Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

February 28, 2025

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 50 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

Thanks so much, everyone, and I appreciate you joining Frontline Ltd.'s quarterly earnings call. Working in the tanker business, we're accustomed to markets that keep shifting and evolving, driven in large part by geopolitical developments. It's getting somewhat tiring to face possible dramatic upheavals on an hourly basis. Here at Frontline Ltd., we remain steady, keep trading our vessels, and hold out for the facts or real results rather than trying to dissect each and every statement out there. One constant thread running through all of this activity centers on sanctions enforcement and an expanding reach in that area, something we view favorably. Before handing things over to Inger, I'll walk you through the TC figures found on slide three of the deck. During 2024's fourth quarter, Frontline Ltd. earned $35,900 per day across our VLCC fleet, $33,400 per day across our Suezmax fleet, and $26,100 per day across our LR2/Aframax fleet. Thus far in the third quarter, 80% of our VLCC days have been booked at $43,700, 77% of our Suezmax days have been booked at $35,400 per day, and 64% of our LR2/Aframax days have been booked at $29,700 a day. Once more, every figure shown in the table follows the load-to-discharge basis along with the consequences of valid state. At the close of the quarter, with anchors. With that said, I'll turn things over to Inger. I'm going to shift to page three in the deck.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Absolutely. Thank you, Lars, and good morning, good afternoon, everyone. Moving on to slide four now, the profit statement. For this quarter, we’re reporting a profit of $66.7 million, which comes to $0.30 per share, along with an adjusted profit of $45.1 million, or $0.20 per share. Compared with the prior quarter, adjusted profit declined by roughly $30 million, primarily driven by lower TCE earnings, though a reduction in expenses helped offset some of that drop. Now let’s turn to slide five, the balance sheet. The changes we saw on the balance sheet this quarter stem from a vessel sale, debt repayments, and refinancing, as well as typical operational items. Frontline Ltd. maintains a solid balance sheet, with strong liquidity totaling $693 million in cash and cash equivalents. That figure includes the undrawn portion of the senior unsecured building credit facility, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements as of December 31st, 2024. During the first quarter of 2025, we further bolstered our already strong liquidity with revolver capacity of up to $91.9 million; we have no newbuilding commitments and no significant debt maturities before 2028. Now, if you’ll move to slide six. Our fleet is made up of 41 VLCCs, 22 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers. The average age is 6.6 years, and 99% of the vessels are eco-friendly, with 56% of the total fitted with scrubbers. For 2025, we project average cash cost breakeven rates of roughly $29,200 per day for VLCCs, $24,000 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $22,200 per day for LR2 tankers, giving a fleet average estimate of about $26,200 per day. This accounts for drydock of two VLCCs and one Suezmax tanker in 2025; we recorded OpEx expense deducted in the fourth quarter of $7,600 per day for VLCCs, $9,100 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $7,600 per day for LR2 tankers. That includes the startup of one VLCC and one Suezmax tanker. The Q4 2024 fleet average OpEx excluding drydock was $7,400. Alright. Now you can proceed to slide seven, cash generation.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#3

Frontline Ltd. stands to generate a considerable amount of cash, given roughly 30,000 earnings days each year. The graph on the right side of this slide shows that potential cash generation, based on the present fleet and spot market earnings from Clarksons Research dated February 28, 2025, comes to $447 million, which equals $2.01 per share. Should the current spot market rise by 30%, that potential cash generation would grow by roughly 80%. Having said that, I'll hand things over to Lars Barstad.

Lars Barstad

executive
#4

Many thanks, Inger. Turning to slide eight — this time around we've structured the presentation somewhat differently, essentially attempting to zero in a bit more on what we consider a normal market, meaning essentially everything other than the media chatter and the stuff surrounding tariffs, sanctions, war, and so forth. So global oil consumption came in at an average of 103.4 million barrels during Q4. That figure is rather solid, representing a gain of 1 million barrels per day compared with a year earlier. By the end of the year, it's anticipated to hit 104.5 million barrels; under normal market conditions, that wouldn't be viewed as a particularly robust progression across the calendar year. Global supply rose by 600,000 barrels per day. OPEC kept their production cuts in place during December 2024, and in fact we anticipate inventories beginning to build through 2025, at least based on what the EIA says. During Q4 — and this goes a long way toward clarifying part of the disappointment we've witnessed in rates — global oil exports actually fell by 700,000 barrels per day. Q4 2023 by itself was down 1.5 million barrels per day. Part of the explanation for this involves what is anticipated to be regarded as the inventory draws over that period. You should also keep in mind that we witnessed, especially, Iran ramping up their exports during October, which left the basic gradation markets rather well supplied with molecules heading into Q4. Obviously, this is material that does not benefit the compliant tanker fleet. Through Q4, we kept seeing new ordering, yet we likewise observed that the delivery window for whatever kind of asset you'd want to build shifted decisively into 2028, preserving the three-year lead time required to get the vessel onto the water. Tanker average fleet size currently sits at 13.7 years; that's the highest level since 2001. It comes down to the regulatory framework. Owners who pass compliance checks are in fact advantaged. When you examine the asset classes Frontline Ltd. operates in, we likewise note it's Suezmax and LR2/Aframax. 46% of the vessels are now over 15 years old, which means they'll need replacing within the next five years. And at this moment, 20% exceed 20 years. This sort of demonstrates to us that a 15% order book is something manageable under this scenario. Essentially, the point you're making is that once you look past the commotion — the talk about tariffs and sanctions, plus all the turmoil surrounding us, which we don't anticipate will meaningfully damage demand — the sole impact we might witness is a drop in trade efficiency, and after that we'd essentially get either steady or perhaps higher efficiency in the way vessels sail, along with extended trade routes. For tankers, conditions continue to look pretty favorable. I believe it served as a useful reminder to those listening that setting all of that aside, markets are in fact operating normally; so we're also going to devote a whole slide to discussing sanctions and tariffs; these are things we hear about daily from different investors, reporters, and so forth, essentially regarding every headline emerging right now. So let's begin by examining tariffs affecting Mexico, Canada, China, and the EU. It all hinges on how things turn out, and that's always the million-dollar question — what will ultimately take effect? A significant energy dimension is also wrapped up in these tariffs. Roughly 4 million barrels of crude oil are brought in by the US from Canada each day. From the US, China brings in just a very small amount, something that might catch some off guard. That figure is approximately 200,000 barrels per day. Altogether, Mexico ships out 800,000 barrels per day, with half of that going to the US — so roughly 400,000 barrels per day. Meanwhile, the US sends 600,000 barrels per day to Mexico, which means that should oil and energy become weaponized in this tariff dispute among these nations, watching how it unfolds for the tanker sector could prove rather intriguing. Next there's the newer US trade representative, or USTR, $1.5 million fee on tonnage built in China. So 22% of the worldwide tanker fleet was constructed in China. Frontline Ltd. has exposure on Suez, quite a bit of China, yet every one of our VLCCs was built in either Korea or Japan, and we hold no newbuildings on order in China; this is, yes, somewhat out there being discussed. No law has been enacted, nor has any legislation been drafted as of yet. Watching it will be fascinating. Still, the sole consequence in this case would be shifting trade distances and greater inefficiency in the half ships trade. Then there's maximum pressure applied to Iran, or alternatively a resolution with Iran. So let's examine both of those scenarios. Under the first — maximum pressure — oil could potentially be pushed out of Iran's access to the market. That means this oil must be substituted, possibly from OPEC, though that would be compliant oil requiring compliant vessels, which again works in our favor since we operate in the compliant market. Should a resolution emerge and Iranian barrels suddenly cease being sanctioned, that would, well, pardon me, the earlier scenario would additionally create floating storage requirements since Iranian oil would pile up. Consider the flip side: if all sanctions were lifted, that might actually prove even more favorable for tankers—specifically those operating in compliance—since Iranian crude would shift into the compliant category, and compliant crude requires compliant vessels. Then there's the matter of Russian sanctions, whether they get ramped up and the pressure intensifies, or conversely, whether they're done away with. When it comes to heightened sanctions pressure, my sense is we're already witnessing the early stages, or the outcomes, of that. On the export front we don't see it, because in reality the barrels continue to flow, but on the import front, the data already shows us that imports worldwide—not just Russian, but Iranian too, and to some extent even Venezuelan—are declining. So in essence, floating storage has to accumulate. Regardless, greater sanctions pressure complicates trade involving those barrels, and it locks up additional tonnage, essentially pulling tonnage away from the compliant market and into the gray or dark markets. Now flip that scenario and imagine every sanction vanishes in a single night—you'd also need to keep in mind that sanctions on oil are quite simple to eliminate. A mere signature could likely accomplish it. However, taking all the designated ships off the OFAC and EU lists is potentially somewhat trickier. Even supposing that were possible, keep in mind—and we've shown this on the chart in the bottom right-hand corner—that over or nearly 50% of Russia's trading fleet is roughly 20 years old.

Lars Barstad

executive
#5

So, taking away sanctions wouldn’t alter the policy that charterers apply regarding that 20-year age limit. That point was made earlier. My guess is it stays firmly in place until the market gets costly enough, or freight rates rise enough, that charterers feel motivated to press their vetting teams to go past that 20-year age restriction. Another highly significant element of this whole picture is whether US Treasury OFAC and the EU will end up on the same page should sanctions on Russia be lifted, or if attempts are made to lift them. On top of that, we’ve lately seen Venezuela-related exemptions. It appears the US is adopting a fresh stance toward Venezuela, along with the exemptions granted for lifting and selling crude. The idea is that this will intensify pressure regarding production growth and exports out of Venezuela. In fact — and this may catch some people off guard — Venezuela has increased its exports from 550,000 barrels to 800,000 barrels compared with a year earlier; and based on preliminary tracking data, they managed to push out a million barrels per day during December. Then there’s yet another piece of this: the Shandong Port Authority essentially bringing itself into line with OFAC by refusing to let OFAC-listed vessels discharge within that province. That could shift. It came about at nearly the same moment OFAC widened its roster of sanctioned vessels by roughly 160 tankers. And clearly, any growth of that OFAC list will strike this directly. Still, it amounts to a game changer, since, well, when enforcement of sanctions isn’t actually possible, the sole thing you can count on is someone choosing to self-sanction. That is essentially what Shandong province — a hugely important import hub for China — has carried out. Beyond that, India has, at least up to now, apparently done the same and is also sort of blocking or anticipating where this charge originates within networks. One brief aside regarding China: there could be a different motivation at play. China has a stake in leveling the field between state-owned and private refineries. A lot of people are active in this province and have, to a considerable extent, benefited from inexpensive feedstock sourced from Iran. And finally, within this rather lengthy set of shifting elements that we as tanker owners face, there’s the Red Sea, Israel, and the Hamas situation, and naturally the Houthis and what they are doing in the Red Sea. So our view is that the risk remains. It rises and falls alongside what happens in Gaza. Even so, as a tanker owner, we aren’t really motivated to transit there. Taking the longer route doesn’t bother us. And at present we also don’t detect any widespread pressure from charterers to pass through that region either. The situation is still high risk. We’d contend that’s not really due to ships having been attacked in the Red Sea — because they haven’t been — but rather because something could go wrong in the peace process and in the ceasefire. So at that point, the situation can spiral very fast. I also wanted to flag something and zero in on this slide, specifically that chart in the upper right corner. What the blue line shows is how fleet development has actually played out. The orange line represents what would have happened in a normal world — one where vessels weren't carrying sanctioned oil and were sent for recycling around the time they hit their twentieth anniversary. When you look at this, the conventional tanker fleet — meaning VLCC, Suezmax, and Aframax — in fact stopped expanding during 2022. Have you run that same exercise for VLCC only? Its growth halted in September or October of 2021, which means you're actually seeing negative fleet growth in the compliant, or under-20-year, markets for close to three years at this point. Keep that in mind. Let's turn to slide ten. What this essentially demonstrates is how much is at stake here — how much is exposed to all these political developments and everything happening in the world around us. So let's go back to before the Russian invasion, back to 2019. Europe was importing roughly 10 million barrels per day of oil. Then war broke out, and Europe lost 1 million barrels of Russian oil. They lost a bit from that, but the Atlantic basin — the US, Brazil, West Africa, and so on — raised its supply into Europe by 1.2 million barrels. 388,000 incremental barrels came from the North Sea, and others accounted for 208,000 barrels per day. By the end of 2024, or in 2024, Europe has consumed 10.8 million barrels per day; this isn't some massive growth. It's a small incremental gain. If you examine the volume changes here, they're quite remarkable; and for a shipper, we don't necessarily want Europe sourcing it from the Atlantic basin. That oil, we want moved east. And that oil has traditionally gone east, but obviously, as Russia has grabbed market share in the eastern market, the Atlantic basin has been locked inside the Atlantic basin. Then moved to Asia. Before the invasion, Asia had 21.7 million barrels per oil of imports, then the war broke out. They lost 600,000 barrels from the Atlantic basin. The further loss, almost all of it went into or stayed in Europe. 300,000 barrels from the North Sea; they lost 170,000 barrels from the Med. In came 1.4 million barrels per day from Russia. Iran managed to increase their exports by almost half a million barrels. And the Middle East contributed with half a million barrels. And as we came into or finished off 2024, Asia is importing 23 million barrels; and it's interesting to see that that growth in that two-year period has predominantly come from Russia and Iran; and this is obviously oil that is not available to a compliant shipowner, to the Frontline Ltd. fleet, or to — and it's basically benefited the growth of this dark trade. If this trading pattern were to flip, it would deliver enormous gains for the markets we serve, and it would shift the trade lanes further back toward something more typical. Russian barrels remain regional, going where they're meant to go, while the Atlantic basin fills the gap left by Russian oil no longer traveling long east. Now, turning to page eleven, let's examine order books. We've actually introduced a column here labeled OFAC. It's rather fascinating. Essentially, this gives you a sense of how many vessels appear on the OFAC list; and I'll tell you, people mention it rather offhandedly; but this ship is on an OFAC list or this company is on an OFAC list. Well, being on an OFAC list is something you want to avoid. It essentially hands the US a free pass to seize your money. If your account is US-dominated, they can simply take it. And people don't necessarily want that looming over them. So essentially, the VLCC fleet is now estimated at roughly 84 vessels. 40% of that is about 15 years. And 18% is above 20 years. The order book stands at 9.8% of the existing fleet. And there are a hundred or we're close to a hundred ships on OFAC lists. Suezmax again. The fleet is 614 vessels.

Lars Barstad

executive
#6

Taking that fleet, 44.3% of the vessels have passed the 15-year mark, which ties back to my earlier point about an average age across the whole fleet of 13.7 years. The numbers start to stack up. Now, if you look at the share exceeding 20 years, that's currently 21.2%. Meanwhile, the order book stands at 97 vessels, equivalent to 15.8%. Turning to LR2 and Aframax, on the LR2 side the order book looks fairly heavy, as we noted before. That said, with the Aframax order book being relatively modest, and considering how these two segments influence each other and move between clean and dirty trades, that order book doesn't concern us either. It's pretty striking that right now roughly 60% of the Aframax fleet sits at about 15 years of age, while around 30% is near 20 years old. That puts things in a different light when something initially seems rather hefty. So let's move on to slide twelve and try to wrap it up. Up there I've placed that headline, "pending bull markets." Naturally, both investors and we ourselves would love for any development in headlines or politics to instantly turn into $100,000 per day for the VLCC. Sadly, that isn't how it usually plays out. It tends to require some time. When it comes to oil supply and demand, our position is that things remain steady. However, trade routes are facing pressure, and we're observing rising need for compliant tonnage. Major importers in Asia, we find, are turning to alternative sources rather than West Africa and Brazil, and to some degree the US. As for the second tanker fleet, its expansion will stay subdued in 2025 as well, particularly when you factor in how the fleet is getting older. At present, policy shifts raise more questions than they provide answers, and the results are hard to assess. I'll acknowledge that. Global oil trade — and this is an interesting sort of conversation to have — but global oil trade is currently being handled by the most aged fleet seen in over twenty years. We still see significant potential gains ahead thanks to our up-to-date, soft-exposed fleet. With that said, let's begin taking your questions.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#7

Thanks. Afternoon, everyone. Lars, I'm reluctant to pose something that's a bit open-ended. I get it — many pieces are in motion, and as you mentioned at the outset, nobody truly has a handle on how it all shakes out. Then you walked us through an extremely detailed breakdown of every geopolitical variable at play. Rather than guess at what might unfold, perhaps you could simply bring us up to speed on what already has. All these developments have landed. A few are just headlines. A few are genuine where sanctions are involved. The market jumped the moment Chinese sanctions hit the news. It looks like it has retreated after that. Has chartering genuinely shifted? Are you noticing hesitancy to hire vessels that could appear on sanctions lists — do you sense that certain measures carry genuine bite and might hold up in the market?

Lars Barstad

executive
#8

Yeah. I'd say that's a quick one to answer. Sort of with, you know, the real turning point being what came out of Shandong province. That triggered an enormous surge in Aframax tonnage that was prepared to load Russian cargoes from and wasn't OFAC-designated to pick up oil from, you know, the ESPO grade flowing out of northeastern Russia. For ships ready to take on that business, rates hit above $500,000 a day for a brief window. We've watched Iranian crude pile up. So essentially, Iranian crude these days gets shipped to Malaysia, sits there, rather than getting relabeled and moved on somewhere else. Honestly, I don't currently have that figure on hand with me. Yet we have observed this at 30 million barrels per day of Iranian; when did we last see it, the third time? 25 to 30 million barrels of Iranian oil parked on tankers around there, which typically serves as the SPS area for such cargo. We're likewise witnessing quite a significant shift, especially involving Middle East trade, where — or West Africa too, naturally, where Western charterers are the ones bringing in ships. That's largely about delivering compliant crude to Asian refiners. And this represents an outright step move, or step change. Then once more, as is typical in our sector, you know, things arrive in waves; we've watched rates climb and then ease off. Climb again, ease off again. We're hopeful we're in some kind of pattern that will, you know, gradually grind upward. I figure the broader complex is simply too large, and the market has also grown somewhat more efficient across the years. You know, with everyone and their mother equipped with AIS and tracking capability and such. What you're essentially doing is steering clear of those knee-jerk reactions in which prices jump to $100,000 right away, and instead it resembles a gradual, steady climb until attitudes shift and awareness of the shift starts to take hold; but yes, I'd say we have witnessed significant shifts. And keep in mind, we're also picking up on considerably greater appetite from Russian or Russian trade enablers for acquiring older tonnage, especially when it comes to the Aframax side.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#9

All right, that's quite useful. My next question involves just a couple of points I'd like Inger to clarify. Regarding the PowerPoint deck and those breakevens, you mentioned 2 dry docks for VLCCs plus 1 for Suezmax. Is that all for this year — merely 3 vessels?

Inger Klemp

executive
#10

Yes; nothing else is scheduled for 2025.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#11

Okay, that's excellent. Let's move on to the second point — administrative expenses. Everybody is aware that these costs looked a bit high through 2023, and also in the first half of 2024, prior to easing in 3Q and then falling sharply in 4Q. At $1.7 million, I think that's the lowest quarterly number we've ever seen. Can you give us some sense of how admin expenses could behave on a more normal basis for 2025 and beyond?

Inger Klemp

executive
#12

Sure. As you saw, admin expenses landed at $1.7 million this quarter. The reason for that was a gain we booked on our synthetic option program. That's a revaluation gain that has to be run through the balance sheet every period, and we then took it out of this quarter's results. As a result, the program became fully vested during the quarter. The related cost came to about $8 million. If you add that amount back to the $1.7 million, you get to roughly $10 million. So looking at it on a normalized basis, G&A going forward ought to come in at about $9 million to $10 million a quarter.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#13

Excellent, thank you Inger, and thank you Lars.

Inger Klemp

executive
#14

Hello Jonathan, appreciate it; we'll move on to the following question now. Bear with us for a second; that inquiry is coming in from Omar Nokta of Jefferies. Your line is live. Go ahead with your question.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#15

Thanks. Hi, Lars and Inger. I appreciate those remarks; and like John mentioned, it's a good, comprehensive sort of deep dive into the sort of macro picture, and it looks like the floodgates at some point are ready to be opened. I had perhaps just a few, maybe, you know, questions specific to Frontline Ltd. Maybe to start, so we look at the 1Q figures. They're solid and higher than what the final 4Q numbers were; we know that discharge accounting, as you mentioned earlier on the call, perhaps overstates it somewhat because of the end-of-quarter ballast days. But I guess just on the final portion, you have 80% of the VLCCs booked, 77% of the Suezmax, and 64% for the LR2s. Just on that, what share can we assume for the rest of the quarter is going to be essentially ballast and non-earning?

Inger Klemp

executive
#16

Well, I think it's hard in a way to be completely exact about what the remaining part of the quarter will be. We don't truly know. So sorry to say, but I guess what you can do in a way is that if you look at the pattern, the historical pattern of what we come in as actual versus what we guide at for the quarter, that can serve as a rule of thumb in a way for this quarter too, if you follow what I mean.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#17

All right. Yeah. So it sounds like maybe the last chunk of the VLCCs is likely sitting at zero. And then there's somewhat more left on the Suezmax and LR2s.

Inger Klemp

executive
#18

Yeah. Since, suppose you take a look at what we typically see — our real rates versus the guidance we provide for that quarter on the VLCCs, for example, tend to land somewhere near 80 to 85% of the guidance, in a sense. That's roughly where we finish, in a sense. It can shift somewhat. That's the reason I say 85. It depends on how big a share you've already got covered within the guidance they're providing, in a sense. Because what they're guiding to right now assumes 80% covered. Whereas for us, in the prior quarter, I believe we were at a 70. Somewhere in the 70s. So it genuinely matters, in a sense, how many days you've got covered in your guidance. And clearly, the reduction is smaller across the remaining part of the quarter, in a sense, when your coverage percentage is high, in a sense. Do you follow what I'm saying?

Lars Barstad

executive
#19

Okay, and Omar, one more layer of complexity here is that trading patterns at any given moment genuinely play a role. During certain quarters, we're running plenty of long-haul trips on predicted VLCCs. And then, clearly, because we recognize revenue from load through discharge — and for anyone on the call who doesn't follow that — income can only be counted once the vessel has loaded. That means the ballast leg effectively registers as zero. And, you know, if a big chunk of your fleet is deployed in something like China-to-US-Gulf trade, all at once those ballast legs turn into a pretty significant factor. Same story for the Suezmax side — those trading patterns shift considerably from one month to the next. Right. Print on Monday, so that tends to hold steadier.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#20

All right, and I'm grateful for the breakdown. No, that's useful. So my next item, just to build on that. We saw somewhat of a gap opening up between the Frontline Ltd. ships and, you know, the Euronav vessels. This quarter it exceeded $11,000 each day. You know, during the two preceding quarters they'd come much nearer to each other. What caused that divergence?

Lars Barstad

executive
#21

Well, you know, our approach is to trade our ships in whatever manner we reckon will serve them best. What took place was that during Q4, we felt just as optimistic as the majority of investors and those around us, anticipating a late-quarter spike. So to lock in those lengthy voyages, you know, Brazil East, US Gulf East, North Sea, you would prefer to use an eco scrubber-fitted ship, since that delivers the greatest value for those long trips. Then you leave the vessels without scrubbers positioned in the Middle East for those 42 to 46-day runs, where you're able to seize far more of a spike. Clearly this turned out to be the wrong call, yet it accounts for much of that spread. Another thing worth pointing out is that only so many cargoes exist that you can sort of pull from the US Gulf. Frontline Ltd. is likely among the biggest movers of US crude. On Brazilian crude, we also rank within the top tiers. Yet given the 41 vessel fleet on the VLCC, we're really lifting as large a market share as we're capable of getting. But as I mentioned at the start, that's the reason this spread grew wider; essentially we sought to keep the powder dry for an upswing late in the quarter. That never materialized.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#22

Understood. Thanks for that. I appreciate it, Lars and Inger.

Lars Barstad

executive
#23

Thanks, Omar. Appreciate it.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#24

Hello. I'm arriving a bit late, so my apologies in case somebody already raised this point. You've accumulated a fairly sizeable pile of dry powder, yet a portion of the fleet is reaching the end of its useful life. At the same time, vessels on order or newly delivered are arriving rather slowly, and taken together, one could argue that points to growing tightness in sale and purchase deals. So if opportunities involving existing ships disappear, do you see any alternative routes for putting capital to work?

Lars Barstad

executive
#25

Honestly, right now, not really. That conviction still matters to us. The reason our order book sits empty comes down to wanting to see the proof in the pudding. Conviction is there, sure, but the proof in the pudding hasn't appeared yet. Prices for resales and newbuildings haven't genuinely adjusted in any meaningful manner. Available yard capacity got taken up by container orders and other asset classes, with that trend especially picking up pace during the latter half of last year. So when you're staring at a $125 million price tag for a new VLCC, you need a steady $50,000 to $55,000 per day across 20 years just to achieve a sensible return. We would prefer to witness $50,000 plus before feeling confident enough to commit that money. That's the reason we chose to essentially pass along the modest sum we hold — well, not modest really. We do distribute quite a lot through dividends. Pass it to you as an investor, and from there you're free to reinvest and allocate it either into Frontline Ltd. or somewhere else.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#26

Thank you; and, as you brought that up. Regarding placing orders for newly constructed vessels, should that occur at some point, would the US blacklisting and sanctions against Chinese shipyards limit your options when deciding where to have new builds made, or not really?

Lars Barstad

executive
#27

In my view, it's somewhat premature. If you look at what's in the news, I certainly wouldn't entertain placing an order for a Chinese vessel at this moment. It's not something we're doing, but I believe for the broader market, it likely leaves everything somewhat in a holding pattern until there's more clarity regarding what the final result might be. We're actually questioning if this can happen at all. So, shipbuilding capacity represents a challenge worldwide. The volume of products, materials, and energy carried or transported across the oceans forms a significant component of the worldwide economy. And we're aware that Japan is somewhat diminishing its capacity to construct ships in a practical or productive manner. Korea has turned into an expensive shipbuilding nation. China stands alone in providing that kind of capacity. So it will be fascinating to observe how this unfolds. But essentially, we're in a wait-and-see approach.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#28

Lars, I appreciate you fielding my questions.

Lars Barstad

executive
#29

I appreciate that. Thanks to you.

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#30

Hey, Lars. I'd like to know, since conditions are getting so unpredictable, what approach will you take for booking ahead, or what's the plan? You said you were expecting something in Q4, and then the market went a totally different direction.

Lars Barstad

executive
#31

Yeah. No, that's the difficulty that comes with being a shipowner — the market we operate in isn't efficient, so to speak; meaning you don't have complete information available when you're making calls. The reason we held the view that activity would pick up near the close of Q4 comes down to seasonality trends built up over many years. It relates to the cold season, which typically hits the Northern Hemisphere, where the bulk of people reside. But there isn't any particular approach out here that I can point to. Right? What we can do is attempt to shift our fleet away from very long voyages toward shorter ones. So clearly, when the market pays well, we'd want to run the long routes. And when things are tough or the market is under pressure, we'd prefer to simply take the shortest route so we can re-fix at a better rate. But there's no more science to it than that. One thing we are not doing — and honestly, Devon, this is a really good question — is committing to time charters. Our view is that we're better positioned keeping our ships in the spot market given where the market stands today. We would significantly raise our time charter coverage if we reached a point where the market was prepared to offer what we consider a fair return on equity; our judgment is that isn't happening at present. So within that strategy conversation, one piece is how we run our spot operations, which was the Q4 question I addressed before. The other piece, clearly, is how we behave when it comes to securing cover.

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#32

And finally, regarding that second point — the proportion coming from the US, you know, that's backing Russia. Suppose a truce is reached between the two sides and the restrictions placed on Russia get removed; would that then allow additional crude to move, you know, or as I'd put it, would those dark vessels end up causing a decrease in tonnage?

Lars Barstad

executive
#33

Yeah. Assuming I understood what you asked, then should the sanctions against Russia be removed, our expectation is that we would go back.

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#34

So does that imply the compliant vessels would end up controlling a bigger portion of the market?

Lars Barstad

executive
#35

Yes. Well, it's somewhat in line with what we said at the start — roughly 50% of the ships now serving Russia will likely meet compliance rules and remain active there. The way the market would work out, though, is that Russian crude would be consumed regionally. Russian oil, after all, belongs in its own backyard. That means Europe; and later on this will shift, or flip the flow of trade so Russian barrels head to Europe, with some going to the US and Latin America; meanwhile the remaining Atlantic basin crude would switch back toward the east, and those are the longer-term trajectories. So our view is there may be a short-term hit for Aframax and Suezmax. Still, you have to consider how old this fleet is; for the VLCCs, though, it makes sense to expect a positive outcome.

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#36

All right; and starting from version 1.0, he ensured that exports from Iran would drop to roughly below $1 million, or 100,000 tons each day. If that were to happen once more, moving up to 2.0, what would the effect be on VLCC demand? And in what way would the dynamics shift?

Lars Barstad

executive
#37

Are you asking about a scenario where Iranian oil gets sanctioned, or something like that...

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#38

No. The reason exports have dropped is that, as I understand it, with 1.0 they guaranteed there would be no exports. Pretty much. Yeah. Almost nothing.

Lars Barstad

executive
#39

Yeah. No, so during the latter portion of last year, Iran accounted for roughly 10 to 15% of the oil that China brought in. China would therefore have to find a substitute for that crude. Most likely, that substitute would be compliant crude. My assumption is it would come from OPEC or the Middle East. That oil would need to move aboard compliant vessels. So on an annual basis, this would really mean additional demand for somewhere between 30 and 45 VLCCs. So I would assume that would be a big gain, mainly for VLCCs.

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#40

Has that already taken place in front of you, or is it still on its way?

Lars Barstad

executive
#41

To a certain extent, we have witnessed it occurring. Right? Still, the fascinating part to monitor, really, is this: exports out of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela have not exactly dropped off swiftly at this point. Yet when you turn to the flip side and examine what is being brought in of crude from Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, that number has actually come down rather sharply.

Devon Sangoy

analyst
#42

All right. Appreciate it, Lars. Good to speak with you.

Lars Barstad

executive
#43

Thanks.

Lars Barstad

executive
#44

Yes, I appreciate it greatly, and I appreciate you joining the call. These are very thrilling days, to be sure. I want to say again that here at Frontline Ltd., we keep chartering vessels on a daily basis. The tanker market out there is actually functioning quite nicely. In spite of all the commotion, and we are clearly eager to watch how these results unfold, it is very hard to scrutinize and assign much worth to it. Thank you.

Operator

operator
#45

That wraps up the conference call for today. Thanks for joining in. Everyone is free to disconnect at this point. Have a great day.

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