Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

August 30, 2024

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 46 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

I appreciate that introduction. Hello everyone, and thanks for joining Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Q2 of 2024 turned out quite similar to Q1 — volatile, yet finishing on weaker tones as we moved into the usual summer seasonal level. Complications surrounding war risk in the Middle East along with tightening sanctions against Russia have unfortunately become standard. I'll be addressing that later on in the call; still, it's key to keep in mind that we're sitting at a seasonal low. And I'd like to note that every shareholder has a very thrilling fall coming, since going into the winter, Frontline hasn't seen this quantity of potential moneymaking days in decades. Before handing things over to Inger, let me walk through our TCE figures on Slide 3 of the deck; during Q2 of 2024, Frontline posted $49,600 per day for our VLCC fleet, $45,600 per day for our Suezmax fleet, and 53,100 per day for our LR2/Aframax fleet. Thus far in Q3, 79% of our VLCC days are booked at $47,400, 85% of our Suezmax days are booked at $41,900, and 65% of our LR2/Aframax days are booked at $50,100 per day. Once more, these figures all use a load-to-discharge basis, which means they'll be shaped by how many ballast days we wind up with by the close of Q3. Even though Q3 bookings landed somewhat below what the market expected, please remember the binary nature of our market, particularly as we exit the seasonal loss; and with that, I'll let Inger walk you through the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Thanks, Lars, and greetings, everyone, good morning and good afternoon. Moving on to Slide 4, where we examine the profit statement and highlights; for this quarter, we're reporting a profit of $187.6 million, equating to $0.84 per share, along with an adjusted profit of $138.2 million, or $0.62 per share. As the slide shows, the adjusted profit for the second quarter was similar to that of the first quarter. The $12.4 million drop in our TCE earnings from selling 2 VLCC and 2 Suezmax tankers was balanced out by lower ship operating expenses, administrative expenses, depreciation, and finance expense, plus a $12.6 million rise in interest income, which accounts for the $0.2 million increase this quarter. Now, let's go to Slide 5 and review the balance sheet. The changes in the balance sheet this quarter mostly stem from the sale of 4 vessels in the second quarter, including 1 VLCC that was held for sale in the first quarter, and from releveraging part of the existing fleet to pay down debt taken on to partially fund the purchase of the 24 VLCCs from Euronav. Frontline holds strong liquidity of $567 million in cash and cash equivalents, which includes the undrawn portion of the senior unsecured revolving credit facility, marketable securities, and minimal cash needs at the bank as of June 30, '24. We have no outstanding newbuilding commitments, and no significant debt maturities until 2027. Next, let's check Slide 6. During the second and third quarters of 2024, we finished our plan to unlock capital by deleveraging part of the existing fleet and also selling older vessels, allowing us to repay a total of $395 million, which was substantial under the Hemen shareholder loan and also under our revolving credit facility with a Hemen affiliate to partially fund the earlier acquisition of the 24 VLCCs from Euronav. As shown on this slide we've put together, this has meant optimizing the capital structure by refinancing 36 vessels and selling 8 older ones. Recent and ongoing refinancings totaling $1.55 billion have obtained long-term financing on very favorable terms with a maturity of roughly 8 years and have enhanced debt margins by about 30 basis points on a weighted average basis. The net expected cash proceeds from these refinancings is $548 million, pardon me, and $311 million from selling older vessels. Now, let's turn to Slide 7. Our fleet is made up of 41 VLCCs, 23 Suezmax tankers, and 8 LR2 tankers. Its average age is 6 years, and it's 99% ECO vessels, with 56% having scrubbers fitted. We project average cash breakeven rates over the next 12 months at around $29,600 per day for VLCC, $22,300 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $21,200 per day for the LR2 tankers, giving a fleet average estimate of about $25,700 per day. Compared to the quarter before, it's a bit lower, with the primary driver being loans for financing and refinancing. Our fleet average projection accounts for dry dock work on two Suezmax tankers and four VLCCs over the coming 12 months — specifically 2 VLCCs during Q3 of '24, 1 VLCC during Q4 of '24, 1 Suezmax during Q1 of '25, and 1 VLCC plus 1 Suezmax during Q2 of '25. For the second quarter, OpEx costs we booked, dry dock included, came to $8,600 per day on VLCCs, $9,300 per day on Suezmax tankers, and $7,600 per day on LR2 tankers. That figure reflects the startup of 2 Suezmax tankers and 2 VLCCs during the quarter. Our Q2 '24 fleet average OpEx — dry dock excluded, I should say — stood at $7,600 per day. Now let's turn to Slide 8 to examine cash generation potential. Frontline's annual earnings days total roughly 30,000, of which approximately 28,000 are spot based. Even amid the soft spot market we've just been through, the cash generation potential, using the current fleet alongside spot market earnings per Clarkson Research dated August 29 — $33,500 per day for VLCCs, 36,600 for Suezmax tankers, and $28,700 for LR2 tankers — amounts to $242 million, or $1.09 per share. Sensitivity is significant from this spot level to the market rates you're seeing today, and a 30% bump from current spot market would lift potential cash generation by roughly 116%. Keep in mind that spot market earnings at that 30% increase come to just $43,600 for VLCCs, $47,500 for Suezmax, and $37,300 for LR2 tankers; and the upside potential ought to be considerably greater down the road, once the party begins. With that, I'll hand the word back to Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#3

Thanks a lot, Inger. Moving on to Slide 9, let's kick off the conversation about what's happening in the market right now. You'll see there's a fresh theme we at Frontline are zeroing in on as we've been attempting to sort of shed light on how the market is currently developing. All of us basically work off pretty much identical S&D models. What's unclear is essentially the way oil gets traded. A 2-tier market has emerged between what we'd call a compliant and a noncompliant market. And that split has widened across the past 12 to 18 months. Right now, and I'd guess this comes as a bit of a surprise to some; 23% of the global fleet is anticipated to be engaged in, or involved with, sanction trade. And within these figures, it isn't automatically a vessel that has transported Russian crude, since the molecule itself remains unsanctioned, but rather ships whose trading activity carries adverse elements, whether that involves Russian crude or other crudes under sanctions; so essentially, what you learn from these figures is that 17% of the VLCC fleet is presently subject to some form of scrutiny, whether from OFAC, UANI, or because red flags are tied to what they're doing. And in the same way, shifting over to the Suezmaxes, 21% of that fleet finds itself in the same sort of — facing the same sort of circumstances. And 28% of the Afra/LR2 fleet displays those identical characteristics. This clearly ties back to growing sanction scrutiny as well as the volumes being traded, and I'll return to that afterward on the next slide. Geopolitical risk tied to the Middle East keeps climbing; it's also rather surprising for us to witness the somewhat moderate volatility in oil movements, given such an explosive backdrop. Chinese imports are being questioned following a soft July. Yet from what we can tell, August tracking points to a gain of 1.2 million barrels month-over-month into China; so even though that hardly makes this story fantastic, at the very least you shouldn't judge China based on what July showed. Global oil demand remains on track, at least according to the figures we're seeing. Oil-in-transit is trending upward. World inventories sit at historical lows. And there's only a limited cushion against adverse events, which might also tie back to weather. Order book expansion across our industry is decelerating. The available delivery window for tankers has shifted into 2028 for any substantial order, that is, and other asset classes are beginning to take the center stage. Let's turn to Slide 10 and go a bit deeper into the growth of sanction exposed trade. So in recent months, there's been heightened scrutiny of the Russian trade, essentially putting more and more vessels at risk of being sanctioned by either G7 or EU for their operations tied to the Russian trade; we've also witnessed a steep rise in Iranian exports, which has essentially boosted the need for tonnage to handle transportation. So what we're seeing is a market that's split into two tiers, and it's sort of taking shape right before our eyes. There's what we'd call the compliant market, and that covers roughly 80% of tanker fleets. Then there's the dark and grey fleet, and that accounts for 20% of the tanker fleet, or possibly as much as 23%. What's really interesting is that nobody's ordering new ships to join the dark or grey fleets — instead, those fleets get their supply from the compliant one. That means the compliant fleet keeps getting smaller while the dark or grey fleet keeps expanding. The way it's fed, essentially, is through the aging of the tanker fleet as a whole. And vessels that are over 20 years old still aren't trading in what we consider the conventional market; that sets up a fascinating dynamic, because if nonconventional trade doesn't keep expanding, the illicit market will quickly find itself oversupplied as fleet aging speeds up. So essentially, ships leaving the compliant market because of age — and also because there's zero scrapping happening — will eventually begin to flood the dark or grey fleet, and at some point you'd expect scrapping to finally kick in. The parallel oil trade also brings a growing risk to any reversal of sanctions, and that's something to keep firmly in mind. The implication here — and we can ask where sanctions enforcement fits into this picture, and also where the IMO stands on safety and cutting emissions, and so on. I can tell you this fleet isn't putting much CapEx toward lowering its carbon footprint. On the bottom right of this slide, you'll see how this trend is playing out. The red arrows essentially mark that divide; the overall fleet keeps expanding, since basically no ships are getting recycled. But the compliant fleet — vessels younger than 20 years — is steadily contracting as we go along. That figure includes newbuildings entering the market. So with that rather stark message, let me turn to Slide 11 and examine the upside potential in the compliance market; tanker seasonality is something we have, and it's very pronounced. 90% of the world's population resides in the Northern Hemisphere, which is basically where most of us on this call are. And the EIA does expect oil consumption to rise by 1.5 million barrels by December, mainly because temperatures are shifting. On average, looking back, the winter market shows consumption rising by 1.5 million to 2 million barrels between August and December. This is a long-term pattern, and we observe it in oil-in-transit and, obviously, in freight earnings too. If you look at the chart on the bottom right, that's — what we did was essentially take the last 34 years and examine the seasonal trend. We're right in the period when this market tends to wake up. It's also pretty encouraging that oil-in-transit is now falling below the long-term trend. On top of that, we should remember that inventories in OECD countries — and we included China and India in this as well — sit at historical lows. Once more, I want to stress that this gives a very small cushion should an unexpected event occur. OPEC is still expected to raise supply starting in October. The real question is whether they'll actually do so with oil trading where it is now, yet 2.2 million barrels are reportedly coming back between October and the end of 2025. Also, as shown on the previous slide, the shrinking capacity of the compliant tanker fleet available to serve conventional oil demand growth makes for a very interesting picture. And I think we also need to bear in mind that even though the market is sluggish right now, the balance is fairly thin. Just 2 weeks ago, VLCC rates climbed 25%. It doesn't take much to move the needle. Let's now turn to the order books. The big theme there is that the ordering we saw at the start, or in the first half of the year, has been muted over the past month, 1.5 months.

Lars Barstad

executive
#4

So in the past 1.5 months, essentially no tankers have been ordered at all. And around the same period, we've watched other asset classes step in and contract vessels. Specifically, large orders have been placed on the container side for delivery in 2028. For VLCC and Suezmax, our view is that the order book still appears low — very low in the case of VLCC, medium low for Suezmax, and high for LR2; however, when it comes to LR2s, as I said earlier, we have to factor in that there are essentially no Aframaxes on order. If you look at that share, or actually take the count of vessels on order and spread it over the entire LR2/Aframax fleet, we end up at 13%, and that's still not something that worries us. Another thing to keep in mind is that we're now seeing a generation of ships delivered after '28 — I mean 2008 in the case of VLCC and Suezmax, and after 2007 for LR2s — and those are fairly large batches of vessels, which will be hitting their age in 2027, 2028 and beyond. So, to sum up before we open it up for questions: as we move into the second half, Frontline has earnings capacity at a multi-decade high. Our balance sheet is strong, with reasonable leverage on a modern fleet. As has been pointed out, a widening gap now exists between trade that complies with rules and trade that operates under sanctions, and that split could fuel some notable price swings down the road. Conditions around safety and security in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Middle East keep deteriorating. With delivery windows for newly built vessels now stretching into 2028, we've observed a fresh pickup in container ship orders. Near- and medium-term oil demand appears to be holding to expectations, though China naturally remains an open question. The seasonal trade is underway. And I'm aware several folks on this line have heard me say this before, so I'll repeat it: winter is coming. With that said, let's begin taking your questions.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#5

Inger, I'll start with you. According to slide 6, the re-leveraging has been finished and the older vessels have been divested. So let me just confirm — we shouldn't anticipate any further large refinancings ahead of 2027, and at this stage the sale of the older ships is essentially done?

Inger Klemp

executive
#6

Your first question was about there being no additional refinancings before 2027, is that right?

Jon Chappell

analyst
#7

Right.

Inger Klemp

executive
#8

So, nothing of real significance. There are some smaller ones that will arrive during 2025. Aside from that — yes; and what was your following question, or the second one you had, sorry?

Jon Chappell

analyst
#9

That was about selling off the older ships. Has that been finished too?

Inger Klemp

executive
#10

Yes, that's finished as well, yes.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#11

Okay, good. Then a quick follow-up about that most recent refinancing involving the sale and leaseback. It's curious — sale and leasebacks were sort of typical in earlier tanker markets, when rates were soft and maybe financing wasn't as accessible or appealing. And you've handled the bulk of your refinancing via traditional credit facilities. What drove the decision to enter another sale and leaseback right now in the cycle in order to refinance the earlier one?

Inger Klemp

executive
#12

Well, actually — this fresh sale-leaseback deal is refinancing an existing sale-leaseback deal. So we aren't really doing more. It's the identical type of 10 vessels we have right now, which we're simply swapping out; and it isn't a typical sale-leaseback deal, in a sense you could view it more as a sort of bank facility since it's a — leverage is just 60% loan-to-value and the terms resemble a bank facility in a sense; so that's why — yes.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#13

Alright, that helps a lot. Thanks for explaining that, Inger. And Lars, I've got one question for you. The seasonality slide seems quite straightforward, and plenty of us with experience grasp it well. I suppose people are somewhat worried about China — you mentioned in your prepared remarks not to extrapolate July — but could you take that inventory slide from Slide 11 and break out China separately? And is there any reason China might be far more aggressive during the second half? Or is it really more about depleted OECD inventories, with China perhaps lacking that kind of winter panic that pushes them toward more aggressive imports?

Lars Barstad

executive
#14

That's a great observation. If we made that chart with China broken out — though inventory builds are implied since the strategic portion of their stocks isn't public — it would appear somewhat different, since China has been roughly stable, maintaining a relatively high inventory level from the time we exited COVID. As you may recall, they took advantage of that stretch of very low oil prices to refill their stocks. Regarding China, there's no mystery here, but it is clear that China isn't moving at the pace we'd prefer. That said, if you look at our neighbors in this building who are in the dry bulk market, the story is somewhat different. So I believe it's crucial to — or rather, it's quite hard to get a proper read on China at the moment. We should also remember that among the imports China receives, nearly 20% of their supply originates from Iran, Venezuela, or Russia. That makes tracking these flows precisely rather difficult; and additionally, we know they're bringing in more crude from Russia in the north. So I'd call China the dark horse. And at present, it doesn't look great, honestly. But other countries in the region historically consume more during winter. The most prominent example is actually India; so — but I truly think that — I don't expect we'll see a subdued China in Q4 or heading into Q1, I doubt that. Whether we'll see year-on-year growth is more uncertain; yet I still believe that given the rest of the picture, with other nations that typically increase demand in winter, we should remain fine.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#15

I have a few things I'd like to ask about the market, but beyond that, I was hoping to discuss how the VLCCs have performed that you've already locked in for the third quarter. For 3Q, you've secured 79% at a rate slightly above $47,000, and while that's clearly somewhat lower than what we saw in the first half, I'd still call it pretty strong given the average the market has posted from, let's say, the beginning of June onward, regardless of whether ECO and scrubber premiums are factored in. So my question is: in your assessment, what's behind that apparent outperformance?

Lars Barstad

executive
#16

To begin with, Omar, it's important to remember that our reporting is done on a load-to-discharge basis. That point deserves emphasis. Not every competitor does it that way, and how our peers report isn't always transparent. So toward the end of the quarter, you shouldn't anticipate that we'll be able to book very much, essentially because revenue can't be recognized before the ships actually take on the cargo. What did occur in Q1, though, is that we took on a sizable new fleet from Euronav, with nearly all of it delivered in the Middle East; so during the quarter, what we've managed to do is deploy that fleet into the trade, mirroring the broader Frontline fleet, while we aim to keep — cap our exposure to — or rather, to attempt to steer clear of concentrating too heavily in any single region; and lately, the Middle East has been the weak point. Somewhat ironically, the VLCC benchmark or S&P 500 or Dow Jones Index is tied to <<inaudible>> entering the trade across the Atlantic Basin, West Africa, U.S. Gulf, Brazil. Unfortunately, there's been a great deal of short hauling since oil really hasn't traveled far during — well, the back half of Q2 and on into Q3; that likewise accounts for part of the softness in this segment specifically, and for how it's been eating into Suezmaxes and to some degree <<inaudible>>. I'd say there's no secret ingredient — potion is likely the better word, yes. But remember as well that this result is — we feel rather fine about it, or proud of it, especially given that we've lowered our scrubber penetration across the fleet. That said, you've likely observed too that the gap between high and low sulfur has stayed rather tight; so one could argue the scrubber advantage in the more recent months hasn't been as noticeable.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#17

All right, thanks for that. And a fast second question — either about that same topic or more broadly regarding the Vs. Have you incorporated product cargo lifting across your fleet?

Lars Barstad

executive
#18

We haven't done so on the VLCCs, though we have on the Suezmaxes. In essence, we're taking business away from our own LR2s.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#19

All right. Moving on to the broader market situation. First, there's been a recent decline in Libyan exports, or at least in production volumes. It appears they might still be capable of shipping from stored supplies. However, should this situation drag on and that barrel stays out of the market, what impact do you see on the various dynamics in crude trading right now? Clearly, the Aframax seems to have taken the brunt of it. But in such conditions, how do you expect the VLCCs and Suezmax to respond?

Lars Barstad

executive
#20

Earlier you asked me something similar, when the trouble began in the Suez Canal, or the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, my response would have been that this is fairly significant. Yet essentially, what has unfolded since those incidents first appeared is that the Libyans used to head east via either Suez or — well, in fact seldom the long route around, but at minimum via Suez. And given the Suez disruptions, we've observed that the oil trade has localized. So you're correct that it hits the Aframaxes; on the Suezmaxes the effect could be somewhat limited, yet I'd argue there's essentially no effect on the VLCCs. And once more, it's then precisely the case that when one crude is removed from the picture, another one takes its place.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#21

So in that scenario, if that Libyan crude is lost and possibly replaced by supply from the Middle East, would that turn into a VLCC route?

Lars Barstad

executive
#22

It might. Yet it could equally be refilled from Latin America, the U.S. Gulf, or West Africa, since Libya at that point is mainly sending barrels into Europe rather than — largely because of the Suez disruptions.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#23

All right, understood. Then here's another one for you, regarding — you brought up the sanctions along with the dark fleet and the grey fleet. What I'd like to know is, when it comes to the situation with Iran, how would you — in your view, how does the market progress if, let's say, Iranian crude exports face greater scrutiny and they drop back to the level of a few years ago? My guess is that grey, dark fleet might perhaps shift back into the "clean" — or not clean, but the market fleet. How do you weigh that against the need to replace those barrels?

Lars Barstad

executive
#24

No. My view is this trend has persisted for much longer than at least I expected, or than we expected. But essentially it keeps making it progressively less probable that the ships serving this market will ever manage to come back into a compliant market; which means that any shift, no matter how improbable, in the sanctions regime targeting Iran, will produce an even stronger benefit for the compliant market. How this — and this is a continuing — or a topic that arises fairly frequently. On our end of things, we find it hard to grasp why this trade is even able to continue. But clearly, if you hail from a crude-short country that must refine gasoline for its citizens, then obviously you'll seize the chance for whatever barrels you can obtain. So unfortunately, I don't believe there's much we can realistically do about this trade. What I am saying, however, is that since the compliant fleet keeps getting older, there's a cost attached to this fleet, and that aging is speeding up as we go along here. So in fact, unless Iran is able to pump substantially more oil, or the same holds for Russia, naturally, Venezuela, all 3, which is improbable; we will in fact begin to have an overcrowded, sort of oversupplied sanctioned market. So I think that's — because I've completely lost faith in enforcing sanctions. I've completely lost faith in sort of the right to regulate one out of this; we had a tanker that exploded outside Singapore not long ago, and nobody paid much attention to it. So we have a Suezmax on fire in the Red Sea right now. Nobody really — it doesn't really generate much of a headline if you're not in shipping. So I've sort of lost that faith. But what I do believe is that we'll see that fleet simply keep expanding because the source of oil — a replacement option for a ship hitting 20 is still — it makes plenty of sense to enter that market. But once the margins in that market get wiped out, we'll in fact begin to see recycling, if that makes sense. Sorry, it's a very, very lengthy answer to the question.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#25

No, it didn't. That's quite fascinating. I value that viewpoint. A bit sobering, though, yes. Thank you, Lars.

Analyst

analyst
#26

Yes, Lars, I'd like to pose something to you regarding what you brought up about the Red Sea oil spillage, which took place, and there were multiple other occurrences. What's your view on how this dark fleet insurance gets covered? Since, once again, that's the volume of crude being transported and there aren't global insurers prepared to take on that risk.

Lars Barstad

executive
#27

That's a really excellent question. When we carried out the — essentially, before this <<inaudible>>, we ran an exercise to determine how many ships and how many vessels are involved in sanctioned trade or sort of conducting illicit activity in the Russian trade, since some owners can trade Russian barrels within — whether through obtaining the attestation on the price cap or through other methods, they actually succeed in trading Russian crude without triggering any alerts; but to determine how much of that oil truly falls under sanction, one of the studies we conducted was essentially to examine how many of these vessels are in fact not insured by any P&I club that can be recognized. And that's essentially the basis for stating that we presume 75% of the Russian volumes are under sanction or sanctions exposed. So — and that presents a horrendous picture if something occurs. So the Suezmax in question that is presently burning in Gulf of Aden, that one has insurance, I understand, from a P&I club, which is recognized. But the tanker that exploded outside Singapore, I could be wrong, but I — it's still matters they're attempting to determine, you actually own the vessel in the end. So I believe this presents a very, very bleak picture if we get more events like this.

Analyst

analyst
#28

All right. Then my next question — given the way people are now questioning whether a soft landing is possible, there's persistent concern that the U.S. economy could slide into recession, or at least not achieve a soft landing. On top of that, China's economy isn't bouncing back. So looking at next year, if neither of these turns around, would global oil demand end up weaker?

Lars Barstad

executive
#29

I don't expect global oil demand to come in lower, though the growth in oil demand that's anticipated will be constrained. That said, when you factor in that the tanker fleet — at least the efficient portion of it — is likely contracting, that leaves us not overly concerned on the tanker demand side.

Analyst

analyst
#30

Are there any additional elements that might influence ton miles? Since across the past 12 months, we've observed a notable shift in ton miles. So, is there any other element you can identify that would push ton miles up or down?

Lars Barstad

executive
#31

Nothing truly springs to mind; we're entering a stretch of the year when weather plays a big role, which is part of why we typically get volatility as winter approaches. So that could certainly shake things up, but — and clearly, abrupt supply shifts such as the one in Libya that was brought up, where we're shedding 6.5 — pardon me, 660 million barrels per day, roughly; that's genuinely sufficient to set off particular changes. But nothing obvious stands out to me. We're looking at the TMX pipeline, the fresh Canadian flow reaching the U.S. West Coast. It's still sort of ramping up, yet it appears not to have reshaped trading lanes in any meaningful way. Then again, something worth monitoring is, naturally, output expansion in Guyana, in Brazil, and afterward in U.S. Gulf. Not a great deal of export growth is anticipated going toward U.S. Gulf next year; though everyone has gotten it wrong annually for quite some time. Plus there's an election happening there too, so — that could influence the appetite to put money into production, which would then affect exports. So I'd say there are plenty of intriguing areas to keep an eye on, but nothing that seems substantial enough to unfold in the very near term.

Analyst

analyst
#32

All right. And like you have observed, you have been distributing a generous dividend. Yet should your prediction about the bull market prove accurate, you are going to be overflowing with a great deal of cash. How do you handle that cash?

Lars Barstad

executive
#33

We hand it over to our beloved investors, and after that it's up to you to figure out what to do with it. No, that was said somewhat in jest, but that is essentially the way we run things. If we don't spot an investment possibility that we believe will deliver our investors a superior return on equity, we will distribute the whole amount.

Analyst

analyst
#34

So you're not seeing — I mean, you've accomplished quite a bit — we were the first to remove every vessel from the yard, a VLCC that was half finished, and now you're going to put your balance sheet to work. That gives you financial leverage as well as operating leverage. Are there still solid chances out there to acquire assets? Or has that phase ended for us?

Lars Barstad

executive
#35

My view, and my hope, is that we're aligned with the other markets in needing rates in our sectors to show confirmation before we feel confident enough to make any move on the asset side. So essentially, at this point, we're happy with how our fleet is put together. However, if the market keeps paying us only $40,000 to $45,000 per day, then it simply doesn't make sense to either purchase or order a vessel at these price levels.

Lars Barstad

executive
#36

I appreciate that, and I appreciate all of you tuning in. I appreciate the really, really solid questions coming through. And we're just going to hope that the usual seasonal pattern begins to show itself. Thanks.

Operator

operator
#37

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

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