Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

May 23, 2025

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 48 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad

executive
#1

Thank you so much, everyone. I appreciate you joining Frontline's quarterly earnings call. It's great to see such a strong turnout today. Even with everything going on around us—equity market swings, policy shifts, and global trade talks—the tanker market has continued moving in a steady, orderly way. Looking back at Q1, VLCCs saw volatility, with 3 to 4 notable rallies and a floor that kept climbing. Suezmax and Aframax closed out the first quarter strongly, while LR2s had a tougher time. We're now in a spot where the usual inverse earnings link among asset classes appears to have disappeared, and VLCCs are out in front; that might also stem from the fact that incremental export growth is at last originating from compliant sources. So before I turn things over to Inger, I'll walk through our TCE figures on Slide 3 of the deck. During Q1 of 2025, Frontline posted $37,200 per day across our VLCC fleet, $31,200 per day for our Suezmax fleet, and $22,300 per day for our LR2/Aframax fleet. Thus far in Q1, 68% of our VLCC days are booked at $56,400 per day, 69% of our Suezmax days are booked at $44,900 per day, and 66% of our LR2/Aframax days are booked at $36,100 per day. Once again, every figure in this table is calculated on a low to discharge basis, which reflects the impact of ballast days toward the end of the quarter; and I believe it's worth noting that especially for our LR2s in Q1, we wrapped up the quarter carrying a fair number of ballast days as we moved into Q2. Now I'll hand it to Inger to walk you through the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp

executive
#2

Thanks, Lars, and hello everybody, good morning and good afternoon. Turning to Slide 4, the actual statement, we'll go through a handful of highlights. During this quarter, we recorded a profit of $33.3 million, equal to $0.15 per share, plus an adjusted profit of $40.4 million, or $0.18 per share. On a sequential basis, adjusted profit for the first quarter declined by $4.7 million, largely driven by our time charter earnings falling to $241 million in the first quarter from $249 million in the prior quarter. Again, that comes from softer TCE rates, although swings in other income and expenses partly made up for it. Let's now look at the balance sheet on Slide 5. The balance sheet movements in this quarter are tied to ordinary items. Frontline keeps a strong balance sheet as well as robust liquidity of $805 million in cash and cash equivalents, which includes undrawn revolver capacity amounts, marketable securities, and cash requirements for the bank as of March 31, 2025. No meaningful debt maturities come due before 2030, and we have no new building commitments. Turning to Slide 6, Fleet Composition, cash. Our fleet consists of 41 VLCCs, 22 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers. It averages 6.8 years of age, and it is made up of 99% ECO vessels, with 56% of those being scrubber fitted. Over the next 12 months, we project an average cash breakeven rate of approximately $29,700 per day for VLCCs, $24,300 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $23,300 per day for LR2 tankers, with a fleet average estimate of about $26,800 per day. That number takes into account drydock cost on 10 VLCCs, 2 Suezmax tankers, and 5 LR2 tankers. Excluding drydock costs, the fleet average estimate works out to about $25,700 per day, which is $1,100 per day lower. No vessels went through drydocking in the first quarter, and we recorded OpEx expenses of $8,400 per day for VLCCs, $8,000 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $8,200 per day for LR2 tankers. The Q1 fleet average was $8,300 per day. Interest expense also came down versus the prior quarter, landing at roughly $6 million. Last, let's go to Slide 7, cash generation. Frontline has considerable capacity for cash generation, with about 30,000 earnings days annually. As the graph on the left-hand side of this slide indicates, the cash generation potential, based on our current fleet and May 25 forward rates for TD3C for VLCCs, TD20 for Suezmax tankers, and an average of TD25 and TC1 for Aframax and LR2 tankers from the Baltic Exchange as of May 23, comes to $332 million, or $1.49 per share, and a 30% rise from the current spot market would lift the potential cash generation by about 100%; with that, I'll hand the word back to Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#3

Thanks a lot, Inger. Turning to Slide 8, let's talk through the different market themes. I said at the start that there's been plenty of noise surrounding us; we've seen disruptive U.S. policy shifts such as <<inaudible>> with only a limited effect so far on the energy complex and on tankers broadly, yet overall this is quite concerning for global growth prospects. And going forward, we'll find out just how large these consequences might turn out to be. Sanctions have moved in a very favorable direction, both through an expansion of scope. Agencies of various kinds are adding fresh vessels to the sanctions list and new operators practically every day; beyond that, we've also observed somewhat greater willingness when it comes to enforcing those same sanctions. But the most significant thing, I'd argue, is the shift in behavior, particularly from India and China, in how they deal with — or approach — OFAC listed vessels; and up to now, both Russia and India — pardon me, China and India, appear to be avoiding ships appearing on the OFAC list. There's some buzz regarding Russia and the Ukraine cease fire talks. A separate but related conversation is also underway concerning a nuclear deal with Iran. Each outcome has the potential to trigger major changes in how the tanker market behaves, and I'll cover that in a moment. In addition, we are seeing some positive developments regarding OpEx <<inaudible>> and OpEx policy. So far, at least, they seem rather eager to return oil to the market, and that supports utilization for compliant tankers. I will also discuss — or touch on — the traditional factors: demand, supply, and inventory shifts. It is quite only, this chart kept showing up in our presentations around early 2020 and 2021 and so on, though it has been absent from the deck for some time. Still, some interesting movements are taking place; and once more, <<inaudible>> the same following the Q4 report. The number of ships actively involved in trading has stopped growing, and that's true even with the new vessels arriving in 2025 and, partly, in 2026 as well. It looks like the trading fleet as a whole will continue to get smaller. I'd like you to take a look at the chart in the upper right corner — honestly, it's pretty astonishing. When you count ships that are under sanctions, or aren't sanctioned yet but have been moving Iranian-Russian <<inaudible>> barrels over the past twelve months, or are more than two decades old, that group accounts for 25% of the VLCC fleet. It represents 46% of the Suezmax fleet, and 52% of the Afra/LR2 fleet. Of course, if those measures were rolled back, a significant volume of Suezmax and Aframax tonnage would re-enter the market. A large share of the operators moving Russian cargoes are complying with the price cap. They are fully allowed to do that, clearly, but tougher sanctions could suddenly drive them out of the gray area and toward something darker. At the same time, demand for non-focused vessels is rising, particularly in the Russian trade. And that portion of the fleet continues to grow gradually. Still, it also reveals how sensitive our market is to sanctions and to any changes in them, largely because of how much tonnage is tied up or still active. Now, moving on to Slide 9, we'll take a look at how the traditional market thinking works. The graph on the left side is a bit on the dramatic end, but it does plainly show how oil supply and demand shifted after COVID hit. So you get a pretty sharp price curve at the start, but these days things have — by now it's settled down more. If you check that gray section, which shows the EIA's most recent projection, what we're actually moving toward is total supply and demand of around 106 million barrels by the end of 2026. The more interesting part is supply. Obviously, higher OpEx is pushing this, but expected output gains—especially in Guyana and somewhat in Brazil—are also playing a role, and that combination leaves the oil markets with more supply than demand. On the right is the historical chart. If you look at how inventories rise and fall, those swings line up pretty closely with tanker market performance overall. The reason is pretty straightforward, and it's not about utilization via floating storage. You don't need a particularly strong carrier to make that happen in the market. Only the additional barrels being moved end up not heading straight to final use—they're going into storage, in places like China, Japan, Korea, or even the U.S. And I'm sure everyone here already knows that inventories worldwide are sitting at multiyear lows. Turning to Slide 10, I'll just run through a few of the current headlines that matter for tankers; regarding tariffs, enforcement of the Liberation Day tariff was pushed back by 90 days, and those tariffs are in the process of being relaxed. Turning to tariffs, energy is largely exempt, so we don't have much concern that this will significantly disrupt global trade patterns. As for the USTR, their recent proposal indicates a softer stance, or at least softer language, with key carve-outs for oil and energy. A final proposal is anticipated by the end of May, following the more recent hearing. That said, thus far it appears that U.S. exports are extensive and oil discharge into the U.S. does not represent a material exposure for Frontline, and additionally half of our fleet is non-Chinese. So we might still be in a position to serve that market. Broadly speaking, in the U.S. accounts for around 17% of the global oil market. Alright, so it wouldn't be a total catastrophe if this turns out to be tied to relations or messaging from the USTR staying the same as what we witnessed previously. We've got maximum pressure on Iran 2.0, or alternatively a nuclear agreement. This is once again making headlines right in the midst of this trade conflict, and talks continue. But when it comes to striking a nuclear deal with Iran, from their perspective, removing sanctions is a red line; and just picture what would follow. So 1.4 million to 1.6 million barrels per day of export capacity that could ramp up fairly quickly, would suddenly turn into compliant barrels. And like I've mentioned again and again, compliant barrels require compliant ships. Sure, you may observe a few vessels managing to get back into the compliance market, but broadly speaking, the majority of ships currently involved in Iranian trade have zero prospect of re-entering the compliant market. Those participating in the compliance market operate under very rigid rules and relationships regarding the vessels they're willing to use; and these ships are additionally hauling an environmentally risky cargo valued for a VLCC at roughly $120 million. So it isn't the sort of thing a Charter will treat lightly. Then there's the expansion of Russian sanctions, this element or a ceasefire conversation happening between Russia and Ukraine.

Lars Barstad

executive
#4

Looking ahead, sanctions are certainly going to be either eased or made stricter, correct? As things stand at this moment, tightening appears more probable than any loosening. Most recently, the EU put 168 vessels—or roughly that figure—onto its sanctions list. About 1.5 weeks back, the U.K. added 100, and OFAC looks set to keep hunting down those who break sanctions connected to Russian trade. There's also a forthcoming debate over whether the oil price cap might drop from $60 down to $50. So plenty of buzz around that. Next, the removal of sale exemptions—previously, you could ship equity barrels out of Venezuela, so Chevron was typically permitted to lift the oil they genuinely owned there. That has now largely been eliminated, and it happens only case-by-case; we see Chevron able to take oil <<inaudible>>; what this means is that their exports, which had in fact climbed to 800,000 barrels a day during the last cycle, are now going dark. Then there's this, which I mentioned earlier too: the Shandong Port in India OFAC compliance. That's very encouraging, since the sole manner in which sanctions can actually function is when receivers or the actors themselves operate these vessels. We have the Red Sea, Israel and Amas—and I should include the U.S. here as well. A seize fire now exists between the U.S. and the <<inaudible>>; our stance on trading in the Red Sea area hasn't materially shifted because of it. Nor has it materially changed traffic claims so far, yet it's also true that the situation remains quite fluid, and any action tied to this conflict could all at once set off an attack. So, up to now, we are unwilling to put our seafarers' lives at risk by trading through the Red Sea; but then lastly, we have OFAC <<inaudible>>, which is nearly vanishing amid all these other narratives suggesting they could potentially bring their voluntary cuts back to the market by October. It will be exciting to see what emerges from the next meeting, and signals already exist that they might add—sorry, 411,000 barrels per day in July as well. What we've observed with the initial production rises hasn't truly delivered that many more molecules into the market. My sense is this stems mainly from the fact that it's more a paper exercise to catch up to the over production already present in OFAC. But starting June onwards, the volumes that may arrive will be real molecules entering the market. I'd like to direct your attention to the right-hand side of this slide, and all of you have seen the fleet development with the orange line being a <<inaudible>> below 20 years of age. Also, the situation remains that hardly any shippers—if there are any at all—will take a vessel older than 20 years in this business. Yet when you check the chart here, we essentially examined every tanker participating in the market that isn't OFAC listed, isn't tied up in long-term storage, and isn't what you'd call near to being a trading tanker. From that, it's clear the total tanker fleet in fact contracted by 0.5% during 2024, and once you factor in all deliveries arriving through 2025, the number isn't especially large, though certain indicators suggest further contraction ahead. Turning to Slide 11, I'm glad to report that sanctions genuinely are effective—not through volume; the volume reaching the market is more or less quite persistent. Rather, it's through the fleet that's actually transporting this oil. January's broadening of specific sanctions, plus the self-sanctioning undertaken by China and India, has driven market conditions for an OFAC listed tanker to become extraordinarily bad. In particular, since Russian crude has stayed under the price cap, it has drawn a great deal of compliant tonnage in to serve this market. Still, this type of decline in utilization of OFAC listed tankers is very encouraging. On the upper right-hand side, we've worked through a scenario where sanctions are either lifted—and this matters because both tighter sanctions and the removal of sanctions will each produce a beneficial outcome for our market. Roughly 7 million barrels per day of oil moved globally is subject to 1 sanction or another somewhere in the world. Just picture it if all of that returned; that's not probable, but it offers an illustration. Those 7 million barrels would translate into transport demand exceeding 200 VLCCs, and given the fleet composition, having that much capacity readily available isn't very probable. What I do think is probable, though, is that 1 or perhaps 2 of these will come in and turn into non-sanction barrels over the coming years. Returning to sanctions <<inaudible>> they do work. When you examine Iranian crude inventories, floating storage appears to be increasing. This is essentially because crude is having difficulty finding a home. Turning to Slide 12 and considering the familiar order book, nothing significant has shifted since our Q4 report, yet I want to highlight that for the VLCCs, there are now considerably more OFAC-listed VLCCs than there are vessels in the order book. Suezmax is much the same—if you adjust for what was on OFAC, and bear in mind, OFAC listed vessels are very unlikely to come back to the compliant market, the order book is nearly negligible; the same holds for Aframax and LR2s, despite the LR2 having a very high nominal order book. Looking back at the chart from earlier — that was Slide 8 — where 52% of that fleet has exposure to at least one sanction, we honestly don't have too much concern about that fleet moving forward. And regarding the age profile, especially for LR2s, once they hit 15 years old they appear to shed efficiency and turn into a less appealing vessel for products trading. That remains true even in a normal tanker market. So let's turn to Slide 13 for the summary. I've largely given it the positive label of pressure building, question mark — at least that's how it feels on the floor around here. So oil supply and demand point toward us entering a stretch of old school inventory builds, along with the utilization consequences that carries for the tanker market broadly. Demand for compliant tonnage keeps rising as sanctions scope and enforcement expand; and once more, the reality that some key participants in this market are effectively self sanctioning, especially when it comes to OFAC. Growth in the less active tanker fleet will stay muted through 2025; we genuinely keep seeing oil demand poised to rise, and given how the fleet is aging, that provides the tailwind we require going deeper into '25 and on into '26. Policy shifts do raise more questions and answers.

Lars Barstad

executive
#5

Hopefully, by the close of this month, we'll have some answers. That said, the general language has gotten less firm. And once more — I'll keep saying this until the situation shifts — the oldest fleet in over 20 years is what continues to handle World Oil Trade. And clearly, when you consider the regulatory environment we're operating in, where decarbonization stands as a central objective for the industry, this is quite contradictory. And finally, from <<inaudible>>, we keep holding onto our substantial upside, as Inger mentioned. We've got a modern, spot-exposed fleet that's ready to serve the compliant oil market. Thanks for that, and now we can begin taking questions.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#6

To start with, stepping back — looking at VLCC fixtures across the past several weeks, things over in the Atlantic have gone somewhat quiet. Would you attribute that to the OFAC accelerated ramp? Also, any thoughts on what could push additional long-haul cargoes out of the Atlantic Basin?

Lars Barstad

executive
#7

Yeah. No, that's a really good question. The ARD, and really the economics behind U.S. exports, is very much a business of ebb and flow. Honestly, we struggle to account for the calm in the U.S. Gulf region right now, essentially; broadly speaking, a fair amount of tonnage is sitting in the hands of oil majors and traders; and those fixtures won't truly show up in the market; they'll essentially get done in-house and the material will sail, so that may be part of it. It might also be partly refinery runs in the U.S. before summer; that essentially reduces the need for exports or the push toward exports. And finally, there's a factor involving Canada, which has raised its exports away from the U.S., not substantially since it's mostly confined to the TMX pipeline expansion, but it contributes to the picture too; yet as I mentioned, along the same lines, we've witnessed extremely active flows out of Brazil and also solid volume out of Guyana. Plus we've seen growing interest, especially from the Indian — from India when it comes to lifting West African barrels.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#8

That's fantastic detail, Lars. I just want to ask one thing about the operating side, I suppose. On a per vessel basis, operating costs came in a bit higher both sequentially and year-over-year. So what's behind that, could you explain?

Inger Klemp

executive
#9

Sure. Regarding ship operating expenses for this quarter, it was more of a normal run rate, in a sense. Last quarter's figure was impacted by insurance rebates as well as supplier rebates, roughly $4.9 million. So the 60.3 million, I'd say, is closer to how things will look going forward. And when it comes to administrative expenses, comparing those 2 figures to one another really isn't valid, I think. You need to make an adjustment for the synthetic option liability item that we provide details on in the press release. Q4 included a gain of 7.9 million, while Q1 had a loss of 1.6 million. Once you apply those adjustments, the rise in Q1 administrative expenses amounts to just $2 million; and then there's interest expense, which declined versus the prior quarter by around 6 million. So overall, honestly, our cost development is pretty solid.

Sherif Elmaghrabi

analyst
#10

Thanks, Inger. I'll turn it over.

Lars Barstad

executive
#11

Thank you.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#12

Thanks. Afternoon, everyone. Lars, regarding <<inaudible>> and the actual plan you've chosen. You're not deviating from it: plenty of spot market exposure, a 100% dividend payout ratio, and you've just refinanced the balance sheet — arguably the strongest capital structure of this millennium. You've described a highly favorable industry backdrop, with OPEC output hikes, an aging fleet, and all those headlines, and so on, and it seems like for the first time this business model isn't getting credit. John, you've raised a really sharp point. It feels like we're in uncharted territory here — the sector's prospects have rarely looked this bright, the balance sheet has rarely been this solid, and we're still sitting well clear of the cash breakeven line, yet the stock changes hands below net asset value. So the question becomes: does something strategic need to shift? Whether that's your thinking on leverage, on the fleet, or on how you weigh the dividend against buybacks? Is there any piece of this you feel has to be reworked in order to get Frontline trading back at a premium multiple while conditions in the industry stay this supportive?

Lars Barstad

executive
#13

John, that's a genuinely great question. And you've held a very long position and done really well by Frontline. And the fact that we're offering a discount like this is surprising too. If you look at how Q4 went for tanker stocks, it wasn't just about peers — alongside peers, it was a total disaster. Comparing it to this same point a year ago, being a tanker CEO was far more enjoyable, and we were getting calls from big generalist investors around the world basically every week. I think they didn't recognize that last year's second half didn't work out, and they've got plenty of other options in their investment universe. What that tells us is there's essentially been an exodus of stockholders from our equity, and the shares have been <<inaudible>> feeling some strain. On top of that, we see that short interest in Frontline has reached a new record, and that's likely tied to the fact that major global investment banks are pursuing worldwide strategies for which a short position in Frontline fits nicely. So my read is that in the past, people buying the stock were ready to bake expectations, or a NAV looking 12 months ahead, into the price, whereas today they're far less inclined to do so — they essentially want to see the proof in the pudding before making an investment decision. My sense is that this is likely the explanation, rather than the idea that the front line is executing an incorrect strategy. In this market, we're genuinely attempting to behave in a rather disciplined way—it's tempting to sign the same kind of time charter deals and give up the upside. Quite a few firms in our sector have gone after that route fairly aggressively, yet we'd rather retain those possible gains, as we still firmly believe this market will give some money back to us over the coming years.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#14

As a brief addition to that, thinking along similar lines, the industry has seen certain asset disposals at prices that remain rather high, particularly for older tonnage. And I realize the sanctioned fleet, or shadow fleet, whatever you prefer to call it, is facing somewhat more strain. But might there be chances for you? You still hold 81 vessels, a huge amount of operating leverage. Could there be some older ships you could cash in on right now without sacrificing much operating leverage? Yet perhaps giving a bit of an arbitrage between asset values and equity value?

Lars Barstad

executive
#15

Certainly. But as you likely recognize, and I don't believe it's much of a secret, a portion of the demand for that more vintage kind of tonnage comes from counterparties that, quite plainly, wish to participate in trades we don't like. So we're extremely careful about engaging with that market. That said, there are other players out there — not necessarily large owners at present — who have a growth plan for the compliant market and actually perceive the same chance in purchasing vessels with 5 to 7 years of life remaining in them, or for storage projects or conversion projects; so you're correct, chances do exist out there. And but we have — we wish to keep this sort of magic 30,000 earnings days per year; we might have one candidate out there, but it won't be material in our strategy to shrink the fleet here.

Jon Chappell

analyst
#16

Understood. Thank you, Lars.

Lars Barstad

executive
#17

Thank you, Jon.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#18

I have a few things I want to ask, and perhaps I'll begin with the market. Clearly, we've watched VLCCs get better as we moved into Q2, and that's certainly an improvement over what the second half of last year looked like. Like you mentioned, that period was genuinely disappointing; however, conditions have gotten better, even if the rates we're looking at don't exactly leap out at you. From where you sit, I suppose, how would you characterize the way things have been developing? Sanctions have removed a substantial share of the fleet, as we've observed. And now we have OPEC barrels arriving. What's your read on the way rates are structured at present? Is it premature to anticipate a genuine breakout? Has the full advantage of these sanctions shown up yet? Or is there more still in store?

Lars Barstad

executive
#19

My view is that we haven't seen all of it yet. To begin with, regarding the OFAC angle, like I said during the presentation, the effect on cargoes hasn't truly appeared in the sense that they've been growing substantially on a month-over-month basis from Middle East OPEC producers. The sole region where we've witnessed meaningful expansion is Kazakhstan, and that could in fact be the very reason OPEC chose to take this step; however, speaking more broadly, what we're seeing — and ideally it becomes a lasting pattern — is that from the moment it all began, with Venezuela of course being sanctioned, going back to when it was hit with full sanctions, we watched that volume shift over to the dark side; after that came Chem Russia, which represents a sizable portion moving into the dark side, essentially. The additional barrel reaching the market now — and bear in mind, demand continues to rise — is in fact originating from compliant sources. So the market we conduct business in has in fact experienced a steadily shrinking volume, and in particular, Iran managed to boost its exports fairly substantially during the second half of last year. But that has now run its course as well; and I've previously stated that this will ultimately get resolved in any case, since it's quite unlikely that Iran, Venezuela, or Russia could succeed in raising direct production and exports meaningfully moving forward. That means compliant oil exports must expand in order to meet demand. And that appears to be happening at present, further intensified by the fact that OPEC is bringing barrels back into the market. So this amounts to positive news for the compliant fleet. And many of those barrels happen to be VLCC barrels. That's the reason we have — we committed a massive investment to VLCC, and half our fleet consists of VLCCs. Our belief is that perhaps a proper VLCC market could become the norm across the coming 6 months.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#20

Thanks Lars. So perhaps a brief follow-up regarding that, looking at the coming 6 months and what you just said. What's your view on how summer seasonality plays out this year? Do you figure that becomes secondary to the sort of dynamics you're currently describing?

Lars Barstad

executive
#21

What I find most exciting about the near term and through the summer — I believe it was Slide 11, where I noted that sanctions genuinely have an effect. Whatever move emerges from the EU or U.S. regarding sanctions, it's highly probable to arrive fast, since either there's a collapse or a breakthrough in the Iran nuclear negotiations, or folks grow weary of no ceasefire managing to get agreed between Russia and Iran. So I'd say we're discussing weeks, not months, before you witness stepped-up action one way or the other on this front. And given that this volume is now drawing so much tonnage away from the compliant market. Plus these sanctions matter so greatly to compliant fleet utilization, I think we could see quite an intriguing summer, simply by examining the political storyline surrounding these 2 specific situations.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#22

Yes. And one last thing, maybe this is for you, Inger. That refinancing involving the '24 VLCCs. Clearly, it's good to have that locked in through 2030. As you noted, you completed the refinancing 3.5 years ahead of when the existing or prior facility matured. In your view, what primarily motivated doing the refinance this early — was the improvement in margin that significant? Or was the real reason lengthening the term?

Inger Klemp

executive
#23

The reduction in margin mattered most; and clearly, the extension came as a sort of added advantage on top of that. Yes.

Omar Nokta

analyst
#24

Could you provide some idea of how much was saved on the spread?

Inger Klemp

executive
#25

Sure, our starting point wasn't what you'd call typical for us, I suppose you could say that. So I can't give an exact figure on it. That said — it was roughly 200 basis points, and at present we're sitting at 170.

Analyst

analyst
#26

Looking at Page 6 of the deck, in the 4Q '24 presentation it was stated that drydocking over the coming 12 months, or for calendar '25, would involve 2 VLCCs and 1 Suezmax tanker. Then in what's shown today, that figure has been raised to 10 VLCCs, 2 Suez and 5 LRs; and the only change on our side is that we've shifted into the first quarter of 2026. Is this simply a typical, unusually large drydock slate for that Q1 of '26? Or is there some other factor affecting fleet maintenance?

Inger Klemp

executive
#27

No, it's — what you said is entirely right regarding our earlier comment that it was 2 VLCCs and 1 Suezmax last time <<inaudible>> and that covered the calendar year of '25; what has since occurred is that 2 VLCCs got shifted out of '26 and into Q4 of '25. And on top of that, we have included the first quarter of '26, given that this is a cash breakeven rate looking 12 months ahead. That brings the overall count to these 10 VLCCs, 2 Suezmax and 5 LR2s, since it's kind of a great many of these vessels that are set to be dry docked in 2026 or dry docked during the first quarter.

Analyst

analyst
#28

All right. So we're looking at a significant maintenance burden during the opening quarter of 2026, is that right?

Inger Klemp

executive
#29

Correct, correct, correct.

Lars Barstad

executive
#30

Also, to tack on a point — this clearly ties to how old the vessel is and when it gets handed over. It's fairly common for handovers to cluster in Q1 of a given year, and on this occasion we've got a fair number of vessels scheduled to arrive during 2026.

Analyst

analyst
#31

Alright. One short thing for you, Lars. You're basically saying that trading OFAC-listed vessels is going to become far more difficult under future restrictions, and on top of that, these ships are at an age where they will never re-enter the compliant market. It seems logical that this would push older tonnage and OFAC vessels toward scrapping, yet up to now that hasn't occurred. In your view, what would need to happen to make that scrapping choice get made? And when would you expect it to occur?

Lars Barstad

executive
#32

Yeah. Well, that's an extremely good question, and I appreciate you raising it, since this is an item that has to enter the conversation with IMO and other regulatory bodies, or whatever term you use for them, because there truly is a major problem in front of us. Based on what I believe was the most recent figure I came across, when you add up all the different sanctioned entities and vessels — vessels being the ones that matter for this — we're discussing 600, 700 ships appearing on the OFAC list, the EU sanction list, or something comparable. Something some of you may be unaware of is that the recycling sector operates in dollars. They also have to perform their KYC, and plainly they cannot purchase a ship for recycling from a party that has violated sanctions. So in a sense, that's a blockage in the recycling business. Therefore, I believe rules of some kind need to be established providing exemptions for recycling. That is exactly the sort of area where IMO, as a UN organization, can show strong leadership to identify a way of making that easier, because the frightening scenario is these ships ending up parked somewhere in Southeast Asia with <<inaudible>> aboard, essentially becoming floating environmental hazards. So this is — it's a really valid thing to point out. And ideally, this will rise higher on the regulators' agenda, ideally above further decarbonization. So let's have that discussion first, and afterward we can discuss decarb later. As for timing, unfortunately these things take an extremely long time before they finally reach the front. So there was this — we also saw one that was sitting off Libya — no, pardon me, Syria, it remained there for 15 years before anyone could actually take action on it.

Lars Barstad

executive
#33

Well, I really appreciate you all joining the call. Hopefully spring is on its way, and it'll be a spring season for the tanker market too as we move forward. And clearly, each headline that emerges will matter to our markets. So, with that said, thanks to everyone.

Operator

operator
#34

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

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Programmatic access to Frontline plc earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the EarningsCalls.dev REST API. Plans from $39.99/month — full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search, and the recently-added /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.

More tools for stock research

OptionsBell: an unusual options activity scanner that tracks options flow across all US stocks and emails you when large trades appear in Frontline plc or any ticker on your watchlist.

StockMarketScan: a stock screener with alerts: 24 pre-built screens refreshed every 5 minutes, watchlists and email notifications. Both offer API and MCP access and fair monthly pricing.