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#31

Well, the first thing I'd like to say is, when I lay out that big list of investments — and I know that throughout, sort of, our entire existence at Capital One, we've always, in certain ways, been the company that invests in our future — but there's definitely been a lot of conversation, as all of you have observed, about that lengthy list of investments we're leaning into. The first thing I'd like to say is, I wouldn't want anybody to form the perception that, like, massively moving the needle of Capital One investments means investing in the network or international acceptance. It's a significant sustained investment we will make for as far out as we can see. But I wouldn't want to leave the impression that it's, like, at the top of the list of what we — we're spending far more money than that on Capital One technology, AI, and maybe the biggest single item is — well, I don't know, there are several, but investing to win with heavy spenders at the top of the market; so I want to say this is merely one of the many things on the list. That said, the — to your point, I believe that the — for as far out as we can see, we'll be investing in international acceptance; but here's the crucial thing; we're not — our strategy isn't hinging on having to invest so much to reach a point where then finally, we can have this big bang moment and move a whole bunch of customers; this is why I went back to the power of the sloping. We take our customers and cards and simply analyze which customers are international travelers, we can empirically see that. Some customers have never traveled outside of the country for 20 years. I mean we can see and truly understand where they're coming from. We have good ways to understand on the front book what is happening. And it's partly a customer point and a product that they're choosing point. Also, if we examine the places people go, that pattern is similarly skewed. So once more, my view is that although we'll keep putting money into the network for as far ahead as we can foresee, by making that spending uneven, we can achieve substantial gains in a concentrated manner and keep building the capacity to serve additional customers as quickly as possible. And through that approach, there's no need to hold off until some future date to begin earning returns on what this network can do; on the debit side we're already experiencing it, and we can push further on the credit card side, with the advantages building up progressively alongside those investments.

John Pancari

analyst
#32

All right. Now, turning to a different topic — the remarks about migration that you addressed in the prior question. When it comes to the back book cards that you'd eventually shift over, what would your approach be for testing and then for actually moving the Capital One back book onto the Discover network? Would it begin with the plain, non-premium cards? And would you target only the ones whose expiration falls in a particular year, and is that how you'd handle the eventual migration of that back book?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#33

Well, that's quite a sharp question you've posed. Let me walk through it. To start, as is our standard practice with testing, we run extensive tests so we can grasp how customers will respond to different things; our testing is therefore quite wide-ranging. That way we won't discover down the road that we were too limited because we failed to think broadly enough on the testing side. Then, considering the factors involved in migration: first off, the front book is — it's a far simpler matter — well, it's a far more clear-cut matter to discuss the front book, since we can simply place specific cards, specific customers onto the Discover network, and there's no migration event; so that's a very appealing method to grow business. When we discuss migrating the book that already exists, which is likewise appealing, the main levers there — the main factors to weigh are international travel, which sits at the very top. How many of our cards are on file, since the more cards a customer keeps on file, the greater the friction involved in switching card numbers and a natural — and something we're examining, in certain instances, is shifting at the moment of expiration, because some of those friction points would already exist at that point. So every one of these items forms part of our testing plan and our strategic thinking.

Mihir Bhatia

analyst
#34

I'd like to touch on credit briefly, and I'll put both halves of my question out there right away. First, regarding the June loss rate — it dropped fairly significantly compared to the prior month, roughly 45 basis points, I believe. Is there anything worth highlighting? Did a sale occur or anything like that, or was that simply the extent of the credit improvement? Then for the second half, pulling up, Rich, could you discuss how the consumer is doing, and even more crucially, how the Capital One customer is doing? You've put a lot into marketing and grown it — are recent vintages coming in as you anticipated? Any thoughts on that would be great.

Rich Fairbank

executive
#35

Mihir, let's begin with how June performed. I don't have that loss rate figure sitting in front of me. That said, here's what I can say regarding the quarter and regarding June. Clearly, credit keeps showing up very strongly. The one metric we probably watch most closely is delinquencies. Within our card business, well, the loss rate for June was especially remarkably strong. Delinquencies for that month tracked with seasonality. And incidentally, across nearly every earlier month throughout 2026, delinquencies came in slightly ahead of the seasonality we'd calculated. So June was once again a really solid month, though I should note it's the first one that failed to outperform seasonality; even so, there's considerable strength there, charge-offs were terrific and all of that; so once more, we're seeing a very favorable credit picture, but I did want to offer those remarks regarding June.

Jeff Norris

executive
#36

Rich, if I may jump in here — regarding that June Domestic Card charge-off rate, there's nothing that needs flagging.

Rich Fairbank

executive
#37

All right, yes. So — first we'll cover the consumer, and after that we'll move on to Capital One customers; so the American consumer along with the broader economy stayed resilient in spite of elevated energy costs and all of that. Whenever you look at the headlines each day, you'd imagine everything is collapsing; yet in reality, the portfolio — the consumer keeps doing exceptionally well. The jobless rate for June came in below where it stood in February, prior to the start of the Iran conflict. Unemployment claims are still at low levels. Hiring has picked back up during the last several months. On consumer spending, that's still robust. Now because of inflation, real wage growth went negative during April and May compared with a year earlier, though it edged back into positive territory by a tiny amount in June as inflation eased somewhat. Looking at our customers' bank balances and the burden of servicing their debt, those appear somewhat stronger than they were 12 months ago across all income levels; within our Domestic Card business, our credit metrics kept getting better versus a year ago during the quarter. And the — I've already touched on this a little, but the robust credit performance also — we likewise witnessed robust credit performance on the auto side. Auto credit metrics are solid too. So what I'd like to do next is shift to leading indicators as we examine our own customers. So we discussed delinquencies. We discussed how solid delinquency performance has been in essentially every quarter this year. Among the other metrics we track, payment rates, which I mentioned before; those sit meaningfully higher than pre-pandemic levels across every one of our customer segments, and that does — it slightly dampens growth, yet it's a healthy indicator of customer credit quality. Spend levels. We keep observing healthy growth in spending, powered both by more accounts and by consistent increases in spend per customer. Turning to revolve rates, those have leveled off during the last year at near pre-pandemic levels for our main products and segments. Now, none of these observations proves anything by itself, but taken together, I believe they sketch a picture of consumer strength and certainly strength inside our own portfolio. Let me now shift to the front book of new originations in our card business. Our front book of new originations keeps performing remarkably well. We're seeing our '24 and '25 originations, honestly, in both legacy Capital One and Discover. Well, allow me to break it apart. In legacy Capital One, we're seeing our 2024 and 2025 originations arriving better than 2022 and '23 and somewhat beneath pre-pandemic levels, which is fairly striking given — and that's not something I believe is being widely seen across the card business, yet it's something where we've witnessed strength in our originations really throughout this entire post-pandemic stretch. This is among the reasons we feel able to push harder on originations, put that cash toward the marketing we mentioned, and so on. Another element on the credit side is recoveries. As we emerged from the pandemic, the stock of recoveries we held was abnormally small, yet that stock has grown quickly across the last 2 years and has helped drive the betterment of our total loss rate during that stretch. Losses at Discover topped out after those at legacy Capital One, and they are now experiencing that same force acting as a benefit to their losses. However, as we look forward, our recoveries inventory ought to decline somewhat from — over the coming 12 months or so, since the pool of recent charge-offs will itself be shrinking. So that's — Mihir, that's a view of leading indicators; yet if I zoom way out, we observe genuine vigor in the consumer and vigor throughout our business results in card and in auto. And that is why, even as we maintain a highly cautious watch on the economy and international developments, we are charging ahead with plenty of optimism into our growth strategies.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#38

I wouldn't drag this call out if the matter weren't significant. But I believe investors genuinely need clarity here; and Rich and Andrew, you both keep saying that your earnings power should end up matching what you projected back when a Discover deal was first announced. So I wanted to dig into that a little. So I was going through your disclosures, and I couldn't tell what baseline you were relying on. But in 2027, consensus EPS — sorry, when the deal was announced, consensus EPS for stand-alone Capital One comes to roughly $21. You said over 15% accretion to '27 EPS at announcement, which rounds up to, let's say, about $24.50 if we apply 16%, 17% accretion. Last quarter, you said that in thinking about ROTCE, you weren't contemplating CET1 dropping all the way to 11%; so applying 12.5% to the current share count, you arrive at a mid-20s ROTCE pro forma. Where does that logic break down?

Andrew Young

executive
#39

Well, Erika, let me unpack a few of the assumptions you just made that actually don't line up with what we've stated, and I want to be really clear about this. First, the assumptions we set out — and I'd suggest you revisit them from when we announced the deal in February of '24. But what we said was that we were taking consensus estimates for both Capital One and Discover, and we adjusted Discover's loss forecast purely based on what we had observed during diligence. Then regarding ROTCE at that time, the weighted average consensus for CET1 was 12.5%. And so when Rich last quarter pointed out that we define earnings power as ROTCE, we simply wanted to stay consistent with that 12.5% denominator for the purpose of running the math, which isn't a claim that this is our target. As I said earlier, on what we think our capital need is, we think our capital need is 11%, but we're simply running the ROTCE math at 12.5% for comparability's sake. And on EPS, naturally, share price assumptions have shifted. There are simply various things that have shifted among those assumptions, especially those tied to individual line items, and that's the reason we keep returning to ROTCE as our definition of earnings power.

Moshe Orenbuch

analyst
#40

Rich, you mentioned expansion in non-prime auto and in the high-end card segment. Could you discuss the non-prime card segment a bit, since that's one where you've achieved growth. It hasn't demanded as much upfront spending as the high end, just — and you've also said the consumer is doing fairly well; so are there possibilities for acceleration there? And I have a follow-up.

Rich Fairbank

executive
#41

Moshe, thank you. I realize you've followed this topic closely for a long time — we've collaborated across numerous decades, and your attention to it makes a lot of sense, since this area matters a great deal to Capital One. You may have noticed the figure slipped to 26%, a decline tied to the Discover portfolio, specifically regarding the subprime share of that portfolio. That said, Moshe, whether we're looking at card or auto, our approach hasn't really shifted. We keep gaining momentum in the business, and results remain solid. If you look at where the strongest growth is happening, it's at the upper end of the market, and that simply reflects the momentum Capital One is building through the investments we've made there. At the same time, we remain quite happy with the results we're seeing in the lower end of the market. Growth there is somewhat slower right now — it doesn't match what we're seeing higher up — but our approach has always been to accept whatever the market offers us, and performance has stayed steady. I should have brought this up sooner: credit performance within that segment is remarkably consistent, and really that holds true throughout the entire credit spectrum. Looking at our own data, we aren't observing the split, or K-shaped, economy that gets discussed so often. That said, it's fair to note that we aren't really competing at the very bottom of the market, where those kinds of pressures might be showing up in the broader economy. So, Moshe, business keeps performing really well. We're pushing forward aggressively — acquiring accounts in that segment costs far less from a marketing standpoint, so we keep investing heavily there, and growth remains quite strong. It's slightly below what we see at the upper end — lower than the high end — but we're still generating a lot of value, and the whole thing looks pretty steady. Another point I'd add: this area of the market gains enormously from ongoing spending on technology, data, and the strength of machine learning and, eventually, AI. Because this portion of the market is built completely around information, analytics, and modeling, and those things are a real strong suit for Capital One, even if marketing dollars in that segment aren't the biggest, we're putting a lot of focus through our investments in technology, data, and AI so we can do even better in that underpenetrated part of the market. Thanks for your question.

Moshe Orenbuch

analyst
#42

Okay. And perhaps, just to add a brief question on top of that. Earlier you mentioned the horizontal P&Ls that you essentially maintain for all your products. So when you consider how Capital One is seen from the outside as a company, I mean, do you feel you receive credit for the earnings streams you're building and the value that's being generated? And if not, could there be some means, whether through a certain level of disclosure or examples of that? Like, are there — is there — I mean, do you believe the stock gives you the recognition you deserve for it? And what might you do about that?

Rich Fairbank

executive
#43

Moshe, that's a wonderful question. My view is that we likely don't receive the right recognition in the stock. But I think the — and I think it would — I don't believe there's a simple method for us to, say, publish the details of our horizontal accounting, though I'd put it this way. When you consider the — I suppose, we have — I'm currently in — what is it, my 32nd year of leading this company, well, since our IPO and my 40th year overall in building this franchise, and among the very, very first actions we took was to install horizontal accounting along with an NPV-based methodology for everything we do; and I think demonstrating that to investors — the power of it — is difficult, but I think perhaps that power shows itself in the 3.5-decade history of Capital One and the capacity to expand the company so dramatically and to produce strong earnings power throughout. And the foundations of that approach have been beginning with strategy, ensuring the businesses we're in lend themselves to above — they are structurally attractive and provide the chance to deliver above-hurdle returns, which explains why we don't do half the things other banks do. And then second, the entire investment philosophy we hold that — the strategic philosophy that we concentrate on long-term value. The financial horizontal P&L investment approach we employ; and the manner in which, over time, we possess a whole methodology of retrospective measurement of how our various programs perform relative to expectation, relative to hurdle rate and all these kinds of things in a way that I think has truly shown the power of this; and so when I then tell investors, we are at a moment where we have exceptional opportunity ahead; that opportunity, there are sort of two different buckets of investment tied to what I'm describing as just extraordinary opportunity we see ahead. One is on the business side, the horizontal P&L measurement of our investments across these emerging businesses and so on. And the other thing is a choice we make at Capital One, which doesn't lend itself to such precise horizontal P&L, Moshe, as you know, which is building the technology foundation of the company. There isn't a method I'm aware of for building a horizontal P&L for a data ecosystem, or for the shift to cloud computing. So certain activities we undertake begin by asking what skeletal foundation is required for us to succeed, and then we go build it. And what we're observing is that measuring the payoff on certain of these efforts will be impossible. If some way existed to do that across time, my belief is it would prove to be the highest-returning investment Capital One has ever made — so for us and for our shareholders, it's a somewhat difficult manner of earning a living. Yet in my view that's a crucial factor; Moshe, this way of doing things is a crucial factor in why we're sitting here today and a primary factor behind the opportunity set we currently possess, and I'm eager for our investors to reap the gains that come from steadfast dedication to this way of operating.

Jeff Norris

executive
#44

That wraps up the Q&A portion and brings tonight's call to a close. We really appreciate you being with us here. Thanks for the interest you've shown in Capital One. Enjoy the rest of your evening.

Operator

operator
#45

Thanks. That brings us to the end of today's call. We appreciate everyone joining in. You're welcome to hang up now.

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