Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

February 28, 2023

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 46 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

Thanks, Daryl. Glad you could be part of Frontline's call covering our fourth-quarter results. I know today's been a whirlwind, especially for those of you on the analyst side. A lot of firms are putting out numbers today. I suspect several of the questions we get in the Q&A will focus on our combination agreement with Euronav being called off. But for now, let's keep our attention on Frontline and the red-hot markets we saw during the fourth quarter. While the consequences of Russia's incursion into Ukraine dominated much of the news coverage, from where we sit in the tanker business, China was really what drove Frontline to its strongest quarterly performance in more than 14 years, because at long last everything came together across the entire quarter and our efficient, no-frills operating approach finally had a moment to prove itself. Let me walk you quickly through our TC figures, which you'll find on slide three of the deck: during Q3, Frontline earned $63,200 per day with our VLCC fleet, $57,900 per day with our Suezmax fleet, and $58,800 per day with our LR2/Aframax fleet. At long last, the earnings relationship between our segments, which had been inverted, was at least for the time being turned around. As of now, during Q1 2022, we have secured 87% of VLCC days at a rate of $58,300 each day, 77% of Suezmax days at $72,400 per day, and 68% of LR2/Aframax days at $63,900 daily. As before, every figure shown in the table reflects a load-to-discharge approach, and they will shift depending on how many ballast days occur by the close of Q1. Before passing it to Inger, let's briefly turn to slide four in the deck. I'll go over a handful of important details regarding the makeup of the Frontline fleet. Frontline still operates one of the industry's most efficient fleets, and during 2022 our diversification paid off for every shareholder. Scrubber spreads remain an incentive for investment, sitting above $200 per metric ton, and we're adding scrubbers to two more vessels. Just two ships in our fleet are still without one. At an average of five years, our fleet's age is comfortably young, and Frontline stands in good shape both for CII and for the EU ETS rules that lie ahead. Now I'll hand things over to Inger for the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Thanks, Lars, and a good morning and good afternoon to everyone. Turning to slide five: during Q4, our total operating revenues came to $353 million, while adjusted EBITDA stood at $287 million. Net income reached $214 million, marking our strongest quarterly net income since 2008. Adjusted net income was $215.5 million. Compared with the prior quarter, adjusted net income for Q4 rose by $133 million, largely because time charter equivalent earnings improved on the back of the higher TC rates Lars covered earlier in this presentation. A broad rise in expenses partially offset that. We declared a cash dividend of $0.30 for Q3 and $0.77 for the fourth quarter. On the share, the Q4 dividend delivers a direct return of 17%. As of December 31, 2022, we changed the estimated useful life of our vessels, moving from 25 years down to 20 years, and this is expected to raise depreciation expense by roughly $59 million for 2023. Now let's look at slide six, the balance sheet. This quarter, total balance sheet figures grew by $227 million, driven mainly by the delivery of Front Gaula, a revaluation gain on the Euronav shares, a working capital increase, and the net income we generated in Q4. At December 31, 2022, Frontline held $556 million in cash and cash equivalents. That includes undrawn amounts under our senior unsecured loan facility, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements. Moving on to slide seven, let's examine cash flow potential. For 2023, we estimate average cash cost break-even rates of approximately $27,000 for VLCCs, $21,500 for Suezmaxes, and $17,600 a day for LR2 tankers, giving a fleet average estimate of about $22,300 per day. Included in this average estimate is drydock of two VLCCs and one LR2 tanker in 2023, all of it in Q1. Regarding operating expenses, we recorded $8,800 per day for VLCCs, $7,600 for Suezmaxes, and $8,700 for LR2 tankers. Two vessels were drydocked in Q4. That was one VLCC and two LR2 tanker. On the right-hand side of the slide, we present free cash flow, in millions and per share, as the debt service bases current fleet and not third party. Assuming VLCC TC rates of $75,000 per day with a five-year historic spread to VLCC for Suezmax and LR2 tankers, annual free cash potential would exceed $1.4 billion, or $6.46 per share. With that, I believe I'll hand the word back to you, Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#3

Thank you, Inge. Yes, the situation is that we're operating in a marketplace where there's a lot of upside. If you turn to slide eight, let me just quickly go through what took place in Q4 in the tanker sector. The headline you see there now gives a preview of things ahead. I imagine everyone already knows we hold an extremely positive view for the coming two years. Across the quarter, every segment, starting from the front of rates, delivered. At long last, it was the VLCCs' moment to stand out. Weighted average market earnings for tankers are in fact approaching the levels last seen in 2004. Looking at the chart underneath on the left side, that's the yellow bar. Broadly speaking, I believe the market has yet to appreciate just how strong Q4 turned out to be. The reason is that this figure represents weighted average earnings across all tankers, and clearly what's taking place with MRs, LR1s, LR2s, AF8s, plus Supras and VLCCs combined is what made that achievable. The conditions we're in aren't ones where only VLCCs are doing better — essentially every segment is doing better. Chinese imports have climbed back over where they stood before COVID, sitting at roughly 10 million barrels per day. In fact, VLCC volumes headed to China have reached a record high. I'd put it this way: the big ships have returned. In Q4, the G7 crude oil price cap took effect on December 5th. We've already witnessed plenty of crude oil and fuel oil being rerouted to, you know, from around Europe toward Asia, and mainly the Middle East. The impact of the December 5th cap turned out rather subdued; we should also remember that, thanks to a gentle winter across the Northern Hemisphere, oil prices were sitting below or near $80 per day, which kept Russian crude priced comfortably under the cap. Let's go to slide nine and examine what we consider the three key themes as we begin what we again believe is an upcycle. The first is oil demand. So long as oil prices stay in the range we're seeing right now, around $80-$90 per barrel, our view is that oil demand will remain reasonably robust. If you check the chart at the bottom left, that one comes from EIA; it isn't a complicated chart. It only moves one way, yet it reveals considerable volatility ahead. Come the end of 2024, EIA projects worldwide oil consumption will exceed current levels by more than four million barrels per day. Asia, and China especially, should be the main force behind that, since China is emerging from COVID lockdowns. The second major piece of this picture is, clearly, fleet supply. Overall tanker fleet growth is expected to go negative in 2024. That hasn't happened since 2002. If you look at the middle chart underneath, you'll find the bars representing growth for each of those years. Looking ahead through 2023, we anticipate roughly 3% expansion in the worldwide tanker fleet. Come 2024, that figure drops to 1%, and in fact it goes negative at some point that year. Then in 2025, the global fleet should shrink by 1%. Shifting trade patterns could speed this up. Currently, vessels over 20 years old make up 12% of the tanker fleet. Scrapping has been quite minimal, and these ships are essentially operating past the lifespan they were expected to have; so naturally, regulatory shifts or initiatives along these lines might hasten the decline in fleet size. Global seaborne trade — shown in the graph at the bottom right — should expand at 67% per year across the coming two years. This stems from major demand hubs sitting in Asia while the bulk of production growth originates from the US and Latin America. The total order book sits at 5%, or perhaps just under that, and delivery slots now point to 2026. Turning to slide 10, let's examine the order books in more detail. Over the past year, contracting activity hit its weakest point in decades. Checking the top-left chart, you won't see a single bar going back to 1996, which is as far as my records go. That's beneath the roughly seven million deadweight tons signed in 2022. Moving into 2023, this muted pace persists. Looking just at the VLCC fleet, 112 VLCCs will cross the 20-year mark during 2023. That amounts to 13.2% of the whole fleet. The order book has 28 units, equal to 3.3% of the fleet currently in service. For Suezmax, the picture is even sharper. By the close of 2023, 85 ships will have passed 20 years. That's 14.5% of the fleet. The order book holds a modest 10 vessels, which is 1.7% of the fleet. In the LR2 segment, things are somewhat more even. A few additional ships are on order, yet their age distribution looks the same. Out of roughly 400 LR2s worldwide, 25 will reach 20 years old in 2023. That works out to about 6% of the fleet. The order book currently has 51, representing 12.8% of the fleet. As I noted earlier regarding LR2s, the useful age of an LR2 — or rather how effective it is to trade one — begins to decline once it passes 15 years, since a fair number of charterers restrict their chartering for ships older than that 15-year cutoff. Now on slide 11, we're going to examine some major exporting regions and assess where the market stands. I said earlier that the three main themes involve oil demand, fleet supply, and distances. For demand to be met, we also need sufficient supply, which means production matters too. At last, worldwide crude exports have returned to where they stood before COVID. We're sitting at roughly 42 million barrels per day in seaborne volumes — that's a bit more than 40% of the oil produced around the globe. West Africa is still having a hard time, though there was a slight uptick in Q4. Latin America is turning into a more and more significant exporting area, with Brazil in particular and, more recently, Guyana serving as the main engines of growth. Russian exports have shown surprising staying power, and they're back at levels seen before the invasion. Some of those figures, I suspect, are skewed by higher shipments made before the December 5 price cap. Even so, Russia appears to keep finding buyers for its crude. US exports remain solid, and we were especially taken aback once SPR releases halted in November — or pretty much halted in November of last year. The US remains the region where output growth will occur. Across the coming couple of years, the US by itself will account for nearly 80% of the fresh oil entering the global market. Turning to slide 12, let's walk through the summary. Frontline is reporting its best quarterly net income since 2008 — a tidy $240 million. Our cash dividend, clearly reflecting both Q3 and Q4 combined, comes to $1.07. We accepted delivery of the last three VLCC newbuildings from Hyundai and disposed of one VLCC plus one Suezmax, each built in 2009. From what we can tell, China was front and center in Q4, with imports into or through China back at pre-COVID levels. Oil demand keeps recovering. Constrained fleet supply alongside rising ton mile demand are the primary forces for the years ahead. Our conviction remains that Frontline's efficient and transparent business model will deliver shareholder returns. With that said, I'd like to open the floor for questions.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#4

Thanks. Appreciate it, Lars. And thank you, Inger, for the update. Obviously, there are plenty of encouraging developments taking shape here. On that final slide, Lars, you mentioned that the newbuilding program is now formally finished, following delivery of those last three VLCCs. You also divested a pair of older tankers, the Suez and the Afra. Strategically, how are you viewing Frontline's fleet going forward, assuming no big-scale M&A — what's your thinking on the fleet from this point? For the first time in quite a few years, I'd say you have no order book. Would you consider selling additional vessels in this market? Do you bring in replacements for the ones you sold? What's your take on all that?

Lars Barstad

executive
#5

No, that's a really good question, and well timed. What we're sort of seeing is that asset prices have gotten somewhat ahead of the markets, which rules out putting money into, let's say, a newbuild. Take the VLCCs — you'd require something nearer to $50,000 per day of earnings on a consistent basis over the coming 20 years to achieve a 15%-20% return on that investment. Our sense is that asset prices have perhaps gotten ahead of things, ahead of time charter rates and spot rates. We're not really at ease. And second, because of how long it takes to get a newbuilding, you likely wouldn't take delivery before 2026. That's two and a half years during which you'd carry meaningful asset price risk if anything were to go wrong in this market. On the resale front, pricing remains high. Once again, the spot and TC markets don't deliver the kind of returns we're after. So it's... Again, we hold certain assets in our portfolio that we probably ought to think about divesting given how strong asset prices are. The catch is that the earnings potential is still so strong on these somewhat older assets, if you want to call them that, that we're of two minds. Do we simply carry on and harvest, keeping these units running so long as they generate plenty of money? Or do we seize the chance presented by elevated asset prices and realize a gain on them? From a CI standpoint, every one of our assets is actually in reasonably good shape. That doesn't worry us much. I'd say the point you're bringing up is likely the very one most shipowners are pondering themselves.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#6

That's a fascinating one. There are many angles from which to examine it, though it's costly. As you noted, the required return profile, at least for newbuildings. Perhaps, as you suggested near the beginning of this call regarding the talks about combining with Euronav, if there's anything you're able to share on that, but clearly much has shifted in recent months. Take Euronav, for example — could you picture returning to that tie-up or merger if somehow CMB were no longer involved, or no longer standing in the way? I just want to understand, when you consider ending the agreement with Euronav, is that purely due to the CMB circumstance, or is there another reason?

Lars Barstad

executive
#7

Let me take the second part first, which essentially or likely addresses the first part of your question. The CMB blocking position wasn't the sole trigger for the termination. There were also specific legal requirements that hadn't been satisfied. I'd say the blocking position ranked among the main reasons our board chose to terminate, but other elements, legal elements, were also at play. At present, a combination with Euronav is off the table. Naturally, there could be a future scenario in which that conversation resurfaces. As things stand now, there have been no discussions whatsoever with Euronav since the termination on this matter, and it is firmly off the table.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#8

Understood. That background is helpful, Lars. Thanks for making room for us. I'll hand the call back.

Lars Barstad

executive
#9

Thanks.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#10

Thanks. Afternoon, everyone. Sorry to get into the weeds on this, but it matters quite a bit. On your dividend policy — we're paying dividends again, and with that February 7th ruling, it feels like the restraints have been removed. Whatever you want to do with your cash, you're free to do it. Looking at the Q3 and Q4 distribution, on adjusted earnings, it comes out to roughly an 80% payout ratio. First, I wanted to check whether there's a genuine payout policy we could model at 70%-80% of adjusted earnings. Second, this depreciation reset you're undertaking, adding $59 million in annual depreciation — that isn't cash, but it is earnings. Given this D&A reset, does that mean the payout might be tied to cash rather than EPS going forward? Let's take the first one. If that's what you're asking, there really isn't a fixed payout policy set in stone. You could probably use the 80% we've been paying for Q4. That's a decent estimate. Mm-hmm.

Inger Klemp

executive
#11

Naturally, that call is going to rest with the board as we move ahead. As for the depreciation policy, I'm not certain I caught what you were asking—would you mind saying it again?

Jon Chappell

analyst
#12

Yeah, sure. If your payout policy is based off of net income.

Inger Klemp

executive
#13

Yeah.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#14

adding $59 million of depreciation.

Inger Klemp

executive
#15

Yeah

Jon Chappell

analyst
#16

you know, is pretty meaningful; it's over.

Inger Klemp

executive
#17

That translates to somewhere around $0.05 to $0.06 per quarter, roughly. That's the ceiling on it. Hello?

Lars Barstad

executive
#18

I think we lost you there, Jon.

Inger Klemp

executive
#19

Did the line drop for you? All right.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#20

Hey, everybody. Chris Robertson here, filling in for Amit. We appreciate you letting us ask a few things.

Inger Klemp

executive
#21

Hi there.

Lars Barstad

executive
#22

Hey there, Chris.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#23

Hello. So, you devoted a good chunk of the presentation to discussing the older portion of the fleet, and I believe that's a key issue going forward; from where you sit, when it comes to owners whose vessels are beyond 20 years old, is it your view that they'll just wait out this cycle and then leave the market? Or do you expect those owners to place fleet replacement orders at some stage down the road? Put differently, what share of the aging part of the fleet do you figure will eventually be substituted versus merely disappearing for good?

Lars Barstad

executive
#24

Yes, once more, an excellent question. My take is that if we begin with the, well, the aged segment of the fleet, there are, as I see it, two groups within it. There's what you'd call the absolute dark fleet, those that have turned fully rogue and are moving Venezuelan and Iranian crude. That accounts for a pretty substantial share of the vessels aged 20 years and above, and those owners will most likely never put money into modern tonnage. More than likely, they'll simply keep running those assets for as long as they stay afloat. Then there are the somewhat more mature ships, ones that, say, sit at around 17.5 years, which these days we usually refer to as the gray fleet. A significant chunk of that group is presently involved in moving Russian crude and products. My sense is that the same holds true for them. Looking ahead, in a scenario where, hopefully, Ukraine sees peace and trade flows return to normal, I'd picture a number of those owners choosing to leave the market entirely and likely not replacing much at all. Where I believe you will actually observe replacement happening is among standard compliant shipowners like us, as vessels reach a certain age; we're committed to this industry over the long haul, which means we intend to still be around 20 years from now too; it'll be players such as us who will most likely form the order book eventually. Once again, returning to what Omar asked earlier, the economics have to pencil out before we can make that financial call. One could argue we've seen asset prices inflate. Wages have inflated as well. In fact, some nations find it hard just to bring workers into the yards. What's truly needed at this moment is rate inflation, since current rates aren't nearly high enough to justify that kind of investment right now.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#25

All right. That brings us to what I believe is a significant follow-up. You brought up the yards and the shortage of labor. As I understand it — and tell me if I have this wrong — the current constraints on shipbuilding capacity stem more from a scarcity of specialized labor than from insufficient infrastructure. In your view, what would you say the odds are that some governments step in with stimulus, or attempt to revive their shipbuilding sectors, or offer incentives for worker training that might help mitigate that down the road?

Lars Barstad

executive
#26

I'd say that's highly probable, especially in China, which is, as you know, net short hydrocarbons overall; from the government's perspective, they have an enormous motivation to try to revive or re- — you know, the shipbuilding sector; we're in fact already witnessing a few yards in China sort of coming back online once more, clearly to a limited extent at this point. When you consider orders that could be placed in 2025, those are mostly Chinese yards. As for Japan, that's a structural problem. I recently found out that a Japanese shipyard worker's average age is 67 years. I'm just 52 myself, but I ask myself, you know, how much steel do you want to cut once you hit 60. Korea, you know, incredibly efficient, advanced technology. They in fact earn a better margin constructing LNG carriers or VLGCs or even container ships. It's, you know, it's tough. I can't honestly provide you with a clear-cut answer, only the color I've just given.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#27

No, that's genuinely fascinating detail. Thanks for providing it, Lars. I'll hand things over.

Greg Lewis

analyst
#28

Hey, thanks, and good afternoon and good morning, everyone. Lars, I was hoping you might discuss the market a bit and, I suppose, address some of the questions we've had and have been hearing from investors, which is that the VLCC market is strong. Some of that recent strength has come despite really lower crude exports from the Middle East, meaning Saudi Arabia, and we recognize that China is definitely importing more crude oil. We're sort of wondering whether there's a bit of a zero-sum game here, where if China imports more, it simply means another Asian producer or Asian consumer is using less? Just any insight you can offer about the market's strength even as OPEC gradually ratchets down production.

Lars Barstad

executive
#29

Sure thing, Greg. What we really saw over the course of 2022 was that it was the smaller vessel classes that began to pick up first — you know, MR came first, then LR1s, and after that LR2s. Those LR2s that had been carrying dirty cargo got switched over to clean products. That in turn drove Aframax demand higher. After that, Suezmaxes began enjoying a great run on Aframax cargoes, and then VLCCs started taking Suezmax stems. You're partly right that a big share of the demand we see for VLCCs right now is really what you'd normally describe as a Suezmax trade. On US Gulf to UK-Continent, we've observed a lot of activity and a high number of fixtures where VLCCs are in fact stepping in. We also saw that briefly during Q1, the moment the West African market for VLCC began to get somewhat unsteady. VLCCs were quick to put a ceiling on Suezmax earnings. To try to make sense of it all, I think with oil being redirected away from Russia — you know, instead of heading to Europe, it's being redirected toward the Middle East and Asia — what you're essentially seeing is both Aframaxes and Suezmaxes being pulled into that trade, which limits how many natural ships remain in those markets, in the compliant markets; that has opened up opportunities for VLCCs to come into that market and, you know, basically earn good returns there as well. It's somewhat a case of, you know, the different asset classes eating into each other's business segments. You're right to say that for purely kind of traditional VLCC trade, there probably isn't sufficient oil to fully engage the fleet at this point. You know, this is going to shift, back and forth in cycles, I believe, as we go forward. I think it was pretty encouraging to see where everything bottomed out in Q1, where we're still very solidly north of at least our cash break evens when the markets turn.

Greg Lewis

analyst
#30

Alright, that's really useful. So then, here's another thing folks seem curious about, and I realize there isn't a simple response to this, and that's regarding the dark fleet. Obviously, wherever you look, sanctioned cargoes, I suppose, continue to flow. Let me put my question this way. Do we have any idea how many ships — leaving out, of course, the Russian-flagged or Russian-owned fleet — might potentially operate in that market? Really, as vessels participating in that market. Is there some method to sort of estimate what the utilization rate for those ships would be if, let's say, someone is trading in what I assume is a dark fleet? My assumption is that's less efficient, but any insight you can offer there, I think, would be valuable.

Lars Barstad

executive
#31

Yeah. Regretfully, it's gonna be a bit of guesswork.

Greg Lewis

analyst
#32

Your estimates beat mine.

Lars Barstad

executive
#33

Okay, to start, I want to mention that when it comes to the gray fleet and the vessels doing Russia trade, that's still a solid-quality fleet operating under IMO regulations, with well-kept ships and so on, even if age might pose some difficulties for them. I'd set that aside; regarding the dark fleet, I've come across figures suggesting 5%-6% of VLCC and Suezmax tonnage participates in that business. When evaluating efficiency, if a compliant modern VLCC counts as a 100 percenter, then in my view those vessels are likely a 30 percenter. We've modeled the entire VLCC fleet this way before, saying that for a vessel over 20 years old whose owner you've never heard of, you'd assign 30% efficiency to it, whereas a dark fleet — pardon me, gray fleet Russian trader would likely achieve only 50%-60% efficiency from the ship, mainly because of restrictions that a vessel with Russian history faces in compliant markets. Next, the modern, compliant standard VLCCs that we possess would be 100%. Running that calculation, you'd actually notice how fleet growth looks, or instead the fleet has stopped expanding; the worldwide capacity for shipping oil is in fact shrinking going forward; as for the dark fleet, those carrying illicit barrels, I believe that fleet isn't expanding as much as it did over the past couple of years. That's clearly positive, yet it's also frightening since it keeps aging. Bear in mind these are vessels that aren't being maintained properly, so we're likely approaching an environmental catastrophe at some point.

Greg Lewis

analyst
#34

All right, well, I really appreciate you taking the time, and I hope the remainder of your day goes wonderfully.

Lars Barstad

executive
#35

Thanks.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#36

Thanks. I'm not sure what occurred in that moment, apologies.

Lars Barstad

executive
#37

Yeah, we lost you.

Inger Klemp

executive
#38

Lost you.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#39

Alright, I'll take the blame for this one. Let me bring that subject up once more, and I apologize, and I realize it comes to just $0.07 per share, but I simply wanted to ask, you know, since depreciation is rising by such a large amount, that's going to affect earnings. Frontline has traditionally paid dividends tied to net income. So I was just curious whether that might change over to free cash flow, considering how much the depreciation figure is moving.

Inger Klemp

executive
#40

No. When I look back at the reason behind this, what we've essentially done is simply take another look at how long our vessels can be used.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#41

Mm-hmm.

Inger Klemp

executive
#42

From our perspective, a 20-year span is a truer picture of how long these assets stay useful than a 25-year one. That's the reason behind making this adjustment. Quite a few companies in our industry are already using 20 years. So it isn't just something we're doing — it's fairly widespread. Regarding the figures, if you simply take the Q4 amount and divide it, then under a payout policy of 80%, you'd land at roughly $0.05 per share. That's the figure in question.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#43

Thank you. You paid down $60 million of the Hemen facility.

Inger Klemp

executive
#44

Right.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#45

I figure a portion of the money coming in from those ship divestitures gets put to use. Given the cash you're bringing in, just as an illustration, on the basis of what we've seen this year, do you expect to pay down debt more aggressively, particularly the Hemen facility, using cash generated by operations alone? Or would you say additional older vessels need to be sold in order to speed up that reduction in leverage?

Inger Klemp

executive
#46

As for paying back more on the Hemen facility or the Stena facility — that one's actually named that — no concrete steps have been decided on. It comes due in May 2024, and really that's all there is to say. Yeah.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#47

Okay. Well, thanks for letting me back in. Have a great day, guys.

Lars Barstad

executive
#48

Thanks.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#49

Hello, Chris Robertson here once more. I'll attempt to squeeze in a final query regarding demand from China. Demand recovery has been really striking up to now. Based on the post-COVID rebound alone, how much farther do you figure it can run? And then, over the next few years, with additional refineries coming online, where might total Chinese import demand land across the next 12 months?

Lars Barstad

executive
#50

I have to admit, I'm not the keenest oil analyst. In stretches when they sense crude prices are at a discount, we've watched China behave pretty boldly, getting ready for greater demand — domestic demand, that is. From what I recall, the peak we've observed out of China is roughly 13 million barrels per day of imports sustained over a period. Hard to predict. My slight worry is something I hinted at — the growth in oil output, or rather oil export growth, that has shown up, and we're now at pre-COVID levels. On domestic demand, China hasn't returned to where it was before COVID. Internally, they possess a substantial and heavily consuming aviation market. As summer approaches, when Europe recovers and takes holidays, so will Americans, and so will the Chinese. Given that oil production isn't really above what it used to be, I find that pretty thrilling, and we've lost a couple of years of ordinary demand growth, which historically has run at least between 1% and 2% annually. I side with those who are fairly bullish on crude prices during the second half of the year, and I'm somewhat uneasy about how supply and demand for oil will shape up once everything is fully operational again. Naturally, OPEC holds spare capacity and can still deliver additional barrels to China. Yes, I'm eager to watch that narrative develop. We should also remember that while China has brought in a great deal of volume, they're shipping out a considerable quantity of products as well. That will clearly halt once domestic demand catches up. Yes, it'll be an intriguing one.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#51

Yeah, that's certainly quite intriguing. I appreciate you sharing that. I have nothing further.

Lars Barstad

executive
#52

Thanks, Chris.

Lars Barstad

executive
#53

Yes. I appreciate everyone joining us once more and taking the time to hear our Q4 presentation. Should any additional questions come up in the weeks ahead, the Frontline Management team is always reachable. Naturally, I want to express my gratitude to the whole Frontline organization for an outstanding quarter and an outstanding result. Thank you.

Operator

operator
#54

That brings today's call to a close. Thanks for joining us. Everyone can go ahead and hang up now. Have a great day.

Read the full transcript via the API

You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Frontline plc transcript — plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments, AI summaries and full-text search — through the EarningsCalls.dev API.

Get the API View API docs →

This call discussed

For developers and AI pipelines

Programmatic access to Frontline plc earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the EarningsCalls.dev REST API. Plans from $39.99/month — full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search, and the recently-added /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.

More tools for stock research

OptionsBell: an unusual options activity scanner that tracks options flow across all US stocks and emails you when large trades appear in Frontline plc or any ticker on your watchlist.

StockMarketScan: a stock screener with alerts: 24 pre-built screens refreshed every 5 minutes, watchlists and email notifications. Both offer API and MCP access and fair monthly pricing.