Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

February 6, 2024

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 38 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Good morning, everyone, and thank you for being here today. With me are Chris Ericson, who serves as our CFO, and Matt Benton, our Chief Operating Officer. If you're new to GBDC, I'd like to briefly walk through what we do. Our approach, both currently and from the very beginning, has centered on making first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses supported by strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Yesterday we released our earnings press release covering the quarter that ended December 31, and an earnings presentation is now available on our website; we'll be referencing it throughout today's call. As always, I'll begin with the headlines and a performance summary for the quarter, after which Matt and Chris will walk through our financial results for the quarter in greater depth. Then, to close, I'll share an outlook for the period ahead and we'll take some Q&A. The main takeaway is that GBDC delivered an excellent fiscal first quarter. GBDC's results for the quarter aligned precisely with the preliminary figures the company filed on January 17. Adjusted net investment income per share came in at $0.50. That matched fiscal Q4 2023 for the highest adjusted NII per share the company has ever reported. On an annualized basis, it equates to an adjusted NII return on equity of 13.3%. Adjusted earnings per share reached $0.45, which equates to an adjusted return on equity of 11.8% annualized. We recorded a modest net realized and unrealized loss of $0.05 per share for the quarter, though credit results overall were quite strong. No new defaults emerged. The already low level of nonaccruals declined further, and internal performance ratings held steady. All 3 of these points will get more attention later on this call. Lastly, NAV per share rose $0.01 versus the prior quarter, reaching $15.03 as of December 31. We take pride in GBDC's first fiscal quarter results, but we're even more enthusiastic about the 2 strategic announcements tied to the earnings prerelease. As a refresher: first, GBDC has signed a definitive merger agreement with Golub Capital BDC 3 Inc., which we refer to as GBDC 3, with GBDC surviving the transaction, pending certain stockholder approvals and customary closing conditions. Second, GBDC's investment adviser has agreed to cut both GBDC's income incentive fee and capital gain incentive fee to 15% from 20%, in connection with and in support of the proposed merger. That incentive fee reduction took effect January 1, 2024, and it will remain in place while the proposed merger is pending, becoming permanent once the merger closes. As you may remember, GBDC's investment adviser previously announced a permanent cut to the company's base management fee, lowering it to 1% from 1.375%, effective July 1, 2023. Thanks to a management fee of 1%, an incentive fee of 15%, an 8% hurdle rate, plus a cap on incentive fees calculated cumulatively from inception, GBDC has, in our view, established a fresh benchmark of alignment with shareholders among BDCs that trade publicly. I would urge everyone to check out the investor presentation posted on GBDC's website as well as the announcements, so you can find out more about the reasons we consider these developments so thrilling and significant. Having said that, I'll now pass things over to Matt, who will take us through the details of what we achieved during this quarter.

Matt Benton

executive
#2

Thank you, David. Let me begin on Slide 4. As David mentioned a moment ago, GBDC delivered outstanding results for the quarter that closed on December 31, 2023. On an adjusted basis, NII per share came in at $0.50, which works out to an adjusted NII ROE of 13.3%. That adjusted NII per share figure matched the quarter ending September 30 as the best GBDC has ever posted. Versus fiscal Q1 of 2023, adjusted NII per share rose $0.17 year-over-year, a gain of roughly 35%. Adjusted earnings per share reached $0.45, equating to an adjusted ROE of 11.8%. Three main drivers powered GBDC's robust profitability. The first and most important is strong credit performance, which I'll discuss in greater depth shortly. The second is elevated base rates, in line with what we saw in earlier quarters. And the third is expenses that are sustainably lower thanks to the cut in GBDC's base management fee rate that went into effect in July of 2023. Updates on the portfolio and balance sheet largely show trends from the 9/30 quarter carrying forward. Net funds fell $73.2 million on a sequential basis. Although market-wide deal activity picked up in calendar Q4 compared with the remainder of 2023, the pace of GBDC's new investments stayed measured. That was intentional. GBDC's model doesn't rely on fee income generated by new originations or repayments to produce strong returns. Credit performance across GBDC's investment portfolio likewise continues to be strong. To start, nonaccruals came down. Measured as a percentage of total debt investments at fair value, nonaccruals fell to 1.1% at 12/31/2023, down from 1.2% at 9/30/2023. Second, internal performance ratings stayed solid. Investments sitting in rating categories 1 and 2 accounted for 40 basis points of the total portfolio at fair value. NAV per share rose $0.01 quarter-over-quarter to $15.03. NAV per share now stands more than 200 basis points above where it was a year earlier, even with GBDC paying out larger distributions to shareholders over that stretch. Now to financial leverage. Net leverage edged down to 1.18x, which aligns with our intention to bring leverage down step by step to 1.15x debt-to-equity or below. Let's move on to distributions. The Board signed off on $0.46 per share of distributions: our regular quarterly distribution of $0.39 per share plus a fiscal Q1 supplemental distribution of $0.07 per share. Combined, those distributions equate to an annualized dividend yield of 12.2%, using GBDC's NAV per share as of December 31, 2023. As a reminder, we announced previously that the Board raised the company's regular quarterly distribution to $0.39 per share from $0.37 per share alongside the proposed merger announcement and the related reduction in the incentive fee. Adjusted NII per share came in well above the company's regular quarterly distribution, producing a distribution coverage ratio of 128% on the higher regular quarterly distribution of $0.39 per share. The Board additionally approved a supplemental distribution of $0.07 per share under the company's variable supplemental distribution framework. As you may remember, the framework came out during 2023, and its purpose was to assist shareholders in grasping our approach to balancing two things: the chance that GBDC keeps producing excess income, with all else held equal, and our emphasis on NAV growth along with resilience. Details regarding record dates and payment dates for fiscal Q1 distributions can be located on Page 23 of the earnings presentation, while information on the variable supplemental distribution framework is on Page 24. Prior to passing things to Chris for a detailed walk through the quarter, I want to stress that GBDC's robust fiscal Q1 results do not yet capture the effect of the reduced incentive fee rates that GBDC is anticipated to have moving forward. Slide 5's analysis puts a figure on how greatly GBDC's earnings power has already grown because of its reduced base management fee rates, plus how much additional earnings power we anticipate from reduced incentive fee rates. By setting the June 30, 2023, column beside the September 30, 2023, and December 31, 2023, columns, you can observe that reduced base management fee rates produced a rise in adjusted NII ROAE of roughly 80 basis points, equal to $0.03 to $0.04 per share each quarter. The column on the right displays GBDC's pro forma results for the quarter ended December 31, 2023, assuming its incentive fee rates stood at 15% rather than 20%. We calculate that GBDC's pro forma adjusted NII per share would have risen from $0.50 to $0.53, which amounts to earnings accretion of roughly 6%; thus, with all else held equal, we anticipate reduced incentive fee rates will raise GBDC's adjusted NII per share moving forward by roughly $0.03 to $0.04 each quarter, or roughly $0.13 on an annual basis; that equals approximately 90 basis points of incremental adjusted NII ROAE. You will begin to observe this incremental potential earnings power within GBDC's fiscal Q2 results. GC Advisors is voluntarily waiving incentive fees above 15% starting January 1, 2024, as the merger is still pending. If the merger closes, the reductions to incentive fee rates will turn permanent, and GBDC will be positioned to gain substantially from greater earnings power moving forward. I will now hand things to Chris for further detail on our results.

Chris Ericson

executive
#3

Appreciate that, Matt. Moving on to Slide 8, you're able to see the way the main earnings drivers Matt just walked through fed into growth as well as NAV per share. Thanks to a mix of elevated short-term rates, appealing credit spreads, and GBDC's inexpensive leverage structure, adjusted NII came in at $0.50 per share, which equaled a record figure set in the previous quarter and stood considerably above the dividends distributed in that period. On top of that, an equity position we exited during the quarter generated a net realized gain of $0.01 per share, while modest net unrealized losses produced adjusted net realized and unrealized losses of $0.05 per share for the quarter. Taken together, those results pushed net asset value per share up to $15.03, an increase of $0.01 per share versus the preceding quarter. Now let's walk through the specifics of GBDC's financial results for the quarter that ended December 31, 2023. We'll begin on Slide 11, which gives a summary of our origination activity for the quarter. Net funds growth fell by roughly $73.2 million compared with the prior quarter, since new investment commitments and delayed draw term loan fundings were exceeded by the net effect of exits and investment sales. Both market-wide deal activity and Golub Capital's origination volume picked up in the quarter ended December 31, even though GBDC's origination stayed measured as part of our effort to bring GBDC's leverage ratio down to 1.15x debt-to-equity or below. We anticipate deal activity will keep improving during calendar 2024, although that could apply more to the back half than to the front half. Golub Capital stayed very selective, closing roughly 2% of the deals it reviewed across calendar year 2023. That sits at the low end of our customary 2% to 4% selectivity rate and speaks to our emphasis on quality rather than quantity. The asset mix of new investments, shown in the middle of the slide, stayed mostly one-stop loans. Turning to the bottom of the slide, the weighted average rate on new investments declined by 80 basis points this quarter. That drop came mainly from tighter spreads on new investments, which compressed by 40 basis points quarter-over-quarter. This broadly matches what the market is showing us. Spreads on new transactions have come in since earlier in 2023, yet they remain fairly attractive. Slide 12 presents GBDC's overall portfolio mix. As you can see, the portfolio's breakdown by investment type held steady quarter-over-quarter, with one-stop loans still making up about 86% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 13 shows GBDC's portfolio is still highly diversified by Obligor, with an average investment size of about 30 basis points. We strongly believe in modulating credit risk through position size, which we think has benefited GBDC through past credit cycles and will keep mattering when it comes to future credit cycles. As of December 31, 2023, 94% of our investment portfolio was made up of first lien senior secured floating rate loans to borrowers spanning a diversified range of industries we consider resilient. Looking at the economic analysis on Slide 14, there's not much movement from one quarter to the next. Let me take you through the key points. First, consider the dark blue line, which represents our investment income yield. Keep in mind that amortization of fees and discounts is part of that investment income yield. In line with interest base rates, GBDC's investment income yield has flattened out over recent quarters, rising slightly on a sequential basis — an increase of 10 basis points, bringing it to 12.6%. Our cost of debt, shown by the teal line, rose modestly, by 20 basis points; consequently, our weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, fell a bit — 10 basis points lower than the previous quarter, at 7.2%. With that, I'll hand things back to Matt.

Matt Benton

executive
#4

Thanks, Chris. We'll now turn to Slides 15 and 16 to examine credit quality metrics more closely. The key message here is that credit quality continues to be solid and stable. Looking at Slide 15, nonaccruals went down 10 basis points on a sequential basis, landing at 1.1% of total debt investments at fair value. This continues a pattern we've observed, since that figure has steadily declined starting from the quarter that ended 12/31/2022. The count of portfolio company investments sitting on nonaccrual status stayed at 9 as of December 31, 2023. On Slide 16, we show how internal performance ratings for GBDC's investments have trended. As of December 31, 2023, approximately 86% of GBDC's investments carried a rating of 4 or 5, meaning those investments are performing at or above what we expected at underwriting. The share of loans with ratings of 1 and 2 — those we consider most likely to experience significant credit impairments — stayed quite low, at 40 basis points of the portfolio at fair value. Loans carrying a rating of 3 declined, primarily to 13.7%. Following our usual practice, we'll skip Slides 17 through 20; those contain additional detail regarding GBDC's financial statements, dividend history and other key metrics. I'll finish this portion by going over GBDC's liquidity and investment capacity on Slides 21 and 22. To start, let's look at the key takeaways on Slide 22. Our weighted average cost of debt during the quarter came in at 5.4%, which we think ranks among the lowest within our peer group. Unsecured notes make up 62% of our debt funding, with laddered maturities spanning 2024 through 2028. The fixed rate notes maturing in 2024, 2026 and 2027 were issued at a weighted average coupon of 2.7%. And as we've mentioned before on prior occasions, none of them were swapped out for floating rate exposure. During the quarter, GBDC re-entered the investment-grade debt markets for the first time since 2021, with a $450 million 5-year term issuance, carrying a stated maturity of December 2028 and a fixed coupon of 7.05%. After the quarter closed, GBDC once again tapped the investment-grade debt market, this time with an additional $600 million 5.5-year term issuance, with a stated maturity of July 2029 and a fixed coupon of 6%. Those 2029s weren't part of the 62% figure I referenced earlier, since we issued them after quarter end. Both issuances strengthen GBDC's debt maturity ladder while also continuing to support new portfolio company investments and tackling refinancing risk tied to the $500 million of notes maturing in April 2024. Additionally, keeping in mind the forward curve and the goal of match funding a predominantly floating rate investment portfolio, we entered an interest rate swap covering half of our new 2028s and the entirety of our 2029s. The weighted average floating rate equivalent comes to SOFR plus 268 basis points, which we view as a highly attractive cost of funds when considering unsecured notes relative to our secured borrowing costs. All in all, our liquidity stood in a strong position, and it got a big boost from what we issued in December 2023. When the quarter closed, we had over $1.3 billion in liquidity, coming from unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver — which is meaningfully overcollateralized — and the unused unsecured revolver that our advisor provides. That robust liquidity at GBDC works out to 8.2x its current unfunded asset commitments. The variety, adaptability and cheap cost of how GBDC's funding is structured is a key factor supporting our 3 investment grade ratings from Fitch, Moody's and S&P. When it comes to Moody's and Fitch, GBDC's ratings profile stands apart from most of the rated BDC sector, which gives us deeper and more cost-effective access to the debt markets; now I'll turn it back to David for closing remarks and Q&A.

David Golub

executive
#5

Thank you, Matt. In summary, GBDC kicked off fiscal year 2024 with a very strong first quarter. The primary factor was robust credit results. Elevated rates and reduced fees are helpful, yet GBDC's performance over the long haul always boils down to credit above all else. I'll conclude with our outlook, then open the line for questions. To provide context, looking back at calendar year 2023 is useful. From a macroeconomic standpoint, 2023 did not unfold as most investors anticipated. At the beginning of the year, the consensus among economists was that a recession lay ahead. Yet no recession occurred. But growth actually ended up being pretty strong, and that disconnect between the consensus forecast and reality has turned into something we keep seeing over and over. Time after time across the last four years, the consensus got it wrong. People figured COVID would cause a depression, and instead we saw a boom. Inflation was called transitory at first, then it was called stubborn, and in the end it was neither one. With that track record in mind, we think it's important to remain humble when trying to predict where the economy goes next, particularly given the context of 2 wars, polarized politics and upcoming elections. Given that, instead of offering precise forecasts, my approach is to consider what's pushing us forward and what's holding us back. I'll structure our perspective around those positive and negative forces that we're seeing in two main areas: credit and deal activity. Starting with credit — for Golub Capital companies, both economic expansion and credit results through 2023 came in above what was anticipated. The broader economy also performed better than expected. Will this continue? Let's get into it. One positive force is momentum. The Golub Capital Middle Market Report covering the fourth calendar quarter, published a few weeks back, generally indicated strong growth and healthy margins. Current economic figures are also favorable, showing low unemployment, typical inventory levels, consistent job gains and easing inflation. One more positive factor is that companies appear to be coping pretty effectively with this tough climate. We think that's particularly the case for those with private equity owners. From where we sit, this sort of market is exactly where the private equity playbook pays off most. Now, what's working against us? The biggest issue is uncertainty — with two wars underway and a sharply divided presidential race, it becomes tougher for firms, private-equity-backed ones included, to feel sure enough to commit to the kinds of significant investments that set up tomorrow's growth. So when I weigh those main positives and negatives against each other, what I see as the most likely outcome is that economic expansion will more or less flatten out. My sense is that firms which have already adjusted successfully will probably keep performing well. And for those that haven't managed to adapt, I don't think 2024 is going to bring them any relief. Now, turning to what we might see in private equity deal making. In Q4, deal volume picked up considerably relative to the first three quarters of calendar 2023. On top of that, a lot of bank CEOs have said they expect that momentum to accelerate. I agree with that view when I look out over the medium term, but when it comes to the near term, I'm more cautious. A rise in M&A activity in 2024 looks quite likely, though it may not arrive in Q1 or Q2. My optimism stems from the following: many private equity sponsors hold substantial unspent commitments with deadlines looming. They must deploy that capital or else their investment period will lapse. A second set of private equity firms aims to exit and launch a new fund, and their investors are telling them unmistakably that generating distributions is essential to raising additional capital. Thus, we have motivated buyers on one side and motivated sellers on the other. To my mind, this turns the question into when, rather than whether, M&A activity will improve. Another probable catalyst for heightened deal activity involves taxes; we won't venture into political forecasts, but I'm willing to wager that discourse around taxes will grow increasingly prevalent throughout the year, given that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is scheduled to sunset in 2025. Based on what we've observed, the anticipation of elevated tax rates tends to prompt sponsors and business owners to zero in on transactions. Lastly, allow me to address one final aspect of our outlook. We anticipate that the upcoming stretch will be highly thrilling for GBDC. Provided the planned merger with GBDC 3 is completed, we expect that the combined GBDC will possess greater earnings potential than at any prior point, supported by exceptional credit quality, fees aligned with shareholder interests, and the advantages of greater scale; with that, operator, could you please unblock the lines for questions?

Robert Dodd

analyst
#6

Moving to what you mentioned, David — ultimately, credit is what counts most, I believe. So could you share any detail about the quarter's deployments? It appears there were possibly quite a few revolver drawdowns. Of course, between the fundings and the repayments there's a gap — a spread — which might be follow-ons for portfolio companies already held; so any color on the mix would help. And during that quarter, did those drawdowns show anything out of the ordinary compared with how they've typically behaved?

David Golub

executive
#7

Roberts, I appreciate the question. Regarding revolver activity, nothing stands out to me as out of the ordinary. Revolver activity stays remarkably consistent; for any single credit, though, it's often volatile. Yet given the approximate count of borrowers in GBDC, the movement is genuinely substantial. At the close of the year, some revolver drawdown activity frequently occurs, since businesses that pick December 31 as their fiscal year end pull cash so their balance sheet can display some cash. Still, I see nothing out of the ordinary, nor any cause for concern, when it comes to revolver draws. Looking back over the previous calendar year, I'd say the share of new investments that are add-ons has been unusually high. With buyers and sellers finding it hard to agree on price and on value, add-ons have proven somewhat simpler, since buyers enjoy special economics — through synergies, they can extract more from their purchase than a seller is able to. Those are the only points I'd offer in answering your question.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#8

Understood, understood. Now regarding those two particular names. Apologies for the noise behind me. I mean, it appears the bulk of the write-downs you took this quarter stem from Elite Dental and Rubio's, and since both are already sitting on nonaccrual status, correct, there'd be no hit to earnings regardless of what happens, plus you've committed extra capital to each of them. So could you share your perspective on how the workout process unfolds, perhaps specifically for those two if you're comfortable discussing them, or more broadly, regarding the timing of taking a markdown while simultaneously injecting more money into those same operations?

David Golub

executive
#9

Certainly. I believe what has benefited us greatly throughout the years is our capacity to come in and act as a sponsor. Unlike banks that extend credit and prefer not to end up holding the collateral, we are prepared to, and in certain instances even keen to, seize the collateral and manage turnarounds. When you examine numerous businesses we've assumed control of as sponsor in all but name, our track record in them tends to be strong. A few prove difficult. Those two names you brought up have proven difficult; the difficulty stems from operational problems at each that we are addressing. As I noted during my prepared remarks, over this past year or two, the majority of companies successfully adjusted to shifting market conditions, yet a number remain under pressure. We feel that pressure too. And those two you cited are ones we've devoted considerable effort toward. My belief is we'll eventually achieve success with each, though they have indeed proven difficult.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#10

Robert, on the fee reduction, I'd add one remark: for shareholders, that's a very meaningful positive. So well done there.

David Golub

executive
#11

Thank you, Robert.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#12

First question from me. Overall, your portfolio's credit quality has held up really well so far, and this quarter we started seeing some separation between the BDCs. I'm just curious — when you look at your credits rated 3, which again aren't especially elevated, and the credits generally, compared with your portfolio, have you all seen any sort of patterns in those investments, whether that's concentration by industry? Or I also wondered if vintage exposure had anything to do with it, sort of? Sure, there were some loans — I believe from that 2021 vintage — where we started to see a bit more strain, mainly because the market conditions back then were overheated. So I was wondering if you guys have picked up on any patterns among those credits you've rated 3 in your portfolio?

David Golub

executive
#13

Ryan, to start, I'd say I share the view you just expressed. My sense is that we're currently in a climate — and have been for a number of quarters now — where the performance gap between different credit managers in the BDC sector is becoming increasingly pronounced. And we take a lot of pride in being on the favorable side of that split. My view is that variation in results will keep appearing. As I noted in my prepared remarks, we're currently in a stretch where certain businesses are struggling to adjust to elevated interest rates and, in certain instances, weaker economic expansion. Consequently, you're beginning to observe increases in defaults, increases in the share of certain BDCs' more troubled credits, nonaccruals, low performance ratings and marks. My sense is that we will very likely witness additional instances of this throughout the rest of this reporting cycle and as we move into the following several reporting cycles. Let me walk through the three rated credits we have. For anyone who needs a refresher, a credit carrying a 3 rating is one that is currently performing, or is anticipated to perform, below the level we had assumed when we underwrote it. This is not a severely impaired credit. A credit that was more seriously impaired would carry a rating of 1 or 2. What we've found with our 3s is that they tend to be fairly idiosyncratic. No patterns tied to vintage or industry are showing up for me. If there is a place where a pattern has emerged, the way I'd characterize that pattern is somewhat different from the direction you were going in. What we're seeing is this: if a business has been struggling or hasn't been delivering strong results, those are the accounts where making progress was toughest. So in the current climate, the winners keep on winning, while the losers keep on fighting an uphill battle. And I'd expect that dynamic to persist going forward.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#14

All right, that's clear. So then, one thing you said in your prepared remarks struck me as rather interesting — you were discussing how deal activity could rise as the year goes on, perhaps in the latter half, driven by greater motivation on both sides, with sellers needing to give capital back to their LPs while buyers prefer not to hand capital back and are therefore looking to put it to work. My thinking is that supplying leverage or debt for a transaction involving a seller who's motivated would likely work out well, since that seller might accept a reduced purchase price, which leaves you with a considerably larger equity cushion. I'd expect the reverse to be true when the buyer is the highly motivated party — someone just looking to put capital out the door, perhaps acting somewhat aggressively on terms and structures, at least when it comes to the purchase price multiple, because they have to place that capital. So these look like 2 deals that are opposite in nature. I'm just curious: if deal activity accelerates in the second half of the year thanks to motivated buyers and sellers alike, how do you see that affecting lending — specifically the quality of deals, when you consider the bulk of it — the terms, leverage, structures, all of it?

David Golub

executive
#15

That's a fair question, Ryan. What I'd say is that our attention lands far more on the identity of the buyer than on the forces you just outlined. Let me give you a few figures that a lot of people on this call likely already know. There are a bit more than 200 private equity firms with which we've completed multiple transactions across Golub Capital's history. During calendar 2023, repeat sponsors accounted for 97% of our direct lending — 97%. Across most years in the last 10, the figure has sat near 90%. So we're extremely selective about our counterparts; we give careful thought to partnering with sponsors we strongly believe excel at their craft. They excel at selecting strong companies, they excel at creating value once those companies are acquired, and they excel at repairing problems when they err. So in that regard, our approach is heavily centered on sponsors.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#16

All right, that makes sense. If I could squeeze in one more question. This one's really directed at Chris, regarding the swaps on your liabilities tied to interest rates. You executed swaps on a chunk of your older bonds, converting every one of the existing unsecured notes from a fixed rate into a floating rate. Does that reflect a shift in your overall approach, where you'll simply convert every fixed-rate obligation into a floating rate? Some BDCs operate that way — regardless of what's happening in the market, they swap from fixed to floating each and every time. Or is it instead about capitalizing on today's market environment, plus where short-term benchmark rates currently sit and what the forward curve suggests, essentially exploiting that market and outlook? What's the reasoning there — a long-term philosophy, or more of a one-time move based on market conditions?

David Golub

executive
#17

Chris, I'll kick things off and then you can add your thoughts. Our long-term approach is a desire to remain mostly match funded. We strongly believe in match funding. Since the overwhelming majority of what we hold are floating-rate assets, that pushes us toward floating-rate liabilities on our side; we do hold some assets that aren't floating rate, so it's not necessary for every single thing to be swapped. When we issued those unsecured bonds during a period of extremely low rates, we made a deliberate choice back then not to swap, which isn't typical for us, and the reason for that choice was an asymmetric risk profile we identified. We judged it very improbable that rates would decline further from those low levels, while we recognized rates could rise; that call proved correct, though please don't take it as evidence that we're skilled at predicting interest rates. Broadly speaking, being in the business of forecasting interest rates isn't something we want.

Ryan Lynch

analyst
#18

Alright, that's clear. Nothing more from my side. Guys, a genuinely strong quarter; and I'd simply like to echo what Robert said — excellent work on lowering the fee structure, both the present reduction and the one you've carried out on the base fee, so that is certainly a significant win for shareholders. That's everything from me.

David Golub

executive
#19

Thank you, Ryan.

David Golub

executive
#20

Alright. I appreciate all of you being here with us today. There's one final thing I'd like to ask — today happens to be Chris Ericson's birthday. So wishing Chris a happy birthday would be wonderful. We're looking forward to speaking with you again next quarter. Should anything come up before that, don't hesitate to get in touch.

Operator

operator
#21

That brings us to the end of today's conference call. Thanks for being with us. You can go ahead and disconnect your lines now.

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