JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

October 11, 2024

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Banks earnings 65 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#1

Thanks, and good morning, everyone. Let's start on Page 1. The firm posted net income of $12.9 billion, with EPS of $4.37, revenue of $43.3 billion, and an ROTCE of 19%. A few highlights worth noting: in CCB, we remained #1 in retail deposit share for a fourth year in a row; in CIB, IB fees and Markets revenue both increased significantly versus the prior year, reflecting broad-based strength across the franchise. In AWM, quarterly revenues and long-term flows each reached record levels. Now let's turn to Page 2 for firm-wide results. Firm revenue totaled $43.3 billion, up $2.6 billion, or 6%, from a year ago. Net interest income excluding Markets came in at $274 million higher, a 1% gain. The improvement reflected balance sheet mix, securities reinvestment, more revolving balances in Card, and higher Wholesale deposit balances, though these were largely offset by lower deposit balances in Banking & Wealth Management along with compression in deposit margin. Noninterest revenue excluding Markets climbed $1.8 billion, or 17%; stripping out the net investment securities losses booked in the prior year, however, the rise was 10%, powered by higher asset management and Investment Banking fees. Markets revenue advanced $535 million year-on-year, an 8% increase. Expenses reached $22.6 billion, up $808 million, or 4%, from a year earlier, as compensation — including revenue-related compensation and employee growth — drove the increase, with lower legal expense providing a partial offset. Credit costs came in at $3.1 billion. That figure includes $2.1 billion of net charge-offs and a net reserve build of $1 billion. Within that reserve build, $882 million was in Consumer, mostly in Card, and $144 million was in Wholesale. Net charge-offs increased by $590 million compared with a year earlier, largely because of Card. Moving to the balance sheet and capital on Page 3: we ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 15.3%, unchanged from the previous quarter, since net income and OCI gains were offset by capital distributions and higher RWA. RWA this quarter reflects more lending activity, along with greater client activity and market moves on the trading side. During this quarter, we repurchased $6 billion in net common shares, which partly reflects our use of the proceeds from the sale of Visa shares, as we mentioned earlier. Now let's move on to our businesses, beginning with CCB on Page 4. CCB posted net income of $4 billion on revenue of $17.8 billion, a 3% decline compared with a year ago. In Banking & Wealth Management, revenue fell 11% year-on-year, driven by compression in deposit margins and a drop in deposits, partly offset by an increase in Wealth Management revenue. On a year-over-year basis, average deposits fell 8%, and they were 2% lower sequentially. Customer activity around chasing yield, CD volumes included, has slowed, and for the rest of the year we anticipate deposits staying roughly flat. Client investment assets gained 21% compared with a year ago, helped by market performance, and our branch network keeps producing strong referrals of new Wealth Management clients. Home Lending revenue increased 3% year-on-year, with higher NII driving the gain and lower servicing and production revenue partly offsetting it. Now to Card Services & Auto. Revenue was 11% above the prior year, fueled by greater card NII on the back of larger revolving balances. Card outstandings rose 11%, as robust account acquisition combined with continued normalization of revolve. Moving to Auto: we originated $10 billion there, which is 2% lower, while still keeping margins solid and credit quality high. Our expenses were $9.6 billion, up 5% from the prior year, largely on account of higher compensation in field and technology roles, along with increased marketing spend. On credit performance for the quarter: credit costs came in at $2.8 billion, primarily from Card, and included net charge-offs of $1.9 billion — $520 million higher than a year earlier — as well as a net reserve build of $876 million, mostly tied to bigger revolving balances. Switching to the Commercial & Investment Bank on Page 5: CIB delivered net income of $5.7 billion on revenue of $17 billion. Investment banking fees climbed 31% compared with a year earlier, and our year-to-date wallet share of 9.1% put us in the #1 spot. Advisory fees were up 10%, supported by the completion of several sizable transactions. Underwriting fees rose substantially, as debt jumped 56% and equity gained 26%, mainly on account of favorable market conditions. With momentum staying positive across the year, we feel good about our pipeline, even though the M&A, regulatory environment and geopolitical situation keep presenting uncertainty. In Payments, revenue came in at $4.4 billion, a 4% increase year-on-year, powered by fee growth and higher deposit balances but largely offset by margin compression. Turning to Markets, total revenue reached $7.2 billion, up 8% year-on-year. Fixed income was flat, as outperformance in Currencies & Emerging Markets was offset by lower revenue in Rates. Equities rose 27%, which reflected solid results in every region, mainly because of a favorable trading backdrop in the U.S. and greater activity late in the quarter across Asia. Securities Services revenue came in at $1.3 billion, a 9% increase versus a year earlier, chiefly from fee growth tied to higher market levels and volumes. Expenses totaled $8.8 billion, 1% lower year-on-year, as reduced legal costs were mostly offset by higher revenue-linked compensation, headcount growth and greater technology spending. Average Banking & Payments loans fell 2% from a year ago and 1% quarter over quarter. Among middle market and large corporate clients, we keep seeing weakness in new loan demand as well as revolver utilization, partly because clients can turn to receptive capital markets. Turning to multifamily — we're seeing some encouraging signals in loan originations now that long-term rates have come down, but near-term growth overall should stay muted, since payoff activity is offsetting those originations. Average client deposits rose 7% versus a year ago and 3% quarter over quarter, mainly on growth from large corporates in Payments and Securities Services. And credit costs came in at $316 million, driven by higher net lending activity — including in Markets — along with downgrades, partly offset by better macroeconomic variables. That wraps up our lines of business; now AWM on Page 6. Asset & Wealth Management posted net income of $1.4 billion, with a pretax margin of 33%. During the quarter, revenue came in at $5.4 billion, a rise of 9% versus a year earlier. That was powered by management fee growth on stronger average market levels and robust net inflows, investment valuation gains versus losses the year before, and increased brokerage activity, though deposit margin compression partly offset these. Expenses reached $3.6 billion, climbing 16% from a year ago, mainly because of greater compensation, which includes revenue-linked compensation and ongoing expansion of our private banking advisor teams, along with elevated distribution fees and legal expense. Long-term net inflows for the quarter totaled $72 billion, with fixed income and equities leading the way. In liquidity, net inflows came to $34 billion. AUM stood at $3.9 trillion and client assets at $5.7 trillion, each rising 23%, thanks to higher market levels and sustained net inflows. Lastly, loans grew 2% quarter-on-quarter and deposits grew 4% quarter-on-quarter. Moving to Corporate on Page 7. Corporate posted net income of $1.8 billion. Revenue was $3.1 billion, an increase of $1.5 billion year-on-year. NII came to $2.9 billion, up $932 million from a year earlier, largely reflecting the effect of balance sheet mix and securities reinvestment, including from earlier quarters. NIR was a net gain of $155 million, versus a net loss of $425 million in the prior year, chiefly because net investment securities losses were lower this quarter. Expenses of $589 million declined $107 million year-on-year. To wrap up, let's go to the outlook on Page 8; we now anticipate 2024 NII ex Markets of roughly $91.5 billion and total NII of roughly $92.5 billion. Our adjusted expense outlook is now approximately $91.5 billion. Given where we stand in the year, we've included on that page the implied fourth quarter guidance for NII and adjusted expense. Also note that the NII figures imply roughly $800 million of Markets NII in the fourth quarter. On credit, we still expect the 2024 Card net charge-off rate to come in at approximately 3.4%. So in closing, we're pleased with yet another quarter of strong operating performance. As we look at the next several quarters, we expect performance to face some pressure while normalization keeps playing out. Even so, we stay positive and concentrated on execution so that we can continue producing strong returns throughout the cycle. With that said, let's begin the Q&A session and take your questions.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#2

So Jeremy, as you pointed out, the full year NII guidance suggests a fairly significant decline in Q4 NII ex Markets, roughly 6%. Could you perhaps walk through what the biggest drivers are behind that sequential drop, including any early views on how deposits are behaving and pricing following the 50 basis point cut? And since it ties in, I'll just put my follow-up out there too. I know the forward curve keeps shifting quite a bit, but ever since Dan raised it a month ago, could you lay out how you're approaching the NII path for '25?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#3

Yes. Absolutely, Jim. Let me do my best to address both of your questions at once. So the way things stand today, the largest single factor behind — behind the sequential decline is, in fact — what we anticipate is, in fact, the yield curve. That yield curve has shifted somewhat since Daniel offered his remarks at the conference earlier this quarter, though not dramatically. On deposit balances, which clearly matter a great deal here given the Fed has begun the cutting cycle. It seems to us at the moment, as I said in my prepared remarks on consumer, that we're essentially at the bottom right now as we speak. If you look at yield-seeking behavior, it has declined considerably. So that's not as big a headwind anymore, all else being equal; and if you then look at checking account balances, they've been fairly steady for a while now, which we take as a sign that consumers have largely finished drawing down their cash buffers; so that's somewhat supportive for consumer deposit balances; against that backdrop, another point worth noting is the CD mix, since with rate cuts on the way, we anticipate CD balances repricing with fairly high betas and likely the CD mix is actually topping out about now. Then when you turn to Wholesale, we've actually been seeing some growth there already. And when you pair that with the growing view held by many in the market that the end of QT will probably be announced before long, that's also somewhat supportive for deposit balances. So perhaps I'll — well, I suppose, then you also asked me a bit about next year. I guess one thing worth saying, right, is that we did see a sequential rise in NII this quarter. So as you might remember, during Investor Day I mentioned there was a possibility we'd experience quarter-over-quarter gains and then quarter-over-quarter drops, and folks shouldn't jump to the conclusion that we'd reached the bottom when that occurred. That's basically precisely the situation we're in right now. But looking at it from today's vantage point, with the yield curve in mind, and assuming that curve plays out, clearly we have a fairly clear view of quarter-over-quarter decreases in NII excluding Markets. That said, the bottom could arrive at some point around the middle of next year, and at that stage, a mix of balances, card revolve growth and other elements could bring us back to quarter-over-quarter growth, clearly. We're estimating that's quite a ways out in the future, and we'll provide formal guidance and all of that next quarter. But I believe that gives you something of a framework to work from.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#4

I'd like to raise the topic of expenses, particularly in light of a few things Daniel said not long ago — he observed that the consensus forecast for next year's expenses appeared somewhat too light. As I recall, that figure stood at slightly below $94 billion at the time. Once we strip out this year's onetimers, that implies a core expense base of just under $90 billion, which amounts to a fairly robust increase in spending. I'm aware that you've consistently shown strong dedication and discipline when it comes to investment. What I'm hoping to grasp more clearly is where those extra dollars are going and which investments are getting priority, especially as we look toward next year.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#5

Certainly. That's a fair question. And I concur with the figures you cited. You're right to adjust for those one-off big-ticket items this year, and to factor in where consensus stood when Daniel spoke. On the NII remarks from that time, let me also flag: consensus showed $91.5 billion for this year and $90 billion for next year — a $1.5 billion step-down sequentially, as implied then. Our comments came about because that drop struck us as too small. I'm glad to go deeper on any of that. Now, turning to expenses. Okay, suppose for the sake of discussion you begin with a base of $90 billion — naturally, inflation is returning to normal levels, and naturally, we're constantly seeking efficiencies to counterbalance inflation. That said, if you take 3% hypothetically on that base, that amounts to a few billion dollars immediately that we're up against; so that's one factor. Another factor is that we've kept carrying out our growth strategies throughout this year; so there's a fairly meaningful amount of annualization. You can't really spot that in the fourth quarter figures owing to the seasonality of incentive comp. If you removed that factor, what you'd likely observe is a series of sequential gains, plus annualization acting as another drag. Also worth mentioning: we anticipate growth next year in our fees and volume-related businesses. All else being equal, that would mean a heavier expense load. Putting all of that together explains much of why that consensus figure—just under $94 billion—appeared low. On priorities and investments, truly nothing has shifted. The strategy remains the same, the plans remain the same, and we're simply executing with the same long-term view we've always held. One thing I'd point out on NII: we're currently in Q3, clearly not Q4. Back in the past, we typically held off on guidance until Investor Day, which came in late February. Next quarter we'll give formal guidance covering both expenses and NII. Regarding expenses specifically, we're presently smack in the middle of the budget cycle. As a result, our visibility there is probably a bit more limited than what we have on NII, at least at the margin.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#6

Let me give you a quick view on expense. What you refer to as expenses, I often think of as investments. If you look back at Investor Day, you'll see we're bringing on private bankers in Asset & Wealth Management. We're adding ETF in Asset & Wealth Management. We're adding private bankers in international private banking. We're growing Chase, both management — some branches have been added across the United States of America. We believe there are enormous opportunities in the innovation economy, and that requires bankers plus certain technology and things of that nature. Our aim is to gain share, and everything we do, we get really good returns on it. So when I look at that, these are opportunities for us. These aren't expenses that we have to actually punish ourselves on. And we do get — and we show you fairly extensively cost and productivity on various things. And also AI is going to go up a little bit; and I would put those as categories, just it's going to be generating great stuff over time.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#7

I just have one quick follow-up, and it's really about drilling into NII. It looks like you moved a pretty meaningful amount of cash, or excess reserves held at the Fed, into securities. The yield expanded, which is encouraging even with pressure at both the long end and the SOFR contraction during the quarter. I was hoping you could speak to how willing you are to extend duration in this environment. I know in the past you've had some aversion to doing that. But do you expect to redeploy more excess liquidity, given the expectation for deeper rate cuts?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#8

Yes, sure. So when it comes to extending duration, Steve, you know this, obviously, but I think it's important to state that, all else equal, extending duration does not change expected NII if you assume the policy rate follows the forwards, right? So that's point one. Point two, the way we see it, the curve is still inverted. And so even if you don't believe the policy rate follows the forwards, extending right now is actually a headwind to short-term NII. Like that's not — that wouldn't be something we'd consider either way, but I just think it's worth saying for the broader audience, it's quite different from the situation you have with numbers...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#9

We buy mortgages at 6%. So rate...

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#10

Right, so on the question of extending duration and actually managing duration at this point, there are a couple of points to make. Clearly, duration comes in a lot of different forms, though one figure we report is the EAR. Once the 10-Q is filed, you will see that this figure is somewhat lower; assuming our present estimates hold, it will decline from 2.8% to roughly 2.1%. Several factors account for that, some passive and others active decisions aimed at lengthening duration somewhat. Ultimately, deciding to manage and extend duration comes down to weighing the volatility of NII against shielding the company from extreme scenarios in either direction. So at present, were we to choose extension because of <<inaudible>> various factors, we definitely could. The portfolio gives us the room. Still, for the time being, we are comfortable with where we stand.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#11

The single guarantee I can give you is that six months from now, the forward curve won't look the way it does today.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#12

First off, thank you very much for fielding all those NII questions up to now, Jeremy—my opening question is really just one more follow-up, I guess. As you can imagine, once Daniel made those remarks on stage back in September, everyone has been attempting to figure out the over/under for net interest income next year. So perhaps a two-part first question, and the second part draws on what Jamie just said. To start, NII is projected to fall 6% quarter over quarter in Q4. My understanding is that for '25 versus the prior year, consensus shows a 4% decline from your new level. So it seems consensus still has space to move lower. And if you look at the forward curve, Jeremy, it might actually be somewhat worse on a year-over-year basis than what we saw in the fourth quarter sequentially. That being said, as Jamie mentioned, none of us knows what that curve will end up looking like, correct? It has swung around so dramatically. So when we consider the curve, which is preferable for JPMorgan — having additional cuts at the short end with a steeper shape, or fewer cuts with a somewhat flatter curve?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#13

All right. Okay. You saved a curveball for the very end there, Erika. I certainly didn't anticipate that would be how your question concluded. Let me address the first part of what you asked, and then I'll get to the second part as well. So the current 2025 consensus for NII ex Markets sits at—right now it's at $87 billion, which is clearly below where it stood at the conference earlier in the quarter. We're glad to see it shift somewhat closer to our own view. It still appears a bit high, though it's certainly within range. Now, that figure is made up of—as I mentioned before, we generally anticipate the NII trough at some point mid-year, so you can put the pieces together yourself. You have a fourth quarter run rate, and you have some sequential declines. You have a midyear low point, plus a rough estimate for the entire year, so it stands to reason that the low point is probably somewhat below those figures. And then, if revolve growth picks up again in the second half, both deposit balances and the continued card revolve tailwind—though that tailwind will be somewhat smaller than you might otherwise have assumed, I mean, sorry, somewhat smaller than it was this year, but still a tailwind. Clearly, how those elements combine will unfold in different ways. And as you noted, nobody knows what the yield curve will ultimately do? Still, based on the assumptions we hold right now and today’s yield curve—and keeping in mind that we’re already in Q3, meaning this is somewhat preliminary—that’s our view.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#14

May I add one thing? First, going forward, let's simply hand over that number. I don't want these calls to turn into us spending the whole time walking through everyone's guesses about what NII will be next year. And let me also note that NII, with everything held constant, is a figure, yet nothing ever stays constant. If a recession hits, the yield curve's impact will look quite different from what it would be under continued growth. Decisions get made by us constantly, and things happen in the marketplace, and I just think we've devoted too much time to this irrelevancy just so you can have a model and a number in it. So next year it will come in below $87 billion, probably not by much, we don't know, and the environment is unknown to us.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#15

All right. Turning to your question on the EAR, there are a few points I’d like to make. As I said earlier, when that figure is released, it will reflect a level of roughly 2.1%. One key point to keep in mind is that, as you’re aware, what this rate cycle has shown us is that our empirical EAR runs meaningfully above the modeled EAR we disclosed. The primary driver there is that retail deposit betas have in practice come in even lower than the modeled deposit beta. So as a starting point, you need to adjust that EAR figure upward relative to the reported number, for that reason and a few others as well. There are also some nuances in how dollar and nondollar sensitivity interact. Then there’s your question, which touches a bit on the front end versus the back end. What you’re seeing is that the front-end EAR has actually become smaller, and most of the EAR now sits in the back end. So it’s certainly true that, all else being equal, a steeper curve benefits us. But I’d also note that this empirical-versus-theoretical adjustment falls disproportionately in the front end. So to answer your question directly, yes, we want a steeper curve. That said, having the Fed cut more than what the yield curve currently prices in is definitely, at the margin and in the context of next year’s numbers, a headwind. It would be a headwind for us. We remain asset-sensitive to Fed cuts.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#16

Let me get to my second question, if I may. Jamie, I fully get where your frustration comes from. Honestly, your long-term shareholders couldn't care less whether the figure is $87 billion or $85 billion, correct? What matters to them is return on equity. With that in mind, it's about seeing how much capital you produce every quarter, 72 basis points this quarter. So aside from the usual boilerplate questions you'll get about buyback and organic growth, yada, yada, dividend increases, how are we supposed to think about the way JPMorgan deploys this capital? The world is pretty much your oyster, isn't it? You already hold a strong position, and you could deploy this capital to reinforce your business even further. And again, beyond that standard quarterly discussion you always have, how should your shareholders think about the way you're viewing opportunities to put this capital to work?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#17

All right. So first off, when you say dominant, I would be quite cautious with that word. We go up against some very fierce competition, across different countries, in various regions of the world, from fintech companies and direct lenders. Let me offer a really precise point about direct lending and similar areas. Serving our clients is always the objective. When I mention some of those costs, what I'm describing is capital being deployed — deployed in a different manner. Opening branches means you take on an expense at the outset, but later on your capital backs the deposits. The same holds for the innovation economy, for private bankers, and so on. Roughly speaking, we hold no less than $30 billion in excess capital, and as far as I'm concerned, it isn't burning a hole in my pocket. My view is that if you possess an entire business and aren’t able to put it to work properly right now, waiting is entirely sensible. I’ve also stated plainly that I believe conditions — or what lies ahead — may prove rather stormy. In my judgment, asset prices — and you have to form an opinion at times — are inflated. Whether they’re vastly inflated or only slightly, I can’t say, but I would rather hold off. We’ll be in a position to put it to work. This patience will serve our shareholders extremely well. The same applies to putting capital to work. We have the ability—any of us could purchase $100 billion in 6% mortgages and boost net income by a couple of billion tomorrow. That's not how we operate. Serving our clients well, building technology, and doing things of that nature—those are what matter most to us. And we also don't yet know what the real excess capital is. So we're being somewhat patient. We'll exercise a bit of patience and wait, and things will work out fine. That's our current position, and it won't change; should it change, we'll inform you. We speak with plenty of shareholders, and they get it — repurchasing shares above 2x tangible book value isn't always the smartest move, since folks can redeploy that capital better or buy stock back at lower prices down the road. Markets don't remain elevated indefinitely. All right. One final point. Sometimes cash is an extremely valuable asset when the world gets turbulent. And you can see my friend Warren Buffett building up cash reserves at the moment. I mean, people ought to think a bit harder about how we're working to navigate this world and grow our company over the long term.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#18

I'm really glad Jamie stopped himself before saying what he was about to say, since that's exactly the answer to this question. We've now seen a few more banks form partnerships with alternative managers; loan growth has been limited for several years, partly market-related, and flows into fixed income funds have been limited too, while private credit overall has grown plenty; and you're among the best asset managers anywhere, though in my view you're less dominant across all of private credit. So perhaps you could discuss what you're working on and why that's too narrow a way to think about your ability to serve every part of clients' lending needs. Not only public markets and the public lending side.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#19

Yes. Let me spend some time on this one, because clearly it has become very important, with people talking about how they're growing and partnering and so forth. And so first of all — I'll speak strategically first and then tactically. I think both matter. First of all, our purpose is to give clients an agnostic view of the world and of which products and services suit them best. Therefore, when a client comes in, we'll offer them both direct lending done by us and syndicated lending or other specialized kinds of lending, and each has pluses and minuses. Direct lending can be executed faster, perhaps with simpler covenants, unitranche. It costs more. And you're seeing everything swing back and forth between syndicated lending and direct lending. But we're going to offer clients essentially what serves their best interest and tell them what those products are across the board. We said previously that we allocated $10 billion of capital to make direct loans; we've actually deployed a lot of capital, some of those have nearly been paid off, some of it's done. So we are going to do it directly; and we are going to — that $10 billion could become $20 billion or $30 billion, we're not capping it today. I will say today, we're extending — we will do $500 million, we will do $1 billion, we will do more than $1 billion. We'll do it sole-handed or we'll do it alongside partners. Very importantly, we are not going to commit ourselves to one partner. So we have — and I think we've announced a bunch of co-lenders; but that simply creates more flexibility and more size. We're not going to use that flexibility to slow things down and have to get permission from everybody. Because as I said, JPMorgan could underwrite it and hold it like a bridge loan and syndicate it afterward. So you can — and we're going to rely on our own risk management measures and so forth. Again, all in service of the client and making sure we're offering them the best thing. So we’re shifting to another approach: we won’t lock ourselves into a single source of capital. If we did that, I think it would restrict the range of what we can provide to clients. There’s a good chance we can be more competitive on price. We can deliver something highly tailored, rather than the kind of solution a third-party capital provider would give. That’s the strategy we’re pursuing. We’ll be present. We’ll execute. And we’ll execute even though capital arbitrage is happening right now. So if you examine the arbitrage today, the difference is dramatic when a bank has to hold something versus an insurance company. That puts us at a disadvantage, but we’ve dealt with those kinds of disadvantages in other businesses for a long time. We’re going to do what’s right for the client. Keep in mind that when we do well by a client, we also generate other revenue from that client, so it’s not only the loan—we consider the entire relationship. So we’re very comfortable that we can compete. I just announced considerably larger lending platforms, sizes, and things of that nature. So I hope the press is listening, and that they heard this as well.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#20

Jeremy, looking at your capital ratios right now, they're clearly quite strong. Could you give us a bit more detail on the new Basel III? We don't have the specifics yet, but as Vice Chair Barr mentioned some of them, it seems capital requirements for you and your peers will drop a fair amount from the original proposal. What's your thinking on that? Any insights on how far it might fall from the original proposal to where you stand today?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#21

Yes. When I said we're at $30 billion of execs, that assumes Barr's speech, that the 20 goes to 12 or whatever it is, more. We feel it will be more than that because there are other factors involved; now I was just giving you the minimum of excess capital. In my view, it would be more, but it is what it is, and we'll wait to see the final numbers.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#22

But Gerard, perhaps to add some color here. So yes, clearly everybody focused heavily on that speech; it was a significant speech. Yet ultimately, we truly just need to see the proposal, since the details matter enormously for this kind of thing. And so our focus is on hoping the proposal appears so we can work through the detail and keep advocating as appropriate. I note you mention requirements coming down versus what was initially proposed, which is clearly true, part of the speech; but I do think we have to be somewhat careful not to fall into the trap of saying that is like progress simply because the original proposal was so dramatically higher than what anyone considered reasonable. And I would remind you, what you obviously know, that prior to this proposal coming out, it was our position, strongly felt, that our then-prevailing capital requirements were, if anything, already more than we needed. So we have a long way to go here. And I think our position, which Jamie has been articulating very consistently, is that they need to get it right, do the right amount of work, and importantly, do it holistically. So it is not just RWA, it is RWA, it is G-SIB, it is SCB, it is CCAR. So that is really what we feel strongly...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#23

And let me just add one thing. We simply want the figures handled properly and backed up. If they ended up higher, that would be acceptable to us as well. My view is just that they ought to be approached with genuine diligence and genuine consideration, plus some attention to cost versus benefit, the effect on the economy, how it shifts lending and matters of that kind. So we're eagerly awaiting the actual specifics, since that is what will truly make the difference.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#24

Great, thanks. And just to follow up on that, given the excess capital you mentioned a moment ago in connection with direct lending, you look at your current cash and marketable securities relative to risk-weighted assets. You show it in your presentation, naturally, $1.5 trillion, with an average loan of $1.3 trillion. Once everything — once the dust settles, you'll know what your capital requirements are. Could you frame for us now, could you — is levering up that excess capital through more loans a path that might be considered over the next 2 or 3 years compared with where you stand on a mix basis? I realize you're going to grow your loans, but my question is about the mix.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#25

No, absolutely not. What we want is the outcome of doing good business. We want to do good business. If that grows our balance sheet, we're fine with it.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#26

And honestly, Gerard, it really hinges on the kind of loans we're discussing, correct? So ultimately, as Jamie puts it, this is capital. Ideally we'll put it to work growing the franchise organically, and that might cover loans that stand well on their own as decent loans, along with loans that fit inside a broader relationship where other revenue comes to us too. So the strategy hasn't changed from what we've always done. But I wouldn't view it as extra capital aimed at some specific product. I'd view it as money held for a rainy day. Let's hope conditions don't worsen significantly. But should they, we'll be prepared, and hopefully chances will arise to put it toward the client franchise or toward the stock; and if not, we'll give it back.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#27

So lower rates were expected to produce a boost in loan growth and to help convert some of those Investment Banking pipelines. I mean, clearly we've only had a single cut and it's still early; but are there any early indicators of that, in terms of appetite to borrow more, and again, conversion of the banking pipelines?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#28

Honestly, Matt, on the whole I'd say no, with a few small exceptions. So I think it's probably reasonable to say that the stronger-than-expected Investment Banking fees late in the quarter came to a significant extent, as I noted, from DCM and also, somewhat, from some M&A transactions closing faster. And I do believe a portion of that DCM strength involves the kinds of deals that are opportunistic ones that aren't in our pipeline. And those tend to come about when treasurers and CFOs kind of observe better market levels and seize them. So it's possible that this is partly an effect of the cuts. But as I think I said, we did see, for instance, a rise in mortgage applications and a very small increase in refi. In our multi-family lending business, there may be a few signs of greater activity there. But these cuts were priced in very heavily, right? The curve has been inverted for quite a while. So to a significant degree, this is anticipated; so I'm not — it isn't clear to me that one should expect an immediate dramatic response, and that's not really what we're seeing.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#29

I get how the debt markets work, rates have fallen, spreads are pretty tight and the markets are very accessible. So it sort of stands to reason that folks are making the most of that right now. Those circumstances might not last or remain in place late next year.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#30

And then looking at the debit and credit card spend you break out specifically, you posted good year-over-year growth, up 6%, and it was flat quarter over quarter. I realize seasonality between 2Q and 3Q is significant. Last year I believe it rose roughly 1%. But are you noticing any shifts in consumer spending, whether in the mix or in signs of a slowdown toward the end of the quarter?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#31

What I'd say about consumer spend is that it's a bit dull in a sense, because the situation has turned normal. What I mean is, I think we're reaching a stage where discussing the pandemic no longer really makes sense. But perhaps for one final time. One feature was the heavy rotation into T&E as people traveled a great deal, booked cruises they'd never taken before, and everyone was dining out frequently, and so on. So there was the big spike in T&E, the big rotation into discretionary spending, and that has now normalized. Ordinarily you'd assume that rotation away from discretionary and toward nondiscretionary would signal consumers hunkering down and preparing for a much worse environment; but considering the levels it began from, what we see is really a form of normalization. And within that data, we aren't observing weakening, for instance, in retail spending. So on the whole, we view the spending patterns as fairly solid and consistent with the narrative that the consumer stands on solid footing and consistent with the strong labor market and the current central case of a kind of no-landing scenario economically. But obviously, as we always point out, that's one scenario, and many other scenarios exist.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#32

Jamie, I believe I've watched you weigh in on government this year more than at any other point in your career. And on August 2, an op-ed in the Washington Post, Davos, you're discussing government. I think it was this week or last week on Bloomberg, you said bank mergers ought to be permitted. During your bus tour in August, someone asked you, which is what I'm asking now, under what circumstances would you step away for government service? And your reply back then was, "I love what I do." We understand, you love what you do; but under what circumstances would you think about government service? It seems you'd be more inclined to go now than previously, simply judging by the many remarks you've made. Is that accurate, inaccurate? What's your view?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#33

I believe that's inaccurate. I have always been a American patriot. And my country matters more to me than my company; and I believe a government is very important to get this — and if you look at the world today, Mike, it is so important that we get things right for the whole geopolitical world. So I'm not just speaking about the American economy; so — and we try to take part in policy at the local level, at the state level, at the federal level, at the international level, to try to help. That's our job; we try to grow economies and things like that. So nothing has changed in my view, in my opinion, or my interest. I just think it's very, very important that we try to help government do a good job.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#34

So suppose the next administration came to you and asked you to serve the country—would you be willing to consider that?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#35

The odds of that happening are pretty much nil, in my view, and I doubt I'd take it on. Still, I've never ruled it out entirely. I don't make promises to people. There's no need to. But no—I mean, I love the work I do. My plan is to keep doing what we're doing. I can just about guarantee I'll be at this for a long stretch of time, or at minimum until the Board forces me out.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#36

Let me approach that question from the opposite angle, for those of you who are concerned about me leaving. The reverse way to look at it is this: over these calls over the last couple of years, you've been saying the stock is overvalued — and I believe that's part of what you're getting at. Your point is that the stock market is overvalued, and so every stock is overvalued. And on one hand, you emphasized during this call AI, tech, market share gains, high returns, high capital; so do you think that in some sense, when you consider the value, your price and your capacity to do buybacks, you're leaning more toward an old school model for valuing your stock rather than a new school model that could place you in the category of more tech-oriented firms, particularly given your progress with AI?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#37

Well, listen, you're making a very good point, which is that I think we have an exceptional company, exceptional franchises, and the price point at which you might buy the stock; but I'm not that exuberant about thinking even tech valuations or any valuations will stay at these very inflated values. And so I'm just — we're just quite patient in that. And I think you're going to have to judge us over time about whether we've done the right thing by doing nothing. And remember, we can always do it. We haven't lost the money. It didn't go away. It's sitting in store. The only time we'll be really wrong is if the stock runs way up and you've got to buy at much higher prices. And I just — I would be a real skeptic about that happening.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#38

I suppose I simply wanted to ask a follow-up. You mentioned private credit and how it's disrupting bank lending. One more thing I'd find helpful if you could speak to is that we keep hearing quite a bit about firms such as Jane Street and other market makers possibly shaking up fixed income trading. Is that genuinely a risk? And could a firm like JPMorgan find an opportunity to compete on the private venue side when it comes to market making, going beyond the usual kind of FICC activity?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#39

Right, Ebrahim, what I'd say is that I wouldn't describe it as a risk — I'd describe it as a reality. As we've consistently stressed across all our businesses, we function in a highly competitive environment. And that holds true for — and that competition isn't confined to going up against banks or traditional financial institutions; in the consumer space it stretches to fintechs; and in market making, it's clearly more and more stretching to some of the kinds of firms you're mentioning. Now, in a lot of cases those firms are also clients of ours. And that's the same sort of dynamic you see, say, in private credit, which we've talked about previously. So without a doubt, the ecosystem is shifting. There are new competitors. There are changes in market structure, new dynamics. And like any business, we're innovating and adapting and making certain we're ready to compete through all the traditional approaches and all the new ones. Naturally, certain aspects of being a bank do hold us back from doing that. And one point we've raised, harking back to the capital liquidity regulations, is that regarding the effect on the sort of U.S. capital markets ecosystem that the world envies, it has functioned well under its present contract for a long stretch, with certain activities sitting inside the regulatory perimeter and robust participation coming from unregulated capital of various kinds. And a world in which more and more of that activity is pushed outside of bank market makers represents a significant change to that structure — one that is untested, and it's not clear why anyone would want it. And we've warned that if that is what the regulations are meant to achieve, it ought to be deliberate and carefully examined. But in the interim, we'll adapt and compete as best we can, subject to the limits of the existing rule set.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#40

Could I add a point? How this shakes out in private markets remains uncertain. There is some of that activity happening, and certain people are discussing building more active offerings in private markets. In some ways, we are strongly positioned for that too, since it demands liquidity, market making, valuation, and buyers and sellers on both sides to generate liquidity. So that has not yet developed; but we are not — competition may come, yet we will be present when the moment arrives. And the second item is public markets, where you have seen reports on dealer inventories, both corporate and treasuries. And I do believe that has eased somewhat. But once more, keep in mind that we do this on behalf of our clients. We are a major market maker for clients on both sides of the markets, in credit as well as treasuries. And we might notice a slight distinction with some of the others who are simply trading their own accounts. So from where we sit, both are competitors, but we remain present. We will do it. We'll put more capital to work if we choose to; and if it were truly necessary to serve clients, we would even commit additional capital at lower returns. So we are quite mindful of this, of the competition on both sides. As Jeremy said, we sat here 10 years ago talking about the electronification of the business and can we keep up with that? And so far, we have.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#41

Understood. Just a quick one, and Jeremy, I believe you said QT might stop at some stage; the repo market seemed to spike toward the end of September. Could you share your view on the danger of a market liquidity shock as we head into year-end? How — and do you have a take on how fast the Fed ought to recalibrate QT, or actually halt QT, to head off some <<inaudible>>?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#42

Yeah, good question, Ebrahim. But I think you've more or less answered it yourself. What I mean is, the argument going around is that the repo spike at the close of this quarter signalled the market may be nearing that lowest comfortable level of reserves that people have speculated about so heavily, and bearing in mind that this figure is likely higher and pushed by how firms' liquidity needs have evolved rather than by some of the more conventional gauges. As a side note, that's simply one more reason it matters to examine the entire framework holistically when we consider the regulatory response to the events of 2 springs ago. You don't want spikes of that kind, and it prompts some questions about why there isn't greater readiness to deploy into disruptions of that sort, even though this one was fairly minor. Anyway, when you add it all up, it appears to lend some weight to the idea that perhaps QT ought to be wound down. And that appears to be increasingly the consensus — that it will get announced at some stage during the fourth quarter. So finally, the point was, if you follow that view through, it's a residual headwind for system-wide deposit growth that gets removed. And that's among the reasons we feel we're probably at the trough of our deposit balances at the level of...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#43

Yes. I’d like to add a few policy points here. I’m not really certain they can actually pull that off, because there are inflationary forces at work, partly from QE. And if you look at volatility as well, that isn’t a risk to JPMorgan; it’s a risk to the system. And when banks have — I touched on the constrained balance sheet a bit already. So banks will be holding trillions of dollars in cash and be unable to put it to work in the repo markets. And is it sound policy that each time this occurs — since you can do it very safely, fully collateralized, all of that, supplying what I’d call flexible financing in the marketplace — the Fed has to come in every time? I think that turns into a policy question: whenever there’s some kind of fluctuation in the market, people panic, and the Fed has to stomp in and provide support; and can they always do so if you have a somewhat more inflationary environment ahead? So I think you have to be very thoughtful about this. That’s why we do believe they should examine calibrating SLR and eCLR and CET1 and all these things, especially for this; so my view is it will happen again. I can’t tell you exactly when, but I’d be surprised if it doesn’t happen again.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#44

Is this coming through? Hello? Are you able to hear me clearly?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#45

Yes, we hear you fine. Are you able to hear us?

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#46

Yes, so that's one for Jeremy and one for Jamie. Jeremy and Jamie, sorry for the NII question I'm about to ask, but since it makes up over half of your revenue, I do care about it somewhat. But when I think about the trough and then the build-up, QT ending, deposit growth — I mean, that's part of the calculation for the improvements as we head into 2025, correct? I should factor that outlook in, is that right? And that's built into how you're thinking about it. I know we don't have a number from you for NII for '25, but it is in there, right?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#47

Yes, in other words, it comes back to my earlier point and to what I mentioned in the prepared remarks regarding consumer deposit balances specifically — there are a lot of different offsetting factors at play right now, right? You've got the yield curve. You've got card revolve. You've got balances, and balances have been a headwind. We now view them as neutral, and they could potentially turn into a tailwind later in the year. And one of the possible reasons for that is — one of the possible tailwinds — one of the possible reasons for that is the possible end of QT; but stress the word possible, as Jamie said. You also obviously have a bit of the fixed asset — fixed rate asset reprice dynamics beginning to come through somewhat. While we're on NII, just to annoy Jamie a little more, I do want to make a point I didn't have a chance to make earlier, which is there's a reason we highlighted the implied fourth quarter run rate for the Markets NII in the presentation, which is that if you take that and annualize it, it gives you a launch point run rate that is significantly higher than what's currently in the consensus and obviously what we've seen this year; and I'll give you the concise version of my usual speech that changes in Markets NII are almost always bottom line neutral and offset in NIR; but for the purpose of trying to help you guys with your models, I would just encourage you to recognize what that launch point is, the number of cuts that are in the curve, the fact that that number has historically and in the recent past been quite liability-sensitive; so you can draw your own conclusions about what that should mean. Again, it shouldn't change the overall revenue expectation. It's just a balance sheet and income statement geography issue. But just for the sake of helping you tidy up models, I wanted to make that point.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#48

So when Daniel made those comments back in September, were they about total NII or NII ex Markets? Could you...

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#49

Those were core NII, or NII ex; so to repeat what I said at the time, the '24 consensus stood at $91.5 billion and the '25 consensus was $90 billion on NII ex. And what we were pointing out was that this figure, which is still an asset-sensitive figure, pointed to an inadequate level of sequential decline year-on-year. As we currently see it, consensus for NII ex Markets is $87 billion. And as we've mentioned, that's nearer the mark, though it may still be a touch toppy.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#50

All right. And then one question for Jamie. Jamie, we've already spent a fair amount of time discussing the capital you hold, the capital in reserve. I just wanted to get a sense of how you're viewing that opportunity set ahead of you when it comes to deploying it for possible portfolio acquisitions. I understand depositories aren't on the agenda, but we're all aware there are portfolios out there that may be seeking a home. Could you give us a feel for how interested you might be in buying assets at this point?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#51

Yes. I mean, I mentioned acquisitions. I mean, I always want our folks to be looking at those things and thinking about those things and being — but if you heard what I said about my caution regarding the world, I'm not — it's difficult for me to say that we're going to be in the market buying credit assets.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#52

What about loans? <<inaudible>>, and I...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#53

Yes, spreads <<inaudible>>, but creating — but again, actually helping clients, that's an entirely separate matter. Since with clients, we make credit asset spread and typically we've got other things going on. If our bankers are able to put capital to work that way, naturally we'd like to do more. And there are multiple avenues our CIO could use to deploy capital. We'll likely do more; and we're always asking, can we do more in affordable housing? Can we do more in areas where we're genuinely quite comfortable? And yes, if ways to deploy capital can be found, we'd be glad to do so. But we put <<inaudible>> across this category...

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#54

And how about the private label credit card side of things?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#55

And when it comes to being priced and valued, they seem kind of stretched.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#56

I'm curious about the private label credit card, just as an example. Would that be something that could benefit clients?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#57

There's almost no possibility. But it matters a great deal — and when I say that, I always instruct the management team to challenge my thinking. Look, we have experience with private label. I understand exactly what it involves. We've been down that road. I have plenty of concerns about it; yet could something shift someday and turn out to be a different situation? Yes, that could happen. So I don't want to rule it out entirely. Marianne Lake tells me, "Jamie, I'm seeing it plainly, the world has changed." We're going to change too. But as things stand right now, I'd say no, there's no possibility.

Saul Martinez

analyst
#58

I won't be asking about a particular NII figure for '25, but I did want to dig into how we should think about deposit margin and volume dynamics in the CCB over the coming few years. You've seen a fair amount of pressure on the deposit margin, 2.6%, down roughly 30 basis points. As deposit balances have declined, that puts some pressure on deposit NII. Yet deposit margins remain well above the levels they were at when rates stood at levels consistent with where the forward curve is — now has been heading. So I suppose how should we think about both volumes and margin dynamics if rates do come down, say, to the level consistent with the forward curve? I know the forward curve is probably going to be wrong, but that's the reference point we have; and on the other side, volume offsets. You mentioned, Jeremy, retail deposits becoming a tailwind. I guess how big a tailwind can they be, especially as you expect to gain quite a bit of market share in retail deposits? So just give us a sense of the push and pull of these dynamics that really help drive the deposit — the value of deposit Franchise.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#59

Sure. Yes. Thanks for the question, Saul. You've basically already outlined the key components. To keep things simple, I'll try to respond without citing the published CCB deposit margin figure, since that number clearly reflects both the interest rate paid on CCB deposits and the internal FTP applied to them. That's a complex item that shifts based on how betas are modeled, among other factors. So I think it's more useful to approach this from a firm-wide angle and examine how the rate paid has moved relative to policy rates broadly, while leaving aside duration management and similar considerations. So I think that when you take that step, what becomes clear is something we've noted for some time: the deposit margin, as defined here, is just the gap between the policy rate and the weighted average rate paid on consumer deposits—and it was at an unsustainably high level, which meant a correction had to come about in some fashion. Either deposits would reprice at the product level through checking and savings; or we'd have witnessed substantial internal migration, meaning an expanding CD mix; or a lower policy rate would have come to pass. So here and now, naturally, we make pricing decisions in light of market competition at any moment, considering what the deposit environment looks like; but repricing has not been necessary for us to keep primary bank relationships, which was our core strategy as well; chasing hot money at the margin was never something we would do; we have leaned in heavily to CDs and reached the present CD mix level, and that strategy has worked well. And as we see things now, the margin is coming down because the policy rate is coming down. That seems to leave us fairly comfortable from a pricing standpoint. In our view, the CD mix has likely peaked. As it comes down, it won't go all the way back to zero, which is where it was when the cycle began. That's a key point to keep in mind. So with everything else held constant, that creates some margin compression. And throughout all of this, clearly, an environment with lower yields ought to mean somewhat reduced outflow from consumer deposits. As I mentioned, we're observing far less yield-seeking behavior. Then, when you factor in what you brought up — specifically our long-term share gains in CCB deposits, largely driven by the brand strategy and the build-out, plus the fact that just about 1/4 of our top 125 markets in CCB have reached that 15% share level. We therefore see substantial room to expand what’s left and remain on course for the roughly 30 to 40 basis points of average yearly share gain we’ve delivered in the past. That’s essentially how you build a tailwind from consumer deposit margin returning to normal along with balance growth.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#60

Jeremy, tell me if you disagree with this. Things were unusual during the stretch when rates sat somewhere between 0% and 1%, or 2%. Outside of that, if you step back and ask what deposit margins look like in a typical banking operation — set aside those chasing very hot money, since that does happen — the answer is 2% to 2.5%.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#61

Absolutely. Yes. I agree.

Saul Martinez

analyst
#62

Okay, that's helpful. So it sounds like you're slightly above that, though there's still a bit of pressure — but you're not dramatically above those levels...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#63

We're already seeing very good returns in the business — in Banking & Wealth Management; we're growing market share. And when we build branches and things like that, we don't necessarily assume current margins. We look at what normal margins would be over time; and we're very comfortable. Very nice business for you all.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#64

Thanks, everyone.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#65

Thank you.

Operator

operator
#66

Appreciate everyone joining the call today. At this point you're welcome to hang up, and I hope the remainder of your day goes well.

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