JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
July 14, 2020
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveThanks, operator. Morning, everyone. I'll walk you through the presentation — it's on our website as usual — and please check the disclaimer at the back. Beginning on page 1, we posted net income of $4.7 billion, earnings per share of $1.38, and revenue hit a record $33.8 billion, with a 9% return on tangible common equity. Those results include several significant items. To start, we built $8.9 billion in credit reserves, then there's roughly $700 million of gain in our bridge book plus $500 million of gains in credit adjustments and other — both of those reflect reversals of some losses from the first quarter. Even with the difficult and unpredictable conditions we're facing, the results for this quarter show once more how much we gain from having a platform that is both diversified and large in scale; let me highlight just a few things. CIB posted its best-ever quarterly revenue, with IB fees rising 54% and markets revenue climbing 79% compared with a year earlier, and both set records, with momentum seen everywhere. Consumer deposit growth reached a record 20%, an increase of more than $130 billion from the prior year, while average deposits across the firm stood at $1.9 trillion, roughly 25% higher year-on-year and 16% higher than the previous quarter. Average loans rose 4% both year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter, mostly driven by the loan growth tied to COVID that occurred in March. But if you look at where we ended the period, loans declined 4% from the prior quarter. That came from revolver paydowns and smaller balances in Card and Home Lending, though $28 billion of PPP loans partly made up for it. And finally, our CET1 ratio rose roughly 90 basis points this quarter, after we added about $9 billion of reserves and paid out close to $3 billion in common dividends. As you remember, we entered the second quarter following record-breaking business activity in March; over the next few pages, I'll bring you up to date on some of those key activity metrics we reviewed last quarter and tell you what we're seeing now. So let's move on to page two. Turning to wholesale first, at the top of the page: during the quarter, we witnessed unprecedented amounts of both debt and equity being issued. This happened as clients made purchases to retire most of what they had drawn on revolvers back in March, and they kept strengthening their liquidity positions while market conditions remained favorable, helped along by exceptional moves from central banks. The big wave of investment grade debt issuance that appeared in March carried over into the second quarter, and once high yield markets came back to life, U.S. issuance volumes rose 90% relative to the first quarter. Over in ECM, as markets recovered to where they stood before COVID, May and June combined gave us the two busiest months for equity issuance we have ever had, powered by converts and follow-ons. Now shifting to how consumers are spending, on the bottom left. Looking at how much people spent using debit and credit, the total is still below where it was, but it's been climbing steadily ever since hitting bottom during the second week of April, and by the final two weeks of June it was only 4% under the same period last year. Travel, entertainment, and eating out continued to see much weaker spending, even though there was a slight improvement, largely from more people going to restaurants. Retail gave us our largest improvement, as volume from cards used in person bounced back sharply over the back half of the quarter, while card-not-present volume grew solidly and without interruption throughout the quarter. More recently, however, the nationwide acceleration in overall sales has stopped rising, particularly in states seeing a growing number of cases as well as those seeing a shrinking number. The year-over-year declines continued to be more pronounced in states where restrictions remain partly in place, particularly across the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. Regarding consumer demand for credit, we saw similar recovery trends. In auto, loan and lease originations hit their lowest point since the financial crisis in April, but May and June brought a dramatic rebound, with June setting a record as the strongest month for auto originations in our company's history. And in Home Lending, after reaching a low in April, retail purchase applications had climbed by June to levels well above where they stood before COVID, reflecting a robust and broad-based market recovery. Continuing with the topic of how consumers are behaving, please turn to page three, where we'll share an update regarding our customer assistance programs. New requests for help fell substantially during the quarter relative to the peak levels observed in early April. At present, we have provided assistance to close to 1.7 million accounts, representing $79 billion in balances across both our owned and service portfolios, and within that group, a substantial share — just over 50% in both Card and Home Lending — have made at least one payment during their forbearance period. On the cards side, when we look at how early reenrollment has been going, just a modest share of our customers have made it through the first 90-day deferral window and arrived at their due date. Still, among that group, most picked their payments back up, and fewer than 20% of accounts asked for more help. Next, regarding Home Lending: among borrowers whose forbearance ended in June, the majority either received an extension because they asked for one or were automatically placed into fresh three-month forbearance plans, and roughly 40% of those extensions remain active. So although we're monitoring these figures carefully, we can't yet reach any firm conclusions. Turning now to page four, where there's additional information on our second-quarter performance: revenue came in at $33.8 billion, an increase of $4.3 billion, or 15%, compared with the same period a year earlier. Net interest income came in roughly $600 million lower, a 4% decline, due to falling rates—though that was largely made up for by stronger market NII and growth in the balance sheet. Meanwhile, non-interest revenue rose $4.9 billion, or 33%, mainly on the strength of CIB markets and IB fees. Expenses reached $16.9 billion, climbing about $700 million, or 4%, compared with a year earlier, driven by costs tied to revenue, with ongoing cuts to structural expenses providing a partial offset. Credit costs for the quarter totaled $10.5 billion, which included an $8.9 billion net reserve build and $1.6 billion in net charge-offs. Additional details on how those reserves were built can be found on page five. During this quarter, our net reserve build came to $8.9 billion, which broke down into $4.6 billion from wholesale and $4.4 billion from consumer, primarily card. When we raised reserves in the first quarter, the assumption was a downturn that would be severe yet short-lived, with a robust rebound arriving in the year's second half; and while recent weeks have brought some encouraging economic signals, there's still substantial uncertainty about the shape the recovery will take. Our revised base case appears at the bottom of that page, but remember that it represents just one of five scenarios feeding into our allowance for credit losses. This forecast is based on how those scenarios are likely to play out when weighted, and it bakes in a recession that drags on longer — GDP comes back at a slower pace, and joblessness remains above 10% until the midpoint of 2021. Obviously consumers take a hit, but on top of that, we expect this drawn-out slump to hit wholesale sectors in a much wider and deeper way than what showed up during Q1.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveBecause the macroeconomic picture has grown more uncertain, and because we don't know how customers will behave when it comes to paying what they owe, or what will happen with government stimulus and whether it ultimately works for consumers as well as wholesale clients, this quarter we placed considerably more emphasis on the downside case. As a result, we are ready for, and have set aside reserves against, conditions worse than the base case. And since CECL spans the entire life of a loan, should our assumptions come true, we would not anticipate any significant further reserve builds down the road. Turning now to the balance sheet and capital, on page six. We closed the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 12.4%, which sits more than 100 basis points above the new SCB base minimum of 11.3%. Briefly on SLR, though the ratio we reported is 6.8%, it's important to note that we will not lean on temporary relief, and absent that relief our ratio stands at 5.7%. As we stated in late June, absent any meaningful change, the Board plans to keep the $0.90 dividend for the third quarter. Because the range of possible outcomes ahead is so wide, I'd like to take a few minutes to explain why we feel comfortable making that statement, including the worth of our strong and steady earnings stream and the way we are managing capital through this crisis. So let's move to page seven. It might seem self-evident, yet it deserves restating: starting in 2018, our PPNR on a quarterly basis—which has averaged above $13 billion—has generated greater than 60 basis points of fresh CET1 capacity every quarter, even following substantial spending on our businesses. That highly effective earnings flow lets us expand the franchise and support our customers and clients at their moments of greatest need, and it gives us room to take on losses and restore capital rapidly during periods of stress. Although across the past two and a half years we have returned roughly 100% of cumulative earnings, sending out close to $75 billion in surplus capital, we are presently accumulating a considerable amount of capital after pausing our buybacks. We also think that our capital foundation stays solid even if conditions get much worse, as shown on page eight. As of right now, we hold $34 billion in reserves along with $191 billion of CET1 capital, and $16 billion of that amount exceeds what our regulatory buffers require. The 3.3% SCB works out to $51 billion in capital we could draw on to absorb stress whenever needed; beyond that, the 3.5% GSIB surcharge gives us an additional $54 billion, so that our $69 billion regulatory minimum is never breached. As you're aware, we plan and oversee our capital against multiple situations, including one labeled Extreme Adverse, which Jamie talked about in his shareholder letter earlier in the year. We've refreshed that analysis, and it now builds in a steeper GDP decline — almost 14% lower by the close of 2020 compared with the fourth quarter of 2019 — along with reported unemployment finishing the year at close to 22%. Under those circumstances as well, we estimate ending the year with a CET1 ratio above 10%, and the advanced approach would be the one applied to us. That puts our regulatory floor at 10.5%. We probably wouldn't choose to draw down any of our regulatory buffers on our own, yet under this scenario we'd have to, though it's notable that the amount would be small. Another point worth making: given how little the Fed has told us about its U and W scenarios, we think the path for the economy that our Extreme Adverse scenario models over the coming 12 months is even worse. And should we be mistaken about that and our losses come in at double, we still would not exhaust the full SCB.
Jamie Dimon
executiveJamie here. I want to expand on a few of those items. So we're presenting this scenario, and clearly it rests on plenty of assumptions we won't walk you through in much depth — the point is simply demonstrating our capacity to absorb another $20 billion in loan loss reserves. That $20 billion takes us into an Extreme Adverse case, which might roughly correspond to the Fed's U or W shape, and we'll be doing far more work on that, since clearly we have to be ready for it. We fall into advanced CET1, and that's a result of taking no actions. As I've consistently said, advanced capital is highly pro-cyclical. When downgrades occur, your RWA climbs sharply. The capital base barely moves, yet RWA climbs sharply; and there are plenty of steps we'd take that could prevent that outcome entirely. Another point I'd highlight: this Extreme Adverse scenario most likely can't unfold within a single quarter. It would play out across multiple quarters. We have a decent sense of what July looks like, along with August and so forth. So even if the economy begins drifting that direction, it'll take us a couple of quarters before you conclude there's a 100% possibility. Keep in mind, this means we now believe it's 100%. Naturally, things could deteriorate further, incidentally, but we're only attempting to demonstrate how much capital the Company actually holds. And the dividend — now I'm going to sound like I'm contradicting myself. I'm not. Alright? As of today, we have all that PPNR, all those earnings, everything. So it would be somewhat foolish to anticipate Extreme Adverse down the road and cut your dividend. Because we can readily weather extremely difficult periods and never cut the dividend. But if you land in something akin to Extreme Adverse, suddenly you're facing new scenarios that are even worse. You can't know. So at some point, the Board will weigh cutting the dividend, since conditions would essentially worsen further under Extreme Adverse and we want the ability to handle whatever comes our way. The Company's foremost priority is serving our clients, serving our community through thick and thin, and nobody should ever worry about JPMorgan Chase. So there's no intention of doing it; but should things turn truly bad — I mean, we use the words materially and significantly — that's something we ought to examine. Another point, incidentally: these loan losses represent our best estimate of loan losses, not the CCAR-style figures. All of you are producing estimates showing DFAST and Fed adverse. We will not move that kind of money on credit. Alright? And on the following page, Jen will walk through some material. I'll add a few brief remarks. Additionally, regarding what she mentioned about avoiding temporary buffers — I find the word "temporary" rather amusing when entering a crisis, since you might be able to rely on it briefly, yet it vanishes on March 1st or February 1st. So, from my perspective, nothing of that sort should be something we count on.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveAlso, regarding advanced RWA, let me bring Jamie in here. Looking at the slide, you'll notice a move from 13.1% down to 10.4%. Roughly fifty percent of that reflects growth in RWA, while the remaining half comes from the <<inaudible>>. Anyway, as Jamie mentioned, let's turn to page nine. All of this occurs within a capital framework that still leaves room for recalibration. We've discussed this for years, yet it may never have mattered more than now. I'll begin with CCAR, and Jamie already raised this point. However, it doesn't predict what we truly expect would occur; the global market shock is perhaps the clearest illustration. It represents a meaningful share of the SCB, and clearly we've seen a very different outcome in the first half of 2020. Thus, we still hold the view that chances exist to rationalize the capital framework as a whole, such as the GSIB points we've raised repeatedly; over time, these adjustments would encourage faster economic growth without undermining financial stability.
Jamie Dimon
executiveYes. Once more, I'd like to stress a few points. The purpose behind CCAR was demonstrating that banks are capable of weathering severe stress, if every possible thing goes wrong. What CCAR produces is not a projection of your actual future results. Every one of those tests essentially mirrors the global financial crisis, and under all of them we're shown losing somewhere in the range of $25 billion to $30 billion across the following nine quarters. Yet during those same nine quarters around Lehman, we earned $30 billion; not one quarter produced a loss for us. We respond, we broaden our businesses, we need multiple sources of earnings. And we don't oppose CCAR, since it shields you from the very worst scenarios imaginable. Still, it isn't really predictive. Take the global market shock, where I believe they assume $25 billion in counterparty losses. To put that in perspective, during ‘08 and ‘09, Fannie Mae went bankrupt, Freddie Mac went bankrupt, Bear Stearns was effectively gone, Lehman Bros. was effectively gone, AIG was effectively gone, and countless financial institutions across Europe failed, along with countless counterparty failures — yet our trading results across the two worst quarters combined came to a $4 billion loss, not $25 billion; and naturally that was recovered quickly, because as we've noted, when trading conditions deteriorate, spreads widen out, and suddenly you earn more from trading since you — plus you get recoveries on positions. So the 3.3% stress capital buffer doesn't reflect what we'd actually lose. And so — my hope is that over time, through genuine actions, we could bring that figure down toward roughly 2.5%. As for GSIB itself, I said earlier, I don't object to the idea of large banks and holding more capital; but GSIB is — it isn't the same as CCAR. CCAR factors in your diversification, your strength, your earnings, your PPNR, and similar items; GSIB doesn't. It's merely a size measure multiplied again and again and again. Diversification isn't in it. Margins aren't in it. Actions aren't in it. It isn't in it — it simply fails to represent the whole picture, though I'd call it something like a company's risk. And so, we hold sufficient capital to withstand a great deal, which is how we've always operated the Company, so we can cope during adverse periods, because in my short lifetime, I've witnessed crises again and again and again and again. We aren't forecasting them. We're simply ready for them. So, I'll stop there.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveAlright, thanks. Moving on to the segments now. We'll begin on page 10 with Consumer & Community Banking. CCB posted a net loss of $176 million, and that figure includes reserve builds totaling $4.6 billion. Revenue came in at $12.2 billion, which was a 9% decline compared to a year ago, primarily from deposit margin compression, reduced transaction activity, and customer relief, though strong deposit growth and Home Lending margin expansion partly made up for that. Deposit margin fell 108 basis points versus a year earlier amid a sharp drop in rates, yet deposit growth hit a record 20% year-on-year, rising more than $130 billion; our estimate is that roughly 50% of that growth is tied to COVID, reflecting government stimulus for consumers and small businesses, reduced consumer spending, and delayed tax payments. Mobile users rose 10% compared to a year ago. And since the pandemic began, we've observed higher levels of digital engagement; take quick deposit enrollment, which has risen to 2 times what it was before COVID. As I said earlier regarding consumer lending, overall activity this quarter reflected an environment that kept shifting. Auto loan and lease originations dropped 9% year-on-year because of the Mazda partnership exit. If you set that aside, auto originations were up in the mid-single-digits. And although conditions in the Home Lending market were favorable, total Home Lending originations slipped 1% from a year ago, as a decline in correspondent volume was largely offset by growth in retail volume. Overall CCB loans declined 7% year-on-year, with Home Lending down 14% from prior loan sales, and card down 7% on reduced spend, while business banking rose 59% thanks to PPP originations. Expenses totaled $6.6 billion, a 3% decrease, from lower travel-related benefit, structural, and marketing costs; finally, credit costs included that $4.6 billion in reserve builds I referenced, plus net charge-offs of $1.3 billion, mostly from card. Now let's turn to the Corporate & Investment Bank on page 11. CIB delivered net income of $5.5 billion and an ROE of 27% on revenue of $15.4 billion. Investment Banking revenue reached $3.4 billion, up 91% year-on-year, mostly from our strong capital markets performance and gains on our bridge book, which largely reflected better market conditions. IB fees this quarter set an all time record, rising 54% year-on-year. We held our number one rank and increased market share to 9.8% for the first half of the year. In advisory, we were up 15%, helped by the closing of several notable transactions. Underwriting fees climbed 55%. We kept our number one rank in overall wallet and are the leaders and lead left across leveraged finance; in equity underwriting, fees increased 93% and we gained roughly 200 basis points of share relative to the first quarter. On outlook, we expect third quarter IB fees to decline, both sequentially and year-on-year, because of the typical seasonal drop and fewer M&A announcements so far this year. Should the economy settle down, we'd anticipate capital markets returning to typical activity levels. Yet a prolonged stretch of turbulence might create more need for liquidity, which would in turn push capital markets activity higher. Turning to markets, revenue came to $9.7 billion in total, a 79% increase compared with a year earlier and a record for any period, powered by robust results across the quarter, and it wasn't until later in June that things started shifting back toward more typical levels; we experienced strength spanning products and regions for both flow training and sizable episodic deals. Although solid line activity carried over the theme from the first quarter, our market-making results this quarter gained from better market liquidity, and we managed to monetize flows more effectively. Fixed income rose 99% versus a year ago, or 120% once you adjust for last year's gain from the Tradeweb IPO, fueled by very busy primary and secondary markets across products, especially in macro. Equity climbed 38%, mostly on the back of robust client activity in equity derivatives and cash. Looking ahead, we anticipate the deceleration we first noticed near the end of June will persist. On top of that, last year's second half was quite strong, which makes any year-over-year comparison tough; but clearly, this environment renders forecasting markets performance harder than it normally would be. Wholesale payments revenue reached $1.4 billion, a 3% decline versus a year earlier, mainly because of our reporting reclassification and merchant services. Security services revenue came in at $1.1 billion, up 5% from a year ago, since sustained elevated volatility during the second quarter pushed up transaction volume and raised average deposit balances. Credit adjustments and other showed a gain of $510 million, as I noted at the start, thanks to tightening of funding spent on derivatives, and it partially reversed the first-quarter losses. Expenses totaled $6.8 billion, 19% higher than the prior year, on account of revenue-related expenses. Lastly, credit cost of $2 billion mirrors the net reserve build I mentioned earlier. Now let's turn to Commercial Banking on page 12. Commercial Banking posted a net loss of $691 million, which encompassed a reserve build of roughly $2.4 billion. Revenue of $2.4 billion rose 5% versus a year ago, lifted by greater deposits and loans plus an equity investment gain and more investment banking revenue, mostly offset by reduced deposit NII. Record gross investment banking revenues of $851 million climbed 44% compared with a year earlier, reflecting more bonds and equity underwriting activity. Expenses of $899 million fell 3% versus a year ago, on lower structural expenses. Deposits of $237 billion increased 41% from a year earlier, since the rise in balances starting in March has mostly stayed on our balance sheet while clients seek to remain liquid in this environment. End of period loans grew 7% versus a year ago but slipped 4% from the prior quarter. C&I loans dropped 7% quarter-over-quarter as revolver utilization, though still elevated, has fallen considerably from the record highs in March; however, the impact of PPP loans partly offsets this. Commercial real estate loans came in level, with originations generally softer across both commercial term lending and real estate banking. Within credit costs of $2.4 billion, you had the reserve build I referenced a moment ago plus $79 million in net charge-offs, and oil and gas accounted for about half of those. Moving now to Asset & Wealth Management, which starts on page 13. That segment posted net income of $658 million, with a 24% pretax margin and a 24% ROE. Quarterly revenue reached $3.6 billion, a 1% increase versus a year earlier, as gains from higher average deposit and loan balances and stronger brokerage activity were mostly canceled out by deposit margin compression. Expenses totaled $2.5 billion, 3% below the prior year, reflecting reduced structural costs along with lower volume- and revenue-related expenses, partly offset by ongoing investment in advisors. Credit costs came to $223 million, attributable to the reserve builds I noted earlier; during the quarter, net long-term inflows hit $29 billion, positive in every channel and every region, with fixed income and equity leading the way. Meanwhile, net liquidity inflows reached $95 billion, which made us the top institutional money manager in the world. AUM stood at $2.5 trillion, and total client assets were $3.4 trillion, rising 15% and 12% respectively from a year ago, fueled by cumulative net inflows into liquidity and long-term products. Last, deposits climbed 20% year-over-year on growth in interest-bearing products, while loans rose 12% on strength in both wholesale and mortgage lending. Turning next to corporate on page 14. Corporate posted a net loss of $568 million. Revenue was negative $754 million, a decline of $1.1 billion from a year earlier, caused by reduced interest income from lower rates, including the effect of faster prepayments on mortgage securities. And expenses of $147 million were $85 million lower than the prior year. Now let's go to page 15 for the outlook. As you can see, even with an uncertain environment, our newest full-year outlook is largely consistent with what we guided previously. Given the latest insights, we anticipate net interest income of roughly $56 billion and adjusted expenses of roughly $65 billion, a touch above what we expected before, which mirrors the outperformance in the second quarter and will ultimately depend on how we perform in the back half of the year. So, in closing, amid an unprecedented environment, our second quarter results underscored the advantages of our diversification and scale along with the earnings power they generate for our company. Although the range of possible outcomes is wider than ever, our priorities haven't changed. We're focused on supporting our employees, customers, clients and communities around the globe, and on being good stewards of the capital entrusted to us by our shareholders. I want to finish by thanking everyone who continues to serve on the frontlines of this crisis and our people here at JPMorgan Chase, whose unwavering fortitude and dedication have shone through during these times. With that, operator, please open the line for Q&A.
John McDonald
analystMorning, Jen and Jamie. Jen, I was hoping you might share a bit more detail about the commercial exposures you have to industries hit hard by COVID, both in CRE and C&I — so I'm thinking energy, tourism, and retail — just so we can get a sense of where the added commercial reserves this quarter were pointed.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveAbsolutely; to begin, the sectors facing the greatest impact, such as those you listed, make up roughly one third of our total exposure. Over 50% of that portion is investment grade, and of the portion that isn't investment grade, two thirds carries security. As for downgrades in the second quarter, well, to start, during the first quarter, when our view was of a steep yet brief slump, our attention was heavily concentrated on the sectors facing the greatest impact. Now, with our outlook shifted toward a downturn that drags on longer, our reserves reflect a far wider-ranging effect spanning many sectors. To illustrate, of the reserve build in the second quarter, roughly 40% sits within the sectors facing the greatest impact, compared with two thirds of the builds in the first quarter coming from those same sectors; and as for the downgrades recorded in the second quarter, fewer than one third occurred within the sectors facing the greatest impact.
John McDonald
analystAnd when you say most impacted sectors, which ones are you counting in that?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveConsumer and retail, oil and gas, real estate, retail and lodging — plus sub-sectors, when you consider real estate.
John McDonald
analystAll right, one more quick follow-up. You kept the full-year NII guidance unchanged even though net interest margin fell quite a bit. Could you walk through what's baked into that second-half NII view, and also how trading-related NII factors into it?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveYeah, that's a good question. You've got it exactly right — markets activity does support NII. So stronger results in markets lift NII, though they can weigh on NIM, simply because that NIM sits under the average; so yes, holding that guidance steady was partly tied to markets doing better. Correct.
Betsy Graseck
analystHello, and good morning. Thank you. Jennifer, to begin with a question, on page three you covered quite a bit of information regarding the forbearance you've received and the share of customers who have made at least one payment while in the deferral period. Could you help us understand, for the various asset classes you laid out in your base case, what you expect those delinquencies to ultimately become?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveI won't get into specifics, but I'll mention a few points, which is that it's still too soon to draw many conclusions from what we're observing. Visibility remains limited, I'd say, because of all the support that exists out there; however, you're correct that we view these customers as higher risk, since they're enrolled in a forbearance program; therefore, we factored that in when we considered our reserves.
Betsy Graseck
analystAll right. So what I'm getting at is this: if you flip that rightmost column, one could interpret it as the delinquencies that ought to be anticipated down the road. And as a follow-up, I want to ask — you said in the prepared remarks that assuming your expectations pan out, you'd essentially be near fully reserved for the cycle. Could you maybe help us understand which expectations those are? Because I realize you're anticipating a result that's worse than your base, so I got somewhat puzzled regarding what I ought to treat as your base case and which expectations you're referring to when you say that if they come true, your reserving is finished.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveSure. Let me begin by saying that because, as I noted earlier, we still don't have much visibility, there are a lot of assumptions in play. Those include assumptions about where the economy is headed — and I'll come back to that — assumptions about how people will act when they're making payments, and assumptions about stimulus as well. So, coming back to where the economy is headed, we've laid out 5 separate scenarios. Compared with what we'd have done under other circumstances, we tilted more toward the downside scenarios. The Fed itself has given the same weight to downside scenarios as to its base case. So we definitely felt that adopting a conservative bias there was the sensible approach. So if you turn your attention to slide five, what's shown there is only the baseline scenario. In that version, you'll notice the rate comes in at slightly below 11% as this year wraps up. Then, once you factor in the weighted result for joblessness across all five scenarios, what we get is unemployment in the double digits throughout the opening six months of 2021 — which differs from what's presented on page five. That page reflects only the baseline case, and it indicates a degree of easing compared with the fourth quarter, landing at a touch under 8% as 2021 comes to a close.
Jamie Dimon
executiveBetsy, to be clear about what I just said, the base case is essentially what you'd get if you used the projections from Morgan Stanley, from Mike Feroli, from JP Morgan, or from the Fed for their base case. Wrapped into that are all of those assumptions regarding the stimulus and P2P and everything along those lines. So that's the base case, and we've set aside more than that. As a result, should the base case play out, we might have reserved too much. My hope is that the base case does happen.
Jim Mitchell
analystPerhaps a brief additional question regarding the consumer and delinquencies. Clearly, you experienced an effect from deferral programs and delinquencies — in fact, 30-day delinquencies actually decreased. Could you discuss what you are observing in the non-deferral programs? It does not appear that we are witnessing much stress whatsoever, even when it comes to early stage delinquencies. To what would you ascribe that? What are you observing is your non-deferral programs?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveI mean, plainly I would ascribe that to the quantity of support that exists in the form of stimulus. And so, as I stated, the visibility regarding what we are confronting is extremely, extremely low, since we are not currently seeing what one would normally anticipate seeing, given a recession; and so, the manner in which we must consider reserving is entirely about the outlook, because we are not in fact seeing it today. And so, Jamie has stated this on many occasions, May and June will turn out to be the easy bumps when it comes to its recovery. And now we are truly reaching the moment of truth, I believe in the months ahead.
Jamie Dimon
executiveRight. And to build on that, during a typical downturn you'd see joblessness rise, missed payments rise, charge-offs rise, and housing values fall. Not one of those things is happening now. Wages decline, savings decline. Here, savings have climbed, wages have climbed, housing values have climbed. So the impact of this downturn will show up. It won't appear immediately, given all the stimulus and the reality that 60% or 70% of those out of work are earning more than they did while employed. It's simply a very strange period.
Jim Mitchell
analystPerhaps I could ask something else about DFAST. Jamie, you said some things regarding the market shock. We experienced something like a market shock, and everybody's trading came through pretty nicely. Do you think that will shift how the Fed sees stress losses in the trading book as time goes on, or do you feel that perspective isn't too hopeful?
Jamie Dimon
executiveMy expectation is nothing will change; and as I mentioned, they aren't — what they're doing is checking that a bank is able to handle the bad scenario — as though every one of them were the worst bank. They don't extend credit to banks for favorable, positive outcomes. So that idea isn't something I oppose. I simply want to ask, if things turn really ugly and you get everything completely wrong, what becomes of your trading or something along those lines? And they apply identical assumptions, such as outflows. The outflows they use for liquidity exceed those of the worst bank during the worst crisis. But their aim is simply to confirm that each bank is able to handle that.
Brian Kleinhanzl
analystAbsolutely. Thank you. A fast question regarding the balance sheet. Clearly, we saw huge growth there as liquidity accumulated during the quarter. But how should we view this moving forward? Do we expect it to unwind across the coming couple of quarters? Is it something more lasting that will remain, meaning you'll simply run a significantly bigger balance sheet for the near term?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveLet me begin with deposits. In Q1, this was largely a wholesale narrative. We indicated we anticipated a return to normal, and that is what has occurred. We began observing it; so, going forward on wholesale, I believe there are pluses and minuses. Revolvers will keep paying down, security services will probably keep returning to normal. I'd say tailwinds for deposits — Fed balance sheet expansion — will be slower yet persist; and we do believe organic growth will keep coming. On the consumer side, likely lower from here because of tax payments plus the rise in consumer spending; but in either case, I think we'll keep seeing extremely strong year-over-year growth, for both wholesale and consumer in the back half of this year. Then, regarding balance sheet management, we oversee the balance sheet along several dimensions, NII, liquidity, capital and interest rate risk; and so, we've had $400 billion of deposit growth since the end of last year. And when you factor in, as you're aware, that a portion of that growth is probably temporary and deployment opportunities have shrunk, given the rate environment, we've kept a decent amount of that in cash. Still, we did add roughly $88 billion in securities in Q2 and on the deposit side, we've been very-disciplined on a pay rates.
Brian Kleinhanzl
analystSo if we take it that those deposits have gone up, should we expect a bigger portion moving away from deposits on the asset side and over into securities? And is your plan to deploy them to support lending?
Jamie Dimon
executiveOnce the Fed grows its balance sheet, the end result is that it shows up in deposits. And for the most part, a sizable chunk of deposits is going to be securities. The reason is that loan growth usually moves toward recession and doesn't climb very much, with revenue of $16.4 billion.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveAs consumer spending bounces back, we ought to see a bit of expansion in cards, which will provide some support, though PPP will begin to be paid down, and, as Jamie mentioned, there will be loan growth, just somewhat slower.
Jamie Dimon
executiveLet me draw attention to the scale of these figures. Altogether, we hold more than $1 trillion, split among funds kept with central banks — roughly $400 billion to $500 billion — Treasury holdings of approximately $700 billion, plus other highly liquid instruments, largely high-quality securities, adding up to $1 trillion. When people assess how safe and sound an institution of this kind is, that represents an enormous amount of money. A portion of it is mandatory — we must maintain substantial liquidity — yet part of it simply reflects our conservative approach to investing.
Brian Kleinhanzl
analystThank you.
Matt O'Connor
analystMorning. I wanted to ask whether you might discuss a little the timing we should expect for when some charge-off begins to appear. Clearly, there's a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the stimulus and the forbearance, but what assumptions do you hold regarding when charge-offs begin rising, potentially where they reach their peak, and how long they stay at that level?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveThat's genuinely hard to determine. I mean, initially, we need to begin observing delinquencies. And so later this year — but next year will be far heavier on charge-off, when you consider realizing the assumptions that we've made in the reserves; it's very — it's difficult to know. The positive aspect is CECL is life of loan. So, we feel well covered for the scenarios that we're looking at.
Matt O'Connor
analystAlso, give us a refresher — you're noticing a bit of an uptick in nonperforming assets. Sure, that's from a low base, but the numbers are beginning to rise; and walk us through why that hasn't yet begun to show up in net charge-offs, or whether it's simply a matter of timing and will appear in the coming 1 or 2 quarters?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveRight. If you examine that rise in non-accruals within wholesale, 1 client accounts for half of it. So honestly — I wouldn't read anything into it. And like you mentioned, it's ticking up from a really low point; so once more, we still aren't witnessing what you'd anticipate seeing when it comes to recessionary signals.
Mike Mayo
analystHello. I'd like to follow up regarding that reserves issue. Therefore, assuming the Fed's central scenario comes to pass, you'd be holding more reserves than necessary. Should your own central scenario...
Jamie Dimon
executiveOur hope is that we've set aside too much…
Mike Mayo
analystAnd assuming those more cautious baseline projections come true, fine, you've finished adding to reserves. Should things turn out worse, more reserves will be needed. Yet from the time the quarter closed, we've been watching COVID infections rise across Florida, Texas, California, and other places; and doesn't a connection exist between rising COVID cases, fatalities, and economic activity, or what's your thinking there? And I'm looking at slide two, and that debit and credit card sales volume keeps grabbing my attention. And it appears to be leveling out in June. So, from when the quarter ended, first, if you were to sort of mark-to-market your view right now given what's going on, do you feel better, worse or the same compared with the quarter's end, when it comes to your assumptions?
Jamie Dimon
executiveOur feeling right now is identical to what it was when the quarter closed — that's essentially mark to market. And Mike, one thing is crystal clear. The future can't be forecast by us. We have no idea. Another thing that's crystal clear is — at least in my view, I believe you'll face a far murkier economic landscape ahead than what existed in May and June, and that — preparation is essential. There will be plenty of ups and downs. Fear about COVID will grip people. Fear will grip them regarding the economy, small businesses, the companies, bankruptcies, emerging markets. So it's simply going to be murky, which explains why, when you examine the base case, adverse and extreme adverse case, every one of them is possible. And the probabilities attached to those things are just guesses on our part. That's what we're doing; the worst case is what we're ready for. We have no knowledge. I doubt anyone has knowledge. And this — the term unprecedented is seldom applied correctly. This time, correctly is how it's been applied. What's happening across the globe is unprecedented. Clearly, COVID itself is a leading factor. So, the Fed's W case, they were quite explicit. Their W case holds that COVID returns massively in the fall, and the economy must be shut down once more. And clearly, care is required on our part. That probability is unknown to us; we truly don't know, and incidentally, guessing wastes our time.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveAlso, Mike, let me just make clear that what we've set aside is meant for a situation worse than our base case. Given everything you mentioned, those factors shaped how we decided to put a little more weight on the downside scenarios. So even though there's perhaps — we'd like to think — a conservative tilt here, this is genuinely our best estimate drawing on all the information we have, and that does take in the kind of slowdown you brought up regarding more recent activities.
Mike Mayo
analystMy next question is sort of the other side of that. Through this extremely tough stretch, your deposit growth during the last 12 months has matched the number five bank in the country. The increase in deposits is honestly extraordinary. You noted that 50% of it comes from COVID. Is the remaining 50% then the result of share gains? I suppose that packs in a few questions. How much of it ties to digital banking, and how much do you think will disappear after this crisis ends?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveI already touched on how we view deposits going forward. Let me also be clear: when we cited 50% as COVID-related, we meant that on the consumer side. We believe a portion of that will go away as tax payments and consumer spending return. As for how much reflects share gain, that's hard to determine. Historically, we've done well when rates are lower. I agree with you — I think it's due to our digital capabilities, our branch footprint, our people, and everything we offer that sets us apart during a time like this.
Erika Najarian
analystFirst up, a question for Jamie. A great deal of feedback from investors shows they take encouragement from the fact that banks are able to stay profitable even while taking on pretty sizable provisions, which you demonstrated today, yet they're wary of bank equities because of the looming DFAST resubmissions in Q4 and what those might mean for the dividend. And, I suppose — I realize you touched on this during your prepared remarks, but I'm curious: in the scenario you foresee unfolding, and measured against that 60 basis points of CTE1 generation each quarter, how do you see dividend sustainability holding up outside of the Extreme Adverse case?
Jamie Dimon
executiveIt's entirely sustainable. And should we find ourselves in the Extreme Adverse case, the Board should and will weigh cutting it. As I noted, the Extreme Adverse case on its own remains fully sustainable with the dividend intact. The rationale for weighing a reduction is that once unemployment reaches something like 14% or 15%, the future becomes unknowable; so at that point you'd be facing yet another Extreme Adverse case, one with 20% unemployment. And so, to shield yourself against that, trimming the dividend amounts to inexpensive equity. Thus, the aim is to keep the dividends going. You can examine the figures. It's utterly tiny on a quarter-over-quarter basis. So, this choice could be taken as you move into these situations. And all of us are hoping the base case materializes.
Erika Najarian
analystAnd then, to add one more thing quickly, this is also something we heard from investors: when it comes to the Extreme Adverse scenario, would you rather trim the dividend, or would a temporary suspension be preferred, or do those two options differ at all?
Jamie Dimon
executiveThose two options do not differ at all. Your dividend gets cut. Ideally, you restore it once conditions allow. So a temporary suspension — that phrase just sounds odd. It is a suspension. Twice in my life I have done exactly that; it is a sensible move; and should that capital be needed down the road, you might imagine you'll run into something awful along those lines; so then, here's the other point, and you can pose a different question. Should the base case play out, we will wind up generating way more capital than we need. And we'll resume repurchasing shares, which I'm hoping we can pull off before the price climbs a great deal.
Jamie Dimon
executiveOur current outlook doesn't include that for this year. Still, for Q4, I wouldn't entirely dismiss the possibility.
Glenn Schorr
analystHi there. I've got a question for you. So, the broader markets saw a significant rally, and that has generated a substantial amount of revenue. But, considering the outlook regarding the uncertain past that we have discussed throughout this entire period, I'm interested in how you might consider potentially reducing risk on the balance sheet. Now, part of that is simply the fact that this massive liquidity accumulation itself represents a less risky balance sheet. I understand that. But, are there steps you could take proactively to lower high leverage RWA in a setting that is more stressed? Has selling into this recovery been happening — that's essentially what I'm asking?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveI suppose there are 2 parts to that, which would be the Investment Securities portfolio and then proactive actions we might take regarding RWA, if that addresses what you're asking. Glenn, I'll begin with Investment Securities. We are taking a cautious approach. And we have, when opportunities arose, sought to lower credit exposure in that area during the second quarter. And then, when it comes to RWA, we are — since we are getting ready for a variety of outcomes, we are devoting considerable time to considering what we might do if it became necessary. But, it is kind of a final option because we definitely don't want to create any effect on clients and customers. And so, we are prepared — we are examining it. However, we haven't taken any action that I would describe as proactive up to this point. Our focus is very much on assisting clients and customers in getting through this crisis.
Jamie Dimon
executiveAlright, I'll put it this way: when it comes to consumers, we've been tightening credit standards prudently, just as other banks have done — that's already taken place — and sure, additional steps are possible. But Jen, you shared some impressive figures showing how solid credit quality is. I believe the — go ahead and share those FICO numbers you mentioned to me recently. And also, just how much stronger Home Lending is…
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveOh! That was — that relates to LTV, the weighted average LTV. I mean, it's truly remarkable. And I used to work in mortgage, so I ought to have kept that in mind, but I did need to check; and back in 2010, the weighted average LTV for our portfolio in Home Lending came to 90%, and today it stands at 56%.
Jamie Dimon
executiveSo you can figure that things look stronger in credit cards, and they look stronger in auto as well. Our subprime exposure is smaller. That covers the consumer side. When it comes to lending — on the commercial side, we've consistently been cautious. We're always extremely disciplined and meticulous, that sort of thing. Typically in downturns like the one we're in, people become a bit — more focused on collateral and the leadership group and how quickly they respond and bringing in capital. So many of these firms have brought in quite a bit of capital. Turning to the investment side, and this is again somewhat of an accounting quirk, we actually have the ability to make it more conservative by placing securities into held to maturity, which we've done very little of and I'm going to think about — personally, I don't get why that lowers risk, but it does bring down your SCB. And perhaps we'll do that as time goes on. But the security portfolios are fairly cautious. There are — and in trading it happens daily; so trading is — just picture trading as Daniel, and Troy Rohrbaugh and Jason Sippel and the entire team, they're each and every day handling those risks and those exposures. And you can figure that they're handling them very, very well and tightly right now. And we definitely aren't swinging for the fences or anything of that sort. We're attempting to be extremely careful and serve our clients. And so, yes, you are more conservative. And bringing down RWA, yes, we can, if we chose to, we could begin doing that through all these different measures.
Glenn Schorr
analystThanks. A quick question about the consumer side. I'm wondering whether you have — at this point we are 4 months into the biggest part of the lockdown in the United States, and a number of your branches have been either shut or drive-up only, and we're seeing your deposits expand like a weed. So I'm wondering whether you've picked up any lessons that could alter your thinking about the branch network, about your organic growth efforts as we move ahead and eventually emerge from this?
Jamie Dimon
executiveYes. So, on the deposit figure — deposits rose along with the PPP. Deposits rose as a result of the payroll checks that people received. Deposits rose — the revolvers are drawn down by $50 billion, roughly that; and naturally all of that has already been reversed and so on. So, you need to consider both sides of that. But, you were about to say something, Jen?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveI wanted to jump in as well — naturally, there's a great deal we're picking up. I mean, I brought up the fast deposit enrollment; even so, what we've gathered isn't sufficient to justify altering our approach to expanding branches. As a matter of fact, we've just launched branch number 100 as part of market expansion. So that's something we're genuinely thrilled about. Our expectation is that we'll likely add around 75 more during this year. That puts us at close to the halfway mark toward the 400 branches we discussed in market expansion; and so, time will tell — we do have — there remain roughly 1,000 branches that are shut. It's conceivable we discover something that prompts us to consider speeding up de-densification or consolidation, though any such effect would be marginal. And we won't rush into any major shifts, since we want to be certain we gain the advantage over time from observing how our customers behave. That way, they can truly be the ones shaping our strategy.
Charles Peabody
analystMorning, and thanks. I have a couple of things. First, on page 6, you show the SLR ratio with the temporary capital relief programs factored in. I was curious whether you also have a comparable CET1 figure. And within that same question, once we get to next March, which of those ratios would be the tighter one?
Jamie Dimon
executiveCET1 has no temporary relief in it.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveRegarding CET1, that is the sole item — and I wouldn't even describe it as relief. There is a gradual introduction when it comes to CET1, though it occurs across a great many years. Therefore, I don't really view that as something temporary, the way SLR is. As for SLR right now, it is indeed temporary, set to run out during the first quarter of next year, and that's precisely why we are intensely focused on handling it absent those exclusions.
Jamie Dimon
executiveAnd those are two separate things, and we handle both of them. So I wouldn't claim that one outweighs the other. We oversee roughly 20 distinct capital liquidity ratios.
Charles Peabody
analystJamie, today FSOC is holding a closed-door meeting. From what I gather, two subjects are on the table. The first concerns liquidity in the secondary mortgage market, and the second involves the COVID stress test overlay. Any thoughts or insights on what might be under discussion for either one?
Jamie Dimon
executiveNothing specific. On COVID — clearly we have some perspective there. With COVID, we're obviously going to conduct a fresh stress test, and we'll examine every step case, UW and similar items, since they spelled it out, and it's completely sensible that folks would point to that sort of stress test. The mortgage markets, though, strike me as a separate matter. Right? And our position has been unwavering that mortgages, strange as it may sound, cost far more than they ought to. Ordinarily, you'd look at — take the 10-year rate at 60 basis points, and the mortgage sits at roughly 1.6% or 1.8%, rather than 3.3%. The explanation for this is that servicing and origination expenses run so high, and naturally that gets passed along. It's elevated because a huge volume of rules and regulations has been imposed, and many of them don't produce safety and soundness. Safety and soundness really means 80% LTV, confirmed borrower incomes, making certain you do the proper things. And the second factor is that there's essentially no securitization market. That market matters because it lowers your risk-weighted asset and creates greater incentive for banks to hold loans on their balance sheet; plus securitization genuinely transfers risk to another party. So my view is they ought to alter that. They ought to alter it right now. Non-agency mortgages would be the ones to benefit, and those are even more — considerably pricier than agency mortgages. So once a securitization market exists that people have confidence in, and you need to tweak Reg A, B somewhat, then you get a much healthier market, mortgage costs will decline, and they'll decline especially for those at the lower end. I mean, this ought to be phased, and phased straight away.
Saul Martinez
analystThere's something bigger I'd like to ask about, and I'm hoping to hear how each of you sees public policy and banks, going a bit wider than what we discussed regarding stress testing and capital planning. Banks, I realize, are putting in serious effort so that this time around they're contributing to the answer rather than adding to the trouble. That said, conversations are opening up more these days around social justice and inequality, and honestly, those talks are well past due in my view. My concern, though, is this: whether it's deserved or not, banks seem to be cast as standing on the wrong side of several of those matters. You can spot it in how the mainstream press portrays the large banks around PPP and similar topics. So I'm simply wondering — does it worry any of you that populist, anti-bank measures might gather momentum, define them however you like, be it rate capture, directed lending, splitting the banks apart, or anything else, given how polarized politics has become? Or is my alarm excessive, my worry misplaced about things that probably won't happen here? Really, I'd just like your read in general, plus where banks sit within the wider political and policy landscape.
Jamie Dimon
executiveWhat you must do each and every day when you show up at work is act correctly, for the correct reason, and look after your customers — that's what we aim for. We put a lot of effort into looking after our staff, into developing people, and we put a lot of effort into bringing Black leaders forward within the company, in finance, and elsewhere. Naturally, we get things wrong sometimes. So I can grasp where some of that frustration comes from. Even so, our aim is to give it our best. We engage on policy matters, such as this mortgage issue, that would leave Americans better off. And we get it — folks expect banks to pitch in for America, and that's what we do. Staying a sound, strong bank all the way through this crisis and keeping on serving our customers is the single most crucial thing we can possibly do. Keep in mind, lending responsibly means lending well. Lending irresponsibly means lending badly. Quite often, then, we're told banks ought to be doing additional work of that sort. No — doing irresponsible things is irresponsible. The results of that will be poor. That's roughly what took place the previous time. So our aim is to get it right, and our aim is to pay close attention whenever criticism comes, and at times — frequently with good reason — about what we might have handled better, ought to handle better, or will attempt to handle better going forward.
Saul Martinez
analystAll right, that's useful. Even though that was such a wide-ranging thing to ask, for Jen I'll make this one quite specific, about your NII outlook. My assumption is that it factors in income from PPP fees on loans that won't be forgiven; and have you put a number on that, or estimated the size, in terms of how large you expect those amounts might be?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveWell, on PPP our position has been quite plain: making a profit off PPP isn't our aim. That isn't to say you won't run into a few geographic wrinkles. So revenue will come in, expenses will come in too, and profit ends up at essentially nothing; the figure is insignificant in this quarter, since those fees get recorded across the terms of the loans. So this quarter it's minimal, on both the revenue side and the expense side; and going forward, you'll see — we'll likely see more of it during Q3 and Q4. Once again, the bottom line stays at zero. And in the bigger picture, even the gross amounts won't amount to much.
Gerard Cassidy
analystCould you walk us through that wholesale portfolio reclassification you brought up? How frequently do you carry out that review process, the one where corporate loans have to be examined for possible reclassification? Then, secondly, earlier in response to a question, you mentioned certain COVID-related sectors getting hit by the current situation. Could you point out for us which part of that COVID group you referenced is under the most stress?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveSure — regarding the reclassification first, we said it stemmed from a geography matter within Merchant Services. However, it wasn't necessary to…
Jamie Dimon
executiveThere was no reclassification of wholesale loans.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveYeah, and when it comes to who's been hit hardest, I mean, these are the folks you'd anticipate finding in travel, oil and gas, real estate, and retail. So it's those industries you'd figure on. Even so, like I mentioned before, and it's worth pointing out that with regard to the downgrades we saw during the second quarter, fewer than one-third of them fell within the most impacted industry. So honestly, this is — we view it as being far more broad-based.
Gerard Cassidy
analystAll right. Thanks. Moving to my second point — I might have overlooked this, and I do apologize — but on slide 3 of your deck, you provided quite thorough specifics regarding forbearance within the consumer portfolio. Can you share any figures for the commercial and corporate books, for loans that could be under forbearance? And does that skew more toward commercial real estate or C&I?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveThose figures simply aren't material. If they had been, we'd have put them in. So I'll return to what we've already stated: we simply aren't observing what you'd normally expect to observe.
Jamie Dimon
executiveBut eventually they land in the non-performing bucket.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveThey do end up classified as non-performing.
Jamie Dimon
executiveIn wholesale or commercial, there isn't a category the way there is in consumer.
Ken Usdin
analystThank you, and good morning. I wanted to ask about something you brought up in the slides — the capital discussion and those longer-term chances to recalibrate. To start, do you expect any conversation with the Fed regarding that 3.3 SCB, the way some other banks have referenced? And second, where do you see things landing on the GSIB recalibration, given what you said about systemic risk and how it shouldn't affect a bank's balance sheet?
Jamie Dimon
executiveGoing back to the Fed about the 3.3% isn't something we plan to do, though naturally we're examining the reasoning behind that 3.3% and we might tweak our forward plans so that figure comes down somewhat. Another CCAR is only a couple of months away, so doing extensive work makes no sense when we could simply address what's already in place. On GSIB — my long-held view is that substantial recalibration was needed there. Still, certain items should already have been recalibrated, namely America being gold plated, which strikes me as entirely needless; cash, treasury, and plenty of other items ought to have been removed from the calculation. Clearly it climbs a great deal whenever the Fed takes actions such as those recently, and no adjustment was ever made for economic growth or expansion of the shadow banking system, even though that was the intent. So my hope is that eventually they get around to it. Unfortunately these matters become deeply entangled in politics. Extremely complex calculations get politicized, which I found somewhat odd and amusing. My position, though, is that when they run the numbers, they ought to run them correctly. And at this point, they simply aren't correct.
Ken Usdin
analystYes, and for my second question, I'd like to return to slide 3. On that page, you show the percentage of accounts. Auto appears to be the largest. Then, in the page 13 supplement, the balances suggest a higher percentage for deferrals. Could you discuss the reasons for those discrepancies a bit, and then explain why you believe more accounts are deferring in auto compared with other asset classes? Thank you.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveOkay. Honestly, I don't have the answer for how to reconcile slide 3 with the supplement. So Jason and his team can get back to you on that.
Ken Usdin
analystThen perhaps you could just say something regarding auto and deferrals — what's your sense of what's showing up among those customers compared with others? And does that, in your view, signal anything different when it comes to credit trends going forward?
Jamie Dimon
executiveNo.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveNo, yeah.
Chris Kotowski
analystMorning, and thanks. I suppose my view is that this was a really remarkable quarter when it comes to raising capital. According to Dealogic, more than $2 trillion in debt and equity was raised during the quarter. So I have a question with two parts about that. First, when you look at it, was a sizable chunk of it in the sort of stressed segments, and presumably capital ranking below your bank debt? And how much has all of that contributed to improving the quality of bank loans? And then, secondly, looking forward, did basically every business that required capital and could secure it in Q2 get it done — meaning we're likely in for a fairly flat stretch from here — or do you think many of these companies will still need to continue raising money on an ongoing basis?
Jamie Dimon
executiveI'd say, first of all, this is happening across the board. What I mean is, you saw solid companies and less solid ones, and the high-yield markets became accessible. I'd put converts in there too, along with equity. A great deal of capital was raised by a lot of players. In my view, that was a smart move. A lot of folks mentioned, I believe, that they had already secured funding in advance for many of their capital requirements, ensuring they could navigate whatever this crisis might bring for their business, their sector, and so forth. So my sense is it won't resemble the earlier situation—it will certainly decline—but I still believe certain companies will have a chance to raise some of that money ahead of time. However, that's precisely what it is: getting funds early, since this isn't capital—much of this money isn't being gathered in order to be spent. Instead, it's being collected so it can remain on the balance sheet, keeping you ready for whatever may lie ahead. You've probably heard plenty of businesses say things like this, and you'll need to work through it on your own: we have enough money to last two years, or enough to last three years, or enough to — folks simply want to be ready. In my view, that's the right approach.
Chris Kotowski
analystAlright, that's all from my side. Thanks.
Jamie Dimon
executiveHowever, simply to help with your models, we aren't anticipating revenues in Investment Banking — those are going to normalize, or perhaps even drop under normal in the upcoming quarter and in quarters beyond. At some point, we can't forecast on a monthly basis precisely, and as for trading, since nobody else is doing it, reduce it by half, reduce it by half; and that is likely going to be nearer to what lies ahead than if you claim it will remain at twice its typical level.
Andrew Lim
analystThanks for taking my questions; I think these are pretty straightforward. I was just hoping for some clarity on what CECL provisioning actually involves. And clearly, you've set aside some very large provisions using assumptions that are much more conservative. But by its very design, CECL provisioning should mean that in the third quarter, assuming your assumptions hold steady, your provisions ought to drop quite a lot relative to the second quarter, back to a far more typical level. I just wanted to hear how you're thinking about that for the third quarter?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveSure. I'd begin by saying that where we stand today, even though there's a conservative tilt to that position, it represents our best estimate of what we're up against. We certainly hope that down the road we'll look back at this and see it as a conservative point in time, but it is our best estimate. And so, if our assumptions play out, and again, our reserve reflects something worse than the base case. So, if that does play out, then we shouldn't see meaningful reserve builds in the third quarter, or if that continues to be — in the third quarter.
Andrew Lim
analystSo, to put that in context, is this comparable to what we saw in 2019, for instance?
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveYes. Reserves are held for growth, not for prices.
Andrew Lim
analystRight, that makes sense. Then when it comes to the CIB trading environment, we obviously had June and have had part of July. Would you call that back to a normal level in line with 2019, or is there still fairly robust trading carrying over into Q2 — sorry, Q3?
Jamie Dimon
executiveI already gave an answer to that. You ought to assume it will drop by 50%; we have no idea, since we're just a couple weeks in. But we aren't assuming these incredible trading results will continue. With luck, we'll outperform that. And we just don't know. I also mentioned one reserving point, because it's probabilistic. You might not alter anything in your assumptions, yet the odds of possible outcomes shift, leading you to set aside additional reserves.
Jennifer Piepszak
executiveThank you.
Jamie Dimon
executiveThank you.
Operator
operatorThank you for participating in today's call. You may now disconnect.
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