Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
May 24, 2022
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks a lot. Good morning and good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to Frontline's first quarter earnings call. I think I'll begin by noting that, in many ways, this quarter has certainly been a hectic one. The situation in Ukraine has placed real demands on our company. To begin with, we needed to assist our crew members, who include both Ukrainian and Russian nationals, in some cases serving side by side aboard our vessels. Our legal and compliance people have worked nonstop amid sanctions rules that keep shifting, ensuring that we remain compliant. It is also quite gratifying to see that Frontline has been able to navigate all of these difficulties while simultaneously trading our ships in a highly competitive manner. On top of everything else, we announced a proposed merger with Euronav in early April, and since that time we have been working hard together to settle on a suitable deal structure for this combination. Let's turn to slide three and review the highlights. During the fourth quarter, Frontline earned $15,700 per day with our VLCC fleet. We earned $16,900 per day with our Suezmax fleet, and $19,000 per day with our LR2/Aframax fleet. Thus far in the first quarter of 2022, we have booked 74% of our VLCC days at $22,600 per day. We booked 70% of our Suezmax days at $32,700 per day, and 58% of our LR2/Aframax days at $46,300 per day. Every figure in this table is calculated on the load-to-discharge basis, as is customary for Frontline; also this quarter, I want to direct your attention to slide four so I can explain how returns differ based on vessel characteristics. You can plainly observe from the figures on the right-hand side of this slide that earnings vary considerably depending on which type of ship we are trading. As you can see on the left-hand side, Frontline's fleet is young. 88% of our fleet qualifies as eco vessels, and our scrubber penetration stands at 63%. You can also see that all the scrubbers are concentrated on the VLCC and Suezmax assets, which have the greatest consumption. We now see a $17,100 per day premium for a VLCC when comparing an eco vessel with a scrubber against a traditional non-eco VLCC or vessel. For the Suezmaxes, that premium comes to $9,500 versus a non-eco ship, and for the LR2s, it amounts to $8,500 a day premium versus a non-eco vessel. Essentially, this high oil price environment is impacting us significantly; that said, it doesn't capture the whole picture. The technical, operational, and commercial results we have been able to deliver also depend heavily on our talented team; we function more as asset managers, optimizing a portfolio of multi-million dollar investments, than as traditional ship owners; with that, I'll hand it over to Inger to walk you through the financial highlights.
Inger Klemp
executiveAppreciate that, Lars, and greetings everyone, morning or afternoon depending on where you're joining from. If we move over to slide 5, we can examine the income statement. During the first quarter of 2022, Frontline brought in total operating revenues of $104 million alongside adjusted EBITDA of $53 million; net income came in at $31.1 million, equating to $0.15 per share, while the adjusted net loss stood at $1.6 million, or $0.01 per share for that same first quarter. The adjustments recorded this quarter comprise a $24.9 million gain on derivatives, a $0.3 million gain on marketable securities, a $6.1 million gain on sale of vessels, a $0.4 million gain on insurance claim, and a $1.3 million amortization of acquired time charters, partly offset by a $0.1 million share of losses of associated companies. Compared with the fourth quarter of 2021, the adjusted net loss for this quarter dropped by $3.1 million. This reduction in adjusted net loss stemmed from higher time charter equivalent earnings thanks to stronger TCE rates during the quarter, partially counterbalanced by other shifts in operating gains and expenses. Now let's examine the balance sheet on slide 6. During Q1, our total balance sheet size shrank by $56 million compared with Q4 2021. The main drivers of this quarter's balance sheet movement were the disposal of the LR2 tankers from Lion and Panther, plus ordinary debt paydowns and depreciation. At March 31, 2022, Frontline's cash and cash equivalents stood at $179 million, a figure that takes in undrawn capacity from our senior unsecured loan facility, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements. On the short-term debt side, we have total balloon payments of $261.1 million tied to two loan facilities that come due in Q1 2023, and our plan is to refinance them ahead of maturity. Let's take a closer look at slide 7. Maintaining low expenses has consistently been a fundamental part of Frontline's identity and one of the guiding principles behind the Frontline platform, which involves keeping things straightforward and targeted while running management teams that are lean and effective. What this slide demonstrates is that during the first quarter of 2022, Frontline beat its competitors when it came to OpEx, G&A, and interest expense. That, combined with the fact that revenues this quarter also surpassed those of peers, accounts for why Frontline's operational results in the first quarter of 2022 were so strong. Let's turn our attention to slide eight, I believe. For the rest of 2022, we project average cash cost break-even figures of roughly $23,700 each day in the VLCC segment, $19,800 each day for the Suezmax tankers, and $16,600 each day for the LR2 tankers. The projected average across the fleet comes to roughly 20,100 daily, and that figure factors in 13 ships undergoing drydock between Q2 and Q4 of 2022, adding $750 per day in impact. Breaking down those 13 vessels, we have three VLCCs, five Suezmax tankers, and five LR2 tankers. Looking at Q1, our OpEx — drydock included — worked out to $8,200 per day for VLCCs, $7,000 per day for the Suezmax tankers, and $7,900 per day for the LR2 tankers. When it came to Q1, a single VLCC went into drydock and completed that process in Q2, and two LR2 tankers did the same, with one of them finishing in Q2. On the right-hand side of this slide, there's a chart showing free cash flow per share at debt service along with free cash flow yield. It's based on the fleet we have now and the share price from May 23rd, across a range of TCE rates. If you take Clarkson's historical TCE rates for non-eco vessels spanning 2000 to 2021, and then adjust for scrubber and eco vessel premiums, Frontline's free cash flow per share comes out to $2.43, which gives a free cash flow yield of 27%. Assuming higher TCE rates, and once vessels are fully delivered, that yield potential gets bigger. With that, I'll turn it back to Lars.
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks, Inger. The main takeaway from my report on the Q1 tanker market is that volatility has returned. On slide nine, if you check the chart in the lower left corner, you can see that after roughly 18 months of staying in a range of 10,000 to 30,000 on a decent day, we are now shooting upward suddenly. The quarter itself was pretty calm, since worldwide oil demand was estimated to average approximately 98.8 million barrels. Q1 is by history or season a shoulder quarter, and demand fell 1.7 million barrels versus Q4. In fact, supply arrived at the identical figure. This marks the first quarter in quite a while when we have not made a substantial withdrawal from inventories. When you set it against Q1 of last year, some notable shifts begin to appear. Demand actually rose 4.5 million barrels per day year over year, while supply climbed by an impressive 6.3 million barrels per day. As the year got underway, oil in transit began to level off near 1 billion barrels, and as I said, inventory draws taper off. Russia's invasion of Ukraine set off volatility as trade routes began to shift. What we observed late in the quarter and into Q2 is strong product demand growth in both the U.S. and Europe beginning to open up from Asia. COVID-19 keeps having an impact, especially on Chinese demand, largely because of their zero tolerance policy and full lockdowns. That is mainly what is weighing on VOCC utilization. Let's turn to slide 10, and I'll attempt to provide some explanations of what is happening with Russian flows. New trading patterns are taking shape, and Russian crude oil and product exports from the Black Sea and the Baltic were actually down no more than 360,000 barrels per day from Feb 2022 relative to May. European imports from Russia dropped 1.4 million barrels per day over that same span. Imports from Asia, Africa, and the Americas to Europe have taken their place. Asia has raised its imports from Russia by roughly 850,000 barrels per day. Unknown, which appears in the top right corner of the graph up here, contributes another 1.1 million barrels. Unknown is essentially because this is being tracked and the vessels have not yet arrived at their destination port, so going forward, this will become increasingly known to move that direction. Essentially, 2 million barrels of oil per day is being redirected. Set against what is considered global trade in oil, or seaborne oil, at about 38 million barrels per day, that equals 6%. 6% of oil is now traveling at minimum 50% farther, if not double the distance, and some even contend 2.5x the previous distance. Geographically, Europe is clearly near Russia, and now large volumes of crude oil and products are sailing past Europe to customers mainly in Asia, while Europe must replace those very barrels from either the Middle East, West Africa, or U.S.. Halting this pattern could really only happen through blocking Russian exports or putting sanctions directly on oil. Just how probable that is, I'll let you debate. On top of that, there's a U.S. factor at play; right now they're signaling they might remove sanctions on Venezuelan crude so it can be exported to the U.S. and Europe. Really, all of this shifting, rerouting, or upheaval is making conditions in the market far tighter than they were before the Ukrainian invasion, especially for Aframaxes but also for VLCCs and Suezmaxes. Turning to slide 11, since something else is happening in our markets too, let's examine the products market. We're actually in what people consider — or you can see headlines appearing more frequently — a diesel shortage. That's driving record refining margins and opening up arbs. Whether this stems entirely from disrupted diesel flows or Middle Eastern flows out of Russia is still undecided, since there's also a component of really robust demand, especially in Europe too. What's essentially occurred is that refining margins have absolutely skyrocketed. You can see that in the top graph on the left side, showing Northwest Europe spot refinery margins from May 2020 through today. These margins partly reflect a shortage of feedstock, yet partly also reflect strong demand. For the first time in a good while, this has opened up broad arbitrages from the Middle East and from Asia. Predicting how long the present situation lasts is extremely difficult, but this is a structural problem. Refining capacity in both the U.S. and Europe shrank during the COVID-19 pandemic, when disastrous refining margins were being suffered. There's plenty of refining capacity in the Middle East and Asia, and it keeps expanding too. Let's go to slide 12 and the tanker order books. This marks the first occasion since 2018 that we've witnessed fleet growth going negative. What we did in the top left chart is essentially examine net fleet growth in deadweight terms, the year-on-year change, along with net recycling of tankers over that same span. As you can see, this development began late in Q4, and across Q1, net tanker fleet growth has in fact gone negative. The last times we saw this were first in 2013 and 2014, and then again toward the end of 2018. A stretch of high volatility and pretty solid market rates came afterward. Based on the different order books, we anticipate this will keep going. Looking at VLCCs first, we remain in the same position, since a big share of that fleet ought to have been retired yet is still floating on the seven seas. 82 VLCCs will reach that age. They're either already beyond 20 years or will be beyond 20 years during 2022. When it comes to the Suezmax, the figure matches 67, while for the LR2s it stands at an impressive 22. As those listening are surely aware, the order book keeps shrinking. No fresh orders are coming in; actually, within the VLCC and Suezmax category, not a single order has been placed since September of last year. There's some movement on the LR2 side, with 6 LR2s ordered during this year so far, yet that still isn't making much of a difference to the overall picture for that segment. On the question of when a vessel could be delivered if you placed an order today, my view is that 2024 is essentially off the table, so you'd have to look at 2025. The situation remains that the major shipyards constructing tankers have much greater interest in other asset classes, since those deliver superior margins. To wrap this up, oil demand keeps climbing, yet worldwide oil supply challenges are growing as Russian exports have been cut back. We saw tanker volatility return during Q1 2022. As I've mentioned several times to the media and to analysts recently, calling a major cyclical upturn now would be premature, though we remain hopeful. Tanker fleet growth has turned negative, and that trend should persist while speeding up, provided no new orders get placed. Ton miles are growing substantially, especially for Suezmax and Aframax, because Russian flows have been redirected. Product demand is strong and refinery margins in Europe are at record levels, which strongly supports our LR2s — the vessels we call the VLCCs of the product market. That said, the expectation is that these refinery margins will lead to higher refinery runs, which ultimately would benefit the VLCC. We're delighted that Frontline can swiftly seize volatility through what we see as an efficient, diversified fleet, a low cost base, and an agile market approach. Finally, ahead of Q&A, allow me to touch on a few points regarding the Frontline and Euronav combination. As I noted at the start, we've been working hard together since going public with this in April. Our goal is a combined company carrying a $4.2 billion market cap; that would secure broader index inclusion. We think it will draw share liquidity and, naturally, broker coverage. We further believe it may enhance access to capital-restricted financing resources. On their own, Frontline and Euronav are in fact seen as small-cap or borderline small-cap. Now we're solidly stepping into mid-cap territory, judging by the New York Stock Exchange. In our view, the combination would deliver an enhanced commercial offering. We would hold meaningful size across all relevant trading regions, and that would produce efficiency and utilization. On top of that, considerable synergies have been identified between the two companies, spanning OpEx, G&A and financing. And last, each of the two businesses sees itself as an ESG leader, and that clearly is going to create a force in the industry on that front; so with that said, I want to begin taking questions. Questions.
Jon Chappell
analystThanks. Afternoon, everyone. I'd like to pick up right where you stopped, and I realize there are likely certain constraints on what you're able to share about the possible deal. Frontline has clearly, over the years, been quite an active player when it comes to buying and selling vessels, and so forth. And beyond that, judging by the rates you've posted quarter to date, it appears you'd get back to paying a dividend under your formula-based policy by the very next quarter. So my question is this: while you're wrapping up the terms of this transaction and awaiting greater clarity, or perhaps a closing, does anything stand in the way of your usual strategic moves, be they operational or financial, when it comes to returning capital to shareholders?
Lars Barstad
executiveAt this stage, no; in fact, it isn't.
Jon Chappell
analystAll right. I suppose we'll need the terms before we can tell whether that shifts, so nothing for now. Let me pose something about the market. You covered the various pluses and minuses out there quite comprehensively. The VLCCs have clearly trailed badly, so I'd like to hear how you think the Vs might close that gap with the other segments. Does it simply come down to China reopening after its lockdowns and resuming its import growth? Is it that plus the indirect knock-on effects of the crude map being redrawn by events in Russia or Ukraine? Could it be that the market is simply so much firmer because of geopolitics for the mid-size and product carriers that the Vs, even though they'll perform well, might not climb back to the top of the leaderboard across the asset classes?
Lars Barstad
executiveWell, look, history has flung plenty our way over the years if you go back far enough. One thing holds true: every one of these asset classes moves in close correlation with the others. It's difficult for me to accept that things will play out differently now, that we'd see an extended stretch in which earnings are almost inversely related, with the LR2 leading, the Suezmax in between, and the VLCC trailing. The largest issue in my view — and I touch on this in my summary too — is that global oil supply is a problem. The oil price is signalling that we can't produce enough, or at minimum can't export enough, oil. That, along with what's happening in China, is what I see keeping the VLCCs down. There are a handful of places incremental crude could come from, one being the U.S. if output rises. Right now they're doing SPR releases. Whether the markets have fully felt that yet, I'm not certain. If China comes back, that might show up more clearly. Second, Iran remains on the sidelines. Honestly, my optimism there is limited. In earlier quarters I felt more hopeful than I do this quarter about a deal there. On Venezuela I'm fairly hopeful, and there are in fact developments in Venezuela that might alter things. Even if Venezuela winds up only able to ship to Europe, that would essentially tip the balance, since it would free up more West African crude to head to China, say, and that would generate VLCC business.
Jon Chappell
analystMm.
Lars Barstad
executiveMy view is that this won't persist over the long haul. What you'll probably observe is that VLCCs are already moving in on Suezmax cargoes, as we can see right now. Suezmax vessels have been taking Aframax cargoes, and that pattern continues down the line. Things have a tendency to balance out in this way. So at this moment, what's going to set things off? It would be quite fascinating to watch whether Beijing steers clear of major lockdowns across China, and if China returns at essentially full strength. Should that happen, I believe we'll witness additional upside that this market can deliver.
Jon Chappell
analystMm-hmm. Alright, I appreciate that a lot, Lars.
Chris Tsung
analystHello there, good afternoon to you. How's it going?
Lars Barstad
executiveHey, good afternoon.
Inger Klemp
executiveGood afternoon.
Chris Tsung
analystHello. I saw what's in the report. I was hoping you could say a bit more about why the choice was made to bring the time charters with SFL to an end, and whether that $600,000 loss and termination sits on top of the $4.5 million.
Lars Barstad
executiveEssentially that was the adjustment to the balance, on the, at the point when we canceled it.
Inger Klemp
executive16 and withholding tax?
Lars Barstad
executiveYeah. Yeah.
Inger Klemp
executiveUh, all right. So this is a line item that has shown up each quarter for — gosh, how many years now? Essentially it's an entry we're required to record to reflect events from 2015, when Frontline merged with Frontline 2012. Back then, Frontline 2012 counted as the accounting acquirer, while Frontline Limited was the one being taken over and therefore had to be fair valued. So at that moment, we recorded on the balance sheet a valuation tied to these ship finance leases. It's the sort of entry we have to make relative to the profit share we believed at that moment should be paid out in connection with those leases; in a sense, it means we put too much profit share on the balance sheet relative to what we truly paid them. That's the reason we had to do it. Sorry for the lengthy explanation, but.
Chris Tsung
analystOkay.
Inger Klemp
executiveYeah. Okay?
Chris Tsung
analystAlright. Yeah. Thanks. This sort of ties into what was asked before about whether any limits exist when it comes to the merger. Just, yeah, I'm aware that roughly four vessels sit under commercial management, and I just want to confirm that this will keep going should the merger be completed or, you know, yeah, that's what I'm asking. Thanks.
Lars Barstad
executiveYeah. No, of course, Chris, that's a reasonable question. Yes is the answer. You know, we would, you know, since none of our commercial arrangements would be altered by the merger.
Lars Barstad
executiveOkay, that's all from me. Thanks, Lars, and thank you, Inger. You're welcome.
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks.
Chris Robertson
analystMorning, and I appreciate you fielding my questions.
Lars Barstad
executiveMorning to you.
Inger Klemp
executiveGood morning.
Chris Robertson
analystRegarding that 12% of the fleet which isn't eco, I suppose, what's your thinking on those ships when you factor in, of course, IMO 2023 and what comes after, and also when you factor in the pending merger with Euronav — do you see them as candidates for sale, or would they more likely get incremental upgrades so they meet the new rules?
Lars Barstad
executiveThat's a good question. You know, to be quite honest, they aren't viewed as candidates for sale, but that has more to do with where we believe we sit on the curve. You know, or we strongly believe a period is now beginning in which global tanker capacity, or carrying capacity, will actually be declining while at the same time we believe oil will move and demand will be, if not fantastic, at least sustained. So essentially, having assets on water carries value going forward; that's basically our core thesis. As for these ships that aren't eco, you know, we've examined how much CapEx would be required for them to be challenged by, you know, energy efficiency come 2023, and it's very little. I don't know whether you're familiar with the term derating, and essentially that means limiting the engines' power capacity, and then you actually fall into line. Other adjustments are possible too, which involve low CapEx investments. As I say, as I've kind of covered in earlier quarters, the Frontline fleet is actually in pretty good shape to face EEXI and the CII that follows over the coming years. When it comes to design, our average rating is A, and we're quite confident we can maintain that for a prolonged period of time. This comes down to the simple fact that, you know, these ships are capable of reducing power and output.
Chris Robertson
analystAll right, and I appreciate the detail behind that answer — very thorough. For my follow-up, I'd like to ask about the impressive quarter-to-date rates that Frontline has locked in. It looks like you've landed ahead of several competitors. Could you address whether that simply reflects how Frontline records these figures, or whether some operational or positioning edge during the quarter let you beat the others?
Lars Barstad
executiveWe report, as everyone knows, under U.S. GAAP, on a load-to-discharge basis. In the long run, that really doesn't create any distinction versus reporting on a discharge-to-discharge basis. Whenever we provide guidance, you should figure that some share of open days toward the quarter's close won't have any income attributed to them. Looking at the past few quarters following guidance, the earnings did come down, though possibly more noticeably among the larger vessel classes, which sail longer routes, compared with the smaller ones. My expectation — or at least our hope — is that the LR2s and Suezmaxes will align more closely with that guidance. As for the VLCCs, there's potential for an adjustment, and it depends on how the market moves going forward.
Chris Robertson
analystAll right, I appreciate you taking the time.
Lars Barstad
executiveAnd regarding what you asked, you'll see that with others in our sector, the majority give figures on a discharge-to-discharge basis, though at minimum one also reports the same way we do.
Inger Klemp
executiveI'd say no fewer than two.
Lars Barstad
executiveRight, two at minimum, yes.
Inger Klemp
executiveI mean, load-to-discharge is actually the U.S. GAAP standard.
Lars Barstad
executiveMm.
Inger Klemp
executiveIn a sense, that's the basis they ought to report on. As you mentioned, we're probably aware that at least 1 does it on a discharge-to-discharge basis. Mm. Yeah.
Chris Robertson
analystAlright, that's reasonable. Many thanks.
Analyst
analystApologies — I believe my line was muted. I appreciate you fielding these. Could you shed some light, perhaps with specific instances, on exactly where the boundary sits regarding crude you're willing to move that contains or could contain Russian origin material, as opposed to what you refuse to handle? My presumption is that nothing in the Black Sea would be touched by you, but would you take on crude in the Baltic? Might you ship crude destined for Asia that was perhaps loaded onto smaller vessels in the Black Sea or Baltic and is now intended for an STS transfer onto a VLCC? Would you take on crude at Fujairah that may or may not include Russian crude blended in as one component? Roughly where does that boundary sit? Do you believe your boundary is placed in precisely the same spot as every other publicly listed firm, or not? What I'm really attempting to grasp is how much Russian crude will ultimately end up shifting to, you know, gray market vessels or whatever term you use, somewhat comparable to how Iranian and Venezuelan crude gets moved at present.
Lars Barstad
executiveThat's an excellent question, and it's tough to respond to, since this has essentially been the central topic at our company from the moment this whole situation began. Essentially, the decision we reached is simply to comply with the sanctions. Whatever the E.U., the U.S., the U.K. — whatever they determine, we adhere to. So to frame it another way, we aren't claiming any moral superiority, but we are doing what the politicians instruct us to do. One thing to bear in mind is that from the time this war commenced, the E.U. has been bringing in substantial volumes of gas and oil from Russia.
Analyst
analystMm-hmm.
Lars Barstad
executiveWhat we're dealing with here are molecules the world genuinely requires. Essentially, from where the client sits, we operate inside the framework handed to us. That said, in practice, because of the sanctions network, this prevents us from conducting considerable business with Russia. On top of that. There's another element, which is breaching sanctions or being at risk of breaching them. What has then transpired is that the majority of publicly listed owners, who clearly stand to lose a great deal if they run into a sanctions problem with the U.S., U.K., or E.U., have for the most part held back from accepting that risk; that's the point we've reached too. You brought up a gray market. Well, Russian crude can still be traded.
Analyst
analystMm-hmm.
Lars Barstad
executiveLoading and transporting it are both permitted. The situation is that vessel owners who don't perceive much exposure — these being independent operators — assess the danger and conclude they can tolerate it given the premium available, so they've entered this trade. Naturally, I won't pass judgment or say anything about how owners choose to run their operations. The reality is we've observed them — this trade is extremely inefficient, since you end up sailing over long distances and.
Analyst
analystMm-hmm.
Lars Barstad
executiveThe ports close by, clearly. What happens is that this draws vessels away from the usual staple non-Russian commerce, which means that for our Suezmax fleet, we are seeing tighter conditions in West Africa, the U.S. Gulf, and similar regions. Essentially, you get. The tanker market feels the identical impact, nearly as though you were heading to Russia and loading those barrels on your own. Predicting how this will develop is quite hard. At this moment, you know, it's and we are already witnessing it, Russian crude can in fact move quite unrestrained into the market, and chiefly to Asia then, with both oil and products. We have, you know, to a relatively limited extent observed STS and that sort of operation; mostly the vessels are simply going straight. I believe that in order to and if this is what the political sphere desires, if Russian exports are to be halted, something must be done regarding how the sanctions are built. That appears to be. Well, it's not ruled out, naturally, and politics isn't my field, but it appears they have chosen to hold back on that at least so far. I noted during my presentation that Russian exports from the Baltic and Black Sea have declined by just 360,000 barrels per day since February. That indicates this oil continues to flow.
Lars Barstad
executiveSpeaker 7 asked whether we had secured any cargoes in the Baltic over the past month. Lars Barstad replied that yes, on one occasion we had, and that it was under contract. Essentially, when the vessel is commercially...
Analyst
analystYeah.
Lars Barstad
executiveYes, that’s been outsourced to an outside company. Clearly, we follow a quite strict approach when reviewing every consequence. For example, under no circumstances would we ever dispatch someone holding Ukrainian nationality to a port in Russia.
Analyst
analystMm-hmm.
Lars Barstad
executiveYeah, so, you know, ensuring the crew matrix and everything else is in order — that's been difficult for every owner during this stretch. It comes down to how sanctions get imposed; sometimes you're not even, you know, in a solid legal position to avoid calling.
Analyst
analystMm-hmm.
Lars Barstad
executiveIt's a contractual issue.
Analyst
analystYeah. Yeah.
Lars Barstad
executiveThe party.
Analyst
analystAlright. I appreciate you answering my question.
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks. I'm very grateful that you tuned in. Clearly, I want to express my appreciation to my team for the outstanding work they delivered during this quarter. Thank you.
Lars Barstad
executiveThank you.
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