JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
July 14, 2023
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Jeremy Barnum
executiveThanks, operator. Good morning, everybody. Our presentation can be found on the website. I'd ask that you look at the disclaimer at the back. Beginning on page one, the company posted net income of $14.5 billion, EPS of $4.75, and revenue of $42.4 billion, with a ROTCE of 25%. Those results reflect the First Republic bargain purchase gain of $2.7 billion, a credit reserve build of $1.2 billion for the First Republic lending portfolio, and $900 million of net investment securities losses in corporate. Let me mention a few highlights. CCB client investment assets rose 18% year-over-year. In AWM, we saw record long-term inflows. In IB wallet share, we ranked number one. Before I go deeper into the financials, let me provide a quick update on where the First Republic integration stands, on page two. The settlement process with the FDIC remains on schedule, with a number of key milestones recently completed. Systems integration is moving along quickly as well. Our goal is to be substantially complete by mid-2024. As of July 2, First Republic employees are formally part of our company. We're happy that acceptance rates on our offers were very high. It's still early, but as the sales force gets back into the market, we're glad to see strong client retention, with roughly $6 billion of net deposit inflows since the acquisition. Now back to this quarter's results, on page three. You'll notice that in several sections of the presentation, we've specifically highlighted the First Republic impact where it's relevant. To simplify things, I'll begin by covering First Republic's overall effect on this quarter's results at the firm-wide level. For the remainder of the presentation, I'll generally leave out the First Republic impact to make comparisons with prior periods easier. With that in mind, First Republic added $4 billion of revenue this quarter, along with $599 million of expense and $2.4 billion of net income. As I mentioned on the first page, that includes $2.7 billion of bargain purchase gain, which shows up in NIR in the corporate segment, and $1.2 billion of allowance build. Keep in mind that the deal closed on May 1, so the First Republic figures reflect only two months of results. In the line of business results, you'll see that we're presenting First Republic revenue and allowance in CCB, CB, and AWM. For this quarter's results, all of the deposits sit in CCB, and substantially all of the expenses sit in corporate. As integration moves forward, some of those items will be allocated across the segments; now, returning to firm-wide results, excluding First Republic. Revenue came in at $38.4 billion, up $6.7 billion, or 21% year-over-year. NII ex markets increased $7.8 billion, or 57%, driven by higher rates. Noninterest expense for the ex-markets segment fell $293 million, mostly because of those net investment securities losses I referred to earlier, with some offset from several smaller items, mainly from the prior year. Markets revenue declined $772 million, which works out to 10% lower than a year ago. Expenses came to $20.2 billion, an increase of $1.5 billion, or 8% compared with last year, mainly from higher compensation costs, including wage inflation, plus greater legal expense. Credit costs totaled $1.7 billion, which included $1.4 billion of net charge-offs, mostly in card. The net reserve build consisted of a $389 million build in the commercial bank, a $200 million build in card, and a $243 million release in corporate, and I'll go into all of those in more detail later. Moving to the balance sheet and capital on page four. We closed the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 13.8%, unchanged from the previous quarter, since the benefit of net income less distributions was offset by the First Republic impact. In the two charts on that page, you can see we've provided some details on how the transaction affected both RWA and the CET1 ratio. As you're aware, CCAR was completed a couple of weeks ago. Our new negative SCB stands at 2.9%, compared with our current requirements of 4%, and it takes effect in fourth Q 2023. That new SCB also reflects the board's intention to raise the dividend to $1.05 per share in the third quarter. Turning to liquidity, our bank LCR finished the second quarter at 129%, matching what we expected at Investor Day. Roughly half of that decrease is tied to the First Republic transaction. While we're on the balance sheet, as we previewed in the 10-K, we'll be updating our earnings at risk model so it incorporates the impact of deposit repricing lags. When this quarter's 10-Q is released, you'll see the up 100 basis points parallel shift scenario coming in at about positive $2.5 billion, while without the change it would have been roughly negative $1.5 billion. Now let's move to our businesses, beginning with CCB on page 5. U.S. consumers and small businesses are both still resilient, and we haven't seen any meaningful shifts in the trends within our data that we talked about at Investor Day. Now to the financial results, which I'll discuss excluding the First Republic impact on CCB, CIB, and AWM. CCB posted net income of $5 billion on revenue of $16.4 billion, up 31% from a year earlier; in banking and wealth management, revenue rose 59% year-on-year, driven by higher NII on higher rates. End-of-period deposits dropped 4% quarter-on-quarter, as customers kept drawing down their cash buffers, including for seasonal tax payments, and sought out higher yielding products. Client investment assets climbed 18% year-on-year, driven by market performance and strong net inflows across our advisor and digital channels. In home lending, revenue fell 23% year-on-year, driven by lower NII from tighter loan spreads and reduced servicing and production revenue. Seasonality helped push originations higher compared with the prior quarter, but they remained 54% below the same period a year earlier. Turning to card services and auto, revenue rose 5%, mostly because card services NII climbed on larger revolving balances, with lower auto lease income partly canceling that out. Card outstandings increased 18% versus a year ago, reflecting revolved normalization plus robust growth in new accounts. On the auto side, originations climbed $12 billion, a 71% year-on-year gain, helped by competitors scaling back and inventories steadily continuing their slow recovery. Expenses came to $8.3 billion, 8% higher than a year earlier, mainly from compensation as wage inflation and more headcount weighed, while we keep putting money into front office and technology staffing along with marketing. Regarding credit performance for the quarter, credit costs totaled $1.5 billion, including a $203 million reserve build tied to loan growth and card services. Net charge-offs reached $1.3 billion, an increase of $640 million from a year ago, chiefly from card, since 30-day plus delinquencies are back at pre-pandemic levels, matching what we expected. Now to CIB on page 6. CIB delivered net income of $4.1 billion on $12.5 billion of revenue. Investment Banking revenue came in at $1.5 billion, up 11% from a year earlier, or down 7% if you exclude prior-year bridge book markdowns. IB fees fell 6% year-on-year. We held the number one ranking with a year-to-date wallet share of 8.4%. In advisory, fees dropped 19%.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveUnderwriting fees declined 6% on the debt side and rose 30% on the equity side, and we saw more favorable momentum during the final month of the quarter. Regarding what the second half looks like, encouraging signals of capital markets activity have appeared, and July ought to serve as a solid gauge for the rest of the year; that said, announced M&A on a year-to-date basis has fallen considerably, and that is going to create a headwind. Turning to markets, total revenue came in at $7 billion, a decline of 10% versus a year ago. Fixed income dropped 3%. As we anticipated, the macro franchise largely returned to normal after last year's elevated volatility and client flows. Improved performance in the Securitized Products Group and credit mostly made up for that. Equity markets fell 20% against a very strong prior year quarter, especially in derivatives. Payments revenue reached two and a half billion, a 61% increase year-on-year. Leaving out equity investments, the gain was 32%, mainly from higher rates, partly offset by lower deposit balances. Security services revenue of $1.2 billion rose 6% year-on-year, thanks to higher rates, partly offset by lower fees. Expenses came to $6.9 billion, up 1% year-on-year, from higher non-compensation expense along with wage inflation and headcount growth, largely offset by lower revenue-related compensation. Now to Commercial Banking on page 7. Commercial Banking posted net income of one and a half billion dollars. Revenue of $3.8 billion increased 42% year-on-year, from higher deposit margins. Payments revenue of $2.2 billion rose 79% year-on-year, from higher rates. Gross Investment Banking and markets revenue of $767 million fell 3% year-on-year, mainly because of fewer large M&A deals. Expenses of $1.3 billion increased 12% year-on-year, mainly from higher compensation expense, including front office hiring and technology investments, along with higher volume-related expense. Average deposits rose 3% quarter-on-quarter, from inflows tied to new client acquisition, partly offset by continued attrition in non-operating deposits. Loans increased 2% quarter-on-quarter. C&I loans rose 2%, reflecting stabilization in new loan demand and revolver utilization in the current economic environment, along with pockets of growth in areas where we are investing. CRE loans also rose 1%, reflecting funding on prior year originations for construction loans in real estate banking, along with increased affordable housing activity. Lastly, credit costs were $489 million. Net charge-offs were $100 million, including $82 million in the office real estate portfolio. The net reserve build of $389 million came from updates to certain assumptions related to the office real estate market, along with net downgrade activity in middle market banking. To wrap up our lines of business, AWM on page 8. Asset and Wealth Management posted net income of $1.1 billion, with a pre-tax margin of 32%. Revenue of $4.6 billion rose 8% year-on-year, from higher deposit margins on lower balances and higher management fees on strong net inflows. Costs came in at $3.2 billion, which marked an 8% increase from the same period a year earlier. The rise stemmed from greater compensation, reflecting expansion of our private banking advisor teams, larger revenue-linked pay, and the effects of Global Shares along with JPMorgan Asset Management (China), with both transactions having closed during the past year. During the quarter, net long-term inflows hit a record $61 billion, positive throughout every channel, region, and asset class, with fixed income and equities leading the way; on the liquidity side, net inflows reached $60 billion. Assets under management totaled $3.2 trillion, a 16% gain versus a year ago. Total client assets came to $4.6 trillion, rising 20% from the prior year, fueled by ongoing net inflows, elevated market levels, and the contribution from acquiring Global Shares. Lastly, loans declined 1% from the previous quarter, due to reduced securities-based lending, while deposits fell 6%. Now moving to Corporate on page 9. As I mentioned at the start, the First Republic bargain purchase gain and nearly all of the expenses are being reported in corporate. Once those items are excluded, corporate posted net income of $339 million. Revenue reached $985 million, an increase of $905 million versus last year. NII stood at $1.8 billion, climbing $1.4 billion compared with a year earlier thanks to the effect of higher rates. NIR was a net loss of $782 million, and it included the net investment securities losses I referenced earlier. Expenses totaled $590 million, up $384 million from a year ago, mostly because of elevated legal expense. Credit costs produced a net benefit of $243 million, which reflected a reserve release after the deposit placed with First Republic during the first quarter was eliminated through the transaction. The outlook begins on page 10. We now anticipate that 2023 NII and NII ex markets will come in at roughly $87 billion. That increase is being driven by higher rates, combined with deposit repricing that is slower than what we had previously assumed for both consumer and wholesale. Let me take this moment to remind everyone again that major sources of uncertainty persist, and we do anticipate that the NII run rate will fall substantially beneath this quarter's run rate at some point down the road, as competition for deposits continues to unfold. Our expense outlook for 2023 is still about $84.5 billion. On credit, our expectation remains that the 2023 card net charge-off rate will be around 2.6%. In closing, we take pride in the exceptionally strong operating results posted this quarter. Looking ahead, we stay focused on the considerable uncertainties surrounding the economic outlook, deposit competition, and the capital impact from the pending finalization of the Basel III rules. Even so, in spite of the probable headwinds in front of us, we remain optimistic regarding the company's capacity to keep delivering excellent performance across a variety of scenarios. With that, operator, please open the line for Q&A.
Jim Mitchell
analystOh, thank you. Good morning. Hey, Jeremy, you mentioned that NII guidance went up. Obviously, Fed Funds futures have risen, so that stands to reason. Maybe, I suppose, first, could you sort of go over, I suppose, touch on how deposits are behaving generally when it comes to betas and mix, and what you're observing there so far appears to be arriving somewhat better than anticipated? Then second, and likely more significantly, can you assist us in considering what higher for longer rates mean for the NII outlook next year and past that? You know, I suppose the intermediate-term outlook that you folks have discussed.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah, certainly. Thanks, Jim. When we discussed what drove the upward revision, as I mentioned, it's, you know, higher rates combined with lower deposit reprice, difficult to separate those two drivers. To be specific, I think when you examine consumer, the mix of the passage of time, you know, and the positive feedback we're receiving from the field and the CD offerings especially, has resulted in, you know, simply a fairly stable environment from that standpoint. Likewise, in wholesale, we're simply observing slower internal migrations. You know, you asked about mix. I think that clearly we're seeing the CD mix rise, and we would keep expecting. We would expect that to keep occurring, likely even beyond the peak of the rate cycle into next year, as we keep capturing money in motion. As you put it, the most crucial point is the fact that, as I stated earlier, we don't view this level of NII generation as sustainable, and we spoke previously about a sort of medium-term run rate, you know, in the mid-seventies. That was prior to First Republic, you know, you could make the case that perhaps that number ought to be somewhat higher, but regardless of what it is, it's far lower than the current number. We don't know when that will occur, you know, we're not going to forecast the exact moment. That's going to depend on competitive dynamics in the marketplace, but we want to be clear that we do expect it at some point.
Jim Mitchell
analystAll right. I suppose I have just a single additional question regarding that. If we end up not seeing any reductions in rates, I apologize, until the midpoint of the coming year or even after that, does that perhaps provide a bit of reassurance for how things look next year, or do you remain concerned about a meaningful reprice?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveI would not automatically take it as given that the movement from where we are running now to that figure in the mid-seventies is all that responsive to the rate picture specifically. At the time we released that figure, we examined a variety of rate scenarios and the reprice we believe would go along with them. The intent was genuinely to represent something closer to a sustainable level across the cycle, in our view. I would not regard it as especially tied to rates.
Jim Mitchell
analystAll right, excellent. Thank you.
Erika Najarian
analystGood morning, Jeremy. I'm over here chuckling, since back at Investor Day I asked whether you had additional NII surprises tucked away, and apparently the answer is yes. What I really want to do is pose something wider, and Jamie, perhaps I could hear your perspective. After all, you generated a 23% ROTCE on 13.8% CET1. We understand the message perfectly well that a more typical level of NII production isn't $87 billion. Still, with full consideration of the possible reduction tied to Basel III endgame, could it be that your inherent ROTCE actually sits higher than that 17% through-the-cycle figure, during periods when rates aren't at zero? When that ROTCE objective was first rolled out, conditions on rates looked quite different, and now everyone is saying that even with Fed cuts, the likely floor for Fed funds won't be zero. Any thoughts would be welcome.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah. Thank you, Erika. That's a solid question. There's clearly a great deal packed into it. I'd begin by noting that whenever we've discussed a 17% ROTCE across the cycle, despite the fact that it may have been rolled out at a time when we sat at the lower zero bound, the underlying assumption was always a normalized rate setting. In some sense, that holds true now as well. Beyond that, you didn't raise this directly, but regarding the proposed Basel III endgame, one pertinent issue could be: should a much larger amount of capital sit in the denominator, what becomes of that objective? As I mentioned during my prepared remarks, our confidence is strong regarding this company's capacity to generate outstanding returns across the cycle. Right now there are numerous moving pieces involved. Certain ones might turn out favorably, others unfavorably. On the capital matter specifically, one thing worth noting is that simply running the straightforward calculation of diluting the ROTCE by enlarging the denominator overlooks the chance for reprice, meaning repricing of products and services, which naturally connects to our argument that such capital increases carry consequences for the real economy. We aren't claiming we can simply raise prices to escape the problem, yet clearly we must achieve the proper returns on products and services, and wherever pricing power exists, we'll make adjustments in response to the greater capital requirement. There are many moving pieces at play, though the key takeaway is that across a variety of scenarios, we remain confident in our ability to produce solid results, and we'll observe how the combination of all these factors unfolds, particularly once we see the Basel III proposal and it moves through the comment period.
Jamie Dimon
executiveErika, one more point from me. To start, our portfolio spans companies delivering anywhere from 0% ROTCE up to 100%. A number of them require heavy capital, which is why we evaluate the entire set. In my view, 17 is a solid figure and a solid goal. Beyond that, credit is another area where we're earning above normal levels. As you're aware, that's been the case for quite a long while, and we're very mindful of it. We recognize it will rise. Once it settles back to normal, it will be significantly higher than where it stands today. For instance, we'd view a normalized credit card figure as roughly 3.5%.
Erika Najarian
analystFor my next question, Jeremy, would you be able to tell us again the jobless rate that's baked into your ACL ratio at the end of Q2?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveSure, that figure remains 5.8%.
Erika Najarian
analystThanks.
John McDonald
analystHey, good morning. Jeremy, I'd like to ask about capital following the Barr speech. The specifics aren't available to us at this point, so I just want to inquire about the choices in front of you and approaches for reducing the impact, on RWA and possibly regarding GSIB too, while you think through what you heard not long ago.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah. Appreciate it, John. Clearly, this is on our minds heavily. That said, even though plenty of highly specific speculation has been circulating that could force you to begin some planning, it really appears this time around that it's genuine, and we will eventually receive a proposal at some point during this month or thereabouts. Before long, we'll actually be able to look at something in writing, and the speculation can come to an end. That said, engaging in a bit of speculation, the largest individual factor behind the rise that's being discussed, which includes Chair Powell's figure of 20%, or Vice Chair Barr's 2% of RWA, which amounts to approximately the same thing, appears to simply be how operational risk is being brought into the standardized pillar. That's somewhat of a straightforward uniform levy on all of it. It's rather difficult to find efficiencies around that, apart from, clearly, the reality that you can just raise prices, provided you hold pricing power. That's clearly not our goal, and that's what we mean when we refer to consequences for the real economy. There are specifics. There's a great deal of the FRTB material. You know, we could dive deep into that inside the markets business, and we do possess a solid history of modifying and optimizing. This time, it could be a more basic set of issues regarding business mix rather than, you know, the capacity to optimize in a highly technical manner.
John McDonald
analystAll right, that helps. Since this will be introduced gradually over several years and you're producing capital at an elevated rate, even if the ROTC declines somewhat, how should we frame your approach to accumulating capital for these new rules relative to your normal investing, buybacks, and similar activities across the coming 2 years?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah, I suppose I'm inclined to lay out our usual capital hierarchy. We won't cut back on investments — that shouldn't shock you. Broadly, our aim is always to meet new requirements sooner rather than later. Once we understand the requirements and have clarity, clearly, considering the amount of organic capital we're bringing in at present, no matter what the final figure turns out to be, complying will be fairly straightforward in a narrow sense. That doesn't mean there won't be effects on returns or pricing. If for some reason matters don't unfold as we expect, I don't envision us dropping investments we consider strategically vital just to satisfy tougher capital requirements before the official timeline or anything like that.
John McDonald
analystAll right, so buybacks could be possible?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveObviously not likely; the result would probably not be that.
John McDonald
analystOkay, thanks.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveSorry, John — please continue. Was there something else you wanted to ask?
John McDonald
analystYeah. No, I'm just wondering — do repurchases have a part to play, you know, over the coming 2 years, whether as a strategic move or just on an occasional basis, buybacks?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveI mean, you know, it comes back to the capital hierarchy, right? Ultimately, you know, if there's nothing else for us to use the money for, we'll do buybacks. You know, we discussed the $12 billion figure for this year. Obviously, there are plenty of new moving pieces there, though if everything else holds steady, considering what we've done up to now, that probably remains a sensible number for the whole year. Yeah, that's always going to sit at the bottom of the list, but yeah.
John McDonald
analystUnderstood. All right, thanks.
Ken Usdin
analystThank you. Morning, everyone. I'd like to dig a bit into how you view the balance between the commercial side of things and what could show up in loan growth down the road, against those early signs of improvement folks keep mentioning in the investment banking backlog, plus how it actually feels when it comes to markets opening back up and that trade-off between capturing more of those fees versus what's going on with demand for loans. Thanks.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveAbsolutely. Fair question, Ken. On investment banking and markets, I'd say last month came in somewhat above what we'd anticipated. There's plenty of discussion about green shoots, particularly across capital markets more broadly. M&A still clearly faces certain headwinds, with activity running at lower levels and some regulatory pressure there. Time will tell. Given what we've seen recently, declaring a trend feels premature, but we'll keep watching. As for the wider economy and what we expect on loan growth, overall we continue to anticipate fairly solid growth in card loans. Beyond that, across various products and for a range of reasons, whether mortgage or C&I once revolver activity normalizes, and particularly should the economy cool somewhat, I'd anticipate demand for loans staying fairly modest in those areas. Outside of card, we aren't truly anticipating significant growth. Naturally, when the right deals, right products, and right terms come along, we're there. We extend credit throughout the cycle. To me, that's more a story driven by demand, tied to how the economy performs, not anything to do with us tightening.
Ken Usdin
analystGot it, that’s clear. To build on it, regarding the consumer, you said spending is still happening, though at a somewhat slower pace, and you also noted that people are drawing more on their extra deposits. Could you expand a bit further on how you view the consumer’s condition? Is card growth still being powered by a need to carry balances rather than a desire to hold larger deposit balances? And how does that trade-off look on that side as well?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYes, from our perspective, when it comes to consumer credit, we continue to view this as a normalization narrative rather than one of deterioration. In fact, balances carried per account have not yet returned to where they were before the pandemic. At least in our portfolio today, I’d certainly describe it as a desire rather than a necessity. And yes, I think the consumer keeps surprising us positively.
Ken Usdin
analystUnderstood. All right, thanks.
Gerard Cassidy
analystHello, Jeremy. Hello, Jamie. Jeremy, since it appears we might be getting close to the point where Fed funds rates stop rising, could you share your perspective on how you're now evaluating the Treasury operations and the asset-liability side of your balance sheet going forward, compared with how you were positioned and running things 12 months ago?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveGerard, to be honest, I'd say there hasn't been much of a shift there. We have remained fairly steadily worried about the possibility of rates moving higher. Naturally, we always aim to arrange things so they generate sensible results throughout a wide spectrum of scenarios, yet on the margin our tilt has been toward higher rates, and at these levels that tilt might be somewhat weaker than previously, though much of that simply reflects positive convexity working its way through in the modeling. Regardless, with everything else held constant, I believe we'll keep concentrating on ensuring we're in good shape under a higher rate scenario, while remaining balanced across a variety of scenarios. Our positioning hasn't really changed a great deal, and that clearly encompasses the fact that we acquired First Republic, which, even after accounting for certain liabilities, carried a long structural interest rate position, and we truly did not wish to become longer through that transaction. Consequently, we took steps to guarantee that on a net-net basis, we stayed roughly where we were during the prior quarter.
Gerard Cassidy
analystGreat. For a follow-up question, when you walked us through the commercial banking part of the business, you said there was some reserve building related to office real estate, plus some downgrades in the middle market. Could you go into a bit more detail? What are you observing in this space, both in commercial real estate and in C&I loans? What's going on in that segment too?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveI'd warn against taking too wide a lesson from this. I mean, when we discuss office, for instance, our portfolio, as you're aware, is pretty small, and our exposure to what people call dense urban office is smaller still. Multifamily lending makes up the large majority of our portfolio overall. Because of that, our sample of observed valuations for office properties is pretty limited. We'd prefer to be ahead of the cycle, and given everything we observed this quarter, it simply seemed sensible to add a little there, reaching what appeared to be a comfortable coverage ratio. Across the remaining middle market segment, downgrades outnumbered upgrades, but I wouldn't view that as necessarily signaling anything especially meaningful in the wider picture.
Gerard Cassidy
analystThank you.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveSteve, are you there?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveOkay.
Ebrahim Poonawala
analystMorning. So for my first question, I want to build on what was said about the economic forecast. We've spent a full year fretting over a potential recession, and people are debating whether the Fed's rate increases are still working their way through the system with a delay. Jeremy, when I consider what you said, I believe you noted that your view on unemployment right now is pretty close to what it was a quarter back. How much concern is warranted regarding the credit cycle over the next six to 12 months? Do you find yourself moving toward the view that American companies and households have handled this rate cycle far more smoothly than we thought they would a year ago?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah. I'm certain Jamie has thoughts on this too, but speaking for myself, I'd warn against drawing too many strongly optimistic conclusions from just a handful of recent data releases. Generally, our stance isn't so much about forecasting any specific result as it is about preventing excessive excitement that causes everyone to fixate on a single prediction, since we recognize multiple outcomes are possible. Right now, plenty of people are discussing the possibility of a soft landing, a no landing scenario, immaculate disinflation, or whatever term you prefer. Whether our own thinking on all that has shifted in any major way, I can't really say. The bigger picture is that we remain very focused on what Jamie said earlier: loss rates still have room to normalize even after the pandemic, which means we're likely earning a bit too much on credit. As we've discussed, there's an expectation that NII will decline considerably. Setting aside the question of whether the economy delivers some unexpectedly bad results compared to where things stand now, even under the central scenario, you simply have to accept that a fair amount of normalization is coming.
Jamie Dimon
executiveOkay, one more point I’d make: that 5.8% figure isn’t a forecast from us. It’s the mean jobless rate across several scenarios we’re required to apply, and those scenarios are hypothetical for CECL purposes. If you want our actual outlook, it will always look somewhat different, since the result isn’t known. We’re trying hard to be transparent about that. Consumers are in solid shape. They’re drawing down extra cash, and all of that is a tailwind. Even if a downturn comes, they’d enter it from a fairly strong position, with very low debt and, you know, home values still favorable. The challenges are big and to some degree without precedent. There’s the war in Ukraine, oil, gas, quantitative tightening, governments’ unmatched fiscal demands, QT, something we’ve never gone through. My view is that folks ought to take a breath about it; we can’t know if those forces will lead to a soft landing, a mild recession, or a hard recession. Hopefully, we all want the best outcome.
Ebrahim Poonawala
analystUnderstood. As a quick follow-up regarding the Basel reforms that are coming, I have two things to ask. You've discussed how the U.S. economy gets affected, and other people have expressed the same view. At this stage, is anybody actually listening? And second, Jeremy, perhaps you could speak to the structural adjustments you anticipate making within the capital markets division as a result of FRTB. Thanks.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveRegarding your first question, I mean, you know, I think one can simply go read the speech Vice Chair Barr gave, correct? That topic was tackled by him rather bluntly. It's evident he holds a different view, which is his prerogative. We'll find out how things unfold; our feeling remains that, holding everything else constant, requiring more capital will unquestionably drive up the expense of credit, and that hurts the economy; we'll find out how things unfold on that front. As for FRTB, the situation is genuinely quite intricate. Honestly, it's likely far too granular for a call like this. To offer just a single trivial and unimportant yet illustrative case, you know, yield curve spread options are one product affected by FRTB. Should the FRTB proposal be enacted in its present form, that product simply ceases to be workable. Naturally, if we must discontinue that product, nobody truly minds. That's merely one illustration of how, at times, when you are extremely rigorous about deploying capital comprehensively down to the level of each individual product and adjusting in response, you may end up needing to alter your business mix. There are, clearly, larger products that carry far greater weight for the actual economy, such as mortgage, where, you know, the piling on of operational risk and the manner in which it's proposed, particularly if certain other favorable aspects of the proposal fail to materialize, you know, you're yet again rendering that product even more difficult to provide to homeowners. We'll see. We'll see how it plays out.
Jamie Dimon
executiveLet me just tack on to what was said — the thing is, suppose a given offering isn't profitable on its own. You might still deliver it for customers who are excellent customers. Your management approach ends up being per offering, per customer, and per what amounts to the overall business mix, and those are the tweaks involved. Broadly speaking, almost no loan really works for your balance sheet taken in its entirety. That's simply something folks need to acknowledge, so we've just steered our way through every kind of wrinkle that came up and worked out what on earth to do.
Ebrahim Poonawala
analystThanks.
Mike Mayo
analystHello, I have a follow-up regarding Vice Chair Barr's address from earlier this week. If your capital ratios were to climb by 20%, and possibly those of other firms too, how much would you consider altering your operating model — things like reallocating, shifting where you conduct business, adjusting prices, or just, you know, cutting out certain things you previously did? It's somewhat ironic, or perhaps not, that Apollo reaches a record-high share price during the very same week as that speech. If capital ratios rise to the extent that's being floated, how much business would depart JPMorgan or the broader sector?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYes, Mike.
Jamie Dimon
executiveHold on — before Jeremy responds to that question, I simply want to note that this is fantastic news for hedge funds, private equity, and private credit, as well as for Apollo and Blackstone, and, you know, they are celebrating out in the streets.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveCorrect, absolutely. What I meant to say, Mike, is that I agree on all counts. Does that mean repricing? Without a doubt. If we possess the ability to set prices, and if the increased capital rules result in us earning insufficient returns for our shareholders, then we'll attempt to adjust our pricing, and we'll observe whether it holds up, how it moves through the broader economy, and what impact it has on demand for our offerings. Should that repricing fail to work, then for certain offerings, a remix becomes necessary, which involves exiting particular products and services. As Jamie notes, that likely results in those products and services departing the regulated perimeter and relocating to, well, other places; that's acceptable. As Jamie notes, those individuals are customers, and I believe that same idea was also covered in Vice Chair Barr's remarks. Historically, when risky operations exit the regulated perimeter, there have been some adverse outcomes; all of these are significant matters to weigh.
Mike Mayo
analystOkay, and now a different topic. I'm thankful for the Investor Day—it offered a bit more insight into how likely your investments are to succeed or not. As you know, all of us continue to monitor that carefully. That said, you've just raised the revenue outlook by $10 billion for NII, covering this quarter through the first quarter, while keeping expense guidance unchanged by even $1. Doesn't that make you want to spend a bit extra? If you're picking up share, why not allocate more? I'm not suggesting you ought to, I'm simply asking—doesn't it tempt you? You've got $10 billion in additional revenues, yet you aren't increasing expenses by $1. What's the reason?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveMike, let me make sure I understand. Are you really finding fault with our expenses being too low? Is that what you mean?
Mike Mayo
analystOkay, so let me make sure I've got this straight — it's really the reverse side of what I was asking about 2 years ago, if you look back.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveThat's reasonable. I like that you're seeing both sides; seriously though, we have consistently been quite explicit, correct, that what we spend reflects spending across the cycle, tied to investment across the cycle, tied to spending across the cycle, grounded in how we view, across the cycle, the earnings power this company generates and the aim of delivering the proper return. Generally put, NII usually passes directly down to the bottom line, whether it's rising and, incidentally, whether it's falling as well. We've lived through such periods, as you recall well. As for whether there are chances to put additional dollars toward, you know, marketing and similar things, we did in fact examine that not long ago. That doesn't strike me as a particularly significant item in this year, which partly explains why we haven't updated the expense guidance so far. You know, it's really about investing across the cycle and being truthful and rigorous regarding which revenue lines flow, you know, bring expense loading and which ones do not.
Mike Mayo
analystOne final brief follow-up.
Jamie Dimon
executiveMike, my sense is that we're moving at pretty much maximum speed. Suppose you truly sat down with risk — we've got credit compliance, audit, marketing, bankers, recruiters, trainers, all the same. This is simply it. As you know, at this moment we're giving everything we've got, and, as you know, our aim is to be certain we do things correctly and approach them with thought and care. Money isn't the only factor — it's the personnel, plus how many items can you alter simultaneously and respond to simultaneously.
Mike Mayo
analystOne brief follow-up on that point. The efficiency ratio you posted this quarter is, as you're aware, the smallest we've witnessed in ages. My read is you're cautioning us not to annualize this efficiency ratio, since NII is going to decline eventually. If you just take, well, you compare your firm to the cheap operators, where would you place yourself at present, and how much further can you push? Were someone to annualize what happened this quarter, you'd be creeping nearer.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYes, you put it plainly, correct? There's no way to annualize the figures we have right now. Speaking more widely, regarding measuring our firm against the cheap operators, that touches on a subject that has held your attention for quite a while, namely every bit of the spending we're making on technology so as to boost scalability generally and shift a greater portion of our cost structure toward, as you know, variable rather than fixed when it comes to how we handle volumes. That accounts for a major share of why we're making the outlays we're making in modernization and cloud and AI and every one of the things we've discussed frequently. We honestly feel quite confident about our efficiency as a company, yet there is unquestionably space to get better.
Mike Mayo
analystOkay. Thanks very much.
Steven Chubak
analystHello, and thanks for fielding this. Sorry about those technical problems before. I'd like to ask about the deposit outlook. There are indications that the recent liquidity reduction has come mostly from RRP rather than from industry deposits. I just want to hear your thinking on what you anticipate for deposit growth during the back half, for your firm and also for the wider industry, particularly once Treasury issuance starts accelerating in earnest.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYes, that's a solid question, Steve. I'll make a few points on it. Clearly, our deposit figures have fluctuated somewhat, reflecting the turbulence we witnessed among regional banks and, of course, the First Republic transaction. If you take our end-of-period deposits for this quarter and extend that forward, our core view is that a modest downward trend would resume from this elevated starting point, largely because QT is working its way through the system. Though we do hold some hope that share gains will offset this. For instance, in consumer, some of our branch expansion markets are maturing, so share is rising there. In wholesale, we've clearly put substantial investment into products and services, and we believe our offerings are compelling enough to help us win mandates, so there may be some share offsets there too. Overall, our core view stays the same: modest deposit declines throughout the franchise. On top of that, you're observing what we've observed too — once we moved past the debt ceiling and the TGA build, that build took effect, and a great deal of bill issuance followed. There's a major question in the market about whether that would drain reserves or drain RRP; thus far, with the bulk of the TGA build — I believe their target is 600 and they're sitting at 550 or so, meaning they're nearly finished — a larger portion than some had feared has drained from RRP. As you point out, that strikes me as a fairly positive signal and shows how the system functions better when there's an ample supply of short-dated collateral at the front end of the yield curve. That entire RRP, TGA bank, reserve dynamic will remain significant, but it's encouraging to see RRP declining somewhat.
Steven Chubak
analystThat's useful context. Now, turning to card income as a follow-up: you know, the top line was pretty quiet this quarter. Could you break down where the pressure is coming from — and more precisely, what portion of that drag ties to FAS 91 as opposed to other drivers?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah. Honestly, Steve, that card income figure is somewhat of a one-time situation. This quarter we had a reward liability adjustment — a fairly technical item — so it's only a short-lived headwind; on top of that, the quarter-over-quarter comparison is also being weighed down by a modest favorable one-off in the earlier period. Of course, you know, I realize you all track it, but card income isn't really something we focus on all that heavily ourselves.
Steven Chubak
analystCould you put a number on how much the reward liability affected things?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveWhy not have Michael hand you those figures? The amount isn't all that large, though it's sufficient to make the sequential figure appear slightly off.
Steven Chubak
analystGreat. Thanks for taking my questions.
Glenn Schorr
analystThank you. I'd like to pick up where we left off regarding the discussion about pricing power, since your position has remained steady throughout: your capacity to maintain pricing strength is constrained by how competitive the market is. So my question would be, if that's not going to change at this moment, at what point will it? What I mean is, so much has shifted among institutions, among European banks, among regional banks. It seems to me certain segments would exist where you'd be both more capable and more inclined to raise prices. Perhaps you could connect that to what you said in the press release regarding which significant, which tangible effects on markets and end users you mean when you discuss significant regulatory changes? Thanks a lot.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveSure. So look, regarding pricing power, you're right; it truly varies by product, and it varies based on how competitive things are from one bank to another. So it's extremely granular, it's extremely specific to each product; and, you know, sometimes, we'll possess greater pricing power than we do in other situations. I believe the broad message we're attempting to convey regarding Basel III endgame is simply that, you know, like, we consider the capital increases to be too large. It creates pressure on returns when all else is held constant. That clearly creates pressure on us to raise prices wherever possible. That tends to be harmful for the real economy, and precisely how all of that unfolds across various products and services has yet to be determined. Importantly, since we don't actually have the proposal yet. We need those details. I'm sorry, Glenn, I forgot the second half of your question. What was it?
Glenn Schorr
analystHonestly, I believe you already covered that point, so I'll simply ask something connected as a follow-up. That idea of private credit handling big traditional investment-grade lending — it could be one piece of the competitive picture that caps how much you can raise pricing. In Jamie's letter, you discussed the drawbacks — or rather, my question is: what goes wrong if a greater share of the mortgage credit asset-backed intermediation business shifts away from the banking system?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveWell, I suppose that hinges on what you'd call a drawback, but my view is that, from society's standpoint, recent history shows us that whenever home lending takes place beyond the regulated perimeter, and conditions turn sour, whenever economic downturns arrive, the result is poor outcomes for individuals, for homeowners, and for society overall. Jamie has written about that topic at length. On top of that, from a financial standpoint, we've discussed how mortgage lending — the swings in profitability, clearly, follow a fairly cyclical pattern, and lately it has actually delivered quite strong profits, before becoming less so. For instance, the correspondent channel is right now recovering somewhat. Margins there are thin. It's difficult, and raising capital requirements makes it tougher still; that turns into one of those spots where you face the tension between remixing and pricing power that came up moments ago. It could, in reality, result in us doing less — meaning reduced credit for homeowners and greater regulatory risk as that activity migrates beyond the perimeter.
Glenn Schorr
analystAppreciate that, Jeremy.
Betsy Graseck
analystHi, good morning.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveHey there, Betsy.
Betsy Graseck
analystJeremy, I was hoping we could dig a bit deeper into what's behind the shift you described that's headed our way in the 10-Q — the one about asset sensitivity moving from liability sensitive over to asset sensitive. That's how I interpreted it, anyway. I'd just like to get a clearer picture of what's causing that?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveAbsolutely, Betsy. That figure has always presented difficulties, as you're aware. It's designed to serve as a kind of risk management gauge, though its value in that regard is somewhat constrained; when rates shift, its ability to forecast our NII path has proven inconsistent. As we examined this and worked to refine it, and as we communicated with all of you throughout this most recent rate hiking cycle, we reached the view that the disclosure's value would be greater if our modeling accounted for the impact of deposit repricing lags; that change has been made, and it produces precisely the outcome I described. It raises the EAR figure by roughly $4 billion, moving from negative $1.5 billion — approximately where it stood last quarter and where it would be this quarter absent the modification — to approximately two and a half.
Betsy Graseck
analystSo then.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveEvery standard disclaimer holds true, correct? What I'm saying is, whenever rates move by any amount, our net interest income will inevitably shift in a way that differs from what that disclosure indicates, whether for this reason or that. We certainly try our hardest to make the use.
Betsy Graseck
analystAll right. Would it be reasonable for me to view that adjustment as essentially a mark to market reflecting where things stand right now? And then, looking at the guidance you've given for the periods ahead, over the longer horizon, what you're essentially telling us is, "Listen, deposit betas are picking up speed." So as I work through the 10-Qs across, say, the coming 4 or 5 quarters, ought I to anticipate that the 2.5 figure will decline, given that the deposit betas you expect are going to keep accelerating from this point forward? I'm simply attempting to reconcile those two pieces.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYes, that's a fair question, and it's actually fairly technical. In the past, I believe the figure was put together by assuming through-the-cycle betas across every deposit category. Your idea that deposit beta acceleration would be built into that figure wouldn't have applied, because essentially terminal deposit betas would have been used, derived from the forward curve, and then applied on the basis of a 100% shock to that forward curve. What's new here is the nuance we've added: recognizing that in light of the shock, the repricing implied by the beta won't happen instantaneously, so you simply get the mathematical results of that. As for turning that into a claim about what we expect beta to be over the coming 12 months in relation to our NII guidance, that might be a step too far. I'm not certain at this point.
Charles Peabody
analystOkay, earlier you mentioned that you expect deposit betas to speed up going forward, and that this factors into the longer-term NII outlook normalizing in the mid-70s. Is that correct?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveThat's correct, though I want to be exact.
Jamie Dimon
executiveYeah.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveGo ahead, Jamie.
Jamie Dimon
executiveRight. Essentially, the answer is affirmative — assuming the upcoming cycle moves beta upward through 30, then 40, then 50, regardless of which product we're discussing, that's the delay involved. As that process genuinely unfolds, provided rates do rise, the 2.5 figure will decline gradually. Should rates fail to increase, then 2.5 could remain precisely 2.5 once more.
Betsy Graseck
analystUnderstood.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveThe point I intended to make, Betsy, is simply this: when you look at that 87 dropping to a much smaller figure, two things are baked in — internal migration, plus the possibility (and there's no guarantee of it at all) of a product-level reprice. And beyond that, clearly the way things play out shifts somewhat depending on which business segment you're in, as you go from large corporate wholesale over to consumer.
Betsy Graseck
analystOkay. All right, thank you. Appreciate it.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYep.
Matt O'Connor
analystMorning. I share your view that, down the road, consumers are going to demand greater sensitivity on deposit rates. So what do you think would actually push you to adjust your rates in a significant way? The top 2 banks, as you know, hold roughly 50% of consumer market share. Loan to deposit ratios sit at low levels. Your projection for loan growth — and I believe this applies to others too — is pretty sluggish, except perhaps in card. I understand this is just common sense, and it matches what history shows us, but there truly is a notable split between the big banks and everyone else, where the big banks simply have no need to offer much on deposits, for a whole host of reasons. What would cause you to shift that?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveUltimately, Matt, it comes down to what we hear back from the field. That means competition, plus what the field tells us. You know.
Jamie Dimon
executiveI think.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveGo ahead.
Jamie Dimon
executiveMy view is that each bank's situation differs regarding what it requires. A broad spectrum of results exists. Keep in mind, we also approach this on a city-by-city basis. The competitive landscape you face in Phoenix, Arizona differs from what you encounter in Chicago, Illinois; we offer products with high interest rates, so all of those factors combine. I wouldn't label it as either a large bank or a small one, and once everyone releases their results, you'll observe who paid somewhat more for certain things and who didn't, and so on. Personally, folks, I'd treat this as a certainty. In my opinion, that's an error. Pricing power is quite limited across the majority of our operations, and betas will rise. Consider that a given. Never in banking's entire history have we witnessed a scenario where rates failed to reach a particular level without requiring competing offerings and rates climbing via migration, direct rates, or a shift toward CDs or money market funds, and we will need to vie for that. Portions of our business already show this, while others do not.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveRight, and let me just jump in on that, Matt — it truly comes down to being the primary bank for our customers, and that, you know, sits at the heart of what we're doing.
Matt O'Connor
analystYeah. And once more, I completely concur — for institutions such as yours, we have never observed loan to deposit ratios at this depressed level. You could simply allow deposits to decline, you know, by a small amount across a fairly extended period, in order to arrive at the choice not to offer higher rates. You know, I recognize that is the compromise, that in time you will...
Jamie Dimon
executivethat is somewhat more involved, since you know, a large portion of that loans to value ratio is reduced owing to regulatory matters, LCR, capital ratios, et cetera.
Matt O'Connor
analystGot it. Okay. All right, thank you.
Jamie Dimon
executiveThanks.
Charles Peabody
analystMorning. Jeremy, on the fourth page of your deck, you present a few liquidity measures, and there has been a, well, significant worsening — or I suppose I shouldn't call it worsening — a depletion of part of that surplus liquidity, clearly, mainly for First Republic. What I want to know is how fast do you intend to restore that liquidity? Since when I look ahead to 2024, there are likely around six factors that will turn liquidity into a scarce and valuable thing to hold in excess. So my first question is: what are your intentions regarding refilling that liquidity?
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYes, Charles, I recall we discussed this somewhat at Investor Day, correct? As I mentioned during my prepared remarks, yes, we believe roughly half of the movement in the bank LCR figure comes from First Republic, while the remainder is simply the anticipated, you know, decline in deposits across the system flowing into our HQLA balances within the bank LCR ratio. All of that is completely as anticipated, and so, I'd say the refilling idea isn't right. Actually, clearly, we continue to hold plenty of liquidity; now, if you wish to extrapolate trends into the future, that's another matter, but, you know, that's essentially what banking involves; we'll make adjustments as needed regarding our mix of assets and liabilities, among various products, and to secure, you know, adherence to the ratios and fortress balance sheet principles, just as you'd anticipate from us.
Jamie Dimon
executiveOne more thing I'd mention: take a look at that figure right at the top of the press release — $1.4 trillion in cash and marketable securities. Suppose we burned through all of the excess; we would still be sitting at, and I have the precise figure here, $1.2 trillion. My view is that we hold excess liquidity, and the liquidity ratio is a somewhat separate matter. In my judgment, the system contains ample liquidity, and naturally, there are several levers we could pull to alter this literally overnight should we choose to.
Charles Peabody
analystUnderstood. As a follow-up tied to that, suppose you look at your $87 billion NII projection for this year — that suggests at least one quarter of roughly $22 billion in NII — and then suppose you look at your eventual mid $70 billion NII estimate at some future point, that suggests at least one quarter of $18 billion in NII. That's roughly an 18% decline. Assuming the balance sheet stays constant, what you're describing is a 30 basis point decline in your margin, your NIM, to move from $22 billion down to $18 billion. So what's actually causing it? Is deposits truly the main factor, or are you considering interest reversals as credit quality worsens, or is it liquidity being rebuilt? I'm only attempting to understand better which effect is largest.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveYeah. Hey, Charlie, I'd view that as essentially entirely a deposit issue. It simply isn't all that complex, correct? I believe we did this, I think either during the fourth quarter or during the first quarter, when we included a small chart on a page, in very plain terms, showing what the dollar effects are of, say, a 10 basis point shift in deposit rate paid in terms of NII run rate. Whether that comes from migration out of lower yielding into higher yielding — moving from 0% to a 4% CD clearly has a large effect on margin — or whether it's because savings reprices, fairly modest rate movements there amount to quite a lot of money when you have, say, a couple trillion dollars of deposits. It really isn't any more complex than that. That's why we're being so forceful about reminding people about what we expect that spread rate to be.
Charles Peabody
analystThank you.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveThank you very much.
Jeremy Barnum
executiveThank you for tonight.
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