Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

November 27, 2024

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 41 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

I appreciate that, everyone, and I appreciate you joining Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Thanks. Markets and stocks never travel in a straight line. I think recent months have shown us that; we've made the case before that we're in a stretch similar to the 2002 to 2008 bull run, though this one is driven by the supply of tonnage rather than powered by robust growth in oil demand; that parallel, I'd contend, remains valid, and to illustrate, back in November 2004, people were calling the market finished, and we saw a correction exceeding 30%. A few weeks later the bull rally picked back up, and we were headed skyward once more. By the same token, it's tough to forecast the bearish mood. Bull runs are just as difficult to predict, so before I hand things over to Inger, I'll walk through our TC figures on slide three in the deck; during the third quarter of 2024, Frontline earned $39,600 per day across our VLCC fleet, $39,900 per day on our Suezmaxes, and $36,000 per day for our LR2/Aframax fleet. Thus far in the third quarter, we've locked in 77% of our VLCC days at $44,300 per day, 70% of our Suezmax days at $39,600 per day, and 60% of our LR2/Aframax days at $34,600 per day, and once more, every figure in this table reflects a load-to-discharge basis, with the consequences of ballast days at quarter's end. The market hasn't given us the figures we were hoping for, but we're still running at solid margins. With that, I'll let Inger walk you through the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Appreciate that, Lars. Good morning, everyone, and good afternoon as well. Moving on to slide four, which covers the profit statement — we're reporting a profit of $60.5 million for this quarter, equal to $0.27 per share, along with adjusted profit of $75.4 million, or $0.34 per share. Compared with the prior quarter, adjusted profit fell by $62.8 million, mainly driven by a decline in our TCE earnings, which went from $357.7 million last quarter down to $292.2 million in the current one. That drop stems from weaker TCE rates in the third quarter versus the second quarter. Now let's go to slide five, the balance sheet. The changes we see there this quarter stem from refinancing efforts aimed at cutting debt, plus normal items. Frontline maintains a solid balance sheet, with strong liquidity of $526 million in cash and cash equivalents, which covers the undrawn portion of the senior unsecured revolving credit facility, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements as of September 30th, 2024. We have no newbuilding commitments left, and no significant debt maturities before 2027. Turning to slide six, our fleet is made up of 41 VLCCs, 22 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers. Average fleet age is six years, and 99% of the vessels are ECO, while 56% have scrubbers fitted; we project average cash break-even rates over the coming 12 months at roughly $29,600 per day for VLCCs, $23,400 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $22,000 per day for LR2 tankers. That works out to a fleet average estimate of about $26,300 per day. Included in that fleet average estimate is dry docking for five VLCCs and two Suezmax tankers over the next 12 months, with two VLCCs going into dry dock during the fourth quarter of 2024, one Suezmax in the first quarter of 2025, one VLCC and one Suezmax in the second quarter of 2025, and two VLCCs in the third quarter of 2025. During this quarter, OPEX expenses, including dry dock, came in at $8,700 per day for VLCCs, $7,900 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $7,800 per day for LR2 tankers; that figure includes dry dock for two VLCCs. The Q3 2024 fleet average OPEX, excluding dry dock, was $7,900 per day. Let's proceed to slide seven. Even with the spot market currently under pressure, Frontline produces solid positive cash flow, and at $30,000 days annually, there's considerable upside potential for Frontline. Looking at the graph on the right side of this slide, the cash generation potential based on the current fleet and spot market earnings from Clarkson Research as of November the 26th comes to $304 million, or $1.36 per share. And should the current spot market rise by 30%, that potential cash generation would go up by about 100%; with that, I'll hand things back to Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#3

I appreciate that, Inger. The way the market is being talked about right now is a bit of a mixed picture. On slide eight, you can see that while worldwide crude supply is climbing, the growth in demand is quite subdued. Tensions in the Middle East tied to geopolitics are still with us, and watching how the new American approach unfolds going forward matters a great deal. Sanctioned barrels account for 17% of the oil that gets shipped to market, while 6% of what the world consumes involves those sanctioned barrels. The tariffs imposed on Canada and Mexico very recently could add more friction to the movement of oil. Even more significant, though, is that tanker order books have quit expanding as containers once again begin to capture the spotlight. Looking at the chart on the right-hand side, it essentially compares the supply-demand balance per the IEA, shown by the orange line, against tanker markets and their performance through the years. What stands out, and this is worth noting, is that even though demand is underwhelming and somewhat anticipated to keep growing, as we enter 2025 we appear set for an oversupplied tanker market once more, with the resulting consequences for tanker utilization. In the bottom three slides — the bottom three charts on this slide — you can observe how these markets are in fact range-bound, albeit at an extremely low level, except for the clean markets, where LR2 exposure has seen a sharp correction over this period. Turning to slide nine, let's examine the key oil flows. As I said earlier, overall worldwide demand growth has been muted so far this year, and that holds across every region. We observe oil supply still rising, and this is mainly occurring around the Atlantic Basin. Nations such as North America, Brazil, Guyana, and to a degree West Africa are bringing more supply to market; yet the problem is that this increment of barrels has a tendency to remain local. What I mean by local is staying within the northern hemisphere — naturally flowing into Europe to substitute for the missing Russian barrels, but also being traded between regions. That said, a fairly steady stream of oil departs the Atlantic Basin for Asia, yet no growth can be seen in those barrels; in essence, this means that while for years we enjoyed a favorable ton-mile effect as oil generally traveled farther, what has happened lately is that ton-miles have not risen beyond the volume being produced, and in fact have declined somewhat once you factor in what belongs to the compliant fleet versus what does not. The share of Asian demand met by sanction-exposed oil has hit a staggering 25% in Q3 2024, and our argument is that this signals the tanker market is more and more vulnerable to any shifts in sanctions and policy down the road. Let's proceed to slide nine and take a look at the order books. We've seen a substantial rise in order books over the course of the year, especially for Suezmaxes and LR2/Aframaxes, but also quite significantly for VLCCs. Yet at the same time, the fleet keeps getting older, since practically no vessels have gone to be recycled. When you examine today's VLCC fleet, the order book amounts to 76% of the fleet that exists, while 14.8% of that fleet exceeds 20 years of age and isn't trading in the market we know ourselves; using that same measure, for Suezmaxes the order book now matches the number of ships older than 20 years; for LR2s, however, we observe an enormous quantity of vessels on order. Yet when you combine LR2s and Aframaxes, since very few uncoated Aframaxes are on order, the picture turns more balanced, arriving at a situation similar to the Suezmaxes, where an equivalent quantity of vessels beyond 20 years is on order. Given all that, we essentially don't view the order books as a major threat, especially for VLCCs going forward. Five vessels are set for delivery next year, and 131 VLCCs are trading in the market that formally wouldn't qualify to trade. Numbers for Suezmax are comparable. There are 108 beyond 20 years as the year draws to a close. And if you combine the Aframax/LR2 market, you've got nearly close to 200 vessels trading in the market, essentially ships that aren't necessarily reachable for mainstream players. Shifting from page 10 to 11. To sum up, we still prefer to describe it as a roller coaster bull market. Frontline possesses a modern fleet, a strong balance sheet, and we keep retaining the upside here. Oil supply is anticipated to exceed demand in 2025, with whatever implications that might bring. Today's trade flow developments are difficult as sanctions take hold, and I say take hold with an exclamation mark, because essentially the sanctions are pushing the long ton-miles onto vessels we don't identify ourselves with. Policy shifts regarding the Middle East and with the maximum pressure that Trump has been advocating going forward, this will be a very intriguing space to watch. Order book growth has halted, and modern asset values stay firm. A brief note on that: with the order book now sort of extending into 2028, no shipyards feel any rush to discount tankers since they are, or they remain, busy securing contracts or interest on container ships and other asset classes. And a fun fact as well at the presentation's end. World oil trade is now served by the oldest fleet in over two decades. If you want to find a tanker fleet with an average age like this one, you'd have to rewind all the way to 2002. That's a bit unexpected, given how much work is going into cutting emissions and how much tighter the scrutiny has become globally, which we're all seeing. So, with that said, let's begin the Q&A.

Jonathan Chappell

executive
#4

Thanks. Good afternoon. Inger, let's begin with you. I realize you've accomplished quite a bit regarding the capital structure this year — refinancing, reducing debt, and so on. With the market growing somewhat more volatile and perhaps hitting lower lows that worry people, and with leverage that, on the surface, still appears a touch elevated, has any consideration been given to this: taking advantage of the robust market we've enjoyed over the last couple of years, some of those strong asset values, some of the older fleet you've divested, and — despite the fact that you have no significant debt maturities coming up soon — being somewhat more proactive about deleveraging the balance sheet at this point in the cycle?

Inger Klemp

executive
#5

From my perspective, the value we see over the long term is at present a bit under 50%, and we truly don't foresee any danger that the modern fleet's worth will go down; therefore we really don't believe this represents the high leverage you likely are at. That debt level sits fine with us.

Jonathan Chappell

executive
#6

All right. Lars, you brought up a few occasions the narrative and geopolitics, and keeping an eye on how things unfold going forward. Perhaps we can draw that out a bit, since at times the narrative ends up overshadowing how the market is seen. I believe there are likely 2 — well, 1 item that gets a great deal of attention and 1 item that perhaps gets somewhat less. So perhaps brief responses to each, yet if a resolution were reached in Ukraine, while sanctions and pressure on Iran were escalated, what would the pluses and minuses be if those 2 developments occurred at roughly the same time?

Lars Barstad

executive
#7

Let's begin with Russia and Ukraine. The sanctions placed on Russia, I'd contend, are rather unreliable. As a result, Europe is purchasing unprecedented volumes of gas from Russia, even as a price cap is applied to oil and products. And by pure coincidence, we're importing a record quantity of fertilizer from Russia too. This brings me to believe that any enduring resolution to the conflict, or to the devastation Russia has inflicted upon Ukraine — I suspect these sanctions could be rolled back quite rapidly. The political price of keeping those sanctions in force, especially as we head into what's predicted to be a frigid winter across Europe, might well push politicians to retreat from them rather swiftly. That would nearly instantly return a substantial amount of oil — oil that rightfully belongs to Europe — back into Europe. Consequently, many Atlantic Basin barrels would need to locate a different destination, and they'd most probably be priced toward Asia, which entails longer voyages. Beyond that, if action is taken regarding Russia — pardon me, regarding Iran — and I've said this on many occasions, Iran is achieving tremendous success in shipping enormous quantities of oil in spite of sanctions. Should someone manage to curb that, those barrels would also require substitution, and the probable source for that is OPEC. It strikes me as rather odd that OPEC is content to reduce the number of barrels they're producing while observing Iran expand its exports. Therefore, if developments occur on that front too, the Iranian supply would have to move onto compliant vessels, which would create an exponential impact on our markets. Turning to the Russian fleet: essentially, what has transpired across the past 2 years is that Russia has become nearly self-sufficient in tonnage. They possess 300 vessels, divided — predominantly, for the most part — into Aframax and Suezmax, which means they're able to handle their own volumes. So you won't see some enormous reallocation. Naturally, a portion of these ships will re-enter the compliant market once sanctions are removed, yet we must bear in mind that the typical age of this fleet — over half of these vessels exceed 20 years — and we don't think compliant charterers will be adjusting their age limits at this point.

Jonathan Chappell

executive
#8

Okay. That's very helpful. Thank you, Lars. Thanks, Inger.

Lars Barstad

executive
#9

Thank you, Jonathan.

Omar Nokta

executive
#10

I appreciate that, Lars and Inger. Good afternoon, everyone. I'd like to add a little more commentary of my own regarding the marketplace as a whole. I'm curious about how the VLCC segment in particular has been shaping up — and Lars, I believe you mentioned this near the start of the presentation — it appears that freight rates have a tendency to hover around rather dull levels. After that, a surge in chartering volume pushes rates upward, yet before long that activity loses momentum once more, and things return to the prior state. It really does look like rates are stuck within a tight band — for modern vessels, let's say somewhere around $25,000 to $50,000. And that pattern appears to have held since August. In your view, is there a scenario where rates could push beyond that range during this winter, or is there simply an insufficient amount of cargo available in the market to be moved?

Lars Barstad

executive
#11

Omar, as you're aware, that's an extremely tough thing to respond to. The very fact that we're moving within a band, I'd say, signals that the market's balance isn't altogether terrible. Essentially, what we lack are those marginal barrels required to tip things further along. That said, I'd argue the market's traits have shifted somewhat; you've got the Middle East, or what we refer to as the AG market, where their Asian interests account for over 80% of those cargoes. And the Asians, once more, get along with one another, so you don't truly see pressure emerge from those negotiations. So in essence, it falls to the Atlantic Basin to set the price; this TD3C, the benchmark index for Middle East to China, functions almost like the Dow Jones of freight, yet it carries the smallest amount of what you'd call open interest from the oil market. So you essentially require the Atlantic Basin to do the pricing, since the mechanism then works this way: vessels will simply avoid it. What I mean is, they'll head directly to the U.S. Gulf, Brazil, or West Africa, because that delivers a superior return, and for that, we essentially were missing the growth in ton-miles coming from the Atlantic Basin heading east. I noted during my presentation that such volume has stayed more or less level, so we require some dynamics to shift here for that to happen, essentially to compel Atlantic Basin barrels — not compel them, but draw them toward Asia to a larger extent than we've seen. If you were to ask me at this moment, I'd say it looks like we're stuck in this range-bound sort of pattern. Yet once more, the balances remain tight. On the fixtures we're doing here, we're genuinely posting black numbers; it isn't a total catastrophe, but pushing past this $50,000 per day, as you put it, is quite hard.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#12

Yes. Yes. Thank you, Lars, I appreciate it. That's a tough one — definitely a tough one to respond to. Perhaps I could pose a different question to you that may prove equally challenging, or we'll find out, but I suppose regarding 2025, and as previously discussed, including with John, there is an enormous amount happening — the Middle East conflict, Russia, Ukraine, the Red Sea, Iran, OPEC changes. There are simply numerous distinct variables at play. Broadly speaking, from where you sit, looking ahead toward 2025, what do you believe represents the base case for VLCCs next year when it comes to earnings potential? Obviously I realize it's extremely hard to pin down, but perhaps simply relative to how 2024 has averaged out, how would you describe, from your standpoint, what 2025 is going to look like compared with this year?

Lars Barstad

executive
#13

Honestly, my hope had been that 2024 would deliver what it now looks like we won't get until 2025. In a way, we totally misjudged how far the present condition of the market could stretch. If someone had come to me back in, let's say, 2021 and said that 70% of the tanker fleet would be above 20 or thereabouts, that 6 to 7% of the global fleet would sit under all five sanctions, and so on, and yet everyone would keep trading away happily, my response would have been that this can't happen; yet clearly it can. What excites me, I think, is that the government coming into office in the U.S. is making the case for a tough line on sanctions evading. To most people, it's clear what sort of thing those exports end up funding. At some point, I think it ought to be equally clear to the IMO that perhaps their attention belongs on what's happening in the unregulated shipping markets instead of bringing up decarbonization at every turn; so I have a lot of hope. I also think, in a sense, that we are pushing our luck here, though not through Frontline. We're quite content, but the market is the one pushing its luck here; so any negative development in this market, as we talked about, say, if something occurs involving Russia-Ukraine, that moves the balances. If something occurs with Iran and curtails their capacity to export, we are hugely exposed to such shifts, which clearly would suddenly leave the tanker market in an extremely, extremely, extremely strong position.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#14

Yeah. Yep. Understood. Well, Lars, I appreciate it. I'll turn it over.

Lars Barstad

executive
#15

Thank you.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#16

Hi there, and thanks for fielding my questions. I was hoping you might add a bit more detail regarding the sale and purchase markets; over the past month or two, it appears asset values have eased somewhat. Is the reason, I wonder, that additional sellers have entered the market, or perhaps reduced appetite for vessels tied to the dark fleet? Any insight would be useful.

Lars Barstad

executive
#17

I'd say it's a mix of diminished appetite coming from the sanctioned trade. As I noted earlier, Russia is more or less saturated when it comes to the fleet required for trading their markets. The margins — as I think we touched on briefly in our Q2 presentation — the margins in this market are being squeezed. We're actually observing that discounts on Iranian crude keep shrinking, which means there's less available for freight. So one hopes these markets are becoming saturated, with the result that the latter or older portion of the tanker fleet will lose that bid, and values will adjust. That's precisely the reason Frontline has concentrated so heavily on divesting older assets — essentially because we've viewed that gap, so to speak, or the overperformance in asset values on the older fleet, as extremely risky. Still, based on what we're observing, it wasn't many weeks ago that we saw pretty solid prices for modern secondhand vessels. At present, the market is somewhat paralyzed. Nobody is really swapping numbers or trading ships firm. Yet we're fairly comfortable that with respect to the modern portion of this fleet, it hasn't grown whatsoever over the last couple of years, and that downside is quite limited. As for the older portion of the fleet and the tail end of the curve, I believe fairly soon we'll need to recycle or scrap.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#18

Thanks. Now, on that trend of bigger tankers carrying refined products, I've seen a few industry reports suggesting they're moving back into the dirty trade. So my question is: once they make that switch back, what holds them there — particularly since you pointed to how rate momentum is shaping up as we head toward December?

Lars Barstad

executive
#19

Put simply, this comes down to nothing but math or economics. When the crude market is quiet and you've got a ship plus a cargo history that lets you clean up at a reasonable cost, you'll take that opportunity; however, on the crude tanker side, hardly any of these vessels are actually built to move products. That means they aren't able to keep doing it over a long stretch; still, I'd say the main driver in this case is the economics. And clearly, right now the clean market isn't providing the economics needed to rival crude, so basically you'd rather switch back; yet I think what we've learned from this — which we saw around May and June of this year — is that efficiency across the asset classes has gone up. We ourselves were caught off guard by how fast these ECOs moved crude tankers into the clean trade. Of course, that also happened because the crude market was under pressure at that point. So in one scenario, if the clean market were to suddenly rally now, you'd see crude vessels clean up. But if both rally at the same time, you won't get that sort of interconnectivity across the asset classes.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#20

Alright, that's quite useful. I appreciate you answering my questions.

Lars Barstad

executive
#21

Thanks.

Lars Barstad

executive
#22

You're completely correct about that. On heavy-duty trucks in particular, there's substantial subsidization happening in China, aimed at pushing that fleet—roughly 16 million vehicles—toward fuels, or what we might call gas-based propulsion: LNG and LPG. The sales figures are remarkable, with 50% of new sales now running on alternative fuels, and that's been reported to have cut diesel demand in China by somewhere in the range of five to 700,000 barrels per day. That's against 3.5 million barrels per day, given the present installed base of alternative-fuel heavy-duty trucks. That said, we're in a strong spot to have watched these trends firsthand, especially from Norway, since Norway has led the world in EV penetration and new EV sales. For a long stretch, more Teslas were sold in Norway than in the U.S., thanks to heavy subsidizing, and yet, somewhat surprisingly, we've found that fuel demand hasn't dropped the way people anticipated—which reinforces our view that activity and consumers matter more than penetration itself. Even with two or three million alternative-fuel trucks, or perhaps more, maybe six million, I'd guess, arriving fairly soon in China, you still have that legacy fleet on the road, and with greater economic activity, those vehicles tend to be driven longer, or at least farther. That's certainly what we've seen here. Turning to EVs, China has an enormous car population. I believe we're still several years out from that market hitting a tipping point where petrol demand genuinely begins to fall in a meaningful way; but I think in most markets worldwide, the U.S. aside, we're reaching stages where, at least for personal cars, demand isn't anticipated to grow much. In fact, we've already hit peak gasoline demand in numerous countries. That said, what we haven't seen peak demand for is petrochemicals. If you examine the different agencies and their petrochemical reporting, growth there is enormous. So while transportation represents a major slice of the demand picture, we're also witnessing quite durable demand growth coming out of the pet chem markets. So I'd say it's somewhat premature to declare oil demand doomed, essentially because of high EV sales volumes in Asia, or specifically in China. The second question concerns OPEC. OPEC has repeatedly delayed its production increase. What's your outlook as we head into 2025? How do you see production playing out? Will market share be the focus, or price stability? That's the question of our times, isn't it? We're reading the same narrative you are. In one month, you hear that OPEC—Saudi Arabia especially—will prioritize market share over absolute price. Then a month later, the story flips entirely. What amazes me is how long we've actually stayed in this territory. It's rather striking that OPEC remains so disciplined while watching non-OPEC output rise and seize market share to this degree. So for me, logically, I struggle to grasp why they stay so disciplined, though that's just my perspective; still, I believe it's extremely hard to know what goes on in Vienna's corridors. Well, these days it's online on Sunday, actually, when they hash out these issues. How do you view the current season? This quarter, normally a very robust one—we haven't witnessed that. Looking ahead to December and January, how do you see the season unfolding? Sorry, I didn't catch that. Seeing what? How do you see it—typically this quarter delivers the strongest rates, yet we haven't seen that, so how do you see rates moving forward in December and January? Peak winter. A few market analysts have actually pointed out that perhaps Q1 becomes the new Q4; we've observed on several occasions that when Q4 disappoints, Q1 bounces back with a vengeance. There's no way to predict it. Numerous factors play into this. Yet I think, as was noted during our presentation, the maximum pressure campaign driving Iran to zero strikes me as far more compelling entering next year than any potential seasonal dip where incremental demand actually appears as we move into the new year. So I'd say I'm more intrigued by political developments arriving in the new year, or near term, than by whether the seasons have shifted. But it's a fact. We have indeed witnessed seasonal demand climbing into Q1. There's a greater degree of refinery turnarounds, essentially freeing up more oil for trade. Lars, what gives you such confidence regarding Iran? Is it the shifting political landscape in the U.S. with the Trump administration entering, making Iran sanctions far tougher, or is it something different? No, no; we're entirely apolitical, but it's a fact that most countries across the Western world sanction Iranian barrels. Their method of evading those sanctions involves using ships that aren't regulated by or compliant with any IMO principles. And I don't believe—or at least I hope—that's not a lasting situation; so at some point, something has to give. In fact, the most bullish scenario you could paint is that every sanction on Iran gets lifted. Such an outcome would be wonderful. Appreciate it, Lars. Wishing you the best. Thanks.

Lars Barstad

executive
#23

Thanks a lot for tuning in. Just keep in mind that back in 2004, we felt the same doom and gloom too; yet just months later, we were climbing toward the skies. Let's hope this market turns out somewhat more thrilling than what we anticipated for this quarter, and that the Christmas presentations go well. Thank you.

Operator

operator
#24

That brings us to the end of today's conference call. We appreciate everyone for joining in. You can go ahead and disconnect your lines at this time. Thanks.

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