Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

November 20, 2024

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 46 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Good morning, everyone, and thank you for being with us on this call. Joining me are Chris Ericson, who serves as our Chief Financial Officer, and Matt Benton, our Chief Operating Officer. If you're new to GBDC, our approach to investing centers on delivering first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses that have the backing of strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Yesterday, we put out our earnings press release covering both the fiscal quarter and the year that ended September 30, and an earnings presentation is now available on our website. We'll be referencing that presentation throughout today's call. As I typically do, I'll begin with the headlines and a summary of how we performed this quarter, after which Matt and Chris will walk through our operating and financial results for the quarter in greater depth. Then, to close, I'll share our outlook for the period ahead and take a few questions. The headline here is that GBDC delivered a good fourth quarter and a solid fiscal 2024. As you'll remember, fiscal 2024 brought several landmark events that strengthened GBDC's shareholder value proposition. The first was a permanent cut to the company's incentive fee rate. The second was a new supplemental variable distribution framework, and that framework has generated $0.29 per share in supplemental distributions thus far. The third and most significant was the completion of a second win-win-win affiliate merger, this one with GBDC 3. So although today's focus will be on how GBDC performed in the fiscal year's final quarter, I believe it's important to remember how transformational fiscal 2024 was overall. With that context in mind, let me cover a few highlights before turning things over to Matt and Chris. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.47 for the quarter. That works out to an adjusted NII return on equity of 12.4%. For the full fiscal year, adjusted NII return on equity stood at 12.9%. Adjusted net income per share for the quarter was $0.36, which equates to an adjusted return on equity of 9.4% for the quarter. The adjusted return on equity for the entire fiscal year was 10.7%. GBDC's results got a boost from the continuation of several trends we've pointed to in recent quarters. First, borrower performance stayed generally strong, as you'll see when we walk through key credit metrics. Second, elevated base rates keep enhancing the earnings power of GBDC's portfolio. Third, there's GBDC's industry-leading fee structure. That fee structure, together with a voluntary $0.03 per share incentive fee waiver provided by GBDC's investment manager during the quarter, meant shareholders captured more of the value GBDC created. That said, GBDC did encounter some headwinds during the quarter, mainly from a tail of underperforming borrowers that I believe everyone in credit is dealing with these days. Last quarter, we discussed how GBDC experienced negative outcomes on loans to Pluralsight and Imperial Optical. Looking at the quarter that closed September 30, we completed a restructuring involving Pluralsight, plus a second credit that had been on nonaccrual for a long time, and the realized losses showing up in this quarter's P&L reflect that. When borrowers underperform, our approach never changes: we lean on our deep roster of seasoned investment professionals and the playbook built up across many decades, all with the goal of holding eventual losses to a minimum. In each of these two situations, GBDC today carries equity stakes obtained through the restructurings, and we see potential for upside in them. Also in the quarter ending September 30, we recorded fair value markdowns affecting a number of additional companies that are not performing well. The size of net realized plus unrealized losses came in better than the prior quarter, though it still exceeded what we consider a typical level. So to put it briefly, performance in fiscal Q4 was good — not great, but good — and it delivered a strong finish to a fiscal year of transformation that, in our view, positions GBDC extremely well over the long term. I'll revisit that point near the close of our prepared remarks when I walk through the outlook; for now, I'll hand things to Matt Benton, who will take you through the quarter in greater detail.

Matt Benton

executive
#2

Thanks, David. I'll begin with Slide 4. Our adjusted NII per share came in at $0.47, which translated into an adjusted NII ROE of 12.4%. On an adjusted basis, earnings per share were $0.36, which works out to an adjusted net income ROE of 9.4%. Three key factors drove GBDC's earnings. First, credit performance was generally solid. That said, as David mentioned, we recorded some fair value write-downs on a number of underperformers. Second, continued high base rates, in line with recent quarters, provided support to earnings. Next, GBDC benefited from costs that stayed consistently low, which stems from an investment advisory fee structure that leads the market. And fourth, this quarter Golub Capital GBDC's investment manager decided, just this once, to give up part of its fee voluntarily. That worked out to a gain of about $0.03 per share for both net investment income and earnings. Our motivation here was making things better for shareholders by handing them an early taste of the lower cost of funds that GBDC is set to record, thanks to the debt funding initiatives we launched after the quarter closed. I'll dig into those exciting initiatives in more depth soon. Now let me walk through portfolio activity and credit quality for the quarter. We originated just under a billion dollars gross, which was up from the prior quarter because we chose to increase leverage a bit following the merger. After accounting for repayments and the unfunded commitments associated with those originations, net funds grew by $368 million quarter over quarter, which works out to roughly 5% growth in the net portfolio. Because a big portion of that growth arrived late in the period, GBDC didn't get the full earnings power benefit from it. Let me offer a few thoughts on the broader environment. In today's conditions, the underwriting pendulum has clearly swung toward borrowers in every credit market — investment grade, which trades in a 20-year types, the broadly syndicated market, and private credit alike. On the larger end of deal sizes especially, we're seeing tighter spreads and more borrower-friendly terms in the paperwork — especially when it comes to how EBITDA gets defined — along with greater amounts of debt. Given how these underwriting practices have shifted during the last twelve months, we've made a conscious choice to be pickier and to focus our efforts more heavily on transactions in the core middle market. Because our pipeline is so broad, we tend to evaluate more than 2,000 opportunities each year. Looking at the year so far, Golub Capital's origination figures show just how cautious we've been. To start, our selectivity rate stands at 3%. Next, roughly 70% of our borrowers are repeat customers. Third, Golub Capital acted as lead or sole book runner on more than 87% of the deals we closed, and so far this year, we were the only lender on nearly 1/4 of those transactions. We also keep tight reins on how deals are structured and documented — that's just how we've always operated. Next, at the point when loans are originated, our average LTVs have typically been somewhere between the mid-30s and mid-40s, and the average sits around 37%. Last, because of how pricing works once you adjust for risk, we've decided to focus our efforts on the core middle market. For the loans we originate, median EBITDA has come in under $60 million. Although the credit quality across GBDC's investment portfolio remains strong on the whole, consistent with David's comments, we saw a slight uptick in Category 3 credits this quarter. Holdings rated in categories 4 and 5 dipped a bit, going from 89.2% of the portfolio at fair value to 87.1% over the quarter. Meanwhile, investments in rating Category 3 climbed from 10.1% of the portfolio at fair value to 11.6% compared with the prior quarter. And positions in rating categories 1 and 2 stay quite minimal, making up only 1.3% of the total portfolio at fair value. Measured as a share of total debt investments at fair value, non-accruals edged up to 1.2% when the quarter closed, versus 1% in the June quarter. Keep in mind, these figures sit far beneath the BDC sector average. Over the course of the quarter, nonaccrual investments climbed to 11%. Four new nonaccrual investments were added during the period, which outweighed the restructuring of three that had previously been nonaccrual. Several of these positions were fairly small in size. Turning to Slide 4, I'll briefly review the distributions that were paid as well as a few balance sheet movements for the quarter. The $0.49 per share distributed during the quarter was made up of three components: the $0.39 per share quarterly base distribution, the $0.05 per share quarterly variable supplemental distribution that was declared in August, and the $0.05 per share special distribution declared in June 2024 in connection with the closing of the GBDC 3 merger. We think these supplemental distributions should eliminate any excise tax obligation for GBDC on earnings that haven't been distributed. As we've said before, our preference is generally to give capital back to shareholders rather than incur any excise tax. NAV per share dropped $0.13 from the prior quarter, landing at $15.19, because distributions were unusually large. Despite that decrease, GBDC's NAV per share is currently $0.17 higher than its level on September 30, 2023, which we view as a clear anomaly among BDCs. Turning to leverage, debt to equity increased quarter-over-quarter, reaching 1.09 turns on a net of cash basis. That number reflects cash trapped and debt securitizations intended to pay down principal on outstanding notes. Like I mentioned before, looking at the asset side, the bulk of the increase in net leverage happened in the last several weeks of the quarter. For the quarter, GBDC's average net leverage was only 1.02 turns. Driving net leverage up, closer to our target range of 1.02 terms to 1.15 turns, will act as an additional tailwind for profitability. Now let's turn to distributions declared during the quarter. The Board declared $0.43 in total distributions, which included a regular quarterly distribution of $0.39 per share plus a fiscal Q4 supplemental distribution of $0.04 per share. Taken together, these distributions represent an annualized dividend yield of 11.3%, calculated using GBDC's NAV per share as of September 30, 2024. Adjusted NII per share keeps comfortably surpassing the company's regular quarterly distribution, producing regular distribution coverage of 121%. Along with that, back in June 2024 our board approved extra special distributions, which would be delivered through 3 equal installments of $0.05 per share after the merger closed on June 3, 2024. The last of these special distributions, at $0.05 per share, is scheduled for payment on December 13, 2024, going to stockholders of record as of November 29, 2024. Details on the record dates and payment dates for fiscal Q4 distributions can be found on Slide 23 of the earnings presentation, while information on the variable supplemental distribution framework is on Slide 24. At this point I'll hand things over to Chris for more detail on our results. Chris?

Chris Ericson

executive
#3

Thanks, Matt. Moving on to Slide 7. You can see that our $0.47 per share was under the $0.49 per share in total dividends distributed in the quarter. Net realized and unrealized losses came to $0.11 per share. Combined, these factors pushed net asset value per share down to $15.19, a decline of $0.13 per share versus the previous quarter. Now let's examine the specifics of GBDC's financial results for the quarter that ended September 30, 2024. We'll begin on Slide 10, which provides a summary of our origination activity during the quarter. Net funds growth rose by $368 million compared to the prior quarter, which equates to a 5% expansion in total portfolio size relative to June 30, 2024. The asset mix of new investments, shown in the middle of this slide, continues to be mostly one-stop loans. And at the bottom of the slide, the weighted average rate on new investments dipped slightly quarter-over-quarter to 10.7%; we remain very selective, as the average loan-to-value on Golub Capital's middle market originations for the quarter came in under 40%, with an outsized share of those originations going to repeat borrowers. Slide 11 presents GBDC's overall portfolio mix. As you can see, the portfolio breakdown by investment type stayed steady quarter-over-quarter, with one-stop loans still making up roughly 86% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 12 shows that GBDC's portfolio continues to be highly diversified across portfolio companies, with an average investment size of about 30 basis points. In addition, our largest single borrower accounts for only 1.5% of the portfolio, and our top 10 largest borrowers account for only 13% of the portfolio. We strongly believe in managing credit risk through position sizing, which we think has benefited GBDC in past credit cycles and will remain important in the current cycle. As of September 30, 2024, 92% of the investment portfolio was made up of first lien senior secured floating rate loans to borrowers across a diversified range of industries we consider resilient. The economic analysis on Slide 13 highlights what drove the change in GBDC's net investment spread to 5.2%. Let's go through this slide carefully. Starting with the dark blue line, which represents our investment income yield, and as a reminder, the investment income yield includes amortization of fees and discounts. GBDC's investment income yield dropped 30 basis points sequentially to 12%, mainly because of lower discount amortization compared with the prior quarter, along with the effect of moderating investment spreads over recent quarters and, to a lesser degree, the impact of lower interest-based rates in September. Our cost of debt, the fuel line, rose 30 basis points to 6.8% as we experienced the full quarter impact of assuming the GBDC 3 debt funding facilities. Matt will explain later on the call how we have already carried out a multifaceted plan to lower GBDC's post-merger debt funding costs. Consequently, our weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, fell 60 basis points sequentially to 5.2%. On top of that, within the quarter we recorded a reduction in interest expense tied to marking to fair value the interest rate swaps we already hold on the 2028 and 2029 notes. Under hedge accounting, we're required to fair value those interest rate swaps each quarter and put any change in fair value through interest expense; still, the key thing to keep in mind is that this is a noncash expense and it will net to zero across the lives of the swaps. As we've done in earlier periods, the net change in fair value connected to our interest rate swap hedges has been left out of how we calculate our weighted average cost of debt, given that these are noncash amounts that will net to zero across the life of the swaps. With floating rate exposure making up almost 80% of GBDC's total debt funding, we think GBDC sits in a strong position should interest rates decline. At this point I'll hand the floor back to Matt.

Matt Benton

executive
#4

Thanks, Chris. Turning now to Slides 14 and 15, we'll dig a bit deeper into the metrics around credit quality. The main takeaway: credit is still holding up well. Slide 14 shows non-accruals rose slightly, up 20 basis points from the prior quarter, landing at 1.2% of total debt investments at fair value. On Slide 15, you can see how internal performance ratings for GBDC's investments have trended. As of September 30, 2024, roughly 87.1% of GBDC's investments carried a rating of 4 or 5, meaning they are performing in line with, or better than, what we expected at underwriting. Loans we consider most at risk of serious credit trouble — those rated 1 and 2 — continue to make up a very modest portion of the book, just 1.3% of the portfolio at fair value. Following what we normally do, we'll move past Slides 16 and 19, which offer further information about GBDC's financial statements, its dividend history, and additional key metrics. On Slide 21, we address some steps taken following September 30, 2024 that relate to GBDC's funding structure after the merger. You may remember that when the merger happened, we discussed the opportunity to achieve enhancements in GBDC's funding. At the start of November, we shared details on the pricing of a fresh $2.2 billion securitization of term debt for GBDC. The AAA notes came in at SOFR plus 156 basis points, which is a really strong level relative to what we pay when borrowing through our secured corporate revolver. This transaction features a 4-year reinvestment period, plus favorable structural elements underneath that provide us with considerable flexibility. Along with pricing that CLO, we made the decision to announce a complete payoff of some of GBDC's older debt securitizations that carry higher costs. We also sent out a notice of redemption to pay off in full, on December 16, 2024, the GBDC 3 2022 to 2 Debt securitization. Worth noting, that securitization's pricing sits at 3-month SOFR plus 260 basis points. Additionally, we shared that the JPMorgan credit facility has been expanded to $1.9 billion. Meanwhile, every outstanding balance under the GBDC 3DB credit facility was paid off, and that facility has been shut down. In our view, putting these debt funding moves together will substantially reduce GBDC's cost of funds and once again give GBDC one of the lowest cost debt funding structures across the BDC sector, while also considerably lengthening its debt maturity ladder. We anticipate that GBDC will realize the complete run rate advantage from these steps during the quarter ending March 31, 2025. GBDC's funding structure, along with other important points, is presented on Slide 22. During this quarter, the weighted average cost of our debt came in at 6.8%. As I just walked through, the funding actions we completed after the quarter closed should bring down GBDC's cost of funds over time. Unsecured notes make up 43% of our debt funding, and none of them mature in 2024 or 2025. The fixed rate notes maturing in 2026 and 2027 carry a weighted average coupon of 2.3% from issuance. We've mentioned before that we chose not to spot them out for floating exposure. As for the remaining portion of GBDC's total debt funding, the rate is either floating already or has been swapped into floating. All told, GBDC stayed in a strong liquidity position, and when the quarter closed we had roughly $1.4 billion in liquidity, made up of unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver — which is meaningfully over collateralized — plus the unsecured revolver from our adviser that remains unused. At this point I'll turn things back to David for closing remarks and Q&A. David?

David Golub

executive
#5

Thanks, Matt. To wrap things up, GBDC delivered a solid fourth quarter and closed out a robust fiscal 2024. I'd like to finish with our outlook, then I'll open the line for questions. Last quarter, we discussed a few headwinds we expected the market broadly, and GBDC specifically, to encounter when it came to credit spreads in origination. Our thinking today hasn't really shifted, but I want to briefly address each of these three areas. Let's start with our credit outlook. Over the last couple of years, we've been saying we anticipated seeing more credit stress, and as I noted last quarter, it's here—the evidence is everywhere around us. You can observe it right now in the BSL market: LSTA projections for the default rate, adjusted for liability management transactions, are currently north of 4% annualized. That figure is over twice the long-term average. We also see it in reports from major credit rating agencies such as S&P and Fitch, as well as from the top law firms covering restructurings and bankruptcies. Now I'll say something that might catch many of you off guard. We believe this heightened credit stress is actually a positive. Golub Capital has always performed well in difficult markets, and we're very confident this will be the case of the cycle 2—more defaults, more underperforming credits—these should push market conditions away from where they stand today, which is quite borrower friendly, toward something more lender-friendly. And it should drive out some of the tourists who've come into direct lending but don't have what it takes to succeed over the long term. Let's move to the second headwind affecting spreads. The broadly syndicated loan market experienced dramatic spread compression in 2024. I mentioned this last quarter, and private credit lenders have faced spread compression too. This trend has been most evident among borrowers with over $100 million in EBITDA, which we refer to as the large market segments. The large market segment is where many of our competitors concentrate. I'd note, it's not where we focus. We're set up to focus on the core middle market, and the core middle market wasn't immune to the spread compression trends, but we find wider pricing, lower leverage, better documentation terms and honestly, the best competition there. Lastly, origination. Consensus expectations had predicted a strong recovery in the level of M&A activity in 2024. We were more cautious, and our call turned out to be right. We've seen a pickup in M&A activity this year, but not a big one. We do believe we'll see a pickup in 2025: falling interest rates, less political uncertainty, continuing pressure on PE sponsors to return money to LPs—all of these are tailwinds for M&A activity in 2025. I think it's too early to predict an M&A super cycle, but we are seeing signs of improving activity. To wrap up, looking at each of those three challenges, we're seeing evidence that things are getting better, and we expect the market environment to strengthen throughout 2025. That said, I'd like to take a moment to consider the possibility that we've got this wrong. Consensus forecasts, after all, have missed the mark frequently over the past several years. The encouraging part is this: no matter what lies ahead, we believe GBDC is positioned well to deliver superior results. The reason is that we believe Golub Capital excels at a complementary collection of capabilities. We have a strong track record of finding durable borrowers operating in durable sectors. Thanks to our relationships and incumbencies, we're a partner of choice for appealing sponsor-backed businesses. Our investment process and protocols let us spot and tackle problems that come up at an early stage, and our deep know-how in handling troubled credits helps us protect value. These competitive edges were built gradually, with tremendous purpose and tremendous effort. This marks our 30th anniversary year, and we take pride in celebrating what we refer to as 30 years of good board. With that, I'll turn it over to questions.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#6

One of the things I wanted to ask — David, you covered credit spreads and so on. What about what Matt brought up, the terms you're beginning to observe, like weaker EBITDA definitions and similar items? Where does that sit on the spectrum from best to worst throughout cycles? Since clearly, spreads hit a bottom and then stop declining, yet everything surrounding them — document structures and definitions — gets weaker, and then at some point that reverses. So where do you think we stand in the cycle, not only regarding spreads, but also all the accompanying pieces?

David Golub

executive
#7

Absolutely. That's a good question, Robert. I believe it matters, when considering documentation terms specifically, to discuss them within the framework of a market segment. Specifically, when comparing the core middle market with the large market, a fairly significant gap in documentation terms always exists; within the core middle market, we generally have what's known as covenants. We generally have robust protections against leakage of different kinds. We generally have robust EBITDA definitions. In the bigger market, where we along with other private credit lenders are up against the broadly syndicated market, there's greater variation in how strong documentation terms are. And when the market shifts from favoring lenders to favoring borrowers, documentation terms shift more. Currently, the broadly syndicated market is quite strong. It has returned in a massive way during 2024. I believe the claim that the broadly syndicated market was deep got made too soon. A year ago, I said loudly that it would return, and that the expansion of private credit was being overhyped compared to the broadly syndicated market. And we've gotten better, correct, and the broadly syndicated market has refinanced many loans that had been financed within the private credit market. It has also posed a threat to the private credit market, which has led private credit lenders to accept repricings and to accept documentation for new loans that leans more toward borrowers. So at present, I'd describe documentation terms as sitting on the borrower-friendly end of the range on the large market side. They haven't reached 2021 levels exactly, but they're comparatively borrower-friendly, and that is among the reasons, Robert, that we've concentrated more than ever on holding to our core emphasis on the core of middle market.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#8

Appreciate the explanation. Turning to 2021 — clearly you're not suggesting 2025 will look just like it. How do you see things shaping up — what's working in favor and what isn't — where do you expect it to end up? Do you figure it lands a bit under '21 yet far stronger than '22, '23, and '24? Or how would you rank those years? And judging by what you're seeing in the market — since we clearly haven't gotten there yet — what would have to occur for you to call it a super cycle?

David Golub

executive
#9

At this moment, 2025 M&A volumes are still up in the air. Let's go through the helpful elements and the hurdles. Favorably, rates have come down somewhat. Spreads have come down. Political and policy uncertainty has diminished somewhat with the elections now behind us. Private equity firms keep facing pressure to hand back more disposition proceeds to their investors. And a second continuing pressure weighs on private equity firms that haven't yet put enough of their existing funds to work. So we have some fairly significant tailwinds that I consider truly powerful. Unfavorably, a great deal of uncertainty persists. I think we don't know how things will play out on taxes, tariffs, spending levels — there's considerable geopolitical uncertainty, highlighted by the last few days' developments in the Ukraine Woolworths. A big question lingers about what will act as the catalyst for more M&A activity. Because what usually happens, Robert, is a kind of snowball effect — as M&A activity expands, so does certainty about where market clearing price levels will land, and that then produces even more M&A activity. So I'm not saying we won't see a big M&A year in 2025. I'm saying I'm not sure. And I think it's too soon right now to be pounding the table proclaiming an M&A super cycle in 2025. We might — I hope we do. But I think it's too early to make that call, especially with roughly $8 billion in dry powder still waiting on the sidelines.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#10

Understood. If I may, one additional question. You've clearly put significant effort into the balance sheet since the quarter closed. But regarding the secured side, with the CLOs, the credit facilities, and so forth — would you consider that piece finished? After we spent time a couple of years back examining how the secured portion of the liability structure works, do you have any perspective on unsecured spreads, given that spreads have tightened not only for SL borrowers but for DC borrowers too? So how would you describe the positioning? Is the secured side complete while the unsecured side still requires attention? Or what's your read on that?

David Golub

executive
#11

Look, on the right-hand side of GBDC's balance sheet, the balancing and optimizing we do is never finished. In my view, this represents a core competitive advantage for Golub Capital. We excel at it. We excel at maintaining, over time, a balance sheet that's low-cost and flexible. As you noted, we have accomplished a great deal on it at present. Much of the benefit we described at the merger's time has been realized, specifically lowering the borrowing costs of the combined company after the merger. Still, I understand your point — throughout the spectrum, we're finding appealing chances to add new debt, whether secured or unsecured. And it falls to us to continue seeking opportunities that GBDC can capitalize on.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#12

Sorry about that — I had myself on mute — regarding how strong deployment was this quarter, with $1 billion in originations. Could you help us understand what that looked like for the entire platform, and whether it rose everywhere or was mostly directed toward GBDC? And I'd also like to ask, since you've made some remarks about being careful on credit and pricing is somewhat less attractive right now, why put so much to work in this quarter rather than possibly holding back a bit in hopes of a stronger stretch of activity in the year ahead?

David Golub

executive
#13

Thank you, Paul. That's a good question; let me offer a few thoughts on it; we've always deployed capital throughout the entire <<inaudible>> of the platform. This quarter is no exception. Our allocation approach wasn't altered in any manner designed to boost the amounts going to GBDC. That said, we did want a chance to grow the assets inside GBDC. As you may remember, once the merger closed, we sat well below our target leverage level. Honestly, I'd say that even in the quarter that just ended, we remained considerably beneath that target; our average leverage for the quarter came in at a bit above 1x, while our goal is 1.1 to 1.15. A second thing I'd note is that the figure for total new investment commitments is somewhat inflated, because it includes certain refinancing, repricing, and activity where exits and entries happen at the same time; because of that, I pay closer attention to the net funds growth figure, $368 million, and that is hardly a spectacular number. It looks quite ordinary. My third point is that although originating new deals is difficult in this climate, we hold some enormous strengths, and two of those enormous strengths are the ties we have with private equity sponsors and the portfolio we already own. Both of them truly came to the fore during the quarter we just completed. Nearly every new origination involved sponsors we've worked with before, and repeat borrowers made up a share of our origination that is very disproportionate compared with what's typical. So during this stretch we're genuinely pressing our competitive edges and concentrating on sponsors, borrowers, and industries where we possess expertise.

Paul Johnson

analyst
#14

Thanks for that. That's really useful, and it covers what I needed — and then maybe one for Chris, regarding the noncash interest expense tied to the swap in this quarter. Can you somehow put a number on what that came to, per share, for the noncash interest expense stemming from the swap markdown?

Chris Ericson

executive
#15

Paul, that figure was roughly — it came to roughly $0.02 per share.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#16

First question concerns that yield drop. Was the main driver something on your end, or did competitive pressure push the spread lower? Or is it — like what I'm noticing with other bank credits — that repricing has gotten quite aggressive around here?

David Golub

executive
#17

I'd frame it as several things coming together. Within the bigger portion of our book — the large market borrowers — we've observed some shifts, just as you put it, with repricings occurring. Also — and this is visible on Page 10 of the presentation — the weighted average spread for new loans sits below where it was in earlier quarters, which speaks to that spread compression we've been discussing. So multiple elements are at play. The third piece I referenced, and something all of us holding floating rate assets will encounter increasingly across the period ahead, is base rates coming down. All three of those, then.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#18

The second thing is this — when you look at how things unfolded at our sites, where the sponsor basically grabbed his ball and left, well, sponsors typically, you'd probably agree based on what you've seen, typically cooperate with their lenders and attempt to reach a stronger result. I hope what happened there isn't showing up again somewhere else across the portfolio.

David Golub

executive
#19

We maintain strong communication with the sponsors we serve at all times. Sponsor responses to workout scenarios vary widely. Our initial approach is to collaborate with sponsors on mutually beneficial outcomes, ones that include ongoing capital infusions and ongoing advantages for the sponsor. However, should a sponsor decide they aren't able to do that, for whatever reason among many possible ones, we're perfectly happy to accept the keys and take charge of the matter. That's something we've always done, Ray, and in this current stretch and the one ahead, I expect nothing will change.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#20

For the final question: do you believe there are other vehicles within GBDC that will ultimately move into our bigger pool, whether for ongoing favorable impact on operations or on funding costs, or more broadly, will we expand simply because we'll be stronger? Or is the present size appropriate given today's conditions?

David Golub

executive
#21

Across Golub Capital, we're constantly seeking chances in sectors where our knowledge runs deep, where we hold an edge, so the portfolio can grow. At this moment I'm quite happy. The GBDC approach has me quite content right now; for 14 years it has remained highly steady. Within that approach, I foresee additional chances for expansion. Therefore, no significant shifts are expected from me. For instance, I don't expect us to reveal, in the next few days, stakes in specialty finance affiliates in disconnected fields, the way certain rivals have; that isn't how we operate.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#22

No — what I was actually asking is whether a GBDC 4 exists that, in your view, will ultimately land inside the public GBDC.

David Golub

executive
#23

My apologies, I misread what you were asking. There is a private BDC in our portfolio, GBDC 4, and as a public filer its filings are available for you to review. Down the road, once it has matured, a moment could arrive when exploring liquidity alternatives for GBDC 4 would make sense, and that could include merging it into GBDC.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#24

Suppose your firm stood at $10 billion rather than $8 billiojn — would that give you an edge given how the market looks right now? Or is your present scale the ideal fit for the current environment <<inaudible>>.

David Golub

executive
#25

Honestly, I consider this at the level of all of Golub Capital, not just GBDC. As a platform, our priority is ensuring our scale matches the opportunities in front of us. We are not in the business of collecting capital and afterward putting it to work however we can. That approach to asset management — gather funds, then figure out how to use them — is not one we subscribe to. So, Ray, one thing we spend a lot of time on, and it applies not only to GBDC but throughout the Golub platform, is this: how much dry powder should we build up so we can capitalize on mortgage conditions, while avoiding holding either an excess or a shortage of dry powder.

David Golub

executive
#26

I'd like to express my appreciation to all of you for being here today and for the questions you raised; and, as always, should anyone have additional matters they'd wish to discuss, don't hesitate to get in touch. Thank you for joining us today.

Operator

operator
#27

This concludes today's call. Thank you all for joining. You may now disconnect.

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