Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

August 10, 2020

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 46 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Thanks, Ingrid. Hi, everyone, and I appreciate you being here. With me virtually today are Ross Teune, who serves as our Chief Financial Officer, along with Greg Robbins and Jon Simmons, each a Managing Director at Golub Capital. All of us at Golub Capital, together with the rest of the team, sincerely hope that you and those you care about remain safe during this difficult period. Earlier today, we released our earnings press release covering the quarter that closed on June 30, and we also put an earnings presentation up on our website. We'll be referencing that deck throughout the call today. Let me begin with 2 headlines. First headline: for fiscal Q3, GBDC's results were in line with what we had filed back on July 15. On an adjusted basis, net investment income per share reached $0.28, adjusted EPS landed at $0.94, and NAV per share was $14.05. Second headline: we delivered a strong fiscal Q3. Solid adjusted net investment income came out of the portfolio, along with resilient credit results, and those included reversing a meaningful portion of the unrealized losses that had dragged on results in fiscal Q2. I'll start by going through the main performance drivers for fiscal Q3, then I'll take you through GBDC's quarterly results in detail, relying heavily on my colleagues who are on the phone. After that, we'll open things up for your questions. Turning to Slide 6, you'll see three factors—beyond solid underwriting—that we believe drove GBDC's impressive results in the fiscal third quarter. The first is that the U.S. economy began reopening sooner than we'd expected. The second is that, on the whole, the companies in GBDC's portfolio outperformed our expectations, especially those operating in subsectors hit by COVID. And the third is that, by and large, our private equity sponsors have come forward to support their portfolio companies. Let me expand on each of these three points. To start with, the economy reopened faster than we'd expected. When we conducted our risk assessments back in late March and April, our base case projected a significant reopening by mid-summer. We had assumed the worst situation would unfold shortly after Labor Day, while our best scenario pointed to late June. What actually happened was a significant wave of reopenings during May. It's possible Dr. Fauci is correct that this came too early for keeping COVID in check, yet we think those earlier reopenings provided a meaningful lift to numerous borrowers within GBDC's portfolio. Turning to theme two: across GBDC's holdings, the companies we lend to outperformed our expectations in most cases. That was particularly true for those operating in subsectors hit by COVID. As you may remember from the earnings presentation for our fiscal second quarter, we highlighted 5 industry subsectors that seemed more exposed to COVID-related risk; these were restaurants, dental care, high care, fitness franchises and retail. Looking at the third quarter of our fiscal year, it's good to see that a lot of GBDC's borrowers in those industry subsectors did better than we had thought they would. Broadly speaking, the majority of GBDC's restaurant and retail borrowers figured out how to keep their doors open, reduce expenses, and shift their focus toward takeout, delivery, curbside pickup, or online-based business models. A number of the borrowers in these industry subsectors even recorded same-store sales increases over the quarter. On top of that, our dental and eye care borrowers—which had been closed for a period of time—have for the most part recovered more strongly and turned in results better than we had expected. Theme number three is that our private equity sponsors are, for the most part, stepping up to support their portfolio companies. During March and April, as COVID first emerged, our worry was that sponsors could be swamped by too many struggling portfolio companies, lacking either the bandwidth or the money to support them all. So far, that scenario hasn't played out. What we see instead is sponsors stepping in with time, know-how, operating talent and, frequently, funding. To us, that speaks to how solid our borrowers are, how solid our sponsors are, and how solid Golub Capital's ties to those sponsors are. The credit performance GBDC posted in fiscal Q3 reflects those same 3 themes; the right side of Slide 6 lists 4 effects on GBDC that we'll explore in more depth as today's presentation continues. We'll start by discussing the first of those effects, which is that the GBDC portfolio as a whole received improved internal performance ratings. If you would go to Slide 7. As you may recall, during the earnings presentation for the prior quarter, we highlighted how our internal performance ratings had shifted downward — moving out of categories 4 and 5, which consist of loans doing at least as well as we had anticipated when we underwrote them, and into category 3, which consists of loans that are performing, or are expected to perform, worse than we had anticipated. At December 31, category 3 accounted for 7.2% of the portfolio at fair value, and by March 31 that figure had climbed to 26.5%. For the quarter ended March 31, the share of the portfolio in categories 1 and 2 — loans performing significantly below expectations — was essentially flat. During the three months that concluded on June 30, our performance ratings got better, which matched the fact that borrowers did better than we had anticipated. Specifically, the share of loans falling into categories 4 and 5 rose from 71.5% of the portfolio at fair value as of March 31 to 76% of the portfolio as of June 30. Loans in category 3 dropped from 26.5% of the portfolio on March 31 to 22.3% of the portfolio on June 30. And on top of that, the portion of the portfolio sitting in categories 1 and 2 — loans whose performance is materially below expectations — decreased. Even though risk ratings are getting better, I should be upfront: loans we've placed in category 3 still make up a larger share of the portfolio than what was normal prior to COVID. Still, some perspective is warranted here. Because conditions right now are so unpredictable, we waste no time moving loans down into category 3. Once a loan lands there, it immediately brings more attention and closer monitoring. That setup lets us lean on the full scale and expertise that the Golub Capital platform offers. Being placed in Category 3 doesn't automatically signal that defaults or losses will happen. A good illustration is the meaningful portion of GBDC's loans that carried a 3 rating as of the March 31 quarter and then shifted upward into categories 4 and 5 during this quarter. It has long been our belief that identifying problems, or potential problems, sooner leads to better outcomes down the road. Now let's continue examining how the key themes we previously highlighted influenced GBDC's fiscal Q3 results. As we pointed out, new nonaccruals remain at a modest level. We'll come back to that topic when we walk through GBDC's financial results in our usual review, but in short, nonaccruals represented 2% of total investments at fair value, up just a bit. Net realized losses also remained minimal, while net unrealized losses turned into a reversal. You can see both the small net realized losses and the substantial unrealized gains in the NAV bridge on Slide 8; our starting point is NAV per share of $13.49 as of March 31. That number is pro forma for the dilution tied to the rights offering. To it, we add adjusted NII of $0.28 per share. Our dividend of $0.29 per share gets subtracted. Then, as shown in the next column, realized credit losses for the quarter were quite low at $0.03 per share. Net unrealized gains accounted for most of the increase in NAV per share. During the third fiscal quarter, we saw net unrealized gains amounting to $0.74 per share, which clawed back a large chunk of what we'd lost on an unrealized basis in fiscal Q2. As things stand, we continue to see our job as being all about keeping realized losses to a minimum while generating additional unrealized losses of this kind. I want to spend a few moments during this call walking everyone through our approach to that work. For that, I'll hand things over to Greg Robbins, who has an update for us.

Greg Robbins

executive
#2

Appreciate that, David. We'll kick off by going over how GBDC has responded strategically to COVID-19, which you can see on Slide 10. When we last spoke, we covered 3 main objectives GBDC has been working toward throughout the COVID-19 crisis. The first was to actively oversee its broadly diversified portfolio of senior secured, first lien investments; the second was to back existing portfolio companies via amendments and incremental investments that strengthen credit; and the third was to shore up its balance sheet while getting ready to seize appealing new investment possibilities. Our view is that GBDC's solid fiscal Q3 results indicate the strategy is delivering. To begin, Slide 11 lays out the general makeup of GBDC's portfolio as of June 30. On the left side, the figures reveal that GBDC's portfolio is still sizable, varied, finely spread and concentrated at the top of the capital structure. There are more than 250 investments in the portfolio, and the typical investment represents under 40 basis points of the portfolio at fair value. Looking at the right side, it's clear GBDC's portfolio was built for resilience. From inception, we concentrated on lending to businesses we think will hold their value even if a downside recession occurs. These borrowers, in most instances, are additionally resistant to COVID-19. More than 80% of the portfolio as of June 30 was made up of investments in industries we consider comparatively shielded from COVID-19, such as enterprise software, business services, financial services and others. In the same vein, under 1% of the portfolio was invested in sectors we know have taken especially severe hits from COVID-19, including airlines, entertainment, hotels, energy and similar areas. The bulk of our proactive portfolio management has centered on the approximately 20% of the portfolio sitting in industry subsectors we flagged as less shielded from COVID-19. Now to Slide 12. As you may remember, we outlined a 3-part approach to proactive portfolio management. The first part is gathering information; the second is crafting strategic plans; and the third is carrying out those strategic plans. Since March, we started by collecting information and addressing the borrowers hit hardest. We've reached Phase 3 of our approach now, putting game plans into action for every borrower, collaborating with sponsors, management teams and junior capital lenders. This approach has also already yielded significant results. More than 50 credit-enhancing amendments have been executed by our team. By "credit-enhancing," we mean any amendments that include a pricing increase, better documentation terms or an additional equity infusion from the sponsor. Because we engaged proactively with sponsors and they showed an encouraging level of support for their portfolio companies, we experienced just 1 default on principal and interest payments during the quarter. Slide 13 offers 2 illustrative examples of the kinds of credit-enhancing activities we have completed and anticipate completing over the next few months. Slide 14 demonstrates how GBDC has strengthened its balance sheet. As of June 30, GAAP leverage stood at 0.86x, placing it at the bottom of our target range. Regulatory leverage came in under 0.75x. At quarter end, GBDC held $435 million of liquidity through cash and borrowing capacity. GBDC likewise made moves to strengthen how its debt capital is structured. In late June, we changed the Morgan Stanley credit facility, lifting the amount we can borrow over the long term from $200 million up to $400 million. On top of that, we paid off in full and shut down the 2 SLF credit facilities with Wells Fargo that had been winding down. Then, last week, we set the pricing on a brand-new $300 million CLO that comes at a low cost. Thanks to all of this, GBDC now has plenty of room to maneuver and real capacity to act. That room and capacity means GBDC is well placed to seize appealing opportunities. Slide 15 shows how leverage came down sharply following the global financial crisis. Golub Capital managed to take major advantage of those opportunities. Our view is that what's happened in the markets lately will probably bring about a lasting environment that favors lenders, a lot like what followed the last recession. We expect the present market conditions to produce things such as reduced leverage, wider spreads, better covenants and stronger protection on the downside. And, as we've said in earlier quarters, and as Slide 16 shows, we think GBDC holds strong competitive advantages that will assist us in producing superior returns for shareholders down the road; so having said that, I'll turn things over to Jon Simmons, who will walk through our financial results for the quarter that closed June 30 in greater depth. Jon?

Jon Simmons

executive
#3

Thank you, Gregory. Before we go further, I want to remind everyone that alongside the GAAP financial measures included in the investor presentation, we have also presented certain non-GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP measures, which we call adjusted measures, are intended to remove the effects of the GCIC merger-related purchase premium write-off and amortization; additional details about them appear in the appendix of the earnings presentation. Throughout the conference call, we will use them where it makes sense, since we believe they give a clearer picture of how we are performing and match the way we assess our results; now, let's move to Slide 18 to examine the quarter's results more closely, and I will focus on the column located on the right-hand side of the page. Adjusted net investment income per share, or what we term income before credit losses, for the June 30 quarter came in at $0.28, which matched our expectations and aligned with our quarterly dividend. Adjusted net realized and unrealized gain per share came to $0.66. That compares with an adjusted net realized and unrealized loss per share of $2.04 for the March quarter. The adjusted net realized and unrealized gain in this quarter was mainly the result of reversing unrealized losses that had been recorded in the prior quarter, for the reasons David discussed in his opening remarks. Adjusted earnings per share for the June quarter totaled $0.94 per share. That compares with an adjusted loss per share of $1.71 for the March quarter. Our adjusted net asset value per share as of June 30 stood at $14.05, which takes into account the earnings above our dividend this quarter, reduced by the dilution caused by the rights offering. On June 29, we made a quarterly distribution of $0.29 per share; and lastly, on August 4, 2020, our Board declared a quarterly distribution of $0.29 per share, payable on September 29, 2020, to shareholders of record as of September 8, 2020. This distribution matches our historical dividend practice of aiming to pay distributions at an annualized rate of roughly 8% of NAV. With that, I will turn the call over to Ross so he can walk through the quarterly results in greater detail. Ross?

Ross Teune

executive
#4

Thanks, Jon. Moving to Slide 19, what you see here is $15.7 million in total originations for the quarter ending June 30, plus $88.4 million in total exits and sales of investments. Once unrealized appreciation and other portfolio activity are factored in, total investments at fair value increased 1%, which works out to $40.2 million. As of June 30, undrawn revolver commitments stood at $28.3 million, and undrawn commitments on delayed draw term loans came to $80.9 million. Given GBDC's overall balance sheet and liquidity position, those unfunded commitments are relatively modest. At the bottom of the table, you can see that the weighted average rate on new investments was 7.5%, and the weighted average spread over LIBOR on new floating rate investments was 6.3%, and both of those increased from the prior quarter. Just as a reminder, the weighted average interest rate on new investments is calculated using the contractual interest rate at the time of funding. For variable rate loans, that contractual rate would be based on current LIBOR, the spread over LIBOR, and any LIBOR floor. At the top of Slide 20, you can see that GBDC's portfolio stayed highly diversified by obligor, with an average investment size of under 40 basis points. Looking at what's at the bottom of this slide, you can see that the mix of our portfolio across investment types didn't shift between quarters — one stop loans remain the biggest category we hold, making up 83%. Moving on to Slide 21 now. First lien, senior secured floating rate loans account for 97% of what we've invested, and we've kept a defensive posture in sectors that we think can hold up. Let's go to Slide 22. Here you'll find a graph that lays out yields on the portfolio along with net investment spreads for the quarter. Starting with the light blue line — that one shows income yields, meaning what we actually earned from the investments, interest and fee income included, though it leaves out amortization tied to upfront origination fees and purchase price premium. For the quarter, income yield came down slightly—10 basis points—landing at 7.7%, and the primary driver was LIBOR's ongoing slide. The investment income yield, shown by the dark blue line, factors in amortization of fees and discounts, and it likewise dropped 10 basis points, reaching 8.1% for the quarter that closed June 30, again because LIBOR fell. That said, given that a 1% LIBOR floor applies to the majority of loans, neither the income yield nor the investment income yield decreased anywhere near as sharply as LIBOR did, which is evident at the bottom of the slide. Conversely, since there's no LIBOR floor on our variable rate debt facilities, the aqua blue line — our weighted average cost of debt — came down 50 basis points, landing at 3.2%. That means our net investment spread, shown as the green line, which measures the gap between what we earn on investments and what our debt costs on a weighted average basis, grew by a net 40 basis points, hitting 4.9%. Now let's move on to the following 2 slides. Measured both at cost and at fair value, nonaccrual investments remained a modest portion of overall debt investments, even though they ticked up a bit, hitting 2.8% and 2%, respectively, as of June 30. We ended the quarter with the same number of nonaccrual investments as before — 10. That's because we got rid of 2 of them, while 2 different ones moved into nonaccrual status. David already touched on this in his opening remarks, but better results at our portfolio companies brought the share of investments rated 3 on our internal performance scale down to 22.3% of the portfolio at fair value as of June 30. One thing to remember: independent valuation firms assess at least 25% of our investments each quarter, and for the quarter that closed June 30, the portion of portfolio company investments those outside firms valued was over 30%. If you turn to slides 25 and 26, you'll find more specifics about where we stood on the balance sheet and income statement for the three months that closed on June 30. Now on to Slide 27. The chart at the top gives you a picture of how our return on equity came in each quarter over the last five years, and the one below it covers both the standard quarterly payouts and the special ones we made during that stretch. Let's go to Slide 28. What you see here is the long history we've built of delivering solid returns to shareholders going all the way back to our IPO. The next slide lays out our liquidity position and what we can invest as of June 30, including restricted and unrestricted cash, what's open to us under our revolving credit facilities, and the debentures we can access through our SBIC subsidiaries. Like Gregory mentioned right before I came on, we made some improvements to our liability structure this quarter. We amended the Morgan Stanley revolving credit facility, which lifted the borrowing capacity over the entire term of that facility, taking it from $200 million up to $400 million. On top of that, we repaid and shut down the 2 SLF credit facilities — those had already gone past their reinvestment periods and were carrying significantly less leverage than they could have. On Slide 30, you'll find a summary of our debt facility terms as of June 30, and it also highlights how we focus on keeping our sources of debt capital diversified, long-term and stable. So with that, I'll turn it back over to David for some closing remarks.

David Golub

executive
#5

Appreciate that, Ross. So, to wrap things up: GBDC delivered a robust fiscal Q3, net investment income came in strong, and we moved the ball forward nicely on carrying out our post-COVID plan. But ahead of taking questions, I want to state plainly that although the fiscal third quarter gave us some encouraging signals, we believe this COVID bus trip still has a long way to go. We're concerned about the high case counts across many regions of the country. We're keeping in mind that further restrictions could come, maybe even additional lockdowns. We're watching closely for COVID's possible indirect consequences, especially when it comes to shifts in consumer spending and business investment. What we hope you take away today is this: we've acted prudently to get GBDC ready for a broad array of possible scenarios. Our strategy is sound. Our balance sheet is a fortress; and we can tap the competitive advantages that come with the Golub Capital platform. Because of that, we believe GBDC sits in a very strong position. With that said, let's open up the line for questions.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#6

David, I want to begin with the dividend payout. If we look at the model here, there are obviously several moving pieces, but it seems that based on next quarter's equity base, the way things shake out, the hurdle won't be enough to support the payout threshold anymore, so you would need to revisit the dividend. That might shift if you recover some unrealized losses. Please correct me if I have this wrong as I work through it all, but as the incentive fee becomes more fully engaged going forward, how do you see your path to covering the dividend at the $0.29 level?

David Golub

executive
#7

I believe you're correct that there are quite a few moving pieces. When we established the dividend policy at $0.29, we understood there were numerous moving pieces. In fiscal Q3, I think we have made progress by raising NAV per share to a point where the $0.29 can be sustained, which is what we expected would happen. And we are cautiously optimistic that we will continue to see trends ahead that support that. So I think we are headed in the right direction here. And in the end, during this time of unprecedented uncertainty, no one can be certain about very much. But I believe we are on the right path as we concentrate on recovering unrealized losses by way of unrealized gains and, in doing so, lifting our NAV per share and reaching a point where $0.29 is not just sustainable but something we can grow from over time; and as you are aware, Fin, that is what we have always done. What we have always done is adjust dividends gradually and carefully over time. And before COVID struck us, that direction was consistently upward.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#8

All right, that helps. Now, regarding taking an aggressive stance — I valued every detail you gave about your COVID-affected portfolio and how you managed it. Clearly, your position is quite strong. This quarter's originations were, quite reasonably, on the low side, but if we assume that both presently and moving ahead you're actively surveying the market, then just some big-picture perspective on what you're observing would be great. Is the pipeline recovering? And how should we frame the opportunity and origination outlook for you folks?

David Golub

executive
#9

The quick answer: yes, green shoots are appearing in the M&A market, which makes us a bit more hopeful regarding the potential for greater originations over the next few months. Like we talked about three months ago, the initial response to uncertainty stemming from COVID was an almost complete halt in M&A activity; that's hardly shocking. Under those market uncertainties, buyers and sellers simply couldn't reach agreement on valuation. Unless they had extremely compelling reasons, sellers opted against putting companies up for sale. Given better results over recent months and with a substantial share of the industries we cover demonstrating considerable resistance to COVID, we're witnessing a pickup in M&A activity and financing opportunities. Has it returned to normal? Not yet, but compared with a couple of months ago, the improvement we're seeing is remarkable. And when we assess the caliber of these opportunities, the pattern Gregory mentioned during the call appears to be holding — meaning that following a dislocation, the opportunities we typically encounter combine somewhat lower leverage, improved documentation terms and wider spreads; that's what I believe we're seeing right now.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#10

Ryan, first of all, this kind of continues from that question about the market environment. On Slide 15, you can see a pretty solid illustration of how leverage levels moved as we came out of the previous recession. I'm just curious whether you think this one might end up being different, simply because there's so little deal activity happening right now, possibly as a result of this abrupt economic shutdown caused by the sudden stop; and then eventually, the recovery that's already underway today might arrive and speed up quite rapidly once we fully reopen, though obviously none of us knows when that will happen, whereas the earlier downturn was somewhat — it felt like a somewhat slower rebound spread across several years, with really strong terms and structures and companies for several years. I'm just asking whether you believe this downturn — or the recovery from it — might unfold, or will unfold, in a way that differs from the previous one.

David Golub

executive
#11

That's an excellent question, Ryan. And it's the $64,000 question; I doubt anyone truly has a confident answer to it. But let me offer a few observations. First, it's quite unusual for a downturn or dislocation not to produce a stretch of better lending opportunities. So I'd say it's very likely we'll see conditions that are appealing for lenders ahead. The real issue is how appealing, and how long that will persist. So let's focus now on which key factors will determine how appealing it is and how long it lasts. Well, among those factors is the extraordinary quantity of private equity dry powder sitting in the market at present. Not only is it at record levels, but right now it isn't being put to work at a pace consistent with all of it getting deployed. Again, if history serves as a reliable guide, and in this case I suspect it probably will, that points toward a pickup in private equity capital deployment once the COVID-related uncertainties diminish somewhat more. A third factor backing the notion that we'll see durable, lender-friendly terms is that we've witnessed a substantial number of participants in middle market lending who've been badly harmed by COVID and whose fundraising has likewise suffered because of COVID. And that, once again, is a rather consistent pattern that tends to occur during downturns and can result in less competition, which can be beneficial. I'm not saying, Ryan, that I believe this downturn will definitely resemble 2008, '09. I don't know. What I can say is that I think this recovery will probably take a while, given very high unemployment rates and, at some point in the fairly near future, cuts in government spending. But this is an unprecedented period. Since nobody has ever experienced a worldwide pandemic of this kind, along with the government reaction it triggered, every one of us has to prepare for multiple possible situations. A theme I've frequently brought up ever since COVID started is how much we focus on precisely that — I'm making plans for quite a few distinct scenarios.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#12

Alright, that tracks. GBDC has mostly built its reputation as a lender focused on first lien, sitting at the top of the capital structure. But back when you were managing private credit funds during the recovery from the last downturn, you were open to moving into more junior capital as that part of the market started looking more appealing. My guess is it's still too soon in this recovery for GBDC to think about that approach. That said, could you share any thoughts on whether GBDC would be willing to go down that road at all as this downturn plays out, if a chance presents itself?

David Golub

executive
#13

Well, there were 2 points in what you said, so let me try to break that down a bit. Do I believe that in the near term Golub Capital BDC will shift its core strategy away from senior debt, first lien debt and toward junior debt? No, I don't. It seems very likely to me that we'll keep our focus on first lien and one stops. The second part of your question was whether we would ever think about putting a portion of our capital base, a meaningful portion of our capital base, into junior debt. I wouldn't rule that out entirely, because as you mention, we've had a pretty strong track record as a firm when it comes to investing in junior debt under the right market conditions. I just don't believe that moment is now.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#14

Alright, that's reasonable. After the equity raise, your balance sheet looks to be in truly strong condition. You have plenty of dry powder. With that said, are you folks looking at, are you folks assessing altering your liability structure in any way, mainly moving a portion of it toward unsecured debt down the road?

David Golub

executive
#15

Sure. So my response is close to what I believe I said on this topic 1 quarter ago. We've mentioned on quite a few earlier earnings calls that we strongly believe in what unsecured debt can offer, and we believe it's sensible to layer unsecured debt into GBDC's liability structure as time passes. As you noted, we currently enjoy the advantage of substantial liquidity, so there's no urgency on our part. We've — we're running at the low end of our leverage targets. Our intention is to bring in unsecured debt at the right moment, so that we do so with appealing pricing and other terms.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#16

Yeah, well, Ryan already touched on part of this, so let me take it a bit further. To that point, the portfolio seems to be holding up quite well considering the conditions we're facing. Now, on the liability side — and I appreciate your response, David — but when I look at it, 2 of your bank facilities are exiting their reinvestment period, not maturity, but reinvestment period, in Q1 of next year; so would it make sense to think the unsecured could arrive before then? Or is that simply irrelevant, and your current expectation is just to extend those facilities and then the reinvestment time frames?

David Golub

executive
#17

Robert, what I'd say is we enjoy excellent relationships with our banking partners. I'm extremely confident that if extending those facilities were the right call, doing so would pose no difficulty whatsoever, as we demonstrated recently by extending one of them, the Morgan Stanley facility. It isn't a matter of whether we can. It's a matter of what capital structure is optimal for GBDC. And what makes this difficult is that when you issue unsecured debt matters more than you'd think. This is long-term fixed rate debt, and its pricing has shifted quite dramatically within just the past couple of months. So we need to be very deliberate in how we approach it. As you're aware, last week we priced a new securitization for GBDC. That pricing represented a new post-COVID low for securitization financing. Our AAAs came in at LIBOR plus 235. So one method by which we've generated returns for shareholders over time is holding our liability costs extremely low. And we aim to achieve 2 objectives at once. First, adding unsecured to the stack, and second, keeping liability costs very low.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#18

That is entirely reasonable. And indeed, the CLO pricing appears pretty appealing. The other piece, clearly, is connected to it, which is having underutilized capacity. Should you bring in unsecured and then end up with 4 credit facility revolvers sitting underutilized, they get somewhat costly, matching your comment that you recently shut down the 2 SLFs since they were no longer efficient; from that angle, would you anticipate continuing to operate 4 credit facilities if and when unsecured is introduced into the stack? Any insight at all regarding what the ideal count or size of revolver capacity would be for the business?

David Golub

executive
#19

Yes. I mean — I believe if you look ahead to a time when our capital stack contains unsecured, it likely involves fewer bank revolving credit facilities and a reduced overall amount of bank revolving credit facilities.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#20

Understood, and thanks for that. Let me shift to another subject, then. You mentioned green shoots beginning to appear when it comes to deployments, and at the moment you have ample liquidity. Could you share anything on whether your focus is mostly on bolt-on acquisitions or possibly platform acquisitions? I ask because, clearly, with a bolt-on, perhaps the due diligence is simpler in a setting where I personally haven't seen anything stay on plan since March, or where — compared with a bolt-on, whose due diligence might have to be broader in scope and might involve travel. I mean, could you give us some color regarding the type, how the due diligence gets conducted, and so on?

David Golub

executive
#21

Yeah, that's a great question. Let's take your question and broaden it out, and talk about how the deal environment will look going forward. First, some context. When we look back at Golub Capital BDC — and I don't think we're all that different from Ares or any of the other very large platforms — about half of our deal activity, historically, has been with borrowers we already have relationships with. And you're absolutely right: when you consider doing deals during COVID, working with existing borrowers is much simpler than working with companies you're not familiar with. Since the management group is familiar, the business is familiar, you've established a connection, and you've previously conducted thorough, on-site diligence, it becomes far simpler. So without question, a much larger share of upcoming deal activity than we'd typically see will come from what's already in our portfolio. That said, I expect we'll still see some new platform deals, and those will involve sponsors and industry verticals we're already acquainted with, since achieving flawless diligence in the current climate isn't possible, for all the reasons you just mentioned. In my view, that generates a fresh avenue of competitive edge for leading firms such as ours. We've built exactly the kind of tight connections with leading sponsors that this setting calls for. Across several sectors, we bring serious sector familiarity and subject-matter depth — that covers software, franchise-style operations, and certain health care segments that look especially appealing now that we're past COVID. So Robert, that's a strong question you've raised. My sense is that, at least over the short run, deal-making after COVID will differ somewhat from what we saw before it, and that shift will tilt the field so some firms gain an edge while others don't.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#22

One final item from me. As far as I know, your company has not traditionally relied on unsecured borrowings as part of its capital structure. Yet, David, you noted that you had no objection to them and would be ready to make use of them when conditions were appropriate. So I want to understand why there was apparently neither an interest in nor a capacity to obtain an investment-grade rating from a major ratings firm, simply to keep one available in case you decided — should market conditions turn sufficiently favorable that pursuing that became somewhat simpler, considering that your firm has an outstanding long-term record and a portfolio built for defense? What prevented such a rating from being sought or obtained previously?

David Golub

executive
#23

I would rather not devote much time to revisiting history, except to say that we examined unsecured issuance quite thoroughly, which even involved holding conversations with the rating agencies. Therefore, I believe your underlying assumption is mistaken — this was not something we failed to do or were unable to do. Still, the crucial thing is that we are where we are. As I see it, when I review our balance sheet, we sit in an extremely solid position: we hold substantial liquidity, and we retain the option, should it prove sensible, to move forward with an unsecured offering down the road.

David Golub

executive
#24

Appreciate that, Ingrid. And once more, my thanks to each of you for being here with us right now. Your time, your engagement, and the way you work alongside us genuinely mean a lot. As ever, should anything be left unanswered from this session, or should new questions come to mind after this call wraps up, don't hesitate to get in touch. Until then, I'm eager to talk with everyone again when we report next quarter.

Operator

operator
#25

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