Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
February 29, 2024
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks so much, everyone, and I appreciate you joining Frontline's call for the fourth quarter earnings. We didn't get that completely wild, off-the-charts bull market everybody was hoping for during the final three months of 2023, yet returns were still solid. December also marked the point when we began taking delivery of VLCCs from Euronav, and we're quite pleased that everything has gone smoothly since they joined the Frontline fleet. A special shout-out goes to our project, technical and operations folks, who brought these ships into our fleet without any trouble and with real professionalism, demonstrating just how scalable our company's business model is. Before handing things over to Inger, let's check the TCE figures found on Slide 3 of the deck; during Q4, we achieved on a plan basis $42,300 each day for our VLCC fleet, $45,700 each day for our Suezmax vessels, and $42,900 each day for our LR2/Aframax fleet. Suezmax and LR2 markets both did considerably better than the quarters before them as those periods wrapped up — as the <<inaudible>>. As shown in our press release, full year 2023 ended up solidly with us earning $50,000, $362,600 and $46,800 each day on our VLCCs, Suezmax and Aframax/LR2 fleet, respectively. <<inaudible>> we generated over $650 million across the full year <<inaudible>> and in certain circles that counts as respectable. Truly, it's the strongest year we've seen in 15 years. Thus far in Q1 of 2024, 81% of our VLCC days are locked in at $55,100 each day, 72% of our Suezmax days stand at $52,800 each day, and 69% of our LR2/Aframax days come in at an impressive $67,800 each day. Once more, every figure in this table uses a load-to-discharge basis and will be influenced by how many ballast days we ultimately have at the close of <<inaudible>>. Now I'll turn it over to you, Inger, to walk us through the financial highlights.
Inger Klemp
executiveAppreciate that, Lars. Good morning, everyone, and good afternoon as well, ladies and gentlemen. Moving to Slide 4, the profit statement, we'll review a few highlights. Frontline's total operating revenues for the fourth quarter — pardon me, operating revenues net of voyage expenses — came to $207 million, with adjusted EBITDA of $198 million in Q4. Our reported profit was $118.4 million, equal to $0.53 per share, while adjusted profit for the quarter stood at $102.2 million, or $0.46 per share. Compared with Q3, adjusted profit rose by $21.4 million in the fourth quarter, driven mainly by higher TCE rates boosting our TCE earnings, partly counterbalanced by swings in other income and expenses. Next, I believe we should move to Slide 5 for a few balance sheet highlights. Frontline holds strong liquidity of $416 million in cash and cash equivalents, which includes the undrawn portion of the senior unsecured revolving credit facility, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements as of December 31, 2023. We carry no remaining newbuilding commitments, and there are no meaningful debt maturities before 2027. Now let's go to Slide 6, covering fleet competition, cash breakeven, and OpEx. Once all 24 VLCCs purchased from Euronav are delivered and the 6 older vessels are sold as expected in the first quarter of 2024, the fleet will be made up of 41 VLCCs, 24 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers, with an average age of 5.8 years, 99% ECO vessels, and 57% fitted with scrubbers. Looking at the graph on the right, we project average cash breakeven rates for 2024 at roughly $28,800 per day for VLCCs, $23,700 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $21,200 per day for LR2 tankers, giving a fleet average estimate of about $25,700 per day. This factors in the anticipated sale of the 6 older vessels — older VLCCs, sorry — along with the 24 VLCCs bought from Euronav in the first quarter of 2024. The fleet average estimate accounts for drydock of 4 Suezmax tankers and 5 VLCCs during 2024. Two Suezmax tankers will drydock in Q1 '24; 2 Suezmax tankers and 1 VLCC in Q2; 2 VLCCs in Q3; and 2 VLCCs in Q4. OpEx expenses including drydock for the fourth quarter were reported at $9,400 per day per VLCC, $12,500 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $7,100 per day for LR2 tankers, covering drydock of six Suezmax tankers and two VLCCs. Q4 '23 fleet average OpEx, excluding drydock, was $7,300 per day. Now, moving to Slide 7, let's examine the financing behind the purchase of the 24 VLCCs. This covers when we signed the agreements with Euronav to buy the fleet of 24 ECO vessels, as well as our Q3 '23 presentation. Our stated goal was to reduce reliance on funding from the Hemen shareholder loan by using transplant capacity to releverage the current fleet, given the loan-to-value being at historic lows, and/or by selling off every non-ECO vessel. During January and February of 2024, we took action on that front: we reached an agreement to divest 6 older non-ECO vessels, and we are in the middle of refinancing 24 vessels on terms we consider favorable, which we expect to produce net cash proceeds of about $646 million. That lets us pay back in full the Hemen shareholder loan along with the amount drawn under the $275 million senior unsecured revolving credit facility with a Hemen affiliate tied to the acquisition, and it also allows us to keep our competitive cash breakeven rates; having said that, I hand things back over to Lars.
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks a lot, Inger. Let's turn to Slide 8 and take a look at what's shaping the market story right now. As everyone's aware, the headlines are dominated by Middle East tensions — the situation between Israel and Palestine. Then there's the Red Sea and Aden developments and what those mean for ton miles, viewed through a tanker lens. On top of that, the U.S. is ramping up pressure on what people call either the Dark Fleet or the Grey Fleet, and they're also paying more attention to possible ways around the Russian price cap. It was pretty interesting to see earlier this week <<inaudible>> that they had analysts — analyzed the tanker fleet and concluded, in their view, that the Grey Fleet is now made up of 135 VLCCs, 92 Suezmaxes, and 150 Aframaxes. These are vessels <<inaudible>> engaged in dark trading of Iranian barrels, moving cargo to North Korea, involved in all kinds of things, and the Russian fleet is included too. Altogether that's 375 vessels across the segments we operate in. In total, all <<inaudible>> the way up to 700 ships tied to some form of shady activity, which works out to 8% of the entire tanker fleet. So those figures are pretty shocking. Another factor that's had a role over the past few months is the heavy activity in the contracting market. That's especially true for Suezmaxes and VLCCs — so much so that <<inaudible>> 2027 is beginning to look somewhat tight. One more thing worth noting: we've gone through a lengthy stretch of voluntary OPEC cuts, with Saudi Arabia particularly out in front. That may have, or potentially has, let non-OPEC production expand quite dramatically. According to the EIA, <<inaudible>> it's up 2.9 million barrels per day year-on-year. And as those of you listening would know, the bulk of this OPEC production isn't in the Middle East, naturally — it's much farther away. And I'm tied to that <<inaudible>> basin. This keeps reinforcing our ID that trading lanes are steadily lengthening — the U.S., Brazil, <<inaudible>> and other nations can keep raising output down the road; and China and Asia remain where the <<inaudible>> growth is taking place. Turning to the shots on this slide, global oil trade has more or less paused a bit. Global oil in transit has also paused somewhat. But looking at more frequent indicators, we do observe that oil in transit is climbing. What we — and we expect that's because of longer ton miles via the Cape of Good Hope, steering clear of the Suez Canal; in the bottom three shots, you can see how the market's been — volatility has picked up here. I prefer to view this by drawing a line along the bottom, and I think we are, or hope we are, in what appears to be rising territory. In a sense, in real time, what we are seeing at this moment, especially with VLCCs, is that we appear to be locating a floor at a slightly elevated level compared with where we stood previously. On top of that, there are signals pointing to rising volatility. This has been especially visible in the <<inaudible>> markets, where swings during Q1 have been extreme. Turning to Slide 9, let's examine the Red Sea scenario a bit more closely. The straits separating Yemen and Djibouti — Djibouti — passage there is highly dangerous. When this conflict, or unrest, first began, vessels singled out were mostly tied to Israel; now, however, strikes hit anyone at random, including even a Russian-linked fleet, which we had assumed was somewhat shielded from disruption given Russia's backing for certain of these groups — those have been attacked too. So in my view, we ought to label these as indiscriminate attacks. Political analysis isn't my profession, yet clearly I've picked up a great deal during the past month regarding this conflict, and the Houthi movement itself is highly fractured. It simply isn't a single cohesive organization. What we hear from the region indicates they are receiving assistance from Somali pirates as well. It's a complete shambles, I'd say, and it produces a profoundly dangerous environment for seafarers and for our own assets too. Frontline is not <<inaudible>> and will hold to that stance for as long as the security picture stays unchanged. Suez Canal traffic has fallen by 40% to 50% at this point. Certain people might have anticipated a much bigger drop. Still, bear in mind that this is also an export area. That means, for example, crude departing Saudi Arabia continues to transit the Suez Canal, since they invoice it. This lies above the el Mandeb straits, into the Gulf of Aden. We're also observing trade routes now shifting toward Cape of Good Hope voyages; that adjustment takes time, because essentially ARBs <<inaudible>> and crude price differentials have rested on Suezmax. Ships transiting the Suez Canal must be recalculated essentially to reflect VLCC volumes traveling around the Cape of Good Hope. Thus we're seeing additional barrels already shifting onto the VLCC, and on the products side there is now, to a larger extent, a preference for the large carriers, being a <<inaudible>>. For listeners unaware of what <<inaudible>> Suezmax means; there aren't many of these globally, roughly 19, as Clarkson reports, though you can also clean up a Suezmax to enter this trade. Just glancing at the charts, if you look at the right side of this slide, essentially at the top you can see oil tankers making the detour. And you can see it's been a <<inaudible>> swift climb since December 2023. So if you look at oil tankers during the year—well, many of them—not really Suez, but more precisely the barbell within that group, the straits have dropped significantly since December 2023. What that does for tankers is broaden the trade routes; in other words, a greater share of oil is traveling around the Cape, while a smaller share takes the shortcut through the Suez Canal. Let's turn to Slide 10 now and examine the order books. In my introduction I noted that one of the major themes, sort of across recent months, has been that ordering activity is on the rise. Those new orders don't show up on this slide, since our approach to new orders is quite careful and conservative. The reason is that in shipping, you hear rumors about LOIs, options, and all kinds of talking points surrounding new orders. So we've decided to only firmly record new builds once an IMO number has been assigned; that's what counts as a confirmed order; so going forward you should anticipate that especially for VLCCs and to some degree for Suezmaxes, those orange columns will grow. Yet we must remember that right now, within the VLCC fleet, 15% of vessels currently in service are roughly 20 years old. There are 133 VLCCs that are either already 20 years old or will reach that age during 2024.
Lars Barstad
executiveAnd when you take a look at the age groups as well, we're sort of entering this phase here, where 29 VLCCs came out of the yards in 2004, meaning they're turning 20. Then in the current year, 31 VLCCs, <<inaudible>> 2005, will hit 20 next year. Altogether, 60 ships in the current year and the next one are crossing that 20-year line. Throw in the 2007 deliveries too, and you arrive at 79, or nearly 80 ships, which will make those pink negative columns in the <<inaudible>> bigger, the way we show it. Suezmax is pretty much the same story, we're arriving at these age groups, with 25, 23, 25 ships delivered in 2004, 2005 and 2006, in that order. So you end up at roughly the same figures as with the VLCCs, 73 ships that across the coming 3 years will cross that magical 20-year mark. Turning to the LR2s, that's the segment where we could perhaps have some concern regarding the order book, and in fact a fairly substantial number of <<inaudible>> expected to be handed over during 2025. Well, once more, take a look at the left hand side of that chart, and look at — and also bear in mind that an LR2 loses effectiveness as a product carrier once it turns 15, and look at the age groups we're now arriving at in 2000 — from 2008, 2009 and 2010 vintages, there are in fact over 92 LR2s that will cross the 15-year mark across the coming 3 years. Let's go a bit deeper into this, since this is, after all, what I sort of see as a supply story rather than one about demand. <<inaudible>> more during the stretch from 2004 through 2008. What we hope will be a drawn-out bull market has more to do with supply. So let's turn to Slide 11. And up at the top we're emphasizing — placing the emphasis on the VLCC <<inaudible>>. So if you essentially examine how the VLCC fleet develops as anticipated given the deliveries currently firmed up in the order book, we observe a steady sort of growth of the fleet up to 900 ships or beyond 900 ships. Once you account for the ships reaching 20 years, the curve looks entirely different. Some of you may have watched us use this chart previously, here it is simply refreshed; and then what consequences does this carry. So if you check the shot at the top right hand side, you'll notice average VLCC utilization. VLCC <<inaudible>> half the time, and then others reckon — the remaining half of the time, but then you have to subtract further utilization for positioning, carrying out bunkering operations. So doing all the remaining things you do that aren't really connected to the voyage and also a bit of waiting time to load cargoes. So you end up near a 50/50 laden ballast split; however, examining this across different vessel age groups reveals that utilization for VLCCs already begins to decline starting with 17-year-old ships. Certain operators impose a strict cutoff at 15 years. The Chinese, for example, do this. Others grow reluctant or would choose a newer vessel when presented with one that is 17, 18, or 19 years old. And clearly once you hit 20 years, you are losing the majority of your customers. And this — so despite vessels in reality lasting beyond 20 years, utilization keeps dropping. Another noteworthy point, more broad-based for tankers overall, involves the left side of the chart, and it is somewhat an observation we aimed to highlight this time: when you chart all the orders that have been made, and examine the interval between ordering and delivery, you will notice a linear upward trend — lead times are extending. And in particular for tankers, represented by the blue dotted line, in December 2020, it averaged 1.8 years from when the order was made to when the vessel was delivered. Now, we are actually approaching three, which is a significant shift; and you also need to bear that in mind when thinking about orders being placed currently. Order backlogs are large, though not so much for tankers, as the bottom right slide — pardon me — is displaying. So essentially the bulk of deliveries arriving in 2024 and 2025 pertain to bulkers and containers. And crude tankers represent merely a very tiny share of total deliveries arriving; only in 2026 can we anticipate deliveries of any meaningful scale for crude oil tankers; so with that, let me conclude before we begin taking questions on Slide 12. So I believe one of the key takeaways from our Q4 presentation is that we completed the long-term financing of the $2.4 billion following the transaction we carried out in Q4. And keep in mind, everyone, this is likely the biggest single pure tanker deal ever done; we disposed of 5 non-ECO VLCCs and one non-ECO Suezmax as we communicated last quarter and <<inaudible>> to refinance a substantial portion of our fleet on highly competitive terms. And without really shifting our LTVs much, we are evidently getting a slight boost from prices climbing during that period too. And I think what matters more to those of you listening here, we have not issued a single share. So every vessel has been delivered and this doubles our VLCC footprint while boosting our earning days by over 30%. Also, let me take you back to a point earlier in the presentation when Inger walked through our fleet-wide average cash breakeven figure of $25,700 per day — anything earned beyond that amount flows straight to the bottom line. Clearly, we face a serious security situation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. What this appears to be doing is boosting ton miles, and it benefits the bigger carriers that deliver stronger economies of scale, essentially because they are able to lift more — larger volumes. We're witnessing more contracting activity, particularly for Suezmax and VLCC vessels. Yet the reality is that the age composition within the tanker fleet is the <<inaudible>>. Beyond that, <<inaudible>> oil demand over the short and medium term stays <<inaudible>> () while non-OPEC supply keeps expanding. And once more, Frontline's scalable operational platform has absorbed this fleet growth with relative ease as the markets continue their positive growth. I'd also say it matters to direct your attention to the bottom image in this summary. Those represent the earnings averages — weighted earnings averages for oil tankers going quite a way back; and our expectation is that we are approaching, or perhaps already sitting in, something comparable to the 2004 to 2008 stretch. At least when you look at the numbers, though, you do get thrown off somewhat by the fact that VLCCs are underperforming, or at minimum not showing up as prominently as they typically would. In fact, both 2022 and 2023 have delivered outstanding returns for the tanker industry.
Lars Barstad
executiveAlso, as we head into January of this year, things are looking pretty solid for us. And on that note, I'll hand it over — or rather, I'll ask the operator to open the line for questions.
Ben Mohr
analystHello there, and thank you for fielding our question — good morning to everyone. Representing Deutsche Bank today is Ben Mohr, sitting in for Amit. With 2 months of 2022 already behind us, could you share how convinced you are about the FLCC segment at this point? What's your read on how this segment is developing for the tanker market thus far? And how are you currently viewing what remains of the year?
Lars Barstad
executiveHonestly, our confidence is high. That said, those who focus on very short-lived trade events will surely have plenty to say about this observation. What we keep seeing is that conditions are tight — extremely tight, in fact — yet vessel owners may end up bidding against one another, something that really shouldn't happen in a situation like this. On top of that, the shockers are handling their hand exceptionally well. They essentially keep supplying the market with cargoes while singling out the owner and that vessel's schedule so things look quiet. Since we hold a sizable position in this market, we're always in a position to gather additional information from most players, and what we find is that activity is in fact extremely strong. So the activity level is solid, but for owners to turn that into meaningfully better earnings has proven extremely difficult. Beyond that, I borrowed the term grind during this presentation — I genuinely believe in a steadily firming grind when it comes to utilization, and that will keep going. My view remains that we'll still get the usual seasonal dips along with seasonal rallies, which typically arrive with the summer season, refinery turnarounds and similar factors. Even so, I find it fairly encouraging to watch how fast the VLCC market moved — say, from $35,000 to $40,000 per day, then climbing all the way to 90 — above $90,000 per day; and that's for this segment. After that, naturally, it pulled back in this market, and once the parents of particular type pockets arrive, this market catches fire. So overall, I'd say we're taking delivery of just one VLCC during this year, and possibly 5 to 6 VLCCs in the next year. It has been many, many, many years since we saw that level of supply growth, and we're also losing a fair number of vessels to age; so I'm optimistic, though it's really hard to judge whether we head straight into a $100,000 per day market, or whether we grind our way through $50,000, $60,000, $70,000 — nobody can say for sure.
Ben Mohr
analystExcellent, thank you. <<inaudible>> a follow-up question. Regarding the vessels <<inaudible>>, have we already witnessed that, or do you believe there's still further to go?
Lars Barstad
executiveMy view is that more remains ahead. We are currently observing cargoes that traditionally would have been Suezmax shipments traveling via <<inaudible>>, now consolidated and loaded onto VLCCs while routing around the Cape of Good Hope. The identical pattern has appeared in the Med — East med barrels that would typically transit Suez are now being combined onto VLCCs; therefore we genuinely are witnessing this, or at least anticipating that VLCC utilization will keep climbing. Also, I think within this slide deck, you can check the visual where we essentially track how many ships are traveling around or past the Cape of Good Hope. Sure, that figure has somewhat flattened and perhaps might be <<inaudible>> slightly lower; however my expectation is that it will simply grow, evidently, provided the circumstances persist — meaning the security conditions stay as poor as they currently are in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Ben Mohr
analystThanks.
Jon Chappell
analystThanks. Good afternoon. Inger, you've gotten a great deal done quickly, modernizing the fleet and then arranging that financing quite boldly and fast, and nicely, without altering the LTV. When we consider 2024 in the market Lars described in such detail, the cash flow that's being produced, is there deleveraging you'd want to see, following this entire deal involving the 24 VLCCs plus the refinancing? Or do the terms look good enough to you that you're content to simply let it amortize, and any cash flow produced would then follow the old Frontline approach of aggressive dividends?
Inger Klemp
executiveYes, as you mentioned, I mean, we're pleased with that, we're deleveraging the fleet order, the <<inaudible>> ordinary amortization ahead; so I mean, we're pleased with this — at ease with this loan-to-value we have following this refinancing. If not higher at all, it's roughly 53.5% or so in that regard, or market values. So I think we're pleased with just — I want to say amortizing the depth ahead in an ordinary way.
Jon Chappell
analystAlright, that's helpful. So Lars, three months back I posed this same question to you, and after that you ended up divesting 6 of the oldest ships you had. What's your take on the other aging units still in the fleet? Does a fairly solid arbitrage chance remain, in your view, to turn some of those older non-ECO vessels into cash and thereby assist with generating cash flow? Or would you say you're quite satisfied with what you've got and you're now heading into this stretch of multiple years of strength?
Lars Barstad
executiveHonestly, I'd tell you that we're fairly happy with how we positioned ourselves. It's somewhat — well, arbitrage is the term you used, and perhaps that fits, but my view is that there's considerable risk tied to the high prices currently seen for second hand tonnage. So when we simply consider the book values we can extract here, or the amounts we can obtain beyond book values, that indicates we're sitting at a very elevated spot on the curve. So clearly, nothing can be ruled out, but at this point we are very much, or rather pretty, content.
Jon Chappell
analystGreat. Thanks, Lars. Thanks, Inger.
Lars Barstad
executiveThank you.
Greg Lewis
analystYes. Hi there, and thanks. Good afternoon to all of you, and I appreciate you taking my question. Lars, I was hoping you could talk a little about what's happening with the new build market. I mean, a competitor placed an order for a couple of that, a couple of these, I believe it was last week, so just how are you viewing that? I mean, you did sort of emphasize the order book outlook <<inaudible>> really thereof, and you presented an optimistic view for the coming years. So I suppose, at this stage, how is Frontline considering the opportunities that exist in the new build market?
Lars Barstad
executiveThat's a great question. Basically, because of what capital costs and how long these projects take to deliver, the final price ends up somewhat above—actually, quite a bit above—what you'd see on the list price. And I've certainly noticed a competitor of ours has been placing orders for a good number of vessels lately, at figures that are quite high by historical standards. That's just how shipping works, and honestly it's part of what makes this industry entertaining: once one player dips a toe in, all of a sudden everyone else is racing to dip theirs in too. For quite some time now, I'd say the new build sector for the larger vessel classes has been somewhat subdued. It's nearly a question of who will step up and set the fresh benchmark for Korean-built and Chinese-built ships. Quite a number of deals have actually closed at this point, and it appears this is now taking shape around certain threshold figures. Chinese new builds, you're seeing them transact somewhere in the $115 million to $120 million range. After that, you've got Korea — and this is genuinely the first time in ages — carving out the $128 million to $130 million bracket for conventional vessels. We are definitely keeping an eye on the situation, though somewhat from the outside, since you've presumably had your hands full over the past quarter and a half. So even though we track it, we have not yet stepped in as an active participant.
Greg Lewis
analystAll right, that's helpful. So you brought up the Dark Fleet, or the shadow fleet — I'm interested because you clearly have visibility into far more data than we do. Is there a method to identify the sub sectors within that fleet? I mean, I've heard the figure of 700 vessels. I'm not sure — I believe you mentioned that earlier during the prepared remarks. Any sort of detail, if you had a best estimate, regarding which kinds of vessels make up that fleet? The reason is that many people are attempting to work out, hey, those ships belong to that fleet, which means moving forward, the efficiency or utilization of those vessels will be permanently constrained no matter what occurs. So any sort of insight into that, or what really comprises that dark shadow fleet?
Lars Barstad
executiveI think you can simply begin with — just presume that any ship over 20 years old is, in one manner or another, aside from very, very few exceptions that are storage units, involved in the Dark or the Grey Fleet; that doesn't total 700 ships, so you have to sort of shift into the 17.5-year category too. I think you need to grasp that although we do earn fairly good money in tankers currently, we aren't making this; so it follows that when you have a 15-year old ship, clearly, we'll take you through class, then you must complete your 17.5-year class, after which you begin to consider how much this will cost me. How many million dollars that need to be placed sort of into sort of trading, at least within their own fleet, or you begin to examine the second hand market. I think additionally the door is shutting somewhat for those who have sort of been, say, a bit frivolous in contemplating either selling the tonnage too. I sort of applaud the recent efforts by U.S authorities and how they're really now tracking down and penalizing actors that are dealing with either directly or indirectly with ships that disappear into the Dark or the Grey Fleet; also sort of the latest regulations from EU have also sort of applied pressure on this. So — but it's sort of identifying these ships, it's actually fairly easy, but obviously they use all the tricks in the books in order to avoid getting detected. Where we'll see the sort of end game of this is when we start to see extended scrapping. And to this day, we have not seen that. We've seen one or two ships sort of being sold for scrap; but it's been extremely muted in that industry and that's sort of what I would look for. Okay, so at this point this market is little by little starting to <<inaudible>>; plus something that would set things off here clearly would be a disastrous environmental occurrence. That has in fact already happened in the Caribbean. It clearly hasn't been — well, clearly isn't right, but maybe the media hasn't given it sufficient attention. Yet no one really has any idea which vessel it was, who owned it, or whatever the situation was, but you simply get an enormous slick of oil floating into <<inaudible>>. So — but it's — I believe the simplest method for pinpointing these vessels is essentially <<inaudible>> a segment of the fleet that doesn't actually normally possess the permission to trade any longer, which is plenty threshold.
Greg Lewis
analystAll right, that's really useful. Thanks, everyone, for making room in your schedules.
Lars Barstad
executiveThanks as well.
Sam Bland
analystAppreciate you fielding this. To start, when we check the order book shown on Slide 10, the figure for the LR2s strikes us as quite elevated at 22%. Is your habit to examine that figure purely in relation to the LR2s? Or do you in some manner fold it together with the crude Aframax, arriving at a single combined order book spanning both vessel types, since — I suppose — one could attempt to <<inaudible>>. In your view, what is the most sensible way to interpret it?
Lars Barstad
executiveThat is a reasonable question, Sam. Looking back at the decks we've presented over the last few years, it would be clear that our own team has had a degree of hesitation regarding which method works best in this situation. The issue is that the order book for Aframax vessels — specifically the uncoated type of tankers — is very thin, basically close to nothing. And given that the LR2 is essentially the vessel class we trade, we simply made the call to concentrate on that one. That said, I did bring up the 15-year figure — though it isn't a hard ceiling. Yet when it comes to chartering, anything older than fifteen years is generally not what people want, since you're carrying valuable goods and the protective coating degrades — its condition drops as time goes by. My perspective on it is this: once these LR2 vessels exit that fleet, they end up as Aframaxes. In a sense, that's essentially where Aframax fleet expansion comes from, you could practically say, and I'd add that beyond seventeen years, a ship definitely isn't handling clean cargo anymore, or at minimum that's true in the vast majority of situations. That's part of the reason our attention has stayed squarely on LR2s. When you look at the Aframax fleet, it's clearly big, and you'll find all sorts of quality tiers within it, plus different sorts of trade those vessels are involved in. Our attention tends to stay on the LR2s — there are a little more than 300 of them — and after that we keep track of the monitor <<inaudible>>, the ones basically moving between clean and dirty cargoes. As of now, or at least based on the most recent data I've reviewed, out of that group of more than 300 ships, no less than 80% of the fleet is operating in this region.
Sam Bland
analystAlright. Then the second thing — earlier on in the presentation you mentioned something about how rates in the Red Sea area might need what you called some kind of reset, to account for the new trade routes and patterns. Is that the case that part of the Red Sea disruption has fed into rates and part of it hasn't yet caught up?
Lars Barstad
executiveYeah — no, no — you're completely right, I probably didn't say that clearly. The point is that when you re-fix and you book cargoes ahead, covering your shorts or going long or whatever it is you're doing, everything sits several days out, sometimes months out. Then all at once you have to come to terms with the reality that the Suez Canal is closed to you, and your freight expense is going to rise. So in effect, freight costs give the market a sudden shock. Oil therefore remains in the West, or remains in the East, since that cost factor isn't priced into whatever framework you've built on the trading side; so a bit of time is needed before it all falls into place. On top of that, you face logistical limits to some degree, since it's simple enough to send the VLCC <<inaudible>> to early Europe, but which port do those barrels get discharged at? Then you have to start reasoning that, well, what I have now is a VLCC, not a Suezmax. The Suezmax is much more nimble and simpler to position, since it has far more port options. The same logic holds for clean. Even though you'd be delighted to load a Suezmax with a product, discharging that into, say, Rotterdam isn't really possible, since the berth won't accommodate a Suezmax. That's just one illustration; so all of this requires time before you <<inaudible>> actually go after it. So my sense is that the first shift, the one on the clean side where the red spiked, was essentially renowned vessels arriving from left to East, because trading was constrained on this long haul. And since some of you had ships sitting empty in the Middle East region, you had to set freight at a level that would make ships sail empty from Europe to the Middle East; and — but clearly, we can see that has now more or less normalized and corrected, in my view; and this is only my own thinking, my visibility into the trading books of the various majors and traders is limited. But what it does look like, at least, is that we now see these stems being gathered and assembled. Product flowing from the East to the West, and from the West to the East, in bigger volumes.
Sam Bland
analystAnd what that generally indicates is that you'll see somewhat greater strength in the bigger vessel.
Lars Barstad
executiveIndeed.
Sam Bland
analystThat's the implication.
Lars Barstad
executiveYes.
Sam Bland
analystOkay. Understood. Thank you.
Lars Barstad
executiveOkay. Thank you, Sam.
Lars Barstad
executiveI appreciate everyone joining the call. We're in a dynamic market — perhaps even more dynamic than we'd like. Still, I want to emphasize my view that what we're experiencing is a slow, steady push forward in the proper direction; and there are, in a sense, indicators in the <<inaudible>> that point to ups and downs ahead. With that said, many thanks to all of you.
Operator
operatorThat wraps up the conference call for today, everyone. We appreciate you joining us. At this point, please go ahead and disconnect your lines. Thanks again.
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