Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

November 22, 2022

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 67 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Hi everyone, and thank you for being with us today. With me is Chris Ericson, our Chief Financial Officer. We're also joined by two new faces today: Matt Benton, who was recently promoted to a new position as Chief Operating Officer of GBDC — please help me congratulate him — and Greg Cashman, who leads the Direct Lending Group at Golub Capital. If you're new to GBDC, our investment strategy is, and has been since we started, to concentrate on providing first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle market businesses that are sponsored by strong, partnership oriented private equity firms. Yesterday, we released our earnings press release covering the quarter and the fiscal year that ended September 30, 2022, and we put an earnings presentation up on our website. We'll be referencing that presentation during today's call. One part of Golub Capital's culture is what we refer to as raise the bar exercises. These are our efforts to make improvements in how we operate. Today, we're introducing a new format for our earnings calls that grew out of one of those raise the bar exercises. We're going to address five topics. First, I'll go over highlights of how GBDC performed for the quarter and for the fiscal year that ended September 30. Second, I'll discuss the macro environment — what we're observing in the economy and what we believe it means for GBDC. Third, Greg Cashman will share some real time market insight on two subjects. You can think of them as defense and offense. On defense, Greg will describe the steps Golub Capital has taken and is taking to manage risk given the heightened macroeconomic uncertainties all of us are facing. And on offense, Greg will discuss the opportunity set for new investments and why we view it as quite attractive right now. Fourth, we'll walk through financial results for the quarter and for the fiscal year in detail. And finally, I'll return to offer some closing remarks and take questions. Before we get started, I also want to note that we intend to file a new and improved investor presentation within the next two weeks. Going forward, we plan to file updates to that presentation every quarter. We hope you'll find it a useful source of additional information about GBDC and about Golub Capital. So, let me begin with highlights for the quarter. The overall headline is that GBDC delivered solid performance, and that's even though it was a second quarter in a row marked by sharp downdrafts in debt and equity markets. The first highlight is that adjusted net investment income was strong. Adjusted NII per share rose 6% to $0.33 from $0.31 per share in the quarter that ended June 30. The rise in adjusted NII per share was driven by higher base rates, continued credit stability, and GBDC's low cost of funding; that said, market downdrafts do affect us too. Mainly because spreads got wider, GBDC recorded unrealized losses during this quarter, and as a result, NAV per share fell 1.7%, moving from $15.14 down to $14.89. The positive side, which we'll revisit shortly, is that from a fundamental standpoint credit quality appears quite solid. Any time a quarter is defined by spread widening, I end up repeating the same point. I say that mark-to-market losses caused by spread widening don't matter over the long term. What does matter is keeping permanent or realized losses to a minimum. If realized credit losses can be avoided, those mark-to-market adjustments get reversed over time — as borrowers repay, as their credit attributes get better, and as market spreads tighten. Fortunately, we believe some reversals of mark-to-market losses will show up in future quarters. And there's additional positive news: with base rates and spreads rising, and with GBDC's funding structure, NII could rise further in the quarters ahead; we'll get into that in greater detail later on this call, which leads me to a second highlight, dividends. In our press release, we announced a 10% raise in GBDC's quarterly base dividend, taking it from $0.30 per share to $0.33 per share, which works out to an 8.9% dividend yield against our 9/30/2022 NAV of $14.89. What's behind this dividend increase? Put simply, higher base rates and higher spreads have boosted GBDC's earnings power; on the asset side of the balance sheet, GBDC's portfolio, consisting almost entirely of floating rate loans, is producing more interest income thanks to higher base rates and higher spreads. The forward rate curve indicates rates will probably climb further from here, and because of lag effects, today's rates and the spread widening aren't yet fully captured in this quarter's earnings. On the liability side of the balance sheet, GBDC has secured low cost, highly flexible debt capital. Roughly half of GBDC's debt consists of fixed rate unsecured notes, and those notes carry an average cost of approximately 2.7%. We think interest income will likely grow more quickly than interest expense in the period ahead, and that means GBDC's earnings power will likely surpass the 8.9% dividend yield GBDC recorded in the 9/30 quarter. We'll share more specifics on this during this call. I'd also point out that GBDC has now fully worked through its “catch up” for the income incentive fee. That means as our portfolio keeps resetting to today's higher base rates, and as we gain from additional base rate increases, 80% of incremental returns will add to GBDC's NII. Going forward, we believe GBDC is well-positioned to produce NII meaningfully above the new quarterly base dividend of $0.33, which gives us flexibility in calendar 2023 to weigh another dividend increase and/or possible supplemental or special dividends. The quarter's third highlight is that GBDC's credit quality is still strong. As you're aware, the way we invest centers on backing resilient businesses, resilient sectors, resilient regions, and resilient proprietors. We steer clear of deeply cyclical or unstable segments such as energy, crypto, real estate, or aviation. And the evidence so far indicates that this approach is delivering results. Let me walk through a handful of key points, which we'll revisit a little later on. Losses we realized during the quarter and across the fiscal year came in low once again and were fully — in fact more than fully — surpassed by gains we realized. During the quarter, realized losses totaled slightly under $1 million, against $4 million in realized gains; across the fiscal year, realized losses amounted to only $2.5 million, compared with $21.4 million in realized gains. More than 90% of the investments held in GBDC's portfolio carried an internal performance rating of 4 or better as of September 30; that figure aligns with the loan performance ratings we saw before COVID, and the share of investments sitting on non-accrual, measured at fair value, likewise stayed low at only 1.3% of our portfolio. Here's the fourth and last key point: GBDC is positioned well for the uncertainties all of us will confront in the period ahead. This isn't our first time facing something like this. In the past, we've steered through tough stretches successfully. In fact, tough stretches have typically proven beneficial for our business and beneficial for our investors.

David Golub

executive
#2

We have shaped GBDC's portfolio so it can withstand both credit risk and interest rate risk. Over 90% of that portfolio is made up of floating rate first lien, first out senior secured loans made to companies we consider resilient, and those companies are backed by private equity sponsors whose relationships with us go deep and stretch back a long way. GBDC's funding structure is highly flexible and durable, with plenty of liquidity. Unsecured, longer dated, unsecured notes account for 47% of its debt funding, and on top of that sits a $1.2 billion corporate revolver that has undrawn capacity and is materially over collateralized. Because of how defensively GBDC is set up, it also happens to be in a great spot to take the offensive, given that the current environment for new originations has become quite appealing; we'll share more specifics on our origination outlook a bit later in this presentation. Put simply, we view GBDC's performance across both the quarter and the fiscal year as strong. So let's zoom out now, examine the broader economic landscape, and break down what that means for GBDC. Golub Capital, as you're aware, brings a distinctive vantage point on the economy; hundreds of middle market companies borrow from us, monthly financial statements arrive from a large number of them, and we're continually talking with a wide range of sharp private equity firms along with their management teams. We essentially get near-instantaneous data and understanding about the slice of the economy we extend credit to. The picture emerging is that things are grinding forward. It isn't surging the way it did twelve months back, yet it continues to move ahead with genuine expansion. Businesses are managing to maintain their top lines, and mostly they're raising their prices roughly in step with inflation. Profitability has slipped somewhat—we'll revisit that subject later—but looking at it from where we sit, shoppers are still opening their wallets and companies are performing fairly well. The key unknown is what happens next. We find ourselves in a puzzling landscape, defined by opposing forces and a remarkably broad spectrum of potential outcomes. Several factors are currently pushing things downward — among them inflation running hot, interest rates climbing, tightening through quantitative measures, shrinking fiscal support, consumers feeling worse, and the hit to wealth caused by the recent steep drops in both stocks and bonds. Yet other forces are pushing upward. Unemployment remains quite low, household finances are mostly in good shape, company earnings continue to be solid even though growth has shown some recent softening, and stockpiles across most durable goods categories stay thin, mainly because of supply chain problems. So basically, we now have multiple forces tugging in opposite directions, and all of this is unfolding while the global landscape remains disrupted. You've got the conflict in Ukraine. You've got friction pitting Russia against Western nations. You've got friction pitting the U.S. against China. You've got friction inside many democracies, splitting right-leaning and left-leaning groups. And on top of that, worries persist about Iran and North Korea, just to give a few examples. So let's return to the central question: what happens next? My hunch is that the answer isn't available to anyone. Say you go looking for some parallel from history and you want to assert, "Well, 2023 is going to be just like…" — I doubt a reliable one exists. This specific blend of forces feels to me like something we've never seen before. Looking at things now, we think the most probable path ahead involves muddling growth, even though plenty of alternative outcomes could play out. So how does that affect GBDC? Given these conditions, we feel the smart approach is to manage GBDC in a way that delivers solid results if our muddling growth prediction turns out correct. At the same time, we need it to withstand surprises. Let me pass things over to Greg Cashman, who leads Direct Lending at Golub Capital, to explain more about how we're juggling both defense and offense given this macro outlook.

Greg Cashman

executive
#3

Appreciate that, David. Let me begin by addressing the way we handle risk given current conditions. I'll cover our present observations, the adjustments we've made, the things we've kept the same, and the fresh investment possibilities we're identifying. Starting with our present observations: as David noted, credit quality at GBDC is broadly holding up well. We've seen minimal realized losses and non-accruals, and our internal performance ratings are in line with what they were before COVID. Those represent several of the quantitative measures we use to evaluate credit performance, and we also gauge our credit results through a qualitative approach, drawing on input from sponsors and management teams. What we're observing right now is that our borrowers essentially fit into one of three categories. The majority are doing well, with profits on the rise. Next, a smaller set of borrowers is expanding somewhat more slowly than anticipated, yet still performing adequately. Last, one group is experiencing declining profits because of margin strain, typically driven by wage pressure, increasing input costs, or a combination of the two. Whenever we speak with sponsors and CEOs at companies in that final category, the usual response is that they've just implemented price hikes or intend to do so soon. The question is whether those increases will hold. And should they hold, will they be sufficient to counterbalance climbing costs? In most instances, they likely will, since we aim to back market leaders that we view as able to withstand inflation. Still, the truth is that it's premature to know for sure. So let's turn to the way we handle risk given what the macro environment is showing us. I'll begin with the things we've kept the same. Our lending remains concentrated on resilient companies, in resilient industries, in resilient geographies, with resilient owners. We steer clear of interest rate sensitive sectors such as homebuilders, as well as heavily cyclical or capital-intensive sectors like E&P and real estate. We concentrate on defensive businesses with robust free cash flow profiles that should perform well across a broad range of economic conditions, even when our outlook on the future isn't especially bright. What have we changed? We believe we're skilled at our work, yet we recognize we aren't flawless. As a result, we're currently scrutinizing potential weak spots. That alone isn't a departure. Spotting issues early has long been central to how we manage the portfolio. What I'd like to emphasize is that we've upgraded our credit monitoring screen, aiming to spot tail risks in a granular, bottom-up, company by company manner. We're closely examining five critical factors. First, interest rates. We're identifying borrowers that might face potential liquidity or cash flow problems stemming from higher base rates. Second, inflation. We're identifying companies vulnerable to shrinking operating margins. That involves a close look at cost drivers and pricing power. Earlier, I noted that not all attempted price hikes by businesses will hold. Therefore, our attention is on situations where pricing strength might have reached its cap. Third, resilience to recession. Certain firms are more vulnerable to downturns than others; specifically, we aim to pinpoint businesses facing substantial danger of declining sales. Fourth, overseas exposure; we seek out firms with significant susceptibility to fluctuations in the U.S. dollar or to clients or vendors located in regions marked by geopolitical strife or economic frailty. And fifth, earnings quality. We examine credits featuring large EBITDA adjustments that might not materialize in reality. The purpose of our strengthened credit oversight now is to pinpoint borrowers at greater risk and direct additional resources toward them, just as we did in March 2020. That sums up our approach to risk. Now, I'd like to discuss opportunity. Put simply, deal activity overall has declined and this is an extremely appealing environment for originating loans. Why has market-wide deal activity fallen? Well, we've recently experienced a drop in the equity markets and in such conditions buyers and sellers struggle to agree on value, sellers hold out for the price they might have received three months ago or six months ago, while buyers refuse to pay that amount. The favorable aspect for us is that our 300+ incumbencies provide strong access to opportunities even when the market for new deals is sluggish. Many of our sponsor clients view dislocations like the current one as excellent chances to expand their platforms through accretive add-ons. This means they require additional capital and the natural place they turn to first is their existing lender. For hundreds of borrowers, that lender is us; in these instances, we are familiar with the company, we are familiar with the management team, and we are familiar with the sponsor. We've observed their performance. And we don't have to negotiate an entirely new credit agreement to provide the capital they require. During times of reduced M&A activity, we usually observe a rise in the share of origination coming from borrowers who return to us. As a reference point, roughly half of our origination volume across the past several years has originated from repeat borrowers. That share is rising significantly and we anticipate it will stay high for the remainder of 2022 and into 2023; and we believe these add-on opportunities are especially appealing. The market is the most favorable to lenders that it has been in recent years. Spreads have expanded by 50 basis points to 100 basis points, leverage has decreased half to a full turn, and documentation terms are more stringent, particularly in areas we care deeply about such as the definition of EBITDA. Consequently, we think the opportunity set in our focus areas ranks among the most appealing since the great financial crisis. With that, I'll hand it over to Chris Ericson to review GBDC's results for the quarter and fiscal year in greater detail.

Chris Ericson

executive
#4

Appreciate that, Greg. Now let’s move to Slide 4, which lays out how we did this quarter versus the one before. At GBDC, adjusted NII per share came in at $0.33, up $0.02 from the previous quarter. On an adjusted basis, net realized and unrealized loss per share was $0.28, mostly reflecting unrealized depreciation tied to spread widening. Adjusted EPS landed at $0.05 per share, and given how debt and equity markets pulled back during the quarter, we consider that a strong result. On to Slide 7. Here you can see the walk from GBDC’s NAV per share of $15.14 at June 30, which slipped 1.7% to $14.89 per share at September 30. Let’s go through each piece. As I noted a moment ago, adjusted NII was $0.33 per share, while dividends paid by the company were $0.30 per share. That adjusted NII was offset by a $0.28 per share loss from the net change in unrealized appreciation and depreciation on investments. In our view, spread widening in the market, not fundamental credit problems, was the main force behind those unrealized losses. Then lastly, net realized appreciation and depreciation produced a gain of $0.01 per share. Slide 10 lays out our origination activity for the quarter. Net funds growth fell quarter-over-quarter, and two main factors drove that: first, in the September 30 quarter, exits and sales of investments ran ahead of new originations; and second, fair value adjustments on existing investments from unrealized depreciation also fed into the negative net funds growth. The asset mix, which you can see in the middle of the slide, stayed roughly in line with what we originated the prior quarter. At the bottom of the slide, the weighted average rate on new investments rose 120 basis points this quarter, reflecting both higher base interest rates and wider asset spreads on new originations. Weighted average spreads on new investments rose 40 basis points versus the prior quarter, going from 5.8% to 6.2%. We think higher benchmark rates together with rising asset spreads lay a foundation for GBDC to generate even better returns in future periods. Slide 11 presents GBDC’s overall portfolio mix. As you can see, the breakdown by investment type held steady quarter-over-quarter, with one-stop loans still making up roughly 85% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 12 shows that GBDC’s portfolio stayed highly diversified by obligor, with an average investment size of about 30 basis points. At September 30, 94% of our investment portfolio consisted of first lien senior secured floating rate loans, defensively positioned in industries we believe to be resilient. I’ll hand things over now to Matt.

Matt Benton

executive
#5

Thanks, Chris. Moving on to Slide 13. A broad observation here is that with rates moving higher, the asset-sensitive character of GBDC's balance sheet really comes into focus. I'll dig into that idea further on the following slide. For now, focusing on what Slide 13 presents, let's begin with the dark blue line, representing our investment income. Keep in mind that investment income encompasses amortization of fees and discounts. GBDC's investment income rose 170 basis points, driven mainly by a mix of climbing interest rates and faster discount amortization resulting from elevated payoffs relative to the previous quarter. In comparison, our cost of debt, shown by the teal line, went up just 70 basis points. Our cost of debt gains considerably from roughly $1.5 billion in unsecured notes carrying fixed rates and a weighted average coupon of 2.7%. Putting these two elements together, our weighted average net investment spread, the green line, rose 100 basis points versus the prior quarter. Importantly, the widening of GBDC's net investment spread, together with GBDC's present GAAP leverage of 1.22x debt-to-equity, has carried GBDC entirely past the catch-up period on the income incentive fee; this means additional gains to our weighted average net investment spread from higher base rates will lift NII. Now let's examine this more closely. On Slide 14, we've measured the possible favorable effect of elevated base rates on GBDC's NII earnings power. The main point is that GBDC's adjusted NII per share is positioned to gain considerably from two significant tailwinds ahead. The first tailwind involves a delay between market base rate changes and when loans in our portfolio reset to elevated base rates, occurring quarterly in most instances. Put differently, GBDC experiences roughly a one-quarter lag effect across its portfolio. The chart here is meant to clarify this pattern for you. In other words, the average LIBOR or SOFR rate GBDC truly received on its investments during the quarter ending 9/30 was considerably below market rates as of 9/30. The second tailwind is that base rates appear set to rise beyond 9/30 levels according to the interest rate forward curve. These tailwinds will be partially offset as GBDC's floating rate liabilities likewise reset to elevated base rates, yet importantly, that effect touches only the 53% of GBDC's debt stack that is floating rate. Put another way, GBDC's floating rate liabilities account for under 30% of GBDC's total funding once its equity capital is factored in. Bear in mind that 95% of its total investment portfolio, equities included, is floating rate. To attempt to measure the possible gain from these tailwinds, Slide 14 presents our estimates of GBDC's adjusted NII per share across two hypothetical scenarios. Let me explain how to interpret this chart. The bar farthest left displays GBDC's actual adjusted NII of $0.33 per share for the quarter ending 9/30. During the quarter, the typical LIBOR rate came in at roughly 300 basis points. The center bar examines what GBDC's adjusted NII per share would have been during the quarter ending 9/30, assuming every floating rate asset and liability had been tied to the quarter-end LIBOR rate of 375 basis points; under that assumption, holding everything else constant, we calculate adjusted NII would have risen 12%, reaching $0.37 per share. The bar on the right takes this one step further, examining what adjusted NII per share would have been had LIBOR stood even higher, at 475 basis points — that's 100 basis points above the actual quarter-end LIBOR. Given that three-month LIBOR currently sits above 460 basis points and is expected to exceed 5% by January of next year, we view this as a realistic scenario. So this scenario captures both the lag effect and the higher rates we anticipate going forward. Holding everything else constant, we calculate adjusted NII would have risen 24%, reaching $0.41 per share. The key takeaway: we believe GBDC's NII per share carries substantial built-in momentum simply from the higher LIBOR rates that have already happened but haven't yet made their way into GBDC's results; we're not factoring in net funds growth, nor are we factoring in wider spreads on existing investments, for instance, from amendment activity, increased payoffs, or non-accruals. Those, in our view, represent potential drivers of additional NII upside. If you'd like to drill down further, you'll find more detail on GBDC's asset sensitivity in the Form 10-K. Now let's turn to Slides 15 and 16 and examine credit quality metrics more closely; on Slide 15, you can see that the count of non-accrual investments as of 9/30 stayed flat at eight investments versus 6/30. That's because the disposition of one non-accrual investment was offset by one new non-accrual investment being added; additionally, after quarter-end, one of these eight non-accrual investments was disposed of for proceeds somewhat above fair value as of 9/30. On Slide 16, as David noted earlier, internal performance ratings have remained strong and stable. More than 90% of investments carry an internal performance rating of 4 or higher, meaning they are performing as expected or better than expected at underwriting; and just 1.3% of investments carry an internal performance rating of 2 or lower, meaning they are performing materially below expectations at underwriting. We'll skip slides 17 through 21. Those slides contain more detail on GBDC's financial statements, dividend history, and other key metrics. The final slide I want to cover before returning it to David is Slide 22. We believe GBDC has meaningful value embedded in its funding structure. Our stable, flexible, and low-cost funding structure helps us play offense in the attractive environment for new investments that Greg described earlier. At the close of the quarter, we had roughly 800 million in available liquidity, made up of unrestricted cash, undrawn capacity on our corporate revolver—which is significantly over collateralized—and the unsecured revolver we have through our advisor that remains unused. When we look at our GAAP debt-to-equity ratio net of unrestricted cash as of 9/30, it stood at 1.17x. Unsecured notes account for 47% of our debt funding, and most of those come due in 2026 and 2027. Those fixed rate notes were issued at a weighted average coupon of 2.7%, and we chose not to swap them into floating rate. For the quarter that closed September 30, our weighted average cost of debt came in at 3.7%, which we think ranks among the lowest across our peer group of publicly traded BDCs. Our view is that this funding structure gives us a meaningful competitive advantage, and we expect that to remain the case. Now I'll hand things back to David for his closing remarks and the Q&A.

David Golub

executive
#6

Appreciate that, Matt. As a recap, GBDC delivered a solid showing across both the quarter and the fiscal year that closed on September 30. Net interest income got a lift from elevated base rates along with wider spreads, and it's probable that each of those will climb even more. Credit quality stayed robust, realized losses stayed modest, and we announced a dividend raise for GBDC, plus we signaled our view that the company might look at another increase down the road. On that note, I'll turn the line over for questions.

Jordan Wathen

analyst
#7

Hello there, and good morning. Jordan Wathen here, sitting in for Fin today. Thanks for providing the details — oh, good afternoon. Thanks for the information regarding NOI upside driven by increasing rates. I'm simply wondering, and perhaps you can offer some background concerning how climbing rates could affect the interest coverage of the companies you lend to, recognizing that this may not matter for certain of those recurring revenue loans, but possibly for the broader portfolio overall?

David Golub

executive
#8

Well, we face several headwinds bearing down on borrowers over the next several months. A slowing economy is one place those headwinds come from. We addressed that to some degree during our prepared remarks. Higher base rates represent a second place those headwinds come from. Now, the stories differ as widely as the borrowers themselves across some of the conversations we've recently had with investors. I've been emphasizing what I believe is really the key takeaway: that average interest coverage ratios don't actually tell you very much. As lenders, our losses don't come from average credits; our losses come from the tail. Our worst credits are where we lose money; that's the reason I found what Greg Cashman said during today's call so significant. What we believe we ought to be doing at present on the defensive front is conducting a detailed, bottoms up examination of every loan we hold so we can pinpoint those that are most exposed. Part of what creates that exposure, Jordan, involves the effect of increasing rates. Borrowers face additional sources of trouble in the current environment too. In my view, that detailed approach is the correct method for safeguarding the portfolio. Drawing much of a conclusion from interest coverage ratios alone doesn't seem very possible to me. Let me offer another illustration of why I consider interest coverage ratios troublesome. EBITDA adjustments have been among the biggest points of friction during investment committee conversations and talks with sponsors across the past couple of years. When people compute interest coverage, typically they aren't relying on cash EBITDA; they're relying on an adjusted EBITDA. And adjustments won't buy you beer. So once more, if credit were simple, if a collection of formulas and ratios could capture everything, I suppose that would hurt our business, since it would suggest investors have no need for us to exercise credit judgment. I don't believe it's simple. I believe credit is extremely hard and demands a substantial amount of judgment. This strikes me as an area that demonstrates that point. Interest coverage will be something all of us need to examine going forward loan by loan, in light of how the company is performing. Is it expanding? Is it shrinking? What cash taxes, what CapEx, what other cash needs matter for that particular company? I apologize if my tone comes across as heated here, but it bothers me how much attention gets paid to a single ratio. In my view, it doesn't reveal a great deal.

Jordan Wathen

analyst
#9

No, I appreciate that. Let me try asking it another way. Have amendment requests and amendments gone up at all lately? Would you say they're forward-looking? Perhaps somewhat concerned about where their interest costs are headed over, say, the next 6 to 12 months?

David Golub

executive
#10

So no, we really haven't yet seen more amendment requests come in, but my belief is that we will. I think the stretch ahead will bring far more difficulties for borrowers and lenders alike than the stretch we've just come through. So will there be businesses that wind up in credit stress more so in 2023 than in 2022? Yes. Will more amendments be needed? Yes. Will rising rates be behind some of those amendments? Yes. I don't believe we're feeling the full effect yet, since we're still at an early point in this credit cycle and since rate increases have happened fairly quickly, but all of that's on its way.

Jordan Wathen

analyst
#11

All right, and if I may squeeze in one final question here. This quarter, roughly $2 million in deferred interest income made its way into the top line. Was that tied to Paradigm, to the nonaccrual exit, or possibly to the dermatology associates company returning to accrual status? I'd just like to know if you could sort of break that out for us.

David Golub

executive
#12

Chris Ericson, give me a hand with this one. My belief is it's the second item Jordan brought up, but please verify.

Chris Ericson

executive
#13

Yeah. He's correct. It's both, both of them. We saw some topside benefits.

Jordan Wathen

analyst
#14

Okay. Thanks. That's everything I had.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#15

Hello, and nice work on the quarter. To press a bit on credit quality for the forward outlook more than anything else, you've heard plenty of remarks regarding margin pressure, and so forth — has any of that shown up in end demand? Looking at the new non-accrual, from my vantage point it appears to be, arguably, what we might call a semi-discretionary health care business, perhaps; and that's the sort of thing, clearly, where at the margin a consumer could cut back on usage. So, are you observing anything along those lines, or is it — as you suggested, correct — is it entirely margin right now on labor costs or input costs, and so on?

David Golub

executive
#16

Well, I'm reluctant to say entirely, Robert, since, as you know, circumstances differ throughout a portfolio as big as ours, yet the dominant pattern is businesses holding their revenues steady, and in lots of instances still expanding revenues. If they're delivering results that disappoint, the cause isn't a revenue shortfall; the cause is a margin shortfall. And once you peel back another layer of the onion to grasp why a margin shortfall exists — it's, once again, the most frequent patterns involve wage increases and raw material price increases that they have not yet may not be able to. So, when I say have not yet, I don't mean to imply it's guaranteed they will manage to, but they have not yet passed through in the form of price increases. I believe that reflects not only what we've experienced at Golub Capital. I believe that's largely what we're observing beyond our portfolio, and also inside our portfolio.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#17

Understood. Thanks for that. If I may, just one more. I realize you've mentioned that conditions out there favor lenders more. Where exactly did the biggest change show up? Clearly, spreads have been getting wider, but is it mostly the EBITDA definition that's gotten better, or is it the OID? Could you share any detail on, you know, which places have shifted the most?

David Golub

executive
#18

I wouldn't point to a single item, Robert. Several things are involved at once. So, you brought up wider spreads. That's true — I'd put them frequently at 50 basis points to 100 basis points wider. OID, in my view, has improved. OID along with closing fees frequently rise by an extra 1%, not in every case, but frequently. Call protection has gotten stronger; documentation terms have gotten better when it comes to the EBITDA definition and especially the capping of adjustments; so, no single piece. I doubt it ever is. When market conditions swing from favoring borrowers to favoring lenders, or the other way around, the change usually spreads over multiple dimensions at the same time.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#19

That's helpful, thanks.

Jeffrey Bernstein

analyst
#20

Hello. To start, nice work on the quarter, and I genuinely value how this call was structured today along with the openness, so thank you. I was hoping you could expand a bit on demand elasticity, especially as it relates to your companies. Clearly, around us, businesses are posting 5% sales growth against a 10% price hike, yet unit volumes are falling, and eventually that seems unsustainable, but could you speak more concretely about the types of businesses you extend credit to and how you approach elasticity?

David Golub

executive
#21

What you're raising is precisely the correct issue, and before I go further, let me say upfront that I believe nobody has the complete answer at this point. That's impossible for us. This cycle and this stretch of climbing prices are still too young. When I review the portfolio and once more hunt for trends, some businesses find it simple to push through higher prices with little effect on demand. Take, for instance, a business-to-business software firm that is mission critical, holds a 98% renewal rate, and whose core product value proposition centers on saving clients money. Such a company enjoys substantial pricing power. Now consider the opposite end, where firms may face greater strain given today's conditions. Picture a restaurant chain simultaneously absorbing higher protein costs and rising wage rates, which is far tougher. Consequently, I believe we will witness growing divergence in results across the coming several quarters. We'll gain far better insight into which businesses possess pricing power and which ones might be nearing the limit of it. My sense is that our portfolio will hold up rather well through this, though we won't escape entirely without damage. The current climate differs from anything observed throughout the past 15 years, and what we anticipated — management teams haven't faced this situation before, so I think all of us must acknowledge a shared amount of learning and uncertainty in these conditions.

Jeffrey Bernstein

analyst
#22

That's excellent. Then there's one additional item from me. This concerns a tail risk, though clearly, since we've gotten through COVID, it's a pretty apparent sort of tail risk. That would be exposure to China, exposure in the China supply chain, and so forth. As you know, things stay fine right up until they aren't. So, what's your thinking on this? How do you discuss it with your companies, and so forth?

David Golub

executive
#23

Supply chain challenges have been a major topic, not only now, but truly across the past, well, ever since COVID arrived; thus, we've been collaborating with sponsors and with borrowers regarding supply chain matters for quite a while. I'd say, broadly speaking, they're improved relative to before, not fully solved, yet substantially better than they once were. I believe where you're going is, if China keeps up its zero COVID policy and/or if fresh geopolitical strains emerge between the U.S. and China, might that circumstance deteriorate? Might that develop a different character? And I think the response to that is yes; so, I think management teams once more, this is recent over the past couple of years. I think management teams regard China supply chain risk differently than it was regarded several years back. I think it's regarded now as something requiring management where contingency plans, you know, need to be at the ready. And I think that pattern will probably persist.

Jeffrey Bernstein

analyst
#24

That's excellent. Many thanks.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#25

Hello there, and good afternoon. I appreciate you answering my question, and well done on a solid quarter. I've just got one or two items here, mostly regarding the software ARR lending piece within your portfolio. Since it represents a bigger share of the portfolio, and since it has proven to be a fairly fruitful market segment for numerous lenders, I'm simply wondering how leverage multiples have performed for software loans in that space. I'm drawing on what I can observe from public equity markets. Clearly, plenty of software businesses have declined substantially during this year — again, that's in public equity pricing, naturally — and we've witnessed quite a few prominent tech firms declaring layoffs, and so forth. I'm simply wondering how that market has performed. And I'm attempting to determine whether there might be some kind of headwind, I suppose, when it comes to those businesses themselves regarding software renewal rates, revenue growth, and similar matters.

David Golub

executive
#26

That's a wonderful question, and allow me to attempt a nuanced response, since I believe a nuanced response is warranted. To begin with, when considering the types of borrowers we hold within our recurring revenue loan segment, it's genuinely crucial to grasp that these aren't the consumer-oriented tech businesses listed on public markets that have experienced enormous valuation drops. We don't extend credit to firms such as Facebook and Snap and Netflix that serve consumers directly. Our lending goes to businesses that are mission critical business-to-business software companies. Why does that matter so much? It matters a great deal because demand doesn't swing with the same volatility. When you're backing a mission critical business-to-business software firm, chances are strong that you're examining a business enjoying extremely high recurring revenues. You're also, in the instance of one of our RRL borrowers, quite likely examining a business showing considerable revenue growth momentum. They possess a value proposition for prospective customers that convinces those prospective customers they can achieve substantial savings by adopting a new software product. Consequently, this business model is inherently far more resilient than plenty of the businesses whose valuations have dropped on public markets. That said, funding for such businesses comes mostly from venture firms and late stage venture firms, along with early stage private equity firms, a number of which hold investments crossing over into technology sectors that haven't performed well. Therefore, we're certainly observing a rising appetite for the sorts of businesses we've traditionally led to, that pricing on new RRL loans is considerably higher, considerably better than previously, and that these businesses find it tougher to raise additional revenue at valuations representing upticks from their prior round. As a result, there's greater enthusiasm on their side for turning to debt capital instead of diluted equity. In my view, there's substantial potential ahead for us in this category. As you might remember, we got in quite early — you could even say we created this space back around 2014 and 2015. Over the years, it's treated us well. Then, during the couple of years leading up to roughly April or May of this year, we had actually stepped back somewhat from this category, since we felt the competitive intensity had become excessive and prices had dropped too far. So it's encouraging to observe that a portion of that trend has turned around across the past couple of months.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#27

Paul, thanks. That makes sense, and it's quite fascinating. My final question ties into that thread. Could you help us picture these businesses, or the sorts of potential businesses — you mentioned Golub, software firms that Golub aims to fund in that space — are they ones that already hit some attractive level when it comes to producing cash flow, or would you describe them as still moving along some kind of path toward a cash flow generation goal, or perhaps, to build on that, is the emphasis less on those two things and more simply on the top-line revenue growth?

David Golub

executive
#28

Within our recurring revenue loan segment, the priority is strategic value should events not unfold as anticipated. Thus, a secondary exit analysis comes first. Should we be mistaken and this company's push to expand quickly and pour substantial capital into growth, if that push proves to be a poor choice, does a base business remain that is sufficiently big, sufficiently significant, and sufficiently shielded that a strategic buyer would find it valuable? And would that strategic buyer pay a price sufficient to keep us from losing money? So generally, such loans carry a fairly modest loan-to-value, yet they look elevated against conventional credit measures such as loan-to-EBITDA or loan-to-cash flow. And beneath all this, these businesses have affirmatively chosen to pursue swift expansion. They intend to spend heavily on sales and marketing so as to encourage swift expansion, sacrificing profitability in the process. That is precisely why assessing credit for these businesses matters so much, since we aren't relying on their ability to produce cash to cover interest and principal. Consequently, we must have great confidence in their strategic value.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#29

Understood. Thanks for that response. That's quite useful; I have nothing further.

David Miyazaki

analyst
#30

My apologies. I appreciate you fielding my question. David, I'd like to go back to a few things you said during your opening remarks concerning certain opposing forces currently at play. Across the BDC sector, as we've moved through results for the past 2 quarters, what we've observed is — just about everyone has gained from elevated benchmark rates. And we really haven't observed a meaningful uptick in defaults. So at first glance, it would appear that, broadly speaking, the risk-return characteristics of middle market lending have improved. Yet I believe most people are anticipating that non-accruals will climb. So, given improved yields, improved yield spreads, elevated interest rates, stronger covenants, and a possible recession, would you say the risk-return characteristics of your lending activity are improving or deteriorating compared with what we've witnessed in recent years?

David Golub

executive
#31

Well, the response is that it's simultaneously better and worse, and all things considered, I'd say better. Allow me to break that down. Should we experience continued muddling growth and possibly a further slowdown from this point and possibly a recession, those are — at the risk of pointing out what's evident — those are drawbacks on the credit side and one would reasonably anticipate those to drive up credit losses, defaults, non-accruals, degrade performance ratings, heighten volatility surrounding credit outcomes, all of which are drawbacks when viewed through a risk-reward lens. Meanwhile, we have several tailwinds working in our favor. You named a few of them, David. Among them is rising rates. Simply having base rates that are 4% higher by itself covers a meaningful portion of credit losses. Another is wider spreads on newly originated loans; as we've discussed, spreads are extremely appealing at present. A third is that we've made a number of fair value mark-to-market adjustments reflecting the wider spread environment, and barring negative credit events, those will begin to reverse gradually as loans get repaid or as credit conditions for those companies, those particular companies, get better or as spreads begin to tighten once more. So, regarding your question, we have both types of forces. We have forces pushing toward greater risk and we have forces pushing toward greater return. My personal view at this moment is that the balance tilts favorably, yet I think I must remain humble here and acknowledge, you know, we have — we could be mistaken, correct? I mean, the central evaluation here has 2 parts. There's a macro component and a micro component. The macro component is, do you believe we're headed for a stretch of muddling growth or a stretch of severe recession? Those 2 are not the same. Then, regarding the second point, the micro part involves evaluating how our portfolio will endure given the macroeconomic backdrop. At this moment, my sentiment is — I hold the opinion that sluggish growth is a more probable outcome than a deep downturn, and that our portfolio will endure rather well. I believe those are the essential standards, the essential factors that investors will have to evaluate.

David Miyazaki

analyst
#32

So, considering the extended cycles you've been through, would you say we're somewhat above average or somewhat below average when it comes to return relative to risk, taking those two factors together?

David Golub

executive
#33

That's genuinely tough to respond to. I'm not certain how to approach that when we consider lengthy cycles. The period I most enjoy lending… Apologies. Please continue.

David Miyazaki

analyst
#34

I was about to mention this, and I'll give you a bit of background on it. Consider our exposure to lending in the middle market, plus how that asset class's appeal may increase or decrease when rates drop, covenants loosen, and spreads compress. The return component typically suffers, while simultaneously the danger grows since covenants are weakening. So it appears as though, at this moment, even though we're heading into somewhat of an economic downturn — whether recession or muddling through — despite that apparently being ahead of us, when you compare return and risk to other moments in the cycle, the middle market lending asset class appears — from what you're saying — to be slightly superior to what it is most of the time. And I'm considering how your publicly traded stock, on one hand, would suggest — since it trades at a valuation below the typical level — that a lot of investors disagree with that view. Meanwhile, I'm wondering what your limited partners are telling you on the institutional side. Do they perceive middle market lending as a more appealing area? So that's roughly where I'm attempting to determine how your perspective compares to those two groups?

David Golub

executive
#35

That's a fascinating point, David. I certainly believe that, looking at how institutional investors feel at present, there's a broad perception that compared to traditional fixed income — which has done dreadfully versus public equities — and compared to numerous other alternative categories, middle market lending has delivered solid results and holds strong potential going forward. Thus, we continue to observe capital moving within the institutional world toward this segment, with one caveat. That caveat is the so-called denominator effect, which means institutions that have target percentages of their portfolios allocated to equities are in fact trying to boost their dollar amounts in equities at this time, because the drop in equity markets has left them below those target percentages. So there's a curious tension in conversations with institutional investors currently: they'd prefer to be reducing equities, yet their portfolio management rules are indicating they ought to be increasing public equities. To return to what you asked, I believe this is a very compelling moment for most investors to be raising their allocations to our asset class, mainly because finding other asset classes that are doing well and are apt to do well looking ahead is so difficult. So I'd echo your assessment — I think this is a favorable time to put money into the space from a long-cycle risk-reward perspective. I'd also say that risk-reward is partly relative, and during a stretch when rates are climbing, it's tough to feel enthusiastic about traditional fixed income. I'd say that even though public equity markets have fallen back from their peak levels, most investors still don't see them as inexpensive. I'd like to hear what you think about that.

David Miyazaki

analyst
#36

Honestly, my ability to see the future is worse than yours. If I examine how the public markets are valuing BDCs, it seems like there's a significant gap at the moment between how those businesses are actually performing and what their valuations suggest — many companies with genuinely strong operating results are trading at levels that are historically cheap. So a disconnect clearly exists, and I can't tell whether that's simply due to the public markets frequently getting things wrong, or whether they're correctly forecasting an environment of suboptimal return relative to risk when it comes to lending to middle market companies. In my view, you're correct that private credit's standout performance is worth noting, though some of it stems from a shorter duration profile combined with a period of rising interest rates. Still, if default rates stay at low levels, that is truly the crux of the matter. It will determine whether this environment offers a genuinely attractive return relative to risk. So, I also wish my ability to see the future were stronger.

David Golub

executive
#37

The questions you're raising are the right ones. I share your view on the approach you're taking. I also agree with how you've framed it — we'll only truly understand this looking back, once we see where defaults and credit losses end up. And that, I believe, is the judgment those of us investing need to reach at this point.

David Miyazaki

analyst
#38

Excellent. Thank you so much. I appreciate you taking the time.

David Golub

executive
#39

Thank you, David.

Ronald Phillis

analyst
#40

Hello, Dave. I appreciate it—and I should mention this is my initial time participating in the call. I'd like to express gratitude to you for fielding some fairly tough questions without sidestepping them. That's quite useful. Our firm invests in your LPs rather than the BDC, which explains why I'm here; and I believe the majority of what I wanted to ask has already been covered, and my plan was to follow up along the same path as Dave, the earlier questioner, but you handled things so lucidly that I want to say thanks once more. There's one area where I lack clarity, since it's somewhat less visible and relates to my effort to grasp the attractive market circumstances currently in place—specifically, how money has been flowing into private credit markets across, say, 3-month, 6-month, and 9-month periods, from both institutional and retail channels? My understanding is that retail—assuming I have this right—the retail figures entering private credit have represented the most recent source of expansion for that market. And that's what I wanted to ask. Thank you.

David Golub

executive
#41

Of course. I appreciate the question. Let's break this into 2 parts. We'll examine demand and supply. Regarding demand, private debt offers several avenues for growth. First, there's expansion of the private equity ecosystem, which has increased substantially across the past 10 years, and judging by fundraising activity and available dry powder within private equity, that ecosystem will probably keep expanding. Second, private debt is capturing additional share from the broadly syndicated market. The count of private equity borrowers who now turn to private debt providers instead of issuing broadly syndicated loans has risen quite sharply, and I believe this shift in share toward private debt will persist. So, multiple forces are driving demand upward; regarding supply, we've observed various capital sources. There's the BDC segment. There's the institutional segment that David Miyazaki mentioned. And over the past 2 years, via the non-traded BDC segment, we've witnessed retail's expansion. Data on retail fund flows comes out with a delay, so I lack solid visibility into current conditions. What I can say is that beginning in May, there's been a rather notable deceleration in fresh fund flows entering non-traded BDCs. That isn't unexpected given how much volatility markets have generally experienced and the drop in publicly traded market valuations. So, at present, I'd characterize things as something of a supply-demand imbalance, with demand substantially exceeding supply, which is producing the more borrower-friendly environment.

Ronald Phillis

analyst
#42

Thanks for that. I appreciate it.

David Golub

executive
#43

Well, I would like to use this moment to express gratitude to each of you for being with us on today's call. We value your partnership. Should there be any question we didn't address that you were hoping to have answered, don't hesitate to contact Chris, Matt, or myself, and any of us would gladly follow up with you, and we're eager to speak with you once more next quarter. Many thanks.

Operator

operator
#44

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you all for joining. You may now disconnect.

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