Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
May 11, 2020
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
David Golub
executiveThank you, Selena. Hi, everybody, and we appreciate you being with us today. Joining me virtually are Ross Teune, who serves as our Chief Financial Officer, along with Gregory Robbins and Jon Simmons, both of whom are Managing Directors at Golub Capital. Our whole Golub Capital team, ourselves included, hopes that all of you and the people you care about remain safe during this difficult period. We feel fortunate that our staff is in good health, secure, and getting work done efficiently from their homes. Much of today's discussion will concern how COVID-19 has affected the economy, but before that, I'd like to pause and recognize the toll it has taken on people. Roughly 50% of Golub Capital's team — me among them — resides in or around New York City, and surely each person listening has seen reports of how severely COVID has struck New York, with more than 170,000 recorded cases and more than 140,000 — pardon me, more than 14,000 confirmed fatalities. COVID-19's effect on our community is unmistakable; all of us know people who have fallen ill or suffered something worse. What is equally unmistakable is a feeling of strength and togetherness. Where I live and throughout the city, at 7 PM nightly we throw open our windows to clap and cheer for the healthcare workers serving on the front lines. This has gone on for weeks, and it remains a deeply moving experience for me and, I believe, for the majority of people. An op-ed by my friend Nick Kristof ran recently in The New York Times, calling attention to several remarkable organizations engaged in COVID-19 relief efforts. We take pride in backing their efforts, and I hope you might think about joining us. Today we put out our earnings press release covering the quarter that closed March 31, 2020, and an earnings presentation is now available on our website; we'll be referencing that presentation throughout today's call. Allow me to begin with a headline from Slide 4. That headline: GBDC's results for fiscal Q2 matched the preliminary estimates we filed on April 13. Adjusted net investment income per share came to $0.33. Adjusted EPS was a loss of $1.71, and NAV per share stood at $14.62, which fell toward the high end of the NAV range we had published earlier. Before I continue into a fuller discussion of these results, I believe it's important to place them in context. COVID-19 is already having, and will keep having, a major effect on practically every company in the U.S., GBDC included. Once the rights offering has closed, we believe GBDC will be even better positioned to navigate a COVID-19 world. Our aim today is to provide all of you with a clear, analytical evaluation of how COVID-19 has affected GBDC so far and to walk through the risks and opportunities we foresee for GBDC ahead. After that, we'll examine GBDC's results for the quarter in depth. Let's turn to Slide 6. On Slide 6, as you can see — in our view, it's hard to exaggerate how much COVID-19 impacted the U.S. economy during March. Following an extended period of consistent expansion in GDP ranging from 2% to 3%, the economy shrank by almost 5% during calendar Q1. What stands out is that nearly the entire contraction happened in March; an important cause and consequence of the Q1 shrinkage was an extraordinary surge in job losses. During late March and on into April, the economy shed jobs at a pace exceeding 5 million each week, which drove the unemployment rate upward sharply. It has kept climbing after the quarter closed. The latest figure I observed was 14.7%, something not witnessed since the Great Depression. As substantial swaths of the economy essentially halted operations, financial markets declined, as Slide 7 illustrates. So given this situation, how did GBDC perform? Allow me to begin with two positive developments. Moving to Slide 9, the first positive development is that GBDC's portfolio was built for resilience. The portfolio mostly targets industries that have remained comparatively shielded from COVID-19, such as enterprise software and technology business services, financial services, and others. Loans to businesses within these sectors make up more than 75% of GBDC's portfolio. Additionally, the scale, diversification, and granularity of GBDC's portfolio reduce the possible effect of idiosyncratic COVID-19 problems that might impact particular borrowers. The typical investment size within GBDC's portfolio came in under 40 bps as of March 31. The second positive development, displayed on Slide 10, is that GBDC holds very little exposure to numerous segments that COVID-19 has struck hardest, including sectors such as airlines and aircraft finance, energy, hotels, entertainment, and gaming. Investments in these COVID-19 affected industries accounted for under 1% of GBDC's portfolio at fair value on March 31. Likewise, GBDC's emphasis on lending at the top of the capital structure to sponsor backed companies means the portfolio holds very little exposure to second lien debt, mezzanine debt, and other asset classes that we consider especially fragile in the current environment. GBDC's total exposure to these asset classes likewise came to under 1% of the portfolio at fair value as of March 31. However, I'm not trying to claim that GBDC is untouched by COVID-19. Moving to Slide 11, you can observe that GBDC carries exposure to a number of industry sub-sectors that have felt and probably will keep feeling significant COVID-19 impact. Areas we're especially watching include restaurants, dental care, eyecare, fitness franchises, and retail; these sub-sectors make up slightly under 20% of GBDC's portfolio at fair value on March 31. We think many borrowers in these sectors are strongly positioned and will come through fine. Let me clarify why; within restaurants, we've concentrated on established concepts primarily in quick service and fast casual; both have traditionally performed well during recessions. Many provide drive-through, carry-out, or they shifted to offering those. In fact, one of our restaurant obligors recorded its best ever sales day last week without any traditional sit-down customers. When it comes to dental and eyecare, our emphasis has been on regional franchises that lead their markets, and our view is that once reopening is allowed, they'll bounce back; in certain instances, we think they could even benefit from demand that has built up while they were closed. With fitness franchises, we concentrated on concepts offering low cost and high value, which we feel fit well with a climate in which customers are watching their spending more carefully. And on the retail side, our focus was on consumer staples and franchisors that we think are fairly shielded from cyclical strain. As a matter of fact, most of what we hold in retail has been classified as “essential,” so it stayed open throughout COVID-19, while other holdings that dealt with certain store shutdowns experienced a sizable rise in e-commerce revenue. All of these things help offset the impact, but I want to be straightforward: COVID-19 has created difficulties, especially within this segment of the portfolio, and we are actively managing GBDC's portfolio to tackle those problems. However, prior to my colleagues and me walking through those efforts, let's begin by going over how such difficulties shaped GBDC's results in the second fiscal quarter, the quarter that closed on March 31. Put simply, we observed two primary effects.
David Golub
executiveStarting with slide 12, we saw a shift downward in our internal performance ratings, moving from categories 4 and 5 — those are loans meeting or exceeding what we expected when we underwrote them — into category 3, which covers loans performing below our expectations or anticipated to do so. Category 3 rose from 7.2% of the portfolio at fair value on December 31, 2019, to 26.5% as of March 31, 2020. Most of that rise came from investments in the sub-sectors I mentioned earlier as being most exposed to COVID-19 challenges. The share of the portfolio performing materially below expectations in categories 1 and 2 was basically flat quarter-over-quarter. Moving to Slide 13, COVID-19 also triggered credit spread widening. COVID-19 credit problems combined with wider spreads produced unrealized losses of $2.06 per share on GBDC's NAV. One approach to examining what drove that unrealized loss is through the internal performance ratings; for investments in categories 4 & 5, we see spread widening as the main driver of the unrealized losses, since we believe these borrowers are performing at or above original expectations. So on average, looking at loans in categories 4 and 5, they were marked down from 99.9% of par on December 31 to 96.2% of par as of March 31, 2020. That markdown represented $1.02 of GBDC's adjusted unrealized net depreciation per share for the quarter, or roughly half of the total; for investments in category 3, our view is that the unrealized losses reflect both spread widening and credit stress. As we mentioned earlier, most of the increase in category 3 came from GBDC's investments in sub-sectors we believe are materially exposed to COVID-19. On average, loans in category 3 were marked down from 96% of par on December 31 to 90% of par on March 31, a bigger average markdown than in categories 4 and 5. Markdowns in category 3 represented $0.86 of GBDC's adjusted unrealized net depreciation per share for the quarter, or 42% of the quarter. I'm sorry, 42% of the total. In categories 1 and 2, the average markdown was several points larger than the average markdown in category 3, which isn't surprising. We believe the markdowns in this category reflect COVID-19 stress layered on top of pre-existing credit challenges. Categories 1 and 2 make up a relatively small portion of GBDC's portfolio — about 2% of total investments at fair value — and markdowns in categories 1 and 2 contributed $0.18 of GBDC's adjusted unrealized net depreciation per share for the quarter, for 9% of the total. Slide 14 provides a bridge from December 31, 2019 NAV per share of $16.66 to 3/31/20 NAV per share of $14.62. Looking at adjusted NII, GBDC produced $0.33 per share, which isn't a shock when you factor in our 8% annualized income incentive fee hurdle rate. Moving to the next column, you'll find realized credit losses — net realized losses came to $0.03 per share, which is quite minimal. What clearly drove the drop in NAV per share this quarter was the unrealized depreciation of $2.06 per share that we already walked through in detail. So how should we frame these unrealized losses? At one level, provided our underlying borrowers keep paying principal and interest, those unrealized losses in the portfolio will reverse across the remaining life of the loans. That's simply loan math. We're hopeful a substantial chunk of the unrealized losses will reverse well before then, as credit spreads begin to normalize in the months ahead; that's precisely what occurred in Golub Capital's loan portfolios after the 2008 financial crisis. To put it another way, unrealized losses give you a snapshot each quarter, but ultimately, for lenders who hold their loans to maturity alone, just one thing matters: either it pays off or it doesn't. So as we consider what job one is for Golub Capital, job one is really clear. It's to minimize GBDC's permanent or "realized" credit losses. With that, let me hand things over to Gregory Robbins, who will provide some specifics on how we are approaching that task. Gregory.
Gregory Robbins
executiveThanks, David. Now let's move to Slide 16, where two main strategies have had our attention. The first is handling our portfolio in a proactive manner, and the second is strengthening GBDC's balance sheet. We'll go through both one at a time. Slide 17 covers that initial priority, proactive portfolio management, which has unfolded across three phases. During phase one, starting earlier in 2020, we established channels for dialogue with the companies we invest in, their private equity backers, and industry advisers, so we could collect information and evaluate each borrower's exposure to COVID-19. To back these efforts, the Golub Capital direct lending group — over 130 professionals strong — shifted away from originating loans and toward managing the portfolio. We performed thorough analysis drawing on 13-week cash flow projections, up-to-the-minute sales numbers, and other proprietary information to break the portfolio into segments and pinpoint the borrowers hit hardest; in phase two, we put together and carried out near-term action plans for those borrowers facing the greatest COVID-19 impact. We also assisted a large number of our borrowers in seeking loans through government programs when that made sense. Now we're in phase three, crafting and implementing longer-range action plans covering every borrower. This work happens jointly with the management teams and sponsors at each individual company. In the numerous instances where borrowers are performing well in spite of COVID-19, the plan calls for continuing as before. For the tougher situations, our attention goes to amendments that improve credit quality or to additional investments in which we, holding first lien positions, might help fund a resolution together with capital backing from the private equity sponsors. No two deals look alike, yet we believe our strong relationships with sponsors and our leading position across the bulk of our loans have provided both the leverage and the agility needed to craft mutually beneficial outcomes. When sponsors cannot or will not stand behind a company, we are ready to "take the keys," and in a limited number of instances, we anticipate doing exactly that. We intentionally expanded our workouts team across the past 12 months as preparation for an economic downturn. Slide 18 lays out the second priority, which has been making GBDC's balance sheet stronger so it can sustain current investments and open doors for future ones. We've discussed this before in connection with GBDC's rights offering, whose subscription period wrapped up on May 6 and should bring in roughly $300 million in fresh equity for the Company. GBDC plans to direct the rights offering proceeds toward three primary objectives. The first is paying down existing debt. The second is funding credit-enhancing incremental investments that support portfolio companies already held, and the third is pursuing chosen new investments. On a pro forma basis after the rights offering, GBDC's GAAP leverage as of March 31, 2020 will drop from 1.22 times down to 0.92 times, placing it at the bottom of our target range and comfortably inside our 150% asset coverage test. We've put together a plan for how the proceeds will be used that we expect will deliver GBDC a substantial increase in flexibility, liquidity, and borrowing capacity. We anticipate being able to give you further specifics on that strategy before long. Additionally, our view is that GBDC's capacity to pursue new deals aggressively down the road has been strengthened by the rights offering. At present, new deal M&A is paused, since buyers and sellers cannot reach agreement on the day of the week. That is fine, as our current priority is remaining concentrated on credit-enhancing incremental investments within our portfolio. However, looking ahead three to six months, my sense is this will shift. Some of the most appealing opportunities, as history has demonstrated, arise during and following major market dislocations. Leverage levels fell sharply after the Global Financial Crisis, as Slide 19 illustrates, and Golub Capital managed to take substantial advantage of those opportunities; our belief is that recent market events will probably produce a sustained lender friendly environment much like what we witnessed from the last recession. Reduced leverage, wider spreads, better covenants and stronger downside protection are elements of what we anticipate emerging from the present market environment; so to sum up this section of the presentation, although we acknowledge that uncertainty remains elevated or is likely to continue, our view is that GBDC is well-positioned to navigate COVID-19. GBDC has built a number of formidable competitive advantages, we believe, as Slide 20 shows. In our experience, the key to consistent, replicable, premium shareholder returns lies in sustainable competitive advantages. Having said that, let me pass it to Jon so he can walk through our results for the March quarter in greater detail. Jon.
Jon Simmons
executiveAppreciate that, Gregory. I'm looking at Slide 22. To begin, let me remind everyone that alongside the GAAP financial measures included in our investor presentation, we have also supplied certain non-GAAP measures so that GBDC's financial results can be more easily compared with how we performed before the merger with GCIC; these non-GAAP or “adjusted” measures aim to remove the effect of the write-off and amortization tied to the merger-related purchase premium, and further detail on them appears in the appendix of our earnings presentation. We will use these adjusted measures as appropriate, since we believe they serve as a stronger indicator of GBDC's financial performance. With that background, let's turn to the quarter's results in the column at the far right of the page. Adjusted net investment income per share—or, as we refer to it, income before credit losses—for the March 31,2020 quarter came in at $0.33, the same as the prior quarter. Adjusted net realized and unrealized loss per share stood at $2.04. That's compared with adjusted net realized and unrealized gain per share of $0.02 for the quarter that ended December 31, 2019. As David mentioned in his remarks, the adjusted net realized and unrealized loss during this quarter was mainly the result of unrealized losses stemming from the impact of COVID-19. Loss per share and adjusted loss per share for the March 31,2020 quarter totaled $1.71, which compares with earnings per share and adjusted earnings per share of $0.35 for the December 31, 2019 quarter. Because of a loss per share, our NAV per share fell roughly 12.2% to $14.62 as of March 31, down from $16.66 at December 31. On March 30, 2020, we made a quarterly distribution of $0.33 per share, and then, finally, on April 9, 2020, our board declared a quarterly distribution of $0.29 per share, payable on June 29, 2020 to stockholders of record as of June 9, 2020; that distribution aligns with historical quarterly cash distributions and an annualized rate of approximately 8% of net asset value. I'll hand the call over now to Ross so he can walk through the results in more detail. Ross.
Ross Teune
executiveOkay, thank you Jon. Moving to Slide 23, I'll begin there. On this page, you can see that for the quarter that closed on March 31, 2020, our total originations came to $167 million, while total exits and sales of investments were $291 million. After accounting for unrealized depreciation and other portfolio activity — including an unprecedented amount of revolver fundings — total investments at fair value went down by 5.4%, which is roughly $238.1 million. One thing I'd like to call out: at March 31, 2020, we had only $17.5 million left in undrawn commitments on revolvers, plus $134.1 million of remaining undrawn commitments on delayed draw term loans. Relative to GBDC's balance sheet and liquidity position, those figures are modest. Looking at the table at the bottom, the weighted average rate on new investments was 7.1%, the weighted average spread over LIBOR on new floating rate investments was 5.2%, and the weighted average fee on new investments — all three came down versus the previous quarter, mainly because a greater share of originations this quarter were traditional senior secured. The weighted average rate on investments that were paid off was 7.7%, which was fairly in line with the prior quarter. Just as a reminder, the weighted average interest rate on new investments reflects the contractual interest rate at the time the funding occurred. When it comes to variable rate loans, that contractual rate would be derived from current LIBOR, the spread over LIBOR, and whatever impact a LIBOR floor has. At the top of Slide 24, you can see that GBDC's portfolio stayed highly diversified across obligors, with an average investment size under 40 basis points. The bottom portion of that slide shows our overall portfolio mix by investment type held steady from quarter to quarter, with one-stop loans still our biggest category at 82%. Now on Slide 25, 97% of our investment portfolio continues to be in first lien, senior secured floating rate loans, positioned defensively in industries we consider resilient. Moving to Slide 26, this chart sums up portfolio yields and net investment income spreads for the quarter. Let's look first at the light blue line — it represents the income yield, meaning the actual amount earned on investments, including interest and fee income, but not including amortization of upfront origination fees and purchase price premium. That income yield fell by 20 basis points to 7.8% for the quarter ended March 31, 2020, largely because LIBOR kept declining. The investment income yield — the dark blue line, which does include amortization of fees and discounts — also dropped by 20 basis points, landing at 8.2% for the quarter ended March 31, 2020. The weighted average cost of debt, the aqua blue line, likewise declined by 20 basis points to 3.7%. Consequently, our net investment spread — the green line, which represents the gap between the investment income yield and the weighted average cost of debt — held steady at 4.5%. Moving on to the following two slides, non-accrual investments as a share of total debt investments at cost and fair value rose slightly, reaching 2.3% and 1.6%, respectively, as of March 31, 2020. Over the quarter, non-accrual investments grew in count to 10 in total. As David mentioned during his opening remarks, largely because of the COVID-19 outbreak, the proportion of investments assigned a 3 under our internal performance ratings climbed to 26.5% of the portfolio at fair value as of March 31, 2020. To remind everyone, independent valuation firms assess no less than 25% of our investments every quarter; for the quarter that ended March 31, 2020, independent valuation firms valued more than 40% of portfolio company investments in total. Slides 29 and 30 offer additional detail regarding our balance sheet and income statement as of and for the 3 months ended March 31, 2020. Moving to Slide 31, this chart shows our lengthy track record of consistent NAV per share growth since IPO, before COVID-19's impact in the quarter ended March 31. Moving to Slide 32, the upper chart sums up our quarterly returns on equity across the last five years, while the lower chart sums up our quarterly regular distributions and special distributions across the last five years. The following slide sums up our liquidity and investment capacity as of March 31, 2020 through restricted and unrestricted cash, availability on our revolving credit facilities, and debentures available via our SBIC subsidiaries. As noted earlier, the rights offering we announced on April 1 expired on May 6. The offering was substantially oversubscribed and will bring in roughly $300 million in net proceeds. Slide 34 sums up the terms of our debt facilities as of March 31, 2020, before applying any proceeds from the rights offering, along with our emphasis on diversified, long term, and stable sources of debt capital. With that, I'll hand things over to David for some closing remarks. David.
David Golub
executiveThanks, Ross. To wrap up what we covered today: during calendar Q1 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak brought about credit stress along with wider spreads. That, in turn, produced sizable unrealized losses in GBDC's portfolio. What matters most for us right now is taking a proactive approach to portfolio management so that realized credit losses stay as small as possible. Should we pull that off, everything else will fall into place. Here at GBDC, we've built a long, industry-leading record of holding credit losses down, and that includes getting through numerous earlier stretches when markets were uncertain and volatile. We think we're heading into this stretch with a set of strong competitive edges that have never been better — our seasoned team, our scale, our sponsor relationships and our industry expertise. Between our track record, those competitive edges and a real sense of humility, we ought to be well positioned to steer GBDC through these difficult times. With that, I want to thank you for spending time with us today and for your partnership. Operator, please open the line for questions.
Finian O'Shea
analystHello, good morning — actually, good afternoon. I appreciate you bringing me in, and I hope everyone is doing well. David, my first question concerns the proceeds from the rights offering. I believe Greg provided some detail on that already. Could you share additional insight regarding how those funds will be divided between paying down debt and making new commitments? And when it comes to new credit enhancing commitments, what does your current pipeline look like for those portfolio opportunities?
David Golub
executiveWonderful. Let me take up both of those questions one at a time. First, we'll discuss the rights offering proceeds. At this moment I can't give you a precise figure, though I can offer a directional one. Let's begin with the objectives we've set for how the rights offering proceeds will be deployed. Our aim is to use those funds to strengthen liquidity and generate greater flexibility. Together, that should allow us to operate on both offense and defense across the portfolio and take advantage of what Gregory described — the appealing lending environment we expect to emerge once the M&A market finds its footing again; so at present our thinking is that roughly $140 million of the proceeds will go toward retiring a number of older debt facilities that have exited their reinvestment periods. These include the 2014 CLO, which has been winding down, along with the two SLF facilities. Retiring those facilities frees up a substantial quantity of unencumbered assets, which will be added to the already sizable pool of unencumbered assets on GBDC's balance sheet; we're also holding discussions about upsizing one or more of our long-term bank facilities. Taken together, the growth in unencumbered assets plus the larger size of one or more of our long-term bank facilities ought to leave us with ample liquidity, considerable availability under our debt facilities, and hundreds of millions in unencumbered assets. So I'm happy with the way that is progressing. We also intend to keep examining other debt options, unsecured notes among them, once the market turns more favorable for that. Your second question, if I understood it correctly, was about what the pipeline looks like for those credit enhancing incremental investments I've mentioned before, and the answer is that it's good. We're currently in many conversations with sponsors, as you might expect, regarding longer-term amendments, and often those amendments will involve some mix of fresh sponsor investment, junior debt providers deferring interest, an improvement in our credit position, in certain cases a re-pricing of our loans, and in certain cases a new investment from us on appealing terms. So we have a substantial number of those in the works at the moment, and I believe that type of transaction will be the focus of our efforts over the coming three or four months. We'll keep examining whether new transactions might be possible, though honestly, at the moment, very little fresh activity is happening. To borrow Gregory's phrasing, the M&A market is dead since buyers and sellers can't agree on the day of the week; so it's both timely for us to be focused on these credit enhancing incrementals in our own portfolio and there's also not much competition for time in respect of that.
Finian O'Shea
analystThanks; that was really helpful detail. My follow-up about the Morgan Stanley credit facility amendment has pretty much been covered, or at least answered in a way. We're aware that was the relapse — the commitment collapse got extended by only a single quarter, and presumably cash proceeds would be required to bring that down. You sort of addressed that already. You're exploring alternative types of unsecured debt and other borrowing there, but is there anything we ought to consider, given the near-term decline in that credit capacity from this point forward?
David Golub
executiveSo what I believe you're referring to is the fact that, in the filings we made last quarter, we noted that we had extended a portion of the Morgan Stanley bank facility, though not on a permanent basis. We're currently talking with Morgan Stanley as well as our other bank providers regarding the appropriate mix of commitments across our long-term bank facilities. The reality is that the entire Morgan Stanley facility isn't something we require. Therefore, keeping it as it currently stands isn't something we'd want to continue, but we have several attractive options available; a final call on this will be made within the next few weeks.
David Golub
executiveOkay. Thanks; and this is my last one. I'll rejoin the queue; regarding the dividend, which was recently cut to $0.29 during the portfolio update, can the BDC generate that distribution via the rights offering transaction? A —
David Golub
executiveI believe many things at this moment are going to affect NAV per share. We just finished a quarter in which we experienced a very substantial unrealized loss that lowered NAV per share. As for dividends at GBDC, my preference would be for us to have a consistent dividend that gradually rises over time, which is what we maintained for roughly 10 years before the COVID-19 quarter. So what we need to evaluate going forward is — where will NAV per share ultimately land after the uncertainties tied to COVID-19. I believe once we gain greater clarity on that, we can provide a more definitive response to your question. I believe at present the response to your question is that we will simply, like everyone else, need to struggle through the uncertainties produced by this COVID-19 situation. Okay. That's everything from me. Thanks very much.
Ryan Lynch
analystHey, good afternoon. First, I wanted to revisit the rights offering. I know you provided some broad remarks about the reasoning behind why it was pursued, but was a main driver for the rights offering related to any worries about possible covenant breaches involving any of your securitizations and the possible effect of redirecting cash flows to repay those securitizations rather than cash flows that had to be distributed as dividends for RIC status?
David Golub
executiveNo. I don't think it was exactly as you characterized it. I would frame it a bit differently. I would say COVID-19 produced a situation in which we observed a far broader array of possible future outcomes than we usually do; so if you normally consider the future as a bell curve and you build your base case assumptions around the center of the bell curve, you can construct an upside case and a downside case that sit slightly away from that base case and encompass the overwhelming majority of possible outcomes. In a COVID-19 world that isn't possible. The curve has a very different form; it is considerably flatter with considerably flatter tails. As an asset manager operating during the pandemic, we determined it was wise to build greater adaptability into how our capital is structured, so we could steer the business successfully across a far broader set of possible situations. In certain of those situations, our worry was that we might lack adequate capital both to complete these incremental investments meant to strengthen credit and at the same time to fully capitalize on the inexpensive funding sources that GBDC holds by contract. So, Ryan, I'm not suggesting your question is off base. My view is that those worries rank among a large number of concerns that led us to decide a rights offering was the proper course. I'd place that broader set of concerns beneath the heading of heightened uncertainty in the surroundings, along with a wish for a balance sheet that performs well given a wider range of potential future situations. I'm feeling quite positive about our current position.
Ryan Lynch
analystOkay. Over a longer horizon, do you believe this experience will cause you to reconsider the way you put together the liabilities side of your balance sheet? You folks operated without any unsecured notes or unsecured debt, while plenty of other BDCs have decided to include that in their liability structure. That kind of debt clearly carries a higher cost, which hurts during good times, but when things turn down like now, it generates a meaningful pool of unencumbered assets that becomes really valuable in a downturn such as this one. And I'm not sure whether we'll witness BDCs doing dilutive rights offerings like this, particularly those carrying large amounts of unsecured debt. So going forward, do you think you'll revisit your liability structure in terms of how it's composed?
David Golub
executiveWe had already revisited our liability structure. As I mentioned during the September quarter discussion and the December quarter discussion, we had started a serious evaluation of obtaining an investment-grade rating and issuing unsecured notes. So I believe in unsecured notes. I think they have a place within the liability structure of a scaled BDC, and I'm certain it's something we will be looking to explore, provided that market normalizes when it comes to costs.
Ryan Lynch
analystAll right. Then here's more of a technical question. Regarding unfunded commitments, I believe the figure stood at $152 million when the quarter closed. Of those unfunded commitments, how much consisted of revolvers, or commitments the borrower could fully choose to draw down, compared with commitments featuring something like a delayed draw term loan, or ones where the borrower lacked complete discretion to draw down?
David Golub
executiveAt quarter end, acquisition focused DDTLs made up the overwhelming majority of our ongoing commitments. I think undrawn revolvers had fallen to $16 million. Back in March of 2020, most obligors drew their revolvers.
Ross Teune
executiveRyan, we actually provided that detail in our 10Q for this quarter. The precise figure for unfunded revolvers came to $17.5 million.
Ryan Lynch
analystThanks, Ross. Thanks — at least things went okay. Then there's one more item. Regarding the calendar second quarter — so the June quarter has closed — if we assume no movement in fair value across your portfolio, it's really about how confident you are. Do you expect the total return look-back tied to each of your incentive fee structures to activate, with all other things held constant? I'm simply trying to gauge what you all are seeing relative to my model.
David Golub
executiveLet's go over that together offline. I believe we still have a bit of a cushion before the NII incentive fee — the look-back would limit NII incentives — but I'd also say we don't expect NII incentive fees to be very large in the near term.
Ryan Lynch
analystAll right. Yeah, all right. I appreciate you answering my questions and for the time. I'll rejoin the queue.
Matt Tjaden
analystHello everybody, good afternoon, hope you're all doing well; I've just got two brief ones. The first concerns how sponsors are feeling and their readiness to commit additional capital. So any broad thoughts you could share on that, and more specifically, I suppose what would interest us is whether the willingness to commit additional capital varies depending on the industry. So, say, for a retail portfolio company of ours as opposed to something more of a staple, healthcare for instance. Does willingness to commit additional capital differ at all? Thank you.
David Golub
executiveI'd say industry does not create a difference. When we discuss the extent of sponsor support with sponsors, two factors carry the most weight. Factor one is how much they favor the company, perceive its ability to recover performance, and see it becoming a fruitful investment for them. Sponsors, for clear reasons, being economic animals, wish to direct their resources toward those businesses that will perform well for them. The second matter, which arises occasionally though not often, is when a specific investment originates from an older fund and the sponsor has only limited resources left available in that older fund. And it might face some competing demands amid COVID-19. So the toughest conversations we expect with sponsors are those falling into the second category, where the sponsor wants to give support but lacks the capacity to do so to the extent it would like. On the whole — and look, it's still early days, but on the whole, we've been quite pleased by how sponsors have worked with us in a very collaborative, solutions-focused manner.
Matt Tjaden
analystGreat, that's useful. And then the final thing — any detail you could give about how large the amendment reliefs were during the quarter, and then throughout April, whether that has accelerated, would be really useful. Thank you.
David Golub
executiveIn calendar Q1, amendment activity was fairly light for us. About a dozen companies that COVID-19 hit hard — we agreed with them to lower the cash portion of the spread on our loans, with part of that spread payable in PIK. Nearly every one, or I believe all but a single one, of our borrowers paid back principal and interest during the quarter. Looking ahead, I expect many amendments will be necessary. Actually, I believe the bulk of those amendments will land in calendar Q3 rather than calendar Q2. Keep in mind that for most companies, Q1 had two good months and one bad month, so in the vast majority of cases, Q1 financial results will not trip covenants. For many companies, though, Q2 financial performance will make tripping covenants harder to avoid. Those financial statements would come due over the summer, and that is when I would expect the largest crush of amendments to be required.
Matt Tjaden
analystI've got nothing further. Thank you, everyone — I appreciate it.
David Golub
executiveSelena, one more for us.
David Golub
executiveGreat. I simply want to express gratitude to all of you. I realize this call ran quite long; our goal was to share plenty of information so that each person could grasp the impacts and difficulties tied to COVID-19 in a clear-eyed way. I hope it proved useful. Thanks for tuning in. Thanks for working alongside us. And, as we always say, don’t hesitate to get in touch whenever more questions come up. I look forward to our conversation next quarter.
Operator
operatorAppreciate it; today's conference call now wraps up here. We're grateful that all of you joined in, and we'd ask you to go ahead and hang up your phones.
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