Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

November 30, 2023

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 49 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

Thank you. Everyone, I appreciate you joining us for Frontline's call covering the third quarter's earnings. At the outset, I think it makes sense to note that Q3 of this year opened with difficulties, and to point out to those listening that the months of July, August, and Sept are typically referred to as the summer lull within the tanker business. The enthusiasm we felt in June created strong hopes for the autumn market. And while it hasn't been spectacular, we have experienced worse. Conditions in the tanker sector remain solid, with the risk leaning more toward the upside rather than the downside. Still, this puzzle contains numerous components. Some of them I'll address during this presentation. Before handing things over to Inger, let's review our Q3 figures on slide 3 of the deck. During the third quarter, Frontline recorded, <<inaudible>> per day across our VLCC fleet; $37,600 per day across our Suezmax fleet; and $33,900 per day across our LR2/Aframax fleet. We observed the more typical divergence among the segments. Yet this came back together as we moved into Q4, with 81% of our VLCC days booked at $48,100 per day, 70% of our Suezmax days at $50,300 per day and 70% of our LR2/Aframax days at $51,300 per day. Once more, every figure in this table is calculated on a load-to-discharge basis and they will be influenced by how many ballast days we ultimately had at the close of Q4. We'd also like to point out that these figures do not include the '24 VLCCs that get delivered over this quarter and the next one. Additionally, since revenue can only be recognized once a vessel is laden, those new vessels are unlikely to have a material impact on Q4 revenues. I'd now like to have Inger walk you through the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Appreciate that, Lars, and greetings everyone, morning or afternoon depending on where you are; moving on, I believe slide 4 is where we go next, the Profit Statement. During the third quarter, Frontline brought in total operating revenues net of voyage expenses amounting to $232 million, alongside adjusted EBITDA of $173 million. Our reported net income came to $107.7 million, equal to $0.48 per share, while adjusted net income and net profit stood at $80.8 million, or $0.36 per share, for Q3. Compared with the quarter before, adjusted profit for the third quarter fell by $129 million; the primary reason was a drop in our time charter equivalent earnings stemming from weaker TCE rates during this quarter, though that was partly compensated by swings in other income and expenses. The third-quarter adjustments comprise a $17.9 million gain on marketable securities, a $1.7 million share of losses from associated companies, a $400,000 unrealized loss on derivatives, plus $11.1 million in dividends received. Now let's move on to the following slide, slide 5. Frontline holds robust liquidity of $715 million in cash and cash equivalents, which takes in the undrawn portion of our senior unsecured revolving credit facility, the marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements for the bank as of September 30, 2023. Within the balance sheet for the third quarter, the current portion of long-term debt contains $91 million tied to a loan maturing in the first quarter of '24, refinanced during November '23, and additionally $75.3 million connected to the senior unsecured revolving credit facility, which back in October '23 we pushed out to the first quarter of 2026. No newbuilding commitments remain for us, and no significant debt maturities appear until 2027. A solid leverage ratio of 52% is also something we carry. Next, I think slide 6 is up. For the fourth quarter of 2023, our estimate for average cash cost breakeven rates comes to roughly $28,200 per day on the VLCCs, $25,700 per day on the Suezmax tankers, and $17,100 per day on the LR2 tankers, giving a fleet average estimate of about $24,200 per day. Included in that fleet average estimate is drydock for 7 Suezmax tankers during this quarter, where just one vessel has 50% of its drydock cost counted because docking spans two quarters, plus one VLCC in the fourth quarter. When drydock cost is excluded, the cash breakeven rates are estimated $2,000 lower, or $22,200 per day. OpEx expenses we recorded, drydock included, for the third quarter were $7,400 per day on VLCCs, $7,500 per day on Suezmax tankers, and $7,100 per day on the LR2 tankers. A single Suezmax went into drydock during the third quarter and wrapped up in the fourth quarter. Q3 fleet average OpEx, once drydock is excluded, came to $7,400 per day. Finally, let's turn our attention to slide 7 and the way the purchase of the 24 VLCCs was financed. Looking at this slide, you can see how we plan to cover the $2,350.0 million purchase price for the 24 VLCCs: a bank facility of $1.4 billion, $252 million in cash proceeds from selling 13.7 million Euronav shares to CMB, $49 million of cash on hand, $99.7 million drawn from our senior unsecured revolving credit facility, and $540 million from Hemen's shareholders. What we aim for is to keep the demand on cash from the shareholder loan as low as possible, relying on Frontline's ability to releverage the current fleet thanks to the historically loan to value and/or through selling older, non-eco, less efficient vessels. That said, I'll hand the floor back to Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#3

I appreciate that, Inger. Like I said at the top, during the introduction, the third quarter proved a difficult one. And for those listening, on slide 8, they can refresh their memory: take a look at the three charts positioned along the bottom, and if you check July, August, and September, you'll get a sense of the situation we found ourselves in. Even so, we did pull off a fairly solid return during this quarter, in my view. The dominant story across Q3 was unquestionably the G7 price cap, which took effect, seriously, on Russian crude, plus heightened scrutiny of the fleet transporting Russian crude. Many of those ships and their owners chose to go back to the non-Russian fleet, which added supply, essentially going head-to-head with Frontline's vessels as Q3 wore on. On the brighter side, I'd say China kept pushing ahead with record import volumes. And U.S. exports came in stronger than expected, generating very healthy ton miles. We saw U.S. sanctions on Venezuela removed. I'll address that again later. As we moved toward Q4, we observed rising political risk along with the Israel/Hamas conflict; so far this hasn't touched the physical trading of ships as such, but it is a safety issue for our seafarers, and it's likewise an operational issue whenever we transit that region. I've noted before in presentations that ordinary seasonality is now in play, given that we have fewer black swans affecting operations in the market after COVID. And then we return to something extremely current: OPEC's actions and OPEC's keenness to keep markets balanced. With that said, let's turn to slide 9; actually, I was just attempting to verify on Twitter whether OPEC had issued a statement by now; it appears many people are wagering on a cut of 1 million barrels per day entering next year or across next year, on top of Saudi Arabia's voluntary cut of 1 million barrels. And I believe it's wise to remind the audience that OPEC output, production, and export — these terms aren't equal. Output and production aren't exports; and since oil demand remains very firm, we should also keep in mind that OPEC isn't the sole supplier; furthermore, those production targets allow individual nations room to modify their export levels. And exports appear more tied to domestic demand among the major producers rather than the announced OPEC targets. What we've witnessed since August this year, for example, from Saudi Arabia is that their exports have in fact risen. Also, looking at an aggregated chart on the right hand side covering all OPEC producers, we've seen the very same pattern. So, while production is indeed declining in line with revised targets, exports are in fact climbing. So once more, what explains that is largely that demand within these countries for that crude — or for crude generally — has fallen, and that lets the different OPEC nations ship out greater volumes. Ultimately, in my view, what truly counts for such countries is the money they earn from oil. And given every one of the other crude supply options available to us right now, maintaining a pledge to keep the oil market balanced is likely a hard thing for OPEC to do. So with that said, let's turn to slide 10 and talk through a few of the tanker themes. Something fairly striking is, to begin with, how persistent Russian shipments have been despite what is, broadly speaking, a very clearly announced stance against — pardon me. Well, to begin with, the market finds it fairly striking how Russia has kept exporting and how resilient those flows are, once more, against a quite resolute policy regarding crude <<inaudible>> being bought <<inaudible>>. We likewise observe Iran, which remains under heavy sanctions, still succeeding in keeping its shipments going and even raising them as we head into the back half of this year. Then finally, Venezuela is, in a sense, the newest arrival at the table, now that U.S. sanctions have been removed. On top of that, U.S. shipments sit at all-time peaks and are climbing; as for Venezuela, we anticipate that its shipments can rise by roughly 300,000 barrels per day near-term, essentially getting to 600,000 to 700,000 barrels per day on an annual basis. That isn't a huge figure, but looking at things right now, as we can see, there are 4 to 6 VLCCs <<inaudible>> in the late — pardon me, in December, late November and December; and that is in fact a meaningful count of vessels that aren't open to U.S. shipments. Thus, we think this will in fact, to some degree, make the Atlantic market tighter; then finally, what we've observed, and I brought this up earlier regarding seasonality, is that we've had 2.5 million barrels of refining capacity that has now returned following the fall maintenance; and because a great deal of that volume goes to oceangoing oil, that represents a substantial share of the 42 million barrels of oil moved each day. Let's turn to slide 11. And in this presentation we've put in what we refer to as the very long view. And this is, in a way, a fascinating thing to note both when it comes to products, but likewise when it comes to crude. East and West of Suez and how the ocean's pipelines appear to be extending. Additional oil output capacity and shale is supplied from West of Suez. We've watched Brazil raise its output; we've watched fresh production emerge from Guyana. We're watching Venezuela's shipments climb. And we see shale keep on boosting productivity. At the same time, we're watching robust refining capacity being constructed, or already constructed, and set to keep being constructed East of Suez. Crude transportation into these refineries as feedstock stands to gain, and so would the products trade, since that clean or refined product would head back toward West of Suez. It's worth flagging, too, that future tanker capacity isn't capturing any of these projections or this trade extension. Moving on to slide 12, let's examine the orderbooks. We've been reviewing this slide each quarter for a good while now, and I'd say it hasn't really shifted in any material way. Over the past quarter, we basically saw no fresh orders for VLCCs, and the orderbook sits at 1.8% of the fleet. In my entire time in shipping, at least, I believe this is the first instance where just 3 VLCCs are set for delivery next year. That will hit the markets when Q1 arrives. Typically, you'd have — I wouldn't call it a wall — but a meaningful number of VLCCs slipping from the prior year into Q1. Demand for LR2s will probably feel this too, given that many of those vessels carry refined products on their maiden voyage. That won't be on offer in Q1 of next year. Both the Suezmax and LR2 fleet have grown, we've observed, though mostly during 2026 and, to a lesser degree, in 2027, based on the latest data.

Lars Barstad

executive
#4

What this tells us is that the amount of capacity the yards have available for building in 2026 is shrinking, and our attention has shifted more toward 2027. I've mentioned this over and over at this point, and it means we're looking at an extended stretch ahead in which growth of the fleet should stay subdued. One more thing to remember: a clean trading LR2 has an effective age that sits far nearer to 15 years than to 20 years. Finally, turning to page 13, I'd like to take a few moments to discuss EU ETS. As I imagine nearly everyone listening knows, the EU has put in place a tax, a fee, call it whatever you like, on carbon emissions occurring inside the EU as well as on routes into and out of it. From the 1st January 2024, shipping gets brought into the fold. EUA exposure on voyages currently underway that extend into 2024 is already present. Emissions on voyages within the EU and the EEA must be accounted for at 100%. For emissions on routes into and out of the EU and the EEA, 50% will apply. Under this scheme, 40% of total emissions are covered in 2024, 70% in 2025 and one 100% in 2026. How shipping gets orchestrated within the EU is going to change fairly significantly because of this. Each ton of carbon emitted inside the EU, or on the way in, or on the way out, actually corresponds to 3.2 tons of carbon. What that means is carbon credits have to be purchased for every ton emitted. EUAs aren't hard to obtain and can be traded across a range of exchanges. Monitoring falls to the European Union, and we have to report through our — or by way of our normal MRV reporting to the authorities. The headline point, I'd say, or the big question mark, is whether our industry has genuinely prepared itself for this shift. Here at Frontline, our choice has been to adopt a very pragmatic approach. To begin with, our fleet is modern and energy efficient, which means we ought to be competitive since our emissions will most likely come in below those of our peers. We've also chosen to treat this like an extra fuel cost. In practice, that means feeding it into our voyage calculations and into our freight calculation. So it amounts to an additional voyage cost; on top of that, across our whole fleet, just 60% of voyage days carry EU ETS exposure. Still, I believe it matters a great deal that this is essentially right around the corner. Some press coverage has touched on it. Charterers and owners are holding continuing discussions about how to handle it, both from a charter party standpoint and a legal one. Worldscale has already incorporated EU ETS into its Worldscale calculation. But where this ultimately lands, once we begin to see trading patterns evolve on the way in and on the way out and costs to the charter evidently rise, or hopefully get added to the charter? I believe it will be fascinating to watch how things unfold in the coming year. As I said, exposure is already happening for us, since ships that enter the EU to carry out a cargo operation during 2024 — and several of those are being contracted right now — will fall under the EU ETS. So let's turn to 14 and walk through the summary. Tankers, then, are delivering results. If you look at the bottom chart on this page — and I believe this matters, because clearly, as I noted today and as I was quoted in the press, I would certainly love to see plenty of fireworks in the market — but looking at those columns on the right side, on average, as a combined tanker fleet that includes every tanker, we genuinely are not doing too badly. So tankers are delivering results, and perhaps the moment has now arrived for the VLCCs, at least based on the latest market development. Frontline has more than doubled the size of its VLCC position, and we are preparing for tighter fundamentals. The fundamental backdrop is still there: order books sit at decade lows, and lead times for replenishing them keep getting longer. Through this transaction, Frontline has raised our operational leverage as worldwide oil demand is projected to rise. Expectations for oil demand over the short and medium term look very good. And we can see that reflected in the numbers. Political risk has risen, which generates tension in both the oil and freight markets; yet we think Frontline's large, modern fleet and highly efficient business model stand ready as this next chapter unfolds. Many thanks for that. With that, I'll open the floor for questions.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#5

I've got three quick questions, mostly for clarification. Lars, let me begin with you. That slide comparing output, production, and exports is really interesting. Exports have clearly begun rising in a meaningful way since August; yet when I look at your quarter-to-date VLCC bookings, they're only slightly above what you recorded across the entire third quarter, and you're also hinting that ballast days push that figure below 48,000, which suggests an even smaller or narrower beat versus 3Q. If exports have rebounded so strongly from the bottom in August, what has been preventing the usual seasonal rebound for VLCCs in the fourth quarter so far?

Lars Barstad

executive
#6

That's an excellent question, and honestly it's something we talk about every day, at least internally here at Frontline, because overall activity in the tanker market is incredibly high. Plenty of cargoes are being worked, plenty of fixtures get done daily; however, quite a number of participants appear perfectly content to take last ton. One way I'd explain it — and I'll be pretty blunt — is this. Take the Middle East as an exporting region: roughly 70% of cargoes leaving the Middle East are under contract. That means they sit either within a COA or under some type of time charter coverage. Those COAs get priced off the spot market or spot pools. But that leaves only about 30% of cargoes reaching the spot market to be negotiated; and if you then examine how owners are balanced, you'll also discover that a good share of those owners participating in that 30% aren't necessarily — they have little appetite for the market rising. Maybe they act as both charterers and owners, or for other reasons, they simply aren't eager to fight this market. So we're left with very few — to borrow the phrase, genuine owners who are around basically to resist and battle for the next incremental gains. And regrettably, I'd say the market has grown increasingly efficient. So whenever we get situations in the VLCC markets where you'd think, fine, this will jump by 5 points, since only one vessel is in position, all at once that single vessel in position takes last ton <<inaudible>> or 2 points beneath last. Right now the situation is really quite hard to make sense of. When it comes to Suezmaxes and Aframaxes, my sense is that heightened scrutiny — especially from OFAC toward traders who used to work with Russia — is the explanation, and that scrutiny has pushed more vessels into this conventional market, all at the level of the indices. What you really have to do, I think, is recognize that this market needs to keep grinding a while longer before the tightness shows up. Finally, we continue to observe a substantial amount of oil moving on vessels that sit entirely outside the IMO, insurance, legal — whatever you want to call it — framework. So when you consider the group of ships older than 20 years — and one analyst brought this up during this morning's meeting — you see a 1996 VLCC loading Iranian crude, and you have to ask yourself why this is still happening. I suppose that covers the questions both you and plenty of others have.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#7

All right, yes, I'm grateful for that. Thanks. Inger, the second question goes to you; looking at slide 7, I fully grasp the goal of reducing that $540 million shareholder loan as much as possible, and I realize there are chances both to refinance and perhaps to sell certain non-core vessels. However, your liquidity stands at $715 million. Looking at this chart, my assumption is that the $149 million — the cash on hand — the $49 million, and the $100 million on the senior unsecured all form part of that $715 million, which leaves you with $565 million of liquidity, and that exceeds the shareholder loan. So, I suppose what I'm asking is, given that you wouldn't want to drain every single dollar of liquidity, why not deploy the liquidity you already have to immediately eliminate a large chunk of the shareholder loan, rather than depending on vessel sales or refinancing?

Inger Klemp

executive
#8

That $715 million encompasses the shares in Euronav, and it also forms part of the financing for this transaction. So at a minimum, we must remove that first; beyond that, the $715 million also takes in the undrawn amount under the senior secured revolving credit facility, and as this slide states, we intend to draw roughly $100 million of it. Furthermore, naturally, we require some cash sitting on our balance sheet to sustain operations, plus minimum cash requirements; therefore, I believe you'll see that we do indeed need this — the $540 million in cash too.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#9

Final item, very brief, simply trying to grasp how the fourth quarter will play out. My understanding is you made it plain that with respect to the 24 VLCCs and their revenue, nothing should be anticipated before January, when the initial cargo gets lifted. Clearly, interest expense would decline during December. But how about operating expense and depreciation? Once the vessels arrive, will operating expense and depreciation immediately appear on the profit and loss statement, leaving revenue as the sole item that lags?

Inger Klemp

executive
#10

Yes. I suppose what we discussed earlier today was the possibility of assuming that out of those 24, as many as 15 vessels get delivered during the fourth quarter. If we take it that in December a vessel arrives every second day, that works out to roughly 255 operating days in December for those vessels. Therefore, as you point out, operating expenses will of course be there, since accrual begins the very first day a vessel is taken delivery of. There will also be interest expense tied to the loan draw-downs, plus depreciation on the vessels; so, that is right.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#11

Hello, and good morning or good afternoon to you both, Lars and Inger. This is Chris Robertsonon, speaking on behalf of Amit. To start things off, Inger, I have a question for you. Looking at slide 6, which covers the drydocking we expect in 4Q — how have drydocking days been moving lately? I'm aware they ran fairly high when COVID congestion was an issue; but at this point, is it roughly 30 days for each vessel, or 35? What's the current level?

Inger Klemp

executive
#12

For the fourth quarter, the assumption behind the drydockings we've scheduled is roughly 20 to 25 days per docking.

Chris Robertson

analyst
#13

Then, Lars, perhaps a question about the market for you. Let's shift focus to China. Demand for imported Chinese oil has actually been quite strong in 2023, I suppose, in spite of certain economic troubles and the ongoing issues in the property market. From your perspective today, what is happening with domestic demand for Chinese oil products? Also, what do you anticipate regarding export quotas as we head into 2024?

Lars Barstad

executive
#14

You are completely correct, and the economic headwinds that have largely shaped the discussion surrounding China have not truly shown up on the side of crude oil imports. And by the way, the situation is identical when you examine LPG, coal, and iron ore too — China appears to be quite healthy. My view is that, over time, oil and oil products in China have turned into more of a consumer good instead of an industrial one, which may clarify part of this resilience. We are also observing that China did — or at minimum, it is suggested that they accumulated substantial inventories as we moved through Q3, though they seem to be drawing on those right now. Regarding product exports, I believe how this winter treats us will be crucial to that, since we witnessed a bit of this last year: with a relatively mild winter throughout the northern hemisphere globally, China's willingness or capacity to grant export quotas for products was quite favorable early in 2023. So my view is that your final question, about products and product quotas, is likely more about weather than anything else; on the import side, we recently saw them raise fuel oil import quotas, which is genuinely encouraging given the concern that China might stop expanding.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#15

Lars, I suppose it's clear that while this call has been going on, we're beginning to notice headlines appearing indicating OPEC Plus has reached an agreement on a cut; and it seems we're still awaiting the statement, yet it appears to be 1 million barrels of incremental cut. Now, whether that's a cut or merely a quota reduction, we don't know. But broadly speaking, I suppose, throughout history there has always existed this tight link with VLCCs particularly that a cut is negative, a boost is positive. That appears to have been questioned during the last several quarters, I suppose, and given what you said in the presentation. But I suppose, Lars, when you sort of consider it, how do you believe this market unfolds in the near term, if indeed 1 million barrels are removed from the market? Clearly, it reads as a negative, but from a big-picture view, what do you think this means for VLCCs and, let's say, the Suezmaxes, across the coming few months?

Lars Barstad

executive
#16

No, I feel tempted to call it outright positive, but that's not really something you can say. I think this idea of OPEC cuts and mostly that occurs, in and or around the Middle East. If you examine it from a very historical standpoint, that was when Middle East nations dominated crude oil exports overall. Now, the landscape has shifted, U.S., South America, even the North Sea and West Africa, to some degree, is a major contributor. I think there's no question that the demand side is sort of East of the Middle East and East of Suez; and then, — and I'm not the sole commentator who has sort of stated this, but this is, in fact, excellent news for U.S. fracking and excellent news for U.S. production. But then, it will also then help the long haul trade of crude oil. But I think at first, it's clearly a bearish sign. It does contradict OPEC's very, very bullish stance on demand. So, that's perhaps something one needs to dig a bit more into. But, so first, you do — assuming demand is going to be the same, you need to source oil from elsewhere; but second, also bear in mind that, as I mentioned, production is not necessarily exports, and we do see that Middle Eastern exports are actually more correlated to the temperature in the Middle East over the summer when they do consume a lot for cooling rather than the stated sort of production quotas.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#17

And I suppose it might be the case that, over time, additional output from non-OPEC sources will begin to close that gap. I guess, when you consider those 24 VLCCs that are being brought in, clearly, the financing is already arranged, and you have made quite clear that no equity raise is required to support the deal, and you touched on liquidity earlier, Inger. I guess, any fresh perspective on whether there is a need or perhaps a readiness to issue equity, despite the fact that your leverage remains at 52%? Any new thoughts about possibly accessing equity purely to reduce the risk associated with the transaction?

Lars Barstad

executive
#18

Not really, to be fully clear. I think we have been quite outspoken during this presentation, and Inger plainly said that our current or legacy Frontline has the capacity, to put it differently; we are likewise exploring whether we might sell off some assets so that our extremely, extremely modern fleet is preserved. So, I think our message matches what it was when the transaction was announced publicly, and we will simply keep going along that path.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#19

Thanks. That's all I wanted to cover there; and then, one last item regarding the dividend. Clearly, you have the — I believe I raised this with you either in the prior quarter or possibly the month before, during the call you held right after the deal was announced, specifically about the dividend: you've followed this informal approach of maybe distributing 80% of earnings, which happened recently alongside the reduced net debt gearing. What's your current view on that dividend? Does that percentage shift once the transaction closes and leverage rises, or do you remain at ease with, let's say, 80% serving as a solid threshold?

Lars Barstad

executive
#20

Like you correctly point out, no policy exists on our end, yet the expectation ought to sit near 80%, and that's what we'll keep doing, provided the market permits it. That's precisely why we lack a formal policy — we'd rather not be compelled to make dividend payments when doing so isn't really workable from a financial standpoint. So ultimately this falls under our Board's discretion. That said, we have a major shareholder whose appetite for dividends exceeds yours, so my sense is you ought to anticipate that carrying on in the future.

Greg Lewis

analyst
#21

Lars, I suppose I wanted to ask about where we might see possible sources of crude output beyond OPEC. Obviously, Guyana has stood out as a real bright spot. I'm curious, when we consider South America, how do you see the volumes coming from there? Also, there have been newer headlines this week. It feels like they're hitting us from a million angles regarding Venezuela. I'm not sure; they're displeased about the situation in Guyana, and there's discussion of an invasion of Guyana. My question is, how much crude is currently reaching the global market from Venezuela? How much originates from Guyana? And should there be some kind of disruption there, which parts of the tanker sector would likely bear the biggest impact?

Lars Barstad

executive
#22

Well, I think the exports from Venezuela, and clearly the U.S. will push hard for sanctions relief. That's mainly since the U.S. refining sector, or the crude slate as it's called, genuinely requires those barrels. They can't process additional shale, so they truly need this blend in the refineries; so one might assume that the bulk of this Venezuelan oil would then travel short haul on Aframax and possibly Suezmax to the U.S. But what we've observed lately is that many VLCC cargoes are accumulating, and in fact a number of them are headed toward India. So I suppose the verdict is still pending on Venezuela. Venezuela was—they were shipping somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 barrels per day before the sanctions were removed. It's anticipated, and this isn't my figure, it's what I've essentially seen in the media, that they could, in the near term, manage to raise this to 300,000 barrels per day—or by 300,000 barrels per day, so they'd reach a 600,000 to 700,000 barrel per day level of export capacity. How much of this goes to the U.S., Europe, or Asia is a very, very hard call. They apparently still owe China a couple billion dollars for that oil from loan-type—or financing arrangements made some years ago. As for Guyana, Guyana is producing and exporting, since it's a small country, they hardly consume anything, roughly 450,000 barrels per day. I think in the Venezuela-Guyana debate, one could likely take some comfort from the fact that almost all their oil output is held by U.S. interests; so it's probably reasonable to think the U.S. will assist Guyana in safeguarding their sovereignty over these regions; but it's far too early to guess about that. Operations are proceeding normally out of Guyana, right now. That said, I suppose one encouraging sign is that — how should I put this — most analysts, I believe, have found themselves pretty taken aback by just how much staying power U.S. production has shown during this year, and it has even come in somewhat ahead of what people were expecting, even with DUCs in short supply, CapEx in short supply, and everything else in short supply. And simultaneously, we have observed that in Latin America, an increasing number of barrels are, in a manner of speaking, being forced out of the different basins located there. So, regarding that trend down the road, we are somewhat optimistic.

Greg Lewis

analyst
#23

Turning to the situation with vessels waiting at the Panama Canal, it certainly appears that this is having an effect on the product tanker market's smaller portion, particularly when we consider cargoes from North America moving south toward Southwest South America. Has the LR2 market experienced any indirect consequences, since that is where your attention lies? I am attempting to grasp these interruptions, and my understanding is that container ships are given precedence over product tankers, which is causing product tankers to be more — I heard that some MRs might even transit the Strait of Magellan. Are we observing any type of indirect consequence there that is affecting the LR2 market?

Lars Barstad

executive
#24

To phrase it differently, I would not call it meaningful. And we have not really — it is not frequently that we have had exposure to the Panama Canal; on another instance we did ballast through coming from the opposite end, but that is not — yes, I would minimize the effect, at least for the bigger clean vessels, since we have not truly observed that making the market any tighter, or raising ton miles, to be honest.

Lars Barstad

executive
#25

Alright, I really appreciate everyone taking the time to tune in, and I hope your day goes well. And ideally, there’s still a bit of — I used the term fireworks — at the very least, a few firecrackers remaining in this market as we head into December. Thanks.

Operator

operator
#26

Today's conference has now wrapped up. Thanks for joining us. Everyone is free to leave the call at this point. Enjoy the rest of your day.

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