Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
February 9, 2023
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
David Golub
executiveHello, everyone, and thanks for joining us. Alongside me are our Chief Financial Officer, Chris Ericson; Matt Benton, our Chief Operating Officer; and Greg Cashman, the head of Golub Capital's Direct Lending Group. For those of you just getting to know GBDC, the approach we take to investing — and have taken from the very beginning — centers on supplying first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses that have the backing of strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. We released our earnings press release yesterday covering the quarter that closed on December 31, 2022, and an earnings presentation is now available on our website; we plan to reference that presentation throughout today's call. Just like the prior quarter, we're using a fresh format for these calls, and under that format I'll begin by covering the headlines and giving an overview. So let's get into the headlines. GBDC delivered a solid quarter, in line with what we talked about three months ago; net investment income grew strongly and credit trends were largely steady. The shift has come in how we see the macro picture. During the past two or three quarters, I've described conditions as carrying exceptionally high uncertainty. My sense is that this uncertainty is diminishing now, and we are in — and probably will remain in — a stretch of muddling growth. Later on, I'll go deeper into what I mean by that, the way we're handling it, and the reasons a muddling growth situation could actually work in Golub Capital BDC's favor. Following that, Chris and Matt will walk everyone through the quarter's financial statements piece by piece. Then I'll return at the end for a few closing comments and to field questions. One more thing before we begin: in the coming weeks, we plan to file our quarterly equity investor presentation. As you may remember from last quarter, I noted that this presentation is a new one for us, and our intention is to refresh it every quarter. We trust this will serve as a helpful resource for extra details regarding GBDC and Golub Capital. All right. We'll begin by reviewing how we did during the quarter. On a per-share basis, adjusted NII rose 12%, reaching $0.37, compared with $0.33 per share for the quarter that closed September 30, 2022. That works out to a 10% adjusted NII return on equity. Higher base rates and wider spreads were the main forces behind the rise in adjusted NII per share. As you may remember from the earnings call we held last quarter, we said then that higher base rates and wider spreads had significantly boosted GBDC's capacity to generate earnings. Because that earnings power improved, we chose last quarter to lift GBDC's quarterly dividend by 10%, bringing it to $0.33 per share. In our view, both GBDC's record adjusted NII per share for the quarter that closed 12/31 '22 and its 112% dividend coverage ratio confirm that raising the dividend was the right move. I'll return to how we're approaching the dividend from here in my closing remarks. If we turn to credit trends in GBDC's portfolio, conditions were largely stable, and realized credit losses remained modest. Actually, GBDC posted a net realized gain of $0.02 per share for the quarter, because gains on equity co-investments outweighed realized losses by a comfortable margin; that's been a consistent pattern since GBDC began operations; during the quarter we did observe some additional spread widening, which contributed to incremental unrealized losses. A small number of borrowers, as we expected, also showed somewhat softer credit performance, reflected in a modest uptick in nonaccruals and a modest increase in the percentage of our borrowers falling within performance rating categories 1, 2 and 3. Even so, when you step back, what stands out is that credit quality keeps holding up well, the businesses we back are largely in good shape and growing, and I'll walk through that in greater depth shortly. All things considered, we view GBDC's results for fiscal Q1 as fairly strong. Ahead of Matt Benton and Chris Ericson taking you through the numbers, I'd like to turn to something else and spend a few moments on how we see things going forward. Spending time on what lies ahead before we've finished digging into the quarter we just closed might strike you as a little strange, but there is a reason behind doing it this way. Since our previous earnings call, our forecast has shifted, and that shift affects how we should think about the main issues we're tracking and that we believe investors ought to be tracking too. A major theme we raised last year was our view that we had entered a stretch of atypical uncertainty. I noted that an unusually large set of strong forces were pressing on the economy while pulling in divergent directions—inflation, climbing interest rates, choppy energy and other commodity prices, and shifting consumer behavior after the pandemic. Regarding the conflict in Ukraine — I noted that those various forces made forecasting our direction quite hard, and we believed the set of believable outcomes for the next stretch was exceptionally broad. Lately, though, that set of believable outcomes has, I think, become substantially tighter. A good amount of ambiguity remains. Even so, from where we sit, the figures from the past several months indicate that inflation has slowed down dramatically already, and indicate that borrowing costs sit close to what will probably be their highest points. Expenses tied to occupancy, plus prices for energy and commodities, are broadly coming down. The jobless figure has remained at a low level, and how consumers act has shifted much less than numerous people had worried it would. What does all of this add up to? A deep recession seems far less likely now than it did 3 to 6 months ago. Meanwhile, chances are greater that we'll experience an extended stretch of muddling growth — and it will probably last quite a while. Given this revised outlook, what does it mean for GBDC? From where we sit, it makes us more confident about how we'd answer 3 key questions that come up often from investors — those 3 questions. Question one: what's the current state of GBDC's portfolio? Question two: during 2023 or 2024, should credit losses be expected to spike? And question three: taking everything into account, will write-downs keep growing? Alternatively, could it be that certain write-downs GBDC previously took end up being reversed? All three of these inquiries warrant deeper examination. The first I'll take on personally, Greg Cashman will be with me for the second, and Matt Benton will then address the third. Now, the initial question: how does the portfolio look? Things are going well. Some weeks ago, we released the Golub Capital Middle Market Report covering the fourth calendar quarter, and it showed something unexpected on the upside. Compared with the second and third calendar quarters, median profit growth accelerated, and it exceeded inflation by a substantial amount. That marked a sharp contrast with the 2 quarters before, when median profit growth came in much lower. Median revenue growth remained solid in calendar Q4, in line with earlier quarters. The figures for both revenue growth and profit growth came in above what we had expected, and that held true across all 4 sectors we monitor: consumer, health care, industrials and technology. In our view, these strong results show that our borrowers are coping well with the headwinds that emerged in the spring.
David Golub
executiveNext question: should we expect a sharp rise in credit losses? My response comes in 2 sections. First, I'll explain an approach I consider poor for addressing this. After that, I'll turn it over to Greg Cashman to go through an approach I consider superior. The poor approach relies on a shortcut. It would be wonderful if a fast-to-assemble or simply grasped collection of quantitative metrics could settle the matter. Indeed, certain folks attempt exactly that. I'm not aiming to single out particular competitors, yet a lot of them currently display graphs focused on average interest coverage ratios. At times, those graphs also illustrate outcomes for such ratios under varying scenarios regarding climbing interest rates or shrinking EBITDA at the underlying company. Charts like these appear informative. Allow me to explain my view that they aren't. To begin, interest coverage equals EBITDA split by interest expense — appears simple enough. Yet what counts as EBITDA? Do we mean GAAP EBITDA, credit agreement EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, or yet another metric — especially amid fast shifts and uncertainty matching our present moment? Every one of those metrics has flaws, and not a single one captures what truly matters: future earning power along with future ability to produce free cash flow. The bottom half of the fraction, interest expense, creates trouble too. Which period serves as your baseline? Have you incorporated the forward curve? Have you incorporated hedges or caps the borrower might hold? Once more, this method fails to capture what truly matters: future interest expense, net of hedges, across the coming several years. An additional issue: the analysis presumes ceteris paribus. It presumes nothing else shifts. Yet nothing else seldom stays fixed. What truly matters is learning whether the borrower confronts deteriorating circumstances such as mounting wage pressure, pressure on raw materials, or intensifying competition. We need to learn which kinds of surprises demand our attention, plus the odds of those surprises occurring. Presuming nothing else shifts dodges every one of those essential questions. Now a fourth issue with the analysis. Issue number four: strong management teams alongside strong business owners adjust when things change. COVID-19 made that unmistakably clear. No sensitivity analysis could have revealed which firms would handle lockdowns effectively and which would not. Last of all, the most significant issue: even supposing every measurement I just covered is right, this analysis only reveals the effect on your typical borrower. Skilled lenders never take losses on their typical borrower — they take losses on their weakest one, or what statisticians label the tail. Right off the bat, I can say that at December 31, 2022, the weighted average interest coverage ratio for Golub Capital's direct lending portfolio overall stood at 2.4x, and GBDC's weighted average comes close to matching that entire direct lending portfolio; honestly, though, I don't believe that gives you any real insight. So what would work better? Well, perhaps several methods are worthwhile. Still, let me describe the method we've adopted — one we've put to the test across many business cycles spanning over 28 years, and one that I believe sits at the core of how we've outperformed and delivered premium returns that stay consistent over time. I'll turn things over to Greg, who will walk through our method in detail.
Greg Cashman
executiveThanks, David. Our approach can be boiled down to a single sentence: nothing beats detailed, loan-by-loan credit work. During the prior quarter's earnings call, I noted that we had strengthened how we monitor credit in light of the tough conditions. Because of our size, one big advantage is that whenever we encounter a difficult stretch—like the one that began over the summer—we're able to shift a portion of our more than 170 investment professionals from offense to defense. We were able to, and in fact did, move resources away from underwriting fresh transactions and toward combing through the portfolio for weaknesses. After that, we examine, one at a time, every business we flag as vulnerable. To be specific, beginning last summer, we went company by company through Golub Capital's whole middle market loan portfolio. Six main risk factors were the focus of our review. Number one: we searched for a set of businesses facing possible liquidity or cash flow problems stemming from higher base rates. Number two: we sought out businesses exposed to shrinking operating margins; that required a close look at cost drivers and at pricing power. Number three: we examined resilience to recession. Certain businesses are more recession-prone than others. We hunted for businesses carrying meaningful danger of declining revenues, working capital deterioration, growth in accounts payable, and comparable weaknesses. Number four: we hunted for businesses significantly exposed either to a stronger U.S. dollar or to customers or suppliers located in regions of geopolitical tension or economic frailty, for example Europe and China. Number five: we examined credits carrying large amounts of EBITDA adjustments that might never actually materialize. And last, we examined concerns unique to our software company investments. We search for businesses with substantial quantities of high-margin transactional or other nonrecurring revenue. Our initial screen wrapped up near the close of summer. From that point, the work moved forward across 3 distinct phases. During Phase 1, the direct lending team at Golub Capital assembled a leadership working group made up of me, our co-heads of underwriting, and our Head of workouts. For brevity, I'll refer to this group as DL leadership. Based on how many risk factors we identified and how serious they were — the ones I went through earlier — DL leadership put together a first group of credits to examine more closely. We created our own template for portfolio resiliency memos, and it let us dig into the specifics of the 6 main risk factors I brought up. For every credit on that priority list, our field teams put together a resiliency memo, then passed it along to DL leadership so they could review it further and talk it over. Then came Phase 2: field teams wrote up and submitted a portfolio resiliency memo for another set of credits that DL leadership picked out, and we treated those as less urgent. On top of that, deal teams put together a detailed resiliency model spanning over 100 credits, and that's what helped us decide what to prioritize for Phase 3. In Phase 3, the deal teams put together and submitted a resiliency memo. It covered a third wave of credits, which DL leadership picked based on the Phase 3 resiliency models. In total, 60 portfolio companies received a deep-dive, bottoms-up analysis across Phases 1, 2, and 3. An additional 88 portfolio companies that could be exposed to one or more key risk factors were screened and modeled during Phase 2, and they were determined not to be priorities for further analysis at this time. That wraps up what we did. Now let's move on to what we learned. Based on our work so far, we have 2 key learnings. To start, our review led us to determine that the number of fragile businesses in our portfolio is limited. Said differently, we saw a reassuring level of durability across most of the portfolio companies we examined closely — reassuring, though not unexpected, given that resilience sits at the heart of how we underwrite, and we are extremely choosy about the borrowers we take on. A short while ago I noted that we singled out 60 portfolio companies for in-depth review. Based on what that review showed, we concluded that enhanced monitoring is not currently required for 50 of those companies. We concluded that those ten remaining portfolio companies could be helped by tighter oversight, which would leave us better equipped to spot and tackle any possible weakness down the road. Keep in mind that these ten businesses were picked out of the full middle market lending book at Golub Capital. To give you some background, seven of them sit inside GBDC's investment portfolio and represent roughly 3% of that portfolio's fair value as of 12/31/22. In our view, this demonstrates how the scale and fine-grained makeup of GBDC's portfolio, which spans more than 300 borrowers, lets us reduce risks tied to individual companies by spreading exposure around. I want to briefly walk through our approach to those GBDC portfolio companies we're watching more closely. On the whole, these borrowers are right now delivering pretty much as we anticipated, yet we decided there's a greater chance they could disappoint going forward. For the most part, we anticipate getting repaid in full by these borrowers. Even so, being highly proactive is one piece of how we handle credit monitoring overall — aiming to spot at-risk borrowers sooner and partnering with sponsors along with management teams so those borrowers gain more room for error. As you might remember, back when the pandemic struck in March 2020, we followed a comparable approach: we reviewed the portfolio looking for weak spots and singled out a group that would get closer attention. Our review zeroed in on the share of the portfolio sitting in industry subsegments that we felt carried fairly substantial COVID-19 exposure — places like restaurants, eye care, and dental care. We made clear that we weren't really anticipating that this group would end up impaired. As it turned out, those credits for the most part bounced back over the following quarters. Even so, we felt it made sense to steer additional resources toward catching problems early and, when needed, stepping in early. Our perspective on the GBDC portfolio companies is comparable — following the portfolio review we recently conducted, they are being watched with greater vigilance. That leads into the second major takeaway. Looking at the 50 borrowers that were not put into enhanced monitoring, certain common traits stood out. Here are a few of the elements that made us feel good about these borrowers' prospects going forward. First, we verified that the EBITDA add-backs truly met the definition of one-time items. Second, we identified growth catalysts — including acquisitions completed recently — that we expect will bolster coverage ratios in future periods, something trailing twelve-month financials had not yet fully reflected. Third, we identified realistic expense savings and synergies that hadn't been fully realized up to that point. Fourth, we had ample liquidity available to bridge any near-term gaps in operating cash flow. And fifth, we had interest rate hedges in position, which softened the impact of increases in base rates. In our judgment, these offsetting factors show the care we apply during underwriting, especially when it comes to assessing EBITDA adjustments. As we've noted previously, running stress tests and sensitivity analysis mechanically doesn't confirm that EBITDA adjustments are real — meaning they'll drop out and convert into genuine future earnings capacity. As a matter of fact, we think the period ahead will demonstrate that throughout the middle market, certain companies' adjustments won't roll off and won't turn out to be genuine. And in our view, that will be a major factor behind greater dispersion in manager performance. So, to recap the main points from our work so far. Our detailed, granular review indicated that the portfolio is broadly well positioned for the period ahead. We found a modest group of borrowers we intend to watch even more closely than we normally would; these companies are by and large doing fine at present, and we expect them to keep doing so. Nothing in what we found causes us to think that realized credit losses will fall outside the range of our historical experience. Two last points. What I've laid out today is one piece of a continuing effort. You can't review the portfolio thoroughly a single time and call it done. As additional data comes in, we'll keep refining our analysis. Doing this well demands scale and experience; and we won't get it right 100% of the time. That isn't a realistic objective. What we aim for is to spot which borrowers carry elevated risk and then hold early conversations with sponsors and management teams about strengthening their resilience. Yet surprises will happen. They always do; we'll keep updating you on the portfolio all through this difficult environment; and with that, I'll turn things over to Matt.
Matt Benton
executiveThanks, Craig. I'll address the third main question David raised a bit earlier. Should we expect additional write-downs? Or might we see some write-downs that GBDC has already recorded being reversed? Let me begin with some background. During the past calendar year, GBDC delivered solid results even though the investment backdrop was uneven. Our trailing 12-month ROE came in at 4.6%, a figure that stacks up quite well against traditional fixed income performance during that same window. The Bloomberg Aggregate Index declined 13%. High-yield bonds fell 10.6%, while the LSTA loan index slipped 0.6%. Mark-to-market write-downs in calendar Q2, Q3 and Q4 weighed on our returns, and that was mostly driven by credit spreads widening across the market and, to a smaller degree, by credit concerns. Net unrealized losses across this 9-month stretch totaled $0.79 per share, roughly 5.1% of NAV as of 3/31/22. Importantly, during that same stretch, GBDC generated net realized gains equal to 0.3%, or 30 basis points, of 3/31 NAV. So how should investors view that $0.79 per share of net unrealized losses? One framing is to treat it as an embedded loss reserve. Let's go to Slide 8 of the earnings presentation. That slide lays out the $0.79 per share of net unrealized depreciation on investments for the 9-month period ending 12/31/2022, sorted by our internal performance rating categories. As you'll remember, the top categories, 4 and 5, consist of loans performing as expected or better than expected at underwriting. The bulk of our investments sit in categories 4 and 5; as of 12/31/22, they made up 89.3% of the portfolio. Critically, the gold box on the chart indicates that investments in categories 4 and 5 represented 75% of the cumulative unrealized losses since 3/31, or $0.59 per share. If, as we do, you believe loans in categories 4 and 5 are very likely to be repaid, based on our experience, then you'd anticipate GBDC recapturing most of that $0.59 per share over time. To put it another way, we believe GBDC holds a sizable embedded loss reserve tied to loans we currently expect will be repaid at par. Second, let's move to Slide 9. The analysis there essentially examines GBDC's actual historical realized loss experience and asks how high future losses would have to be, relative to historical experience, to consume what we refer to as GBDC's embedded loss reserve. Let me take you through the chart. The bar on the left shows the 5.1% of NAV, at $0.79 per share, of cumulative net unrealized losses we recorded for the 9-month period ending 12/31/2022. The bar on the right shows GBDC's worst ever 12-month stretch of actual net realized losses. That came to 1.9% of starting NAV for that 12-month period. What this tells us is that our unrealized write-downs on the portfolio over the 9-month period ending 12/31, 2022, are roughly 3x the size of GBDC's worst-ever 12-month loss experience. Also keep in mind that GBDC, across the past 12 months as well as since inception, has posted average annual net realized gains rather than losses; our view of what this analysis shows is that over the quarters ahead, GBDC will probably experience reversals of earlier write-downs. Having said that, let's turn our attention to how GBDC performed in the quarter and go through the earnings presentation more thoroughly. I'll have Chris start us off, and I'll return a little later.
Chris Ericson
executiveThanks, Matt. Moving on to Slide 4, we can observe that GBDC's adjusted NII per share rose $0.04 from the prior quarter, reaching $0.37 per share, equating to an adjusted NII return on equity of 10%. As David mentioned before, this quarter-over-quarter growth in adjusted NII per share was mainly due to rising interest base rates affecting GBDC's portfolio and the company's inexpensive funding structure. Additionally, accrued dividends from certain preferred equity investments contributed roughly $0.02 per share in the quarter and will be part of adjusted NII going forward. This positive movement in adjusted NII was partly countered by an excise tax accrual of about $0.01 per share, stemming from calendar year 2022 taxable income surpassing distributions, or spillover income, caused by realized gains and short-term temporary book-to-tax differences that we anticipate will eventually reverse. GBDC reported an adjusted net realized and unrealized loss per share of $0.22, largely from unrealized depreciation tied to a mix of spread widening and specific credit issues at certain portfolio companies. This unrealized depreciation was partly offset by $0.02 per share in realized gains from selling equity investments. Adjusted EPS came to $0.15 per share. We consider this a strong result given the market and economic volatility and uncertainty. Now, I'd like to briefly give more specifics on 2 elements of adjusted NII. First, we chose to take on an excise tax of around $2.2 million, or $0.01 per share. In the past, we've aimed to keep excise tax payments low. This year's choice was mainly because a significant part of the spillover income involved short-term taxable gains on foreign exchange hedges that we expect to reverse during the rest of calendar year 2023. We believed this approach was better than maintaining NAV stability throughout calendar 2023 as opposed to making a large one-time special distribution on a significant portion of spillover income that will eventually reverse. Second, we reviewed how we recognize dividends on preferred equity investments, which used to be recorded in unrealized appreciation. This part of the portfolio grew large enough relative to our calendar year 2022 that we decided it was suitable to accrue these dividends within net investment income, aligning with industry norms. This contributed $0.02 per share to adjusted NII and will remain a ongoing part of adjusted NII going forward. Another point I'd add here: most of these preferred dividends are set up as noncash or PIK income and are typically gathered at redemption, amounting to about 2.5% of our total investment income. Moving to Slide 7, you'll notice that NAV fell 1.2% from the previous quarter to $14.71 per share, down from $14.89 per share. Let's go through the details. As I mentioned, adjusted NII was $0.37 per share, and the company distributed $0.33 per share in dividends. When you factor in the unrealized depreciation on our investments, that net change cost us $0.23 per share, which offset adjusted NII. Then net realized appreciation gave us a gain of $0.02 per share. If you go to Slide 12, you'll see a summary of what we originated during the quarter. Net funds growth was up a little versus the previous quarter, mainly because new investment commitments and delayed draw term loan fundings came in above our exits and sales of investments along with the net change in fair value of investments. The asset mix you see in the middle of that slide stayed pretty much in line with what we originated the quarter before. Down at the bottom of the slide, the weighted average rate on new investments rose 210 basis points this quarter, driven by a mix of higher base rates and wider asset spreads on new originations. Weighted average spreads on new investments were up 50 basis points from the prior quarter, moving from 6.2% to 6.7%. On Slide 13, we show GBDC's overall portfolio mix. You can see that the breakdown by investment type held consistent quarter over quarter, with one stop loans still making up around 85% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 14 shows that GBDC's portfolio is still highly diversified by Obligor, with an average investment size of roughly 30 basis points. As of December 31, 2022, first lien senior secured floating rate loans made up 94% of our investment portfolio, which is defensively positioned in industries we consider resilient. Moving to slide 15, as we went through in detail last quarter, the fact that interest rates are rising really underscores how asset sensitive GBDC's balance sheet is. Let's begin with the dark blue line, which represents our investment income yield, including amortization of fees and discounts. Rising interest rates were the main driver behind a 130 basis point increase in GBDC's investment income yield. On the other side, our cost of debt, the teal line, went up just 70 basis points. Our cost of debt gets a meaningful benefit from our $1.5 billion of unsecured notes, which are fixed rate and carry a weighted average coupon of 2.7%. Putting those 2 factors together, our weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, rose 60 basis points compared with the prior quarter. I'll hand it back to Matt now so he can talk about how GBDC is positioned for higher rates. Matt?
Matt Benton
executiveAppreciate it, Chris. If you turn to Slide 16, we've put numbers behind how elevated base rates could lift GBDC's NII earnings power. What matters most here is that GBDC's adjusted NII per share should keep gaining from 2 main tailwinds over the next stretch. Tailwind number one: a delay exists between market base rates moving and the loans in our portfolio repricing to those higher base rates, and in most instances that reset occurs just once each quarter. Put differently, roughly a quarter passes after base rates rise before GBDC captures the complete advantage of those higher base rates. The graphic on this slide is meant to clarify that mechanism for you. Looking at the chart, the average LIBOR or SOFR rate that GBDC truly earned on its investments during the quarter ending 12/31 came in well below where market rates sat at quarter end. Tailwind number two: base rates are set to climb beyond 12/31 levels, reflecting the latest Fed moves plus what the forward curve implies. The bar furthest to the left displays GBDC's actual adjusted NII of $0.37 per share for the quarter ending 12/31. Across that quarter, the average LIBOR rate came to roughly 375 basis points. The bar on the right illustrates what GBDC's adjusted NII per share would have totaled in the 12/31 quarter had every one of its floating rate assets and liabilities been pegged to a LIBOR rate of 477 basis points, the rate on the final day of the quarter. Under that scenario, holding everything else constant, we calculate adjusted NII would be 13% higher, at $0.42 per share. Keep in mind that the current 3-month LIBOR sits somewhat above the level we used in this analysis. The takeaway: we believe GBDC's NII per share carries substantial built-in momentum simply from base rate increases that have already happened but haven't yet shown up in GBDC's results. We're not factoring in wider spreads on existing investments, such as those from amendment activity or elevated payoffs. From where we sit, those could drive additional NII upside. More specifics on GBDC's asset sensitivity appear in the Form 10-Q, should you want to dig deeper. Let's turn to Slides 17 and 18 and examine credit quality metrics more closely; on Slide 17, you can observe that nonaccrual investments as of 12/31 rose to 9 from 8 versus 9/30; the reason is that one nonaccrual investment being disposed of was offset by 2 new nonaccrual investments being added. Beyond that, the percentage of investments on nonaccrual measured at fair value ticked up modestly between the 9/30/22 quarter and now, reaching 1.8% of our total portfolio from 1.3%. On Slide 18, as David noted previously, internal performance ratings remain strong and stable, in line with pre-COVID-19 levels. More than 89% of investments carry an internal performance rating of 4 or above, meaning they are performing as expected or better than expected on underwriting. Also, just 1.3% of our investments carry an internal performance rating of 2 or worse, meaning those holdings are doing significantly worse than what we projected when we underwrote them. We'll move right past Slides 19 through 23. Those slides contain additional information about GBDC's financial statements, dividend history and other key metrics. The final slide I'd like to discuss before I give the floor back to David is Slide 24. In our view, GBDC holds substantial embedded value within its funding structure. At quarter end, we had close to $750 million in dry powder, coming from unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver, which is meaningfully over-collateralized, and the unused unsecured revolver our adviser provides. Our GAAP debt-to-equity ratio as of 12/31, net of unrestricted cash, stood at 1.19x. Unsecured notes make up 47% of our debt funding, and most of those mature in 2026 and 2027; we issued these fixed rate notes at a weighted average coupon of 2.7% and chose not to swap them into floating rate. For the quarter ended December 31, 2022, our weighted average cost of debt came to 4.4%, which in our view ranks among the lowest across our peer group of publicly traded BDCs. We see our funding structure as a meaningful competitive advantage. I'll hand things back to David for closing remarks and Q&A.
David Golub
executiveThanks, Matt. In summary, for the quarter that closed on December 31, GBDC delivered solid results. Adjusted NII per share came in strong and significantly above the dividend we had just increased. Overall, the portfolio is in good shape and performing well on credit. Unrealized losses have run high over the past few quarters, but as we have noted repeatedly, over the long term what counts is steering clear of realized losses; and during the latest quarter and across the last 9 months, we posted net realized gains once more; we have long held the view that spotting risks early and stepping in early to reduce them is essential to keeping credit losses in check. Doing that well requires scale and experience; today we walked you through how, last year, we carried out what we regard as a very thorough portfolio review against a variety of key risk factors and how we zeroed in on a small group of names we intend to keep watching very closely. Now Greg put it well; we will not get it right 100% of the time. That is not a realistic aim. As in earlier periods, our method is to try to spot borrowers carrying higher risk and then to talk early with sponsors and management teams about ways to make them more resilient; this method has succeeded in the past, and I think it will succeed again. What does succeed mean to me? It means that, once again, we will manage to hold realized credit losses down and we will watch a big share of the unrealized losses we have absorbed during the last 9 months reverse. Lastly, I said I would return to the subject of the dividend in my closing comments. We earned $0.04 per share more than our dividend in fiscal Q1. And as we have stated previously, we expect GBDC's earnings to be pushed higher by higher base rates, higher spreads and GBDC's extremely low cost of funds; given that, we are assessing whether and when it would make sense to raise the quarterly dividend again, pay a supplemental dividend, or do both. For the moment, we believe it is prudent to wait and see, but we will keep you updated as our thinking evolves. With that, let's open the line for questions.
Jordan Wathen
analystThis is Jordan, filling in for Fin today. I just have a question regarding your loan documents. There's likely a — some PIK on — There's likely a new or increased PIK on roughly 3% of loans during this quarter. Could you — if you don't mind, just sort of describe this? Is it something that's ordinary course toggling, perhaps default interest, or is it something completely different?
David Golub
executiveIt's a mix of all those things, Jordan. So what we're observing, especially within our Golub growth portfolio, is sponsors asking for loans that include a PIK component or an optional PIK component. That accounts for part of what you're seeing. And in a few instances, we've added a PIK component onto existing loans through amendments, as part of trying to move loans that had been underpriced up to the levels we wanted to reach, without putting additional cash drag on those companies.
Jordan Wathen
analystAll right, that's useful. Then I have something for Chris. During this quarter, are the BDCs handing the advisor the entire incentive fee? If that's the case, about how much room exists before earnings drop back within the bands?
Chris Ericson
executiveWe did, indeed, hand over the complete incentive fee for this quarter, and our performance sits comfortably higher than the 8% hurdle rate. On the precise figure for that, I'll need to follow up with you.
Robert Dodd
analystYou went over the — the portfolio's exposure <<inaudible>> success.
David Golub
executiveWould you mind beginning once more? Sure. Could you please repeat your question from the start?
Robert Dodd
analystRobert, no problem. It connects to that vulnerability review you're comparing — and the disclosure plus what's in the presentation really helps. How much of it, if any, matches what's typically shared with your outside valuation adviser every quarter for the fair value work they help with — or did all of this go beyond the usual kind of review that feeds into assessing the appropriate group fair values of the loans each quarter?
David Golub
executiveLet me give everyone on the line some background. Every quarter, an internal team at Golub Capital handles valuation work for each position in the portfolio. And roughly 30% of those valuations also get a look each quarter from outside valuation specialists such as Duff & Phelps, Houlihan Lokey, and so on. What we hand the valuation firms is a comprehensive set of information; so, Robert, there's nothing we're trying to put together that wouldn't also go to the valuation firms. However, that analysis — the resiliency review we conducted — is a special one, in that starting in the late summer of last year, we moved a sizable share of our underwriters onto an exercise we've carried out previously. We did this during COVID. We've also done it in other stretches of rapid change, where we screen the portfolio once more to examine exposure to shifts we've pinpointed. So I'd say the answer to your question is that it's both in line with the information given to the valuation firms and it's a fresh analysis that we perform occasionally rather than quarterly.
Robert Dodd
analystUnderstood. Thanks for that. And if I may, one additional question about credit, looking at the landscape once more. I mean, it isn't — yours isn't elevated relative to the industry's historical benchmarks; so I simply want to note that in the past it has also sat well under industry benchmarks. Yet right now, if I examine — at cost, say, or what's achievable on fair value, by no measure historically is it relatively elevated; the only point in over 10 years that exceeded this was the peak amid COVID. Could you give some more detail about what — objectively, there aren't many assets involved, and it isn't that big, so why is it so elevated compared with the lower levels we typically see right now?
David Golub
executiveYou're focused on the percentage at cost. I'm not focused on percentage at cost. What I focus on is percentage at fair value. That, in my view, captures what we have at risk at a particular moment relative to the difference we've already recorded as a hit against earnings. And when we look at nonaccrual investments as a percentage of fair value, it isn't out of line with our history. Actually, that figure is on the low side compared to what's typical in our sector. Within this pool, there are a few credits where the carrying value we hold right now is fairly modest, and my sense is that the amount we paid for those investments sits high compared with their fair value — which tends to introduce some skew when you're examining that ratio against cost. Our plan is to revisit this, dig deeper, and then return with additional analysis that I'm hoping we can pass along to you.
Ryan Lynch
analystStarting off, I want to mention that I genuinely value how much information you all provide and explain regarding the resilient analysis, along with those several slides covering where markdowns showed up in your portfolio compared with potentially weaker credits and with mark-to-market decreases that might later bounce back; that's truly an excellent analysis, and I'm grateful for it. Regarding the resilient analysis, you referenced the 7 investments you all flagged that are part of GBDC's portfolio. I'm wondering — I believe you stated that by and large, those holdings are doing okay right now, yet there's greater heightened possibility of trouble later on. Have you begun talking with the sponsors behind those positions at this point? On a wider note, you mentioned that a robust detection system helps us identify problems sooner and put early risk mitigants in place. Can you explain what early detection and risk mitigation look like once you've identified a risky investment that's starting to struggle? What tools do you have to improve the chances of recovering value from an investment that's underperforming?
David Golub
executiveAbsolutely. Thank you, Ryan, and I'm glad you liked the new format for our earnings presentations and the additional disclosure. You know, one thing that sets Golub Capital apart is that we're nearly always the lead lender on our loans. Our share is above 90%, and that level has held for a long stretch of consecutive years. In a standard transaction, we either serve as the only lender or belong to a compact banking syndicate in which we act as the lead arranger. That gives us the ability to accomplish things that are extremely difficult within the broadly syndicated space, or even in private deals where you're merely one member of a bigger club. It allows us to sit down with the borrower and the sponsor in conversations where both sides understand that the call rests with us. Both sides recognize there's room to get inventive and deliberate when it comes to crafting solutions. Usually, the sponsor involved is one we've already partnered with on several transactions. That means each side understands the other wants to keep the relationship strong and constructive going forward, which lets us keep working together. With that as background, we stay in regular contact with our borrowers and sponsors — not only when a company is struggling, but across our entire portfolio. If a company starts to worry us, we hold additional conversations with the borrower and the sponsor, and we lay out the problems we're seeing. We'll go over what they intend to do and how they might act to build themselves a bigger cushion for mistakes—perhaps by decelerating an expansion initiative, cutting CapEx, or divesting a division or one or two smaller business units. Alternatively, the sponsor could inject additional capital, or in certain situations, the business might be placed on the market. These are conversations we have on a routine basis with sponsors and management teams. And what we learn from our credit monitoring efforts shapes those conversations. That stands in sharp contrast, I'd say, to the broadly syndicated market, where there's a huge pool of lenders, none of whom is the decision maker, and the borrower can't even really reasonably expect to get that group to consent to any meaningful modifications, since so often it's a set of lenders, or just one lender, that refuses. So the dynamic is quite different, Ryan. The structure is deliberate, giving us greater authority and greater control. And I believe that benefits everyone at the table.
Ryan Lynch
analystAlright, that context is useful, and it gives a bit of a window into those conversations and processes. My next question — it sort of arose while you were discussing weighted average interest coverage and its value. You publish the Golub Capital Altman Index, and I believe it's quite useful for getting a sense of how broader portfolio trends shift each quarter. But when I consider what you said about weighted average interest coverage being a poor measure, since the typical borrower won't really be the one in trouble — it'll be the marginal credits — could you apply that same lens to the Golub Capital Altman Index and say that perhaps the quarterly results aren't so helpful, because they only reflect the average and might not represent the actual credit performance of the individual underlying borrowers in your portfolio? I'd really like to hear your perspective. I do find the index quite useful, but given what you said about weighted average EBITDA, I'm curious about your take on that.
David Golub
executiveIt really hinges on your purpose. I think you make a fair point. If your intent is to use the index as an indicator of overall portfolio health, then I'd say it's quite valuable. If instead you're using the index to gauge how the tail is performing, then I don't believe it's very helpful. For the tail, our portfolio ratings are the best information source. One thing I often stress when speaking with investors is whether we're observing meaningful migration into categories 1 and 2 — the 2 risk performance rating categories that include investments which are significantly underperforming. Are we seeing a growing share of the portfolio fall into those 2 categories? In a pre-recessionary or recessionary environment, you'd anticipate that sort of credit migration — repeated quarter-over-quarter increases across a series of quarters — and you'd expect category 1 and 2 credit levels that are elevated relative to historical norms. What I think we can say is that, portfolio-wide, the middle market index figures are encouraging; and regarding the tail, the portfolio performance ratings are encouraging in that they don't display the migration I was referring to.
David Golub
executiveThanks. I simply want to express gratitude to each of you for spending part of your day with us. I realize this presentation ran especially long, so I appreciate you sticking with it. Our goal was to walk everyone through quite granular details regarding the portfolio as well as how we handle credit monitoring; so thank you for bearing with us on that. As ever, I'm also grateful for the partnership. If anything comes to mind, please don't hesitate to get in touch, and I look forward to our next conversation in a quarter.
Operator
operatorThis concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.
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