JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

January 15, 2025

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Banks earnings 50 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#1

Thanks, and good morning to all of you. Let's begin on Page 1. Net income came in at $14 billion for the firm, with EPS of $4.81, revenue of $43.7 billion, and an ROTCE of 21%. Moving to Page 2, there's additional detail on our fourth quarter results. Revenue for the firm was $43.7 billion, which represents an increase of $3.8 billion, or 10%, compared to a year ago. NII ex Markets declined $548 million, or 2%, primarily because of lower rates and the resulting deposit margin compression, along with reduced deposit balances in CCB, though this was mostly offset by securities reinvestment, higher revolving balances in Card, and increased wholesale deposit balances. NII ex Markets rose $3.1 billion, or 30%. If you exclude the net investment securities losses from the prior year, the increase was 21%, mainly due to higher asset management fees and Investment Banking fees. Markets revenue rose $1.2 billion, or 21%. Expenses totaled $22.8 billion, a decline of $1.7 billion, or 7%, from a year earlier. When the prior year's FDIC special assessment is excluded, expenses rose $1.2 billion, or 5%, mostly from compensation along with higher brokerage and distribution fees. Credit costs came to $2.6 billion, which reflected $2.4 billion in net charge-offs and a net reserve of $267 million. Page 3 shows the reported results for the entire year. As a reminder, 2024 included a number of significant items. If you set those aside, net income for the firm was $54 billion, EPS was $18.22, revenue was $173 billion, and our ROTCE came in at 20%. A few highlights from the year: in CCB, we saw a record number of first-time investors and brought in nearly 10 million new card accounts; in CIB, Markets, Payments and Securities Services all posted record revenue. And in AWM, long-term net inflows reached a record $234 billion, positive across every channel, region and asset class. Turning to balance sheet and capital on Page 4. We closed the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 15.7%, which is up 40 basis points from the previous quarter, since net income and lower RWA were mostly offset by OCI losses and capital distributions, including $4 billion of net common share repurchases during the quarter. The $24 billion drop in RWA reflects a seasonal decline in Markets activity and lower wholesale lending, mostly offset by a seasonal increase in Card. Now let's move to our businesses, beginning with CCB on Page 5. CCB posted net income of $4.5 billion on revenue of $18.4 billion, which rose 1% from a year earlier. In Banking & Wealth Management, revenue fell 7% year-on-year due to deposit margin compression and lower deposits, partially offset by growth in Wealth Management revenue. Average deposits declined 4% year-on-year and were flat sequentially, as consumer balances have stabilized. Client investment assets rose 14% year-on-year, mainly from market performance. And we continue to see healthy flows across branch and digital channels. In Home Lending, revenue rose 12% year-on-year, mainly from higher production revenue. Now let's look at Card Services & Auto. Revenue rose 14% compared to a year earlier, mostly because of card NII tied to larger revolving balances. Card outstandings increased 11%, reflecting solid account acquisition along with growth in revolvers. On the Auto side, originations came to $10.6 billion, a 7% increase, which reflected greater lease volume thanks to strong new vehicle inventory. Expenses reached $9.7 billion, 4% higher than a year earlier, mainly from field compensation and technology growth. On credit performance for the quarter, credit costs totaled $2.6 billion, which included net charge-offs of $2.1 billion — an increase of $428 million versus a year ago — driven by Card. The net reserve build was $557 million, mainly from higher Card revolving balances. Now, the Commercial & Investment Bank on Page 6. CIB posted net income of $6.6 billion on revenue of $17.6 billion. IB fees climbed 49% from a year earlier, and we held the #1 rank with wallet share of 9.3% for 2024. Advisory fees rose 41%, helped by large deals and share gains across several key sectors. Underwriting fees grew substantially, with debt up 56% and equity up 54%, mostly from favorable market conditions. As for the outlook on the overall Investment Banking wallet, given the positive momentum, we continue to feel optimistic about our pipeline. Payments revenue came in at $4.7 billion, up 3% year-on-year excluding equity investments, driven by higher deposit balances and fee growth, largely offset by deposit margin compression. Lending revenue was $1.9 billion, up 9% from a year earlier, mostly from lower losses on hedges. Shifting to Markets. Total revenue was $7 billion, up 21% year-on-year. Fixed income rose 20%, with stronger performance in Credit and continued outperformance in Currencies & Emerging Markets. Equities increased 22% on elevated client activity in Derivatives, amid greater volatility and higher trading volumes in Cash. Securities Services revenue was $1.3 billion, up 10% year-on-year, driven by fee growth on higher client activity and market levels, as well as higher deposit balances. Expenses of $8.7 billion were up 7% from a year earlier, mostly from higher brokerage technology and legal expense. Average banking and payments loans declined 2% year-on-year and 1% sequentially. Global Corporate and Investment Banking loans fell 2% quarter-on-quarter, driven by paydowns and lower short-term financing, primarily offset by new originations. In Commercial Banking, middle market loans also declined 2%, driven by paydowns, predominantly offset by new originations. And commercial real estate loans were flat, as new originations were offset by paydowns. Average client deposits rose 9% year-on-year and 5% sequentially, driven by underlying client growth. Lastly, credit costs was $61 million, driven by net downgrade activity and the net impact of charge-offs, largely offset by a reserve release due to an update to certain loss assumptions. Then to wrap up our lines of business, Asset & Wealth Management on Page 7. AWM reported net income of $1.5 billion, with pretax margin of 35%. We posted revenue of $5.8 billion, which rose 13% compared to a year earlier. That was mainly fueled by management fee growth on stronger average market levels, solid net inflows, and increased performance fees. Our expenses came to $3.8 billion, climbing 11% from the prior year, largely because of greater compensation — this includes revenue-linked compensation — along with ongoing expansion of our private banking advisor teams and elevated distribution fees. For the quarter, long-term net inflows reached $76 billion, and every asset class was positive. On the liquidity side, we recorded net inflows of $94 billion during the quarter, and for the entire year it was $104 billion — I'm sorry, $140 billion for the full year. Client asset net inflows totaled $468 billion for the year. AUM stood at $4 trillion, while client assets came in at $5.9 trillion, with both figures rising 18% versus a year ago, lifted by sustained net inflows and better market levels. Lastly, loans grew 2% from the previous quarter, and deposits increased 5% quarter-on-quarter. Now let's move to Corporate on Page 8. Corporate posted net income of $1.3 billion. Its revenue of $2 billion represented a $223 million increase year-on-year. NII of $2 billion fell $415 million compared with a year earlier, as lower rates took a toll, though balance sheet actions — chiefly securities reinvestment activity — offset most of that.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#2

NIR came in as a net loss of $30 million, versus a net loss of $668 million a year earlier, mostly because net investment securities losses were smaller this quarter. Expenses totaled $550 million, which is a drop of $3 billion compared with last year, largely because the FDIC special assessment of $2.9 billion was absent from the prior year. So with that, let's shift to the outlook, beginning with NII on Page 9. For 2025, we anticipate NII ex Markets of roughly $90 billion. Walking through the drivers, as we typically do, this outlook takes rates along the forward curve; worth pointing out is that the decline in NII comes from both the cut anticipated in 2025 and the effect of the 100 basis points of cuts during the back half of 2024. On that page, you'll see we've charted how card loan growth has moved historically. We anticipate another year of healthy card loan growth, though under the 12% pace from 2024, since tailwinds from revolver normalization are mostly now behind us. Now on to deposits. Deposits across the firm have steadied, and we anticipate a clearer growth trend emerging during the second half of 2025. Notably, that trend is already visible in consumer checking deposits; regarding deposit margin, modest compression is expected because of lower rates. Putting that all together, we think the NII trough may arrive around the middle of the year, with growth after that, as shown at the bottom of the bar. And just to be complete, we anticipate firm-wide NII of roughly $94 billion, reflecting Markets NII rising to about $4 billion, which you should view as largely offset within NIR. Last, I'd like to highlight that beginning this quarter, we're adding an earnings-at-risk estimate into the earnings supplement, so there's no longer a need to wait for the K or the Q to obtain that figure; now let's move to expenses on Page 10; for 2025, we expect expense of roughly $95 billion. Looking at the chart in the middle of the page, I'll discuss what's driving the year-on-year change, and you'll notice these are quite consistent with what we've been telling you lately. The biggest increase comes from volume and revenue-related expense, mainly due to anticipated growth in auto leasing and in capital markets. Keep in mind, this arrives alongside higher revenues. We keep adding bankers and advisors to back business growth and to broaden our branch network. Higher tax spend is mostly business-driven, as we keep investing in new products, features and customer platforms, along with modernization. Marketing continues to drive spend, since we keep finding attractive opportunities, producing strong demand and engagement in our Card business. And last, even though we haven't specifically flagged it on every bar, inflation still adds some upward pressure; and as always, we're creating efficiencies to help counter it. Moving on to Page 11, where we'll discuss credit and then wrap things up. Regarding credit, for 2025 we anticipate the Card net charge-off rate will come in around 3.6%, consistent with the guidance we gave earlier. To conclude, 2024 marked yet another year of record revenue and net income, and we take pride in what we achieved. Looking toward 2025, we continue to expect NII normalization, though it will be less pronounced than our earlier assumption. Stepping back, we believe it's crucial to recognize the tension, the risks and uncertainties present in the environment, along with how much optimism is baked into asset prices and expectations; given that backdrop, we stay optimistic regarding the strength of the franchise, yet our focus is on preparing ourselves for a broad array of scenarios. Lastly, I want to touch briefly on the wildfires in Los Angeles. Although we anticipate minimal financial effect from them, we do have a presence there across all 3 lines of business, so we are maintaining close communication with our customers, clients and employees. We're extending support in multiple ways, such as waiving consumer and business banking fees, contributing to local relief organizations, providing employee donation matching and backing employee volunteer efforts; with that, I'll hand things over to Jamie before we open up the line for Q&A.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#3

Morning, everyone. Let me start by making clear that Daniel Pinto hasn't departed from the firm at this point. So any such talk is premature. What I'm — right, I simply wanted to add — and I would be careless if I failed to mention, here's a young man who came aboard at age 20 in Argentina. He was in charge of trading in Argentina, after that he was in charge of trading across Latin America. Following that, he was in charge of global emerging markets trading, and after that he was in charge of fixed income trading. And after that he turned into the Co-Head of the Investment Bank and the sole Head of Investment Bank for 10 years. And throughout that entire span, he assisted me in building one of the great investment banks in the world. And so — and after that, clearly, he served as President for 5 years or more, a great partner of mine, trusted by everyone at the company. So we're delighted to have his skills and talents going forward, but I simply wanted to acknowledge the contributions he made.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#4

Great. All right. So let's go to questions.

John McDonald

analyst
#5

John, thanks for raising the topic of capital. I realize this comes up frequently — that tricky position of having a capital base that keeps expanding while you view it as future earnings. So how do you weigh the cost of holding onto that larger and larger pile against your willingness to wait for better chances to put it to work? And how big are you comfortable letting it get?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#6

Jeremy here — appreciate the question, John, and glad to have you back, incidentally.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#7

Yeah, John, we noticed that. I ran into your group not long ago. It took longer than I'd have liked, but nice job.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#8

Right, so you've already flagged every point we typically bring up, so there's no need for me to go through them again. And the way we're looking at this at the moment, I'd say, is that we're quite at ease with the idea that holding a solid reserve of additional capital makes sense given where the environment stands today. Our view is that there's a strong likelihood a window will come along when we can put that capital to work at improved levels — in whatever form — relative to what today's opportunities would point to. So for us, that comes across as the right sort of strategic and financial call. That said, after examining this pretty thoroughly across the past 6 months, with all the back-and-forth you'd anticipate, we've landed on the conclusion that we already have sufficient capital. The excess we hold is enough; and with that being the case, our preference is that the excess stop increasing beyond this point. So if you consider what that implies, with the volume of organic capital we're generating, it follows that — absent near-term chances to deploy organically or through other means — it translates into additional capital returned via buybacks, with everything else held constant, so that the growth of the excess gets halted. That's the plan as it stands right now. One caveat I'll add, which as you're aware appears in our disclosure: we have no desire to start guiding on buybacks; and we retain the right to alter the trajectory whenever we want, for whatever reason — but that reflects our thinking today.

John McDonald

analyst
#9

All right. Then one more thing as a follow-up. If we consider the plan for investment spending in the coming year, in what ways does that look different compared with, let's say, the prior year or the prior 2 years, whether we're looking across business segments or that spectrum of return certainty you mentioned? And beyond that, which sorts of efficiencies have been factored into the guidance?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#10

Of course. What's actually true — and I suppose that's a positive — is that our teams are extremely steady; so what we're witnessing are the outcomes of the high-certainty investment decisions we've made, spanning every one of those categories you're quite familiar with, the ones we called out on the outlook page for expenses; and those remain the primary places where we're concentrating. Execution gets adjusted slightly around the edges as we chase various opportunities within the Commercial & Investment Bank; we keep digging deeper and examining the specific areas of relative weakness that could show up if you look a level or 2 beneath those very substantial — substantially strong share positions visible at an aggregate level. Daniel would always bring up the reds and the ambers sitting behind the greens, and that's part of the company's culture; so we apply that everywhere and keep examining and iterating. And we direct resources toward those things while doing so. Yet on the whole, the teams are extremely steady. Regarding efficiency, there are a couple of points worth making, which you're quite familiar with. First, whenever we consider efficiency and the way we've produced it at this company, it's organic, it's BAU, it's evergreen; it occurs daily across every team everywhere. And so that's essentially a piece of the bottoms-up culture, and that's still true. We do have a handful of top-down areas where we're focused. Take, for instance, technology — to begin with, we're investing considerable effort in enhancing our software engineers' ability to be productive while carrying out development work. And there's been substantial attention paid to their development environment so that they can be more productive. And with everything else held constant, that yields a modest amount of efficiency. We also maintain considerable — considerable attention on how efficiently our hardware is utilized, and that's part of it too. And one more item worth mentioning: you'll remember that during Investor Day, I said we had likely hit peak modernization spend. As Jamie likes to say, we're constantly modernizing. So the fact that we've hit a peak and it could decline somewhat from this point doesn't change the reality that we'll be modernizing on an ongoing basis. Still, at the margin, that means within the tech teams, some capacity is freed up to concentrate on features and new product development and similar things, which in a sense is another form of efficiency. To wrap up, here's my perspective: when you examine how our staffing numbers have moved across the past several years, it's clear we've expanded significantly, and there were excellent reasons behind that. That expansion played a meaningful role in driving our growth and in our capacity to operate this company with efficiency. Yet whenever you experience that magnitude of increase in headcount, combined with that pace of increase, you must accept that, with everything else held constant, a certain degree of inefficiency has crept in. Consequently, this year, during the budgeting process, we requested that colleagues, at the margin, work to sustain the company's expansion while staying within their limits when it comes to staffing. So, aside from several significant exceptions I'll point out shortly, our intention is to operate with headcount that is approximately level, and that this would prompt employees to create internal efficiencies as they find inventive approaches with their teams and as we explore more effective methods for getting things done. The clear exceptions involve the continuing segments where we invest with strong confidence and where growth is expected — so clearly, branches, bankers, and similar areas — plus the essential, non-negotiable domains of risk and control, such as cyber, or anything independent risk management requires to guarantee we operate this company securely. That sums up our current thinking on efficiency.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#11

Let's start with something straightforward, then move to a harder one. Jamie, who will take over from you? The second thing is, I know I raised this at Investor Day — how come you won't remain in the CEO role a bit longer? From what I'm picking up from investors right now, sure, it fluctuates, but I believe they'd prefer you to stick around. So why declare that you'll be there fewer than 5 years? You're at last getting the thing you pushed for — 15 years of that spaghetti chart of yours regarding how regulation is structured, plus the unpredictability around capital requirements and regulatory costs. It feels like you're at last getting the outcome you've been working toward. So if investors want you to do so, why not remain a bit longer? And what else would you even do? Golf isn't your thing. Treasury Secretary isn't in your future. Your work seems to be your hobby, correct? So how much longer would you remain?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#12

I genuinely love what I do; and taking the second question first, look, we're following a path. That path isn't only about me. It involves the other senior people at the company. It involves the Board. If I remain here for several more years, whether I'm Chairman during that time is something I may or may not be, and that call belongs to the Board, because it truly has to suit the new CEO and things of that nature. Now you're discussing possibly 4, 5 years or beyond. In March I'll turn 69. To me, that's the rational course. I have a couple of health issues that you're aware of. I simply believe it makes a great deal of sense. And so — what was your first question again?

Mike Mayo

analyst
#13

And who will take over for you?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#14

For any large organization such as ours, this situation is regrettable, since those individuals must constantly be under scrutiny and forever coming and going. Several remarkable individuals are on our team. Most of them are familiar to you folks, and there could be 1 or 2 whom you haven't met. The Board constantly evaluates them and holds meetings with every one of them. Jen Piepszak, who has no desire to hold the CEO role, staying on as Chief Operating Officer and remaining afterward is something I consider fantastic. So clearly, she will be working for those individuals. Since I believe maintaining steady management and leadership is tremendously beneficial for an organization, and it will be one of those individuals. And clearly, we won't be informing the press, but no decision has been made as of now. And naturally, at the very end, a few years down the line, individuals fall ill, they alter their thinking, they face family situations; therefore, even if you believed you were certain right now, you could not be entirely positive.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#15

So, under the current base case, you'll stick around for perhaps another few years?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#16

Yes. Under the basic case, that's right.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#17

Perhaps regarding regulation, a different administration is arriving. There's a new — soon-to-be, I suppose, a different regulatory head at the Fed. So perhaps just discuss, once more, which parts of the regulatory framework, were they to shift, would have the greatest effect on you? And are there any places where you believe capital requirements might actually decline? Or is this more a case of requirements merely halting their climb?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#18

Jim, I mean, clearly this is something occupying a lot of our thoughts. But I couldn't descend into a rather deep rabbit hole guessing about every component of the framework and how those might develop. And I simply don't think that's useful at this moment. But let me try to respond to what you asked. So stepping back briefly, if you look at Jamie's quotes, they align very closely with what we've said as a firm for quite some time, namely that what we seek is a coherent, rational, holistically evaluated regulatory framework that lets banks perform their role backing the economy, one that isn't reflexively anti-bank. It doesn't automatically conclude that every question means more of everything, more capital, more liquidity. It relies on data, and it weighs the shared obvious objective of a safe and sound banking system against genuinely acknowledging that banks serve a critical function in supporting growth; and hopefully we got some of that. And that also, along the way, certain elements of the supervisory framework became slightly less bureaucratic and slightly less adversarial and slightly more substantive. So that, at the margin, management can direct its time toward the things that matter most. So whether capital rises, falls, stays flat is truly so complicated because it isn't only Basel III end game, it's also a G-SIB, it's also several other factors. And that's why we keep stressing the importance of doing all of this holistically, properly, with the right analysis. And if that takes time, so be it.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#19

Just to jump in—no, that was excellent. Jeremy covered everything. I've got 3 quick points. Liquidity matters just as much. People have increasingly acknowledged that more factors into liquidity, and discount windows and the way LCR gets calculated, I believe, is quite significant. Competition comes second. Every one of these items ought to be approached while considering which public markets you're after, which private markets you're after, what you're looking for inside the banking system, and what you're looking to get from the banking system. Then third, I believe most folks understand there's an enormous need to pause and examine the business team's Balkanized system we constructed, which carries drawbacks. Even the regulator would confirm that. So at some point, simply take a deep breath. As Jeremy put it, do what's right and keep having the finest management system anywhere in the world.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#20

Got it, that's clear. As a quick follow-up about lending growth — after the election, CEO and business confidence appear to have gone up. So are you noticing any pickup in borrowing demand yet? Any perspective would be helpful.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#21

That's a fair question. Given how much business sentiment has strengthened and how optimistic people generally seem, you'd think there would be some acceleration in loan growth. We aren't actually observing that. My view isn't that this is a bad sign. My guess is that several things are at play here. For one, the capital markets are wide open, and a lot of bigger companies are tapping into them. Add to that small businesses with solid balance sheets, plus perhaps a bit of lingering hesitancy. And it's possible that in certain sectors, some pieces of the policy uncertainty we could be confronting are causing those businesses to hold back somewhat more than they normally would regarding what they carry out in the short term. We'll see what happens once the calendar turns, since the enthusiasm people feel right now is bound to get a reality check at some point. And if that turns into concrete gains and real changes, in whatever form they take, then you'd likely notice it showing up in C&I loan growth especially.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#22

I'd like to build on what was asked regarding capital, and perhaps direct a question to you, Jeremy, about the opposing forces affecting the denominator. Looking at the regulatory figures for the third quarter tied to your G-SIB surcharge score, it appears that score would place you at a 5% G-SIB level. From our understanding, if you report something close to that score when this year closes, your G-SIB surcharge would then rise — reaching 5%, which is an increase of 50 basis points, effective 2 years and 1 day later. Meanwhile, near the holidays, we saw a press release issued by the Federal Reserve as well as litigation filed by the banks. Regarding transparency, it seems the focus will be on possibly achieving improvements as early as this year's stress test. So when we consider how excess is defined — and part of this involves 15.7%, which is plainly an enormous figure — as we think about your returns going forward, that definition of excess keeps evolving too. So how should we frame those opposing forces across 2 major elements: clearly one being your G-SIB surcharge, and the other being your stress capital buffer?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#23

Right, Erika. Okay, you're pulling me into a lot of very deep rabbit holes, but let's attempt to tackle this without going on at too great a length. Starting with G-SIB: yes, the third quarter showed a high trend, yet we experienced normal seasonality in the third or fourth quarter. So although our present estimate of the G-SIB figure is just that, an estimate, we feel quite confident that we ended up comfortably within the 5% bucket purely because of normal seasonality. In fact, December was fairly quiet when it came to the sorts of year-end items that can occasionally generate various kinds of pressure. So that's roughly what you would have anticipated given our usual seasonal patterns. So there's not much to note there. And the evident point is that even under the currently proposed G-SIB rule — which is clearly somewhat stalled, with its smaller buckets plus certain recalibrations and so forth — it isn't even particularly clear that it would have made a difference, either way; but in any case, at present we're operating under the existing rules, and normal seasonality brought us back below 5%. Okay. You brought up the lawsuit. The only comment I'd make on that is we're glad to see the Fed clearly acknowledging that numerous items we've long discussed — around transparency, volatility, and a portion of the non-substantive bureaucratic burden tied to the CCAR process — require improvement. So that's excellent. I don't believe I should be representing the industry groups that filed the suits. Still, based on what those organizations themselves stated in public press releases, it appears this is largely a matter of safeguarding rights given the statute of limitations and approaching deadlines. So hopefully we'll witness meaningful movement on that issue. Now, zooming out, what you're essentially asking is where we stand at the core — and honestly, the clearest way to approach this may be by looking at the numerator. What's our fundamental position on — suppose, purely hypothetically, there's modest expansion in the normalized economic denominator, or genuine organic demand for capital — how much extra numerator would likely be required, or not, depending on conditions? Our thinking increasingly runs toward running various scenario analyses: flat numerator, numerator rising 5, rising 10, rising 20. There may be some scenarios where the numerator comes in somewhat lower, and then we'd estimate our central case and stack our forecast capital figure against it to figure out the surplus; and as you noted, at 15.7%, with the numerator's actual quantum sitting around $275 billion, by virtually any sensible measure, that's an enormous surplus — which is exactly why we reached the conclusion that further growth isn't necessary.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#24

Okay, and I have one more question that builds on what John was asking about. For the time being, just as a rough assumption, based on your comments, since you're looking to halt the increase in CET1, should we simply take it that any funds beyond what's required for organic expansion and dividend commitments — that 15.7% — would be repurchased by the company? I realize you'd rather not forecast the buyback, but is this more or less a temporary stand-in as we consider what could be given back to shareholders through repurchases?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#25

Yeah. I mean, you've referenced our capital hierarchy, and what you're concluding follows directly from what I said about wanting to stop the excess from growing.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#26

Therefore, our plans will never be disclosed to the market. Plus, all of you are aware that everyone out there is building models around such matters and making trades based on them; consequently, buyers in the marketplace who remain steady and consistent and are therefore highly predictable are committing an error.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#27

I think we can go to the next question. Thanks. Yes.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#28

It looks as though you folks have stepped back from the position that you're significantly overearning when it comes to net interest income. And does this stem entirely from the higher rate environment that's now anticipated? Or does it also reflect, in part, a changed perspective on deposit pricing — particularly regarding the consumer side, where, as I understand it, you'd assumed repricing would go a bit further than what we've actually witnessed?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#29

Yeah, that's a fair question, Matt. Let me try, perhaps, to offer a framing that comes at this from a completely different angle. So on one hand, you're correct. When you examine the NII guidance we're providing, which includes the idea that — assuming the yield curve unfolds consistent with the current forwards, which, as everyone knows, is the single thing certain not to occur, but if you wish to suppose something, if you suppose the forwards — we're essentially indicating a possible return to sequential growth during the back half of the year, once again, predicated on all our present assumptions, all else being equal. And one could infer from that, that the overearning narrative no longer holds. I think if you step way back, judged by historical standards, the gap between the policy rate and the weighted average rate paid on consumer deposits is still rather elevated, for a range of reasons, and subject to the reality that, ultimately, deposit pricing will always be a reaction to the competitive conditions we encounter in the field. The present shape of the yield curve is such that, for now at least, when we run the numbers, that's what we observe. Do we believe that's genuinely, genuinely, genuinely sustainable across the cycle? Not clear. But I suppose we'll deal with that issue when it arises. As things stand, this is the outlook for the period ahead.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#30

Yes. We've gotten closer to normalized NII and normalized credit.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#31

Right. Something to keep in mind is that NII excluding Markets has fallen compared with a year ago, so a certain degree of normalization is on the way.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#32

Okay. Now, shifting gears to a strategy-related item. We've come across certain news stories suggesting that you're pushing your Consumer Banking operations into more countries around the world. I'd like to dig into that, since we haven't really witnessed rival institutions pull that off effectively. Clearly, your strategy stems from a strong hand, given your digital leadership. Still, I have to ask: what makes this worthwhile? Does the potential gain sufficiently offset the possibly greater regulatory and execution dangers that accompany running a worldwide Consumer Banking operation?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#33

Yes. Honestly, I believe you've essentially provided your own answer there. We discussed this extensively back when the initiative first got underway, and my view is that drawing parallels with other firms doesn't fit right now. That isn't meant to suggest we're anything extraordinary. It's simply that our approach differs greatly, and the timing is entirely distinct. So this is a fresh initiative. It clearly carries some risk, yet things are progressing fairly well. To state what should be evident, if we judged it unworthy, we simply wouldn't pursue it. That said, we've clearly weighed every risk and opportunity tied to this choice, and it ranks among our strategic initiatives. Those receive intense scrutiny across all our management processes.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#34

Am I coming through clearly? Okay, good — I just wanted to confirm that. Well, this call has been excellent. To start, nice work on a strong quarter. This has been a really good call, with plenty of substantive questions coming through. At this point you might be thinking, what's left to ask? So here's mine. When we look at the NII outlook, you pointed to the NIM pressure, but loans — basically, the balance is climbing, correct? Could you perhaps address — help me get a handle on how the drivers rank? Is it QT ending, deposits rising, pushing that into securities? Is it loan growth turning upward? Within the franchise, is there anywhere you'd point to where loan growth could inflect over the next year? Then finally, regarding what you said about the green, market share #1, the yellow, and the red, those spots we possibly can't see — could you help us understand where those yellows and reds sit? Where are they — just spread around, with every single business having one? Or do certain ones have more than others, meaning more opportunity? And does it lean more toward balance sheet or fee generation? That's roughly what I'd like to get into, if you have a minute.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#35

Sure. Yes, let me give that a try, Betsy. On loan growth, thinking about where it might inflect, honestly the only area that comes to mind fitting that description — at least in terms of mattering to the company's performance — would be acquisition finance. That's fairly new, and it depends on the M&A environment. Should that improve, you'd likely see more activity there. Now, those are — we don't typically hold those loans on the balance sheet all that long. So whether it appears in fees or NII or elsewhere is a different matter. But as our presentation page on the NII outlook shows, card loan growth and revolver normalization have been a meaningful tailwind. And although that remains a growth driver in 2025, again, given our present assumption about what lies ahead, it's — it is slowing somewhat rather than accelerating. It's still expanding above trend, clearly, which is terrific, and it reflects the franchise's strength and the engagement we get from card clients, yet the major normalization tailwinds are no longer there. You're well aware of where the mortgage market stands given rates. Rates also create headwinds in certain other areas, such as our multifamily lending business at the margin. So yes, I'd say in a higher growth environment, with somewhat more optimism, might you see somewhat more loan growth in Business Banking? Might you see somewhat more growth in C&I at the margin? Right, though I'd argue the spot where a shift could show up is mostly in the deal-dependent parts. So we'll watch how that plays out; and regarding the reds and ambers sitting beneath the greens, I believe you're familiar with them, correct? And those line up with our major, long-running investment strategies. The largest one, you could argue, sits in what might be called the affluent segment of Wealth Management; compared with how many households we serve in this country, plus our capabilities, our brand, and what we believe we offer, our penetration there is markedly low. That's the reason we're pressing so hard in that area, since I think we can capture additional share, and it rounds out the franchise quite well. There are plenty of other instances, but we discuss often how we're building deeper within Markets, within Investment Banking, and locating the spots where even — where, at the total, worldwide sector level, we appear strong, yet in any specific region, in any specific subsector, we can improve. And as I said, we keep approaching that as forcefully as we always have.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#36

I suppose there are just 2 things I'd ask about regarding where weakness might show up. Jeremy, I did hear what you said about lending, but there are plenty of conflicting forces at play. Let's assume we've got a new administration coming in — one that's focused on domestic CapEx — and suppose we get no rate cuts at all. Across your customer base, which spots look exposed, whether from tariffs or simply from the absence of further relief out of the Fed? And from a credit quality angle, I'd really like to know what a scenario with no cuts could bring.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#37

OK, now I follow where you're headed with this; it took me a moment. Sure. Well, look, predicting wholesale credit is quite difficult; it's usually driven by very specific, individual circumstances. You're certainly aware that we've been exiting a stretch of more than 10 years with an unusually low charge-off rate. Sooner or later, then, that needs to settle toward a somewhat more sensible level — which connects a bit to what Jamie mentioned before about certain things not having completely normalized. It's fair to say wholesale credit may be among them. On the portfolio's sensitivity to a rate shock, we insist on thorough stress testing. Honestly, much of our underwriting approach exists precisely to shield us from that. So you can be confident we're doing the appropriate analysis, though I'd rather not get into specifics on any particular unit, sector, or anything like that. Jamie, did you want to...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#38

Yeah. I'd simply say that when it comes to credit, the single largest factor has been — and will forever remain — the jobless rate. This applies to consumers, and it spills over into businesses too. It carries into home loans, subprime, and cards. So ultimately, it comes down to what you project for unemployment, which you must arrive at yourself, and that's what shapes things as time passes. Then the other point — you mentioned weak spots — it's joblessness, though the absolute worst scenario would be stagflation. Elevated rates combined with more people out of work would produce greater credit losses quite literally everywhere. I'm not saying — we aren't forecasting that, but you merely inquired about where those weak spots are. Those are the weak spots.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#39

So, continuing along those lines, I suppose. Regarding QT, if you ask specialists, nobody can say what the appropriate point is for the Fed to stop. I'm simply curious whether you have any perspective on that — on when the Fed ought to halt applying pressure to the system and what that might mean for deposit growth.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#40

Yeah. My view is that the standard thinking on QT — and I'm not claiming to contribute anything to that standard thinking, in either direction — holds that the tapering ought to wrap up, and so an ending could arrive at some point midway through the year. Naturally, they could alter that, yet it appears to be what the market currently agrees on; and when we pull back a bit and examine the HA data along with our flow of funds models and similar things, when you consider how RRP is acting, how QT is evolving, what's expected for loan growth across the economy, and so on, plus what effect all that could have on system-wide deposit expansion, it lines up fairly well with the narrative we're giving regarding the underlying growth in our NII outlook, give or take whatever occurs with the policy rate, and deposit balances steadying and increasing across the back half of the year.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#41

Jeremy, during your remarks you brought up how deposits across the whole company had leveled off, and that during the back half of the year, it was possible to envision a bit of expansion in your different — I believe your words were that you had begun to notice perhaps a portion of that within consumer checking deposits. Looking at the regulatory industry figures, before the pandemic household checking deposits throughout the sector sat at roughly $1 trillion. Following the pandemic they have stayed inflated, at $4 trillion. Drawing on whatever you observe among your own customers, what do you think the pressure on these consumer checking account deposits should be credited to?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#42

That is really interesting, Gerard. I will need to examine those figures. Honestly, those numbers don't ring a bell for me. Still, I can talk about our own situation, meaning that whenever we examine the promising expansion we observe within our checking franchise, a few factors are involved; naturally, a certain amount of surplus existed along with some behavior aimed at chasing yield, and because of that you witnessed individuals shifting funds away from checking toward alternatives offering higher yields throughout the past 2 years of the rate cycle. Our sense is that we have reached the last innings of that process; the yield-seeking pressure we now encounter is nowhere near what it once was. At the same time, as you are certainly aware, we are working intensively with customers and bringing in every new customer while going deeper across numerous markets as part of our branch expansion strategy and the deepening efforts in each of those markets; therefore the mix of yield-seeking flows winding down plus strong client engagement and achievement in the organic buildout of that franchise is beginning to appear in checking account growth, something we regard as a really positive signal for the franchise.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#43

Great. Then, to follow up, going back to the topic of capital levels. You've been quite explicit regarding the level you'd like them at. Could you tell us the advantages and disadvantages, as JPMorgan sees them, rather than from an investor's standpoint? Naturally, we realize you're able to conduct a share repurchase. Clearly, nondepository acquisitions are possible using that surplus capital. However, what are the benefits and drawbacks of issuing a special dividend as a way to bring that extra capital down? Assuming you keep delivering these remarkable profitability figures — a 20% return on tangible common equity — your income and capital are expanding quite well annually. But once more, from JPMorgan's viewpoint, what are those benefits and drawbacks?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#44

Yes. So once more, we issued some public remarks about this at a conference a while ago. So it will — he wants to go. So go ahead, Jamie.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#45

Jeremy, you have the floor.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#46

No, no, no — seriously, you should go first.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#47

My response would be that we won't pursue one, and we haven't examined it. Should any of you possess excellent ideas for us, please share them; however, the vast majority of people have no desire for it; it fails to enhance shareholder value; and I have always believed that money available to you is a positive. In my view, assuming you must put capital to work is a massive error. Therefore, our approach was going to involve a great deal of patience. As for special dividends, examining their track record shows they essentially prove ineffective.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#48

Yes. If anyone has a different opinion, we're always interested.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#49

That sounds good.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#50

Thanks, Gerard.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#51

Excellent. Many thanks.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#52

Many thanks. We'll see you again in the next quarter.

Operator

operator
#53

Appreciate everyone for joining us on today's call. At this point you're welcome to hang up, and enjoy the remainder of your day.

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