JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

October 14, 2025

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Banks earnings 57 min

What were the key takeaways from JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s October 14, 2025 earnings call?

In the third quarter of 2025, JPMorgan Chase & Co. reported a net income of $14.4 billion and earnings per share (EPS) of $5.07, reflecting a return on tangible common equity (ROTCE) of 20%. Revenue reached $47.1 billion, up 9% year-on-year, driven primarily by higher markets revenue and increased fees in asset management, investment banking, and payments. Management raised guidance for fourth quarter net interest income (NII) to approximately $25 billion, indicating a strong outlook for the remainder of the fiscal year.

What topics did JPMorgan Chase & Co. cover?

  • Revenue Growth: JPMorgan's revenue of $47.1 billion was up 9% year-on-year, with significant contributions from higher markets revenue and fees across various segments. Management noted, "The increase in NII driven by the impact of balance sheet growth and mix was offset by the impact of lower rates."
  • Credit Performance: Credit costs amounted to $3.4 billion, with net charge-offs of $2.6 billion. Management stated that credit performance remains in line with expectations, although there were "slightly elevated" charge-offs in Wholesale due to instances of fraud.
  • Expense Management: Expenses increased to $24.3 billion, up 8% year-on-year, driven by higher volume and revenue-related expenses. Management emphasized a focus on expense discipline, stating, "We're going to try to keep that focus separate from our commitment to invest for growth."
  • Guidance Update: Management raised fourth quarter NII guidance to approximately $25 billion and indicated a full-year adjusted expense estimate of $95.9 billion. They noted, "The consensus of about $100 billion does look a little bit low" for 2026 NII expectations.
  • Consumer Resilience: Management highlighted the resilience of consumers and small businesses, stating, "Our credit metrics, including early-stage delinquencies remain stable and slightly better than expected." This suggests a positive outlook for consumer credit performance.

What were JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s October 14, 2025 results?

  • Net Income: $14.4B (vs $13.5B est, +10% YoY)
  • EPS: $5.07 (beat by $0.15)
  • Revenue: $47.1B (vs $43.2B est, +9% YoY)
  • Expenses: $24.3B (vs $22.5B est, +8% YoY)
  • NII: $25B (guidance raised for Q4)
  • ROTCE: 20% (vs 18% est)

JPMorgan's strong third quarter results, coupled with raised guidance, indicate a robust outlook for the remainder of the fiscal year. However, analysts are cautious about potential credit risks and macroeconomic headwinds. Investors should monitor the bank's expense management and credit performance closely as catalysts for future stock movement.

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#1

Thanks, and good morning, everyone. First off, I'd like to note that we're experimenting with a condensed version of our prepared remarks this quarter. We're shortening this section of the call so we can reach your questions sooner and reduce the time spent repeating items you've already seen in the earnings materials. So, turning to this quarter's results, the company reported net income of $14.4 billion and EPS of $5.07, alongside an ROTCE of 20%. Revenue totaled $47.1 billion, an increase of 9% compared with a year earlier, driven largely by stronger markets revenue as well as higher fees in asset management, investment banking and payments. Balance sheet expansion and a more favorable mix lifted NII, but that improvement was canceled out by lower rates. On expenses, we landed at $24.3 billion, which is 8% higher than the same period a year ago, and the causes look a lot like what we described in prior quarters — greater volume plus costs tied to revenue. The presentation lays out all the specific drivers. Credit costs came to $3.4 billion, consisting of $2.6 billion in net charge-offs and an $810 million net reserve build. In Wholesale, charge-offs ran a bit high owing to a small number of apparent fraud cases in certain secured lending facilities. Also, the credit picture for both Wholesale and Consumer is matching our projections. Regarding our balance sheet, we ended the quarter at a CET1 ratio of 14.8%, a decline of 30 basis points versus the previous quarter. The presentation breaks down the various positive and negative factors. This quarter's elevated RWA stems primarily from growth in wholesale lending in both Banking and Markets, plus other markets activities. Now looking at our business segments. CCB reported $5 billion in net income. Its revenue reached $19.5 billion, up 9% compared to a year ago, driven mostly by higher NII, which was largely a result of increased revolving balances. There are a few points worth highlighting. According to what our data shows, consumers and small businesses continue to hold up well. We are monitoring the labor market closely because it may be softening, but our credit measures, such as early-stage delinquencies, have stayed steady and come in slightly above what we had projected. According to FDIC figures, we maintained the top spot for retail deposit share in a market where deposits were fairly unchanged, and that makes five years in a row that we have led the industry. Also, since our Sapphire refresh has drawn so much interest, we should note that new account acquisitions for the Sapphire portfolio have already reached their highest level ever this year. CIB reported net income of $6.9 billion. Revenue came to $19.9 billion, a 17% increase compared with the prior year, fueled by stronger revenues in markets, payments, investment banking and security services. Let me give you a little more detail. Investment banking fees climbed 16% compared with a year earlier, driven by busier activity across our products and especially strong equity underwriting amid an active IPO market. Our pipeline is still healthy, and the outlook, the market environment, and how clients are feeling all remain positive. Turning to Markets: fixed income gained 21% versus last year, helped by higher rates and credit revenues plus a solid showing in securitized products. Equities advanced 33%, reflecting robust client engagement across the whole franchise, with standout results in prime. Switching now to Asset & Wealth Management: AWM delivered net income of $1.7 billion on a 36% pretax margin. We hit a record top line of $6.1 billion in revenue, which rose 12% compared with a year earlier. The main fuel was management fee growth stemming from robust net inflows and elevated average market levels, plus more brokerage activity. For the quarter, long-term net inflows totaled $72 billion, with fixed income and equities leading the way. AUM came in at $4.6 trillion, up 18% versus last year, and client assets hit $6.8 trillion, a 20% year-on-year increase, thanks to ongoing net inflows and higher market levels. Also, before I turn to the outlook, Corporate posted $825 million in net income and $1.7 billion in revenue. Regarding what lies ahead, given that we already have three quarters of performance in the books, my plan is to refresh the guidance for the entire year by focusing on the fourth quarter; additionally, the implied full-year figures have been worked out on the page, which makes checking them against what we previously projected straightforward. For the fourth quarter, we anticipate NII ex Markets landing at roughly $23.5 billion, while total NII should reach approximately $25 billion. For Q4, we're looking at adjusted expenses of roughly $24.5 billion, and that brings the total for the entire year to about $95.9 billion — the higher revenue backdrop is what's pushing that up. Turning to credit, our updated projection for the 2025 card net charge-off rate sits at roughly 3.3%, reflecting better delinquency patterns as consumers continue to show resilience. Since everyone's attention is on Q4, and we know you'll probably take that quarterly NII figure and run it out across the year while asking about 2026, we're offering our central case for NII ex Markets in 2026: approximately $95 billion. Keep in mind this is an early look, and the standard qualifications apply. On top of that, we haven't wrapped up the yearly budget process. When it comes to costs, getting that budget cycle done matters even more, and that's the reason we aren't giving you any new figures at this point. You might not have put much effort into fine-tuning your 2026 projections just yet, but it's still worth mentioning: when we examine the fourth quarter, account for seasonality and anticipated wage inflation, and then layer in some growth, that roughly $100 billion consensus figure appears somewhat understated. The official 2026 guidance covering NII, expenses, and the card NCO rate will come with our fourth quarter earnings, and we'll get a chance to go over that outlook again at the company update we recently announced for February. At this point we're glad to take your questions, so let's start the Q&A.

John McDonald

analyst
#2

I appreciate the early guidance regarding NII for 2026. Jeremy, I'd like to dig into what retail deposit expectations went into that figure. During Investor Day, you mentioned that deposits should increase 3% compared to a year earlier by Q4, and I believe speed up to 6% in the following year; this quarter they appear to have stayed flat. So I'm just checking whether you still anticipate that same growth of 3% and 6% that was previously projected.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#3

Yeah. That's a fair question, John. Thank you. Indeed, you're pointing to a specific slide Marianne showed at Investor Day for CCB, containing illustrative scenarios regarding how CCB deposit growth might behave under various possible macroeconomic conditions. Under the central case that was in place at that time, we had 3% growth for Q4 of this year and 6% forecast for 2026; now, as we sit here and refresh our view of the macro backdrop, several things hold true. First, the personal savings rate has come in somewhat below what we anticipated. Consumer spending stayed strong, even as income came in somewhat weaker. So all else being equal, that reduces balances per account in CCB. And as you're well aware, equity markets have performed especially well, which pushes flows toward investments, and our Wealth Management business is capturing that. Yet again, that creates somewhat of a headwind for balances per account. And compared with the scenario we used back then, rates have come in somewhat above what the forwards indicated, and that is generating, once more, somewhat more yield-seeking flow than would otherwise be expected. Those flows remain under the peak, but they're still a factor; so looking ahead, the underlying drivers haven't gone away. Breaking it down, ongoing net new accounts are clearly a key driver. For this quarter, that's been solid, with more than 400,000 net new checking accounts; what remains, then, is simply the matter of how the average balance per customer moves and when that figure reaches its inflection point given the factors we just discussed. So at the margin, that upward inflection point has been delayed somewhat. Still, broadly speaking, we stay fairly confident in the long-term trajectory overall and remain optimistic, though the shift in the macro environment has just modestly delayed some of the growth inflection dynamics.

John McDonald

analyst
#4

Understood. That's useful, and perhaps if we stay with that first take on 2026. Which other main assumptions sit inside it, especially regarding commercial deposits, plus possibly loan growth and rates?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#5

Absolutely. Right. So in line with our standard practice, the forward curves in effect on September 30 are what we rely on; that captures whatever cuts are applicable, I believe the effect of the 75 basis points of cuts during this year, and I believe at the close of September, it was 25 basis point cuts in the first half of 2026; so that, with everything else held equal, is clearly a headwind given that we stay asset sensitive and the annualization of this year and the first half of next year. And then balancing that out, you have every one of the growth dynamics, among them card revolve growth, which has clearly been a meaningful tailwind yet it is going to decelerate somewhat since the normalization of revolve is nearly done at this point but we continue to see quite healthy acquisition dynamics there. So that is going to be a growth driver, though somewhat smaller. And in the same way, I mean, turning a bit toward deposits for a moment. We just discussed how much deposit balance growth contributes to that, and that is going to be a factor. Within Wholesale deposits, this year was a very strong year for growth. So we would anticipate it being somewhat more muted in the next year but the core franchise is performing great. And then wholesale loan growth is going to be whatever it is but the trends in that area are solid; so it is the typical combination of rate headwinds offsetting balanced growth and mix. So we will sharpen it further next quarter, and we will see how it turns out.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#6

I was hoping to dig a bit deeper into credit. I think you already provided us with sufficient detail regarding the Consumer segment. You pointed out the idiosyncratic names within broadly syndicated. So perhaps we could take a step back and note that you're a major participant in, clearly, all of it — broadly syndicated loans, high-yield markets, and more and more in private debt. So what I'm asking covers both demand and credit fundamentals: what are you observing regarding what's driving client demand on the lending side within Wholesale? And then, crucially, are you witnessing credit fundamentals that differ between public and private markets, since there's been plenty of conversation about that recently, and I feel you're in the ideal spot to assist us.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#7

Alright. I'll try my hardest to be helpful. So let me clear one item first, since you were courteous enough not to bring it up, but I already sort of revealed it during the press call. As you're aware, Glenn, we typically aren't in the practice of discussing specific borrower circumstances. But because of how much public scrutiny the Tricolor matter has attracted specifically, I believe it's worth stating that this is adding $170 million of charge-offs this quarter, which we flag on the wholesale side; also worth mentioning, there's been considerable focus on the First Brands situation. We hold no exposure to them. So in any case, that's worth clearing up. So you inquired about demand and you inquired about public-private differentiation. Regarding demand, I genuinely believe — and I don't want to wear out this expression — that from our franchise's standpoint, this sort of moment of renewed animal spirits, so to speak, is fueling demand. We're observing quite robust deal flow. We're observing acquisition finance returning. Naturally, we were heavily involved in one notably large deal during this quarter. And I'd say generally, and perhaps this also speaks somewhat to the public-private question, our credit approach that's agnostic about product across the entire continuum is working out quite well. And I think certain events this quarter demonstrate that when there's something significant to accomplish, we're the ones to contact and we'll deliver the optimal solution spanning a highly comprehensive full product suite. You asked if we're noticing differentiation in fundamentals between private and public spaces. I'm not sure. I haven't particularly heard that. I think it likely hinges somewhat on how you characterize the spaces and what exactly you're differentiating. Like clearly, to state the obvious, subprime auto has been a difficult space for participants in that industry, but that's probably not quite what you meant by private credit; and I haven't heard anything indicating that private deals are performing in a way that differs from public deals. At the margin, it's likely accurate that a portion of the fresh direct lending programs carry underwriting with somewhat elevated anticipated losses, and that matters because, as we've discussed in this conversation, the wholesale charge-off rate has remained extremely low across a lengthy stretch. My view is that merely letting that revert to normal would generate certain upticks in wholesale charge-offs. And clearly, as we've talked about extensively on the consumer side during the past couple of years, while you're in that reversion period, you're always asking yourself whether this is reversion or whether things have tipped into deterioration. Whether that's showing up yet in Wholesale, I can't say, but another point worth making is that the portfolio we hold now will feature a somewhat different composition than what we've carried through the prior 10 or 15 years. Consequently, the anticipated charge-off rate will be marginally greater, with everything else held constant, though naturally that arrives alongside suitable revenues and returns.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#8

I've got one more question about the reserve build. I understand you said it's mostly from growth in card loans. But can you help us understand your thinking on the reserves you're holding against the commercial book, particularly since you just noted that the portfolio mix now differs from what it was in a prior cycle? When I say prior cycle, I mean before COVID, but tell me if you have a different period in mind.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#9

Sure. I'd say our frame of reference was really the whole period since the global financial crisis. At one of our Investor Days a couple of years back, I believe we showed a slide with the wholesale charge-off rate across 10 years. I may be misremembering, but as I recall it was roughly 0 on a net basis, which clearly can't be expected to continue. As for your specific question on reserves, I think you have seen a bit of this already. It may not stand out in the consolidated figures. But during some of the past few quarters, as we began doing more of these direct lending transactions, those deals bring substantial day 1 reserve balances when they hit our books. So ordinarily, that kind of growth arrives with solid reserves. And with luck, our underwriting is correct, and we recover all of that money, naturally. That said, yes, as you're well aware, our whole Wholesale reserve approach is extremely granular and highly specific. Consequently, if the mix changes, that loan growth will carry somewhat greater reserve intensity, though it will be determined case by case.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#10

All right. Great. Then my second question concerns your plans for putting excess capital to work. I realize there was a press release yesterday about focusing on sectors that matter for American security, and similar things. Could you perhaps elaborate somewhat on that additional $500 billion — are you referring to backing expansion across the coming 10 years, weighed against the possibility of raising the dividend? Clearly, you could pursue both at once. Still, I simply wanted to grasp yesterday's press release within that frame, along with what chance there is to increase the dividend.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#11

Certainly, okay; and indeed, you somewhat responded to your own inquiry, and it's sort of a do everything simultaneously situation. Naturally, though, we won't provide forward guidance regarding repurchases or dividend strategy. Yet as you're aware, indeed, we're producing substantial organic capital. Our access is extremely big. We've basically indicated a desire to accelerate the expansion of that access; we've essentially accomplished that since establishing it. And that's in fact allowing us — well — meanwhile, we've in fact expanded RWA considerably, which has produced a few genuine declines in the CET1 ratio; so — as everyone knows, we don't enjoy repurchasing the stock around these prices, yet we wish to maintain the excess at a sensible level. Meanwhile, we're deploying our financial resources to extend credit into the actual economy quite widely throughout the whole franchise; and indeed, yesterday's press release continues that effort. So both, regarding what we already intended to do under ordinary circumstances plus a goal to include a further $0.5 trillion of such lending on the margin. That represents the sort of RWA expansion that uses up excess. And clearly, within the context of the excess, $10 billion of direct equity investments that are additional is a good use of a small share of the excess. And clearly, it won't occur all at once; so I believe all of the above is likely the brief response to your inquiry.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#12

Let's zoom out for a second, Jamie. Your comment in the press release says customers are resilient, but there's still a ton of uncertainty. What I'd like to know is, from where you sit, looking at both Commercial and Consumer, are things getting better as we move toward '26? Or are we closer to a tipping point, where the jobless rate could jump in the coming months and that sparks fresh anxiety about the credit cycle. Even a rough steer on which direction you think this goes would be helpful.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#13

Sure. Jamie may hold personal views on this, but speaking broadly, the story we're trying to tell is grounded in what's true right now. On the consumer front, what's true right now is that people keep bouncing back, they're spending at a healthy clip, and delinquency rates are actually landing under what we'd projected. Those are realities we simply can't get around. And when I talk with our economists, a remark from Mike Farley stuck with me — it was about how we should view today's labor market at a time many are calling a low hiring, low firing moment. One idea is that businesses are dealing with a lot of unpredictability. If you accept that and view right now as a period marked by substantial unpredictability, then "tipping point" may be wording that's stronger than the situation warrants. Still, looking forward, risks clearly exist; growth is already decelerating. We face numerous difficulties along with various drivers of turbulence and unpredictability. So it isn't hard to picture a scenario in which conditions in the labor market get worse than they are now. Should that occur, clearly, as you're aware, consumer credit results will come in weaker. I wouldn't go so far as to say we're banging the drum on this, but we're simply pointing out, as is our habit, that risks exist — and just because conditions are good at the moment doesn't mean they'll stay excellent indefinitely.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#14

On the shareholder side, will AI and the efficiency it delivers really be significant for banks across the next two to three years? Clearly, everyone addressed this at the Investor Day. I'm simply attempting to place it in context — whenever you talk about the expense growth outlook, or offer an early view on the coming year, in what way should people who own bank stocks think about productivity gains driven by AI when it comes to actually reducing expense growth, either next year or across the next few years?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#15

Yeah, that's just my personal perspective. I wouldn't pretend to represent how anyone ought to look at this throughout the entire system. Still, my concern is that right now AI is such a dominant force across the whole market — plus everything it's doing to how equities perform, to the MAG 7, to data center construction, to power expenses — that it simply becomes too much to process. For those of us leading a business like this one, the priority has to be keeping our feet on the ground, dealing with what's real, what's factual, and what produces concrete results; that's why so much effort goes into it. Plenty of staff are devoting serious hours to it. Significant sums are being allocated to it. And we have specialists whose expertise runs very deep. Jamie often points out that our efforts in this area stretch back years, long before generative AI became the hot trend it is today. Still, whether we can genuinely reduce how quickly costs are rising is something only real results will settle. Instead of demanding proof that AI is producing a specific level of savings — something that's really difficult to accomplish and demonstrate, and which could, at the edges, push folks to frantically apply AI in ways that aren't actually efficient and pull their attention away from the process reengineering work they still need to tackle — our approach is simply this: apply traditional cost control, put limits on growth, put limits on headcount growth; that's something we discussed last year. Our approach for this year will mirror that: we hold a strong preference against automatically answering any need by adding headcount, and we're a bit more comfortable leaning on the organization that way, since we recognize that while our measurement of it isn't always exact, AI clearly delivers productivity gains. That's the plan we're following. Ideally, it results in slower growth than we'd otherwise see; however, many growth drivers — per capita labor inflation along with revenue-related expense and investments — will persist regardless, and those are things we'll keep doing indefinitely. So that's how we think about it.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#16

If the two of you could answer this — Jeremy and Jamie — what I really want to know is how big a danger does lending to the NDFIs pose? Just — I ask because the two of you are constantly upfront calling out what might go wrong, be it cyber, or as you mentioned, the labor market or inflation. And it seems to me this hasn't really been flagged by you as a possible risk zone. Perhaps that's since you don't see it that way, but you've got Tricolor, you've got First Brands. One of your fastest-growing areas, I believe, has been NDFIs during the last year. So I'm just attempting to place this into some kind of context: when it comes to Tricolor, who ends up absorbing the losses? Do the end investors in the funds? Is it — do you have skin in the game with your own investments? Are you acting as an underwriter? Where does your exposure lie? So I suppose I'm directing this to JPMorgan in particular, but then to Jamie more broadly for the whole industry. Is this a flashing yellow light that you're devoting more time to? How ought we to think about it?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#17

Right. So let me do as you requested, Mike, and provide a bit of context here. So a couple — let's handle some housekeeping first. So you brought up Tricolor, you brought up First Brands. I just want to repeat, we have zero exposure to First Brands; regarding Tricolor, it accounts for $170 million of the wholesale charge-off in this quarter. Obviously, by definition, that's a reflection of on-balance sheet loans that we are charging off. And as for other exposures, I don't really have anything further to say on that right now. It will unfold as it unfolds. But in the ordinary course, we're consistently pretty conservative about absorbing every possible hit we can based on what's knowable upfront. So take that for whatever it's worth. More broadly, I think one thing that matters to say for context regarding NBFI lending is that the great bulk of that kind of lending we engage in is highly secured or in some fashion structured or securitized. Put differently, it's not as if we're engaged in extremely high-risk, low-rated lending for the NBFI community; and so that doesn't mean there's no risk; that doesn't mean things can't go wrong. And obviously, if you're engaged in secured lending and the collateral has problems, that's an issue, which is plainly relevant in Tricolor's case; so — and we've discussed at length the question about risk inside the regulated perimeter versus risk outside the perimeter. But we've also recognized that many of the private credit players are large, very sophisticated, very skilled at credit underwriting. Thus, I don't believe one ought to take away from this that standards are inevitably weaker in that space or that a massive structural issue exists; and insofar as we extend credit to certain of these entities—who happen to be both our clients and our rivals—that extension of credit adheres to our standard procedures. It tends to be very well collateralized. And every activity we engage in carries some form of risk. Yet I'm not convinced that our provision of loans to the NBFI community constitutes a risk area that strikes us as more heightened than any other risk area, I suppose, is how I'd put it.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#18

Right, Mike, one more thing I'd mention is that this is a really big segment made up of nonbank financial institutions, and roughly 50% of it, I'd say, strikes us as quite conventional, nothing out of the ordinary. Part of it looks quite different now compared with how it looked years back, while another part really hasn't changed much. Still, when you consider things such as COs, CLOs, and lending to leveraged entities that get underwritten using leveraged loans, you end up with something of a double leverage situation layered in there. So my take is: absolutely, that segment carries extra risk that will surface once a downturn arrives. My expectation is that it turns out somewhat worse than what others are anticipating, since none of us knows the full underwriting standards every one of those players applied. Jeremy described them as extremely sharp participants. They understand their business, they've operated for many years, yet not every one of them is all that sharp, and we aren't even familiar with the criteria other banks used when underwriting to some of these entities. My suspicion is that a few of those criteria aren't as solid as you'd assume. With luck, ours are quite solid, even though we clearly make our own errors as well. So yes, I believe it comes in somewhat worse. The credit environment has stayed friendly for such an extended stretch that, in my view, credit elsewhere could weaken somewhat more than anticipated once an actual downturn hits. Ideally, we get a reasonably typical credit cycle. What invariably occurs is that something turns out worse than a typical credit cycle, worse than a typical downturn, so we'll find out. That said, we believe we're extremely cautious. And clearly, we search the globe for anything that ought to concern us. Even so, I keep reminding everyone that the bull market has run a long while. Asset prices sit at elevated levels, and much of the credit-related activity out there won't become visible until a downturn comes.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#19

So, just a quick follow-up regarding Tricolor — once again, this is truly a minuscule amount for you folks — but have you revisited your workflows and made any changes?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#20

Yeah. What I'd say, Michael, is that you ought to take it as a given that any time an event occurs, we examine every process, every procedure, every aspect of underwriting, everything. And we believe we're fine on other matters. But I — my instincts perk up whenever those kinds of situations arise. And perhaps I shouldn't admit this, yet if you spot a single cockroach, chances are there are additional ones. So we ought to — everybody ought to be alerted about this particular case; and First Brands, I'd place in that same bucket; and a few others out there that I've observed also fall into comparable buckets. So — but we constantly review these matters, and we aren't — I'm being careful here. We screw up as well. So time will tell. In my view, there was plainly fraud connected to several of these situations. Yet that doesn't imply we can't sharpen our practices.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#21

Jeremy, it's clear you folks are major participants in home lending, in the residential mortgage space. If you compare that revenue stream to banking and wealth management, it clearly isn't as large. Still, here's what I want to ask. This administration appears to be the type that, once they make statements, they back them up with actual steps. A few months back, Treasury Secretary Bessent said he believes this nation faces a housing emergency. So what I'd like to know from you is: assuming Treasury yields stay where they are, what steps do you think they could take to narrow the gap between mortgage rates and the matching Treasury yield? What concrete moves could they make to shrink that gap, bring mortgage rates down, and get the housing market more active — since refinancing would naturally increase as a result?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#22

I'll handle that question. Let's start with supply. We all understand the components — permits, regulations, rules at the local level, the time required to obtain approvals and construct, the not-in-my-backyard problem, restrictions like not being allowed to put up 2 stories in certain areas. That covers supply. Now demand — and keep in mind, homeownership shouldn't always be the push. Years back, government policy made a serious error on that front. On supply, though, we've raised this point repeatedly. I've discussed it for years — the focus ought to be on cutting the requirements, and our view is that you'd bring mortgage costs down by 30 to 40 basis points in total, with no added risk. After the great financial crisis, excessive measures were layered on — and yes, a response was warranted, but it went too far. Anyone who's taken out a mortgage can tell you about signing 17 forms, 17 documents, and so on; that, to me, is the clearest example. And of course, on government policy, if they want to expand FHA, that's their call; where they choose to subsidize mortgages for near prime or similar borrowers is up to them; but if they went that route, my advice would be to always proceed very carefully.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#23

Great; and to build on that, if we talk more broadly about the agencies that oversee banks, it's clear there has been a big shift under the current administration. Could you share whatever insight you can about what you're genuinely observing in practice, since we are roughly 9 months into this administration working with the new regulators? And beyond that, any insight on the expected timing for Basel III end game and what you're picking up regarding how it might stack up against the initial proposal from July of '23.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#24

Yeah. I appreciate that, Gerard. I'd say I share your view. This administration is making statements and, based on what we observe, moving toward concrete steps fairly fast. So what we pick up from our interactions in Washington, and there has been some fairly thorough coverage in the media lately about how possible new proposals could evolve, and that lines up with what we're also picking up. But broadly speaking, there's an inclination to act, to accomplish things rapidly, and from our vantage point they're examining matters in a fairly thorough way. And as you're aware, we've made the case for quite a while, Jamie has made the case repeatedly, that the issue isn't some system-wide calibration, some sort of reverse-engineering exercise aimed at some figure of whatever kind. The issue is examining each separate piece of the capital rules, grasped as a whole, computing it correctly, and then allowing that to produce whatever result it produces. And incidentally, that result will differ across firms based on their particular business mix. And that's fine. And that's partly why it doesn't truly make sense to attempt to calibrate toward some system-wide aggregate level. It's simply a matter of computing it correctly in a manner that fits the specific product or business line or risk source, and you'll end up with a sensible result for the system. And based on what we're picking up, that is largely where things are headed. The agencies involved are collaborating effectively. There's a feeling of urgency. And so we're heartened; and I'd actually point out, returning to your earlier question, that one area where getting the individual product level right matters is enabling banks to fulfill their proper function in the residential mortgage lending market when it — in cases where it's sensible, retain those instruments on the balance sheet, you want the capital treatment of those to be sensible and matched to the risk; and once more, from what we understand, that is where things are headed; so regarding timing, honestly, your guess is as good as mine. I believe there have been some public remarks, and I would simply rely on those and the media coverage; but we certainly detect a wish to accomplish things rapidly. And these matters are complex. In certain areas, we might have some differences of opinion at the edges. Our stance on the G-SIB surcharge remains one of fundamental disapproval. Even so, we aren't going to allow the ideal to stand in the way of progress, and the signals reaching us are moving favorably.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#25

Right, and I’ll just put the Dana figure in there—they’re on it, examining it as a whole, which is excellent. Still, that Dana number is accurate. For years I’ve pointed out that G-SIB, CCAR, operational risk capital, and double counting of the trading book are simply mistaken. Some of those figures are so far off that when they publish them, they ought to include a disclosure admitting, we understand these are highly inaccurate, similar to the CCAR test. We recognize this bears no real connection to reality, or things along those lines—so it amounts to almost a deceptive disclosure of such items; just give the true figure. The next thing they genuinely ought to do, and I believe they are doing it, is ask what the intended effect is and what the unintended effect is. So consider this—we’ve dropped from 8,000 public companies down to 4,000 public companies. We’ve shifted from pushing mortgages out of the banking system to an enormous buildup within portions of the nonbank institutions, plus a tremendous amount of arbitrage occurring. If I were a regulator, I’d examine all of that and say, my God, is this what I wanted? And the greatest frustration is they couldn’t repair all these things, lower liquidity, lower capital, all these things and make the system safer; so a Silicon Valley Bank blew up because they were so fixated on governance, they neglected to focus on interest rate exposure. And they’re implementing changes that address what risk banks are truly bearing, rather than constantly signaling what a bank ought to be doing. So with luck, they’ll get it done. I believe they’re committed to getting it done. Just look at their words and their speeches—I’m referring to the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC. So I think it’s quite good. Let’s get it done quickly.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#26

My initial question goes to you, Jeremy. This falls under the heading of no good deed goes unpunished. I just wanted to pose a brief question regarding the expense outlook for '26. You said that $100 billion might be somewhat low and that you're currently in the midst of the planning cycle. That would suggest 4% growth year-over-year. Should we now assume that this represents the new normal for labor rate inflation?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#27

Okay; so yes, there are a couple of points regarding that. First, without going too deep into the details, our expenses do have some seasonality. Taking Q4 and extending it across a full year — there are situations where you get a pile of offsets and treating it that way works well, and other times where it doesn't. Because of that, our approach is consistently to begin from what amounts to a fourth-quarter rate stretched to an annual basis. While that logic works fine for NII, applying it to expenses is a far trickier matter. But let me pull back for a second — none of this is news to you. Take ECI or any other official gauge of wage-cost pressures: even with inflation now significantly reduced, we're nowhere near the situation in the middle of the 2010s, when inflation was essentially zero in every practical sense. So yes, I'd say labor's new baseline sits around something like 3% or 4%. And labor isn't the only piece, obviously. Again, I don't want to overlook how much inflation has, more or less, returned to its typical level. However, when we say normal, we're referring to what the Fed has set as its goal. For some time, that goal wasn't being met. So regardless of whether we're talking about workers or about products and services—and I won't get into tariffs or anything like that—this affects every part of what we spend. Beyond that, as we've mentioned, we'll put money into areas where it's justified. We'll compensate for results when results are stronger, and typically, when revenue grows, other costs that fluctuate will grow along with it. On top of everything else, there's the matter of productivity—which encompasses, though it isn't limited to, gains driven by AI. You should figure that we'll be applying pressure everywhere, doing whatever it takes to pull the greatest possible productivity from the company. Yet, as always, we'll work to preserve that emphasis while staying dedicated to putting money into growth wherever we've chosen to do so.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#28

Also, Erika, let me piggyback on that point about medical costs — we laid out roughly $3 billion there. Next year that figure will climb by 10%. So as you consider these various items, we already have that visibility, and there's a decent chance it rises by yet another 10% in 2027, for a variety of reasons. That covers one item. Turning to compensation, I'd like to flag something: you've got ordinary inflation plus pay-for-performance and so forth. Considerable pressure exists — coming from competitors who compensate generously, such as hedge funds, law firms, private equity, and nonbank financial institutions — and we intend to compensate our team at competitive levels; that is indispensable if the goal is a superb company over the coming 20 years. So that element factors in as well. Whether it shifts a great deal is unclear to me when you examine it, but I'd encourage you to keep it in mind. Hearing me state this is likely worthwhile for all of you. The same will hold for research.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#29

I want to be sure my manager gets a copy of this transcript. The next thing I'd like to ask, though, is really directed at you, Jamie. Your approach to thinking about risk has always stood apart, and I have a question with two parts for you. First, when it comes to NDFI exposure and risk, it feels like we don't even know which questions are the correct ones to pose, and that's an incredibly wide-ranging category. So here's my two-part question. First, as it pertains to future credit risk, what questions do you believe investors ought to be asking while they evaluate NDFI exposure? And second, in certain structures, the SSFA accounting for RWAs could allow NDFI exposure RWAs to be brought down from 100% to a level that's much lower — should investors be worried about that?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#30

Which SSFA?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#31

Understood. That abbreviation used to be familiar to me. Within securitization, it's a technical matter: in certain circumstances, the RWA weighting is permitted to be reduced.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#32

Does that fall under insurance?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#33

Nope, this one applies to us. It's sort of tied to the rate cap regulations. Right. Would you rather I take that item first, and then you handle the opening one? So although I can't recall exactly what the — I believe it's something like standardized securitization, or whatever the acronym is. I don't remember what those letters mean. But based on my memory of reviewing it, it strikes me as a tool that lets you take risk weightings that would otherwise be punitive for particular kinds of structures and bring them down from 100 to 20, when one could argue 20 is still likely too high, since you've basically offset the whole risk. So my initial <<inaudible>> to your question is among everything to be concerned about, that item — call it whatever you like, protection enhancement or risk weighting decrease in that specific context — wouldn't be something I'd lose sleep over. As for your point about which questions to raise regarding the NBFI area broadly, I mean, Jamie has his own perspective. But yeah, I think you begin by recognizing that it's an extremely, extremely wide area. So we likely need to tighten the scope somewhat. Subprime auto is one matter, while lending to something like a trillion-dollar asset is a completely different matter; so...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#34

Perhaps we should give this a shot and share a bit more detail. Our exposure there feels reasonably comfortable to us. Still, here's what I think you ought to do — when a downturn arrives, and that's the key point, a credit cycle is going to happen. That shouldn't catch us off guard. Credit card losses rise, middle market losses rise, and in a credit downturn everything deteriorates. My suspicion — though I can't demonstrate it, and I don't know, since none of us knows what underwriting standards everyone else uses. Occasionally we get a look at what another player is up to, and it surprises us that their standards aren't especially strong, yet that's always been the case. My hunch is that when a downturn comes, you'll observe credit losses of a downturn type that run above normal in particular categories. That's simply my suspicion. Then there's another item you could tackle, and I'm going to have Mike Grub handle it for me since I request it from time to time: examine how BDCs are priced along with their publicly traded private credit facilities, and do the work. Disclosures exist regarding that, and we do this. So perhaps at some point we give it a shot, setting out the various carriers of MBFIs — which ones might raise concern and which ones don't.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#35

Perhaps I'll start with what's happening in investment banking. Clearly, conditions have improved. I'm wondering where you're seeing the greatest momentum building up; and with rate reductions on the horizon, is it your sense that we're beginning to witness a pickup in activity, or at least the possibility of one, from financial sponsors? I'd love to hear your perspective.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#36

All right. That's a thought-provoking one regarding sponsors. Honestly, I'm not sure. Speaking for myself, I'm not convinced that rate reductions that the market has already fully anticipated will significantly alter how a highly sophisticated professional group such as financial sponsors behaves. Should that contribute to a flattening of the yield curve driven by other factors, beyond what forwards have already priced in, then the picture might be somewhat different. That said, what I believe is undeniably the case, and this speaks somewhat to what you're asking, is that the climate is — the outcomes are extremely strong and the mood is quite positive. From where I sit, one fascinating angle is to trace how the story has unfolded since the start of the year, correct? There was that period when — everybody was discussing animal spirits and a massive surge; and then came Liberation Day along with all the tariff-related uncertainty and stock market turbulence. As a result, activity sort of quieted down for a stretch; yet what stands out is that on the IPO front, for instance, processes got underway early in the year. And those processes kept moving forward even when conditions weren't optimal for the transactions. The consequence of that is a great deal of material sitting in the pipeline that is essentially primed to launch. And at present, conditions are far more conducive, whether we're talking about stock market valuations, at least up until lately, comparatively subdued stock market volatility, somewhat greater breadth in the rally when it comes to multiples, encompassing smaller cap tech sector and so forth. So yes, that's one particular area. Meanwhile, as you're aware, we're beginning to observe heightened M&A activity too. I mentioned before, I believe it was the most active summer we've experienced in quite some time when it comes to announced M&A activity. We're watching that translate into acquisition finance. From the standpoint of being able to complete deals, I'd say the rate environment is sufficiently favorable. So the overall environment is quite supportive. However, as you're well aware, that could shift in an instant.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#37

Yeah, that all makes sense. Then perhaps a quick follow-up regarding capital relief and the way you're tweaking, or at minimum beginning to consider tweaking, in response to that acceleration in RWA growth. Are there other areas, be it within the Markets division or other activities with marginal returns, where you spot chances to push into growth and consume capital, since clearly the IRRs on buybacks at present, at these levels, aren't particularly attractive.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#38

Right, precisely. What I mean is that's the very calculation we constantly perform, which goes something like: given particular assumptions, what does a buyback yield and what else could we do; of course, we need to be cautious in this area, correct? What I mean is if you push that logic to its limit and claim, well, we'd like to pursue every single piece of business that sits merely 1 basis point above the hypothetical return from buybacks, you could end up making plenty of truly foolish risk choices; therefore you want it to be business that's franchise accretive, and you want to acknowledge that your own estimate of that business's return carries some uncertainty. Jamie frequently remarks that placing liquid par assets onto the balance sheet and layering on leverage isn't something that genuinely creates value, regardless of whatever purported return that instrument shows in the spreadsheet. So that's something we — it's something we ponder frequently. And — yet I'd say insofar as that is influencing how we act, it's likely already influencing how we act, since, as you're aware, we've possessed the access for a good while. The tangible book multiple's price has been climbing for a good while; therefore we'll keep seeking constructive methods to deploy while ensuring we avoid doing anything foolish, honestly.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#39

I was hoping to get some color on total loan yields. I saw they rose 3 basis points during the quarter. Clearly, rates weren't really moving over that period, and now they're starting to come back down. So I'm just curious what's mainly driving the fact that we can still see loan yields moving higher.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#40

That's not something I ever look at. So I genuinely don't know why loan yield went up 3 basis points in the quarter. If I were to guess, though, it's usually some combination of mix effects, since across this company we hold loans with wildly differing yields, ranging from SOFR plus 20 basis points on up; so even modest shifts in mix can have an outsized impact. And then, of course, you have plenty of floating rate instruments — holding everything else constant, you'd think those yields would be lower because of the cuts that have already happened, yet mix effects can readily outweigh that. So I'm confident Michael will give you a solid answer before this call wraps up, but that's one I hadn't checked.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#41

All right, I want to pick up from there. Then, regarding the Sapphire refresh, let's suppose we're beginning to observe a portion of the awards amortization appearing in the card fees line as well as in the card revenue rate. So I'm curious whether you might sort of take us through it, now that this card is launching and you referenced solid additions in that area. What exactly should we be considering regarding which factor drives things when it comes to the card revenue rate, eventual volume growth, and the associated benefits?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#42

Yeah, that's a fair question. One item you may have picked up on when discussing sort of micro supplement points is that the revenue rate is in fact below the NII yield, which suggests a negative NIR yield; incidentally, that yield is a figure that frequently sits pretty near 0. So not much is needed for it to turn negative, yet at present it is negative, so to speak; and although there are numerous puts and takes within that figure when it comes to rewards liability, annual fees and such, the specific dynamic occurring right now is that through the refresh, customers are receiving greater value before the point when the annual fee rises. Thus there's a sort of transitional stretch of a few months while the refresh rolls through in which those figures are somewhat elevated.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#43

The charge shows up across a span of more than 12 months, and a portion of those incentives turn into negative NII beyond 12 months.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#44

Precisely.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#45

That is a single illustration of what you could call genuinely terrible accounting.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#46

Yeah. Once that stabilizes, a few of those figures could get back to looking a bit more typical, though working through it may well require two or three quarters.

Chris McGratty

analyst
#47

Regarding that 15% share of national retail deposits over the long term, does your pricing have to look materially different than it has lately? Put differently, do you need to offer somewhat more competitive pricing to achieve those 4 points of gain over time?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#48

Briefly, my answer would be no, unless my CCB colleagues either disagree or later shift their approach. But I believe what those figures show you at present is that we are indeed shedding a modest amount of share in the FDIC results just released, which place us at #1, something we're glad to mark for the fifth consecutive year. And the other top banks, or other big banks, that have taken up comparable pricing approaches are likewise experiencing some slight share loss. From where we sit, that's expected, a deliberate outcome of maintaining discipline in how we price deposits. And it essentially has no real relevance to the long-term growth plan for reaching 15%, which centers entirely on expansion and deepening plus the core value proposition we provide. And intriguingly, intriguingly, when you examine the detailed market-by-market figures within that FDIC data, you find that we are in fact gaining share across many of the highest priority, highest profile expansion markets; so in that regard, it genuinely confirms the strategy. And incidentally, I received my answer regarding the loan yield question. It's mix, cards included; so my guess was right.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#49

As Jeremy mentioned, our retail branch network is getting deeper. Still, keep in mind that this involves superior offerings, superior assistance, additional locations, and improved positioning, all made deeper through customer segmentation. Should we excel at each of those things, we then expect to take share. I believe we're performing well on that front, though we must sustain it across a 12-month period to reach 15%. Everyone, many thanks for giving us your time. We'll be in touch with all of you shortly.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#50

Thank you.

Operator

operator
#51

Appreciate everyone for joining us on today's call. At this point you're welcome to hang up, and enjoy the remainder of your day.

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