Valley National Bancorp (VLY) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
January 30, 2020
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Rick Kraemer
executiveAppreciate that, Skyler. Good morning, all, and thank you for being here on Valley's call covering fourth quarter 2019 results. With us this morning are Ira Robbins, our President and CEO, Mike Hagedorn, our Chief Financial Officer, and Tom Iadanza, our Chief Banking Officer. Ahead of diving in, please note that the earnings release for the fourth quarter, along with supporting materials, can be found on our website at valley.com. When walking through our results, we refer to non-GAAP measures, which leave out specific items from reported results. Reconciliations between these non-GAAP measures and GAAP results are included in today's earnings release. Please take a look at Slide 2 in the deck for our fourth-quarter 2019 results. Keep in mind that anything we say on today's call might include forward-looking statements about Valley National Bancorp and the banking sector. We ask everyone joining us to review our SEC filings — the 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K — for a full discussion of those forward-looking statements. Now I'll hand things over to Ira Robbins.
Ira Robbins
executiveThanks, Rick. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the call. What we saw in the fourth quarter really shows how much ground we've covered across the last 2 years. We keep taking meaningful steps toward hitting — and then repeating — the objectives we laid out before: steady expansion, better operating efficiency, and a revenue base that's more diversified. For Q4 2019, Valley posted adjusted earnings per share of $0.24. That adjusted EPS figure rose 14% compared with Q4 of the prior year. On top of that, our adjusted EPS for all of 2019 came in at $0.92, which likewise climbed 14% against the full 2018 year. Remember, we produced those numbers against a tough macroeconomic backdrop, one that has squeezed net interest margins across the whole industry. Just as notable, we generated 12.7% growth in tangible book value across the full year, all while announcing and completing a major acquisition. Beyond that, that growth came even as we paid out a meaningful cash dividend and put money back into our products, our people, and our infrastructure. Two years back, we set out a number of key targets and guidelines so you could hold us to account. As you've seen, we've made substantial headway on every single one of those guidelines and targets. Our loan growth has stayed consistently ahead of the industry average, and we've done it while keeping the same prudent underwriting standards that have always been a signature of Valley. We've pushed our core costs lower, surpassing our projected adjusted efficiency ratio goals for the full 2019 year. Our multiyear branch transformation initiative has brought about consolidations and cost savings, and at the same time it's delivered a better product to our customers — something visible in a lot of the underlying deposit trends. And just as crucially, Valley's customer experience scores across our branch network have grown exponentially too. Our fee income keeps rising, helped along by improvements in existing businesses and the expansion of new products. Finally, creating shareholder value sits at the top of our priority list, and we delivered an outstanding deal with Oritani, one that was immediately accretive to tangible book value across all of our capital ratios. What's more, we stay very encouraged by the many trends we saw during the fourth quarter, including: strong organic loan growth with considerable geographic and product diversification, excellent business and retail core deposit growth, continued gains in efficiency, and very sound credit metrics. I take enormous pride in what we've accomplished across the last 2 years, and I believe this marks just the start of a long stretch of success for Valley. At this point, I'd like to hand the call over to Mike Hagedorn, who will walk through some additional financial highlights for the quarter.
Mike Hagedorn
executiveThanks, Ira. Now moving to Slide 5, where we look at net interest income and margin trends for the quarter. Our net interest margin rose 5 basis points, reaching 2.96% versus the quarter before, and the interest rate spread widened 10 basis points compared with the earlier period. This linked-quarter expansion is encouraging to us, since we think there's still a repricing tailwind left in the liability structure we currently have. We laid out that opportunity previously, in the forward repricing gap we discussed on the third quarter call. So our focus has been on bringing liability costs down while staying competitive in the market. Adding to those efforts to reduce the cost of funds, we extinguished roughly $635 million of longer-term FHLB debt in the fourth quarter; we'd originally said we intended to extinguish that debt alongside the closing of the Oritani transaction. This move produced an after-tax charge of about $23 million, and on a comparable level of borrowings it should generate roughly 200 basis points of annual interest expense savings, a meaningful share of which we've already captured in recent weeks. Although we keep emphasizing the short end of the curve on the liability side, we did use the chance to extend duration a bit in the fourth quarter, pushing about $300 million out into 2- to 3-year durations through alternative wholesale funds. Given the absolute rate available and the curve's present shape, we view this step as prudent. From the 12-month forward maturity schedule on Slide 6 of our EPS presentation, you can see there's still considerable room to reprice retail CDs and other wholesale borrowings materially lower, assuming the current rate outlook holds. On Slide 9, the impact of lower repricing shows up in our monthly deposit rate averages. Because of that, we think we're positioned defensively for today's rate environment and outlook. Now to assets. As we anticipated, portfolio yields keep getting hurt by the current environment. Even so, we sold about $800 million of multifamily loans, mostly New York City-based, with a weighted average yield of roughly 3.53%, which offset part of the core yield compression. At year-end, roughly 57% of our loans were adjustable rate, and 37% of total loans are set to reset over the next 12 months. About 15% of total loans are indexed to 1-month LIBOR, and another 9% are tied to Prime, repricing either daily or monthly. On top of that, nearly 19% of loans are priced off varying CMT indices, most of which contractually reprice every 5 years. As the left chart on Slide 8 shows, lower index rates over the past 6-plus months keep pushing new loan origination yields down. Much of that comes from market pressures, but we did see a 17 basis point rebound in new origination spreads this quarter; that matters, and it reflects our ability to tap lower cost deposits to fund significant growth. One more thing worth noting: the speed at which new origination yields have been coming down has started to ease over the past few months. It's too soon to declare a floor, but this steadiness is a positive sign. Now, on to the next item. Noninterest income fell 7% from the linked quarter, mostly because swap fees were lower by $3.9 million. During the third quarter earnings call, we told you we anticipated this business would weaken in the fourth quarter. Looking ahead, we think it may keep facing pressure in the first quarter due to what is typically a seasonally slower stretch for loan growth. Adjusted fee income came in at 13.8% of adjusted operating revenue, down from 16% in the prior quarter. This quarter's result landed somewhat under our long-term target of 15% to 20% of total operating revenue, but the quarterly annualized rise in net interest income offset the falling fee ratio, which is a nice problem to have. Let's dig into the results more thoroughly; we produced swap volume of roughly $10 million in the fourth quarter of 2019, originating back-to-back swaps on about $400 million of notional loans. Net residential mortgage gain on sale income rose 13.5% versus the third quarter of 2019. Those gains came from roughly $300 million in loan sales during the quarter, made up of both conforming flow and one Jumbo bulk transaction. Conforming gain on sale margins came in about 21 basis points better than the prior quarter. Going forward, we think stronger marketing efforts and more education across our sales team and clients will keep pushing noninterest income to be a bigger contributor to the bottom line. Reported expenses climbed roughly $50 million from the prior quarter. The reported figures contain a number of infrequent items, adding up to about $51 million on a pretax basis. To be specific, the loss on extinguishment of FHLB debt came to roughly $32 million, and merger-related expenses were $15.1 million. Amortization of tax credit investments was $4 million for the fourth quarter. Our adjusted expenses, excluding tax credit amortization and the infrequent items already noted, were $145 million, up about $5 million from the previous quarter. Importantly, this does include 1 full month of direct or a tiny expenses, which were approximately $2 million. About $1.3 million of that shows up in the quarterly salary lines, with the remainder spread across several line items; we also incurred roughly $350,000 in quarterly expense tied to resolving Oritani's pre-existing regulatory issues. It's worth noting that the direct Oritani expenses we saw in December would equate to achieving over 38% cost saves on an annual basis, well ahead of our expected time line. Remember, these saves happened before system and back-office integration and without consolidating or closing a single branch. Additional evidence of our dedication to efficiencies shows up in the salary and employee benefits expense. Once we made adjustments for severance tied to the merger and removed the direct Oritani expenses from December, the result was a drop of roughly $1.6 million versus the third quarter of '19. On an adjusted basis, that fourth quarter figure represents a 6.4% decrease from the same quarter a year earlier, 4Q '18. We've discussed this often before — our team is intensely focused on generating more operating leverage. You can see that most clearly in our adjusted efficiency ratio; in the fourth quarter we posted $52.4 million against a 152.4% — excuse me, against a drop of more than 100 basis points from the prior quarter, and for all of 2019 it fell a striking 412 basis points compared with 2018, finishing at 53.78%, which came in comfortably under our 55% goal for the full year. What makes this achievement stand out even more is that it happened as we were moving into new markets, rolling out additional products, and both announcing and completing a major acquisition; focusing on shifting resources toward the business lines, products, and people that deliver the best returns on our expense base has become part of how we manage, and the numbers bear that out. Loan growth, once you adjust for the Oritani acquisition in the fourth quarter, came in at an annualized negative 0.9%. It's worth noting that this figure reflects the sale of about $800 million in multifamily commercial real estate loans, largely located in New York City, which took place late in the fourth quarter.
Mike Hagedorn
executiveIf you take away that sale along with the Oritani acquisition, what we'd have seen is loan growth at a 10% annualized pace. For the whole of 2019, our organic loan growth — once you strip out Oritani and the multifamily loan sale — would have landed at roughly 9%, which is a bit above the top end of what we guided to. Slide 8 shows that a large share of the organic growth this quarter was generated in commercial real estate, C&I and construction. The typical CRE loan we originated this quarter is still fairly modest, at $2.1 million, and for C&I it was only $376,000, which spreads our risk across more areas. Geographically speaking, the growth was spread out nicely. Florida and Alabama accounted for roughly 40% of the total commercial growth we saw this quarter, New York and New Jersey contributed about 55%, and the remainder came from our national commercial businesses. During the quarter we sold about $300 million of residential loans, and roughly 44% of that took the form of a Jumbo portfolio bulk sale, where servicing is retained by us. Conforming loans sold rose 19.6% versus the prior quarter, producing the rest of the gains through sales via our standard GSE outlet. Deposit trends this quarter were quite strong. We ended the quarter with a loan-to-deposit ratio of 101.8%, comfortably inside the range we target. Total deposits, excluding Oritani, were up about 4% on a linked-quarter basis and 8% — 8.6% for the full year. With Oritani excluded, noninterest-bearing deposits rose 10.5% annualized on a linked-quarter basis, and core branch deposits were up 6.4% across the full year. We saw annualized linked-quarter growth of 6.1% in savings, NOW and money market accounts, again leaving out the merger. Momentum keeps building in our branch and online deposit channels, with net new account growth of 3.3% annualized on a linked-quarter basis. What may matter more is that balances tied to those channels grew at an annualized linked-quarter rate above 13.5%. Going deeper, balance sheet growth has been tremendous — and balanced, with checking accounts up 11.3% on an annualized linked-quarter basis. Our online banking efforts, though still fairly immature, delivered net account growth of 9.3% versus the prior quarter, and every one of our geographies also saw net account expansion; these achievements make us proud, particularly when you factor in that we shut 15 branches over the calendar year, which had carried combined balances of about $485 million. That's more proof that our branch transformation work drove more proactive outreach to customers, and together with improved product offerings, is making a positive difference in retention as well as growth. As the chart on Slide 9 covering average deposit balance and rate trends shows, we've been pushing deposit rates down in both the business and retail segments. As you can see, monthly average rates for savings, NOW and money market accounts came down in 5 of the last 6 months, and CDs have followed a similar path. Like we said last quarter, we anticipated bigger repricing benefits arriving in 4Q '19 because of the expected lag effects. Of note, November and December both saw faster declines in the average rate. We still anticipate additional decreases in the first quarter of 2020, because of the forward repricing trend and the liability-sensitive pricing gap that confronts us in the near term. Over that quarter, dependence on short-term borrowings fell by roughly $732 million. That came about through a mix of paydowns that counterbalanced the loan sales noted above, together with accessing brokered CDs and the strong results of our core deposit gathering in the quarter. As noted earlier, we retired about $635 million in long-term FHLB debt in the quarter that we had recognized beforehand. As you may remember, that debt's weighted average cost was approximately 3.93%, versus market rates today that are more than 20 basis points lower — that are more than 200 basis points lower. In the fourth quarter, we brought in $300 million of broker deposits with modest duration at attractive long-term funding rates, seizing on the curve's shape and absolute level. Although we keep focusing on driving liability costs down, this is a sensible way to ladder our funding sources and manage our fairly neutral interest rate position. I'd like to provide a quick update regarding asset quality, capital, and what we expect from CECL. Total nonperforming assets fell by about $6.3 million versus the prior quarter. Accruing past due loans dropped more substantially versus the prior quarter, down more than $20 million. As we indicated last quarter, that decrease was anticipated because of the administrative situation that had caused the prior quarter's rise. In the fourth quarter of 2019, we booked a $5.4 million provision for loan losses. Net charge-offs rose 3.6% versus the prior quarter, mostly because of medallion loans, against which reserves had already been set, and one smaller C&I credit. Now to CECL. We are reducing the estimated range of impact we discussed last quarter. Having run further parallel tests and refreshed our assumptions for forecasted economic conditions and portfolio balances as of December 31, 2019, we estimate CECL might raise our non-PCI allowance by roughly $30 million to $40 million relative to our present reserve levels. That is lower than the earlier projected range of $50 million to $70 million; this addition would exclude the balance sheet transfer occurring inside the PCI-related credit portion that was present at year-end. The PCI-related reclassification will have no effect on pro forma capital or the regulatory phase-in period; regarding capital, you will see the notable gains in both tangible common equity and regulatory capital ratios over the quarter; those improvements came through a blend of the acquisition of acquired Oritani capital and considerable strides toward reducing risk weights tied to a large share of the acquired portfolio. In addition, the drop in risk weights was the — advancing the drop in risk weights was the sale of roughly $800 million in multifamily loans. Strong capital formation through that acquisition, along with other organic initiatives, offers yet another sign that management remains dedicated to constructing a balance sheet capable of fueling value growth well into the future. I want to provide a quick status report regarding the boost to reserves tied to uncertain tax liability involving renewable energy tax credits, as well as other tax benefits that were recognized earlier from the investments in the DC Solar funds, along with interest. You might remember that in the first quarter of 2019, we had already set up a partial reserve. Following recent events, we booked an extra $18.7 million added to our tax reserve, meaning that as of December 31, 2019, we are now fully reserved for the tax position connected to DC Solar. Now, turning to Slide 11 in our presentation to discuss certain targets and outlook. For full year 2020, we are putting in place new loan growth guidance spanning 6% to 8% after residential loan sales. This growth takes as its base roughly $29.7 billion, our period end 2019 loan balance. When it comes to net interest income, our outlook is set at a range of 13% to 16% growth for the year; that figure represents the anticipated percentage growth from our full year 2019 base of approximately $898 million.
Mike Hagedorn
executiveBear in mind that this rate of expansion is inflated because of when the Oritani deal closed, plus the net interest income we anticipate realizing across the entire year from the portfolio we picked up, along with growth we generated ourselves. If Valley stood alone, the growth we'd expect would come in at roughly 3% to 6%. For net interest income, our projection bakes in a 25 basis point cut to rates during 2020. As for how net interest margin will move, it makes sense to expect a bit of mild pressure during the first quarter of 2020, partly from the seasonal dip tied to day count, and also from ongoing strain on yields for newly originated assets and the effect of a full quarter from Oritani. Our earlier target for the adjusted efficiency ratio stays the same — 51% or below, hit at some point within the year. Last, we're setting a tax rate range for the full year of 24% to 26%. With that, I'll hand things back to Ira for a few more remarks.
Ira Robbins
executiveThanks, Mike. I want to give you a quick update on where things stand with the Oritani merger. Valley got its regulatory approval faster than anyone can remember, and we were thrilled to complete the deal in early December. There's a lot we're excited about with this combination — new customers coming in, a stronger foothold in attractive affluent markets, and extra capital to support growth down the road. Integration work is set to happen later in the first quarter, and we expect to start realizing more cost savings not long after that. The progress so far makes me very happy, and I want to express my gratitude to every Valley employee and everyone who came over from Oritani for making this deal so remarkable and successful. To wrap up, 2019 mattered a great deal for Valley. A lot of the themes we've been telling you about over the past 2 years are moving forward, and the numbers and the momentum show that clearly. We've managed to hit some major goals we set out, and those include: growth on the balance sheet that lasts, underwritten through our steady, conservative method; better efficiency and positive operating leverage, which came from a cultural shift across the whole organization; third, managing the balance sheet strategically, with emphasis on growing capital and putting it to work more wisely; and finally, an acquisition approach that stays disciplined and is designed to build shareholder value both near term and long term. And we've done all of this while reinvesting substantially in our infrastructure so that a renewed Valley is supported for years ahead. The bank keeps transforming, and the headway we've made leaves me completely confident and energized. My belief is that these changes ought to benefit shareholder returns over the long run, and at the same time they strengthen our dedication to community, to employees and to innovation. With that, I'll hand the call back to the operator so we can get Q&A started. Thank you.
Ken Zerbe
analystI suppose, to kick things off, regarding the loan sale from this quarter, I simply want to confirm I have every detail straight. To be precise, my question is: how much of a gain did you record on that transaction? The motive I'm asking is that, when you consider — well, we're aware those loans carry a yield of roughly 3.4%, while you're saving 3.9%. That works out to perhaps 50 basis points annually, roughly $3 million in savings, yet escaping this debt costs $32 million. Therefore, a very substantial gain would be needed for this to be economically logical from your perspective.
Tom Iadanza
executiveHi, Ken. This is Tom Iadanza. Regarding the terms of that loan sale, I'm unable to provide any comment. What I can say is that we felt it was prudent to exit, or otherwise reduce, our exposure within the New York City multifamily portfolio. No credit issues existed among these loans we divested — in fact, that portfolio was performing rather well, showing a 63% loan-to-value and a 1.7x debt service coverage, comparable to our other loans; they don't — they failed to align with the relationship banking, return-to-deposit strategy we maintain at the bank. Such assets are capital-intensive, carry lower relative yield, and offer minimal cross-sell and deposit opportunity, and we will consistently evaluate our capital needs alongside our asset businesses to confirm they all fit, or else pursue better opportunities. So once more, I want to emphasize: no credit issues were present. It was a sound portfolio. It presented a chance to shed lower-yielding assets in a class we judged it prudent to reduce.
Ira Robbins
executiveAnd Ken, Ira here. In our thinking, these are actually two distinct deals. The FHLB transaction we talked about regarding prepaying — that debt aligned with what we shared at the time we announced the Oritani transaction. Essentially, we took some of the extra capital produced by the Oritani deal and applied it toward paying down debt, which carried a prepayment charge. As a result, we continued to have a positive capital position stemming from Oritani, and that generated positive EPS as we start moving ahead. So the loan sale truly was a separate decision, distinct from the gain — or distinct from what we did with the borrowings. So I wouldn't view them as linked in any way.
Ken Zerbe
analystUnderstood. Even if a sizable portion of the money from the sale went toward paying back the FHLB?
Ira Robbins
executiveI — we considered each of these separately, correct? When we made the Oritani deal public, we also disclosed the $635 million; the savings expected from it mostly stemmed from either reinvesting or taking on new term debt at a reduced rate. As Tom pointed out, it just worked out that we could complete this one-of-a-kind transaction, and it landed in the same quarter; that being said, the two were truly separate deals. And from our standpoint, again, the FHLB borrowing move we made was mostly tied to the Oritani transaction and really putting some of that surplus capital to work.
Ken Zerbe
analystUnderstood. Alright. So if — supposing there's no gain, which is what I'm assuming, or maybe that's not something we can assume, day 1 could have been net negative for you folks. Yet you're saying you want to proceed because strategically it turns you into a stronger bank down the road, even if this deal cost you money. Is that right...
Ira Robbins
executiveWell, I don't believe we lost money on this deal over the long haul. When you examine make-whole payments tied to any FHLB transaction, you tend to end up roughly neutral. It's essentially a time value of money question — what our projected sales are against your one-time prepayment penalty. For us, as we evaluated it, we asked how much extra capital came our way from the Oritani transaction. Then how much of that extra capital we required versus where we wanted to land from an EPS standpoint looking ahead. It really came down to balancing those two. And separately, once more, we completed a unique transaction giving us a chance, as Tom noted, to cut some of our New York City marketplace exposure; and we managed to push ahead with it. Beyond trimming that exposure, I think, as Tom hinted, those were transactions that didn't give us a chance to cross-sell from a relationship standpoint. So we see it as a far more efficient deployment of capital going forward.
Ken Zerbe
analystGot it. Okay, that's useful. And then perhaps for my follow-up, if I can. What did the PAA adjustment come to for the quarter? And what portion of that contributed to NIM and NII?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveSo the — this is Mike. So the overall credit-related mark came to $28 million, and approximately half of that amount represents the credit interest component; and that carries an average life of roughly 4 years.
Ken Zerbe
analystMy apologies — I was asking about the portion that actually ran through NII during the quarter?
Ira Robbins
executiveWhat we're providing, I believe, is this — with so many transactions, that's something we've deliberately avoided doing. So you may get a figure of $14 million spread across a 4-year span. That lets you derive what 1 month would have come to, and honestly it's not a material figure; from our standpoint, when we look ahead at earnings, we aim to keep them as sustainable as we can and avoid having many purchase accounting adjustments sitting inside them.
Frank Schiraldi
analystTurning to the 2020 loan growth assumptions — I'm curious, when you say 6% to 8%, how much of that reflects runoff from the multifamily portfolio?
Tom Iadanza
executiveFrank, Tom here again. At this point, the New York portion of that multifamily book sits at roughly $1.4 billion, with loan-to-values that are pretty strong, landing in that 50 to 60 band, and it varies between Oritani and what we hold from the legacy Valley portfolio. Everything in the Valley portfolio comes from customer relationships. So significant runoff isn't something we're expecting — we'll take part selectively and originate new business there. Remember, in the past this wasn't a big piece of what we did. Yields on it were consistently low. These loans only go to folks we knew well, long-standing customers who were truly deposit or relationship-driven. So some repayment could reasonably be anticipated through the ordinary course of business, perhaps a bit more than that. Still, I believe what we've grown elsewhere in our business will offset it. Remember, Mike brought up how granular the portfolio is: average CRE loan of $2.4 million, and $375 million on the C&I side from that new production. That's where our attention is. Being well diversified, with no dependence on any single significant asset class, is what we're aiming for. So that approach continues, and we expect to hit the 6% to 8% guidance.
Frank Schiraldi
analystMy apologies — what was the figure you gave for New York multifamily together with the Oritani...
Tom Iadanza
executiveIt's $1.4 billion. Of that, $600 million comes from legacy Valley, while roughly $800 million — just above $800 million — is Oritani. And to repeat, the loan-to-value sits at about 60% for the Valley portion, versus 48% for the Oritani portion. Everything there has performed, and we anticipate that continuing.
Ira Robbins
executiveTaking 2019 as a benchmark, we made roughly $6.2 billion of loans altogether throughout the whole footprint, and that holds true for every one of the individual products. As far as we're concerned, now that we've kept pushing ahead, growing the multifamily portfolio is definitely not something we're focused on. So balances should stay more or less level; as we mentioned regarding where we experienced growth during this year, it was in the Florida and Alabama footprint to a bigger extent than perhaps certain other regions, and also in that C&I product, and that will likely carry on into next year for us.
Frank Schiraldi
analystAll right, and then as a second question, could you walk us through that sale during the quarter and explain why that particular group stood out? Since it appears credit quality remained solid there. What caused — with the capital boost coming from Oritani, plus you noted CECL is a relatively smaller mark as well — why did you choose to divest this group rather than allow it to wind down gradually or be substituted gradually? So how does this differ from the remaining parts of the portfolio?
Tom Iadanza
executiveSure, this group consisted of loans focused on transactions. No deposits came with it. Within this piece, our loan-to-deposit ratio ran rather elevated, while the remainder of our portfolio is built on relationships. Those are individuals with whom we share long-standing ties and who rely on us for numerous products and services. So once more, it came down to evaluating how we allocate capital, exiting lower yielding, non-relationship operations and directing our focus toward return and relationship-driven operations. It's return measured against volume.
Frank Schiraldi
analystAll right. And then, apologies — you may have already mentioned this, but that multifamily property that got sold, it wasn't in Oritani's portfolio, right?
Tom Iadanza
executiveThat one wasn't in Oritani's portfolio — it belonged to a Valley portfolio.
Alex Lau
analystAlex Lau here, filling in for Steve. After the Oritani deal closed, could you share where things stand with branch consolidations? And what about the branches that aren't performing well?
Tom Iadanza
executiveTom Iadanza here, happy to take that one again. We've pinpointed and made public that 9 branches will shut down as part of the acquisition, and every one of them sits under a mile from another location. That's the announcement we've made. That's the situation as of right now. As for the Valley branches and the transformation of our branch network, on earlier calls we said we'd cut the Valley footprint by 10 branches over the course of 2020. That goal remains intact. On a brighter note, deposit retention at the branches we've closed has come in quite strong. The reason is that we got ahead of the customers, reached them early, stayed in close contact, and held onto a large share of those deposits. If memory serves, retention is running around 85%. We'll keep managing it the same way. Each branch gets looked at on its own, making sure the deposit mix is right, the staffing mix is right, and service levels are right. What we care about most in our branches these days is service and sales, and that matters greatly to us. We finished renovating our first 8 branches and giving them the new model look. Speaking as a proud father here, the results came out extremely well, and our customers have responded positively. So our branch transformation is on schedule and moving forward.
Alex Lau
analystAnd a quick follow-up, if I could. Regarding your loan-to-deposit ratio, after the Oritani deal, could you remind me what range you feel comfortable operating in? Would that sit under 100%?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveYes. As we've mentioned previously, the upper end of that same range is unchanged. We're targeting roughly 95% to 105%. So nothing has shifted from where it stood earlier.
David Chiaverini
analystI have a few things to ask. First, on Slide 8, which displays the loan yield portfolio alongside origination yields — origination yields came in at 4.1%, while the total portfolio sits at 4.51%. I'm wondering — I did catch what you said regarding NIM facing mild downward pressure during the first quarter. That said, I'd like to know whether, over a longer horizon, that gap of roughly 40 basis points separating what you're booking new loans at versus the blended portfolio yield means we should brace for further compression as we move through 2020?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveSure. Setting aside what we said regarding Q1 — and I believe you've got that correct — remember that, as I mentioned during my prepared remarks, our spread widened by 17 basis points. So my sense is the pace of that decline is moderating somewhat. Like I noted, we wouldn't say it has hit a floor just yet, though it's definitely a positive sign that perhaps those 2 lines in the bottom left quadrant of the slide might begin to converge a bit.
David Chiaverini
analystAll right, excellent. Turning to the other part of this, given that you've now paid off that pricey FHLB borrowing ahead of schedule, and with certain deposit costs declining, would you by any chance happen to know the blended spot rate — or cost of deposits, or rather total cost of funds — as of December 31? That would help give us a sense of what to anticipate going into the first quarter.
Ira Robbins
executiveLet's take a look. David, I don't believe we have that on hand, but I can definitely follow up with you after this.
David Chiaverini
analystAll right. And the final item tied to that — I appreciate this slide that displays the cumulative cash flow gap. It indicates that rates on CDs reaching maturity fall within a 2% to 2.2% band. At what levels are you currently renewing CDs?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveI'll handle that in two parts. To begin, retention of those CDs is something management monitors quite closely here. Those retention figures have run from approximately 80% to 90%. When it comes to newly rolled over retained CDs, we're looking at 1.5% to 1.7%; that's a very meaningful decrease in what our funding costs us. Regarding this sizable portfolio, which is visible to you, roughly $1.7 billion sits in the first quarter, with an additional $2 billion arriving in the second quarter, followed by another $1 billion in the third quarter. So it's a considerable driver of our potential net interest margin, which we discussed during the third quarter too.
Collyn Gilbert
analystTo build on the NIM topic, I simply want to confirm that I heard everyone right — your guidance does take into account a reduction from the Fed. Is that right?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveThat's right.
Collyn Gilbert
analystAll right. And I'm just attempting to get a handle on this — it appears that when we examine the NII outlook you've provided for the year alongside several of the shifting components, clearly, reaching that figure suggests the NIM ought to move in a considerably more favorable direction than that NII projection suggests. So should there be a chance for upside — I mean, where would you say a greater opportunity exists for you, regarding funding? Or regarding assets? Since I just — it simply appears — and I haven't gone through every figure, but it looks as though you're positioning for NII expansion that's larger than the target range you're putting forward; therefore I want to — I'm attempting to determine what could be escaping my notice here?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveI'd separate this into 2 categories, and I believe you've essentially mentioned them, with the first being our funding expenses. Why we might fail to hit the net interest margin figures you'd otherwise expect comes down to if the curve remains at its present level, if a Fed rate cut occurs or doesn't, the exact shape of the curve, and then the amount we capture; so as I noted during the third quarter, we will reprice lower across the CD and wholesale funding books. What's uncertain is how far down we'll fund? And we'll ladder into it; we won't aim for some floor and afterward choose the correct moment for doing so. The second category concerns the earning asset side, specifically the loan book; and if our loan growth exceeded what our guidance indicates, obviously, our net interest margin would rise.
Ira Robbins
executiveCollyn, I believe you nailed the 2 main things there. But when you step back and consider it, we hold an incredible volume of deposits, plus other funding sources, that will reprice according to where costs stand now compared with the market rates we're observing generally. Then on the asset side, clearly a substantial portion of assets is linked to short-term indexes. So should a rate shift occur, immediately there's a negative hit to our NIM. Having said that, across a longer stretch, it's definitely accretive for us as we keep progressing. I hope that answers it?
Collyn Gilbert
analystAll right, all right. And then, Mike, just so I understand correctly, what you said was that NIM for 1 quarter would decline. Is that what you're suggesting regarding the margin?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveWell, a couple of factors need to be taken into account. To start, the day count in the first quarter is different. You also have Oritani for a full quarter, and its NIM differs from that of legacy Valley; so those 2 things right there create some headwinds.
Collyn Gilbert
analystAll right, all right. Then the final thing I have is on — would you be able to give us the guidance regarding the tax credit expense for the year?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveLet me just verify that I've got your question right. That's...
Collyn Gilbert
analystThe amortization expense?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveYes. 24% to 26% flat.
Collyn Gilbert
analystMy apologies — I meant the tax credit, not the tax rate?
Ira Robbins
executiveRight. My sense is that we've held steady compared with what we saw in the 4Q. Your observation, I believe, is that a few years back, we would typically report a small amount on an all-in basis during the fourth quarter, depending on the activity and the various kinds of instruments we held. So at this point we're at roughly $4 million per quarter, and that figure probably represents a solid run rate for us as we keep progressing into 2020.
David Chiaverini
analystI'd like to discuss costs. In the past, you provided a specific dollar range for expenses covering the upcoming quarter, or maybe two quarters. Do you have any perspective on what a typical expense run rate might look like as we head toward the first quarter?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveMike here. Clearly, we won't provide guidance regarding a year-over-year rise in expenses. You can sort of derive it from our efficiency ratio. That said, I'll note that during 2019 we showed operating leverage, and our aim is to keep that going. Based on the guidance we've provided, I'm fairly confident that once you incorporate it into your model, you'll observe that operating leverage persisting; and to offer a bit of context, the ratio was roughly 2:1 in 2019.
David Chiaverini
analystAll right. Next, I'd like to ask about other income. That figure came in above what was anticipated across the last 2 quarters, landing at $19 million during Q3 and $17 million in Q4. I'm just wondering what sort of level we should anticipate for this line going forward. I believe you said previously that Q1 might see a modest amount of seasonal softness, but would something in the low teens work as a reasonable run rate?
Mike Hagedorn
executiveYeah. Let me point you toward the correct slide. Here it is. If you look at Slide 5, the components are laid out there. The biggest piece sits at the bottom — that darker blue section, which represents swap income. As we mentioned during Q3, the overall volume of swaps completed struck us as unusually high, and it tapered somewhat in Q4, just as we noted. So my view is that any meaningful shift here would likely originate from that particular category, which has typically been running around $13 million to $15 million each quarter.
Rick Kraemer
executiveOkay, thanks to each of you for being here on this earnings conference call. We’re eager to talk with you once more in the next quarter.
Operator
operatorEveryone, that wraps up the call we held today. We appreciate your taking part. You're free to hang up at this point.
Read the full transcript via the API
You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Valley National Bancorp transcript — plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments, AI summaries and full-text search — through the EarningsCalls.dev API.
Get the API View API docs →This call discussed
For developers and AI pipelines
Programmatic access to Valley National Bancorp earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the
EarningsCalls.dev REST API. Plans from $39.99/month — full transcripts, speaker segments,
full-text search, and the recently-added /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.
More tools for stock research
OptionsBell: an unusual options activity scanner that tracks options flow across all US stocks and emails you when large trades appear in Valley National Bancorp or any ticker on your watchlist.
StockMarketScan: a stock screener with alerts: 24 pre-built screens refreshed every 5 minutes, watchlists and email notifications. Both offer API and MCP access and fair monthly pricing.