JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

January 13, 2023

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Banks earnings 62 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#1

Thanks a lot, and good morning to all of you. You can find the presentation posted on our website, and I'd ask that you take a look at the disclaimer on the final page. Let's begin with Page 1. Our net income came in at $11 billion, with EPS of $3.57, revenue of $35.6 billion, and an ROTCE of 20%. During this quarter, Corporate contained 2 notable items: a $914 million gain from selling Visa B shares, which was offset by a $874 million net loss on investment securities. Let me highlight a few things. Credit and debit spend combined rose 9% compared with a year earlier, with gains in both discretionary and nondiscretionary categories. We closed out the year at #1 in global IB fees, holding a wallet share of 8%, and while credit is still normalizing, actual performance across the entire company remains solid. Turning to Page 2, there's additional detail on our fourth quarter results. Revenue reached $35.6 billion, an increase of $5.2 billion, or 17%, versus a year ago. NII ex Markets climbed $8.4 billion, or 72%, on the back of higher rates. NIR ex Markets fell $3.5 billion, or 26%, largely due to reduced IB fees along with management and performance fees in AWM, plus lower Auto lease income and Home Lending production revenue. Meanwhile, Markets revenue grew $382 million, or 7%, year-on-year. Expenses totaled $19 billion, rising $1.1 billion, or 6%, from a year earlier, mainly from elevated structural expense and investments. Credit costs of $2.3 billion encompassed net charge-offs of $887 million. A net reserve build of $1.4 billion stemmed from revisions to the firm's macroeconomic outlook, which now incorporates a mild recession in the central case, together with loan growth in card services, partly offset by diminished pandemic-related uncertainty. Now for the full year results on Page 3: net income was $37.7 billion, EPS was $12.09, revenue hit a record $132.3 billion, and our ROTCE came to 18%. Moving to the balance sheet and capital on Page 4, we finished the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 13.2%, an increase of 70 basis points, mostly from the benefit of net income, including the Visa B share sale, less distributions, along with AOCI gains and reduced RWA. RWA dropped roughly $20 billion from the prior quarter, driven by lower RWA in the Markets business, partly offset by more lending, mostly in card services. Keep in mind we had set a 13% CET1 target for the first quarter of 2023, and we've now hit that 1 quarter ahead of schedule. With that in mind, we anticipate restarting share repurchases during this quarter. Let's now move into our businesses, beginning on Page 5. First, a brief update on how U.S. consumers and small businesses are doing, based on our data. They're broadly in solid shape, though sentiment among both groups shows recessionary worries that our data doesn't yet fully capture. Debit and credit spend combined is up 9% year-on-year. Discretionary and nondiscretionary spend both increased versus a year ago, with travel showing the strongest growth within discretionary. Spending at retail has risen 4%, helped by an especially robust fourth quarter in the prior year. E-commerce outlays climbed 7%, whereas spending in person stayed about level. Cash reserves among both households and small companies keep gradually returning to normal, and that normalization is happening more quickly for lower income groups and smaller firms. For the lower income segments, consumer cash buffers ought to reach where they stood before the pandemic by Q3 of this year. Turning now to the financials. In this quarter, CCB posted net income of $4.5 billion, with revenue of $15.8 billion, a 29% increase versus a year earlier. In our presentation, you'll see we changed the name of Consumer & Business Banking to Banking & Wealth Management. Beginning with that segment, revenue rose 56% compared with the same period last year, fueled by greater NII thanks to higher rates. Deposits fell 3% from the prior quarter, since spending stays robust and the rate cycle continues, though outflows were partly countered by newly added relationships. Client investment assets dropped 10% versus a year ago, a result of market performance, partly offset by net inflows, and there we're witnessing solid momentum, including among our deposit customers. Home Lending revenue declined 46% year-on-year, mostly because of reduced production revenue. Switching to Card Services & Auto. Revenue grew 12% compared with last year, chiefly due to greater card services NII from higher revolving balances, partly offset by reduced Auto lease income. Card outstandings increased 19%. Total revolving balances rose 20%, and we've now returned to where we were before the pandemic. Even so, revolving balances for each account remain under pre-pandemic levels, and that ought to provide a tailwind during 2023. Then Auto originations came to $7.5 billion, a 12% decrease. Expenses totaled $8 billion, 3% higher than a year earlier, mainly because of investments and increased compensation, largely offset by Auto lease depreciation stemming from reduced volumes; regarding credit performance in this quarter. Credit costs reached $1.8 billion, comprising reserve builds of $800 million in Card and $200 million in Home Lending, plus net charge-offs of $845 million, which is $330 million above the prior year. Up next, the CIB on Page 6. For the fourth quarter, CIB recorded net income of $3.3 billion on revenue of $10.5 billion. Investment Banking revenue was $1.4 billion, a 57% drop versus last year. IB fees fell 58%, matching the market. Within Advisory, fees declined 53%, a reflection of fewer announced deals earlier in the year. Market conditions weighed on our underwriting businesses, producing fees that dropped 58% for debt and 69% for equity. On the outlook, the same dynamics persist. The pipeline is fairly strong, yet conversion is highly responsive to market conditions and how people feel about the economic outlook. Keep in mind too that the comparison will be tough against the first quarter of last year. Shifting to Markets. Revenue came in at $5.7 billion, 7% higher year-on-year, powered by the strength of our macro franchise. Fixed Income rose 12%, with heightened volatility fueling robust client activity—especially in emerging market rates and currencies—while securitized products remain under pressure from the market backdrop. Equity markets came in roughly unchanged versus a robust fourth quarter a year earlier. Payments revenue reached $2.1 billion, a 15% increase year-on-year. If you strip out the net effect of equity investments, that figure climbed 56%, with the year-on-year gain attributable to higher rates. Security Services revenue came to $1.2 billion, rising 9% year-on-year, mostly because of higher rates, though lower deposits and market levels largely offset that. Expenses totaled $6.4 billion, 10% higher year-on-year, mainly due to the timing of revenue-related compensation. For the full year, expenses reached $27.1 billion, up 7% year-on-year, chiefly from higher structural expense and investments, partly offset by reduced revenue-related compensation. Turning to the Commercial Bank on Page 7. Commercial Banking posted net income of $1.4 billion. Record revenue of $3.4 billion increased 30% year-on-year, propelled by higher deposit margins, partly offset by weaker investment banking revenue and deposit-related fees. Gross Investment Banking revenue of $700 million fell 52% year-on-year, owing to diminished capital markets activity. Expenses of $1.3 billion rose 18% year-on-year. Deposits declined 14% year-on-year and 1% quarter-on-quarter, largely reflecting attrition of nonoperating deposits. Loans grew 14% year-on-year and 3% sequentially. C&I loans increased 4% quarter-on-quarter, reflecting sustained strength in originations and revolver utilization.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#2

On the commercial real estate lending side, we saw a 2% increase versus the prior quarter. That does represent a deceleration relative to what we saw earlier in the year, and the reason is elevated rates, which weigh on both new originations and prepayment activity. Now, to wrap up our business segments, let's look at Asset & Wealth Management on Page 8. AWM posted net income of $1.1 billion, with a pretax margin of 33%. Revenue came in at $4.6 billion, which is 3% higher than a year ago, and that was fueled by improved deposit margins alongside reduced balances, though that was mostly offset by declines in management, performance, and placement fees tied to the market pullback this year. On the expense side, $3 billion, up 1% versus last year, mainly from expansion in our private banking advisor teams, and that was largely offset by reduced performance-related compensation. During the quarter, net long-term inflows reached $10 billion, with positive flows in both equities and Fixed Income, and for the entire year they totaled $47 billion. On liquidity, we had net inflows of $33 billion in the quarter, while the full year saw net outflows of $55 billion. AUM stood at $2.8 trillion and total client assets at $4 trillion, which were down 11% and 6% year-on-year, respectively, as a result of lower market levels. And lastly, loans declined 1% from the prior quarter, due to reduced securities-based lending, while deposits fell 6% sequentially, as the rising rate environment pushed clients toward investments and other cash alternatives. Moving to Corporate on Page 9. Corporate recorded a net gain of $581 million. Revenue of $1.2 billion was up $1.7 billion compared to a year ago. NII was $1.3 billion, an increase of $2 billion year-on-year, reflecting the effect of higher rates. NIR was a loss of $115 million, and that includes the 2 significant items I referenced earlier. Expenses of $339 million rose $88 million year-on-year. With that, let's shift to the 2023 outlook, which I'll walk through over the next few pages, beginning with NII on Page 10, while I pause for a sip of water. Alright. We anticipate total NII of roughly $73 billion, and NII excluding Markets of roughly $74 billion; on the page, we illustrate how the significant quarterly NII increases through 2022 led to the $81 billion run rate in the fourth quarter, and how we see that developing in 2023. Walking through the drivers, this outlook is based on rates tracking the forward curve. The annualization of the late December hike, combined with the hikes anticipated early in the year and the cuts anticipated later in the year, ought to produce a net tailwind. Working against that tailwind is deposit repricing, which incorporates our best estimate of rate paid across both wholesale and consumers. Beyond that, when we consider balance sheet growth and mix, we anticipate solid Card spend growth overall, along with continued normalization of revolving balances per account and moderate loan growth throughout the rest of the company. We expect lower deposit balances, given modest attrition in both consumer and wholesale, to offset that tailwind. But it's essential to recognize that this NII outlook carries particularly high uncertainty. To be specific, the fed funds rate might not follow forwards, and assumptions around balance attrition and migration might look quite different. Deposit product and pricing choices are going to hinge on how customers behave and on competitive dynamics, since our focus is on keeping and expanding primary bank relationships, and those choices might end up far from what this outlook assumes. Beyond that, when all these factors land could have a big effect on how NII moves quarter to quarter through the year. That being said, if we keep carrying out our strategy of investing to bring in new customers and to deepen ties with the ones we already have, and if we start seeing the effect of loan growth, then we would anticipate sequential NII growth coming back, with everything else held constant. Let me wrap up on NII. Per the guidance, we expect Markets NII to be slightly negative for the year because of higher rates. Keep in mind, though, that Markets NIR offsets this. Now to expenses, Page 11. For 2023, we expect adjusted expense of roughly $81 billion, and that figure includes about $500 million tied to the higher FDIC assessment. Walking through a few of the other drivers: we expect increases stemming from labor inflation, and although that appears to be easing when we look ahead, it is effectively baked into the 2023 run rate. Another labor-related driver is the annualization of 2022 headcount growth, plus our plans for a modest headcount increase this year, all of which mainly relate to carrying out our investments. On investments, we are still investing in line with what we told you at Investor Day, but the increase is more modest than last year's. The themes have not changed, and we will keep giving you more detail as the year goes on, including at Investor Day in May. Naturally, as always holds true, this outlook involves continuing to generate efficiencies across the company. Last, while volume and revenue-related expense ended up being a tailwind for 2022, we expect it to be close to flat in 2023, and as always, that will be entirely market dependent. On to credit, Page 12. On that page, you can see just how exceptionally benign 2022's credit environment was for the company across wholesale, Card and the rest of consumer. Now for the 2023 outlook, specifically on Card net charge-off rates, Marianne went into quite a bit of detail at our recent conference, and our outlook has not really shifted. To recap that story, the entry to delinquency rate serves as the leading indicator of future charge-offs. At present it sits at around 80% of pre-pandemic levels. We expect it to normalize around the middle of the year, with the associated charge-offs arriving about 6 months afterward. Consequently, loss rates in 2023 will still be normalizing. So although we anticipate exiting the year around normalized levels, we expect the 2023 Card net charge-off rate to be approximately 2.6%, up from 2022's historically low rate of 147 basis points, yet still well below fully normalized levels. Let's move on to Page 13, where I'll give a quick summary before we take questions; the 2022 results make us extremely proud, with an 18% ROTCE and record revenue achieved during a rather dynamic environment. In laying out the outlook, I've stressed how much uncertainty surrounds many of the main drivers behind 2023 results. And although we're prepared for a variety of scenarios, we anticipate yet another strong performance. Looking ahead, then, we expect to keep generating strong returns in the near term, and we stay confident in our capacity to hit our through-the-cycle target of 17% ROTCE; and with that, operator, let's open the line for Q&A.

John McDonald

analyst
#3

Jeremy, I'd like to follow up on the NII outlook you gave on Slide 10. On the deposit cost side, the spread of possible results is pretty broad. Per what you said, it appears that 1.5% to 2% is shown there. Is the $74 billion NII figure consistent with roughly the middle of that band? Could you perhaps shed some light on what's driving the $74 billion and how it sits within this range of deposit cost scenarios?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#4

Of course, John. What I'd say is that the chart in the bottom left shouldn't be read too literally. Its purpose is simply to offer a stylized sense that fairly modest shifts in the deposit rate and what the company pays on average, as you're well aware, can have pretty substantial effects on NII. And it also shows that, as we've discussed already, there is a meaningful — the outlook represents our best estimate, in Jamie's words. Within it, the forces at work are the typical ones in wholesale. We'd anticipate a bit of ongoing attrition, particularly among the nonoperating sort of balances. And over time you'll see some internal migration from noninterest-bearing into interest-bearing. On the Consumer side, CDs are moving right now, and new CD production looks good. As of this morning we have a 4% CD in the market; so ongoing CD production plus internal migration there will be one thing pushing the numbers. And beyond that — well, naturally, as I noted in the prepared remarks, we do anticipate, companywide, a modest amount of deposit attrition going forward, driven by QT in the rate cycle and so forth. So all of those best guesses are baked into the outlook. And naturally, what actually happens will differ in some way or another, and we'll simply operate the business this year.

John McDonald

analyst
#5

All right. Regarding repurchases, what's your thinking on how to fit them into the capital allocation blend you work with? Any views on the magnitude, or how you'd quantify what the potential repurchases might be?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#6

Yeah, absolutely. In the spirit of making it easier for you folks to plug a figure into your model, if you consider how we view things, clearly there's another GSIB requirement kicking in next year. So let's say a 13.5% target; and roughly relying on your projections, capital generated organically, less dividends, and so forth, along with every uncertain element in there, I'd suggest a solid figure to plug in is roughly $12 billion of repurchases during this year, for 2023. Though you're aware, naturally, that repurchases sit at the bottom of our capital hierarchy at all times. So should superior uses for that cash exist, they take priority, and the schedule and circumstances determining how much we execute and when rest completely with us. And additionally, bear in mind we might get a Basel III NPR at some point during the first quarter, or possibly the second quarter; and even though it'll be an NPR, it will address just a portion of the overall picture and it won't be the final version, so it probably won't significantly influence near-term choices. That release will carry some informational value that could also inform what we decide.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#7

Jeremy, to start off, I have a question that, as you'd expect, continues along the NII thread we've been on. I understand there's a lot of uncertainty specifically around this year's NII projection. But building on what John asked, I'd like to know whether you might offer somewhat more concrete parameters regarding your expectations for deposit attrition and deposit beta, specifically the terminal deposit beta. What I'm hearing from investors so far suggests they recognize the NII headwinds happening this year. Yet at the same time, you've kept surpassing what looked like cautious NII estimates for 2022, even posting a huge $20.3 billion figure during Q4. That's why I believe those more concrete parameters would be quite useful as investors work out their own projections compared with that.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#8

Thank you, Erika. Well, I completely understand wanting more concrete parameters. In your position, I'd feel the same way. I do believe we're aiming to be pretty helpful in providing a full year figure that, honestly speaking, requires considerable speculation about how events will unfold over the year. Once you begin offering parameters, you're implicitly assuming that results falling beyond those parameters are highly improbable. That degree of precision is simply something we aren't ready to commit to, particularly since ultimately, as I mentioned, many of the repricing choices our company will confront are — made in response to information at that moment on a detailed level tied to our strategy, which centers on expanding and preserving primary bank relationships instead of pursuing every single dollar of balances regardless of cost; so given that, we do anticipate modest balance attrition throughout the company for deposits, as I noted. Jamie, on...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#9

Erika, thanks. I’d like to lay out the broader reasoning behind why $74 billion doesn’t strike me as conservative. The Federal Reserve cut its balance sheet by $400 billion. $1.5 trillion moved out of bank deposits. That means investors have the option to put money into e-bills and money market funds. Naturally, banks are now fighting over that pool of money, and each bank sits in a different position. Certain banks began competing aggressively. Others hold plenty of surplus cash and might compete less. But when you examine earlier periods — and set aside whatever took place in 2016, because I believe focusing on that is a major error — we have never seen queued — these 0 rates; we have never seen rates climb this quickly. So my expectation is that more migration will occur toward CDs and more toward money market funds. Many players are vying for it, and we will need to adjust saving rates. We can do that on our own schedule and watch what others are doing. The timing isn’t known to us, yet it will occur. I also want to emphasize that even at $74 billion, the returns we’re generating are quite strong. And that isn’t — we have consistently told you that at times we over earn and at times we under earn. Still, I’d say, fine, this quarter we’re over earning on NII. We might be over earning on credit. Perhaps we’re under earning somewhere else. So these remain very good numbers, and we will wait and observe and then report back to you, but I don’t want to leave you with mistaken impressions about how safe this is.

L. Erika Penala

analyst
#10

My next question follows along those same lines. Let's step back briefly. As you said, Jamie, the returns remain solid. You noted that a mild recession is already baked into your outlook; so I'll ask again what I raised during the third quarter. Looking ahead to 2023, can JPMorgan still achieve the 17% ROTCE you presented at Investor Day, despite pressure on NII and on the provision?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#11

Yes, we can. That said, many things could change that, but yes, we can. I believe at Investor Day in May, we might provide a more intriguing figure, namely our view of what ROTCE would look like in an actual recession, and I think that even then, it would likely match the typical industrial company, which is solid; so we'll share some specifics on that, and those remain strong returns, and growth is still possible for us. And regarding 17% — keep in mind, 17% is excellent when compounded — any growth at 17% is remarkable. I'd also note that we don't know precisely where capital needs to land right now, and at some point we'll have to adjust for that.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#12

Erika, one quick thing to clear up, just so there's no ambiguity. As you're aware, and as we've gone over many times, including how we handled the allowance through the pandemic — it's tied to our economist's central case forecast, which, as you rightly noted, is a mild recession — but given how we weighted the various scenarios along with a range of other considerations, the scenario actually reflected in the forecast is, from an allowance standpoint, more conservative than that. So we simply wanted to make that clear.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#13

Maybe, Jeremy, I'd like to pick up where we left off regarding the credit assumptions you're working from. Could you share what's baked into that reserve ratio by year-end — for instance, what unemployment rate you're using — and your view on all the noise surrounding commercial real estate, especially the difficulty of repricing given where rates sit now? Does that worry you? With cap rates where they are, are you noticing stress among CRE clients? And what about the broader environment right now?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#14

Absolutely. Ebrahim, let me address CRE first and keep it brief. Our multifamily commercial term lending operation, as you're aware, looks nothing like a traditional office-focused business. When it comes to office, our exposure is tiny, and it's Class A, top developers, prime locations. That means the bulk of what we hold in commercial real estate consists of affordable multifamily housing and commercial term lending — areas that, from a credit standpoint, remain very well protected for numerous reasons. As a result, we're very much at ease with the loss experience in that segment. Now, turning to your question about credit assumptions more broadly: yes, as I mentioned, the baseline economic projection includes a mild recession, and from what I recall, unemployment tops out around 4.9%. When we tweak those scenarios to build in a somewhat more cautious view, the implied peak unemployment comes out meaningfully above that figure. So I believe we've got suitably cautious expectations for the environment baked into the balances we hold today. As for the path we laid out in the presentation, those definitely — they can account for something beyond a very mild soft landing. Naturally, though, it wouldn't make sense to build a full-blown hard landing into the figures we're showing now, given that the odds of such an outcome are obviously far under 100%.

Ebrahim Poonawala

analyst
#15

Got it. And I suppose, just to follow up, you've handled RWA growth quite effectively when you compare loan growth year-over-year against RWA, which remained fairly level. When we consider capital management, what should our expectations be regarding how RWA evolves? Are there still chances to make improvements as we head into whatever the Fed announces concerning Basel?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#16

Yes. So opportunities for optimization definitely remain. We keep working extremely hard on this, and it's a major focus area. Part of that shows up in the current quarter's figures, though certain other factors driving this quarter are what you could describe as more passive elements, especially within market risk RWA; and yes, but we ought to be clear that while we've stated that capital optimization's impacts don't constitute a material economic headwind for the company, they aren't 0 either. There are genuine consequences stemming from the decisions we're making because of this capital environment. And under a Basel III outcome that is unreasonably punitive from a capital perspective, there will be further consequences from that. We clearly hope that doesn't happen and think it's not appropriate, but we'll see what happens.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#17

For a moment, I'd like to discuss leveraged loans — I find this topic intriguing. You've managed to sidestep a number of them quite well, bringing them on board during roughly the stronger portion of the past six months, so that was a smart move on your end. Pricing has dropped considerably. Even so, balance sheets at banks — not the one you run — remain somewhat clogged up with plenty of older positions. I'm eager to find out whether pricing has fallen far enough. Would you say you're participating again? And more broadly, how crucial is this for deal activity to recover, in terms of having funding available from the major banks?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#18

Yes. There are a few points to address there, Glenn; the brief response is that we are entirely ready to engage in that business. Conditions have improved, pricing has improved; the necessary resources are at our disposal; we are completely, completely present. There's no backlog and no problem; beyond that, I believe a certain story exists suggesting that market activity must get past a backlog; we aren't persuaded that this holds true. Our view is that the backlog is already reflected in the figures and everyone ought to focus on what's ahead, and the system possesses the capability to absorb the risks. So I take your point. I find it a compelling point, yet we are completely open to doing business and not especially worried about the backlog when it comes to banks' capacity to fund activity.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#19

Fascinating. So perhaps somewhat durable, even more so. All right. Jamie, since you're here with us. During the previous yearly letter, you mentioned how small the competitive barriers are and how fierce rivalry comes from every direction, not merely fintech; and I was merely attempting to reason aloud. Does that situation look better or worse, that rivalry picture against a far greater rate environment? Perhaps I'll stop there and let you take it wherever you wish.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#20

My view is that nothing has changed. There are the Apples, essentially delivering plenty of banking offerings, and Walmart launching its own; and clearly, elevated rates are going to damage certain players within the fintech space and possibly benefit others. Thus, we anticipate stiff rivalry ahead.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#21

Jeremy, you said in your payments business that if you excluded the equity investment write-downs, the growth was over 50%. Can you share with us on the equity write-downs — obviously, private equity is going through some challenging times. And I'm assuming that...

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#22

It was a gain last year. It wasn't a write-down this year.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#23

Understood. All right, I was under the impression a write-down had occurred in that spot. Fine.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#24

Allow me to clarify that point. My apologies for the confusion.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#25

That's excellent. Thanks, Jamie. Could you — if we stay on the topic of private equity briefly, would you tell us what the exposures to JPMorgan are within the private equity markets? Is it — looking at it from the standpoint of your loan book, or is it purely equity investments? And perhaps you could go into more detail on that.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#26

Pardon me, are you asking me to handle that? Sure, there are a few elements here. So Jamie is correct. The year-over-year headwind largely stems from the fact that this is an investment that, purely due to the measurement alternative accounting standard, we had been compelled to write up before. This is an investment where we received payment in kind as part of selling some of our internally developed initiatives; so in any case, that's fine. The key thing is there is a modest write-down in this quarter. And what matters there is that the core business is doing extraordinarily well, both as a result of higher rates, but also as a result of the strategy that Takis discussed extensively at Investor Day delivering results across fees and value-added services and so forth. And I suppose running through your question is essentially private equity overall and what our feelings are regarding that area? Did I understand that properly?

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#27

Right, Jeremy. And regarding lending in general — clearly, a lot of these firms have experienced significant declines in their valuations. Given the difficulties they're facing, does that raise the risk level when extending credit to some of them?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#28

Yeah. I'd say that's a risk our company handles very carefully. Our exposure to the non-bank financial sector, you could say, is well defined. And naturally, we've given some thought to how normalized wholesale charge-offs might appear across the cycle; they're clearly above what is essentially 0, which is where we stand today; but our credit discipline and our book give us confidence.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#29

Thanks. For my next question, you folks clearly made solid progress this quarter when it came to increasing the loan loss reserve. I have two things to ask about that. Number one, results from the Shared National Credit exam come out every February. Is some of that factored into the reserve buildup? And number two, regarding the reserve build, what portion reflected a management overlay as opposed to your base case — the quantitative side of how the reserve decision gets made?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#30

Yeah. I'll respond to that, though I'm leaving out a great deal of nuance. What I'd say is that...

Jamie Dimon

executive
#31

To put it far too simply.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#32

Right, right, I'm aware. Understood. The degree of caution in that management overlay was, to all practical ends, unchanged from one quarter to the next. That, Gerard, is how I'd suggest you frame it.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#33

And then shared national — yes, go ahead.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#34

The National Shared Credit thing will not affect our results materially.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#35

I was hoping you might shed some light on the work you're doing right now to mitigate the RWAs, ahead of everything we've already discussed regarding the upcoming capital rules. Could you walk us through what kind of impact that might have, if there is any at all, on portions of the income statement — be it NII or the trading operation?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#36

Sure, I'll take that one. Let's simply start from the assumption that RWA growth will be modest. Across each and every business — mortgages, loans, derivatives, the way we hedge CVA and similar items — we look at ways to manage RWA. Honestly, it doesn't have much of an effect on the business. Perhaps someday it will, but as of today it doesn't. So we don't assume we somehow give up a little here and a little there. Looking ahead, the largest opportunity will come from a reopening in the securitization markets. Those markets remain quite tight. My belief is that at some point they will reopen.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#37

All right. Then, as a follow-up, returning to how reserves are set: could you help us see, against that 5% peak you mentioned for the third quarter, which was the quarterly average unemployment rate under a 3.9 average baseline, where does the reserve held in the fourth quarter land us? And does the rough guideline you provided last quarter still hold for scenario analysis regarding possible builds before this mild recession?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#38

Let me put it very plainly. The base case, right, is roughly where unemployment reaches that 5%. After that, you assign probabilities to the other scenarios. That is the reason Jeremy says the reserve sits above the base case. Our weighting probabilities were left unchanged. Naturally, though, things worsened and the base case worsened. Nothing more than that—and it remains a solid reference point, so bear in mind: if we reached a relatively adverse case, all of that, with 6% unemployment, then, upon arriving there, you take the average weighting and you have wins. Things might improve or they might decline. Under that scenario, roughly $6 billion more would be required. As the base case itself deteriorates, we edge nearer to the relatively adverse one; that is the whole story. All of these are probabilities, possibilities, and hypothetical figures. Were I in your position, I would simply examine charge-offs, meaning actual results; and so—we do disclose this, yet it is difficult to explain, and each bank handles it a bit differently, and each bank has a somewhat different base case and somewhat different weighting of adverse cases, and so on; therefore we are merely attempting to keep it as straightforward as we can.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#39

Right, I follow you. What makes this instance difficult is that the impact on the income statement will show up well before that charge-off occurs. So all of us are just attempting to account for that. Still, I'm grateful for it. Thank you, Jamie.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#40

And as soon as the — whatever base case reaches the point where you're anticipating relative adverse conditions, you would be building on top of $6 billion of reserves prior to any charge-offs taking place.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#41

Precisely. Correct.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#42

Ken, perhaps only from curiosity. Part of what your question hints at could be how far this quarter's build counts as an installment toward the $6 billion? Much less than the whole amount is what that answer comes to, since loan growth accounted for a large share of it, though as Jamie points out, some of it comes from the flow-through of the lower provision in the central case. One could argue, provided we accept the caveat that this is somewhat imprecise, that a portion of that $6 billion has been paid down.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#43

I'd like to get a bit of a handle on how you're approaching cost management over the course of this year. We've already discussed that NII is difficult to forecast. Markets, clearly, has its upsides and downsides. Could you walk us through your thinking on producing operating leverage, which parts of the cost base must be funded so they're essentially untouchable? And which parts might be trimmed so that, should the revenue line come in softer, you're still able to produce operating leverage that's positive?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#44

Sure. Well, as you're aware, we typically separate our costs into our 3 buckets. In a way, the bucket you're asking about is the one tied to volume and revenue, which we call out since it ought to move fairly symmetrically with a stronger or weaker backdrop and therefore add to operating leverage; take this year's final result, for instance, and the figure we intend to report for 2022, the change versus a year earlier in volume and revenue-related expense — we're still fine-tuning it, and we'll likely give you more detail at the Investor Day — but it's likely around $1 billion; put differently, a decrease versus a year earlier. In contrast, for next year we're modeling something closer to flat. So although the dollar change versus a year earlier in the outlook, from '21 to '22 and '22 to '23, is similar, the composition is actually rather different. So consider this: were we to turn out to be mistaken regarding the kind of backdrop we're budgeting for, you'd anticipate a sizable decline in the volume and revenue-related expense figure contained in the current outlook, and that would add to operating leverage. Beyond that, we're continually producing efficiency. And we've pursued that just as vigorously, regardless of whether revenue conditions are strong or weak. And as you're aware, we keep investing throughout the cycle. So by and large, our investment plans genuinely ought to be that responsive to near-term shifts in the backdrop. Naturally, some items, such as marketing spend in the Card business especially, the arithmetic behind what we anticipate the NPV of those to be across the cycle might shift in a downturn. That could yield reduced investment, with everything else held constant; yet the central strategic investments we're making to safeguard the company's future won't be altered on account of the fluctuations of the environment in...

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#45

All right. And I'm asking partly because a key point of contention regarding JPMorgan's shares has involved the capital requirements, the path of capital, and whether capital will become a heavier weight for you to carry over the coming 2 years. As you make good on the positive operating leverage front, that clearly leaves you space to take on additional capital and still reach those IRR and ROTCE goals on new investments. Could you perhaps shed light on how much of a capital bump you'd be able to take on, considering the operating leverage you anticipate producing? And perhaps that's not a reasonable thing to ask right now, and it might fit better at Investor Day, but that's roughly the argument people are having about the stock.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#46

Understood. I mean, it's a reasonable thing to ask. It's a solid question. I won't give a terribly precise response. And Jamie might have thoughts on that as well. But let me just note briefly, we've sort of indicated that we're pretty confident in this company's capacity to deliver 17% across the cycle. And that factors in our read on the present climate, the operating leverage you brought up and the assumption of tougher capital rules with the 13.5% target in Q1 of '24. Whether Basel III end game and other elements push that figure higher and how much of it we can take on while still generating those returns is, naturally, not something we can answer at this moment; but I'd point out that it isn't merely denominator growth, excessive capital results will drive up costs in the actual economy, which flows into the numerator as well. That's not our desired result, but it is one that could happen.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#47

I get that your business model is changing, that you're putting out cash to bring in more, and that during the prior 10 years your record on that front was solid. However, regarding the Frank acquisition that everyone's been reading about, I want to know what it reveals about financial discipline given the 15 deals you went after, the $7 billion you invest annually, and the 1/5 rise in costs across 3 years on the way to your $81 billion target for 2023 — so really, my question is about financial discipline. I realize you can't discuss specifics of the Frank deal. And sure, you make back the purchase price within 2 days, fine, I understand that; and if fraud is involved, well — fraud isn't something you can control, but even so, it pulls management's resources and focus in different directions. So perhaps just the particulars around the acquisition approach — who finds them? Who handles the negotiations? Who performs the due diligence? Who's running it? And in the end, who answers for all these 15 separate deals? And when your investments span business lines, which is one of your strengths, who ultimately answers when those investments don't pan out the way you hoped? And Jamie, you acknowledged, a couple of years back at Investor Day, that sometimes money gets wasted while you're innovating and growing. But in the end, who answers when an investment goes wrong, whether it's the Frank deal or another one or part of that other $81 billion you plan to spend this year?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#48

Clearly, Mike, that's an excellent question, and it's something we always worry about; we've consistently brought up complacency and similar topics. So clearly, when you step up to the plate 300 times per year, mistakes are going to happen. And we don't want our company so frightened of mistakes that we do nothing, with complacency then giving way to bureaucracy, which means stagnation and demise. So you must be extremely careful that an error doesn't end up crippling the firm. We're highly disciplined, and that shows up in many areas. It shows up in our leverage lending book, in how well our investments perform, in how good our products and services are, in our — in all of that. And acquisitions are no exception. There are — the businesses carry out the acquisitions, but there's also a centralized team conducting thorough due diligence; so both the business and the centralized team do it. We've been at this for 20 years, it's not as though we recently began doing this kind of thing. And clearly, lessons always get learned. And at some point, once this matter is no longer in litigation, we'll share the lessons learned here. Still, we feel pretty good about it; and accountability sits with those running the operation; so the team — that unit made the purchase, they own it, they come back and report; and what we want from folks, when they speak with all of us, is the good, the bad, the ugly. We never want to hear only about how wonderful it all went. And clearly, this matter, one way or another, amounted to a massive error.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#49

I want to pick up on that point, because it ties into growth by acquisition. Turning to growth that comes from within, for example in Payments, which I realize is a priority that reaches across many different parts of the firm. So as you put more money into Payments, which can be a business with a PE of 20 or 30, which would be wonderful if you reached that, who owns that kind of internal spending that spans everything? At times, when you pull the data together, it's consumer, it's the investment bank, it might be asset management, it might be commercial, it might be every piece of Payments. Who owns those?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#50

Just to make it clear; I'd say Marianne and Jen, when it concerns credit, debit, checks and everything tied to consumers; and Takis, whom I believe you saw at Investor Day in the presentation on payments, reporting to Daniel, and that covers wholesale payments, merchant processing, a whole bunch of things. And those are direct responsibilities. It's very clear, this is an area that spans the company. So there's a payments working group that simply devotes time to it; that working group has not made an acquisition, okay? And if they make — if they wish to invest, which happens in some cases, by the way, which you — and you'll see more of this year, we decided together and all the way up to Daniel and me.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#51

Then, as a final follow-up to my earlier question, here's a broader observation. This marks the third consecutive year with roughly $5 billion in expense growth, and Slide 11 is right there; but — I mean, that's a substantial amount of front-loaded costs tied to benefits that come later and are less certain. How confident are you that those later benefits will actually materialize compared to what happened before?

Jamie Dimon

executive
#52

Absolutely; and we attempted to demonstrate to you folks during Investor Day that for each branch we launch, for each bank we bring on, for each technology initiative we pursue, we feel quite confident. Some items are more akin to infrastructure, such as migrating to the cloud, things of that nature, where you can't pinpoint every piece. But we feel quite confident that we — if something isn't delivering, we alter it. So we pose that question to ourselves daily when bringing on wealth managers or branches or similar items, so — and marketing accounts for half of that — not exactly half, but half of that figure; that's a highly specific — for the most part, a highly specific dollar going in, with how many dollars coming out; it isn't a guess, and we're quite precise with that sort of thing. And once more, if we — if there's $1 billion we were spending that failed to deliver the return, we would eliminate that $1 billion.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#53

I'd like to kick things off by asking about what lies ahead for trading and the Investment Banking businesses. Jeremy, since you mentioned those robust pipelines, I was hoping you could shed a bit more light on what your corporate clients are telling you — particularly given that mild recession scenario you described — and when you think Investment Banking activity might turn a corner. Same kind of question for trading. You've got tough year-over-year comparisons ahead; QT is still with us, and the rate volatility proxy remains high. Are you expecting trading activity to cool off meaningfully, or not?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#54

Sure. Thanks, Steve. Let's tackle banking first. The notable thing about banking right now is how big the contraction has been, obviously falling from extremely high peaks. Still, if you use 2019 as the benchmark, 2022 itself was a relatively weak year; and as we look toward 2023, conditions in the real economy may prove weaker than 2022's. You could understandably feel pessimistic, then, about the prospects for the Investment Banking wallet. And admittedly, we aren't exactly wildly bullish. Still, we should keep in mind that a big part of what happened comes down to how fast the landscape shifted during 2022 — particularly interest rates, since they influence the debt business, and valuations, since they influence both M&A and DCM. For companies to move ahead with transactions or choose to go out and raise money, one thing that has to happen is that they become at ease with how the public markets are pricing things. So my sense is there's a possibility this ends up being a tailwind for Investment Banking in 2023. Naturally, we can't be sure. But those are among the considerations on our minds. On the Markets side too, it was clearly another really robust year — stronger than our forecast. Because results had been so elevated as we came out of the pandemic, we thought things would settle down more than they actually did. There were plenty of storylines in 2022. Active managers, in my view, performed nicely, which gives us a modest lift. On top of that, we saw swings in prices while markets stayed fairly calm and kept moving forward. When we think about 2023, a few of those dynamics might become less pronounced, and that may work against us somewhat. Still, volatility isn't simply disappearing, and Markets appear to be staying pretty orderly. In a rate setting of 4.5% or 5%, there are likely more chances to trade than there were when rates sat at 0%. Naturally, we can't predict this. Time will tell. My guess is you'd need to anticipate some amount of normalization. The figures coming out of Markets are genuinely quite robust, though we'll just have to wait and find out.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#55

That's genuinely useful context. And for my follow-up, regarding the completion of Basel III — apologies, Jeremy, I just had to ask. In that December speech by Bar, you made a strong suggestion that capital requirements would be heading up for both your firm and your competitors. You also mentioned, either in your remarks or when answering a question, that the finalization of Basel III might end up being quite punitive. Since we don't have the proposal yet, I was simply hoping you could address how you're planning scenarios for the eventual finalization, plus anything more you can share about mitigation efforts. I believe one point of confusion is that a major driver of RWA inflation comes from op risk, which isn't really something you can mitigate. So what steps can you actually take to counteract some of those possible headwinds?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#56

Yes. So Steve, I'd really like to go deep on this, but honestly, the matter of how to mitigate is genuinely difficult to talk through in much specificity before we actually have a proposal in front of us. And the reason we describe increases as potentially punitive — I mean, you've looked at this topic carefully — is simply to highlight that in the scenario where you get the worst result across all the various moving pieces involved, it amounts to a very significant rise in capital requirements for the entire system. And considering how robust the system is right now, that just doesn't seem logical to us. So we wanted to make that point. But yes, Jamie, go ahead.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#57

Okay, listen — everyone's aware of the operator capital, the trading book, CCAR, G-SIFI, all of those shifting pieces. Let's simply wait and see what they turn out to be, and we'll handle them once we actually get there. After that, we'll determine what needs adjusting within our business and so forth. Raising the capital ratio isn't something we view as required — on that point we're very clear. Among the fresh figures we placed at the top of the press release was our total loss-absorbing capacity, which now stands at nearly $500 billion. Honestly, at some stage, when you've got $500 billion of that plus $1 trillion in liquidity, all of it together is sufficient. Still, let's just wait and see how things look. They'll run it through their international laws and their international requirements, and our hope is that America matches the international standard — that would be great. G-SIFI is meant to get fixed; whether that actually occurs remains to be seen. So let's just wait and see — guessing isn't needed. And should that figure come in too high, we'll let you know exactly what steps we intend to take.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#58

To add just a bit to that, and to build a little on what Jamie said, it matters that we're clear on this. Adjustment time will be available. There's quite a distance, after all, between the NPR and — so, in a way that backs up Jamie's point, let's see what it is, and after that we'll...

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#59

With deposits expected to decline, how are you approaching the management of the securities book? Clearly, the yield curve is pretty inverted, depending on which segment you examine — or honestly, most segments. Meanwhile, because of where rates stand, the securities book is generating far less cash flow than it did a couple of years back.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#60

Right. Keep in mind that the securities book results from investing, but essentially from excess deposits. You've got something like $2.4 trillion in deposits alongside $1 trillion of loans and such. So — and we run it in order to handle interest rate exposure, all those different considerations. And so — and regarding its size, we do projections — I won't share the figures with you, but each quarter we project what we'll purchase, what we'll offload, how much is flowing in, how much we require for liquidity, and we continually tweak it in response to deposits declining and loans and so on. Naturally, whatever you can put to work earns much higher rates these days; and you'll notice JPMorgan's loss in ACM loan book, on a percentage basis, is far smaller than what most others show. We tend to be cautious in that area as well.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#61

I suppose this is more of a big-picture question. We've witnessed a significant decline in the 5- to 10-year section of the curve, and even beyond that. And as was mentioned, banks aren't actually purchasing — they're selling. And I was curious whether you have any views regarding who is buying, and what is pushing rates down so much more than what most people believed they ought to be.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#62

Yes, we do. But to actually get that answer, of course, we should examine what everyone is up to — pension plans, governments. We examine each section of the curve; we examine what other banks are up to. I believe I said earlier during this call that banks are in varying positions. Some might need to sell securities in order to fund their loan books. Clearly, we don't. So people find themselves in varying positions. And as Jeremy noted, it's extremely important. That yield curve 6 months from now will not be identical to how it is today. Although we use it to sort of look ahead, it isn't actually our forecast. We know it will be wrong; and with the investment portfolio, we'd put money where opportunities exist. We purchased a large amount of Ginnie Maes when there was a 60 OAS spread. We sold — one reason we take securities losses, that provides you $10-plus billion that you can reinvest when you think of more attractive securities.

Andrew Lim

analyst
#63

Andrew, first, on credit quality — thanks for the commentary you provided regarding the shape of NCOs, specifically credit cards peaking at the close of this year. Could you share a bit more detail on how reserve builds ought to take shape during this year, I suppose with regard to CECL? My guess is that it should peak fairly soon; that's my first question, just assuming all your macro assumptions stay the same and — all the macro assumptions stay the same...

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#64

Andrew, well, I believe we've discussed CECL fairly extensively, and I think there's some reasonable color there regarding Jamie's $6 billion over a few quarters in a world where the economic outlook is worse than it is today. We are definitely not going to get into the business of providing you an outlook for the sequential evolution of the loan loss allowance; but it's appropriate today and it will evolve as a function of the environment.

Andrew Lim

analyst
#65

Absolutely. All right, let’s dig into NII now. I’d like to reconcile a couple of your remarks there, Jeremy. So if I understood you right, I believe you’re still referring to quarter-over-quarter growth in NII, so I suppose, with an eye toward something like $20 billion plus for 1Q, possibly even 2Q; so I guess we’re getting to roughly $40 billion for 1H and then a steep decline as, let’s say, deposit costs rise and perhaps we also see a few Fed fund rate cuts. Is that how we ought to be framing it?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#66

Yes, no; so allow me to say without controversy that the answer is no, Andrew, just to really remove some uncertainty. So what I said regarding quarter-over-quarter growth was meant to address the rather obvious takeaway, which you are to some extent rightly inferring from the slide, namely that in a situation where we’re leaving the fourth quarter run rate at 81, and we’re telling our ADX markets or whatever, we’re telling you 74 for the full year, there clearly are some quarter-over-quarter decreases somewhere in that as a result of how things unfold. We’re merely saying don’t extrapolate those forward forever. After things settle, we will go back to typical quarter-over-quarter growth. Does that make sense?

Andrew Lim

analyst
#67

Understood. I hear you. Yeah, yeah, yeah, of course. For sure, that's logical. That's excellent.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#68

That's all. Thanks a lot.

Jamie Dimon

executive
#69

Thank you very much. We'll talk to you all soon.

Operator

operator
#70

That wraps up the call for today. Thanks to everyone for joining in. You're free to hang up now.

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