Claros Mortgage Trust, Inc. (CMTG) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
November 1, 2023
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Anh Huynh
executiveThanks, everyone. With me today are Richard Mack, who serves as CEO and Chairman of Claros Mortgage Trust; Mike McGillis, our President and a Director of Claros Mortgage Trust; and Jai Agarwal, CMTG's Chief Financial Officer. Also joining us are Kevin Cullinan, an Executive Vice President heading up MRECS Originations, and Priyanka Garg, an Executive Vice President heading up MRECS Portfolio and Asset Management. Earlier today, CMTG's earnings release and supplement went out. Please use those documents alongside what we present on this call. Should anything be unclear, feel free to reach out to me. As a reminder, forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 may be part of today's call. Various important factors, including those covered in our other SEC filings, could cause actual results to differ materially from what those forward-looking statements indicate. Any forward-looking statements we make today reflect our views only as of today, and no obligation is undertaken on our part to update them; certain non-GAAP financial measures will also come up on today's call, such as distributable earnings, which in our view may matter to investors in assessing our operating performance. Reconciliations of non-GAAP measures to their nearest GAAP equivalent can be found in the earnings supplement. At this point, I'll hand the call over to Richard.
Richard Mack
executiveThank you, Anh, and I appreciate all of you taking the time to be with us today for CMTG's call covering results from the third quarter. If we look back to this same point 12 months ago, investors were mostly focused on when a 2023 recession would arrive and how severe it would be, yet it now appears the U.S. might get through this year without experiencing one at all. That sounds like a good thing, but a great deal of uncertainty still hangs over the capital markets as bond yields rise, particularly for sectors that are sensitive to interest rates. This creates a puzzling situation in which favorable economic growth data can translate into unfavorable news for asset prices, and where the headline economic figures can be read in several different ways. Then layer on top of that the heightened geopolitical dangers we haven't witnessed since the darkest days of the Cold War, highlighted by the continuing Russia-Ukraine war and a fresh, fast-moving conflict in the Middle East, and the result is a recipe for sustained market turbulence while investors wrestle with how to price capital and underwrite future economic growth, corporate earnings and inflation. A number of professionals in the investment world think we are approaching, or have already reached, the conclusion of rate increases. Others have begun asking when, rather than whether, the Fed will start lowering rates. That said, predicting where interest rates will go is hard for us, because so many indicators can shape Fed decisions and because the variables affecting inflation and economic growth are so numerous and frequently contradictory; keeping all of that in mind, here at CMTG we have continued to run our business assuming rates will stay higher for longer. That is one of the primary reasons we have acted so proactively. Our portfolio is being managed with a long-term investment horizon aimed at maximizing value for shareholders, even as we recognize the difficulties facing the commercial real estate industry. Demand patterns shifted because of COVID, which has been disruptive, especially for the office sector, though that disruption may be less severe than the inflation triggered by COVID stimulus that we face now, along with the higher interest rate climate that followed. Those 2 forces together have produced the capital markets dislocation that we keep observing across the real estate sector. It comes as no surprise that, with these headwinds, sales and transaction volumes have fallen considerably across the last several quarters; even so, apart from the office market, we have not yet seen many genuinely distressed trades. What we do observe is deal activity involving certain high-quality assets at values that are only somewhat lower, despite how difficult conditions are. Moving beyond the economic backdrop, I want to offer a few big-picture comments about CMTG's third quarter; overall it was an active and productive period, with portfolio management and strategic execution centered on liquidity and protecting capital. As we said during our previous earnings call, we expected a meaningful amount of loan repayments across our portfolio in the second half of the year; and we are happy to report we stayed on track, as 4 loans were repaid in the third quarter. With the broader real estate market showing only minimal transaction volume, we view this as a good sign regarding the institutional caliber of both the assets and the sponsors in our portfolio. We completed 2 loan sales during the quarter as well. A Texas hospitality loan was the first one, and it went for par, a move meant to lower our total hospitality exposure while strengthening liquidity. The second was backed by a San Francisco multifamily portfolio that includes a rent-regulated component. Being watchful matters in the present climate. As part of how we manage assets, we look at our investments with an eye toward maximizing long-term shareholder value, weighed against the time and capital needed to get there. That means in certain cases, we'll weigh selling a loan when our long-term conviction in that investment has faded; the San Francisco multifamily investment we chose to sell in the third quarter fit that description. Because of the realized loss it produced, this was not an easy call. Still, we ultimately feel this portfolio management choice was wise, in light of the market and regulatory headwinds the investment confronted. Later in the call, Mike will give a fuller portfolio review, with specifics on the loan sales. Finally, as we've said before, CMTG declared a third quarter dividend of $0.25 per share, down from the prior quarterly dividend levels of $0.37 per share; in resetting the dividend we weighed several factors, among them recognizing that the present market disruption was and remains highly likely to continue, plus the wish to seize possible opportunities that could emerge in our portfolio. With those factors in mind, we sought to set the dividend at a level we think can be sustained and comfortably covered by distributable earnings before realized gains and losses, while leaving us ready for upcoming opportunities and possible unknowns. I'd now like to hand the call over to Mike.
John McGillis
executiveThanks, Richard, and hello, everyone. The third quarter proved to be an active one, fueled by robust repayment volume along with 2 loan sales. Even with that activity, the makeup of our portfolio stayed largely the same, though office exposure did come down somewhat. As a quick refresher, CMTG's portfolio, mostly floating-rate and measured by carrying value, stood at $7.1 billion as of September 30, versus $7.5 billion on June 30. That sequential drop stemmed mainly from repayments and loan sales completed during the period, partly offset by additional fundings tied to commitments made in earlier periods. In Q3, we collected a total of $475 million in loan proceeds, split into $248 million of complete repayments, roughly $39 million of partial repayments and $188 million from the loan sales Richard brought up earlier, which I'll discuss further in a moment; on top of that, we funded $174 million in follow-on commitments. Now for portfolio mix: multifamily remains our biggest sector, making up 41% of holdings as of September 30. Although borrowers are dealing with elevated rates, our long-range view on this asset class stays favorable. We still hold the belief that top-tier, well-positioned multifamily properties will deliver solid relative performance, thanks to durable underlying supply-demand dynamics that favor the sector, plus how higher rates affect the affordability of owning a home. Hospitality, our second-biggest allocation, accounted for 19% of the portfolio as of September 30, basically flat versus the previous quarter. On office, we've historically taken a very selective approach, which has kept our concentration in this asset class low. In Q3, we brought office exposure down further, to 13% of the portfolio; the main driver was an office construction loan that paid off during the quarter, just as we had expected. That loan carried a $141 million commitment and was backed by a newly completed Class A high-rise office property in Nashville, Tennessee. This loan illustrates how top-quality office can still be appealing, and why we view construction loans as a valuable piece of our portfolio, especially when they're asset-managed carefully and benefit from the broader perspective and resources of the Mack Real Estate Group; in our view, when a new asset gets delivered, it will often rank among the finest and most sought-after properties in its submarket. As Richard noted, we anticipated a significant volume of repayments, and in Q3 we received $248 million in complete loan repayments, roughly $39 million in partial repayments, with more repayments likely to come over the near to medium term. We think it's worth highlighting how varied the collateral behind these loans was; they span a range of markets and property types, and mostly involve assets that had recently been delivered to the market. Our view is that this points to continued available capital for strong assets and sponsors, which confirms the caliber of what sits in our portfolio. Prior to handing things to Jai, I want to walk through the loan sales we closed in the quarter. Loan number one was backed by a top-tier hospitality property in Austin, Texas, carrying a UPB of $123 million, and its operating results had improved considerably over the life of that loan. We seized a chance to divest the investment at par, and in our view that reflects the credit strength of both the asset and the investment, especially given today's capital markets backdrop. That deal let us boost our liquidity and shore up the balance sheet further, all while bringing down our leverage and our hospitality exposure. The second loan, a $138 million facility originated in 2019, was secured by a group of multifamily properties featuring a rent-regulated element spread across San Francisco. Through the COVID-19 pandemic, the borrower kept supporting this asset, yet chose to halt debt service payments in Q4 2022 because of rising interest rates and lower NOI at the property amid San Francisco market difficulties. From the moment of that payment default onward, conditions in the San Francisco real estate market kept worsening, and together with the prospect of ongoing regulatory strain, that pushed us toward a hard yet clear-eyed choice: sell the loan for gross proceeds of $65 million, a 53% discount to UPB. Although the San Francisco loan produced a disappointing result, our reasoning was that this capital has far better uses, and the money from the sale allowed us to cut leverage, which should be accretive to distributable earnings since that loan sat on nonaccrual. In our view, this also shows our dedication to disciplined, efficient portfolio management, even when it means stepping away from an investment thesis. At this point I'd like to hand the call to Jai.
Jai Agarwal
executiveThanks, Mike and Richard. When it came to Q3 2023, distributable earnings came in at $0.35 per share, after excluding net realized losses, and that amount more than covers the revised dividend we set at $0.25 per share. Once net realized losses are factored in, distributable loss stood at $0.16 per share. That net realized loss totaled $73 million, equal to $0.52 per share, and it stemmed mainly from selling the San Francisco multifamily investment Mike brought up, which had previously carried a 5 rating. On a GAAP basis, our net loss was $0.50 per share. For a reconciliation of non-GAAP financial measures, please look at our earnings supplement. Now I'd like to talk about the portfolio's overall credit profile as well as how risk ratings shifted over the quarter. Nothing new entered the 4 risk-rated category. That said, 3 loans rated 4 moved into a 5 rating, with zero loans carrying combined UPB of $335 million, and against those we took a specific CECL reserve of $71 million; among them are a land loan located in Virginia plus office loans in San Francisco and Atlanta. As of September 30, our CECL reserve stood at $155 million, equal to 2.2% of UPB. Breaking that down, it consists of $72 million in specific reserves and $83 million in general CECL reserves. At quarter-end, specific CECL reserves amounted to 21.3% of the UPB of the loans behind them. The general CECL reserve, at 1.2%, is made up of 3.6% of UPB on loans rated 4 and 0.8% of UPB on all the rest. The general CECL reserve grew this quarter, largely driven by worsening macroeconomic conditions, though that was partly offset by seasoning and a smaller loan portfolio; on top of that, we moved an additional $98 million 4-rated loan backed by an office building in Irvine, California onto nonaccrual status. As of September 30, nonaccrual loans made up 6.1% of our loan portfolio. Now shifting to the balance sheet. Like Richard said, keeping liquidity strong remains a top priority for the organization. As of September 30, total liquidity came to $433 million, covering cash along with approved and undrawn credit capacity. Unencumbered loans totaled $438 million, a figure that includes $407 million of senior loans plus $144 million of mixed-use New York City REO property; beyond that, future funding commitments dropped to $1.3 billion as of September 30, down from $1.9 billion on December 31, 2022. Our net debt-to-equity ratio held steady versus the prior quarter, landing at 2.3x as of September 30. At this point I'd like to open things up for questions. Operator, please go ahead.
Sarah Barcomb
analystSarah Barcomb, on the equity front, we keep hearing that the supply situation in multifamily is getting worse. Developers may be under greater pressure to reach breakeven so they can close a sale or secure more permanent financing. Could you speak to that, and to what you're observing on the ground across your development portfolio and in how sponsors are behaving?
Richard Mack
executiveRichard Mack, sure. Do you mean merchant builders who are selling below cost? Or do you mean leasing and occupancy fundamentals? I just want to be certain I understand the question, and thank you for raising it.
Sarah Barcomb
analystWhat I'm wondering about is based on a few things we've been picking up regarding merchant builders. Given that, plus how much of your focus is on development, I wanted to hear what you'd say about it and what's showing up in your portfolio.
Richard Mack
executiveAbsolutely. All right. When it comes to the sales side of things, what we're observing is merchant builders taking small losses just so they can be released from the guarantees attached to their loans; that's among the reasons we favor our construction loans, particularly when it comes to multifamily. Borrowers have an incentive to accept losses since they're typically obligated to cover the interest rate guarantees. So yes, we're watching merchant builders sell at discounts, though they're modest ones; and broadly speaking, what appeals to us about building the top-quality product in the market is that even amid weak fundamentals, which exist right now, these assets are the quickest to lease up. And there's always a level — "always" is a strong term, but no market I've encountered lacked some level at which the best asset in that market could be leased. That's why we're at ease, extremely at ease, regarding our multifamily development assets. Broadly speaking, demand is solid across most markets, yet we're still working through supply, and that process of absorption is what's holding rents down and pushing concessions back into the market. That said, nearly every planned multifamily development has been halted; so if something didn't start over 6 months ago, it truly isn't breaking ground. We're likewise observing a decline in home sales as mortgage rates rise; our belief is that eventually this will prove bullish for multifamily. So we expect rent inflation will reach the multifamily sector, though catching up to the supply will require some time. Still, over the long term we're quite bullish because of the overall shortage of housing in the U.S. market; from a housing standpoint, we're undersupplied. I hope that — that answered what you were asking.
Sarah Barcomb
analystYes. I appreciate that additional detail. My follow-up question concerns the loan sales. Based on what was said in the prepared remarks, it sounds like you're willing to pursue additional loan sales to bolster liquidity; during the quarter we saw both a watch list loan sale and the sale of a higher quality, 3-rated loan. Could you discuss where else in your portfolio — whether by sector, by geography, or in terms of non-watch list versus watch list — you see additional opportunities to sell and generate more liquidity?
Priyanka Garg
executiveSarah, this is Priyanka. Thanks for asking that. In my view, it will be highly situational, and very specific to the asset and the borrower. Regarding the watch list loan that was sold, I believe Mike did an excellent job of explaining our thinking and how we reached that decision. We will only take that step if we truly believe we are unable to step in and take ownership of the asset. I think we've now accomplished that successfully on two occasions within our REO portfolio; therefore we won't back away from doing so; however, if we don't believe the fundamentals support it, then should we wish to resolve the credit, the route will be a loan sale. Nothing is currently on the horizon that we have earmarked for that, though this is a highly dynamic environment and it remains to be seen. As for the 3-rated loan we sold, that was simply more opportunistic, with the right timing; we managed to sell it at par. It generated liquidity. We are not out in the market actively marketing it. It was not marketed. It came about simply from a conversation with a counterparty with whom we conduct a great deal of business. So once again, it was purely opportunistic and situational, but there is no programmatic strategy when it comes to loan sales.
Rick Shane
analystThis probably won't shock anyone who has tuned into these calls, yet I'd really like to hear a bit about how the dividend policy pairs with your appetite for repurchases. My assumption is that the loan sales were already on the table when you cut the dividend for the third quarter and beyond, but taking everything into account, and with the stock trading at such a massive discount, does that dividend policy still make sense? Or ought you to be more aggressive with the buyback? And I'd note that, on a relative basis, you folks hold a tremendous amount of stock versus many peer companies. So I believe the incentives line up pretty well.
John McGillis
executiveSure, Rick; this is Mike. I appreciate the question. From the dividend standpoint, regarding the choice to lower it, that wasn't really linked straight to the call to sell this loan; instead, we were truly examining our portfolio and the distributable earnings outlook going forward, assuming some possible deterioration from a higher-for-longer rate setting. And we aimed to act proactively with that dividend reduction to capture where we believed distributable earnings, prior to any net realized gains and losses, would land on a forecasted basis, and to let us substantially cover that go-forward dividend, since we had considerably overpaid our minimum distribution requirements under the REIT rules. So those were all essential pieces of that choice. As for share buyback, I'd say liquidity is critical right now. We're genuinely concentrated on preserving and maintaining liquidity and shielding the portfolio in this environment, despite having the capacity to repurchase shares. I wouldn't say we'd say "never," but I don't anticipate doing it unless we felt truly, truly at ease that we held a great deal of excess liquidity. And that it was the optimal use of capital versus redeploying into what we consider a very attractive market at present, though we're being quite, I think, conservative. I think it's also worth remembering, we do have, as Jai noted, substantial future funding commitments on our existing loans, and we're quite comfortable with how that portfolio is performing. And it's key to point out that those loans carry a weighted-average spread to SOFR of 473 basis points over SOFR. So that's above a 10% current coupon unleveraged. So we see that as a very strong use of excess liquidity whenever we have it; so hopefully, that answers your question.
Rick Shane
analystYes, that's useful. And regarding those undrawn commitments, someone noted that multifamily development has largely halted in many instances. Does that imply that, in the short term, draws on those commitments will be fairly limited? So there's somewhat of a — that liquidity won't get pulled until conditions get a bit better? Is that the type of check and balance in play?
Priyanka Garg
executiveRick, this is Priyanka. Let me chime in. I believe Richard's remark was a broader observation about the market; within our portfolio, every construction project is moving forward as anticipated, on time, and mostly within budget. Therefore, I wouldn't anticipate any shift in our upcoming funding obligations tied to our multifamily exposure, or really throughout our construction loans; and as we've said in prior quarters, we have milestones embedded in our loan agreements. We essentially hold an estoppel right each month when we fund draws. So we aim to keep funding draws, keep the project advancing, and have borrowers keep rebalancing. Thus, we aren't observing any deceleration within our portfolio. Projects that had commenced have kept going.
Jason Sabshon
analystJason Sabshon here, filling in for Jade. To start things off, we've been noticing commercial mortgage REITs experiencing losses of 30% to 50% when selling loans in certain situations, and those are loans that reportedly had LTVs of 60% to 70%. So what's causing that level of loss, in your view? What portion comes from a look-through to declining prices at the asset level? What portion stems from the business plan and increased cost of carry? And what portion results from not being able to leverage what you're purchasing?
Priyanka Garg
executivePriyanka Garg here, responding. I appreciate that inquiry. I believe it's an excellent inquiry. I believe this is something everyone is attempting to grasp at present; however, these loan sales, clearly I can only represent our own perspective, but each one is highly situational, and it truly hinges on the borrower's strength, what individuals believe they can pursue, and the jurisdiction where it's happening, since that affects the capacity to foreclose. There's clearly deterioration in the underlying asset, as you mentioned. I believe in our specific circumstance, because we chose to proceed with selling the loan, our primary aim was to concentrate on execution that was extremely swift and assured. Consequently, we chose a robust purchaser capable of closing rapidly, which reduced both market risk and execution risk. Thus, I believe it's simply a circumstance that varies greatly. And for us, we truly aimed to make sure we removed it from our books swiftly, considering the broader situation in San Francisco and its connection to the ongoing unpredictable interest rate climate. So I believe it's an excellent inquiry, but I believe there simply isn't a universal answer. Richard, would you like to contribute?
Richard Mack
executiveI'll add a quick note here. Regarding that San Francisco disposition, our view was that what happened in the regulated multi-housing sector there amounted to a perfect storm. The state of California, and San Francisco especially, keeps stagnating and keeps getting hit by remote work, criminal activity, homelessness, substance abuse, poor governance, and heavy taxation. The list could keep going — plus the threat of tighter rules. I believe there's no end to the problems tied to that particular asset; faced with that much uncertainty, we chose to cut our losses and accept a very, very large one. On the question of similar losses elsewhere in the market, transactions have been fairly scarce. My guess is that hardly anyone is eager to sell at that kind of level unless they're dealing with property types such as office, in especially weak markets, where they believe the future prospects for that asset are greatly reduced. So this instance was highly atypical and, we hope, a one-time event, in the sense that virtually everything that could go wrong did go wrong, and we wanted certainty and wanted to move forward. So several elements are at play. Still, apart from office, I doubt we'll keep seeing loans sold at those kinds of steep discounts.
Jason Sabshon
analystThanks. For my second question, the 10-Q includes some discussion regarding discount rates and terminal cap rates; so broadly, where do you see stabilized cap rates landing for office and multifamily?
Richard Mack
executiveThat's really a difficult one. Priyanka, why don't you take it.
Priyanka Garg
executiveHonestly, that's precisely what I was about to say. Once again, my view is that everything hinges on the particular market and the particular asset. Take a leased-up property — the rent roll's quality matters, along with weighted-average lease terms; there are simply countless factors feeding into it. Regarding the reference you made to what appears in the 10-Q, all of those pertain to transitional assets sitting in our portfolio where lease-up and stabilization will require time, which is inherently what the transitional asset category means. Consequently, the cap rates we applied reflect a more normalized transaction setting, as opposed to today's cap rates, since this is clearly an environment where capital is very constrained.
Richard Mack
executiveOkay, thanks to each of you for being here. In my view, the current climate is challenging, and it will stay challenging. Even so, we're prepared for it. Not every day will be enjoyable, but we've positioned ourselves to operate in conditions like these, to solve issues, and to make it through to the other side. That said, over the coming 12 months, we expect the path to be quite uneven, to say the least. We believe we're extremely well positioned to address these challenges and to be prepared for a rebound in the capital markets, ideally by 2025. So, thanks again to everyone for attending, and we can't wait to talk with you once more on our upcoming earnings call. Many thanks.
Operator
operatorAppreciate it. That brings us to the end of today's call. Thanks to everyone for being here. You can go ahead and hang up your lines now.
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