Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

May 7, 2024

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 38 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Hi everyone, and thank you for being here today. With me are Chris Ericson, who serves as our CFO, and Matt Benton, our Chief Operating Officer. If you're new to GBDC, our approach to investing centers on making first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses that strong private equity sponsors with a partnership mindset stand behind. That approach hasn't changed since our IPO 14 years ago. Yesterday, we put out our earnings press release covering the quarter that ended March 31, and we also posted an earnings presentation on our website, which we'll be walking through on this call. As I normally do, I'll begin with the headlines and a look at how we performed during the quarter, after that Matt and Chris will take you through the quarter's financial results in greater depth, and last, I'll close with what we expect looking ahead plus some Q&A. The big news is that GBDC turned in an excellent quarter. What GBDC reported lined up exactly with the preliminary figures the company filed on April 22. On a per-share basis, adjusted net investment income was $0.51, marking the highest quarterly adjusted NII per share the company has ever posted. On an annualized basis, that works out to an adjusted NII ROE of 13.5%. Adjusted earnings per share reached $0.55, which on an annualized basis equals an adjusted ROE of 14.6%. Credit performance overall was strong. For the quarter we recorded a modest net realized and unrealized gain of $0.04 per share, no new defaults emerged, the already low level of nonaccruals declined, and internal performance ratings held steady. As of March 31, NAV per share rose $0.09 versus the prior quarter, reaching $15.12. We're genuinely proud of what GBDC delivered this quarter, but what excites us even more are 2 strategic announcements GBDC made back in January. To jog your memory about these 2 announcements: first, GBDC said it had signed a definitive merger agreement with Golub Capital BDC 3, which we sometimes refer to as GBDC 3, with GBDC set to be the surviving company, pending certain shareholder approvals and customary closing conditions. Second, in connection with and in support of the proposed merger, GBDC's Investment Adviser agreed to cut GBDC's income incentive fee and capital gain incentive fee from 20% down to 15%. That incentive fee reduction took effect through a waiver as of January 1, 2024, and it will remain in effect while the proposed merger is pending. Once the merger closes, it becomes permanent. We recently sent out proxy materials tied to the merger, and we expect the merger to close during the second calendar quarter of 2024. As you may remember, GBDC's Investment Adviser shared earlier that the company's base management fee would be cut permanently, going from 1.375% down to 1% each year, starting July 1, 2023. With that 1% management fee, a 15% incentive fee, an 8% hurdle rate, and a cumulative since inception incentive fee cap, GBDC has established a fresh gold standard when it comes to shareholder alignment among publicly traded BDCs. I'd suggest you take a look at the proxy and the investor presentation on GBDC's website to find out more about why we believe these 2 announcements are so exciting and so significant. And with that, let me turn things over to Matt to go through our results in greater detail.

Matt Benton

executive
#2

Thanks, David. Now let's look at Slide 4. David covered some of this already, but GBDC turned in excellent results for the quarter ending 3/31/24. Adjusted NII per share came to $0.51, which equates to an adjusted NII ROE of 13.5%. That number beat what we reported in the quarters ending 9/30 and 12/31/23 — the strongest in GBDC's history. Versus fiscal Q2 of 2023, adjusted NII per share rose $0.09 year-over-year, up about 21%. Adjusted earnings per share hit $0.55, equal to an adjusted ROAE of 14.7%. Three primary factors drove GBDC's strong profitability. The largest is solid credit performance — I'll say more about that shortly. Second, elevated baseline rates consistent with what we've seen in recent quarters; and third, a durable decline in costs driven by the reduction to GBDC's base management fee that took effect in July of 2023, along with the incentive fee cut David discussed previously, moving from 20% down to 15%, applied for the first time during this quarter. Let me quickly walk through the shifts in portfolio and balance sheet. Net funds declined by $48.7 million on a sequential basis — that's intentional; we deliberately reduced the pace of GBDC's new investments in order to lower GBDC's leverage. At the close of the quarter, GBDC's GAAP debt-to-equity ratio, together with net unrestricted cash, was above 1.5x — right in the middle of our target range. The credit quality across GBDC's investment portfolio remained strong overall. First, nonaccruals declined. Measured against total debt investments at fair value, they represented 0.9% as of March 31, 2024, versus 1.1% as of December 31, 2023. Second, our internal performance ratings were steady. Just 50 basis points of the portfolio at fair value fell into rating categories 1 and 2. NAV per share rose $0.09 quarter over quarter, to $15.12. The current net asset value for each share sits 265 basis points above the level from twelve months ago. This gain occurred despite GBDC increasing the amount of money returned to its shareholders during that period. Moving on to the topic of distributions: the Board gave its approval to payments amounting to $0.45 per share. This total consists of the regular quarterly distribution of $0.39 per share plus a supplemental payout for fiscal Q2 of $0.06 per share. When combined, these distributions result in an annualized dividend yield of 11.9%, which was determined by referencing GBDC's net asset value per share as of March 31, 2024. Before we go further, a quick recap: as we noted previously, when the merger was put forward and the corresponding reduction in incentive fees was made public, the Board simultaneously raised the company's regular quarterly dividend from $0.37 per share to $0.39 per share. Our adjusted NII per share significantly exceeded that regular quarterly dividend, resulting in a distribution coverage ratio of 131% relative to the increased regular quarterly payout of $0.39 per share. Additionally, under the company's variable supplemental distribution framework, the Board approved a supplemental distribution of $0.06 per share. You'll recall that this framework was introduced in 2023 to help shareholders understand how we plan to balance the likelihood that GBDC will continue to generate excess income, all else equal on the 1 hand with our focus on NAV growth and resilience on the other hand. Details regarding the record and payment dates for fiscal Q2 distributions are available on Page 22 of the earnings presentation, while information on the variable supplemental distribution framework can be found on Page 23. At this point, I'll hand things over to Chris, who will walk us through our results in greater detail.

Chris Ericson

executive
#3

Thanks, Matt. Turning to Slide 7, you'll see how the key earnings drivers Matt just described translated into growth in NAV per share. Adjusted NII per share reached a record $0.51, which was well above the $0.46 in dividends distributed for the quarter. Meanwhile, a net realized and unrealized gain of $0.04 per share stemmed from unrealized appreciation throughout the portfolio and the reversal of unrealized depreciation related to the exit of one portfolio company investment in the quarter. Partially offsetting those gains was $0.08 per share of net realized loss recorded during the quarter. All those factors combined pushed our net asset value per share up to $15.12, which is $0.09 higher than what we saw in the previous quarter. On the topic of NAV growth, we're also expecting some accretion from our merger with GBDC 3. Back in the joint proxy statement we filed on April 15, 2024, we put that figure at $0.38 per share, roughly 2.5%, measured against GBDC's NAV as of 12/31/23 and using a GBDC share price of $16.60 from April 9, 2024. When GBDC closed at $17.09 on May 6, 2024, that price would translate to $0.50 per share of NAV accretion, or about 3.3%, relative to GBDC's March 31, 2024 NAV per share of $15.12. Just a quick note before we dive in — how much NAV accretion comes out of the proposed merger depends on the exchange ratio at the time the deal closes. I'd suggest taking a look at the investor presentation posted on GBDC's website, since it has more specifics. Now let's walk through GBDC's financial results for the quarter that ended March 31, 2024. Turning to Slide 10, we'll cover a summary of our origination activity during the quarter. Net funds growth was down roughly $48.7 million compared with the prior quarter, because the net effect of exits, investment sales, and fair value changes on existing investments exceeded new investment commitments and delayed draw term loan fundings. During the quarter ending March 31, both deal activity and origination across the entire Golub Capital platform saw gains. We anticipate further improvement throughout the rest of the year. That said, we took deliberate steps to modify GBDC's portfolio so we could hit our leverage objectives, and as a result, GBDC's new originations declined that quarter. After the quarter closed, since GBDC had reached its leverage target, we observed greater allocations flowing to GBDC, which mirror its lower financial leverage profile. Golub Capital has stayed very selective, completing roughly 2% of the deals it examined in calendar year 2023. That falls below the 2% to 4% selectivity range we normally see, which speaks to our preference for quality rather than volume. As for the composition of the new investments you can see in the middle of the slide, one-stop loans continued to dominate. If you look at the bottom portion of the slide, the weighted average rate we achieved on new investments held firm at 11% compared with the prior quarter. On Slide 11, we present GBDC's portfolio mix as a whole. You can see that the breakdown of investments by type stayed consistent quarter-over-quarter, and on a fair value basis, one-stop loans continued to represent approximately 85% of the portfolio. If you turn to Slide 12, it shows GBDC remains highly diversified when it comes to its portfolio companies, and the typical position comes in at roughly 30 basis points. Our firm conviction is that credit risk should be controlled by keeping positions at the right size — something we believe has served GBDC well through earlier credit cycles and will keep mattering as we think about the ones still to come. As of March 31, 2024, first lien senior secured floating rate loans accounted for 93% of our investment portfolio, and those loans go to borrowers spanning a wide range of industries that we view as resilient. The economic analysis laid out on Slide 13 points to only a slight shift versus the quarter before. Here's how to interpret this chart: start with the dark blue line, which shows the yield on our investment income. As a reminder, fee and discount amortization factors into that investment income yield. Consistent with benchmark interest rates, GBDC's investment income yield has leveled off across recent quarters, ticking up modestly quarter over quarter by 20 basis points to 12.8%. The teal line represents our cost of debt, which increased slightly, by 10 basis points, to 5.5%. As a result, the gold line — our weighted average net investment spread — moved up from the previous quarter to 7.3%. We expect to see GBDC's income yields come down somewhat in the quarters ahead, driven by spread compression across the market, though this quarter's figures did not yet reflect that. I'll now turn things back over to Matt.

Matt Benton

executive
#4

Appreciate that, Chris. Moving along now to Slides 14 and 15, where we'll dig a bit deeper into the metrics around credit quality. The main point here is that credit continues to look solid and stable. Over on Slide 14, nonaccruals came down 20 basis points on a sequential basis, landing at 90 basis points of total debt investments at fair value. That's really a continuation of the trend, since this level has fallen steadily going back to the quarter that ended 12/31/2022. The percentage of portfolio company investments sitting on nonaccrual status held steady at 9% as of March 31, 2024. On Slide 15, we show how internal performance ratings across GBDC's investments have trended. As of March 31, 2024, roughly 87% of GBDC's investments carried a rating of 4 or 5, meaning those are performing in line with, or better than, what we expected at underwriting. The share of loans rated 1,2 — those being the loans we think are most likely to experience significant credit impairment — stayed very low, at 50 basis points of the portfolio at fair value. Loans rated 3 fell from 13.7% to 12.3% quarter over quarter. As is our usual practice, we'll skip over Slides 16 through 19. Those contain additional detail regarding GBDC's financial statements, dividend history and other key metrics. I'll finish this portion by walking through GBDC's liquidity and investment capacity on Slides 20 and 21. To start, let's look at the key takeaways on Slide 21. Our weighted average cost of debt for this quarter came in at 5.5%, which we think ranks among the lowest across our peer group. 66% of our debt funding comes through unsecured notes, including the post-quarter end repayment of the April 2024 unsecured notes, with laddered maturities on the remaining unsecured notes spanning 2026 to 2029. The fixed rate notes maturing in 2026 and 2027 were issued at a weighted average coupon of 2.3%. And as we've mentioned before on earlier calls, we chose not to swap those into floating rate exposure. During the quarter, GBDC issued $600 million of 5.5-year bonds, with a stated maturity of July 2029 and a fixed coupon of 6%. In connection with that issuance, we entered into an interest rate swap to a floating rate of SOFR plus 2.444%. This issuance, together with our December 2028 unsecured notes, strengthens GBDC's debt maturity ladder, while tackling refinancing risk tied to the $500 million of notes maturing in April 2024, which we later paid off successfully after quarter end; in April, we entered into a second interest rate swap on the December 2028 unsecured notes, bringing the combined weighted average floating rate on the 2028 and 2029 notes to SOFR plus 272 basis points, which we view as a highly attractive cost of funds given unsecured notes relative to our secured borrowing costs. All told, our liquidity position stays strong and is greatly bolstered by the December 2023 and February 2024 unsecured notes issuances. At the close of the quarter, we had roughly $1.9 billion in available liquidity, made up of unrestricted cash, undrawn capacity under our corporate revolver—which is significantly over collateralized—and the unused unsecured revolver from our adviser. Once you factor in the April 2024 repayment of $500 million in 2024 unsecured notes, our available liquidity still stood at a high level, about $1.4 billion. That strong liquidity at GBDC equals 13.1x its present unfunded asset commitments, or 9.6x when you include the 2024 unsecured notes due for payment. The varied sources, adaptability, and inexpensive nature of GBDC's funding structure is a key factor supporting our 3 investment grade ratings from Fitch, Moody's and S&P. GBDC holds stronger ratings from Moody's and Fitch compared with most of the rated BDC sector, which gives us deeper and more cost-effective access to debt markets; at this point I'll turn things back to David for his closing remarks, and then we can begin Q&A.

David Golub

executive
#5

Appreciate that, Matt. To wrap things up, GBDC began calendar 2024 strongly. Favorable credit results, high base rates, and lower fees—when you put all three together, they generated another record-breaking quarter for adjusted NII per share. We see those drivers of performance, plus the merger still pending with GBDC 3, as powerful tailwinds ahead for the company. Speaking of that pending merger, May 29 is the date for the 2024 Special Meeting of Stockholders; if you're among those who have already voted, we thank you. If you're an investor who hasn't cast a ballot yet, we ask that you kindly do so. Even with such a solid quarter, we did encounter certain headwinds, and before we take questions, I want to speak to those. Headwind number one: M&A in the middle market remains fairly sluggish. You may recall that as the year began, several bank CEOs predicted a rise in M&A activity. Yet as we pointed out last quarter, while our outlook for deal activity improving across the medium to long term was positive, we held a more guarded view of the near term. In hindsight, that guarded stance proved justified. First-quarter M&A was much stronger than the same period last year and came in at about the same level as Q4 2023, yet it still looked soft when measured against what we'd call a typical environment. The M&A marketplace fell out of alignment back in spring 2022, and getting it back into balance is proving slow—slower than we would prefer. Another challenge coming from the industry side involved spreads compressing significantly throughout credit markets in general, spanning investment grade, high yield, broadly syndicated loans, and private credit. That said, because we concentrate on core middle market companies, our portfolio was largely protected from the harshest impact of that spread compression. Still, we did feel some of it. For newly arranged deals, broadly syndicated loan spreads have tightened, with reductions ranging from 50 to 100 basis points, and occasionally the decline has been even steeper. A significant number of loans already on the books got repriced, and additional repricings are expected to follow. Although the compression of spreads has been more pronounced in the large deal segment than in the core middle market, it has nonetheless shown up in the core middle market as well, and we expect pricing pressure to persist for quite a while throughout the entire market; taking everything into account, we believe GBDC occupies a strong position to confront these challenges. As we have said many times before, GBDC was built to endure a wide range of circumstances. Following the merger, we anticipate that GBDC will be even more resilient, particularly given what is happening in markets right now. Emphasizing the core middle market rather than holding an outsized concentration in large corporations will demonstrate itself to be a highly significant advantage. Being larger has never struck us as inherently superior, and we have never subscribed to that belief. The reality is that the threat of implementation grants sizable borrowers power over providers of private credit, above all when the BSL market is experiencing a comeback, which is the situation today. Even with only modest deal activity and narrower spreads, we believe our edge—such as the fee model that leads the industry—will allow GBDC to keep delivering stronger results than peers. Now I'll close by discussing what we see ahead. My expectation is greater divergence across BDC managers. Lately, each quarter has brought at least one BDC revealing unforeseen negative developments, typically tied to sizable realized and unrealized losses. Beyond that, leadership upheaval has surfaced at multiple BDCs. My view is that these patterns will persist. Additional unpleasant revelations are coming. That said, GBDC strikes me as favorably situated within this spectrum of manager dispersion, since we think Golub Capital excels at a set of mutually reinforcing capabilities. We gravitate toward durable borrowers operating in durable sectors. Through our relationships and incumbencies, we've become a partner of choice. Underwriting is an area where we particularly shine. Our investment processing protocols let us spot and tackle problems at an early stage, while our deep know-how in working through troubled credits allows us to protect value. These competitive strengths were developed gradually and deliberately in pursuit of our mission to lead in sponsor finance. With that, operator, the line is open for questions.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#6

We'd like to hear more about the spread compression topic. Could you flesh that out a bit? Is there significant repricing going on? Or does it mostly apply to new originations? And what level of spreads relative to the existing book are you observing or anticipating will unfold?

David Golub

executive
#7

Absolutely. Fin, I appreciate the question; the key thing here is to draw some lines based on which borrower size we mean. Among bigger players, over the past 4 months, we've witnessed a rebound in the broadly syndicated arena. CLO creation has returned dramatically. Prices in the secondary for broadly syndicated loans have climbed substantially, and banks that had been highly hesitant about underwriting exposure are now back, willing to assume underwriting exposure and actively pushing broadly syndicated refinancings of what used to be private credit transactions. That dynamic, along with fairly muted M&A that I mentioned earlier, is leading to considerable repricing and refinancing among these bigger players, and a portion of that refinancing and repricing is producing tighter spreads. Looking at the publicly available figures for the broadly syndicated space in Q1, they indicate roughly 50 basis points of spread tightening. However, I believe in the B3 segment and the large unitranche segment, the amount of spread tightening is in fact greater. I'd put it at 50 to 100 basis points. Often, we've observed private credit lenders agreeing to reduced pricing rather than getting refinanced away. And frequently, we've seen sponsors and borrowers opt to swap private credit arrangements for fresh broadly syndicated ones; both of these patterns are occurring. My sense is this won't wrap up anytime soon. I expect we'll keep seeing it in calendar Q2 results. I don't believe what we're discussing is something exclusive to private credit. We're also observing spread compression in investment grade, high yield, asset backed, and CLO liability areas. It's happening very widely. And the crux of grasping it is that there's been a major swing in how investors feel. A year back, the dominant investor attitude was pessimistic. People anticipated a recession ahead. Many worried it could be an especially severe recession. Nowadays, I'd say the overall investor mood is far more optimistic. There's ongoing discussion about the timing of interest rate reductions, yet that very discussion highlights how strong the economy is and the broadly favorable outlook for its future. Let me note that these points apply to the bigger market; within the core middle market, repricing and spread compression are more restrained. It consistently shifts less than the bigger market does. Still, we remain protected. When it comes to the middle market, shifts in the broader market do affect us too. There's some spread compression showing up there, in my view. And my expectation is that we'll keep seeing a certain amount of spread compression in the middle market. At present, I'd call this the largest headwind the private credit universe faces; results had been very strong for a stretch, and we've now entered a time when the pendulum has moved toward conditions that favor borrowers, whereas for quite a while, conditions had favored lenders.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#8

That's useful. Then, turning to the merger as a follow-up, if I recall the first one, GCIC, it seemed to arrive with something of a technical headwind. Naturally, the market differs today from what it was back then, yet we're checking whether, given the conversations you've had up to now, you expect a comparable pattern of shareholder turnover?

David Golub

executive
#9

To give some background, what Finn is referring to is that with the GBDC, GCIC merger, worries were voiced that when the merger happened we would witness a certain sustained level of selling from GCIC investors. As I remember it, in reality we did not. The stock did fairly well after the merger, and the anxieties people held about choppiness truly never materialized. My sense is that things will play out the same way now. Some shareholders in GBDC 3 will be looking to trim their positions; some investors, with GBDC growing bigger, will be looking to establish larger positions. I'm hopeful it won't be exciting.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#10

On the credit quality front—and like you said, nothing really stands out as bad this quarter. Looking at those 3 new nonaccruals, together they were quite small, and 1 was especially tiny. Health care had none, though software accounted for 2. So has something shifted in terms of patterns you're noticing, whether it's margin strain or where pressure is emerging again? These amounts are minor, but we're watching for any signals. Or was either of those software businesses—or both—bringing in recurring revenue? Did they run on cash flow? Can you share anything there?

David Golub

executive
#11

Robert, that's a really good question. Let me give it some framing. Occasionally, when credit trends emerge, you can spot themes and say, "Ah, this sector or this subsector is weaker," or businesses heavily reliant on compensation costs are struggling. At various points in the last couple of years, we could speak that way; we could discuss difficulties in Health Care Service companies; we could discuss difficulties for businesses unable to raise prices as quickly as their costs climbed, especially labor costs. Those 2 patterns are still somewhat visible industrywide. Within our portfolio, I believe we've largely moved past both. But I'd anticipate seeing both patterns continue throughout the broadly syndicated market and across a large part of the BDC market, where plenty of companies still face trouble tied to health-care reimbursement levels and cost structures, plus a lack of pricing power. Looking at our portfolio today, I'd call it highly idiosyncratic. As you mentioned, the 3 additions to nonaccrual are each quite small. One is a recurring revenue loan. Still, I wouldn't infer any health care trend from this. We've periodically faced issues with software companies. We've worked them out quite successfully. I expect that will keep being the case.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#12

Understood. And then, regarding how all the spread compression — typically, when spreads are compressing, that isn't the only concession lenders are making. The weighted average upfront fee declined somewhat this quarter too, but beyond that, structures, covenant packages, and so on usually lose some rigor in a climate like this one. Could you provide any insight into how dramatically that is shifting, if it is at all? Is that a bigger worry than the spread compression? Or is the spread compression — or, as you said, that's the main method for us right now in public credit, but that's a short-term occurrence — if the structures deteriorate to the point that future credit becomes a risk. I mean, any views on that?

David Golub

executive
#13

So I believe you raise a very significant point, which is that you're correct that, broadly speaking, we're either — we're always either in a climate where the pendulum is swinging toward more borrower-friendly or more lender-friendly. And when it's swinging in the direction of more borrower-friendly, it tends not to swing only in terms of spread — it also tends to swing in terms of documentation terms, in terms of leverage, in terms of structure. I stress spread in my remarks today because I believe that's the area where we've witnessed the most substantial movement. And I believe that all of these changes underscore another really significant point, which is that origination strength is going to become a bigger and bigger source of differentiation among managers. What I mean by that is managers who possess large portfolios with plenty of incumbency opportunities, you have particularly strong relationships with sponsors who have scale and depth of expertise, they're going to be able to navigate this coming climate much — with much more aplomb than folks who lack those kinds of advantages, because this is the kind of climate where it gets harder to find attractive loans.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#14

When we run into cases where spreads are getting squeezed or fees might be compressed, what's the broad approach when it comes to refinancing existing borrowers — do you take a reduced pre-seed and tighter spread, or do you walk away?

David Golub

executive
#15

We're in the business of making good investments. I realize that comes across as a bit of a cliché, but I genuinely believe it's a crucial thing to keep straight, since the market we play in includes competitors who care more about volume than they do about quality. So every judgment we make, Paul, is rooted in risk reward. And there are times when we decide that for a borrower asking for a smaller spread, saying yes is the correct call. Other times we turn them down. Last quarter gave me quite a few instances of us passing. In certain of those, someone else refinanced them out. So keeping discipline matters, I'd say. A piece of staying disciplined is excelling at originations, which keeps you from feeling forced into a deal whose credit has an unattractive risk reward simply because your book needs to stay full.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#16

That's clear. I also appreciate the considered response; my final question concerns the shift in portfolio yield, which rose by 20 basis points this quarter. If anything particular drove that, given the spread compression we've been discussing, perhaps looking ahead, any insight would be helpful.

David Golub

executive
#17

I'd call it merely noise. No conclusions should be drawn from it. You're right that it appears unexpected given the spread compression theme.

David Golub

executive
#18

Okay, thank you all for being here today, and we’re eager to speak with you once more in the next quarter. As usual, should you have any inquiries before then, don’t hesitate to get in touch.

Operator

operator
#19

Appreciate it. Everyone, that wraps up the session for today. Thanks to each of you for being here. You're free to hang up now.

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