JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

January 13, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Banks earnings 68 min

What were the key takeaways from JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s January 13, 2026 earnings call?

In the fourth quarter of 2025, JPMorgan Chase & Co. reported a net income of $13 billion and earnings per share (EPS) of $4.63, reflecting a year-over-year revenue increase of 7% to $46.8 billion. The results were bolstered by higher markets revenue and asset management fees, although management noted a $2.2 billion reserve build related to the Apple Card portfolio. For fiscal year 2025, the firm achieved a net income of $57.5 billion and EPS of $20.18. Looking ahead, management maintained guidance for net interest income (NII) ex Markets at approximately $95 billion for 2026, indicating a cautious but optimistic outlook amidst expected rate cuts and ongoing competitive pressures.

What topics did JPMorgan Chase & Co. cover?

  • Revenue Growth Drivers: JPMorgan's revenue increased by 7% year-over-year to $46.8 billion, driven by higher markets revenue and asset management fees. Management stated, "The increase in NII ex Markets was primarily driven by higher firm-wide deposit balances and revolving balances in card."
  • Apple Card Acquisition Impact: The Apple Card acquisition is expected to enhance JPMorgan's card offerings, with management stating, "This is an economically compelling transaction for us as a co-brand deal." However, the integration will take two years due to the need to adapt Apple's technology stack into JPMorgan's systems.
  • Expense Growth Outlook: Management guided for adjusted expenses to reach approximately $105 billion in 2026, up from $96 billion, citing investments in technology and growth initiatives. They noted, "2026 in isolation clearly represents meaningful expense growth in both dollar and percentage terms."
  • Credit Quality and Charge-Offs: While charge-offs increased, they were largely already provisioned, indicating a stable credit environment. Management commented, "At the margin... downgrades are exceeding upgrades by a little bit," but overall, they do not see significant concerns in credit quality.
  • Consumer Deposit Growth Expectations: Management expects modest consumer deposit growth in 2026, lower than previous expectations, due to yield-seeking flows and competitive pressures. They stated, "We're sort of expecting that inflection in balance per account to kick in in the second half of 2026."

What were JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s January 13, 2026 results?

  • Revenue: $46.8B (vs $43.7B est, +7% YoY)
  • EPS: $4.63 (vs $4.50 est, beat by $0.13)
  • Net Income: $13B (vs $12.5B est, +8% YoY)
  • Total Expenses: $24B (up 5% YoY)
  • NII ex Markets Guidance: $95B (maintained guidance for 2026)
  • Full Year Net Income: $57.5B (for fiscal year 2025)

JPMorgan's strong fourth-quarter performance, driven by revenue growth and strategic acquisitions, positions the bank favorably for 2026. However, rising expenses and uncertain regulatory impacts present risks to the investment thesis. Investors should monitor the integration of the Apple Card, consumer deposit trends, and the broader economic environment as key catalysts and risks going forward.

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#1

Thanks, and good morning to all of you. During this quarter, the company posted net income of $13 billion, along with EPS of $4.63 and an ROTCE of 18%. Those figures reflected the reserve build we announced earlier, totaling $2.2 billion in CCB, tied to the forward purchase commitment for the Apple Card portfolio. Revenue came in at $46.8 billion, an increase of 7% compared with a year earlier, helped by stronger markets revenue, plus greater asset management fees and auto lease income. Growth in NII ex Markets came mainly from higher deposit balances across the firm and higher revolving balances in card, though lower rates largely offset that. Expenses reached $24 billion, rising 5% versus the prior year, mostly because of higher volume and revenue-related expenses and compensation growth, including front office hiring, partly offset by the release of an FDIC special assessment accrual. Now for the full year results. As a reminder, 2025 contained several significant items, and those are detailed in the footnote. If you set those aside, the firm delivered full year net income of $57.5 billion, EPS of $20.18, and revenue of $185 billion, with an ROTCE of 20%. On the balance sheet side, we closed the quarter at a standardized CET1 ratio of 14.5%, which is 30 basis points lower than the previous quarter, since capital distributions and higher RWA more than offset net income; the rise in this quarter's standardized RWA stems from more lending in both wholesale and retail, including the Apple Card purchase commitment, which added roughly $23 billion of standardized RWA, with lower market risk RWA providing a partial offset. Sequentially, you'll notice the advanced RWA increase is considerably larger than standardized. And as you're aware, our SCB now sits at the 2.5% floor, which means advanced RWA carries more relevance, so we've included it on the page. For the Apple Card transaction, the advanced RWA contribution came to about $110 billion, calculated from the sum of expected drawn balances and undrawn lines at closing. That elevated advanced RWA level is only temporary and should come down to roughly $30 billion before long. Turning to our businesses: CCB posted net income of $3.6 billion, or $5.3 billion once you exclude the reserve build for the Apple Card portfolio. Revenue of $19.4 billion rose 6% from a year earlier, mainly on higher NII from increased revolving balances in card and a better deposit margin in Banking & Wealth Management. A few things worth noting. Consumers and small businesses are still resilient. We keep watching leading indicators for any stress signals. And even with weak consumer sentiment, our data trends largely match historical norms, and we aren't seeing deterioration at present. Across income groups, debit and credit sales volume kept performing well, rising 7% year-on-year; for the full year, our franchise saw strong growth, with 1.7 million net new checking accounts, 10.4 million new card accounts, and record households in wealth management across digital and advised channels. Next, CIB reported net income of $7.3 billion. Revenue came in at $19.4 billion, marking a 10% increase compared with the same period a year earlier, and that gain was fueled by stronger results in Markets, Payments and Securities Services. For some additional detail, IB fees declined 5% versus the prior year, which mirrors a tough comparison against a robust previous year along with the scheduling of certain transactions that got moved into 2026. On the outlook side, our expectation is solid client engagement and deal activity during 2026, underpinned by favorable market conditions, and our pipeline mirrors that view. Markets. Fixed income rose 7% compared with a year ago, with standout results in Securitized Products, Rates and Currencies & Emerging Markets, mostly canceled out by weaker revenue in Credit trading. Equities climbed 40%, delivering robust results throughout the franchise, especially in Prime. Now shifting to Asset & Wealth Management. AWM posted net income of $1.8 billion of $1.8 billion, with a pretax margin of 38%. Revenue reached $6.5 billion, a 13% rise versus the prior year, mainly powered by increased management fees tied to higher average market levels and robust net inflows, along with greater performance fees. Long-term net inflows totaled $52 billion during the quarter and $209 billion across the full year, positive throughout every channel, region and asset class; within liquidity, net inflows came to $105 billion for the quarter and $183 billion for the year; meanwhile we recorded all-time-high client asset net inflows of $553 billion for the year; and wrapping up the fourth quarter results, Corporate posted net income of $307 million alongside revenue of $1.5 billion. Before addressing the outlook, I'd like to touch on a few items regarding non-bank financial institution lending, since it drew considerable attention last quarter. When examining NBFI lending on an internal basis, our definition is narrower than the one applied in the call report. Our definition centers on exposure to non-bank financial institutions that is collateralized by the loans those NBFIs extend to end borrowers. At the top of the page, we offered a reconciliation between the regulatory definition and our own definition. As you can observe, that outcome also excludes, for instance, subscription lending to private equity funds, leaving roughly $160 billion of exposure as of the fourth quarter. We've additionally provided categories of that exposure that we consider somewhat more intuitive and that correspond to recognizable industry categories and business models of the NBFIs. Now, looking at the bottom left, it's clear that although our narrower definition yields a smaller absolute figure, growth across the last 7 years has been fairly substantial regardless of how you examine it; moreover, the forces behind that growth are widely recognized when it comes to market dynamics and regulatory pressures. Regarding risk, on the bottom right of the page, we've supplied some detail on the structural features tied to various forms of this lending across the different asset classes. Because this activity carries a substantial level of credit enhancement, and because we haven't been through a normal credit cycle over this stretch, it makes sense that looking back at losses starting in 2018 we've recorded just a single charge-off — the one tied to what appears to be fraud. Zooming out, with the expansion we've seen and the newer aspects of certain pieces of this business, we're very conscious of the risk. That said, thanks to those structural protections, you'd typically anticipate that losses within this NBFI bucket would show up either through more fraud-type situations or through a particularly severe downturn deep enough to wipe out all that credit enhancement. Under that kind of scenario, the bigger worry for the industry would probably be losses tied to conventional lending to end borrowers. Moving now to what 2026 looks like. Our expectation for NII ex Markets stays at roughly $95 billion. The same drivers we walked through three months ago are mostly unchanged, so I'll go through them briefly. As always, this outlook tracks the forward curve, which right now builds in 2 rate cuts. Working against that is the anticipated ongoing loan growth in Card — a bit smaller than last year's, since the revolve normalization benefit is now behind us — plus modest deposit growth across the firm. Just to be complete, we project total NII of roughly $103 billion for the year, driven by Markets NII rising to around $8 billion thanks to cheaper funding from those rate cuts, which you should view as mostly offset within NIR; on the expense side, as we mentioned at an industry conference in December, our 2026 adjusted expense expectation is approximately $105 billion. Overall, expense growth keeps lining up with the areas where we see the biggest opportunities throughout our businesses. The specifics of the thematic drivers appear on the page and largely match what we've shared previously. On this slide, we've laid out 2024 and 2025 along with 2026, and we've highlighted the foundation contribution in the FDIC special assessment. Once you adjust for those items, the 2026 growth appears somewhat more consistent. Even so, taken on its own, 2026 obviously amounts to significant expense growth in both dollar and percentage terms; and that increase mirrors our structural confidence about the opportunity set for the company across the cycle, along with some confidence about near-term revenue prospects. More broadly, the landscape keeps growing more competitive, so it stays essential that we make the investments required to protect our position against both traditional and non-traditional competitors. To close out, on Credit, we anticipate the 2026 card net charge-off rate will come in at about 3.4%, helped by favorable delinquency trends stemming from the consumer's continued resilience. We're ready now for your questions, so let's open the line for Q&A.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#2

I'd like to raise the matter of stablecoins with you. There will be some markup activity and discussion in Congress during this week. I noticed the ABA's letter that came out this week, which addressed how urgent this topic is and whether the interest-on-stablecoin loophole can be shut. My understanding is that they — or rather Treasury — put the figure at roughly $6.6 trillion in bank deposits that might be endangered absent action to close that gap. So here's what I want to know: that letter was framed from the ABA's perspective, from community banks' perspective. Why wouldn't this apply to every bank, and to you in particular? And if that gap stays open, what does it mean for the banking industry at large? Because people do end up exposed to things like lacking insurance and so forth; so I'll leave it to all of you to weigh in.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#3

All right. Thank you, Glenn. Let me begin by acknowledging that your knowledge of this probably exceeds mine. Marianne, I'd say, is genuinely the authority on it right now, and she offered a few remarks on the subject at an industry conference held recently; even so, I'll share my quick thoughts, split into a few parts. First, even though this doesn't answer your question directly, it deserves mention that our firm has spent a good while deeply engaged with the entire blockchain technology arena, and via our Kinexys product we're carrying out a lot of genuinely exciting work on the wholesale side — as you're aware, we brought out the first — our first tokenized money market fund. That's a capability built up across an extended stretch of time. We've got truly leading-edge minds working there, and we're applying that throughout the entire company as our involvement in that ecosystem grows. On a connected note, I believe that within CCB we're also integrating somewhat further into the crypto ecosystem. We've reached an arrangement with Coinbase, and it will become possible to purchase crypto within the CCB ecosystem as well. I mention all of this simply to convey that we do notice the intriguing things happening in this area, the technological innovation, and we're participating, observing, and paying attention.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#4

Let me just tack on one brief point: that letter had signatures from the ABA, the FSF, and the ICBA — every one of them banks. It wasn't just a small group of banks.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#5

All right, that's news to me, so thanks for the context. What I meant to say, specifically on that topic, is that I believe your question has an answer with 2 parts. First, it strikes me as quite evident — and it aligns with both the intent behind the GENIUS Act and all the things we've been pushing for — that building a parallel banking system that essentially carries every banking characteristic, such as something resembling a deposit that accrues interest, yet lacks the prudential protections that centuries of bank oversight have produced, is plainly a hazardous and unwanted development. That sits at the heart of what we're advocating. As for your specific question — suppose matters don't unfold the way we contend they ought to, then what danger does that pose to deposits in the banking system? Honestly, I consider that a rather intricate matter, one wrapped up in numerous subtleties: the origin of the funds, their destination, which securities get bought and from whom, the consequences for deposits across the entire system, and how all of that shifts between consumer and wholesale segments. Still, it's evident that certain institutions face some exposure, possibly a great many institutions do, along with a form of menace to the business model. We've always welcomed competition, mind you; so the point isn't to declare we'd rather not compete — it's to prevent the emergence of a parallel ecosystem possessing identical economic traits and dangers while lacking proper oversight. And, I suppose, the last thing to mention is that ultimately, every bit of our analysis on this — whether from the customer angle, the investment angle, or the franchise angle — centers on one query: what genuine advantage does the consumer receive? So even though the technology is impressive and there's fascinating material in it, ultimately you must pose the question of how this genuinely enhances what the consumer experiences. Where it does, we must either engage ourselves or upgrade what we offer; where it doesn't, then occasionally it amounts to a bit of a remedy in search of a problem. So I believe the matter of "risk" to current business models and banking system deposits ought to be examined via that framing. It's clearly a significant matter, though, and our CCB people are devoting considerable time to it.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#6

Thanks for that. Just a quick, tight follow-up. You mentioned that 1.7 million net new checking accounts were opened during the year, and deposit growth is modest, but I also noticed client investment assets grew 17%. Is that the whole story? Or are other factors at work that are holding back deposit growth even with all this strong checking account growth?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#7

Interesting. I think what you're getting at implicitly is whether the fairly muted growth in checking account balances is because investment flows are, in some sense, competing those away? Good question. I'd say partly, but not really. I suppose the bigger picture involves a tension between very strong franchise growth, which you referenced with the 1.7 million net new accounts, set against the persistence of yield-seeking flows, though at a much lower level. So if you look at flows going into investments, yield-seeking flows, I think those 2 are related; but I'd probably rank more traditional yield-seeking flows above investments on that list, though clearly it's both. And so, yes, as we discussed over the past few quarters, the level of yield-seeking flows fell off significantly, but it isn't 0; and so as we discussed last quarter, when you pair that with a somewhat lower savings rate and a few other dynamics, that moment when we expected the balance per account number in CCB to begin growing again has simply been delayed a bit. And so that's why we said previously, I believe last quarter, that our expectations for consumer deposit growth in 2026 are below what they had been in our scenario analysis at Investor Day, and that's still true.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#8

Jeremy, when you were going over the expense guidance, you pointed out that some of it is plainly tied to the investment cycle. You also mentioned that the revenue growth picture there appears fairly strong. I was just curious — and we can observe that in the volume-driven portions of the growth. But I'm just wondering, we have your NII guidance, we have your expenses. Which areas of the fees do you anticipate being particularly robust? You brought up certain deals that got delayed in IB. Could you give us a sense of what will mainly push fee revenue higher across your segments, just to help us round out our estimates a bit?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#9

Of course. That's a fair question. I picked my phrasing deliberately, since I see two ways to frame this—one near-term, one longer-term—when it comes to costs and spending. So to be precise, for 2026, what we present includes volume- and revenue-linked costs, the category we've historically called good expense. That's definitely one factor behind the rise in total expenses. We should also point out that auto lease depreciation makes up a sizable portion of that figure, and you should really view it mainly as a contra revenue item, more or less. So some optimism regarding the fee environment is built into those numbers. To address your question head-on, when it comes to breaking out 2026, I clearly don't want to abandon our practice of steering clear of guidance on fees and NIR, since both depend heavily on the market and swing around a lot. Still, it won't shock you that we're clearly upbeat about investment banking fees in general. Regarding markets, I'd say our outlook on the franchise is quite positive, and conditions are pretty favorable — though this year turned out to be an unusually strong one. So, as we like to put it when it comes to markets, whatever the final figure ends up being is what it'll be, and we'll compete hard to push it as high as we can. As for the remaining fee-related lines — broadly speaking, wealth management and asset management, spanning both CCB and AWM — once again, we feel very good about where that franchise stands and what that means for fees. That said, we're somewhat wary when it comes to drivers tied to market appreciation, considering the starting point we're launching from and the kind of year 2025 has turned out to be. So I'd describe the fee outlook for 2026 as a fairly balanced picture — not because of anything negative in particular, but simply because 2025 was so exceptionally strong. Now, to shift quickly toward the bigger picture: what I'm contrasting is how 2026's anticipated cost increases relate to the revenues tied to that same year, as opposed to the wider bucket of spending on strengthening the franchise over the long haul — essentially that top row on the page covering bankers, branches, product capabilities, and so on, which likewise signals optimism, though of a longer-range sort: a belief that this franchise pays off when you put money into every one of its components.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#10

Great. And then for my second question, on that same trade-off, I believe you folks have had no trouble at all steering clear of relying on improved operating leverage annually. Given that you remain in that very robust high-teens area that plainly keeps producing — clearly keeps producing enormous amounts of capital and lets you accomplish plenty with the firm — how do you manage the relationship between where your efficiency ratio sits and what your ROE results look like?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#11

Yeah. I suppose I'd ground what I say here in that term "outputs" that came from you, then — along a few different lines. If you recall what I presented on Investor Day, I spent a bit of time on how we view putting capital to work as you move down the ladder of incremental return possibilities, plus the reality that we'll definitely commit substantial sums beneath 17%, since the other option is repurchasing shares at implied returns far, far, far beneath that level. That's actually a positive, we make no apologies for it, and we regard it as adding value for shareholders. Because of this, we're genuinely beginning to shift far more toward talking about the through-the-cycle ROTCE goal as merely a result of our broad business approach, the smart allocation of our financial means, and our investments throughout the full range of opportunities; and in certain ways, the same holds for the efficiency ratio. Ultimately, we take whatever steps are required to stay competitive. We'll put money wherever we must to protect the company's future and to generate the revenue expansion we require. And provided what we're up to is still anticipated to pay off over the long run, in a sense, the efficiency ratio ends up being somewhat of a result. Jamie constantly points out that endlessly widening — the idea of steady operating leverage logically means margins that expand forever, and that's plainly impossible within the fiercely competitive industry we're in. So it serves as a solid reality check. Whenever that figure creeps upward, perhaps you need to scrutinize your costs more closely and confirm that all your activities are exactly what you intend them to be at the greatest efficiency achievable, yet we basically do that continuously regardless. That's my response to that.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#12

What I'd add is that when you put capital to work, the goal is to earn a solid return across the cycle, and that means your efficiency ratio will look better at certain points and worse at others. Really, it tends to be a byproduct of the choices you make.

John McDonald

analyst
#13

I'd like to dig into the credit card segment a bit. First off, regarding the Apple Card acquisition, could you share what draws you to that business — both the portfolio itself and what you expect from the co-brand relationship and the platform more generally?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#14

Yes, of course. Let me begin by stating something I believe is clear but deserves mention given all the scrutiny this deal has received — namely that, as you noted, from a limited vantage point, purely looking at the portfolio and the deal itself, this transaction makes strong economic sense for us as a co-brand arrangement. Someone characterized it as a win-win-win involving all 3 parties, and that captures exactly how we view it, so that's a solid place to begin. On top of that, clearly we're discussing a partnership with a company, Apple, that leads in payments innovation and user experience, and it clearly represents a highly compelling distribution channel for cards. So it will be demanding for us. The integration will require 2 years for good reason. We're confident we'll complete it successfully, and I believe the work of completing it, in the limited sense, will improve us, broadly speeding up and pushing our modernization efforts and the ease of use across everything we handle in the card business. Past that, we'll find out. We'll find out what the partnership yields, though clearly, anyone would be delighted to partner with Apple.

John McDonald

analyst
#15

All right. Then perhaps you or Jamie could share a few views regarding the concept of regulators imposing limits on credit card APRs — what the possible effects on the industry might be, and how you'd approach thinking about strategic responses as a major issuer.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#16

Yeah. Thank you, John; and I value how you put the question, since what I'm somewhat attempting to steer clear of is using up a great deal of effort or time guessing about how likely it is that this occurs or doesn't occur, in whatever shape it does or doesn't occur. So for this call's purposes, and clearly you can take it that, as an institution, we'll handle all the necessary contingency planning; yet for this call's purposes, since we know so little at this stage, the approach I'd rather take is to just suppose, for argument's sake, that some measure broadly along the lines of price controls on credit card interest rates is enacted — what then would follow from that. And I believe the initial point to make, something you clearly understand quite well, is that the card ecosystem is an extraordinarily competitive ecosystem; among the most competitive businesses we operate in, it ranks highly. And that holds at every level of borrower credit score, from high FICO to low FICO. So with that in mind, when you — it's just fundamental economics — when that's your starting point, the correct presumption about how the system will respond to price controls being imposed isn't that you'll merely squeeze profit margins, which already sit at what's roughly their competitively optimal level, and thus deliver benefits to consumers. What will really just occur is a dramatic change in how the service is provided. To be specific, credit access will be lost by people, on an extremely, extremely wide and broad scale, particularly those who honestly need it most; and thus that's a quite seriously negative outcome for consumers and, frankly, likely a negative outcome for the economy overall at present as well. I don't want to skip mentioning that I believe it ought to be evident that this would be bad for us too. I won't go into putting numbers on it, but narrowly speaking, this is a major business for us; it's a highly competitive business, yet we wouldn't stay in it unless it were a good business for us. And in a scenario where price controls render it no longer a good business, that would clearly pose a substantial challenge. Past that, how we'd actually react would depend heavily on the specifics, and I simply don't think we have sufficient information right now.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#17

All right. So, as a quick second question following up on that last one, does this change the way you look at the co-brand cards that you currently have? Regarding the rewards card — since I believe one of the stories being told in the media is that only revolvers would be affected. And I'm curious whether you agree with that, or whether this affects the whole card book?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#18

Well, clearly, prime would be hit less than subprime. On subprime, it would be dramatic. And a number of the co-brands carry quite a bit of subprime, and so on. So you truly need to examine it co-brand by co-brand, but you'd need to revise your model for the additional risk from this plus continuing price controls and similar things. So if it played out as it was described, it would be dramatic. If it plays out in a manner that's changed substantially, it would be less. And we don't yet know the figure, but it would be extremely dramatic, it would simply be a cap.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#19

Now regarding the Apple Card, Jeremy, you said it takes 2 years to onboard, and for a solid reason. Is that mostly because of the technology the Apple Card was constructed on? From what I know, the existing product has a tech stack made specifically for that purpose. My question for you is this: are you creating an entirely new technology so the same interface can work with Apple Card users? Or could you instead upgrade the system you already have so those users can be brought onto it? Or does it sit on a completely new tech stack? And are there any other factors that make this a 2-year process?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#20

No other factors exist. For a typical credit card product, we could absorb it quite fast and simply place it into our systems; this one isn't like that. They truly constructed something entirely separate, woven into the iOS tech stack, and they did it well; so it's quality work. Yet we must fold that into our own system. Doing so will require 2 years and a bit of expense to satisfy the terms and standards. Those terms and standards are actually pretty solid; we reviewed them and concluded, "No, that's good." Apple intends to take excellent care of those customers. Many of those elements will be incorporated straight into our system, and we could clearly apply some of that customer service approach elsewhere; and we aim to get it right. That's the whole story. We need to rebuild what their tech stack consists of and embed it within our system.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#21

For my opening question, I'll turn to Jamie. Jamie, people who invest are pretty upbeat regarding the basic macro possibilities awaiting banks in 2026, alongside deregulation, naturally. Yet I believe confidence took a hit this weekend because of that social media post concerning caps on credit card rates and, naturally, on top of that, the DOJ subpoenas directed at Chair Powell; and throughout the weekend, investors repeated that they're eager to hear Jamie's take on the 2026 outlook; so perhaps begin right there regarding how you view the macro landscape unfolding in 2026 for banking and how you weigh the dangers, be it executive overreach or the current geopolitical circumstances?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#22

Yes. Okay, I'll take that one. When it comes to guessing what the economy's going to do, my own view for the short run — call it six to nine months, maybe even twelve — leans fairly upbeat. People still have cash on hand. Employment hasn't disappeared, though it has softened somewhat. On top of that, the One Big Beautiful Bill is pumping in a great deal of stimulus. Less regulation helps broadly, and that includes banks, which will gain the ability to put their capital to work elsewhere. Still, the broader situation matters too, and the timing varies from one factor to another. Geopolitical risk is massive. There's no need for me to walk through every single element of this; the point is simply that a substantial level of risk exists, and whether it materializes depends on how the economy's condition plays out. The shortfalls facing the United States, as well as other nations globally, are extremely big. Nobody can say when the consequences will hit. Eventually they will hit, since borrowing funds without limit simply isn't sustainable. So in the beginning, sure, it's anyone's guess. And naturally, our job is to cope with the reality in front of us rather than some ideal version we'd prefer. Never once — we never try to predict how things will turn out. Our role is serving clients, and we do that across the board. We're going to handle the political matters and the challenges we face globally, things of that nature. We feel confident about growing our operations. That said, when you examine the situation, a rising tide does raise every vessel somewhat. I'm very mindful of that when I review the figures, at any rate. Still, that doesn't mean it won't continue — it doesn't mean it will halt during this year.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#23

Understood. My next question goes to you, Jeremy. Within that $95 billion of NII ex Markets for the year, what level of balance sheet expansion do you see driving that? And perhaps you could also share your thinking on deposit growth in 2026 versus what you said previously regarding yield-seeking flows, and how those figures would stack up against 8% balance sheet growth in '25 and 5% average deposit growth in '25?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#24

Certainly. So — I don't want to sound pedantic, Erika, but I'll shift the focus away from balance sheet growth as such and instead discuss loans and deposits, acknowledging that a meaningful chunk of balance sheet growth nowadays originates within Markets, and that NIM on those assets fluctuates and furthermore isn't included in the NII ex Markets. But stepping back to the broader balance sheet drivers and the growth and mix drivers of the NII, first, as the slide indicates and as I said in my prepared remarks, card loan growth remains a driver. We anticipate roughly 6% or 7% card loan growth in 2026; that's clearly below what we've had lately. But we've discussed this for a while as stemming from the normalization of the revolve per account. So that tailwind is mostly exhausted, and what remains is simply growth from overall system growth and consumer balance sheet growth, plus our optimism regarding share and client engagement, customer engagement throughout the card ecosystem. So that's one key loan driver. Regarding deposits, beginning with wholesale, 2025 was an extraordinarily strong year for wholesale deposit growth; so looking toward '26, we remain fairly optimistic about the wholesale deposit franchise and the payments franchise, products, offerings, customer engagement, growth opportunities, and so on. But surpassing the 2025 performance in wholesale deposit growth will be difficult. So our expectation for 2026 wholesale deposit growth is more modest. And I already said a bit about our thinking on consumer deposit growth, but to restate it, the story there is that the balance between very robust engagement and franchise success shown by the 1.7 million net new accounts originated this year, and the fact that balances per account aren't increasing quite as quickly as we anticipated earlier in the year owing to yield-seeking flows that are far, far below their peak but still aren't precisely 0. Thus, a certain push-and-pull exists between those 2 items; and right now, what we anticipate is that the turning point regarding balance per account will arrive during the latter portion of 2026, and once that happens, you'd begin to observe consumer deposit growth reasserting itself, which would bring us to modest deposit growth for CCB in 2026, though definitely below that 6% scenario we mentioned at Investor Day, which is information we already shared with you during the prior quarter and that Marianne has covered.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#25

Let me just mention one additional element here, and that's the Fed. They're not using the term QE, yet they are discussing purchasing $40 billion of T-bills each month. All else being equal, that injects $40 billion per month into bank reserves. At first, the bulk of that lands in wholesale deposits, and afterward it might be redeployed. So we'll watch how that unfolds as well; even so, it does put more liquidity into the system, and I ought to have noted that this is one more tailwind for the economy.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#26

Yeah. No, you've got it exactly. And within the framework we use for accruals, as Jamie mentioned, our starting assumption would be that expansion in deposits across the system would flow into wholesale deposits with extremely high beta, so it generally won't serve as much of a driver for the NII narrative compared with a year earlier, though when it comes to the system and how it functions, it does matter <<inaudible>>.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#27

Yes. Thanks.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#28

Jeremy, I appreciate the information you provided on the NBFI portfolio. Could you give us some additional detail? You mentioned that expansion across the past 7 years has been substantial, and that market dynamics along with regulatory pressures are what's fueling it. Would you elaborate on that so we get a bit more insight into what's driving it?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#29

Yes. Oh, do you want to handle that? Go ahead, Jamie.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#30

Okay, so we clearly engage in activities we believe are secure and appropriate, and things of that nature. However, this does constitute arbitrage, and we take part in it. Holding a AAA tranche or similar instrument on top of something else gives us a better position from a regulatory capital standpoint than originating the loan directly. That's the reality. There's also arbitrage occurring between banks and insurance companies, and similar entities, and that is driving a portion of this expansion. One point I would make to the regulators is that when arbitrage appears, you ought to examine it and consistently pose the question of why, and whether you are better served pursuing it that manner rather than through a different approach. There is nothing mysterious regarding the loans that all these NBFIs are extending. And this activity has persisted for an extended stretch of time. It has simply grown larger at present.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#31

Correct. Regarding the idea that there's nothing mysterious going on, Gerard, that's how I'd put it too, and one reason I picked that phrasing in my prepared comments was to raise the issue of what story is actually being told here—if you look back at how regulation and competitive forces interacted with the private credit ecosystem specifically, what caused what, and how did all of that develop over time? I believe it's widely recognized that alongside the regulatory capital considerations, leveraged lending guidelines also existed, and once those came out, they genuinely put significant limits on banks' ability to lend in this kind of area, and one could argue that this handed over—or sped up—the expansion of that ecosystem in a manner that might not have occurred otherwise; yet in some sense, that's just the reality. As we've discussed over the past 2 years, there's no justification for us being unable to go head-to-head in that arena. Hence the entire direct lending push, and the recognition that frequently what sponsors are looking for is fast execution of a unitranche structure, avoiding the need to bargain with a syndicate, while at other times they prefer to go through syndication. That's exactly why we committed so strongly to the product-agnostic approach we keep mentioning; and simultaneously, when we end up not being the lender, sure, at times we're up against these players, at times they're clients of ours, at times both apply; and when handled correctly, as we explain on the slide, we're quite glad to lend to them. So all of this fits within a competitive partner ecosystem. And yes, we simply wanted to lay it out a bit given all the inquiries from last quarter.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#32

No, that helped a lot. Thank you. Moving to my next question: you've clearly provided guidance for NII both including and excluding Markets. Looking back at the Markets figure for 2024, I believe revenues came in around $1 billion. You're showing us $3.3 billion for '25, and of course market conditions will affect your guidance on the $8 billion. But what's the plan for expanding that business from where it stood in '24 to where it is now?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#33

Yes, fair question. A few points on this. First, generally speaking, across brief time horizons, that Markets NII figure will move around mostly based on rates, since it's liability sensitive. Put differently, when rates are higher, the figure drops. So what we observed — if you — and we do — we report that figure each quarter. If you chart how it evolves against the policy rate, that connection will show up quite clearly. It's also the case, as I've mentioned at various points, that one reason we downplay it is that if mix shifts happen at a particular time — Brazilian futures versus cash, say, or high interest rate nations — you can see fairly large movements in that figure that ultimately carry essentially no impact on the bottom line, which is why we downplayed the change. Then the third point is simply that, as has been mentioned, the Markets balance sheet has expanded considerably over the years. So as we provide more financing to clients, this effect grows larger, which makes it even more worthwhile for us to separate it out and clarify that, generally, short-term swings carry no bottom line impact; and Jamie, did you want to add anything?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#34

Right. We aren't managing this company with a specific aim of expanding NII, since what we focus on is the revenue the trade generates — at times that's NII, at times it's net revenue. Still, expanding this company matters; ours is the top FICC operation globally, and among the finest equity operations globally. Our people around the globe are remarkable. We're expanding by creating technology, bringing in more research, bringing in more sales, and performing better in regions where our market share isn't strong while a competitor outdoes us. So we intend to expand that operation, and we're pretty skilled at doing so. It's essential to the world's capital markets. And over the coming 20 years, those capital markets are set to expand enormously; so that's — that's the way we develop the operation. NII is merely a result, in and of itself, essentially meaningless.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#35

I believe I understand now — JPMorgan allocates money to fuel expansion. And that expansion is materializing, with a 7% rise compared to the same period a year earlier during Q4. You're prepared to give up some returns in exchange for additional growth, I suppose, since that boosts SBA; yet it truly is striking, that $9 billion jump in expenses, your full-year guidance; and I recognize that a portion of it merely reflects the likelihood that revenues will land above what was anticipated. But could we please get additional specifics regarding the remaining portion? This marks our first opportunity to discuss that $9 billion rise in the expense outlook; so perhaps in certain categories, Jeremy, regarding technology outlays, I believe you moved from $17 billion up to $18 billion during the prior year, and it climbed further still once you factor in the efficiencies you realized, particularly given that you've moved past peak modernization — where do you anticipate tech spending landing in 2026? And concerning AI, how much did you spend during the prior year? And where do you see that heading? And what kinds of payoffs? And then, Jamie, given that you're raising the bar, raising the stakes through that $9 billion of investments, how confident are you that the returns and outcomes you want will actually materialize?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#36

We can't simply — we won't provide — Mike, we owe all of you as shareholders the maximum information we're able to provide, yet we won't provide information that I believe — that places us at a competitive disadvantage. So we've been very direct with all of you. To begin with, we attempt to include everything in there, everything. So even the Apple spending was included, inflation is included, the possibility that revenues could rise was included. So should revenues fail to rise, that figure won't be as large. And — yet predominantly — and tech will increase. But here's the positive part: when we examine the world, we perceive enormous opportunity; right now we're launching rural branches, which we believe will work well. We're launching additional branches in foreign countries; we're creating improved payment systems. We're introducing enhanced personalization in consumer banking and credit card. We're introducing AI throughout the entire company. And all of those represent opportunities. And I grasp your issue and concern regarding that $9 billion, but I believe you ought to be saying, if you genuinely believe they're real, you ought to be doing that. That's the proper approach to growing a company. And you consider the complexity of the world, the quantity of capital requirements, the — our SRI initiative, I believe that SRI initiative might be considerably larger than we anticipated. And that's included; so we're going to — you'll — we'll be vindicated by the results. But we won't be providing detail on each and every thing each and every quarter. You're going to have to, as partners, trust me, I'm sorry.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#37

Okay, I suppose stopping right here would work fine. If you'd like, Mike, I can add a couple more details — just a small amount of extra flavor. Another thing worth mentioning is that a company update is on the way. That gives us a chance to go into greater depth about this. I believe we covered most of the key thematic drivers shown on that page, though Jamie's caution about revealing too much competitive information still applies. Perhaps I'll take about 60 seconds to provide a bit more background. One notable point: last year we made a significant effort around the idea of living within our means, and we followed through. That effort will carry on. Broadly speaking, as an organization, we still want people's instinct — whenever something needs to be accomplished, in technology or any other area — to be anything other than bringing on additional staff. That said, pushing that emphasis further during the past year gave us greater confidence that our resources were genuinely being used in an optimal way. Looking forward now, there's plenty we want to accomplish. There's plenty we must accomplish. The Apple Card fits into that, though other items do as well. So on the margin, we're permitting ourselves to at least make plans for bringing in more technology staff, supporting what Jamie described — the long-term investment initiative — especially within the businesses where developing and delivering products and features is necessary. Sure, AI accounts for a portion of that, yet additional areas exist too. There's perhaps one more point I'd raise, which I don't view as competitively sensitive and which matters: consider how the company's headcount changed across roughly the past 5 or 6 years — it expanded considerably, and that took place through what was clearly a complicated stretch. You had the entire return-to-office matter, hot-desking, remote work, all of that. What came out of it is that real estate square footage increased far more gradually than headcount across that stretch. Meanwhile, since we've made the decision as a company to operate as an in-office organization, we recognized that giving employees a sensible in-office experience is plainly necessary; and in certain instances, that involves a bit of de-densification along with catching up on space renovations globally right now. Midtown Manhattan isn't the only place we mean — for all of our 320,000 employees, we had fallen somewhat behind. So I'd describe that as partly catching up to how much headcount grew.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#38

Jeremy, there’s no need to frighten them.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#39

This isn’t a major factor.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#40

That's — it's a very small number.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#41

It's a small number; but I think it's thematically...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#42

All right. Then for health care, that figure stands at $300 million. And I mean — going through each line one at a time is possible, yet health care inflation is going to hit everybody. That said, real estate amounts to a really tiny figure, so we shouldn't <<inaudible>>.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#43

Yeah. I don't want to place too much weight on it. I simply found it interesting thematically, and I'd say it isn't competitively sensitive. So that's the situation. We might provide a little more detail in our — during the company update.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#44

All right. If I may — I think you know that for any analyst, the rule is trust but verify, right? So if I could just try one follow-up, what do you think about your tech or AI spending for 2026?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#45

It will rise somewhat. But Mike, we have — we're creating additional payment systems. We're creating additional AI systems. We're creating additional — we're linking additional branches, which means network expenses go higher; we're doing everything you'd like us to do; but tech spend is always among the tougher items to measure and evaluate. That's been the case for as long as I can remember. You can picture how granular we get about our initiatives, our rationale, and whether we're hitting deadlines. Yet there's no domain where — if you examined it closely — you wouldn't conclude that, yeah, you need to be — you've got to lead globally when it comes to technology. That's why capital goes into trading. Capital goes into payments. Capital goes into consumer. Capital goes into asset management. Capital goes into corporate. Capital goes — having world-class technologists is essential; that fuels investment. It fuels margin. It fuels competition. A significant portion involves direct-to-consumer work, digital experiences, personalization, trips, deals — all areas we consider excellent. I also appreciate that we possess these naturally arising possibilities.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#46

Do you find yourself allocating additional funds toward AI?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#47

My sense is — as I review this, I'd say it's positive that I'm able to note that across every domain, within each portion of our organization, expansion is possible; certain segments resemble trench warfare, consider particular trading and investment banking operations. Elsewhere we're somewhat ahead and aim to create the following generation of technology. But regarding investment, the point is — you've previously heard me discuss this, many companies, when you construct a new facility, you treat it as capitalized and subsequently amortize it across 20 years. For numerous operations of ours, all costs are recognized immediately. That doesn't imply the return is poor.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#48

So you're putting more money into AI?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#49

We are going to put more money into it — we — my view is that AI — yes, more spending is coming, though it isn't a major factor. Down the road, I do believe it will generate greater efficiency. But on that point, about efficiency — since rival banks must adopt it as well, in the end the benefit gets handed to the customer. It's not a case where you create 3 points of margin and hold onto them. You don't. So a lot of this stuff you build simply to avoid falling behind. And in our case — we examine — we examine every one of our competitors, and that group takes in all the fintech players. There's Stride, there's SoFi, there's Revolut, there's Schwab. Everyone's in the mix; these are strong competitors, and we study their actions and their methods and how we keep our edge; and we will keep our edge, so help us God; we won't chase some expense goal and then, 10 years from now, have you asking us how JPMorgan got left behind?

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#50

Perhaps, Jeremy, a fast one to piggyback on all this credit card interest rate talk. I believe you mentioned, which makes sense, that this would be really terrible for the credit card business and for JPMorgan, and since the President laid out a timeline of Jan 20, can we reasonably infer that no one from the administration has reached out to the banks or the sector about how they intend to carry this out? And do you anticipate anything in the next few days?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#51

Yeah. I suppose I just — everything has moved so fast and there is simply so little information flowing, at least as far as I know, that I simply believe it's best not to respond to those questions. I mean it's completely possible that within the past 12 hours, somebody has talked to somebody. I have no idea; but this is unfolding very rapidly in a somewhat unorthodox manner, beginning with a social media post. So I get why you're posing that question, but I simply have nothing to give you.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#52

Understood. Now, switching briefly to the topic of capital. We know additional G-SIB revisions are on the way, and Basel Endgame will likely land in the next few months. Regarding the appropriate capital level, speaking from where you sit, would you say that holding 200 or 300 basis points above whatever the regulatory floor turns out to be is the correct posture, considering everything Jamie mentioned — geopolitics, the competitive environment, and so forth? Or do you have a perspective on where, ideally, you'd prefer to run the bank compared to where the capital requirements ultimately land?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#53

Alright. I'd like my response to your question to be extremely exact, and it has several components; so let's begin with the reality that the rules remain unfinished and certain elements are still pending. Beyond that, people occasionally bring up a debate regarding what constitutes an appropriate capital level for banks or for the system. Our position on this — which we've stated many times, though I'll repeat it — is that the proper response is to execute each element of the methodology properly across RWA, G-SIB, and stress testing, backed by data, so that the correct result emerges for each individual component, and whatever those components add up to for the system, or for any single bank, is simply what it is. It absolutely should not become a sort of target-chasing workout aimed at some arbitrary figure at the system level, or for large banks, or for small banks, and definitely not for any specific institution. And I believe the encouraging part is that based on what we hear and what we gather, that is indeed the path the agencies are taking; so that's a positive sign. We'll see how it unfolds. Within that frame, one clear illustration we routinely bring up — though it genuinely bears repeating aloud — is G-SIB, where eventually you must genuinely wonder: what is the appropriate gap between how much capital we ought to be mandated to hold versus, say, a very large American regional bank, particularly considering the tremendous strides achieved over the past 10 or 15 years in resolvability and every other facet of the framework? So I'll spare you the lengthy remarks on why G-SIB is utterly badly designed. Ideally, it gets modified in a sensible manner, but it ought to be done properly. Do you want to add something, Jamie?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#54

So when all is said and done, we'll be sitting on $30 billion, $40 billion, or even more in surplus capital. Capital is something we have in abundance. Under no circumstances will capital be the problem. I believe it's crucial to examine the entire range of capital liquidity, stress testing, and everything else involved in figuring out how to make the system safer. And when it comes to many of these banks, capital isn't the issue. What matters is interest rate exposure, liquidity, or resolution-type matters. So I think there's too much emphasis placed on capital; and so — and you'll see, as people react to all the Fed APRs they released, what are they, NPRs they released, what people think about capital. But I genuinely believe — and this is the key point — that you could make the system safer with less capital by changing liquidity. That's where our focus ought to be. Making it safer so none of you have to be concerned about bank failures. And capital alone isn't the answer.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#55

Yeah, absolutely. And just so there's no ambiguity, I do want to circle back and address what you were really asking, since you brought up the appropriate amount of capital for us and the level at which we intend to operate this company, and you mentioned something like a few hundred basis points. And on that point, it's really crucial to separate two things: what we consider the proper level of surplus capital to hold today, given the risk we currently perceive over the short to medium term — and clearly, at present we're carrying a great deal of excess relative to essentially any iteration of the final rules. I'd contend that this feels more fitting than it ever has, considering what we're seeing in terms of the risks and the possible chances to put capital to work should a disruption occur. There's a second way to read your question, which is really an implicit one about buffers over the long haul. And that's the direction I'm — that's what I'm — kind of trying to move away from, because ultimately, we're going to operate this company at the appropriate capital level, and capital requirements are requirements. There's a broader conversation to be had regarding buffer usability. So I simply don't want to leave any uncertainty about some sort of implied 300 basis point management buffer, which is definitely not how we're approaching that…

Jamie Dimon

executive
#56

There shouldn't be any buffers at all. The reality is that these capital figures have already been calibrated to withstand the most extreme stress. That's the way they've been established.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#57

I'd like to inquire about how loans are growing. Jeremy, you mentioned that NBFI and cards have fueled much of that expansion. Yet we've had 3 reductions in rates since September, and several additional ones are anticipated. Changes to regulations are starting to affect sectors such as leverage lending, and further effects are on the way. So, first, are you noticing any initial hints that demand is widening into different areas, for instance traditional C&I, mortgage, or auto? And how do you see '26 shaping up?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#58

Sure, Jim. A few points on that. I genuinely heard it was quite a hectic day for the home lending unit following developments in the mortgage market. So perhaps we'll begin to observe an uptick there; though clearly, bigger forces in housing remain that pose difficulties. At a broad level, looking toward 2026, my view is that for CCB, cards remain the core narrative. In wholesale, leaving aside Markets lending just for discussion's sake, I'd say we hold what I'd call a somewhat upbeat view regarding loan growth when it comes to traditional C&I within CIB. Naturally, you don't require my lecture on how, in CIB, C&I lending functions as a result, not a driver. It serves somewhat as a loss leader, and so on. Even so, it provides a signal regarding client involvement and perhaps optimism among C-suites. I believe our projection of roughly modest C&I loan growth, excluding Markets, stems from combining a fairly positive view of the worldwide corporate landscape overall with some confidence in our expansion and growth initiatives in that area, which matter greatly and represent one of our investment priorities. And naturally, when we bring on new clients, even though we don't do so merely to lend, those clients frequently bring loans along, which is absolutely central to the plan. So overall, I'd characterize it as nothing overly dramatic tied specifically to the lower rate setting, but rather a somewhat upbeat view.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#59

All right, and perhaps one more thing regarding credit. This quarter you recorded additional charge-offs that looked somewhat high, yet NPAs declined within commercial. So I'm merely attempting to figure out your perspective on that. Given that rates are declining and the outlook appears quite strong, do you still see things as Steady Eddie, is there some enhancement, or are there worries regarding corporate credit?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#60

Yeah, that's a fair question. I suppose there are a few subtleties involved. The charge-offs recorded this quarter had, in fact, mostly been provisioned already, which partly explains why we framed the wholesale credit cost story by focusing on net provisioning, since combining charge-offs with allowance can feel somewhat counterintuitive. Yet once you do that and examine what's driving the provision, I believe it's reasonable to say that at the margin — and I should stress it's a really tiny margin — the direction leans more negative than positive, which means downgrades are slightly outnumbering upgrades. We also adjusted some parameters to reflect somewhat greater loss given default within the wholesale lending portfolio, and that produced a modest bump in the allowance. So I don't wish to exaggerate the importance of any of this; relative to the bigger picture, it's quite minor. And I certainly wouldn't claim we're observing anything worrisome more broadly; furthermore, it deserves mention that regarding wholesale charge-offs, those figures have remained extraordinarily low for quite some time even as the portfolio expanded. So merely returning to somewhat more typical through-the-cycle charge-off levels would still mean charge-offs rise somewhat. Put differently, this is the wholesale equivalent of that entire normalization versus deterioration narrative we discussed extensively in card as the cycle normalized, though naturally the caveat is that within wholesale, things tend to be far lumpier. And at any particular point, you can't tell if something is idiosyncratic or signals a broader pattern. Still, at a high level, I'd say there's nothing too worrying. And in my view, it isn't especially driven by rates in either direction. Incidentally, Jamie has left us. He needed to attend another meeting. But I'm still here for whatever questions remain.

Chris McGratty

analyst
#61

Jeremy, I wanted to ask about competition for consumer deposits now that rates are declining, and we discussed how loan growth is beginning to show some positive signals. What I'd like to hear is your perspective on added competition broken down by market, by product, by peer — is it getting more intense or less? Is there anything else you can share?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#62

That area, I'd say, is perpetually highly competitive, and it has been that way across the whole cycle. I wouldn't — nothing has come to my attention lately that would shift that picture in either direction. The bigger takeaway, naturally, is that assuming nothing else changes, when the policy rate is lower, you'd anticipate that flows chasing yield would diminish even more. They're already quite subdued, as I mentioned; but during our earlier discussion of the consumer deposit outlook, we noted there's presently somewhat of a stalemate between this modest level of yield-seeking flows and the anticipated resumption of deposit growth per account. And something you could reasonably anticipate, with all else held constant, is that a drop in the headline policy rate would gradually ease the pressure coming from yield-seeking flows, apart obviously from the mechanical effect of lower CD rates, which is simply direct. Still, at a broad level, I'd say I really haven't come across anything noteworthy or fresh beyond the constant, ever-present backdrop of an intensely competitive marketplace.

Chris McGratty

analyst
#63

Excellent; now, turning to AWM for a second question. The flows and margins are still really, really strong. What I'd like to hear is your perspective on how sustainable that is, and where the biggest opportunities for growth sit over the medium term.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#64

Yeah. I'd say AWM is among the businesses into which we're putting money. Our bullishness on it goes back quite a while. Our investment there also goes back quite a while. We've rolled out a number of product innovations in asset management that have paid off really well and driven AUM growth. And yeah, specifically, clearly, bringing on advisers and bankers within the private bank has been one source — that effort has paid off handsomely, and we keep pushing harder there pretty aggressively; so that franchise is performing well. Flows have been outstanding, and it ranks among the areas where we see optimism going forward.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#65

Okay. Thank you very much, everyone. See you next quarter.

Operator

operator
#66

Appreciate everyone for joining us on today's call. You're welcome to hang up now, and enjoy the remainder of your day.

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