Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
August 6, 2024
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
David Golub
executiveHello, everyone, and thanks for joining us. Chris Ericson, our CFO, and Matt Benton, our COO, are here with me. For those of you just getting to know GBDC, our investment strategy is built around providing first lien senior secured loans to middle market companies that are healthy and resilient — businesses backed by private equity sponsors that are strong and focused on partnership. Since our IPO, that strategy has remained the same. Yesterday, we released our earnings press release for the quarter ending June 30, and we've also posted an earnings presentation on our website that we'll be referencing throughout today's call. As usual, I'll start with the headlines and a summary of the quarter. Following that, Matt and Chris are going to take a closer look at the quarter's financials. After that, I'll wrap up by discussing what we expect going forward, and then we'll take your questions. Let's begin with the main points. The main point is that GBDC's quarter, which wrapped up on June 30, had both strong and weak aspects, and we'll cover every piece of it thoroughly on this call. Let me give you a quick overview. I'll begin with the strong part. To start, we completed our second win-win-win affiliate merger in early June. In our view, that merger benefited GBDC shareholders, GBDC 3 shareholders, and GBDC as a company. Closing the merger boosted NAV. At quarter's end, our net asset value stood at $15.32 per share, representing a 1.3% gain over the March 31 figure. It also locked in a permanent cut to GBDC's incentive fee rate, bringing it down from 20% to 15%. In our view, that gives GBDC a fee structure that leads the industry and strengthens GBDC's ability to generate earnings going forward. GBDC additionally announced a set of special distributions and started making those payments. Next, origination volume gained momentum, extending the rebound in middle market M&A that got underway in the quarter that closed December 31, 2023. For the quarter ending June 30, new investment commitments came to $435 million, which is $111 million higher than the equivalent quarter a year earlier. As anticipated, the bulk of new lending activity centered on Golub Capital's strongest areas—frequent private equity partners, returning borrowers, and sectors where we have deep expertise. Third, the majority of GBDC's portfolio companies delivered solid results. According to the Golub Capital Middle Market Report, median revenue and EBITDA for borrowers rose sharply, marking the seventh quarter in a row of such gains, while performance ratings throughout the portfolio also saw improvement. So which part fell short? Two credits—Imperial Optical and Pluralsight—produced negative results for GBDC, resulting in substantial write-downs on each. We take a lot of pride in how consistently we've kept defaults and credit losses at low levels over the years. That said, we're not flawless. This quarter, after adjusting for the merger, GBDC recorded $0.17 per share in net realized and unrealized losses, and those came mostly from 2 credits. Neither loss pointed to any wider trend or pattern we're seeing across the portfolio. In the case of Imperial Optical, an effort to sell the company at an advanced stage fell apart, so we decided to pivot to a restructuring instead. As for Pluralsight, a top-tier sponsor had already committed over $4 billion of equity to a business that carried roughly $1.7 billion of debt, and it made the decision to stop providing further support. Both of those things caught us off guard and were frustrating. So how did things land for us in the quarter ending June 30? Adjusted net investment income came to $0.48 per share for that quarter. On an adjusted basis, earnings per share were $0.31. That works out to a return on equity of roughly 8% annualized. Through the first 3 quarters of this fiscal year, GBDC has posted a return on equity of 11.4% annualized. This quarter's results included certain onetime merger-related items, and staying true to our habit of acting in shareholders' interests, Golub Capital made the choice to proactively waive, on a onetime basis, the incentive fee for this quarter in order to bolster returns for our shareholders. Matt and Chris will walk through the quarter and the fiscal year-to-date in greater detail, covering a range of onetime effects on the P&L and how we view what GBDC's profitability would have looked like for the quarter once those onetime items are adjusted out. I'll return at the end with a few thoughts regarding GBDC's outlook. Matt?
Matt Benton
executiveThanks, David. I'll pick up on Slide 4. As David already previewed, our adjusted NII per share landed at $0.48, translating into an adjusted NII ROE of 12.7%. Comparing that with fiscal Q3 of 2023, GBDC's adjusted NII per share climbed $0.04 year-over-year, an increase of roughly 9%. Adjusted earnings per share stood at $0.31, which corresponds to an adjusted net income ROE of 8.1%. Zooming out for a wider perspective, GBDC's earnings were shaped by a number of important drivers. First, credit performance was largely solid, with the exception of markdowns taken on Imperial Optical and Pluralsight; together, those two names made up the bulk of the $0.17 per share in net realized and unrealized losses. I'll get into that with more specifics in a bit. Moving on, elevated base rates remain a factor, consistent with the pattern from the past several quarters. The third point: GBDC benefits from an investment advisory fee framework that is a leader in the industry, which holds costs down in a lasting way. Part of that is the incentive fee, which went from 20% down to 15% and was made permanent on June 3, 2024, when the GBDC 3 merger was completed. And finally, Golub Capital, which serves as GBDC's investment manager, decided on its own to waive the manager's incentive fee for the quarter. For net investment income and earnings, that worked out to an advantage of about $0.07 per share. By waiving this fee, Golub Capital carries on a long-standing practice of acting in ways that benefit shareholders. Let me now give you an overview of credit quality and portfolio activity for the quarter. Sequential net funds increased by $2.5 billion, driven largely by the completion of the GBDC 3 merger, lifting the fair value of the total portfolio to $7.9 billion. Overall credit performance across GBDC's investment portfolio was strong, and internal performance ratings improved relative to the previous quarter. The share of investments in rating categories 4 and 5 rose to 89.2% from 87.2% a quarter earlier, whereas investments falling into rating categories 1 and 2 accounted for just 70 basis points of the portfolio's fair value. On a percentage-of-total-debt-investments-at-fair-value basis, nonaccruals increased to 1% as of June 30, 2024, compared with 90 basis points as of March 31, 2024, and they continue to sit well under the BDC sector average. On the credit side, nonaccrual investments increased to 10 during the quarter. One portfolio company went back to accrual status, while two others were newly added. We continue to feel the portfolio overall is in a strong position from a credit perspective. Weighted average loan-to-value for the portfolio was 45%, and in our view that provides quite good downside protection. Despite these broadly favorable credit trends, we did run into the two negative surprises David referred to in his opening remarks this quarter. We don't see them as reflecting the portfolio's broader health, and given Imperial Optical's relative size and the effect it had on this quarter's results, it's probably worth taking a moment to go into more detail on that company. Imperial Optical operates as a comprehensive vision care business, delivering optometric patient services alongside retail eyewear through 280 sites in the United States. As of March 31, 2024, the exposure we held in Imperial Optical consisted of $96.9 million in senior secured debt on a base amount at premerger GBDC, together with a base amount of $41.7 million at premerger GBDC 3. For an extended period, this company has delivered results below the expectations both we and the sponsor held. With the sponsor's backing, over the last year we followed a strategy made up of two parts. The first part was an operating turnaround plan the company implemented, and that plan included appointing a new CEO. The second part was examining strategic alternatives. As of 03/31/2024, our view was that a strategic exit carried a high probability. Yet during the quarter that ended at 06/30, it became evident that this would not come to pass. So we moved to a single-minded emphasis on the operating turnaround. We resized its capital structure appropriately and assumed control of the equity and the Board. We collaborated closely with the incumbent management team and other important stakeholders to secure alignment; this restructuring accounted for most of GBDC's net realized and unrealized loss during the quarter. Moving on to Slide 4, allow me to give a quick overview of some balance sheet movements during the quarter. NAV per share rose $0.20 sequentially, reaching $15.32. Relative to the prior year, NAV per share now stands $0.49 greater, even while GBDC paid out larger distributions to shareholders over this stretch. As David mentioned earlier, among the advantages of the merger with GBDC 3 that recently closed is that the shares issued in that merger — roughly $92 million — were priced above the present NAV, producing significant NAV accretion for GBDC's existing shareholders. Leverage fell substantially versus the previous quarter, hitting 1.05x on a debt-to-equity basis after accounting for available cash, and 1.00x after accounting for available cash plus cash trapped at debt securitizations for the purpose of paying down principal on outstanding notes. We noted last quarter that we anticipated some deleveraging tied to the merger, and that is what occurred. Now let's discuss distributions. The Board authorized $0.44 per share in distributions, made up of a regular quarterly distribution of $0.39 per share plus a fiscal Q3 supplemental distribution of $0.05 per share. Combined, these distributions equate to an annualized dividend yield of 11.5%, calculated using GBDC's NAV per share as of June 30, 2024. Adjusted NII per share keeps surpassing the company's regular quarterly distribution by a wide margin, giving regular distribution coverage of 123%; furthermore, our Board declared additional special distributions payable in 3 equal installments of $0.05 per share, starting in June 2024 after the merger closed on June 3. The 2 remaining special distributions of $0.05 per share are scheduled for payment on September 13, 2024, to stockholders of record as of August 16, 2024, and on December 13, 2024, to stockholders of record as of November 29, 2024. Details on record dates and payment dates for fiscal Q3 distributions appear on Slide 25 of the earnings presentation, and information on the variable supplemental distribution framework is on Slide 26. Before handing things over to Chris for a deeper dive into the financials, I want to point you to Slide 6, a brand-new slide, where we've laid out the significant nonrecurring items that hit the P&L for the quarter ending June 30th. What we're trying to do with this breakdown is give a clearer picture of what we consider a more normalized GBDC core earnings profile, ahead of any effects from modestly releveraging the balance sheet. To start, reversing interest income that had been recognized in earlier quarters on investments that were restructured or moved to nonaccrual status during this quarter brought adjusted NII per share down by $0.05. Next, during the quarter, GBDC booked an extra $0.03 per share of noncash interest expense tied to marking to market interest rate swaps. As I said, these are noncash charges, and over time they ought to net out to 0. Finally, the incentive fee waiver added $0.07 per share to adjusted NII. When you combine these adjustments for nonrecurring items, the result is adjusted NII per share of $0.45, which works out to an 11.7% adjusted NII ROE. On top of that, as I noted earlier, we anticipate that releveraging GBDC's balance sheet toward target levels in response to the deleveraging effects of the GBDC 3 merger will serve as an NII tailwind. Now I'll pass it to Chris to give you more detail on our results.
Chris Ericson
executiveAppreciate that, Matt. If you look at Slide 8, there's a bridge illustrating how GBDC's net asset value per share came in at $15.32, which represents a $0.20 per share increase versus the quarter before. Moving on, I believe it's worth going to Slide 9 and taking a bit of time to explain how the accounting for the GBDC 3 merger works. Since this merger was treated as an asset acquisition under GAAP, the purchase premium got allocated on a pro rata basis across the assets that came from GBDC 3. Consequently, GBDC's starting cost basis, along with the former GBDC 3 assets, matched their fair value as of the acquisition date plus that purchase premium. Given that GBDC applies fair value accounting, right after the merger closed, GBDC booked a onetime unrealized loss in the same amount as that purchase premium. In essence, GBDC first wrote up the former GBDC 3 assets to fair value to reflect the purchase premium, and afterward wrote those same former GBDC 3 assets back down to their fair value. This onetime loss — a paper loss, consistent with GAAP — is a noncash item, and it doesn't represent any economic loss that GBDC actually incurred. Now on Slide 10, we give an illustration of how we anticipate the purchase premium will move through the income statement going forward. Put simply, GBDC will amortize that purchase premium across the life of the acquired loans by way of interest income, as a reduction to net investment income, or NII. That said, this purchase premium amortization will not cause any decrease to net income, because whatever reduction hits NII gets offset by a matching reversal of the unrealized loss, which you can see in the middle graph. And consistent with how we've done things since the GCIC merger, and so that GBDC's post-merger financial results are simpler to compare against premerger results, we'll keep using certain supplemental financial measurements alongside GAAP measurements to remove the effect of the purchase premium write-down; we'll keep discussing adjusted net investment income and adjusted net investment income per share, both of which exclude the amortization of the purchase premium; we'll also discuss adjusted net realized and unrealized gain or loss and adjusted net realized and unrealized gain or loss per share. Those will exclude both the onetime unrealized loss tied to the purchase premium write-down and the matching reversal of the unrealized loss stemming from the amortization of the purchase premium. And last, we'll discuss adjusted net income and adjusted earnings per share, which will compute net income and earnings per share using adjusted net investment income and adjusted net realized and unrealized gain or loss. As this slide depicts, following the onetime unrealized loss on the purchase premium write-down, adjusted net income should equal GAAP net income, since any purchase premium amortization is expected to be offset by a corresponding reversal of the unrealized loss on the GBDC 3 investments acquired. Now, we'll walk through the specifics of GBDC's results for the quarter that closed on June 30, 2024. Starting on Slide 13, you'll see a summary of what we originated during the quarter. Net funds growth rose $2.5 billion compared to the prior quarter, mostly because we acquired GBDC 3's $2.6 billion portfolio when the GBDC 3 merger closed. Setting the merger aside, new investment commitments along with delayed draw term loan fundings were exceeded by the combined effect of exits, investment sales, and fair value changes on existing investments. Both market-wide deal activity and origination across the Golub Capital platform got better in the quarter ending June 30. We anticipate further improvement through the rest of the year. Golub Capital stayed very selective, closing roughly 2% of the deals it reviewed in the first half of calendar year 2024. That sits at the lower end of our usual 2% to 4% selectivity rate and shows our emphasis on quality rather than quantity. The mix of new investments, shown in the middle of the slide, is still mostly one-stop loans. At the bottom of the slide, the weighted average rate on new investments came down slightly versus the prior quarter, landing at 10.7%. We remain very selective — the average loan to value on Golub Capital's middle market originations for the quarter came in under 35%, and an outsized share of those originations went to borrowers we've worked with before. Slide 14 presents GBDC's portfolio mix as a whole after the GBDC 3 merger closed. As you can see, the split by investment type held steady versus the prior quarter, with one-stop loans still making up about 85% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 15 shows GBDC's portfolio is still highly diversified across portfolio companies, with an average investment size of roughly 30 basis points. On top of that, our biggest single borrower accounts for only 1.7% of the portfolio, and our 10 largest borrowers together account for only 14%. We firmly believe in managing credit risk through position size, which we think has benefited GBDC through past credit cycles and will keep mattering when it comes to credit cycles ahead. As of June 30, 2024, 93% of our investment portfolio was made up of first lien senior secured floating rate loans to borrowers spread across a diverse set of industries we consider resilient. The economic analysis on Slide 16 revealed a few shifts versus the prior quarter. Let's go through those carefully. We'll begin with the dark blue line, which represents our investment income yield. Just to remind you, the investment income yield factors in amortization of fees and discounts. In line with where base rates have been, GBDC's investment income yield has flattened out over the last few quarters and fell to 12.3% for the quarter that ended June 30. That decline stemmed from a mix of spread compression and some nonrecurring items in the quarter — most notably the effect of reversing interest income we had previously recognized on investments that were restructured or put on nonaccrual status during this quarter, plus lower interest income earned on cash relative to the quarter that ended March 31 — which together drove a sequential drop of 50 basis points. Our cost of debt, shown by the teal line, rose mainly because of the maturity of the April 2024 unsecured notes, a full quarter of the 2029 unsecured notes being outstanding, and our assumption of the funding facilities from GBDC 3. After the merger closed, we started working through a plan to bring down GBDC's post-merger funding costs by making greater use of our low-cost JPMorgan credit facility. We also think there's room to improve our cost of funding in some of our other funding structures over the rest of this year. On top of that, we recorded higher interest expense for the quarter tied to marking to fair value our existing interest rate swaps on the 2028 and 2029 notes. As a reminder, we chose to swap our recent fixed rate unsecured note issuances, the floating rate, into term SOFR so we could match fund the company's assets, which are mostly floating rate. Hedge accounting obliges us to fair value the interest rate swaps and run any changes in fair value through interest expense. But it's worth noting, this is a noncash expense and will net to 0 over the lives of the swaps. So for the quarter ended June 30, 2024, we had a $0.03 per share noncash reduction in net investment income from higher interest expense caused by marking down the fair value of our interest rate swaps; we saw the reverse effect in the quarter ended March 31, 2024, when the change in fair value on our interest rate swaps led to lower noncash interest expense and a corresponding boost to net investment income of $0.01 per share in that quarter. We've left out the net change in fair value tied to our interest rate swap hedges when calculating our weighted average cost of debt, since those are noncash amounts that will net to 0 over the life of the swaps; we believe that with nearly 80% of GBDC's total debt funding coming from floating rate exposure, GBDC is well positioned for declining interest rates. Taken together, these factors brought GBDC's weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, down sequentially to 5.8%. I'm going to hand the floor back to Matt now. Matt?
Matt Benton
executiveAppreciate it, Chris. To finish up this part, I'll take you through GBDC's liquidity and investment capacity, which you'll find on Slides 23 and 24. Let's zero in on the main points from Slide 24. The weighted average cost of our debt for this quarter came in at 6.5%. Unsecured notes account for 46% of our debt funding. The fixed-rate notes maturing in 2026 and 2027 carried a weighted average coupon of 2.3% at issuance. And as we've mentioned several times before, we chose not to exchange them for floating rate exposure. By issuing the July 2029 and December 2028 unsecured notes, we strengthened GBDC's debt maturity ladder and tackled refinancing risk tied to the $500 million of notes that came due and were later repaid in April 2024. On the whole, our liquidity remains solid and has been substantially bolstered by the recent unsecured notes issuances. We closed the quarter with roughly $1.6 billion of liquidity, sourced from unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver, which is meaningfully over collateralized, and the unused unsecured revolver extended by our adviser. The diversification, flexibility and low cost of GBDC's funding structure is a key factor supporting our 3 investment grade ratings from Fitch, Moody's and S&P. GBDC holds stronger ratings from Moody's and Fitch than most of the rated BDC sector, which gives us deeper and more cost-effective access to the debt markets; now I'll turn it back to David for closing remarks and Q&A. David?
David Golub
executiveAppreciate that, Matt. To recap, the quarter ending June 30 for GBDC contained both excellent aspects and some letdowns; we've already covered the 2 credit losses from this period that disappointed us. We've also gone over the positives, such as robust income production, generally steady credit conditions, and the successful completion of the three-way beneficial combination with GBDC 3. Before we take questions, allow me to conclude with our forward view. During the prior quarter, we discussed several challenges we foresaw in the marketplace that GBDC would encounter regarding new originations, pricing spreads, and credit quality. Our perspective at present remains mostly the same. I'll briefly address all 3 of these topics. First, origination. On the positive side, we observed an increase in M&A dealmaking during the quarter. Many participants in the market, from what we can tell, anticipate additional improvement in M&A dealmaking as this year progresses. That could happen, but we're taking a more conservative stance. In our estimation, transaction activity will probably remain restrained through the second half. In numerous instances, we believe sellers will opt to postpone sale processes while hoping for declining interest rates and reduced economic and political unpredictability. It's our view that volumes won't return to typical levels until 2025. Now let's move to the second challenge, spreads. During the first half of 2024, the broadly syndicated loan market experienced a remarkable narrowing of spreads, and in the second calendar quarter this resulted in a mix of numerous repricings on existing deals plus reduced spreads on newly issued transactions. This pattern was considerably more evident in the large market segment, where direct lenders are up against broadly syndicated market executions. All told, since the start of the year, spread narrowing in the large market segment has fallen within the 50 to 100 basis points range. In the traditional middle market, which is where we concentrate, there has been less spread narrowing and fewer repricings compared to the large market, yet our approach has not been shielded from the spread tightening and borrower-friendly refinancing activities; over recent weeks, the market appears to be settling down, and the volatility seen in the market this week might contribute to that settling. Last, let's discuss our credit outlook; over the past 2 years, we've described how we anticipated observing additional credit strain in both the broadly syndicated market and the private credit market. Although elevated credit strain is apparent, which you can observe through increased default rates in both the broadly syndicated market and in portions of private credit; credit strain never emerges uniformly; we have been noticing — and I anticipate this pattern will persist, we have been noticing additional problems in particular sectors and with regard to particular managers. We anticipate that this dispersion in outcomes will keep going. To wrap things up, we still anticipate encountering certain headwinds over the next stretch, and our view remains that GBDC sits in an excellent position to land on the better side of the manager dispersion range we foresee; following the merger, we think GBDC is set up to produce robust earnings, driven by a portfolio that is resilient, a fee structure that is best-in-class, nonaccruals that are extremely low, and a liability structure that is both durable and diversified. We are grateful for the tremendous backing for the merger that came our way from GBDC shareholders, and we anticipate realizing the merger's expected advantages as we move ahead. With that said, kindly open the line for questions.
Robert Dodd
analystCongratulations on completing all of that. First off, David, I wanted to ask about volatility in the market. You mentioned that short-term volatility could help spreads stabilize. How long do you think that kind of volatility would have to persist before BSL and private market spreads begin widening once more?
David Golub
executiveThat's a terrific question, Robert. It's really difficult to generalize about what's happening in the market at this moment, since all of us are evaluating in real time what's driving the decline that began on Friday, carried over into Monday, and partially rebounded today. In my opinion, this turbulence reflects the recent softness in certain economic figures that were released, the Jobs Report, along with a growing emotional sense that public market valuations, especially in tech, have climbed too high. But I would not be truthful if I claimed to have a solid read on where market volatility — where market prices will go in the short term; I simply don't. Here's what we do know. Over the past several days, loan prices in the broadly syndicated bond market have dropped by roughly 1 point. We've also observed shifts in securitization liabilities markets. For a typical broadly syndicated CLO, I'd estimate the average cost of funds on a marked basis at around 25 basis points. Whether those shifts will carry over into private credit, or even hold up over the coming days or weeks, is hard to determine at this point. My personal view is that this weakness is prompting some reassessment in private credit land regarding how attractive the spread compression of recent months has been, and it may drain some momentum from those players who've been most willing to cut spreads in the private market. But all of this is unfolding in real time, Robert, and it's tough to measure.
Robert Dodd
analystYes. Understood. This is happening right now. Regarding credit, Pluralsight is likely among the most heavily flagged troubled assets we have witnessed in the BDC sector during a single quarter. Everyone saw it approaching. Therefore, it isn't shocking. More generally, though, how much of your portfolio contains loan structures, documentation arrangements, or whatever term you prefer, that resemble the type of structure at Pluralsight which permitted, say, certain asset transfers, unrestricted subsidiaries, and similar moves? In other words, how common is that sort of loan structure across the <<inaudible>> of the portfolio, with less focus on Pluralsight since we're all familiar with it now?
David Golub
executiveBefore addressing the remainder of your question, I'd like to offer some perspective on Pluralsight. Despite what has appeared in some press coverage, I don't consider Pluralsight a strong illustration of a sponsor acting improperly or a sponsor abusing documentation; actually, in this case, what Vista did — and my opinion of Vista as a sponsor is quite high, since we've had extremely few troubled credits with them over the years, and I believe they operate very well — was that they were engaged in talks and negotiations with lenders regarding how to achieve a longer-term fix, and time ran out before a choice had to be made regarding an interest payment; to make that payment and buy additional time, they put together a loan funded by Vista for the purpose of paying interest to other lenders. This isn't lender-on-lender violence; it isn't a liability management transaction; it's far more mundane than either of those. A lot of the large market loans in private credit provide baskets and documentation terms allowing a certain level of pari passu or subsidiary level borrowings. That's quite common. Two key factors make the private credit market comparatively insulated versus the broadly syndicated market from liability management transactions: incentives and norms. What do I mean by each? Incentives. In private credit transactions, you typically find a fairly small number of lenders. Most liability management transactions in the broadly syndicated market that have drawn lots of press and lots of attention set one group of lenders against another group of lenders. When a large group of lenders is involved, it becomes far simpler to form a cool kids club and set that cool kids club against a non-cool kids club. In private credit land, where syndicates are very small, accomplishing that is much more difficult. The second key criterion is norms. Norms of behavior exist in every market, including, especially when I discuss the private credit market, sponsors and private credit lenders maintain strong relationships with one another. If the market's operating properly, that's what happens. And each side is dedicated to making things work and to treating the other fairly. So once more, because of norms, it would be a massive breach of norms and it would wreck the relationship if a sponsor were to deploy documentation terms in a way that harmed one of the major private credit lenders in one of their portfolio companies, someone they conduct a great deal of business with; therefore, in my view, documentation terms aren't the root cause behind the scarcity of lender-on-lender violence cases in private credit. What's actually driving it comes down to incentives and norms.
Finian O'Shea
analystStaying on Pluralsight for a second, and putting all the pieces together, it sounded like the sponsor had been backing the company. Then obviously it appears they halted, and that's where we are now — but we aren't asking about Pluralsight's details, rather for the remaining portfolio, where plenty of businesses might be feeling pressure from elevated interest rates, how typical is that arrangement in which the sponsor has to inject additional capital to sustain interest payments?
David Golub
executiveI would call that pretty rare, Fin. The bulk of companies in the portfolio are performing well. Among those that aren't performing well, they remain cash flow positive once interest expense is covered. So it's a fairly small subset where we'd expect a need for ongoing sponsor support.
Finian O'Shea
analystAll right, that's useful. Now, as a quick follow-up on that — some remarks were made regarding leverage, and it seems like that's going to rise again. So, given that conditions sound like they're picking up out there, we're checking whether you can see that clearly and can give some detail on roughly what leverage level and maybe how soon? Then, as a second piece, from a qualitative angle, what's your thinking on the upside of adding leverage when spreads are so tight?
David Golub
executiveI'd say your question really gets at the very things we're focused on at this moment. At present, we believe a solid goal for GBDC on the leverage front is roughly 1.15x debt to equity, somewhat above the level we're at today. That said, we won't make a mad dash toward 1.15x unless we conclude there are appealing new lending opportunities available that justify, or warrant, expanding the balance sheet. So at this point, as I noted during our prepared remarks, no dramatic jump in deal activity is showing up. What we're observing is a steady continuation of the trend from Q1 and Q2; therefore, we'll be selective, we'll move patiently, and we'll seek to bring GBDC's leverage up across the period ahead, without sacrificing quality.
Paul Johnson
analystI wanted to ask — just attempting to understand your perspective on the fee waivers during this quarter. Did your firm choose to do that completely on its own? What drove that decision? Was it connected to some of the restructuring work at Imperial Optical that happened during the quarter, or was it tied more to general <<inaudible>> pressure?
David Golub
executiveAbsolutely. I appreciate the question. At Golub Capital, we've had a longstanding practice. That practice sets us apart from a lot of other managers. Periodically, we waive fees — that's been our custom for a long time. So this isn't unusual for us. The choice was fully voluntary. When we examined the quarter as a whole, our perspective was that a meaningful amount of one-time noise was present, and we felt it made sense given that one-time noise to forgo the incentive fee. Our thinking is that adopting a long-term perspective as a manager, and ensuring our investors enjoy a favorable experience, benefits everyone.
David Golub
executiveExcellent. We appreciate everyone being here with us right now. As has been our practice, should any additional questions come up, don't hesitate to get in touch with us whenever you'd like, and we're eager to share our next quarterly update with all of you.
Operator
operatorWe appreciate you joining us on this call. You're welcome to hang up at this point. Enjoy the rest of your day.
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