Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
February 9, 2021
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
David B. Golub
executiveThanks very much. Hi, everyone, and we appreciate you being with us today. With me are Ross Teune, our Chief Financial Officer; Gregory Robbins, Senior Managing Director; and Jon Simmons, Managing Director at Golub Capital. All of us on the Golub Capital team hope your 2021 has gotten off to a solid start. We released our earnings press release yesterday for the quarter that ended December 31, and an earnings presentation is now posted on our website; we will be referencing that presentation during today's call. If you're new to GBDC, our investment strategy is — and has been since inception — to concentrate on providing first-lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market companies backed by strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Let me begin with the headline for the quarter ended December 31, and that headline is that GBDC's results were strong and came in line with the preliminary estimates we filed on January 20. During the quarter, GBDC delivered solid net investment income along with continued strong credit performance. We'll go into both of those topics in greater detail as we walk through today's presentation. Gregory will begin with a brief overview of GBDC's performance for the 12/31 quarter, and then he'll pass it to Jon and Ross for a more detailed review of the results. After that, I'll offer some closing commentary reviewing our post-COVID performance, and then we'll open the line for questions. With that, let's take a closer look at GBDC's results for the quarter and the key drivers behind those results. Gregory?
Gregory Robbins
executiveThank you, David. I'll begin with Slide 4. For the quarter that closed on December 31, GBDC's adjusted NII per share was $0.29, adjusted EPS reached $0.56, and NAV per share at period end was $14.60 — all of these numbers falling within the ranges we previously published. What produced those results? At the risk of sounding repetitive, the main drivers, apart from solid underwriting, were the same trends we've covered over the past 2 quarters; those trends, which appear on Slide 6, are: First, the companies in our portfolio by and large keep performing well, even with an economy still affected by COVID; and second, private equity sponsors have by and large kept stepping up to support the companies in their portfolios. And as we saw in earlier quarters, those same themes show up in the four favorable credit trends on the right side of this slide — specifically: better internal performance ratings; nonaccruals coming down; minimal net realized losses; and net unrealized gains that remain solid. We'll walk through each trend, beginning with our internal performance ratings. On Slide 7, we lay out how GBDC's portfolio internal performance ratings have moved favorably through the COVID period. To be specific, from March 31 onward, categories 4 and 5 — loans doing at least as well as we expected when we underwrote them — have risen steadily, while Category 3, which covers loans performing or expected to perform below expectations, has fallen. The share of the portfolio that is performing significantly worse than expected within categories 1 and 2 has continued to fall steadily as well. During the quarter that closed on December 31, categories 4 and 5 rose from 78.9% of the portfolio as of 9/30 to 81% as of 12/31. Over that same span, category 3 dropped from 19.7% to 17.9%. Categories 1 and 2 likewise came down quarter-over-quarter, going from 1.4% to 1.1%. This quite small and shrinking slice of the portfolio sitting in categories 1 and 2 matters because it shows that major credit impairment is still uncommon and idiosyncratic. The portion of the portfolio in category 3 remains above what we generally observed before COVID, yet it has improved substantially since 3/31. Another important sign that credit keeps getting better is that nonaccruals fell from 1.7% to 1.2% quarter-over-quarter as a percentage of investments at fair value at 12/31. We'll return to that in our regular discussion of GBDC's financial results. On Slide 8, you can see our two other key indicators of improving credit quality: low net realized losses and solid net unrealized gains. This slide bridges GBDC's NAV per share of $14.33 as of 9/30 to the higher $14.60 as of 12/31. Let's go through that bridge. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.29, matching our quarterly dividend, as you can see; net realized losses are still modest at $0.01 per share; and net unrealized gains totaled $0.34 per share. Those unrealized gains show that unrealized losses from the March 2020 quarter keep reversing. Stepping back briefly, these indications of solid credit results speak to one aspect of a bigger issue: how effectively did GBDC manage the challenges created by COVID? David will address that topic in his closing remarks today. Let's now examine our results for the quarter that ended December 31. To do that, I'll turn the call over to Jon Simmons, who will take you through the results in greater detail. Jon?
Jonathan Simmons
executiveThanks, Gregory. To start, I want to remind everyone that besides the GAAP financial measures included in the investor presentation, we have also furnished certain non-GAAP measures. These non-GAAP or adjusted measures, which is what we call them, are intended to remove the effect of the GCIC merger purchase premium write-off along with amortization. You can find a fuller description of these adjusted measures in the appendix of our earnings presentation, and we will use them throughout today's call. With that said, let's go to Slide 10 and examine GBDC's results for the quarter in greater detail. Adjusted net investment income per share, or what we term income before credit losses, for the quarter ended December 31 was $0.29. That is an increase from the $0.28 of adjusted NII per share we earned in each of the last 2 quarters. Adjusted net realized and unrealized gain per share came in at $0.27. That compares with adjusted net realized and unrealized gain per share of $0.29 for the September quarter. The adjusted net realized and unrealized gain in this quarter was mainly the result of the continued reversal of unrealized losses that were recorded in the March 2020 quarter. Adjusted earnings per share for the December quarter was $0.56. That compares with adjusted earnings per share of $0.57 for the prior quarter. Our net asset value per share at December 31, 2020 rose to $14.60 from $14.33 as of September 30. Lastly, on February 5, 2021, our Board declared a quarterly distribution of $0.29 per share, payable on March 30, 2021 to stockholders of record as of March 5, 2021. This distribution aligns with our objective of having quarterly cash distributions approximate 8% of net asset value on an annualized basis. With that, I'll turn the call over to Ross to walk through the quarterly results in more detail. Ross?
Ross A. Teune
executiveThanks, Jon. Now moving to Slide 11. New investment commitments hit a record for the quarter that ended December 31, coming in at $526.8 million. After accounting for total exits and sales of investments of $278.7 million, along with unrealized depreciation and other portfolio activity, total investments at fair value rose by 6.3%, or $269 million, during the quarter ended December 31. At December 31, we had $43.5 million in undrawn revolver commitments and $126.2 million in undrawn commitments on delayed draw term loans. Those unfunded commitments are fairly small relative to our balance sheet and liquidity position. At the bottom of the table, I show the weighted average rate on new investments of 7.1% and the weighted average spread over LIBOR on new floating rate investments of 6.1% — both declined from the prior quarter as market conditions kept rebounding since COVID began. As a quick reminder, the weighted average interest rate on new investments is calculated from the contractual interest rate at the time of funding. For variable rate loans, that contractual rate would be computed using current LIBOR, the spread over LIBOR, and the effect of any LIBOR floor. The top of Slide 12 shows our portfolio stayed highly diversified by obligor, with an average investment size of under 40 basis points. The bottom of the slide shows our overall portfolio mix by investment type held steady quarter-over-quarter, with one-stop loans still our largest investment category at 81%. Moving to Slide 13. 97% of our investment portfolio remained in first lien, senior secured floating rate loans and was defensively positioned in industries we believe to be resilient and insulated from COVID-19. Now to Slide 14. This graph summarizes portfolio yields and net investment spreads for the quarter. Let's focus first on the light blue line. That line represents the income yield, or the actual amount earned on the investment, including interest and fee income, excluding amortization of upfront origination fees and purchase price premium. The income yield held steady at 7.4% for the quarter ended December 31. The investment income yield — the dark blue line, which includes amortization of fees and discounts — rose by 10 basis points to 7.9% during the quarter due to increased fee amortization caused by portfolio repayments. Mainly because of the impact of the $400 million unsecured fixed rate bond offering that closed early in the quarter, our weighted average cost of debt, the aqua blue line, edged up slightly by 20 basis points to 2.9%. Our net investment spread, the green line — which is the difference between the investment income yield and the weighted average cost of debt — fell by 10 basis points to 5%, but it remains close to its highest level in the last 2 years despite the significant drop in LIBOR. Moving on to the following 2 slides, nonaccrual investments as a share of total debt investments at cost and fair value stayed low and fell to 1.6% and 1.2%, respectively, as of December 31. Over the quarter, nonaccrual investments dropped to 7 portfolio company investments from 9 portfolio company investments, since 2 portfolio company investments went back to accrual status. As Gregory mentioned during his opening commentary, thanks to stronger portfolio company performance, the percentage of investments rated 3 on our internal performance rating scale fell to 17.9% of the portfolio at fair value as of December 31. Just as a reminder, independent valuation firms value no less than 25% of our investments every quarter. Slides 17 and 18 give further detail on our balance sheet and income statement as of and for the 3 months ended December 31. Moving to Slide 19. The graph at the top sums up our quarterly returns on equity across the past 5 years, and the graph at the bottom sums up our regular quarterly distributions along with our special distributions across that same period. Moving to Slide 20. This graph shows our long track record of strong shareholder returns since our IPO. Slide 21 sums up our liquidity and investment capacity as of December 31 and highlights our recent debt financing amendments. On December 21, we amended the GCIC 2018 debt securitization, which included, among other things, a cut in the interest rate on the 38.5 million of Class A-2 notes from 4.665% to 2.498%. After the quarter ended, we also amended our revolving credit facility with Morgan Stanley on January 29 that included, among other things, an extension of the reinvestment period through April 30, 2021, and a reduction in the maximum borrowing capacity from $325 million to $250 million. Slide 22 sums up the terms of our debt capital as of December 31, which reflects our continued focus on optimizing the right-hand side of the balance sheet. Finally, Slide 23 sums up our recent distributions to stockholders. Most recently, our Board declared a distribution of $0.29 per share payable on March 30 to stockholders of record as of March 5; with that, I'll hand it back to David for some closing remarks. David?
David B. Golub
executiveThanks, Ross. To summarize, GBDC delivered a strong quarter. Adjusted net investment income increased enough to cover our dividend, realized credit losses came in quite low, and unrealized gains were sizable, which extends the reversal of the unrealized losses we took in the March quarter. I'd like to close our prepared remarks with something I'll call post-COVID hindsight. I believe this is a good moment to begin reflecting on COVID and the lessons it has taught us, though I recognize it's still early, since the pandemic probably isn't finished. That said, enough time has passed for us to look back on the post-COVID period and start evaluating how we did. Turning to Slide 24, you'll see the three main objectives we established in March 2020 for steering through COVID. The first was to actively oversee GBDC's investment portfolio; the second involved optimizing GBDC's balance sheet; and the third was to seize attractive new investment opportunities as market conditions recovered. We now have nine months of data demonstrating our performance against those three objectives. Let's examine that more closely. As I noted, our first objective was to proactively manage GBDC's highly diversified portfolio of first lien senior secured investments. During calendar Q1 of 2020, we — and really our entire industry — experienced substantial unrealized losses from marking our portfolio to fair value, which resulted from the market dislocation brought about by COVID. Since then, we've repeatedly stated that our singular focus would be on stopping those unrealized losses from turning into permanent or realized credit losses. We've also said consistently that if we succeeded, we'd expect many of those unrealized losses to reverse over time. So where do we stand? It's too early for a definitive answer, but the data we have so far is quite encouraging. Let's revisit our 4 key credit metrics, this time with a longer-term view. First, internal performance ratings. As Gregory mentioned in his remarks, these ratings have improved, because portfolio companies at GBDC have generally continued to perform well. Since March 31, we've observed a meaningful upward shift in risk ratings — 2 rating categories, 4 and 5. Those are the rating categories for loans doing at least as well as we expected when they were originated, and they've moved there out of Category 3. Category 3 consists of loans performing, or anticipated to perform, somewhat under expectations. Category 3 loans went from 26.5% of the portfolio on 3/31 down to 17.9% on 12/31; that 17.9% remains somewhat elevated versus pre-COVID levels, though it is far nearer to our long-term trend of roughly 10%. Importantly, during this whole COVID-affected stretch, the share of the portfolio rated 1 and 2 — loans at material risk of impairment — remained quite low. It held at roughly 1% to 2%. Actually, the total count of them has gone down. So we've had comparatively few borrowers that were truly troublesome. Next, nonaccruals are back at the low levels seen prior to COVID — about 1.2% of the portfolio at fair value as of 12/31. Third, and this connects tightly with point #2, realized losses have remained modest. Overall, GBDC has posted realized losses of roughly 50 basis points on its investments at cost since COVID began, and the bulk of that stemmed from companies that were already struggling before the pandemic arrived. And fourth, the final point: unrealized losses have recovered substantially. As a matter of fact, roughly 75% of the fair value markdowns taken in the March 2020 quarter have been recovered, thanks to very strong performance across portfolio companies. Those 4 key metrics indicate that our underwriting was solid and that our proactive approach to managing the portfolio has been delivering results. Let's turn to the second key goal for getting through COVID: optimizing the balance sheet. How are we doing on that one? I'd make 3 key points. First, since March 31, GBDC has obtained investment-grade ratings; it has issued unsecured debt capital that is attractively priced and flexible. It has issued a new low-cost CLO, and it has cut back on its use of secured bank facilities. Next, our GAAP leverage is positioned squarely within the target range, sitting at slightly below a 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio. And last, we have ample liquidity, boasting over $350 million in cash and available borrowing capacity. Moving on, our third major objective: to ready GBDC so it could seize what we expected would be an exceptionally favorable stretch for new investment opportunities. So how did we fare on that front? The over $525 million in new originations we achieved during the quarter ending 12/31—a record for us—pretty much tells the story. To wrap up our post-COVID retrospective, we believe we chose the right objectives and have advanced well toward them; it's still too soon to draw firm conclusions, especially regarding credit, and we haven't been flawless. There's still plenty to do, yet the early indicators look promising. Now I'll cover what lies ahead. When I describe our plan for calendar year 2021, it will ring a bell: concentrate on the very same 3 core objectives, remain committed to our established approach of supporting durable businesses in durable sectors, backed by private equity sponsors that prioritize relationships, and draw on the strengths that set us apart. That's all from me. Operator, please go ahead and open the line for questions.
Robert Dodd
analystFirst, David, regarding your question about looking back after COVID — it certainly looks like the market has gotten beyond the COVID point. Could you share any color on — I mean, spreads like — you held — and the spreads on your new deployments were wider than a year earlier. So there still seems to be some widening, at least during the fourth calendar quarter, in spreads compared with pre-COVID. I mean, is that still the case as we head into January? And could you give us any color on — I mean, market spreads seem to have compressed. Are terms holding up? Any color you could give us on that front would be appreciated.
David B. Golub
executiveYes, absolutely. Hi there, Robert — great to hear from you. Let me give you some context on this. For Golub Capital, the fourth calendar quarter set a record, and what made it unusual was the market-wide spike in M&A activity. So this wasn't simply a strong origination quarter for us alone; most of the big private debt managers that were actively lending also had a robust origination quarter. As you pointed out, Robert, if you look at calendar Q4, spreads came in somewhat tighter than they had been before COVID, documentation terms were somewhat more favorable, leverage was somewhat more favorable, and crucially, we could concentrate on businesses whose post-COVID performance had been demonstrated. Most of what we did in calendar Q4 involved sponsors we've done business with repeatedly. More than 90% of Q4 originations came from repeat sponsors. I think over 40% of what we originated in calendar Q4 was actually add-ons. That let us concentrate on credits we know extremely well, with sponsors we know extremely well. I think that creates appealing investment opportunities, since we can make decisions with a lot of information. As we went past 12/31 into calendar 2021, first quarters generally tend to be slower than Q4 quarters. There's some seasonality that's typical in the sponsor-financed business. And I believe we're observing that during Q1 of this year. We're likewise noticing a surge of competition along with narrowing spreads within the broadly syndicated market. And I think that's what you were hinting at, Robert; we've witnessed it through numerous flexes and considerable spread tightening on loans being syndicated while the syndication process unfolds. So my expectation is that what occurs in the high-yield market and the broadly syndicated market will affect the middle market. Typically, there is a delay. It isn't a direct one-to-one correlation, but I expect spreads in the private markets will come under pressure in the months ahead, unless the dynamics and conditions in the broadly syndicated market shift. As things stand, it remains attractive. Looking at the origination pipeline, I'd describe Q1 as a good, solid quarter at this point. Even so, I think it's fair to anticipate that the private market will show patterns similar to those we're seeing right now in the broadly syndicated market.
Robert Dodd
analystThanks for that. For my follow-up, this isn't really a market question. I mean, credit quality across the book overall seems to be improving. It looks pretty solid, honestly. The one thing that kind of jumps out at me is PIK income. Obviously, it's triple what it was twelve months ago. You normally carry very little PIK income, so even now you're still under the industry average. What stands out a bit is that it rose pretty significantly from the last — from Q3 to Q4. Nothing in the portfolio that I've come across really leaps out. I mean there's no single large PIK asset or anything of that kind. But was there some trend in amendments or something else that caused that PIK to grow a little in the fourth quarter. Again, it's not a terribly high number. It's not overly concerning, but it did tick up somewhat.
David B. Golub
executiveI believe you're right. For context, PIK income is comparatively small at Golub capital by industry standards. It has grown somewhat. I'd say there are two areas where we've seen an increase. The first relates to our late-stage lending activities — that means companies in the Software-as-a-Service space that in some cases would rather pay us partly in PIK. And our LSL loan portfolio has grown over the past several years. The second is what you pointed to: when we negotiated amendments to existing credit facilities during COVID, in certain situations we included additional interest as PIK as one element in the overall mix of amendment components. So there's a bit of a rise in PIK income connected to that. My expectation is that this won't persist as a pattern. PIK income, as I see it, should level off and could even fall in the quarters ahead; and the thing I suspect worries you — a repeat of what has happened at other BDCs, where PIK income was never actually collected — is not something I expect to see. At this point, credit risk tied to our PIK accruals doesn't concern me much.
Robert Dodd
analystYeah, I'm being pretty open about what I was actually getting at, but I do appreciate the response, and congratulations on the quarter.
Finian O'Shea
analystDavid, for my first question, I appreciate the comments at the end regarding the names that are underperforming or affected by COVID. Could you give us some extra detail on how much the EBITDA or profitability levels in this category are improving as the economy broadly, albeit gradually, maybe gets better and reopens and so on?
David B. Golub
executiveWell, we've been quite forthright across the past several quarters about how happy we've been with how companies have performed in the industry categories we cited during the week of the March 31 quarter as the ones we were most worried about; so as you may remember, back in the April period, we mentioned dental care, restaurants, retail, eye care, and fitness franchises. And although EBITDA performance isn't something we disclose, fair value marks serve as a proxy for it; and if you examine the fair value marks in those industry sectors, I mean, a typical one of those sectors has moved from fair value marks averaging in the high 80s to fair value marks now averaging in the high 90s. The single sector I'd say we keep watching very closely, and that I still have some concerns about, is fitness franchises — at the risk of stating the obvious; given how slowly the COVID vaccination campaign has been proceeding, I think the general view is that recovery for fitness franchises will likewise be slow. The good news on our end is that it's a small slice of the portfolio; it's spread across a half dozen different companies. We concentrate on the low-cost, high-value segment, which I believe will bounce back well and bounce back quickly once people feel at ease returning to gyms. So I'm — I don't want to come across as alarmist. I'm cautiously optimistic regarding our fitness franchise exposure. But among those COVID industries — the COVID-impacted industries we flagged early, the rest have actually come back quite nicely.
Finian O'Shea
analystThat's useful. And as a quick follow-up, on the style of origination: clearly, for quite a while at least, the main focus has been unitranche, and this quarter there's been some first lien activity, for instance. Yet with the change on the right-hand side of the balance sheet, unsecured is now available to us. And it sounds as though that figure is going to increase. Do you expect any drift in style toward any element of greater risk, be it second lien, other financials, and so on?
David B. Golub
executiveIn short, no. No meaningful change in strategy is anticipated by us. Our aim is to keep fulfilling our mission, which is to be the best in sponsor finance, with a strong emphasis on helping sponsors finance their businesses in a number of different ways, depending on what suits the deal. And my expectation is that the mix within GBDC is unlikely to shift much. If you look back at the charts we present each quarter showing the share of the portfolio held in one-stops—currently around 81%—it really hasn't moved much across many, many quarters; and if you examine the statistics on the degree of diversification and granularity in the portfolio, once again it really hasn't moved across many, many quarters; so those core elements of our strategy, I'd say, are unlikely to change.
Ryan Lynch
analystDavid, you gave some commentary reflecting on how your portfolio has done through this COVID period as you look back. I had one question that's broader. It seems like term structures and yields are rapidly coming back—if they haven't already—to roughly where they were before COVID. But my question goes a bit beyond that. Do you anticipate any permanent shifts or lasting impacts on the direct lending industry after COVID—whether in terms of the players, how those players fund themselves, or where companies—or where direct lenders put their money? I'd just really like to hear your thoughts on any lasting changes you believe could emerge in the direct lending industry after COVID.
David B. Golub
executiveThat's a terrific question, Ryan, and one I've been pondering quite a bit lately. We'll find out whether I'm right, but a hypothesis I'm holding right now is that as we come out of COVID, we'll see a trend that emerged during COVID continue—namely, that the big got bigger; and honestly, we saw that trend before COVID started. The biggest private debt players have been expanding more rapidly than the industry itself has been expanding. So why do I believe COVID might have added to this trend and perhaps crystallized an acceleration of it? It ties back to some remarks I made last quarter. When you consider how hard it is to build new relationships over Zoom, and how hard it is to manage multiple relationships without meeting in person, it follows logically that leading private equity firms will lean toward cutting down the number of relationships they maintain and concentrating more on credit partners of strategic importance. What I believe will further intensify that trend is that we're witnessing somewhat the same phenomenon within private equity. The larger private equity complexes are expanding faster than private equity overall is expanding. And they're building multiple product lines, multiple industries, multiple sized companies that they're working on. So when you consider where the private equity industry is heading, where a smaller number of larger companies will make up the biggest customer pool, they're going to want to work with a smaller number of large-scale private debt managers who, in turn, can offer a variety of different solutions. So I believe that's where we're headed. I believe that's good for Golub Capital. I believe it's probably good for the industry too, because it will lead to a more stable, smarter industry with fewer outlier players who are in and out and, as you mentioned earlier, messing up terms or offering solutions that don't make any sense.
Ryan Lynch
analystUnderstood. Yeah, that's logical. And of course, should those patterns continue, that would clearly be a major positive for Golub and the wider platform you have, considering your size and relationship reach; this may be a straightforward one. But looking at the liquidity on your balance sheet at present, at this moment, you have roughly $27 million of unrestricted cash, $45 million under the Morgan Stanley facility, though that has just been reduced by $75 million, so essentially nothing available there. And then $25 million on your Wells facility, but its reinvestment period concludes in March. So when I consider your liability structure and available capacity along with the cash on the balance sheet, I wanted to hear your thinking on — you had $270 million of growth this quarter. From where would the next $270 million of growth be financed?
David B. Golub
executiveSure; so 2 — good question. Two points on this. First, looking at year-end, the picture is somewhat skewed since we hold a very large amount of restricted cash in the CLOs resulting from year-end or nearly year-end payoffs. So imagine in the period after year-end, a significant number of assets were shifted from bank facilities into securitizations, drawing down that restricted cash and generating more availability in the bank lines. Right now, our liquidity position is quite strong. Still, your question matters — specifically, where do we intend to take the balance sheet next? Looking ahead, we intend to do two things. First, we plan to pursue a corporate revolver. In managing the bilateral bank facilities, one objective is getting the right blend of a new corporate revolver alongside the facilities we already have; so as those talks go on, I'd expect we'll be able to share more with you in the period ahead. The second item is that we do want the unsecured portion of the balance sheet to grow. At the time of our inaugural unsecured deal, we stated plainly that we expect to come back to this market repeatedly—there's no way this will be our final issuance. Ryan, I can't recall whether it was yourself or someone else—but my recollection is that you posed the question about what share of our liability structure should ideally sit in unsecured form. Back then, I responded with a figure above 35%. To reiterate, there's no urgency on our side regarding that step; our priority is confirming we enter that market when conditions are favorable from an execution perspective; nonetheless, my expectation is that we'll seek to expand the unsecured portion of our liability structure as this year progresses.
Ryan Lynch
analystAlright, that's useful. You also provided some pretty solid commentary about how your portfolio has come through COVID and done quite well. But one figure you cited was that 75% of the unrealized losses from the March 2020 quarter had reversed. Which means 25% haven't reversed and are still sitting out there. There are a few ways to look at that, I suppose, but how would you want investors to think about the remaining 25% of unrealized losses that haven't reversed from that March 2020 quarter?
David B. Golub
executiveWell, I'd call it opportunity, right? We saw net income rise substantially across calendar Q2, Q3 and Q4 of 2020 tied to reversals of unrealized losses. Had you asked me right after the March quarter how many quarters the reversals would take, I'd probably have said to expect them to build up over 2 years. As it turned out, 75% of it built up in 3 quarters. So it came faster than I would have expected. I don't think anyone should have assumed that all of it — everything that's going to reverse — would reverse by 12/31. It's reasonable to figure that we hold some loans marked at a discount to NAV — not necessarily a big, sorry, discount to par, not necessarily a big discount to par — that will pay off. And when those loans do pay off, we'll see a reversal — or we may see one sooner if our fair value marks climb back to par. So I don't think a negative conclusion should be drawn from the fact that 25% hasn't reversed yet. The fact that only a very small share of the portfolio sits in Performance Ratings 1 and 2 strikes me as a good sign that not much in the portfolio is truly seriously impaired at the moment. Look, things can change. Surprises happen. COVID surprised us last March. I certainly wasn't expecting a global pandemic. So I'm not claiming there's no risk here; managing risk is the business we're in. But I feel pretty good about where the portfolio stands right now.
David Miyazaki
analystJust a little — and please excuse me if I don't have this at my fingertips or recall it correctly, but I wanted to ask about how GCIC's amortization works. Does that premium get assigned to particular credits, and is that the main thing driving the recognition? Or does some portion of it get straight-lined somehow? I'm just trying to understand how fast it runs off over time.
David B. Golub
executiveIt is tied to specific credits, so it will run off as the credits that GBDC picked up from GCIC get repaid. And I'd really urge you to talk with Jon Simmons and Ross Teune, our resident experts, on this, because it becomes complicated very quickly.
David Miyazaki
analystAll right. All right. I'll accept that invitation. On a — somewhat tangentially related note, could you discuss a bit some other GCIC-type ideas that could be underway at the external manager? What sorts of activities are going on? Are you in the market raising additional funds? Are there further longer-term strategic plans for additional GCIC-like combinations?
David B. Golub
executiveRegarding what's publicly available on that, we have a private BDC whose name is, quite imaginatively, Golub Capital BDC 3, and we're currently in the process of ramping it up; once it is ramped, we'll examine a range of different options for GBDC 3, just as we did with GCIC. A potential merger with GBDC would be one of those options, if we can find a way that works well for everyone to accomplish it and all of the respective Boards and the appropriate shareholder votes go the right way. That could be one of the routes we consider. But no decision has been reached as of now, David, that that's the route we're going to take. As you're aware, we also, at Golub Capital, have a large family of private funds, quite imaginatively named the Golub Capital Partners Funds, and right now we're in the process of fundraising for Golub Capital Partners 14.
David Miyazaki
analystAll right. Has the size of Golub Capital BDC 3 been disclosed by you? Or what amount you're aiming to raise? Just the...
David B. Golub
executiveThat's a public file. A public file it is. Both the fair value of its assets and its commitments are visible to you in the SEC filings.
David Miyazaki
analystAll right. All right. So let me change topics a bit here. Something we've picked up from many of the industry's thriving BDCs was that, before COVID, their credit approach concentrated on businesses that were non-cyclical or that carried some degree of resilience to recession — whether through their scale, their margin safeguards, or simply where they sat within particular sectors. What I'm starting to pick up now is that origination has shifted toward industries and companies that can withstand COVID. And it strikes me there's likely a fairly considerable overlap between those two. I mean, considering how — even though your portfolio came through the pandemic, and looking at the ones that did run into trouble, when you mentioned you figured it would take a couple of years to see this much improvement in unrealized losses. How would you characterize the gap between COVID-resistant and recession-resistant? And I don't expect COVID to disappear anytime soon, but looking ahead, is underwriting for COVID resistance the optimal approach?
David B. Golub
executiveWell, I'd say there are two time horizons to consider. Over the near term, given how much uncertainty surrounds the length of the vaccination effort, and whether a mutant strain emerges that resists vaccines, I believe a lender is wise to concentrate on companies that resist COVID, on borrowers that resist COVID at present. Some hedge fund participants in distressed debt take a different view from mine and are piling into movie theaters, amusement parks, cruise ships, and a range of comparable credits, but that isn't our approach. Over the longer term, if we assume the vaccines work and we return to something resembling normal, I believe one aspect of underwriting will be permanently altered. I doubt I will ever forget what this worldwide pandemic has looked like. And the notion that people gathering in close quarters is a risk factor we must weigh in an underwriting context — I expect that will persist for quite a while. Does that imply every such company gets excluded? Probably not. But does it imply we'll need to build potential new pandemics into our downside case? I believe that would be wise. So it will be interesting to watch how that dynamic unfolds, David. I suspect we'll see different participants answer your question in different ways. Well, thank you all for being with us today. As always, should you have any additional questions, don't hesitate to contact a member of the Golub Capital team; and I look forward to the chance to speak with you again next quarter.
Operator
operatorThis concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.
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