Pershing Square Inc. (PS) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

November 3, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Capital Markets earnings 46 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jill Chapman

executive
#1

Thanks, Jeanne. Morning, everyone. Glad to have you with us for Pershing Square's Third Quarter 2026 Earnings Call. With me today are Bill Ackman, our CEO and Chairman, and Ryan Israel, our CIO. We released our earnings presentation and shareholder letter yesterday; both are posted on our website, pershingsquareinc.com, in the Investors section. Our Form 10-Q is expected to be filed after the market closes on Thursday, October 5. Before we get started, please review the legal disclaimers at the end of the earnings presentation. This call may contain forward-looking statements, which carry risks and uncertainties and aren't guarantees of future performance. Actual results could differ materially from those expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements because of various factors described under forward-looking statements in our earnings presentation and in our IPO prospectus filed on April 30. We don't undertake any obligation to update forward-looking statements; we may also reference non-GAAP financial measures when answering questions. Reconciliations appear in our earnings presentation, which is available on our website. Lastly, please note that nothing on this call is a prospectus, an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy our common stock or any interest or security in any Pershing Square fund or securities of any other person. Also, nothing on this call is investment advice or an invitation or inducement to deal in securities. I'll now hand the call over to Bill.

William Ackman

executive
#2

Thanks, Jill. And welcome, everyone, to the call. Each quarter, the evening before, we put out what I'd describe as a quite thorough letter covering that quarter, and our aim is to highlight the developments we consider most important, along with a quarterly presentation. The purpose of that is to leave us ample time for taking questions from the investor and analyst communities. We structure this in 2 parts. First comes an hour-long, let's call it traditional earnings call. Part 2 is opened quite widely to the entire shareholder base. You're welcome to follow along with Part 2, or simply remain on this call, and we'll get to your questions. Let's start with — I'd frame it as a big-picture observation. What sets Pershing Square apart from other alternative investment managers is that every one of our assets at present is publicly traded. Our capital base is permanent. The implication is that volatility in our AUM comes simply from mark-to-market movements in the value of the stocks held in our portfolio. In fact, Ryan devised a really helpful framework for thinking about our business. Go ahead and explain — it's essentially captured in the letter — the message we're aiming to get across to shareholders.

Ryan Israel

executive
#3

Yes, absolutely. As we noted in the letter, because our business rests on permanent capital, we will occasionally bring in new funds, and that adds meaningfully to our fee-paying AUM. That said, most of our growth—what we call organic growth—will ultimately stem from the returns we produce over time. And when it comes to the great majority of our capital, we seek out companies carrying a high level of certainty, ones whose shape we can foresee across the years and decades ahead. What we're aiming to do is put together a collection of roughly 12 to 15 truly outstanding companies, drawn from a universe of perhaps several hundred that we monitor closely, and we believe that if we buy these companies, we can achieve a return of no less than 20% across a span of multiple years. Should we succeed in that and prove right, our assets would eventually expand at a rate comparable to the gains produced by the businesses we hold. And if you break that down—this is how we actually think about how we generate returns broadly, that rate of 20%-plus—there are essentially two pieces to it. The main way we'll eventually get those returns comes down to how the companies themselves perform, and that ultimately ties back to their earnings growth over time. So generally speaking, we're looking for businesses that can grow with a high level of confidence somewhere in the range of 15% to 25% annually. That's precisely what we have when you look at the roughly 15 companies in our portfolio today. Second, we hope to capture a bit of extra return over time beyond what the business alone can grow at—which we treat as a proxy for the growth and value of that business—and that comes from multiple expansion. When investors put a multiple on a company's profits, our approach is to purchase those companies at moments when the market doubts they can keep delivering at their historical levels, or when people are weighing some new uncertainty that has just emerged and wondering how it will play out. We form a view that the company will probably keep performing strongly, or do even better going forward. And we think we're acquiring that company at a moment when folks are maybe doubting what the future holds for it, and we're able to purchase at a multiple below what we believe the company will eventually be worth once things become a bit clearer — the clouds lift a little and the sky clears, so to speak. That ought to add to the returns the business generates on its own. So those 2 factors together — acquiring some of the world's great growth companies and getting them at appealing or discounted valuations — will probably produce that more than 20% return we're after, and that will be the main engine of our business going forward. At a broad level, that is exactly what we tried to get across in the letter — both the idea itself and how we view the entire portfolio, essentially as a subsidiary of a holding company consisting of 12 to 15 subsidiaries, with each individual investment able to target those 20% returns primarily through earnings growth. And what shows up in our fee-paying assets under management is the aggregate outcome of all those businesses.

William Ackman

executive
#4

One more thing to keep in mind when you're sizing us up against other alternative managers: I know the Apollo call is likely near its end, and they're probably going to concentrate on realization events, given how much those drive incentive fees, along with fundraising momentum and new funds. On our side, the real priority is the progress of the companies underneath — how those businesses are actually performing — since if we've done our job well, that ultimately generates growth in the company's underlying value and, as time goes on, in the assets we manage. With that said, let me turn to one more important subject. A key highlight for the quarter involved our advancements with Howard Hughes. Right before Q2 wrapped up, we finalized the deal through which Howard Hughes bought Vantage, a company focused on specialty insurance and reinsurance. After that, we had the good fortune of Marc Grandisson taking on the Executive Chair role at that business. And we counted ourselves lucky to bring David Gansberg aboard as its CEO. Over the past four months, Marc has assembled what we consider the strongest insurance group in the business — at a firm that's still quite small, yet we intend to expand Howard Hughes's insurance segment quickly by pulling capital from our real estate subsidiary and directing it into the insurance operation. We've done quite well on the management side of things, and on monetization we're moving at full speed. Still, our expectation is that Howard Hughes will truly turn into a holding company led by insurance, and that we should view this business in the coming months and on into next year in terms of directing ever more capital into the insurer. I raise that point because as of today it amounts to a genuinely immaterial slice of Pershing Square Inc's revenues; we get a base management fee of $15 million, along with an upside management fee equal to 1.5% of the company's market cap. We generate more than what initially served as a $66 floor, and that floor rises with inflation. As our business advances, we anticipate the stock will re-rate. Right now it trades at a meaningful discount to — think of it as liquidation value. Being a high-returning insurance company, it ought to trade at a multiple of that underlying intrinsic value. So that's very good progress, and I believe there will be more to share there as we move forward. Let's go to questions.

Dan Fannon

analyst
#5

So Bill, I'd like to follow up on the last things you said about Howard Hughes and the insurance opportunity. Obviously that market is extremely competitive, so I was hoping you could lay out how Howard Hughes has the right to win in an environment like this, where rates are clearly rising and, as you said earlier, competition is pretty fierce.

William Ackman

executive
#6

Sure, let me make a few points. First, the reason we bought Vantage is that it's a diversified platform. As of today it participates in a couple of dozen insurance lines. And Marc is actually going to expand the number of markets where the company competes. At present it's a quite small insurance company, and it holds a fairly limited amount of capital. That means we're able to pursue the opportunities that look like intriguing niches within insurance markets and identify profitable areas in which to operate. I would say Marc feels quite optimistic about the set of opportunities as he perceives it. Regarding rates—if you're referring to interest rates—then clearly, rising policy rates benefit insurers. When interest rates climb, that tends to hurt insurers. What we did was, just days after buying the company, we liquidated Vantage's whole fixed income portfolio and swapped it for a short-term treasury portfolio of under 90 days. Vantage carries no exposure to interest rate risk at all. After reserving an amount of capital matching the float in short-term Treasuries, we directed the surplus — the remaining portion — into a portfolio of common stocks, and on that front we've achieved substantial headway. Since we invested, that portfolio has gained roughly 6%, as I recall. So the investment side is coming along well, correct? Consider a fixed income portfolio: if Vantage had held onto the portfolio it previously owned through the next 4 months, it would have suffered a significant decline in value. Through the strategy we adopted, we have raised the portfolio's value. Still, there's an upside to our modest size when we can attract a leadership group with this level of credibility: Marc contributes not only sharp judgment but also the connections and the knack for drawing in talent — and, as a result, the capacity to spot opportunities that would have stayed out of reach if he weren't steering things.

Kenneth Lee

analyst
#7

Just one thing about the PS Ventures fund vehicle. Could you maybe walk through some of the next steps and perhaps the time frames for when we might start to see that launch?

William Ackman

executive
#8

Sure. So for us, the next steps are, first, we'll likely file an N-2 within the next few weeks — that's the SEC form of the kind we filed for launching a vehicle like this one. It'll contain a lot more detail. There'll be some detail on the initial portfolio companies, too. We are likely to launch a private placement financing of that sort for the company with institutions. So we raised some additional equity capital before launching this as a public company; we'll begin that process shortly after. Once we get through the SEC, which is probably a process of a couple of months, we'll pick our moment to launch that vehicle. But I would say Q1 is a good target for that as a public company to get its inception.

Kenneth Lee

analyst
#9

Great, that's really useful. And if I may, just one brief follow-up. Looking at the portfolios you currently hold, which positions or investments do you believe provide the biggest potential gains or the strongest opportunities for growth over the longer term?

William Ackman

executive
#10

The holding with the most upside for us is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those stocks have dropped 60% this year, amid disappointment that the President hasn't moved forward or really made any announcements. Last year there was a lot of excitement. The stocks climbed basically eightfold since the President was elected, and then they've declined very significantly. But the businesses continue to perform extremely well. Capital is back at levels we think mean the business has effectively been freed; my sense is the administration didn’t want to devote any time to it, or attract the headlines, ahead of midterms. There’s concern that merely talking about Fannie and Freddie might push mortgage rates higher, which would clearly hurt in the midterm elections. According to the Treasury Secretary, this is an issue to be taken up later in the President’s term. So that’s the investment with the greatest upside, and it’s substantial. Across the two companies combined, we hold over 200 million shares. In our view the stocks trade at a small fraction. These are 10x potential. Beyond that, the remaining holdings hold considerable upside across the coming two years or so — though think of it as roughly a doubling spread over multiple years rather than a tenfold gain. On the specific companies, though — Ryan, would you like to walk through that?

Ryan Israel

executive
#11

Yes. So, applying that earnings-growth-plus-multiple-expansion lens, when we look across the portfolio — and obviously, everything we hold today we're really enthusiastic about, because otherwise we'd have found something else we were more enthusiastic about that we could have bought. One name I'd highlight among what you might call the core holdings is Uber. Uber, now, is the fastest-growing business we own. We said in the letter, in effect, that we believe the company ought to deliver earnings per share growth of 25%-plus across the coming 3 to 5 years. And if that company carried a multiple we consider right today, then you'd expect that, assuming we're correct about that 25% earnings per share growth, it would generate roughly a 25% rate of return across that stretch — over the next 3 to 5 years, roughly — which would in fact beat the kind of double we'd anticipate from the portfolio overall. And interestingly...

William Ackman

executive
#12

And that's before there's any adjustment to the multiples. Yes.

Ryan Israel

executive
#13

That's exactly right. What's interesting is that Uber happens to be one of the lowest-multiple holdings in our portfolio, even though it has the greatest growth ahead over the next 3 to 5 years. It trades at roughly 16x earnings — the lowest multiple the company has ever traded at since going public — and we think that's misplaced. It really comes down to 2 fundamental risks. First, people worry about AVs and what impact they'll have on Uber's business. Second, there's this more agentic commerce angle — the Muse-like agentic agents that do the booking, if you will. We've done a lot of work on both of those scenarios, and we keep doing a lot of work on this investment, which we've held for close to 2 years now. We believe both of those things may in fact make Uber's business stronger, for the simple reason that, in different ways, each one actually expands Uber's addressable markets, which would allow for faster growth without causing any disruption to what we believe are some very strong moats around the business. So in short, if Uber can grow its earnings about 25% a year and the multiple can expand from 16x to something significantly in excess of that, Uber could be one of the best investments we've made in a long period of time in the core portfolio.

William Ackman

executive
#14

To look at that specific opportunity over a shorter horizon from a different angle: if you take the analyst estimates, there’s, I think, pretty broad consensus that earnings will rise roughly 35% during the coming 12 months. Suppose you hold a stock at 16x earnings, it does nothing for the next 12 months, and earnings climb 35% — then 12 months from now it would be trading at around 12x earnings. My view is that the odds of that happening are extraordinarily slim. So ultimately, businesses tend to — intrinsic value acts like a tether. Over time the business gets drawn toward intrinsic value, unless — unless our read on intrinsic value is wrong. Actually, I think it could be worth taking a couple of minutes to discuss how we — the major overhang weighing on Uber stock right now is the belief that Tesla will simply conquer everything. It would essentially become the autonomous vehicle player, or maybe there will be 2, and people will open the Tesla app instead of using the Uber platform. What’s our counterargument to that?

Ryan Israel

executive
#15

Right. The largest historical threat has come from Tesla in autonomous vehicles. Increasingly, certain people are concerned that Waymo, which Google owns, might be assembling a fleet of its own. In the end, what worries them boils down to this: such firms are able to produce distinctive vehicles of their own design, and those vehicles would create a separate network, meaning riders would no longer have to launch the Uber app to secure transportation — they would instead approach those AV companies straightaway, and those AV companies would not work together with Uber. Our take is that, in the end, Uber can reach many more cars and drivers than Tesla and Waymo do — and honestly more than the combined total that any self-driving companies still to emerge could ever muster. And from a rider's standpoint, two things genuinely matter. First, they want a car to arrive at their door fast, and second, they want a fair price. The core issue with these supply-and-demand networks is that you want the greatest possible amount of supply in cars so riders can secure decent prices and get them fast. Our thinking on this boils down to this: in the end, AVs will supplement human drivers rather than replace them, since the number of human drivers far exceeds any conceivable AV fleet; as a result, partnering with Uber over time serves Tesla's and Waymo's own interests, ensuring their vehicles achieve improved capacity. An important point to consider is that, from the standpoint of Waymo and Tesla, building these cars comes at a very high cost. So you'll want those vehicles to be used as much as possible. Being part of a network that keeps someone behind the wheel of your car for a large share of each day matters a great deal if you're going to end up with decent returns on your capital. Beyond that, you have to weigh other factors — how mature different technologies actually are, whether they're near enough to being viable for these vehicles to become commonplace, plus regulation and purely logistical questions like cleaning the cars, charging them, and if a rider leaves something behind, how do you actually reconnect them with it? That's an area where Uber's logistics strengths matter a great deal. Still, what it ultimately comes down to is getting the most out of each of these cars, and in our view that happens when everyone plugs into the existing network, with its massive supply and demand — that's where the biggest win for all sits. Assuming we're correct about that, over the longer term you could picture a situation in which more individuals are using cars. At present, when you consider how many miles are driven via rideshare, that group is approximately 1% or 1.5%, somewhere around there. And we believe this figure could grow considerably over time, as long as we can provide more vehicles at lower prices to people. So in the end, we think Uber has a very valuable role to play in that network over the longer term. But competition worries people largely because Tesla and Waymo operate in selected markets — markets we consider the simplest places for them to demonstrate that their concept works — and in some of those markets they're going it alone and, in Tesla's situation, haven't formed a partnership with Uber yet; while in Waymo's situation, they've partnered with us in certain markets but not in others. Still, drawing on all the work we've completed and simply our perspective on how the future will probably unfold, we see it as very likely that Uber's part stays significant, and we believe market growth will end up even greater than what we and plenty of others anticipate going forward.

William Ackman

executive
#16

To build on Ryan's point, mobility demand isn't steady — it comes with peaks and valleys. Obviously you have to serve the customer at peak times, when they're heading to work in the morning, returning home in the evening, Saturday night, Friday night — think something like New York City — and you can't economically build an autonomous vehicle fleet big enough to cover those peaks, deliver a good customer experience, and still earn an economic return on investment. Another interesting fact about Uber: people discuss it almost entirely as though it's a mobility business, yet roughly half of the business today is food delivery. If you value the food delivery segment at where the comps trade today, you're paying almost nothing for the core mobility business. So it's an extraordinarily cheap stock. And it's actually worth noting — I'd say most alternative asset management companies wouldn't go deep on any single company in their portfolio, because it isn't that relevant. For us, a concentrated portfolio is what drives the ultimate value of this portfolio. And we have realization events in real time, because we mark-to-market the portfolio every day, and we get paid based on mark-to-market performance. Let's go to the next question. Operator?

Daniel F. Welden

analyst
#17

I'm curious whether you could walk through what the structure of a future asymmetric fund might look like. Specifically, the return profile in a steady state when there aren't big events happening. And then how do you view that opportunity set at the moment? It seems as though we're living through a period of major change and major tail risk. But how do you judge when the timing is right?

William Ackman

executive
#18

Absolutely. So we picture — the way we'd build an asymmetric hedging-style vehicle would resemble a U.S. treasury money market fund. The capital gets invested in short-term U.S. treasuries. And the interest income, which these days runs at roughly, say, 4-ish percent, would serve as our budget for the asymmetric investments; so we're effectively designing a fund in which you can't lose money, since treasuries protect your principal. If you spend 400 basis points across the year and that investment earns nothing, people's capital stays protected. We prefer that sort of structure over what's called a tail risk fund, where you raise a smaller amount of capital and over time it burns up and drops to 0 unless the world ends. This, in our view, is a considerably better model. As for the — what we hunt for in our big bets along these lines, and they actually tend to involve fairly modest amounts of capital, but they are large notional bets, has been situations where we held a view about a black swan type event — I mean the financial crisis, the COVID crisis or the enormous inflation surge around the 2021 period that would push the Fed to raise rates. We essentially flagged these as possible risks and then searched for an instrument giving us an asymmetric payoff that warranted some of the uncertainty that comes with any of these kinds of bets. What's great about credit default swaps is there's no premium — you don't pay anything for volatility. So they're effectively volatility neutral; so it's really just a contractual wager on an outcome. The drawback with interest rate swaptions is that whether the payoffs are large enough depends heavily on the level of vol in the market. The nearest we got to placing one of these bets in the existing portfolio was, I'd say, late last year or early this year, when we said, look, there's likely to be some kind of war in Iran. That's going to cause a spike in oil prices. Is there a way to hedge that event that made sense. And the trouble was that the rest of the world knew a war in Iran was likely and would lead to higher oil prices. And on top of that, because of the uncertainty, volatility was high. We examined quite a few possible structures, and if you nailed the timing exactly, buying a 1-month oil option while having a friend in the administration who tipped you off about going to war could have tripled your money. Honestly, that would be the optimal method for profiting in that situation. So we took no action. We hold nothing at present. We believe — we devote considerable time to contemplating risk, geopolitical risk, political risk. Some things concern us. AI worries me. And I believe the likelihood of a major cyber incident is — as we've said for some time, you're beginning to witness fairly serious cyber events. Several military bases have had their refrigerators cranked up to 100 degrees. That may sound — it sounds somewhat alarming, though not completely terrifying. I suspect we'll encounter additional alarming events. The difficulty is that we haven't yet found an effective method to hedge against that type of outcome. And broadly speaking, volatility tends to run quite high. So regarding launching a vehicle of that sort, I think we would prefer to — our primary emphasis is on Pershing Square Ventures. We believe it could become a highly successful entity and is what we want to pursue first. My inclination for the asymmetric fund would be to launch it following our next large success, though we could certainly opt to do so later next year. So that remains an unresolved question. But it's a rather unconventional fund in that it's something requiring no thought from you. Regard it as your money market account earning a reasonable yield while you wait. And then occasionally, we'll deploy capital and hopefully generate a substantial pile of money for investors.

Craig Siegenthaler

analyst
#19

Our question concerns Howard Hughes. You mentioned expecting quite swift expansion and anticipating adding further insurance lines — could you expand on that? In what way do you anticipate growing liabilities? Which particular insurance lines do those remarks refer to? And what competitive edges do you have in mind as you look to take share away from established players?

William Ackman

executive
#20

First off, the important thing is that we feel no pressure to grow. What we do want is to put additional capital into Vantage, giving us the flexibility to pick risks. The beauty of this model is that we ultimately expect to earn higher returns on the insurer's asset side than on the liability side. So we're glad to — we will pick and choose, and Marc and his team will do likewise, the risks they wish to underwrite and want to sort of take on. Meanwhile, we'll deploy the balance sheet's asset side into investments capable of compounding at high rates over time. But Ryan, would you like to add to that?

Ryan Israel

executive
#21

Sure, Craig. I don’t want to get out in front of Marc or reveal any of the competitive secrets he’s working on, but I can offer a high-level picture of how we view growth at Vantage. At Vantage, there are more than two dozen distinct business lines where we can write. And one thing that differs, I think, between being on the inside and viewing it from the outside is that people talk about pricing in this industry as if there were only one price. In truth, each individual market where Vantage competes—several dozen of them—has its own pricing system. And in certain of those markets, we actually view pricing as quite attractive. Some markets just don’t provide appealing pricing, so as Bill said, our plan is to focus on segments where pricing growth appears strong. Vantage’s modest size helps us here: when you’re a minor competitor overall yet run multiple business lines, it becomes possible to move results quickly in the promising areas. How? Partly by redeploying the team we already have—in places where our operations are smaller, that team allows us to write considerably more business. Insurance makes that fairly efficient, since when you quote a rate customers find acceptable—one you also consider solid—and they sign off, your operation can expand rapidly, provided you hold enough capital. There’s another route, though: entering neighboring lines, where after examining a particular category of business you conclude a market might exist serving a distinct customer base or sector while sharing that same category—then you can bring on a fresh team to launch in it. That task gets easier when your premium volume is around $1.2 billion rather than, say, a giant carrier writing $12 billion. As a result, we don’t have a big existing business that could really help drive our growth when we choose to push into these areas. The third opportunity—and this is also where I believe Marc is genuinely helping to drive meaningful progress—is that as a small company, we’ve managed to bring in solid people, but Marc is elevating that to another level. We’re now able to attract some truly exceptional individuals to lead the bigger businesses we could eventually develop over time—people who have worked at very large companies and built those truly remarkable businesses. So, because of Marc’s reputation and how deeply experienced he is in this sector, they’re willing to come aboard at Vantage and genuinely recreate those capabilities. At a high level, the way I tend to view the business is this: you’ve got the insurance side, the primary insurance, where much of what I’ve said comes down to the need, in the end, to build fresh teams that sit near the markets, and to operate in new divisions. Then there’s the reinsurance side, which is far more—it’s far simpler to write substantial volumes of business when you genuinely want to push it hard because you believe the pricing is right, and that side represents roughly $1.5 billion. And that’s something you can actually accomplish without hiring very large teams. So on each side of the business, I believe we’re positioned to truly pick our spots—and the spots we pick can truly move the needle, whether on the insurance side or on the reinsurance side as well, even as we manage a business with $1.5 billion in scale. Operator, let’s take the next question, please.

Edmundo Yépez

analyst
#22

Hi Bill. Hi Ryan. The thing I'd like to bring up is Restaurant Brands and the reason it merits inclusion in the portfolio. My research on this company hasn't been extensive, but next to the other holdings it comes across as a business of somewhat lesser quality, purely because rivalry is fiercer and running it is more complicated; and as things stand at the moment, it seems a large share of the EPS growth is coming from the buyback. So — and on top of that, I believe there's a restructuring turnaround component as well, which leads me to think the IRR threshold should be set higher. So why keep it at a high single-digit share of assets, given that right now the TCPs seem to be pushed mainly by multiples rather than growth?

Ryan Israel

executive
#23

Yes. Thanks for that question, Edmundo. It's a great one. What's really interesting about why we hold Restaurant Brands, I think, is that much of what you laid out holds true for the restaurant sector broadly. But the reason we're fond of Restaurant Brands is its role as a franchisor. That means a great deal of the complexity and a great deal of the capital intensity actually rests with the ultimate operator and owner of each individual restaurant box. The good thing about Restaurant Brands is that it holds five separate companies, all at scale, and in each one it serves as the franchisor. That means it isn't the party running the operations. Its role is gathering royalties—having established the brand and then bringing in the actual owners who handle those businesses every day. Because of that model, the business generates very high margins. It requires very little capital, and it genuinely resembles the kind of royalty-style company that Bill and I frequently discuss as the sort we're looking to find. There's a huge opportunity for growth worldwide in businesses of this kind, and we're able to expand using capital from others. So Restaurant Brands, through the various individual brands it owns, can over time achieve roughly 5% growth; right now it's running a bit below that because they've been repositioning some of their businesses, but management has strong confidence that they'll eventually get it back to around a 5% growth level. And from our perspective, that 5% growth really doesn't call for even $1 of capital, which could make it very accretive to earnings. When we discuss the kinds of businesses we're after, one key factor for us is having a business we can feel highly confident about—which we believe a royalty-based operation like Restaurant Brands represents. We also want some growth potential, and I think the unit growth story I just described delivers that. Beyond that, there's the management team. Something worth pointing out: in recent years, this business has attracted one of the two finest restaurant industry executives ever, in my view—Patrick Doyle. If you look into Domino's history, the turnaround under Patrick's leadership in the 2010s ranks among the most successful ever and stands, I think, as a kind of emblem of what many restaurant companies hope to accomplish. Several years ago Patrick came aboard with us as Executive Chairman of Restaurant Brands, and he's genuinely helping to instill many of the success factors he had at Domino's into Restaurant Brands itself; and so what we've observed since his arrival is a company that has managed to reposition its business and achieve even greater success. Actually, the company has laid out a plan that assumes operating profit can rise about 8% annually, and over the past few years they've succeeded in hitting that mark. As you mentioned, they also expect to continue buying back stock, which we're in favor of. Their dividend is quite attractive at nearly 4%. And adding it all together, we think we end up with a relatively low-risk, high-return-on-capital, high-margin business with excellent leadership that ought to be growing its earnings per share, dividend included, at a rate of about 15%, yet it trades at just 17x earnings, a multiple we consider very low given everything I just listed; so we've held this business for quite some time. It's been a successful investment across our holding period; in fact it's among the businesses we've held longest, but we remain really enthusiastic about it and about how they keep improving the business and about the company's leadership.

Edmundo Yépez

analyst
#24

Is there some kind of index inclusion push coming from your side? Because it isn't as though peers — or whatever you'd call them — belong to the S&P. Is there a drive coming from your index? Or is that just part of the...

William Ackman

executive
#25

Yeah, that's absolutely a topic we've devoted time to alongside management, and management clearly grasps the opportunity as it stands today. What I mean is, one reason we see Restaurant Brands as a cheap stock is that it isn't in the major indices, since technically it's a company domiciled in Canada. At its core, though, the company is truly headquartered in Miami; and we genuinely believe there's an opportunity for it to become eligible for listing in major indices. Meanwhile, the company keeps compounding in value. It's actually repurchasing some stock right now. It will be in a position to buy in shares more aggressively once it reaches its goal of becoming an investment-grade company; so we view it as a good story. The stock has mostly been flat for a stretch that's gone on too long, yet much of that came from real multiple compression even as the business keeps compounding; so we expect those lines to cross favorably over the coming several years.

Mike Brown

analyst
#26

I'd like to ask about Pershing Square Ventures. You set a Q1 target for the public launch, so maybe just expand on that a bit more, since we're thinking about what the economics of Pershing Square Ventures might look like — what framework should we use regarding that initial capital base, the fee structure, and then the potential earnings contribution once the vehicle is running? And then perhaps just say a little about, say, the philosophical approach to investing there. What are you focused on doing in the venture space?

William Ackman

executive
#27

Sure. We'll start with entity management, and Pershing Square is going to contribute a couple hundred million dollars of assets into the vehicle — we always prefer the company to hold a meaningful stake. We'll likely bring in more capital via a private placement. We haven't determined that figure yet, though it could be a couple hundred million dollars. After that we'll take it public and raise a few hundred million dollars. Regarding the vehicle, our goal is not to launch at an oversized scale. So I'd say $500 million to $1 billion is probably a reasonable range for the high and low ends. On the business model side, this will be structured as a closed-end investment company — what's known as a '40 Act entity. Our fee will be 2%, matching what Pershing Square USA charges. For a public market investor, this represents the cheapest route to owning stakes in some truly excellent private businesses. Most of the capital is earmarked for companies that remain private yet possess strongly validated business models, are growing revenue at a very fast clip, and have a clear route to profitability — including several names you'd recognize. Beyond that, we'll also hold some earlier stage, highly intriguing companies. Essentially, here's what we did: I've spent 16, 17 years as an active venture investor. My team went through my personal portfolio, in a sense, and chose the ones they liked best; we're essentially offering the strongest of my venture holdings along with other investments. As noted in the presentation, we've recently come close to deploying $100 million in capital, including some rather compelling investments. The encouraging part is that founders are eager to have Pershing Square on board as an investor. So I'd put it this way: there's likely no deal we couldn't gain entry to. We're sitting down with teams and companies, considering how we might serve as an investor that adds real value for them, which would earn us the chance to put money into some genuinely interesting private businesses. Take $500 million to $1 billion — suppose that comes together by the close of Q1. A number of rather interesting companies sit in there, and people are eager to own them. We also have some fairly intriguing ideas about how this entity will reach the public markets in a manner that benefits all of our most loyal investors; we'll share more once we file for this entity, which I believe is roughly a week out — the exact date hasn't been pinned down yet.

Mike Brown

analyst
#28

All right. Nice color. Maybe just — maybe one more thing on the model side here...

William Ackman

executive
#29

Let me add another point to that. So even though this entity is starting out small, what's great about Pershing Square Ventures is that its value NAV will grow over time as, obviously — assuming we're right and we've done well picking strong companies, these businesses grow at rates far above those of the companies we traditionally invest in. So business value can expand faster; these businesses — most of the capital will go into companies that are more likely to go public sooner — public sooner rather than later; and so we capture the benefit of compounding on the underlying assets. And I think given the scarcity, today's public market investor — one of the disappointing things for a public market investor, a typical retail investor, is that while SpaceX is an amazing company, their first chance to invest in SpaceX came at roughly $180 billion or so, a $1.7 trillion valuation. They would have loved to invest at a $100 billion valuation. Well, we're going to — our aim is to find the next SpaceXs and give the retail investor, the public market investor and really even institutional investors the opportunity to access those companies. I believe that will let Pershing Square Ventures trade well, i.e., trade at a premium to its underlying NAV, and that also gives us the flexibility to raise additional capital. So the vehicle we expect will grow with compounding, much like our existing vehicles, but also with the potential to raise capital that we can then deploy; so while it will start out at something less than $1 billion in scale, we think it can actually grow reasonably quickly to become an important contributor to the profitability of Pershing Square — and ultimately, we believe this can build toward $1.8 billion in value.

Mike Brown

analyst
#30

All right, great, yes. So I only wanted to ask about the expense side, just for the model here. Expenses came in below what we had expected this quarter, and this is your first full quarter as a public company. So maybe how should we think about your G&A growth from here into 2027? Just any guidance there would be helpful.

Ryan Israel

executive
#31

Sure. Appreciate the question, Mike. As we attempted to make clear in the letter, a key point to keep in mind regarding both Q3 and Q4 is that we're up against certain costs from last year's third quarter—and the same will apply in the fourth quarter—when we ultimately had some severance expenses we had prepared, along with signing bonuses and other items, plus certain costs we took on even on the G&A side to get ourselves positioned for going public. As we mentioned in the Q2 letter, we’ve seen some extra growth, both in headcount and in the kind of new costs that come with being a public company. That said, this quarter our expenses were down 1%, and I think next quarter you could see something fairly similar when it comes to year-over-year growth rates. What that really shows is that we’re up against expenses from the prior year that are lapping. I’d say that as we get into ’27, those lapping expenses won’t be nearly as significant. You're going to begin noticing a portion of the higher expenses we're carrying — which we view as largely one-off in nature, tied to bringing on more staff along with certain other costs of being a public company — though that has been somewhat hidden during the third quarter and will likely remain partly concealed in the fourth quarter as well.

William Ackman

executive
#32

Yes. At a very high level, I'd say compensation makes up the overwhelming majority of what we spend. But given the way Pershing Square is structured, that compensation cost sits almost completely off the balance sheet, right? So the public company G&A — the genuine economic G&A — runs at roughly $50 million per year. Our view is that it rises nominally with inflation; however, the bonus and incentive compensation, if you will, really derives from the promote compensation that we've kept off the balance sheet. Again, the public company takes the incentive fees within the first 5 percentage points of return, while management gets paid through incentive fees on returns above 5%. That model, and how appealing it is, means both our — it means our expenses — you won't be shocked by what our expenses turn out to be each quarter. It shouldn't come as a meaningful surprise. And given the nature of the business, the mark-to-market nature of the underlying assets, and the fact that all our funds are public, by the end of the quarter you should be able to work out our revenues quite accurately. So I don't expect — although there was a bit of a surprise, if you will, here, with our expenses coming in lower than expected, and that kind of surprise is never a bad one. Once we get past the public company lapping of some costs tied to — when we went public, I expect there shouldn't be much surprise regarding our expense structure going forward. And if anything significant comes up, we'll let you know about it.

William Ackman

executive
#33

Thank you very much for being on the call. It seems we handled the letter well and that many of the questions were addressed ahead of time, which left us considerably more room to take questions from analysts and investors. At 10:30, Part 2 begins. Really, anyone who would like to pose a question is welcome to join the call. And how does someone go about asking a question? Fran, would you like to walk us through it?

Fran McGill

executive
#34

Absolutely. To ask something, just dial in with the information found in Bill's pinned post on his Twitter. Those details are on the Pershing Square Inc. website as well. Plus, you can answer my tweet. We'll be watching that and gathering a bunch of questions.

William Ackman

executive
#35

Correct. The reason we're handling it this way is that last quarter we ran into some technical difficulties responding to questions directly on Twitter, but this is going to be broadcast on Twitter, and we also welcome your questions live. And we'll see you at 10:30. Thank you.

Operator

operator
#36

This concludes today's call. Thank you for attending. You may now disconnect.

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