Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

February 5, 2025

NASDAQ US Financials Capital Markets earnings 48 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

David Golub

executive
#1

Hi, everyone, and thank you for being with us today. With me are Chris Ericson, our CFO, and Matt Benton, our Chief Operating Officer. For anyone new to GBDC, we concentrate on making first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle market businesses that have the backing of strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Yesterday, we put out our earnings press release covering the quarter that ended December 31, and we also posted an earnings presentation on our website. During today's call, we'll be referencing that presentation. As always, I'll begin with the headlines, then Matt and Chris will walk through our operating and financial results for the quarter in greater detail, and after that I'll close with our outlook for the period ahead, and then we'll take some questions. So, the headlines. The main headline is that GBDC delivered a strong quarter and a strong start to fiscal year 2025. We achieved our aspirations to be good <<inaudible>>. Here are the highlights. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.39. That works out to an adjusted NII return on equity of 10.1%. If you strip out the effect of certain noncash interest expense tied to our interest rate swap, adjusted NII for the quarter was in fact $0.40 per share. Adjusted net income per share was $0.42 per share. That works out to an adjusted return on equity of 11%. Adjusted net income per share included $0.03 of adjusted net realized and unrealized gains. The vast majority of GBDC's portfolio has performed well and kept performing well in the quarter that ended December 31. In fact, GBDC's overall portfolio credit metrics saw a nice lift this quarter. We also saw nice growth in GBDC's investment portfolio. New deal activity kept picking up in the market, and GBDC managed to find attractive investment opportunities while staying highly selective, which allowed us to get back to our target leverage. With that, let me hand the call over to Matt Benton to discuss the quarter in more detail. Thanks, David. I'll begin on Slide 4.

Matt Benton

executive
#2

Three main drivers shaped GBDC's earnings this period. To start, credit performance overall came in strong. On 3 nonaccrual investments that got restructured during the quarter, we booked certain realized losses. As of September 30, 2024, every one of those investments sat on nonaccrual, yet gains elsewhere more than made up for those losses. Broadly speaking, we feel good about the credit picture at GBDC, and we'll walk through how that progress shows up in GBDC's quarter end credit metrics. Second, high base rates and appealing spreads keep supporting earnings, in line with what we've seen in recent quarters. That said, yields did come down somewhat this quarter, mostly because SOFR decreased and, to a smaller degree, because spread compression persisted. That spread compression showed up more strongly and more clearly in new investments, though we have seen repricing on some existing investments too, especially within the large market portion of our portfolio. In the core middle market, repricing activity is not as widespread as in the large market, where drive-by repricings happen more often. When the quarter closed, we looked at GBDC's portfolio against today's market spreads and concluded that repricing risk remaining in the existing loan book is limited. Third, borrowing costs came down during the quarter, thanks both to the base rate falling and to funding cost advantages tied to the November 2024 funding structure initiatives we covered on last quarter's earnings call. Those lower funding costs didn't benefit us for a full quarter. That benefit arrives in the March 31 quarter. Fourth, earnings keep gaining from reduced expenses thanks to GBDC's fee structure. And fifth, earnings took a negative hit this quarter of $0.01 per share from noncash interest expense tied to interest rate swaps on our fixed rate unsecured notes. If you add back that $0.01 per share impact on adjusted NII from noncash interest expense, you get roughly $0.40 of adjusted NII per share. Now let me cover portfolio activity and credit quality for the quarter. Gross originations reached $1.2 billion, higher than last quarter, as we worked to keep raising leverage following the merger. Once repayments and unfunded commitments tied to originations are accounted for, net funds rose $450 million on a sequential basis. That works out to net portfolio growth of about 5.5% quarter-over-quarter. GBDC didn't capture the full earnings power of that portfolio growth, since much of the growth landed toward the end of the period. Last quarter, I noted that the lending environment was becoming friendlier to borrowers across every credit market. That trend carried into the December 31 quarter, particularly in the large market segment, where we observed additional spread compression, looser deal documentation and higher leverage. Even so, Golub Capital's origination stats for calendar Q4 kept reflecting our conservative approach. First, our selectivity rate came in under 4%. Second, more than 70% of our borrowers were repeat borrowers. Third, Golub served as lead or sole book runner on 88% of the transactions we completed. Fourth, our average LTVs at origination have typically fallen within the mid-30% to mid-40% range. And fifth, because of the risk-adjusted pricing dynamics we observe throughout the middle market, we are opting to focus primarily on the core middle market. For our calendar Q4 2024 originations, median EBITDA stood at $53 million. We see this as a meaningful differentiator for Golub relative to many peers who concentrate exclusively on the large borrower market. Credit statistics showed quarter-over-quarter improvement. As of December 31, 2024, investments in Ratings category 4 and 5 rose to close to 90% of the portfolio at fair value, up from roughly 87% in the prior quarter. For context, this represents the highest combined level of 4 and 5-rated investments at GBDC since the September 2022 quarter. Investments in rating Category 3 fell to 8.8% from 11.6% of the portfolio at fair value as of September 30, 2024. And investments in rating categories 1 and 2 stayed very low, at just 1.3% of the total portfolio at fair value. Measured as a percentage of total investments at fair value, nonaccrual investments dropped from a very low 1.2% at September 30, 2024, to merely 50 basis points, the lowest level at GBDC since 2019. During the quarter, the count of nonaccrual investments fell to 9 after 3 former nonaccrual investments were restructured. Moving on to Slide 4, let me quickly recap distributions paid and certain balance sheet changes for the quarter. Distributions paid during the quarter totaled $0.48 per share. That figure comprised: one, the quarterly base distribution of $0.39 per share; two, a quarterly variable supplemental distribution of $0.04 per share that we declared in November 2024. And lastly, the final special distribution of $0.05 per share declared in June 2024 in connection with the closing of the GBDC 3 merger. NAV per share fell by $0.06 sequentially to $15.13, mainly because distributions paid, including the special distribution, surpassed earnings. Net debt to equity rose quarter-over-quarter to 1.19 turns. This mirrors leverage net of available cash and cash trapped and debt securitizations for the purposes of paying down principal on outstanding notes. As in the prior quarter, the rise in net leverage occurred largely during the final few weeks of the 12/31 quarter. GBDC's average net leverage for the quarter was only 1.14 turns. Consequently, we anticipate that GBDC will realize the full run rate profitability benefit of its larger investment portfolio next quarter. Additionally, we expect GBDC to keep average net leverage close to our current target of 1.15 turns. In November 2024, we carried out a series of debt funding-related transactions that we expect will lower GBDC's weighted average cost of debt, among them a $2.2 billion GBDC term debt securitization with AAA notes priced at SOFR plus 158 basis points. Alongside the CLO pricing, we redeemed certain securitizations of debt and facilities carrying higher costs. From these transactions, we anticipate recognizing the complete run rate profitability advantage during the quarter ending March 31, 2025, and we believe this will contribute incremental adjusted NII—something we view as a helpful cushion for forward profitability should we encounter additional reductions in base rates or investment spreads. Additional factors are also at play in driving profits upward, and we're actively pursuing them: optimizing borrowing costs further by examining our current funding structure; this quarter, Moody's raised GBDC's rating to Baa2 with a stable outlook, which we think strengthens our capacity to issue unsecured debt at low cost. Portfolio rotation—we believe that successfully monetizing specific non-earning equity investments and low-yielding loans tied to previously restructured names, then redeploying those proceeds into fresh core middle market originations, might yield incremental NII. I'll add the clear caveat that resolving these names successfully requires work, and it won't occur all at once, but we possess the capabilities and means to accomplish it. Now, regarding distributions declared this quarter: the Board declared a regular quarterly distribution of $0.39 per share, which equates to an annualized dividend yield of 10.3% tied to GBDC's NAV per share as of December 31, 2024.

Matt Benton

executive
#3

Once you take away the $0.01 per share impact from noncash interest expense related to interest rate swaps, adjusted NII per share continues to leave us with a healthy cushion above our usual quarterly distribution — distribution coverage comes to 103% — and I anticipate that the profitability drivers I discussed earlier will provide additional room going forward. I typically skip over Slide 5, but this quarter I'd like to go through it, since I think some background on GBDC's profitability from one quarter to the next would be helpful, given the moving parts we've observed across the last couple of quarters. In the quarter that ended 9/30/2024, GBDC generated $0.47 of adjusted NII per share, as shown on Slide 5. What that page doesn't reflect is that this $0.47 figure included a favorable $0.03 per share contribution from the noncash effect of our interest rate swaps, which we discussed last quarter; it also included a $0.03 per share partial waiver of the income incentive fee. After you account for both of those, GBDC's adjusted NII for 9/30/2024 totaled $0.41 per share. This quarter, as I mentioned, GBDC generated $0.40 of adjusted NII after removing the noncash effect from the interest rate swaps I referred to earlier. No income incentive fee waiver took place this quarter. So on a comparable basis, GBDC saw a modest quarter-over-quarter decrease in adjusted NII, going from $0.41 to $0.40. We consider that a solid result given how base rates and spreads shifted during the quarter. So how did GBDC manage to constrain the quarter-over-quarter decline in adjusted NII even with the rate-related headwinds? First, 81% of its liabilities carry floating rates. That meant our borrowing costs benefited from reductions in SOFR. Gross originations were $2 billion. Over the last year we have meaningfully reduced GBDC's asset sensitivity, and those benefits have now shown up as base rates declined. We believe GBDC stands apart from others in the sector and is positioned better than most for a neutral-to-declining base rate setting. Second, GBDC increased financial leverage by a modest amount; and third, GBDC's top-tier fee structure naturally provides a larger return buffer. I'll now turn things over to Chris so he can continue our presentation.

Chris Ericson

executive
#4

Appreciate that, Matt. Moving on to Slide 7, you're able to observe how the earnings drivers that Matt outlined plus the excess distributions made during the quarter fed into GBDC's net asset value per share of $15.13 as of December 31, 2024. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.39 per share, which fell short of the $0.48 per share in aggregate distributions paid out over the quarter. Net realized and unrealized gains totaled $0.03 per share. Taken together, those results pushed net asset value per share down to $15.13, a decline of $0.06 per share relative to the prior quarter. Now if we move to Slide 10, which breaks out our origination activity for the quarter, net funds rose by $450 million quarter-over-quarter, which works out to a 5.5% increase in total portfolio size compared with September 30, 2024. At the bottom of that slide, the weighted average rate on new investments came to 9.4%. Investments that were repaid during the quarter carried a weighted average rate of 11.3%. And as David and Matt explained at the start, this played a role in pushing the portfolio's investment yield below where it stood in prior quarters. Slide 11 presents GBDC's overall portfolio mix. As you're able to see, the breakdown of the portfolio by investment type stayed consistent quarter-over-quarter, with one-stop loans still making up roughly 87% of the portfolio at fair value. And Slide 12 demonstrates that GBDC's portfolio continues to be highly diversified by portfolio company, with an average investment size of about 30 basis points, in line with prior quarters. On top of that, our largest borrower accounts for only 1.5% of the debt investment portfolio, while our top 10 largest borrowers make up under 13% of the portfolio. We strongly believe in modulating credit risk through position size, which we think has served GBDC well through previous credit cycles. As of December 31, 2024, 92% of our investment portfolio was made up of first lien senior secured floating rate loans to borrowers spanning a diversified range of what we consider to be resilient industries. The economic analysis on Slide 13 brings out the drivers behind the change in GBDC's net investment spread to 5%. Let's go through this slide carefully; we'll begin with the dark blue line, which represents our investment income yield. As a reminder, the investment income yield factors in the amortization of fees and discounts. GBDC's investment income yield dropped 80 basis points sequentially to 11.2%. And as Matt pointed out, this was mostly due to a 99% floating rate investment portfolio re-indexing during the quarter to lower 3-month and 1-month SOFR reference rates, and to a much smaller degree, a lower weighted average spread on debt investments in the portfolio, which came about through net originations at lower spreads along with some repricing activity in the existing portfolio. Our cost of debt, the teal line, fell 60 basis points to 6.2%, which reflects our 81% floating rate debt funding structure. As Matt mentioned earlier, we anticipate additional improvement in GBDC's weighted average cost of debt next quarter, as we see a full quarter impact from the transactions we executed in November and December 2024. All things considered, the weighted average net investment spread — that's the gold line — came in at 5%, which is a decline of 20 basis points from the prior quarter. At this point I'll hand things back to Matt.

Matt Benton

executive
#5

Appreciate it, Chris. Turning now to Slides 14 and 15, where we'll dig a bit deeper into the credit quality metrics that are improving. On Slide 14, nonaccruals are shown falling 70 basis points, landing at 0.5% of total investments at fair value — that marks the best level we've seen since September 2019. Slide 15 displays the internal performance ratings trend I mentioned before. Worth noting: investments carrying a rating of 3, which indicates a borrower might be out of compliance with debt covenants, dropped substantially, now making up only 8.8% of the total investment portfolio. Loans rated 1 and 2 — the ones we view as most likely to experience significant credit impairment — stayed at a very low share, just 1.3% of the portfolio at fair value. As is our usual practice, we'll skip Slides 16 through 19; those contain additional detail on GBDC's financial statements, dividend history and other key metrics. I'll finish this portion by going over GBDC's liquidity and investment capacity on Slides 20 through 22. To start, let's look at the key takeaways on Slide 22. Our weighted average cost of debt for this quarter came in at 6.2%, a material decline from the prior quarter, which reflects the debt funding structure transactions we executed. Unsecured notes make up 44% of our debt funding, with no maturities coming due in 2025 and a well-laddered schedule through 2029. The fixed rate notes maturing in 2026 and 2027 carried a weighted average coupon of 2.3% at issuance. And as we've mentioned before, we chose not to swap those into floating rate exposure. The rest of GBDC's total debt funding is floating rate or swapped to floating. This dynamic, again, is part of why GBDC is less asset sensitive today than it was 12 months ago. After the quarter closed, Moody's raised GBDC's corporate credit rating and senior unsecured shelf rating to Baa2 stable, up from Baa3 positive; with that upgrade, GBDC stands as one of only 3 publicly traded BDCs holding both a Baa2 from Moody's and a BBB from Fitch. We'd encourage investors to read the Moody's report, but our view is that the upgrade stemmed from the combination of GBDC's differentiating qualities that we talk about consistently on these earnings calls — specifically a highly diverse, first lien-oriented portfolio, solid liquidity and capital management, and a record of stellar — that's Moody's word, not ours — credit performance going all the way back to our IPO in 2010. All in all, our liquidity position remains strong, and we closed the quarter with roughly $1.1 billion of liquidity, sourced from unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our meaningfully over-collateralized corporate revolver, and the unused unsecured revolver from our adviser. At this point I'll turn things back to David for closing remarks and Q&A. David?

David Golub

executive
#6

Appreciate it, Matt. To wrap things up, GBDC delivered a solid first quarter and a solid beginning to the fiscal year. Before we take questions, I'd like to briefly address our outlook. One market dynamic we discussed at length during 2024 was spread compression. Compression in spreads showed up throughout every credit market — investment grade, high yield, the broadly syndicated space, and our own markets. On our turf, this affected new transactions as well as certain existing ones that underwent repricing amendments. Spread compression has shown up far more dramatically in the broadly syndicated market compared with private credit. Inside private credit, the larger end of the market has felt it more than the core middle market, though no corner of the credit market has escaped it entirely. Looking past spread compression and examining all risk assets through a broader lens, today's markets are baking in a great deal of optimism regarding the business climate. That, I believe, invites a compelling question: is such optimism warranted? Those of you who have tuned into our earnings calls previously can probably guess that I won't be offering some dramatic projection. Our consistent philosophy is to remain humble regarding macro forecasts, for two reasons: we aren't macroeconomists, and consensus expectations have tended to be so far off so repeatedly across the past few years. With that said, I'd like to share a handful of observations. Observation one: the U.S. economy is performing quite strongly. Our Golub Capital Middle Market report called attention to the fact that this most recent quarter marked the ninth consecutive one demonstrating very robust revenue and EBITDA growth. Our data reveals no evidence of a slowdown on the horizon. Observation two: private equity sponsors are putting their money where their mouths are. Deal activity kept accelerating in calendar Q4, and it strikes me as probable that it will climb even more throughout 2025. Dealmakers appear more enthusiastic about deregulation than worried about tariffs. Both observations align with the optimistic perspective. Now let's consider the flip side. Alongside these reasons for optimism, unmistakable indicators of heightened credit stress exist throughout the market. In the BSL market, the LSTA puts out data on defaults adjusted for liability management transactions. In my view, that's the correct approach; and according to their figures, we're currently seeing a rate of roughly 4.7% for the 12 months ended December 31. That's over twice the 20-year average. Achieving true apples-to-apples historical comparisons has become somewhat difficult now that liability management transactions are with us, yet I believe that figure is roughly accurate. It's approximately double. Evidence of mounting credit pressure is likewise appearing in what we hear from the top rating agencies, S&P and Fitch among them, as well as from the prominent law practices handling restructurings and bankruptcies, so the market contains opposing forces that justify both hopefulness and worry. Our view is that this kind of climate has, through history, sorted out lenders possessing solid operations and genuine competitive edges from the newcomers, those companies missing what it takes to thrive as long-term participants; it comes as no shock to us that across the past 5 quarters, performance among BDC managers has grown more dispersed, and we anticipate additional divergence ahead. We're confident that Golub Capital and GBDC will land on the favorable end of that dispersion once more, and that we'll keep producing additional good boring results for our shareholders; with that said, let's take questions.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#7

Nice work navigating things so smoothly while everything keeps shifting. What I want to ask about this morning: with the new administration in place, the dollar has climbed sharply. Rules have been rolled back or attempts are underway to cut them, and then there are tariffs, which seem to switch on and off — one moment in the morning, the next in the evening — and by the close of this week, it appears just 1 of the 3 candidates is still standing. So I'm curious — amid all this chaos, what's your sense of how the portfolio reacts? My understanding is that you're almost entirely a domestic owner of manufacturing and service businesses. So my guess is the effect is small, but I'd really like to hear what you say.

David Golub

executive
#8

Yes. These are certainly interesting times we're in. I appreciate the question. A few things stand out. To start, given how the portfolio is built, we're fairly shielded from shifts in foreign exchange rates and from changes in tariffs. As you pointed out, the bulk of the portfolio consists of U.S. borrowers — U.S. companies serving other U.S. companies. A very large share of the base — the base of our borrowers — is service companies, software providers among them. We do hold a significant portion of the portfolio, a minority but still significant, in Europe. But rather than European firms operating in the U.S., these are largely European firms conducting business with other European firms; we're underweight manufacturing; we're underweight segments exposed to commodities. We've been examining the tariff vulnerability question, and for clear reasons, since the election everyone should be preparing for tariffs as a possibility. One favorable aspect of our business is that we partner with highly astute private equity sponsors and very capable management teams. They're fully engaged on this issue too. From the analysis we've completed thus far, I don't believe we face meaningful first order exposure to tariffs. Still, I want to add a word of caution, since I don't think anybody can predict what the second, third, or fourth order effects might be; and a trade war likely won't turn out well for anyone. So in my view, this is a moment when prudence is wisest — seeking resilient strategies that will perform well under a range of different macroeconomic scenarios. Those are well-worn principles for Golub Capital; no pivot in our approach is needed.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#9

Perhaps that isn't actually carrying on there, but regarding your final comments and a conversation. I'd like to pick up on the loss backdrop that you, David, brought up near the end, though in the context of direct lending. Could you describe how this has shifted as time has passed and, crucially, how things stand now given the intensity of competition, the erosion of terms such as leverage covenants and similar items, and what all of that implies for the loss rate one should expect from the direct lending asset class. As you noted, we can plainly observe that it is climbing in leveraged finance markets. Those markets, naturally, are far more transparent; we observe developments there live, whereas in private markets things unfold far more gradually. So I'm curious whether you might offer us even a broad-brush indication on that.

David Golub

executive
#10

Absolutely; so in the current climate, we effectively have a live test running that lets us examine the way credit stress manifests in the more liquid, broadly syndicated loan market alongside the way it manifests in private credit markets. And I find it quite illuminating to examine the two side by side. One distinction is the factor you raised, Fin: more data exists regarding what is happening in the broadly syndicated market, and the signs of credit stress we observe there take the shape of elevated default rates, a greater number of liability management transactions, and more CCC credits. A notable aspect of the contrast involves the second item. Liability management transactions are appearing; in the private credit market, such transactions are essentially absent, and in the broadly syndicated market those liability management transactions are turning out to be detrimental to recoveries. My view is that for the most part they amount to a shift of value away from lenders toward lawyers and restructuring advisers, since they clearly are not benefiting private equity firms. Very few companies that have pursued liability management transactions have managed successful turnarounds. Practically every one of them ultimately proceeds through restructurings. Such transactions merely postpone what cannot be avoided and, through that postponement, wind up imposing significant costs on credit. Within the private market, we are observing signs pointing to greater credit stress. It isn't widespread; it's a tail. Nor is it present everywhere. It shows up more heavily in certain players' portfolios than in those of others. A trait we observe in the private credit market that mirrors the broadly syndicated market is that when companies encounter genuine trouble, the cause is frequently liquidity problems rather than covenant problems, and this holds especially at the larger end of the market; consequently, by the time lenders become involved and can assume control of situations, the company has already had room to weaken considerably. Turnarounds of that sort can be more difficult to accomplish. A key reason I have a strong preference for the core middle market is that we are usually either the sole lender or one among just a handful of lenders. Our covenant packages are usually tighter, which lets us step in on borrower issues much sooner. So over the next stretch, I expect we'll keep watching this group of laggards work through their challenges — outfits with weaker ability to handle elevated rates, limited pricing leverage, and no expansion across the past 24 months. We're also going to find out what a lot of private credit firms are really made of, since they've never faced a downturn before. Two capabilities will be put to the test. First, how skilled are they when it comes to underwriting? Second, how skilled are they when it comes to managing and reviving weak performers? Over the long run, both of those abilities matter enormously if a private credit firm wants to succeed. I believe we'll come out of that assessment looking quite strong.

Finian O'Shea

analyst
#11

Thanks; that's useful context. I suppose I have one more broad question about the platform. I believe you mentioned this perhaps in your closing comments too — all those newer entrants. Could you discuss how that might be reshaping Golub, driving you to expand more quickly? My sense is Golub is extending its footprint further into insurance and retail, since that seems to be where a great deal of capital is now being gathered — or, if there's any acceleration at all, how much quicker is the Golub operation moving on raising funds and originating loans given the competitive landscape today?

David Golub

executive
#12

We aren't moving any quicker as a result of competition. Actually, we don't shape our strategy around what others are doing. For years, our method of expanding Golub Capital has been to concentrate obsessively on creating competitive edges within an extremely focused scope of activities; we're specialists in private credit and sponsor finance during a time of multi-strategy alternatives. And we won't alter who we are in that regard. A few years back, when several of our rivals spotted a chance to expand substantially in large private credit — the big markets going head-to-head with the broadly syndicated space, we decided to take a different path and rededicate ourselves to the core middle market. And that choice makes me very pleased. Today we stand as one of the biggest — one of the leading firms in the core middle market; and my view is that this is a superior business. So we keep marching to our own beat, Fin. That beat differs from what others in the sector follow, and for us it's the correct one.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#13

Robert, thanks for raising that. Let's take on a few items regarding the liability side, then move to the asset type. Regarding liabilities, your presentation showed the weighted average cost for the December quarter came in at 6.2%, and it hasn't yet reflected all the work you completed — and you did quite a bit during that period. Could you give us a sense of the magnitude — how large are the relative cost savings, or rate savings, once everything is fully in effect for an entire quarter? How meaningful is that reduction on the liability side?

David Golub

executive
#14

Robert, I'm truly pleased you brought that up, since the way companies handle the right-hand side of the balance sheet matters enormously for achieving success over the long term. We have an excellent team dedicated to exactly that. I'll pass the microphone to Matt Benton, who can walk through in greater detail the actions we've taken over the past few months to capitalize on narrower spreads in liability markets, and explain how that will affect our profitability going forward.

Matt Benton

executive
#15

That's a fair question. The simplest approach, I'd say, is to turn to Page 22 in the investor presentation we've put out, where you can see the debt stack and what the funding structure initiatives have done for us — something we've discussed quite a bit. Issuing that low-cost CLO and retiring the pricier debt facilities really only began to show up later in the quarter. On November 18, we closed the $2.2 billion CLO carrying a blended interest expense of SOFR plus 158 basis points, and at that point we retired some of the more expensive legacy debt facilities we held. However, we couldn't, say, call the GBDC 3 2022 to 2 Securitization until December 16 — and keep in mind that was $225 million of third-party notes priced at SOFR plus 260 basis points. So the 6.2% weighted average cost of debt shown on that slide reflects, once more, the weighted average cost across the whole quarter, which means operating for a substantial portion of the quarter with those costlier legacy facilities. As for where things stand now, the simplest way to frame it: the current in-place weighted average cost of funds for GBDC would come from applying a 4.3% current SOFR base rate through that debt stack and then applying the weighted average spread shown on the page, which gets you to roughly a 5.5% weighted average cost of debt today. That's what's in place — that's the number today. Another thing worth noting: there are, of course, always many moving pieces when you consider both sides of the balance sheet here. For the CLOs, which together make up nearly $1.6 billion of outstanding par, their reference base rates didn't reset lower until after the quarter ended. They reset in January. So that's where those sizable differences begin to appear. And once more, my quick math there leaves out amortizing fees, but that's how to think about it.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#16

Understood, understood, that's quite useful. And here's one more related to it. Regarding the JPMorgan facility — well, it's a solid facility with appealing pricing. It wasn't put together at a time when your credit ratings were what they are now. So what's the — how much potential do you see for making changes to that facility? Clearly, it has many years left to go, if you simply choose to leave it as is. But even so, it was — back when you arranged it, you were at BBB-, and it became BBB flat equivalent.

Matt Benton

executive
#17

Yeah. We believe that's yet another strong question. There's potential to make it better, based on what a number of our peers have already done in the market. You can examine some of our close peers and see how they've modified their current facilities; and once more, when we set the pricing — when we established that facility, we had top-tier pricing on it. Naturally, we have excellent relationships with the banks. We possess a very lengthy, highly successful history, and we're able to take advantage of that. So you should absolutely expect that we are looking at that extremely carefully and that, should things work out, there would be meaningful benefit compared with the current plus 175 basis point spread we have right now.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#18

Understood. Now, turning to the asset side, if I may. Not the tail end — I believe, David, you already covered that part — but regarding what I think was 90% falling into our category 4, the top performers exceeding expectations. Does that situation introduce a risk — in quotes, so to speak — given that the market is becoming more active? Specifically, could those assets outperforming expectations turn into acquisition targets within a more dynamic market? And how concerned should we be about substantial portfolio churn throughout '25, assuming the widespread belief holds and the momentum from the fourth quarter keeps accelerating?

David Golub

executive
#19

That's an excellent question. When you examine total portfolio turnover figures over the past couple of years, Robert, they've remained under typical levels. The reason is clear: following May and June of 2022, M&A activity dropped sharply in reaction to interest rate increases. So it stands to reason — if our loans typically carry a 5- or 6-year maturity, with the standard average life for one of them being 3 years, and we've just been through a stretch where M&A and repayments ran lighter than usual — eventually, things will move toward a setting where M&A and portfolio turnover run above typical levels. The positive aspect is that when this shift occurs, I believe plenty of opportunities will emerge for us in the new loan segment. Consequently, I'd expect two developments to occur simultaneously: we'd experience both increased new originations and increased repayments. That matches the pattern observed previously during similar conditions. In my view, this will keep the stretch of elevated portfolio turnover within manageable bounds.

Robert Dodd

analyst
#20

Let me just add one more question on top of that. If that activity were to accelerate, do you believe the possible blend of big versus core middle market deals would change? Given the churn you could experience, might you need to lean more heavily toward bigger transactions, assuming that's where everything is happening? Do you see any chance of a shift in that mix, or something along those lines?

David Golub

executive
#21

Robert, one of the platform's real strengths is that the deals we take part in span from fairly small, $20 million EBITDA businesses all the way to large firms, including those with hundreds of millions of dollars in EBITDA, and for whom we've provided multibillion dollar loans across the platform; so we're able to direct our origination toward wherever the most appealing opportunities appear. Let me restate something Matt mentioned in our opening remarks on this call: lately, the most appealing opportunities we've found have been in the core middle market; and I expect that will largely keep being the case, since that's where our competitive edges are greatest; that's where we're a dominant player. That's where our relationships, our incumbencies, and our expertise carry particular value. That said, I believe having the ability to cover companies of many different sizes gives us the flexibility to adapt if we find ourselves in a setting like the one you're describing, if we're in a setting where the bulk of new M&A activity involves larger companies, I don't think that's what will occur. I believe that as more activity emerges, it will show up across the spectrum. In fact, it could even skew disproportionately toward the middle market; but if things played out the way you described, I think that would be fine.

Raymond Cheesman

analyst
#22

David, I appreciate you taking the follow-up. Software's been a really appealing area for BDCs—yours included—to deploy capital and generate strong returns. How do you view the possibility that this category gets affected down the road, given how artificial intelligence is reshaping things? Not just on the hardware side, with what's happening around NVIDIA, but now it's moving into software too—DeepSeek is reportedly accomplishing far more on the software front than has ever been achieved with hardware. So I'm curious whether you think this category could turn into a different sort of bucket ahead.

David Golub

executive
#23

You're correct that software has been an extremely favorable sector for Golub Capital. We identified it as an industry full of strong credits quite early—roughly 15 years back, when we became a significant software lender. That said, a few points. First, software was never something you could approach without careful thought. There are strong software businesses, and there are weak ones. We've developed the know-how to lend to software companies very effectively. Being a solid software lender isn't something every lender can do. Understanding the credit traits and strategic positioning of various software companies demands considerable skill and expertise. Looking ahead, the ability to tell strong software businesses apart from weaker ones will matter even more—and it will get tougher. Part of the reason is AI. Certain software companies will harness AI to strengthen what they offer their customers. Others will encounter circumstances where AI undermines the incumbencies they've long held. So for firms to assess and separate the companies that will come out ahead from those that will fall behind because of AI, having genuinely robust internal expertise in this area strikes me as very important. That said, AI isn't the sole factor determining who wins and who loses in software. Plenty of other elements come into play too. And in my view, firms skilled at software lending will also need to excel at assessing those additional elements.

David Golub

executive
#24

Alright, I want to thank everyone for being here with us. Your time and focus mean a lot to me. As we always say, should anything else come up or any matters remain that we haven't addressed, don't hesitate to get in touch. And we're excited to speak with you again in the next quarter.

Operator

operator
#25

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for your participation. You may now disconnect.

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