Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

February 11, 2020

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 39 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Thank you, Christine. Good morning, everyone, and thanks for being with us today. With me are Ross Teune, our Chief Financial Officer, as well as Gregory Robbins and Jonathan Simmons, both Managing Directors at Golub Capital. Yesterday morning, we put out our earnings press release covering the quarter that ended December 31st, and we also posted an earnings presentation on our website. We'll be referencing that presentation during today's call. If you're new to GBDC, our investment strategy is, and has been since inception, to focus on providing first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market companies backed by strong partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Gregory will kick things off today with an overview of GBDC's results for the first quarter of 2020. Ross will then walk through those results in more detail, and I'll wrap up with an update on our market outlook. Let me begin with the headline. Our quarter ended December 31st was another solid, consistent quarter for GBDC. Last quarter, as you'll recall, GBDC's reported GAAP results were complicated by one-time non-cash accounting items tied to our merger with Golub Capital Investment Corporation, or GCIC. We said we expected GAAP net income starting in the first fiscal quarter of 2020 to more clearly reflect GBDC's fundamental economic performance, and we believe it does, and we believe it will keep doing so going forward. Our first fiscal quarter post-merger results show strong GAAP EPS above our regular distributions per share of $0.33 a quarter, driven by solid net investment income and $0.02 per share of net realized and unrealized gains. With that, I'll hand the call over to Gregory, who will begin going through the details.

Gregory Robbins

executive
#2

Thanks, David. Before diving into the specifics, I want to point out that alongside the GAAP financial measures included in the investor presentation, we've also furnished certain non-GAAP financial measures so that GBDC's financial results following the GCIC merger can be more easily compared with what we reported before the merger. These non-GAAP measures, which we call adjusted measures, are intended to remove the effect of the write-off and amortization tied to the merger-related purchase premium, and they're described further in the appendix of our earnings presentation. Where it makes sense, we'll cite the adjusted measures, since we believe they serve as better performance indicators. With that in mind, let's move to slide three to review the quarter's results. Adjusted net investment income per share, or what we refer to as income before credit losses, came in at $0.33 for the quarter that ended December 31st, 2019; that's compared with adjusted net investment income per share of $0.33 in the prior quarter. Adjusted net realized and unrealized gain per share was $0.02. That's compared with adjusted net realized and unrealized gain per share of $0.02 for the quarter that ended September 30th. Earnings per share and adjusted earnings per share for the quarter that ended December 31st, 2019, came to $0.35. As we said last quarter, we anticipate that earnings per share will match adjusted earnings per share moving forward, since any purchase premium amortization ought to be offset by a corresponding reversal of the unrealized depreciation on the loans acquired from GCIC in the merger. Adjusted earnings per share for the quarter that ended December 31st, 2019, at $0.35, stayed the same as the prior quarter. On December 31st, 2019, we made a quarterly distribution of $0.33 per share, which is $0.01 higher than before the GCIC acquisition. Beyond that, we also made a special distribution of $0.13 per share — our fourth consecutive calendar year of paying a special distribution. Without that special distribution, our NAV per share would have risen this quarter. Largely because of that special distribution, our NAV per share fell to $16.66 as of December 31st, 2019, down from $16.76 as of September 30th. Last, on February 4th, 2020, our board declared a quarterly distribution of $0.33 per share, payable on March 27th, 2020 to stockholders of record as of March 6th. I'll now hand the call over to Ross to walk through more details.

Ross Teune

executive
#3

Okay, thank you, Gregory. If you look at slide 4, you'll see that our total originations came to $271.1 million, while total exits and sales of investments reached $154.3 million. Those figures contributed to net funds growth of $155.4 million, which works out to 3.6% for the quarter. The table at the bottom shows that the weighted average rate on new investments for this quarter was 7.4%, which was in line with the prior quarter. Additionally, for fresh floating-rate investments, the weighted average spread over LIBOR came in at 5.6%. Investments that were paid off carried a weighted average rate of 7.8%, while newly funded investments generated a weighted average fee of 1.4%. Each of these figures was roughly in line with what we saw the previous quarter. As a quick reminder, the weighted average rate on new investments reflects the contractual interest rate as of the funding date. For variable rate loans, that contractual rate is derived from the current LIBOR, the spread over LIBOR, and any LIBOR floor's effect. Looking at slide 5, the average size of a GBDC investment held steady at $17.3 million as of December 31st, amounting to 0.4% of the portfolio's fair value. Down at the bottom of that same slide, you'll see our mix by investment type hasn't shifted from one quarter to the next — one-stop loans remain our biggest category, coming in at 83%. Turning now to slide 6. Floating rate loans continue to make up the bulk of our debt investment portfolio, and we remain defensively positioned in industries we view as resilient. Let's go to slide 7. This chart lays out portfolio yields along with net investment spreads for the quarter. We'll start with the light blue line. Here's the line for income yield — that's the money actually brought in from the investments, covering interest and fee income but leaving out amortization of upfront origination fees and purchase price premium. For the quarter that closed December 31, income yield came in at 8%, a drop of 40 basis points. The main driver here is LIBOR's ongoing slide across the last several quarters, which keeps weighing on portfolio yields whenever LIBOR contracts reset. Investment income yield — the dark blue line, which factors in amortization of fees and discounts — likewise fell 40 basis points, landing at 8.4% for the quarter, again because of declining LIBOR. On the debt side, our weighted average cost—shown by that light blue line—came down 10 basis points, landing at 3.9%. That drop is less than what LIBOR did, because certain interest rate contracts tied to our CLO liabilities didn't reset until early 2020. Consequently, the net investment spread—the green line, representing the gap between what we earn on investments and our weighted average cost of debt—fell 30 basis points to 4.5%. Now let's move to the following two slides. Credit quality at its core is still solid: as of December 31st, more than 90% of the investments in our portfolio carried an internal performance rating of four or better. For this quarter, the count of investments on non-accrual status rose to 7, and when measured against total investments at cost and at fair value, non-accrual investments represented 1.6% and 1.3%, respectively, as of December 31st. As a reminder, roughly 25% of our investments get valued every quarter by independent valuation firms. Let's review the balance sheet and income statement, found on slides 10 and 11. We closed out the quarter with total investments at fair value of $4.4 billion, total cash and restricted cash of $133.2 million, and total assets of $4.6 billion. Our outstanding borrowings amounted to $2.3 billion overall. Within that figure, $1.1 billion consisted of floating rate obligations issued via our securitization vehicles, $305 million was fixed rate debentures, and $890.7 million represented amounts drawn under our revolving credit facilities. On a per-share basis, total net asset value reached $16.66. The GAAP ratio of debt to equity landed at 1.06, consistent with what we've seen in recent quarters and within the 0.85x-1.15x target range we've set. Turning now to the statement of operations: for the quarter that ended December 31st, total investment income was $78.6 million, and total expenses came to $45.9 million. Since we acquired GCIC on September 16th, 2019, any comparison of total investment income and total expenses against the previous quarter wouldn't be meaningful. If you set aside the amortization tied to the GCIC purchase premium, our adjusted net investment income per share came in at $0.33 and adjusted earnings per share at $0.35 — both level with the quarter before. Now let's turn to slide 12. The chart here illustrates how steadily our NAV per share has climbed since we went public; to give a historical comparison, we show NAV per share on two bases, one including special distributions and one excluding them. Let's move to slide 13. The upper chart provides a summary of our annualized return on average equity across the last five years, which works out to an average of 8.6%. The lower chart summarizes both our regular quarterly distributions and the special distributions we paid out in each of the last four years. It also brings attention to the fact that our quarterly payout went up, moving from $0.32 per share for the quarter that closed on September 30th to $0.33 per share for the quarter that ended December 31. Let's turn to slide 14. On this slide, you'll find several financial highlights relating to our investments in the two senior loan funds. This marks the last time we'll report on the senior loan funds. Back on January 1st, 2020, we noted in an 8-K filing that we had reached an agreement to acquire the remaining 12.5% of the LLC equity interest in the SLF from our minority interest partners. Consequently, starting with the reporting period that concludes on January 1st, 2020 or later, SLF's assets and liabilities will be brought onto GBDC's financial statements. Our liquidity and investment capacity as of December 31st is then summarized on the following slide, showing restricted and unrestricted cash availability under our revolving credit facilities along with debentures accessible via our SBIC subsidiaries. An overview of the terms tied to our debt facilities as of December 31 appears on Slide 16, together with the priority we give to debt capital that is diversified, long-term, and stable. Wrapping up on slide 17: the board has approved a routine dividend of $0.33 for each share. It goes out on March 27 to everyone on the shareholder register as of March 6. With that said, I'll pass it back to David for his closing comments.

David Golub

executive
#4

Thanks, Ross. In summary, GBDC delivered another strong quarter. Net investment income stayed quite steady. Credit performance was solid, even though non-accruals ticked up slightly, and the portfolio stayed nicely diversified. I'd like to wrap up with news on a couple of items. First, what the GCIC merger could mean for the BDC sector, and second, where our calendar 2020 strategy stands. Let me begin with the merger. Through the GCIC deal, GBDC's size effectively doubled, and the terms, in our view, made it a win-win-win for the company, our current stockholders, and our new ones. Interestingly, we believe this is a model only a handful of BDCs will be able to use. Let me clarify. Looking back historically, three main paths to growth have been followed by BDCs. The first is the path GBDC took before merging with GCIC. That approach means expanding steadily via modest, occasional follow-on equity raises, timed for when the manager anticipates rapid deployment of the proceeds. Executed well, it benefits both the company and its stockholders, yet it is inevitably slow. The second path is bigger follow-ons. Certain ones across the industry have benefited managers, but seldom have existing stockholders gained. Usually, bigger offerings have led to either NAV dilution or earnings dilution, or both. The third path is buying portfolios. Some BDCs have generated stockholder value successfully in this manner, yet appealing targets seldom come up, and execution risks run quite high. In our view, the GCIC merger amounts to a possible fourth growth path. That path means buying affiliated private BDCs under terms that are accretive to current stockholders and attractive to new ones. For the math to work, the acquirer must trade consistently at a premium to NAV. Put differently, not everyone can use this path. We believe better-performing BDCs trading at a steady premium could be rewarded by stockholders over time, since they can tap this new form of value-creating growth for shareholders. That raises an obvious follow-up question: what lets a BDC trade consistently at a premium to NAV? You've heard my response before; we think it comes down to access to a platform with durable competitive advantages, which then allow the BDC to generate steady premium returns. That takes me to item two. What is our calendar 2020 strategy? My response will sound boringly familiar. It mirrors what we've done for many years. Remain at the top of the capital structure, concentrate on healthy, resilient middle-market companies backed by strong private equity sponsors, and rely on the competitive advantages of the Golub Capital platform. Looking back at 2019, the ties we had with sponsors, our incumbencies, the reliability we showed, our scale that led the market, our know-how in the industry, and how wide a range of financing solutions we could bring to sponsors — every one of those things played a part in us capturing a large share of the transactions we set out to capture. We anticipate that calendar 2020 will bring much the same. So with that, I appreciate the time you've given me today, and I appreciate your partnership. And Christine, please go ahead and open the line for questions.

Finian O'Shea

executive
#5

Hello there, and good morning. I appreciate you fitting in my question. David, to begin with, I want to say I value what you shared regarding the GCIC merger along with the fresh avenue for bringing in capital. Should we draw any conclusion from this about when Golub three might come, perhaps? Is there anything you'd approach in another way, like the size, or any different structures for the new BDC that we ought to consider? I'd welcome whatever thoughts you can offer.

David Golub

executive
#6

Alright, just to give a bit of background — for anyone who doesn’t know about Golub Capital’s private BDC — after Golub Capital Investment Corporation was formed, and that entity merged with GBDC not long ago, we set up another private BDC, which we named, with great originality, Golub Capital BDC III. Since Golub Capital BDC III files publicly, its progress can be tracked by looking at the 10-Qs and 10-Ks it submits. At present, it’s still in the ramp-up phase. Regarding what lies ahead for Golub Capital BDC III, I’m not able to make any assurances, since, as the GCIC merger showed, a lot of elements and a lot of participants are involved in determining the right course for a private BDC. What I can say is that, from where I sit, as GBDC’s CEO, the GCIC merger looks to me like it worked out very well for everyone involved; therefore, it would make sense in my view for us to consider chances to perhaps do again what we did with GCIC.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#7

Thanks for that background. I just wanted to ask a follow-up about the portfolio credits for this quarter. Regarding those 2 non-accruals, they had been valued at fairly sizable discounts — roughly 80-ish. Yet when you place names on non-accrual, that typically signals you've reassessed, at least to some degree, how much of these credits you expect to recover, and the updated valuations appear to have shifted by a similar amount. Given whatever you can share about their delicate circumstances, could you give us some context on why they went to non-accrual and why the write-downs were so small?

David Golub

executive
#8

Alright, let me start by giving a bit of background. During the latest quarter, non-accruals measured at cost and at fair value rose to 1.6% and 1.3%, respectively. Any time we consider non-accruals, we experience some level of anxiety, correct? Worrying comes naturally to us. All sorts of things make us anxious. Non-accruals happen to be one of them. Still, I want to ensure everybody places our worries within the right frame. To begin with, during this quarter, GBDC carried on its robust history of producing positive net realized and unrealized gains on investments. Over time, that figure is what we regard as the key measure of credit performance; that is the reason we devote so much attention in our earnings presentation every quarter to the chart showing NAV per share across time. A second method we use to examine credit and overall credit quality relies on risk ratings. Once more, regarding risk ratings, when we review the latest quarterly results, I believe they demonstrate considerable steadiness from one quarter to the next and across many consecutive quarters; and the third piece of context I'll offer is that the newest data show that despite this modest uptick, we remain at the lower end of the industry's range, and we sit within our own historical range when it comes to non-accruals and costs. I don't wish to make any part of this appear more dramatic than the reality warrants. Having said that, we are putting in significant effort alongside the leadership teams of the 2 companies placed on non-accrual during this quarter, and I'm unable to share specifics about either of those 2 circumstances. What I can tell you is that I hold cautious optimism that for both companies, we are moving along a solid path toward a solid recovery.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#9

Okay. Thank you for the context; that's all for me.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#10

Hi there, and thanks for taking my questions. My first one relates to Mann Acquisition Company. Could you share any context regarding the type of business that is? We were struggling to locate any details about what that company really does.

David Golub

executive
#11

As a matter of policy, we don't discuss particular credits during our earnings calls. That said, I think some public information exists regarding this company; and Ryan, we'll follow up with you and provide links to it.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#12

All right, that's useful. Clearly, Oliver Street Dermatology was placed on non-accrual during this quarter, and another position that took a markdown was Dental Holdings, which remains on accrual status. Those clearly are two separate companies — one in dental, one in dermatology. I'm aware there have been worries regarding healthcare, especially healthcare roll-up strategies. Does either of these companies form part of a healthcare roll-up practice? Is there any kind of overlap we could identify between these two separate companies that might be putting pressure on each of them?

David Golub

executive
#13

These are truly completely distinct companies. A physician practice roll-up describes one of them, and not the other. The challenges each is facing, I would characterize as idiosyncratic and particular to that company. I do believe your setup is correct, which is that across the industry we are observing general pressure on healthcare roll-up strategies, both in middle market land and in broadly syndicated land. This has come up from me on earlier calls. In my view, it's reasonable to state that executing healthcare roll-up strategies is more difficult than was believed a few years back.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#14

All right, and now for a question that's more of a big-picture one. As all of you head into 2020, and as talks develop with sponsors, clearly 2020 is a major election year, and that always brings a considerable level of uncertainty around that stretch of time. Has any of that come up in your conversations, or have sponsors mentioned anything about possibly attempting to bring deal activity forward and complete transactions ahead of the election? Have any of those talks reached your ears?

David Golub

executive
#15

The election has come up a great deal, along with how divided American politics is at present, and the worries people in private equity hold regarding certain unfavorable remarks about private equity that have been appearing in some campaigns. Nothing resembling what you just outlined has reached my ears, meaning private equity firms wanting to accelerate the timetable for M&A activity so they can finish ahead of the election. It wouldn't be a shock to me if that phenomenon shows up at some point later in the year. My sense, Ryan, is that at this moment we're too early. M&A processes don't require 12 months to unfold. Four to six months is what a typical M&A process takes. Even if that pattern does emerge later in the year, my sense is we're too early for it right now.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#16

Alright, that's useful. One additional item; back in November, your team extended a $1.6 billion facility to Risk Strategies. More recently, you provided a further $1.6 billion unitranche facility to MRI Software. Clearly, those represent major victories for your company and your platform overall. Could you explain how you managed to land those transactions and lock in that financing? Additionally, what might have been the reasoning for those two businesses to select a partner such as Golub rather than — given the magnitude of those deals, there are other options, especially the broadly syndicated loan market, which I'd presume they might have accessed. What made them pick the Golub platform instead of pursuing the more conventional broadly syndicated loan market path?

David Golub

executive
#17

Absolutely. Risk Strategies and MRI both were one-stop executions. In each instance, the sponsor concluded that a one-stop was better than the standard first lien, second lien, broadly syndicated method. Sponsors have traditionally favored one-stops for numerous reasons, such as scalability, flexibility, the ability to more smoothly accommodate growth through acquisitions, simpler closing processes, fewer parties involved which makes future modifications easier, and similar considerations. Up until fairly recently, one-stops were a middle market offering rather than something for the larger market. And what has occurred, Ryan, throughout 2019, is that this shifted; during 2019, we counted 23 one-stop executions above $500 million. Golub Capital has clearly been the market leader in these executions. We led or co-led 13 out of the 23. We led or co-led more than all of our rivals put together. The capacity we've developed to lead these transactions has no equal in the industry. We possess both the ability to retain a substantial share of these bigger one-stops, and we have a capital markets capability to bring in partners. I think what we've accomplished, throughout 2019, is demonstrate for sponsors in larger transactions that one-stop executions deserve consideration as an alternative to the traditional first lien second lien. I think what we're also observing is that as sponsors experiment with one-stops in these bigger executions, they discover they appreciate them. So from my perspective, we're at the start of the adoption curve. We're nowhere near the end of one-stops gaining market share. I think we at Golub Capital are extremely well positioned to preserve our leadership as this larger one-stop market expands. I believe that's a highly positive development for shareholders in GBDC since we're firm believers that these one-stops offer very attractive risk rewards for investors.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#18

Okay, that's useful detail, and yes, Golub has clearly been the leading participant in certain of those sizable one-stop deals. I certainly recognize what GBDC shareholders gain from being able to tap into that quite distinctive pipeline of deals; that covers everything I wanted to ask today. Thanks for your time.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#19

Hello, everyone. If I may, let me return to credit for a moment, specifically the non-recourse. Clearly, one dermatology practice and one industrial floor cleaner — I mean, entirely separate regions of the nation, entirely separate kinds of business. Is there any common thread linking those 2, such as the same sponsor or something similar? In my view, occasionally when a theme can be pinpointed, it means any possible contagion of credit worsening, not only within your portfolio but broadly, might be kept in check. What starts as idiosyncratic can occasionally become far more widespread; so whatever insight you could offer on that would be quite fascinating.

David Golub

executive
#20

Robert, like I mentioned before, if common themes or threads exist among the portfolio companies in our portfolio that have gone through some credit softness during the recent stretch, I don't see them. From where I sit, what I observe is idiosyncratic problems that differ greatly from one credit to the next.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#21

Alright, understood. Thanks for that. It's a hard one. If I could ask about the pricing landscape out there. Not specifically your portfolio, but the wider market. January was again extremely competitive; LIBOR forward curves keep drifting a bit lower, yet spreads aren't responding by getting wider. If anything, LIBOR floors appear to be declining across the broad market. Where do you see the risk reward heading at this point? Obviously, to put words in your mouth, you'll say one-stop. More broadly, it appears that with the forward curve shaped the way it is, I would have thought spreads and other items might be trending more favorably. I believe this came up on last quarter's call, but thus far we simply haven't seen it. So, given where LIBOR is going, do you think anything will actually push the spread environment in a more favorable direction?

David Golub

executive
#22

I don't believe movements in LIBOR will probably cause significant shifts in spreads. I think we'll probably see significant shifts in spreads happen because of shifts in the credit environment, and especially in reaction to shifts in perceived risk of future default and recoveries. So, at present we're in an environment where the economy, especially the U.S. middle market economy, still appears very strong. We shared that in our Golub Capital Middle Market Index results in early January. So long as economic activity keeps looking as robust as what we're seeing, and alongside that a sensible expectation of a continuing salutary credit environment, I think we'll probably stay in the sort of spread environment we've had for the last two years; by historical standards these spreads aren't terrible. They aren't as good as you and I would want, they aren't terrible. Our task as credit managers is to be highly selective and choose credits that we have conviction in or that are likely to repay us.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#23

Understood. Thanks for those details. If I may, just one more question. Since the merged company is now roughly twice as large, and a topic raised when the merger was first launched involved possibly tapping the institutional bond market, among other things. Could you share your thoughts on where you believe you might lower the cost of capital, specifically debt capital, for the BDC relative to its current position? Clearly, it's quite favorable at present, but do you think the greater scale, along with today's bond market—which appears to be offering pretty appealing pricing on debt for BDCs—could let you push that down meaningfully?

David Golub

executive
#24

Like I said during the prior quarter, one thing we're doing after the merger involves closely examining the liabilities side of our balance sheet and investigating every possible route open to us for refining GBDC's debt capital structure. That definitely covers evaluating bond issuance. It also definitely covers additional approaches. It's still too soon for me to walk you through any conclusions we've reached in that area. Still, we're actively pursuing it.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#25

All right. That's helpful. Thanks very much.

David Golub

executive
#26

Thanks, Christine, and thanks to all of you for being here today. We're grateful, as we always are, for the time you've given us and for your questions. Should anything you'd like to discuss have not come up during this call, don't hesitate to get in touch, and either way, we can't wait to speak with you again in 3 months.

Operator

operator
#27

That brings today's conference call to a close. We appreciate everyone taking part, and we ask that you disconnect your lines at this time.

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